CONFLICT AND CONQUEST IN THE ISLAMIC WORLD

A HISTORICAL ENCYCLOPEDIA

VOLUME 1

ALEXANDER MIKABERIDZE

Conflict and Conquest in the Islamic World

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A HISTORICAL ENCYCLOPEDIA

Volume I

Alexander Mikaberidze, Editor

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Agha Muhammad Khan Qajar
Ahmad Bey of Tunis
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Ibn Saud
Ibrahim Pasha

Idris Alawma
Ismail, Khedive
Ismail, Mawlay
Ismail, Shah (Safavid)
Ismet Inonu

Jalal al-Din
Jawhar

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Karim Khan Zand
Kemal Reis
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Nadir Shah
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Shamil
Sher Khan Suri
Suleiman the Magnificent
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Tangiers, Treaty of (1844)
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Preface

Conception and Genesis

Conflict and Conquest in the Islamic World: A Historical Encyclopedia was conceived to fill a large gap on the reference book shelf. Its goal is to serve as a single title dealing with the military–political history of the Islamic world. In recent years, the rising demand for accessible knowledge about Islam has produced many encyclopedias and dictionaries on various aspects of Islamic history. Most of them deal with cultural, social, or political topics and concentrate on Islam in the modern world. There are plenty of reference works on military history, but they largely omit the rich tapestry of the military–political history of the Islamic world and concentrate on the practices and experiences of the Western world. So people interested in the military history of the Islamic world are left with few choices except to consult general reference works or encyclopedias and dictionaries devoted to European military history, which only give a fragmented picture of Islamic experiences. Specialist reference works are numerous and they—most notably the famous *Encyclopedia of Islam*—do offer more detailed and technical articles about various aspects of Islam from pre-Islamic times to the present, but they are also less available and accessible to a general audience.

So the main purpose of the present encyclopedia is to provide a useful and convenient reference source on the major conflicts that have influenced the course of history in the Islamic world since the seventh century. We must stress that this title does not embrace, promote, or in any way encourage the misperception that there is something intrinsic in Islam as a religion that engenders acts of violence and terrorism. The word "Islam," a verbal noun meaning submission (to God) is etymologically related to the word "salaam," meaning peace. We believe that, like any other religion, be it Christianity, Judaism, Hinduism, or Buddhism, Islam is a peaceful religion, and the source of violence lies not in its teachings but rather in the intricacies of human behavior that are influenced by a variety of factors (e.g., environmental, economic, social, or political) that compel humans to commit acts of violence using religion as a cover.

Conflict and Conquest in the Islamic World is a group enterprise that draws on military historians and experts in the field of Islamic history to present clear and accurate historical information on major and minor wars, revolts and rebellions, political events, prominent political and military personalities, armed groups, and so on that shaped Islamic civilization. It presents in two volumes some 625 alphabetically arranged articles contributed by leading military and political historians. The alphabetical and thematic ordering of articles will enable readers to locate topics of interest quickly. A chronology of some 250 conflicts provides a quick overview of the entire span of Islamic history, and a glossary that lists commonly used Islamic military terms will enable general readers to determine quickly the meaning of less familiar terms.

Audience

This encyclopedia was written with high school and college students in mind, but we hope it will also be of benefit to a general audience interested in the subject and to university and secondary-school teachers seeking a better understanding of a concrete event or personality. With this goal in mind, we decided to avoid specialized academic vocabulary and use clear and accessible narrative. Because readers can easily get confused by technical terms and diacritical marks on words borrowed from Arabic and Persian, we decided to minimize the diacritical marks on loanwords from Arabic, Persian, Turkish, and other Islamic languages. We also chose not to use the Muslim calendar, which began in 622 when the Prophet Muhammad and his followers made the *hijra* or "migration" from Mecca to Medina. Many specialist titles use the abbreviation A.H. for *anno Hejirae*, denoting years of the Muslim calendar. The Muslim calendar is based on the cycles of the moon and has no fixed relationship to dates of the Gregorian calendar or to seasons of the year. For simplicity's sake, we converted all dates into Gregorian calendar, which is more familiar to the target audience.

Scope

It is impossible to cover all aspects of Islamic military and political history in a two-volume reference. Thus, this work is selective by nature, but in choosing entries we sought to cover a wide geographic and chronological range, which, as expected, meant omitting some entries. We are well aware of this imperfection but hope it will not detract from the overall value of the book. We tried to focus on Muslim military and political personalities who are oftentimes overshadowed by their Western counterparts. Therefore, we sought to exclude Western personalities whose biographical details can be easily gleaned in existing reference works. The

encyclopedia covers the entire span of Islamic history starting with the Prophet Muhammad's campaigns in the seventh century and ending with the most recent events in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. Geographically, the encyclopedia deals with a vast territory spanning the Iberian Peninsula, North Africa, the Middle East, South and Southeast Asia, and parts of Sub-Saharan Africa.

Acknowledgments

Every book is a result of collective effort, and I am grateful to many persons for their support. Bernard Lewis, the doyen of Islamic studies, was gracious in his encouragement when the manuscript was still in its infancy. The encyclopedia features entries from more than 160 contributors, and I am grateful to them for their commitment and dedication to this initiative. I am thankful to the members of the editorial board for their recommendations. This work would not have been possible without the abiding enthusiasm of Pat Carlin, acquisitions editor at ABC-CLIO, who quickly saw a potential in this title, and editors John Wagner and Andrew McCormick, who shepherded it through the development process. On a personal level, this book could not have been written without the help and support of my family and friends. I extend my love and thanks to all of them, but especially to my wife, Anna, who while pregnant tolerated long lonely nights as I toiled on this manuscript. I dedicate this book to our newborn son Luka George.

Alexander Mikaberidze

Chronological List of Major Conflicts and Battles in the Islamic World from the Seventh Century to the Present

1. Campaigns of the Prophet Muhammad
    a. Badr, 624
    b. Uhud, 625
    c. Medina, 627
    d. Khaybar, 628
    e. Mecca, 630
2. Muslim Conquest of Syria
    a. Muta, 629
    b. Ajnadin, Bosra, Marj Rahit, Wadi al-Arabah, Yarmuk, 634
    c. Damascus, Fihl, Marj as-Suffar, 635. Yarmuk, 636
    d. Jerusalem, 638. Aleppo, 639
3. Sino-Muslim Conflict (eighth century)
    a. Talas, 751
4. Muslim Civil Wars
    a. Buzakha, Dhu al Quassa, 632
    b. Akraba, 633
    c. Camel, 656
    d. Siffin, 657
    e. Karbala, 680
    f. Harra, Mecca, Medina, 683
    g. Marj Rahit, 684
    h. Mecca, 692
    i. Dayr al Jamajm, Maskin, 701
    j. Akra, 721

   k. Aqua Portora, 742
   l. Ain Diar, 744
   m. Karbala, 749
   n. Zab, 750
   o. Medina, 762
   p. Bakhamra, 763

5. Muslim Conquest of Iraq
   a. Hafir (Iraq), Hira, Mazar, Ullais, Walaja, 633
   b. Ain Tamar, Babylon (Iraq), Bridge, Firadz, Nimaraq, 634
   c. Buwayb, 635
   d. Qadisiyya, 636
   e. Jalula, Madain, 637

6. Muslim Conquest of Egypt
   a. Heliopolis, Pelusium, 640
   b. Babylon (Egypt), 640–641
   c. Alexandria, 641–642

7. Muslim Conquest of Iran
   a. Nehavend, 641

8. Egyptian-Nubian War, 641–652

9. Early Byzantine-Muslim Wars
   a. Alexandria, 645
   b. Mount Phoenix, 654
   c. Amorium, 669
   d. Syllaeum, 677
   e. Sebastopolis, 692
   f. Constantinople, 717–718
   g. Adrianople, 718
   h. Akroinos, 739

10. Muslim Conquest of North Africa
   a. Sufetula, 647
   b. Biskra, 683
   c. Mams, 688
   d. Carthage (Tunisia), 697–698

11. Muslim Conquest of Spain
    a. Ecija, Guadalete, 711
    b. Merida, Segoyuela, 713
    c. Covadonga, 718
12. Muslim Conquest of Sind
    a. Raor, 712
    b. Navsari, 738
13. Muslim Invasion of France
    a. Toulouse, 721
    b. Bordeaux, Poitiers/Tours, 732
14. Byzantine-Muslim Wars
    a. Hadath, 778–779
    b. Samalu, 780
    c. Nicomedia, 782
    d. Crasus, 805
    e. Heraclea (Anatolia), 806
    f. Syracuse, 827–828
    g. Palermo, 830–831
    h. Amorium, Dazimon, 838
    i. Messina, 843
    j. Ostia, 849
    k. Castrogiovanni, 859
    l. Poson, 863
    m. Bari, 871
    n. Syracuse, 877–878
    o. Taormina, 902
15. Muslim War of Succession
    a. Baghdad, 809–811
16. Shiite Rebellion, 814–819
17. Zanj Slave Rebellion
    a. Al-Mukhtara, 883
18. Christian-Muslim Wars in Spain
    a. San Esteban de Gormaz, 918
    b. Val-de-Junquera, 920

c. Sanguesa, 924
d. Simancas, 939

19. Sack of Mecca
    a. Mecca, 930
20. Muslim Civil War, 936–944
21. Muslim Civil War, 945–948
22. Later Byzantine-Muslim Wars
    a. Crete, 961
    b. Aleppo, 962
    c. Adana, 964
    d. Tarsus, 965
    e. Aleppo, Antioch (Syria), 969
    f. Amida, 973
    g. Azaz, 1030
    h. Edessa, 1031
    i. Rometta, 1038
23. Muslim Civil War, 968–978
24. Later Christian-Muslim Wars in Spain
    a. Rueda, 981
    b. Calatanazar, 1002
25. Muslim Conquest of Northern India
    a. Lamghan, 989
    b. Peshawar, 1001
    c. Bhera, Waihand, 1006
    d. Waihand, 1008
    e. Thaneswar, 1011
    f. Sharwa, 1019
    g. Somnath, 1026
    h. Hansi, 1037–1038
26. Afghan Wars of Succession
    a. Ghazni, 998
    b. Fatehabad, 1041

27. Dynastic Wars in Iran and Central Asia (10th-11th centuries)
    a. Merv, 999
    b. Tarq, 1002
    c. Uk, 1003
    d. Balkh, 1008
    e. Hazarasp, 1017
    f. Samarkand, 1025
    g. Sarjahan, 1029
    h. Dabusiyya, 1032

28. Seljuk Wars of Expansion 11th century)
    a. Nishapur, 1037
    b. Dandanaqan, 1040
    c. Hasankale, 1048
    d. Isfahan, 1050–1051
    e. Tarq, 1051
    f. Manzikert, 1054
    g. Baghdad, 1055
    h. Rayy, 1059
    i. Kufah, 1060

29. Early Christian Reconquest (Reconquista) of Spain (11th-13th centuries)
    a. Graus, 1063
    b. Coimbra (Portugal), 1064
    c. Cabra, 1079
    d. Almenar, 1082
    e. Ebro, 1084
    f. Toledo (Spain), 1084–1085
    g. Zallaka, 1086
    h. Almodovar del Rio, 1091
    i. Cuarte, Valencia (Valencia), 1093–1094
    j. Alcoraz, 1096
    k. Bairen, 1097
    l. Mollerusa, 1102
    m. Uclés, 1108

n. Valtierra, 1110
o. Saragossa, 1118
p. Cutanda, 1120
q. Arinsol, 1126
r. Cullera, 1129
s. Fraga, 1134
t. Tortosa, 1148
u. Alarcos, 1195
v. Las Navas de Tolosa, 1212
w. Cordova, 1236
x. Seville, 1248

30. First Crusade (1096–1099)
    a. Civetot, Wieselburg, Xerigordon, 1096
    b. Albara, Antioch (Syria), Dorylaeum, Heraclea (Anatolia), Nicaea, Tarsus, 1097
    c. Antioch (Syria), 1097–1098
    d. Arqa, Edessa, Harenc, Jerusalem, Maarat an-Numan, Orontes, 1098
    e. Ascalon, Jerusalem, 1099

31. Crusader-Muslim Wars (12th century)
    a. Melitene, 1100
    b. Heraclea (Anatolia), Mersivan, Ramleh, 1101
    c. Joppa, Ramleh, Tripoli (Lebanon), 1102
    d. Acre, Harran, 1104
    e. Artah, Ramleh, 1105
    f. Khabar, 1107
    g. Menbij, 1108
    h. Tripoli (Lebanon), 1109
    i. Beirut, Sidon, 1110
    j. Tyre, 1110–1111
    k. Tel-Danith, 1115
    l. Antioch (Syria), 1119
    m. Ascalon, 1123
    n. Tyre, 1124
    o. Azaz, 1125

p. Anazarbus, 1130
q. Edessa, 1144
r. Edessa, 1146
s. Inab, 1149
t. Ascalon, 1153
u. Baniyas, Mallaha, 1157
v. Artah, 1164
w. Montgisard, 1177
x. Baniyas, 1179

32. Georgian-Seljuk Wars (11th-13th centuries)
    a. Partskhisi, 1075
    b. Ertsukhi, 1104
    c. Didgori, 1121
    d. Shamkhor, 1195
    e. Basian, 1202
33. Christian Reconquest (Reconquista) of Portugal (12th-13th century)
    a. Ourique, 1139
    b. Lisbon, Santarem, 1147
    c. Alcacer do Sol, 1158
    d. Alcacer do Sol, 1217
34. Wars of the Great Saljuk Sultanate (12th century)
    a. Samarkand, 1141
    b. Balkh, 1153
    c. Shahr Rey, 1194
35. Second Crusade
    a. Dorylaeum, 1147
    b. Damascus, 1148
    c. Mopsuestia, 1152
36. Ghor-Ghazni Wars
    a. Ghazni, 1148
    b. Ghazni, 1151
37. Crusader Invasion of Egypt
    a. Alexandria, El Ashmunien, 1167
    b. Damietta, 1169

38. Later Muslim Conquest of Northern India
    a. Gujarat (India), 1178
    b. Taraori, 1191
    c. Taraori, 1192
    d. Chandwar, 1194
39. Third Crusade
    a. Cresson, Hattin, Jerusalem, Tyre, 1187
    b. Acre, 1189–1191
    c. Arsouf, 1191
    d. Joppa, 1192
40. Fourth Crusade
    a. Sidon, 1196. Joppa, 1198. Zara, 1202
    b. Constantinople, 1203–1204
41. Conquests of Chinggis (Genghis) Khan
    a. Jand, Kashgar, 1218. Otrar, 1219–1220
    b. Bokhara, Hamadan, Khojend, Samarkand, 1220
    c. Bamian, Gurganj, Indus, Merv, Nishapur, Parwan, Durrah, 1221. Herat, 1221–1222. Kuban, 1222
    d. Kalka, 1223
42. Ghor-Khwarezm War
    a. Andkhui, 1205
43. Wars of the Delhi Sultanate
    a. Taraori, 1216
    b. Kaithal, 1240
    c. Deogiri, 1294
    d. Deogiri, 1307
    e. Warangal, 1309–1310
    f. Deogiri, 1318
    g. Warangal, 1322–1323
    h. Godaveri, 1326
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    a. Adiliya, 1218
    b. Damietta, 1218–1219
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    a. Garni, 1225
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    h. Tripoli (Lebanon), 1289
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47. Mongol Invasions of India
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    b. Jalandhar, 1298
    c. Kili, 1299
    d. Amroha, 1305
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48. Mongol Conquest of Asia Minor
    a. Kose Dagh, 1243

49. Seventh Crusade
    a. Ashmoun Canal, Damietta, 1249
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50. Mongol Invasion of the Middle East
    a. Alamut, 1256
    b. Anbar, Baghdad, 1258
    c. Ayn Jalut, Aleppo, 1260
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51. Mongol Dynastic Wars
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52. Eighth Crusade
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    a. Algeciras, Almeria, 1309
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    a. Syni Vody, 1362
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c. Maritza, Samokov, 1371
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g. Rovine, 1395
h. Nicopolis (Bulgaria), 1396

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    a. Alexandria, 1365
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    a. Tashkent, 1365
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    e. Syr Darya, 1389
    f. Kunduzcha, 1391
    g. Shiraz, 1393
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    k. Aleppo, Baghdad, 1400
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75. Russian-Volga Tatar Wars
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    j. Eger, Temesvar, 1552
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   o. Sissek, Veszprem, 1593
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151. French Revolutionary Wars (Middle East)
    a. Alexandria, Malta, Nile, Pyramids, Sediman, Shubra Khit, 1798
    b. Aboukir, Acre, Aswan, Cape Carmel, El Arish, Jaffa, Mount Tabor, Er Ridisiya, Samhud, 1799
    c. Heliopolis, 1800
    d. Aboukir, Alexandria, Cairo, Mandora, 1801

152. Tripolitan War
    a. Tripoli, 1803
    b. Tripoli, 1804
    c. Derna, 1805

153. Russo-Iranian Wars
    a. Echmiadzin, 1804
    b. Akhalkalaki, 1810
    c. Aslanduz, 1812
    d. Lenkoran, 1813
    e. Shamkhor, Shusha, Yelizavetpol, 1826
    f. Abbasabad, Echmiadzin, Erivan, 1827

154. First Serbian Rising
    a. Ivanovatz, 1805
    b. Misar, 1806
    c. Belgrade, 1807
    d. Nish, 1809
    e. Loznitza, Varvarin, 1810

155. Russo-Ottoman War
    a. Lemnos, 1807
    b. Silistria, 1809
    c. Batin, Silistria, 1810
    d. Loftche, 1810–1811
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156. Russo-Ottoman War
    a. Akhaltsikhe, Kars, Varna, 1828
    b. Adrianople, Kulevcha, Sliven, 1829

157. Anglo-Arab Wars
    a. Ras al-Khaimah, 1809
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158. Ottoman-Wahhabi War
    a. Hejaz, 1812–1813
159. Afghan-Sikh Wars
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160. Algerine War
    a. Cabo de Gata, 1815
161. Corsair Wars
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162. Iranian-Afghan Wars
    a. Kafir Qala, 1818
    b. Herat, 1837–1838
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163. Ottoman-Iranian War in Azerbaijan
    a. Erzurum, 1821
    b. Khoi, 1822
164. Greek War of Independence
    a. Dragasani, Eressos, Galaxidi, Monemvasia, Navarino, Sekou, Thermopylae, Tripolitza, Valtesti, Vasilika, Vrachori, 1821
    b. Acropolis, Nauplia, 1821–1822

c. Chios, Devernaki, Peta, Stura, 1822
d. Missolonghi, 1822–1823
e. Anatoliko, Karpenision, 1823
f. Bodrum, Kasos, Psara, Samos, 1824
g. Krommydi, Lerna, Maniaki, Navarino, Sphakteria, Trikorpha, 1825
h. Missolonghi, 1825–1826
i. Arachova, Chaidari, Klissova, 1826
j. Acropolis, 1826–1827
k. Analatos, Distomo, Navarino, 1827

165. French Conquest of Algeria
    a. Algiers, 1830
    b. Macta, Mascara, 1835
    c. Constantine, 1836–1837
    d. Smala, 1843
    e. Isly, 1844

166. First Turko-Egyptian War
    a. Acre, 1831–1832
    b. Belen, Homs, Konya, 1832

167. Russian Conquest of the Caucasus
    a. Aghdash Awkh, 1831
    b. Gimrah, 1832
    c. Akhulgo, Burtinah, 1839
    d. Darghiyya, 1842
    e. Darghiyya, 1845
    f. Girgil, Saltah, 1847
    g. Zakataly, 1853
    h. Gunib, 1859

168. Second Turko-Egyptian War
    a. Nezib, 1839
    b. Acre, Beirut, 1840

169. First British-Afghan War
    a. Ali Masjid, Ghazni, Kalat, 1839
    b. Bamian, Kahan, Parwan Durrah, 1840

c. Bemaru, Charikar, Tezin, 1841
d. Jalalabad, Kabul, Kandahar, 1841–1842
e. Ali Masjid, 1842
f. Babi Wali Kotal, Ghoaine, Haikalzai, Jagdalak, Maidan, Tezin, 1842

170. Ottoman-Montenegran Wars
a. Ostrog, 1853
b. Grahovo, 1858
c. Piva, 1861
d. Rijeka, 1862

171. Anglo-Iranian War
a. Bushire, Reshire, 1856
b. Khoosh-Ab, Mohammerah, 1857

172. Spanish-Moroccan War
a. Castillejos, Guad-el-Ras, Tetuán, 1860

173. Serbo-Ottoman Wars
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174. Later Afghan War of Succession
a. Khujbaz, 1865
b. Kabul, Sheikhabad, 1866
c. Khujbaz, Kila Alladad, 1867
d. Zurmat, 1869
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175. Russian Conquest of Central Asia
a. Tashkent, 1865
b. Bokhara, 1868.
c. Khiva, 1873
d. Khokand, 1875
e. Andizhan, 1876
f. Geok Tepe, 1879
g. Geok Tepe, 1881

176. Egyptian Wars of Expansion
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177. Egyptian-Ethiopian War
    a. Aussa, Gundet, 1875
    b. Gura, 1876
178. Serbo-Ottoman War
    a. Alexinatz, Djunis, Vucji Do, 1876
179. Russo-Ottoman War
    a. Aladja Dagh, Ardahan, Gorni-Dubnik, Kars, Kizil-Tepe, Loftche, Mount St. Nicholas, Nicopolis (Bulgaria), Orchanie, Pelischat, Plevna, Shipka Pass, Stara Zagora, Svistov, Tahir, Yahni, Zivin, 1877
    b. Erzurum, 1877–1878
    c. Plovdiv, Senova, Tashkessan, 1878
180. Austro-Ottoman War in Bosnia
    a. Sarajevo, 1878
181. Second British-Afghan War
    a. Ali Masjid, Peiwar Kotal, 1878
    b. Charasia, Fatehabad, Kabul, Sherpur (Afghanistan), 1879
    c. Ahmad Khel, Kandahar, Maiwand, Urzu, 1880
182. Afghan Civil Wars
    a. Kandahar, 1881
    b. Ghaznigak, 1888
183. Arabia's Egyptian Rebellion
    a. Alexandria, Kassassin, Tel-el-Kebir, Tel-el-Maskhuta, 1882
184. British-Sudan Wars
    a. El Obeid, Tokar, 1883
    b. El Teb, Sinkat, Tamai, 1884
    c. Khartoum, 1884–1885
    d. Abu Klea, Abu Kru, Ginniss, Hashin, Kirkeban, Tofrek, 1885
    e. Gemaizeh, Handoub, 1888
    f. Toski, 1889
    g. Tokar, 1891
    h. Firket, Hafir, 1896
    i. Abu Hamed, 1897
    j. Atbara, Dakhila, Gedaref, Omdurman, 1898
    k. Um Diwaykarat, 1899

185. Russo-Afghan War
    a. Penjdeh, 1885
186. Sudanese-Ethiopian War
    a. Kufit, 1885
    b. Debra Sina, 1887
    c. Gallabat, 1889
187. Saudi-Rashidi Wars
    a. Riyadh, 1887
    b. Mulaydah, 1891
    c. Dilam, Riyadh, 1902
    d. Bukairiya, Unayzah, 1904
    e. Rawdhat al Muhanna, 1906
    f. Jirab, 1915
    g. Kinzan, 1915
    h. Hail, 1921
188. First Greco-Ottoman War
    a. Domokos, Mati, Nezeros, Pharsalus, Velestino, Vigla, 1897
189. French Colonial Wars in North Africa
    a. Ingosten, 1899
    b. In Rhar, In Salah, 1900
    c. Charouine, Timimoun, 1901
    d. Tit, 1902
    e. El Moungar, Taghit, 1903
    f. Casablanca, Taddert, Wadi Kiss, 1907
    g. Bou Denib, Bou Nouala, Djorf, El Menabba, R'Fakha, Settat, Wadi M'Koun, 1908
    h. Fez, 1911
    i. Fez, Sidi Ben Othman, 1912
    j. El Ksiba, 1913
    k. El Herri, Khenifra, 1914
    l. Sidi Sliman, 1915
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190. Wars of the Mad Mullah
    a. Ferdiddin, Samala, 1901
    b. Erego, 1902

c. Daratoleh, Gumburu, 1903
d. Illig, Jidballi, 1904
e. Dul Madoba, 1913
f. OK Pass, 1919
g. Baran, Galiabur, Taleh, 1920

191. Italo-Ottoman War
a. Ain Zara, Benghazi, Sidi El Henni, Sidi Mesri, Tripoli (Libya), 1911
b. Dardanelles, Derna, Two Palms, Zanzur, 1912

192. First Balkan War
a. Chataldja, Jannitsa, Kirk Kilissa, Kumanovo, Luleburgaz, Monastir, Sarandáporon, 1912
b. Adrianople, Jannina, Scutari, 1912–1913
c. Bizani, 1913

193. Saudi-Ottoman War
a. Hofuf, 1913

194. World War I (Caucasus Front)
a. Sarikamish, 1914–1915
b. Karakilise, Malazgirt, 1915
c. Bayburt, Bitlis, Erzincan, Erzurum, Koprukoy Trebizond, 1916
d. Baku, Sardarapat, 1918

195. World War I (Mesopotamia)
a. Qurna, Sahil, 1914
b. Ahwaz, Amara, Ctesiphon, Kut-al-Amara, Nasiriya, Shaiba, Umm-at-Tubal, 1915
c. Kut-al-Amara, 1915–1916
d. Dujaila, Hanna, Khanikin, Sannaiyat, Sheik Sa'ad, Wadi, 1916
e. Baghdad, Istabulat, Kut-al-Amara, Mushahida, Ramadi, 1917
f. Khan Baghdadi, Sharqat, 1918

196. World War I (Middle East)
a. Suez Canal, 1915
b. Agagia, Beringia, Guiba, Hejaz, Jeddah, Katia, Magdhaba, Rafa, Romani, Taif, Yanbu, 1916
c. Medina, 1916–1919

d. Aqaba, Beersheba, El Mughar, Gaza, Huj, Jerusalem, Sheria, Siwa, Tel el Ful, Wejh, 1917

e. Abu Tellul, Aleppo, Amman, Damascus, Dera, Es Salt, Jericho, Jisr Benat, Maan, Megiddo, Tafileh, Yakub, 1918

197. World War I (Gallipoli)

a. Anzac, Baby 700, Chunuk Bair, Dardanelles, Dardanelles Narrows, Eski Hissarlik, Hill 60 (Gallipoli), Krithia, Kum Kale, Lone Pine, Sari Bair, Scimitar Hill, Suvla Bay, 1915

b. Gallipoli, Helles, 1915–1916

198. Waziristan Campaign

a. Palosina, 1919

b. Ahnai Tangi, Aka Khel, Barari Tangi, 1920

199. Saudi-Hashemite Wars

a. Turabah, 1919

b. Taif, 1924

c. Medina, 1925

200. French Occupation of Syria

a. Maisalun, 1920

201. Iraqi Revolt

a. Jarbuiyah, Kufah, Rumaithah, Rustumiyah, Samawah, Tel Afar, 1920

202. Saudi-Kuwait War

a. Hamad, Jahrah, 1920

203. Second Greco-Turkish War

a. Eskisehir, Inönü, Sakarya, 1921

b. Afyon, Bursa, Smyrna, 1922

204. Afghan Reformist War

a. Kabul, 1929

205. Saudi-Yemeni War

a. Hudayda, 1934

206. First Indo-Pakistan War

a. Bhatgiran, Shalateng, Uri, 1947

b. Poonch, 1947–1948

c. Leh, Skardu, Zojila, 1948

207. Arab-Israeli Sinai War
    a. Abu Ageila, Gaza, Mitla Pass, Rafa, Straits of Tiran, 1956
208. Suez Crisis
    a. Port Said, 1956
209. First Sudanese Civil War
210. Algerian War
    a. Algiers, 1956–1957
    b. Frontier, Souk-Ahras, 1958
    c. Kabylie, 1959
211. Second Indo-Pakistan War
    a. Buttar Dograndi, Chawinda, Chhamb, Haji Pir, Khem Karan, Lahore, Phillora, Sialkot, 1965
212. Dhofar Rebellion in Oman (1962–1975)
213. Arab-Israeli Six Day War (1967)
    a. Abu Ageila, Bir Gafgafa, Gaza, Golan Heights, Jebel Libni, Jenin, Jerusalem, Mitla Pass, Nablus, Rafa, 1967
214. Yemeni Civil Wars
    a. Sanaa, 1967–1968
    b. Aden, 1986
    c. Aden, 1994
215. Arab-Israeli Border Wars
    a. Karama, 1968
216. Third Indo-Pakistan War
    a. Chhamb, Dacca, Garibpur, Karachi, Longewala, Shakargarh, 1971
217. Arab-Israeli Yom Kippur War
    a. Chinese Farm, Golan Heights, Latakia, Mount Hermon, Suez Canal, 1973
218. Turkish Invasion of Cyprus
    a. Kyrenia, 1974
219. Lebanon Civil War
    a. Tel-el-Zataar, 1976
    b. Beirut, 1978
    c. Zahle, 1981

d. Beirut, 1982
e. Beirut, 1990

220. Soviet War in Afghan, 1978–1989
    a. Herat, Kabul, 1978
    b. Kabul, 1979
    c. Panjshir Valley, 1982
    d. Ali Kheyl, Panjshir Valley, 1984
    e. Khost, Parrot's Beak, 1985
    f. Zhawar, 1986
    g. Jalalabad, 1989
221. Libyan-Egyptian War, 1977
222. Ogaden War between Somalia and Ethiopia, 1977–1978
223. Iranian Revolution, 1978–1979
224. Iraq-Iran War, 1980–1988
    a. Abadan, Ahwaz, Khorramshahr, Susangerd, 1980
    b. Abadan, Susangerd, 1981
    c. Basra, Khorramshahr, Mandali, Musian, 1982
    d. Amara, Haj Omran, Mehran, Panjwin, 1983
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    g. Al Faw, Mehran, 1986
    h. Basra, Suleimaniya, 1987
    i. Al Faw, Halabja, Mehran, Salamcheh, 1988
225. Second Sudanese Civil War, 1983–2005
226. Al-Anfal Campaign in Iraq, 1986–1989
227. Libyan-Chad War, 1986–1987
    a. Erdi, 1986
    b. Zouar, 1986–1987
    c. Aozou, Fada, Maaten-as-Sarra, Ouadi Doum, 1987
228. Mauritania-Senegal Border War, 1989–1991
229. First Gulf War
    a. Kuwait, 1990
    b. As-Salman, Baghdad, Bubiyan, Desert Storm, Khafji, Kuwait, Wadi al-Batin, 1991

230. Somali Civil War, 1991–

231. Afghan Civil War
    a. Khost, 1991
    b. Kabul, 1992
    c. Kabul, 1996

232. Bosnian War
    a. Bihac, 1992–1995
    b. Sarajevo, 1992–1996
    c. Mostar, 1993–1994
    d. Srebrenica, 1993–1995
    e. Gorazde, 1994–1995

233. Nagorno-Karabakh War, 1988–1994

234. Tajikistan Civil War, 1992–1997

235. Russo-Chechen Wars, 1994–1996, 1999

236. Afghanistan War, 2001–
    a. Kabul, Kandahar, Kunduz, Mazar-i-Sharif, Qala-i-Jangi, Tora Bora, 2001

237. The Salafist GSPC Insurgency in Algeria, Morocco, and Mauritania, 2002–

238. Second Gulf War, 2003–
    a. Baghdad, Basra, Najaf, Nasiriya, Tikrit, Umm Qasr, 2003
    b. Fallujah, 2004, Siege of Sadr City (2004–2008)
    c. Basra, 2008

239. Israeli Operation Rainbow in Gaza, 2004

240. Israeli Operation Days of Penitence in Gaza, 2004

241. The Sadah Insurgency in Yemen, 2004–

242. Conflict in Northwest Pakistan, 2004–
    a. Azam Warsak, 2004
    b. Lal Masjid, 2007
    c. Swat Valley, 2007–2008
    d. South Waziristan Offensive, 2009

243. Civil War in Chad, 2005–

244. Israeli Operation Summer Rains in Gaza, 2006
245. Fatah-Hamas Conflict in Gaza, 2006
246. Israel-Lebanon Conflict, 2006
247. War in Somalia, 2006–
248. The Tuareg Insurgency, 2007–2009
249. Civil Strife in Lebanon, 2007–2008
250. Israeli Operation Hot Winter in Gaza, 2008
251. Gaza War, 2008–2009
252. South Yemen Insurgency, 2009–
253. Libyan Civil War, 2011–
254. Syrian Civil Strife, 2011–

A

Abaka (1234–1282)

Second Mongol (Ilkhan) ruler of Iran who struggled against the Mamluks of Egypt. Born in the Mongolian steppes in the spring of 1234, Abaka was the son of Hulagu and accompanied him on his conquest of Iran and Iraq in 1256–1259. After the death of his father, Abaka was elected as the Ilkhan ruler and was confirmed by the great khan. Abaka continued his father's struggle against the Mamluks of Egypt and their allies. In 1266, he built a fortified line in eastern Georgia to protect his territory from the attacks of the Golden Horde, and he campaigned against north Caucasian tribes in 1270s. Abaka sought to establish diplomatic alliances with European nations against Egypt and sent embassies to France and the Papal States in 1274 and 1277. Although he had negotiated joint operations with England, France, and the Papal States, European states failed to organize any combined action, leaving Abaka alone to face the Mamluks, who attacked his territories throughout the 1270s and routed the Ilkhan forces near Albistan in 1277. Abaka responded by invading Syria in 1280, and although he sacked Aleppo, his army suffered a major defeat between Hamat and Hims. At the same time, Abaka had to turn his attention to the east, where the Chagatai Mongols, led by Burak, raided western Afghanistan but were defeated at Herat. In early 1270s, Abaka campaigned against the Chagatai Mongols in Transoxania, sacking Bukhara in 1273, but was unable to put an end to future attacks. In 1279, the Chagatai army under Tekuder plundered eastern Iran.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Ayn Jalut, Battle of (1260); Golden Horde—Ilkhanid Wars; Homs, Battles of (1260, 1281, 1299); Hulegu; Middle East, Mongol Invasion of the (1256–1280).

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Abbas Mirza (1789–1833)

The eldest son of Fath Ali Shah, Abbas Mirza led military reforms in the Iranian army, which he also commanded in Russo-Iranian Wars. When he was 10 years old, Abbas Mirza became the governor (*beylerbeyi*) of the province of Azerbaijan, where he ruled as crown prince and heir (*na'ib al-saltana*) to the Qajar throne until 1831. When war broke out between Russia and Iran in 1804, he was given command of the Iranian army, which he led on a disastrous campaign against the Russians, suffering a series of defeats at Gumry, Kalagiri, at the Aras (Araxes) and Zagam rivers (1805); Karakapet (1806); Karababa (1808); Ganja (1809); Meghri, the Aras River, and Akhalkalaki (1810); and Aslanduz (1812).

The war resulted in Iran's loss of most southeast Caucasia and convinced Abbas Mirza of the need for military reforms. He believed that introducing European-style regiments would enable Iran to gain upper hand over Russia and reclaim lost territory. Influenced by Sultan Selim III's reform, Abbas Mirza set out to create an Iranian version of the Ottoman *nizam-i cedid* troops and reduce the Qajar dependence on tribal and provincial forces. After the war, he began sending students to Europe to learn Western tactics and employed British and French officers (and a few renegade Russian officers) to raise and drill troops; the number of foreign instructors particularly increased after the end of the Napoleonic Wars, when many unemployed European officers traveled far afield in search of positions. He established a printing press to translate and publish European military textbooks. He built a gunpowder factory and an artillery foundry in Tabriz. He also tried to introduce a new recruitment system to create a more predictable supply of labor and to make himself independent of the local elite. In the new bunichah system, Abbas Mirza put in place a form of conscription under which each province was called upon to provide recruits, the number calculated on the basis of the amount of land under cultivation, supplemented by voluntary enlistment and incorporation of small tribal contingents. Abbas Mirza had to overcome public resistance to reforms, as the general population and the ulama disliked the changes, the European appearance of the new regiments, and the presence of infidel instructors. Although he received British subsidies to defray the cost of military reforms, training and equipping new regiments proved very expensive, which affected the Qajar finances.

The reformed army had some success in campaigns against the Ottomans in 1821–1823, but it proved to be ill-prepared for the second Russo-Iranian war (1826–1828). Although Abbas Mirza was able to seize initiative and regain considerable territory in the southern Caucasia in first months of the war, the Russian counterattack soon shattered the Iranian forces, first on the banks of the Shamkhor River and the near Ganja. In 1827, the Russians drove Abbas Mirza back into Iran, occupying eastern Armenia and capturing Tabriz, the capital of the Azerbaijan

province. At the end of the war in 1828, Iran had lost all its Georgian and southeast Caucasian territories.

The war had an important psychological effect on Abbas Mirza, who accepted responsibility for its outcome. Still, he remained undeterred in military reforms and maintained the reformed forces in his province; by 1831, this force consisted of about 12,000 infantry, 1,200 horse artillery, and one regiment of lancers, organized into 10 regiments of Iranian troops and two units of Russian deserters (*bahaduran*). These units played an important role in maintaining order and defending the Qajar authority in Iran. Abbas Mirza spent the last years of his life feuding with his many brothers, who sought to replace him as an heir apparent. He died leading an expedition against the rebel tribes in Khorasan.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Ottoman-Iranian Wars (18th–19th Centuries); Russo-Iranian Wars.

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Abbas the Great (1571–1629)

The greatest of Safavid shahs, Abbas strengthened Iranian military power and presided over cultural and economic flourish. The son of Muhammad Shah, Abbas ascended the throne at the age of 17 and faced an uphill struggle against internal and external forces. By then, almost half of his country was occupied by the Ottomans and the Shaybanid Uzbeks. The Qizilbash tribal confederation, the regime's foundation, had become fractious and undisciplined. Many provinces were virtually independent. In 1590, to gain a free hand for domestic consolidation, Abbas signed a humiliating peace with the Ottoman Empire, recognizing its occupation of much of northern and western Iran. To consolidate his rule, Abbas began a systematic inclusion of Georgians and Armenians in his newly established standing army of ghulams. Abbas used these ghulam troops to crush the power of the Qizilbash aristocracy, suppress domestic revolts, and coerce disloyal provinces into submission. He used the wealth he acquired from confiscated properties to further reinforce his position. By 1598, Abbas repelled the Uzbeks and restored his authority on the

northern frontier, and later, he reclaimed the Herat, Mashhad, and Khurasan provinces. In 1598, he established contacts with England after an English trade delegation arrived seeking commercial partnership. With English coaching, Abbas greatly expanded and modernized his army to include 12,000 gunners, 12,000 mounted musketeers, and some 500 bronze and brass cannons. The shah also expanded his ghulam forces through regular expeditions into the Caucasus. In 1614–1618, he launched three invasions of the eastern Georgian principalities and resettled tens of thousands of Georgians and Armenians to Iran, where they served as ghulams and helped to develop agriculture, trade, and various industries. He transferred the capital from Qazvin to Isfahan, turning it into a thriving center of arts, craft-based industry, and commerce. To take advantage of the commercial expertise of Armenians and certain Christian minorities (i.e., Jacobites), he established separate town quarters for them and supported their trade.

In 1602, Shah Abbas drove the Shaybanids out of Herat, Khurasan, and Mashhad. The following year, he launched an offensive against the Ottomans, defeating them at Tabriz. In 1606, he routed another Ottoman army at Sis, near Lake Urmia, forcing the Porte to surrender Azerbaijan, Kurdistan, and parts of Armenia. Iranian forces also crossed the Straits of Hormuz and occupied Oman. In 1623, as the Ottoman Empire suffered an internal turmoil, Abbas invaded Iraq and Anatolia, capturing Diyarbakir, Baghdad, and Mosul. By then, the Safavid state was at its greatest territorial extent. Yet, Abbas also suffered a few setbacks. His policies in Caucasus

Abbas the Great of Persia, ca. 1600. (Hulton Archive/Getty Images)

were less successful, and he faced a major uprising in eastern Georgia from 1615 to 1625. The Georgians, led by maverick commander Giorgi Saakadze, defeated the Persian army at Marabda and inflicted heavy casualties at Martkopi and in the Isani Valley. Nevertheless, by the time of Abbas's death in 1629, Iran was powerful and stable state. Yet, fearing potential rebellions, Abbas ended the practice of sending royal princes to govern provinces and, consequently, most shahs after Abbas lacked the necessary skills and experience.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Ghulams; Mughal-Safavid Wars; Ottoman-Safavid Wars.

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Abbasid Revolution (747–751)

A revolt that overthrew the Umayyad Caliphate. The Umayyad family had assumed the leadership of the Islamic realm after the assassination of Caliph Ali in 661. Over the next 80 years, Umayyad caliphs presided over a rapid expansion of the empire that stretched from the Indus Valley in the east to the Pyrenees in the west. Despite establishing a centralized state and developing a vigorous commerce, the Umayyads also generated widespread hostility for constant campaigning and privileged treatment of Muslim Arabs. Non-Arab Muslims opposed discriminatory taxes while Shia Muslims denounced the Umayyads as usurpers and continued to support the descendants of Ali. The Abbasids, descendants of the Prophet Muhammad's uncle Abbas, successfully exploited these animosities against the Umayyads. Their anti-Umayyad propaganda proved especially appealing in Khurasan, the northeastern frontier of Iran, where both Arab and non-Arab Muslims harbored intense grudges against the state. The Abbasids then developed an intricate network of supporters throughout the caliphate, particularly in Iraq, Palestine, and Syria. In 747, the Abbasids launched their revolt in Khurasan, unfurling black flags, symbols

of the Mahdi, a messianic figure in popular Islam. After capturing the town of Merv in February 748, the Abbasid commanders Abu Salama and Abu Muslim advanced west, taking control of central Iran by the end of the year. In 749, they captured most of Iraq and the head of the movement Abu al-'Abbas was declared caliph at Kufa. In January 750, Abbasid forces defeated Ummayad caliph Marwan's army on the banks of the Great Zab River in northern Iraq; the caliph escaped to Egypt but was assassinated there seven months later. The Umayyad family and its supporters were massacred, though a few survivors rallied in Spain. Caliph Abu al-'Abbas and his successor, Caliph al-Mansur, ended ethnic and economic discriminations against non-Arab Muslims, upholding the fundamental principle that of equality of all Muslims. The Abbasids abandoned the Umayyad capital of Damascus in Syria, and shifted the political center of the caliphate to the newly built city of Baghdad in Iraq.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Abbasids; Abu Muslim Khorasani.

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Abbasids

An Arab dynasty that reigned in Iraq (749–1258) and Egypt (1261–1517). By the mid-eighth century the previous caliphal dynasty, the Umayyads (661–749), had made many enemies, including both Shiites and other members of the Muslim community, who thought they were too concerned with worldly issues and not sufficiently focused on Islam itself. They were also weakened by rivalries among the tribes supporting them in their chosen power base, Syria. Eventually, a rebellion broke out in Khurasan (eastern Persia, Afghanistan, and other lands east of the Oxus River). This spread to Iraq, where a descendant of Muhammad's uncle al-'Abbas was proclaimed caliph with the regnal title of al-Saffa. The last Umayyad army was defeated in 750 in Egypt, and the Umayyad caliph, Marwan II, was killed in the fighting.

Al-Saffa's dynasty became known as the Abbasids after their ancestor. In succeeding to the caliphate, the Abbasids became, like their predecessors, both the religious and secular leaders of the Muslim world. Initially, they based their particular

claims to the caliphate on both their kinship with the Prophet Muhammad and the fact that, unlike others, they had taken action against a regime that was perceived as being unjust. Later they also presented themselves as patrons of orthodoxy, stressing their position as guardians of Islam. They made their capital at Baghdad in Iraq, from which most of the caliphs reigned until 1258.

The reign of Harun al-Rashid (786–809) is generally regarded as the high point of the Abbasid caliphate, particularly when contrasted with later events. His death was followed by a civil war between his sons. This was soon followed by a gradual decline in caliphal power, exacerbated by financial problems, increasing domination of the caliphs by their subordinates, and rebellions by Shiites and other disaffected elements. During this period much of the Muslim world fragmented, so the provinces came to acknowledge only nominal allegiance to the caliphs. Finally in 945, Baghdad was taken by the Buyids (Buwayhids), a Shiite dynasty from the mountains of Daylam in Persia. They maintained the existence of the Sunni caliphate, ruling as the caliphs' nominal subordinates until 1055. Meanwhile, Egypt was taken by the Fatimids (969), who also temporarily extended their influence into parts of Palestine, Syria, and Arabia, although by the period of the crusades much of these gains had again been lost.

In 1055, Sunni rule was restored in Baghdad when the Saljuks took control of the city. This did little to change the situation in the city itself, for while the Saljuks became embroiled in the struggle for the Levant with the Fatimids and crusaders, the caliphs remained largely impotent. However, the collapse of Saljuk authority enabled some of the more vigorous caliphs to exercise their own authority somewhat. In particular, al-Muqtafi (r. 1136–1160) asserted caliphal independence from the Saljuks in Iraq. His great-grandson al-Nair (r. 1180–1225) not only overthrew the Saljuks but also, through a mixture of diplomacy, military action, and a little luck, extended caliphal territories and warded off potential attacks from other enemies, including the Mongols. He also made several other social, political, and religious reforms, emphasizing in particular the primacy of the caliph and even coming to a certain degree of understanding with the Shiites. The resurgence of caliphal authority was brief, however. The end came in 1258, when the Mongols took Baghdad and put the reigning caliph, al-Musta'im, to death.

Not all of the caliph's family died in the Mongol onslaught, and in 1261 the Mamluk sultan Baybars restored the caliphate in Cairo. From here the Abbasid caliphs reigned, albeit in name only, until the Ottoman conquest. The last caliph died as a prisoner of war in Istanbul in 1517.

Niall Christie

See also: Abbasid Revolution (747–751); Baghdad, Siege of (1258); Saljuks; Umayyad Caliphate.

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Abd Allah ibn Al-Zubair (ca. 622/624–692)

Arab general who contested the Umayyad Caliphate for nine years. Born around 622–624, Abd Allah was the son of Zubair ibn Al-Awwam, one of the most prominent of the Prophet Muhammad's companions, and belonged to one of the noble families of the Quraish tribe. He accompanied his father during early Arab conquests, participating in the battle against the Byzantines at Yarmouk in 636. In 639, he served in Amr ibn al-As's army, which conquered Egypt and played a prominent part in the Arab conquest of Ifrikiya (north Africa). In 648–649, he distinguished himself in the battle of Sufetula, where he routed and killed Gregory the Patrician, the self-proclaimed emperor of the Byzantine province of Africa. In the early 650s, he served in expeditions to Khurasan (north Iran) before returning to Arabia, where he supported Caliph Uthman ibn Affan (Osman) against the malcontents, valiantly defending him during the siege in the summer of 656. He opposed Caliph Ali and commanded infantry at the Battle of Bassorah (also known as the Battle of the Camel) in December 656. After Ali's death in 661, Abd Allah supported Muawiyah but avoided political life until the accession of Yazid I when he refused to pledge allegiance to the new caliph. Instead, Abd Allah, who had ambitions for the caliphate, declared openly against Yazid. Some sources suggest that he advised Husayn, the son of Caliph Ali and his rival for the supreme authority, to travel to Kufa despite knowing well that the trip would be treacherous and potentially fatal. After Husayn's death at Karbala in 680, Abd Allah had himself proclaimed caliph in Mecca and assumed the title of amir al-muminin. His authority was soon recognized in much of Hejaz (western Arabia) and prompted the Umayyad invasion led by Muslim ibn Okba, who routed Abd Allah's forces at al-Harrah and captured Medina, and Husayn ibn Numair al-Sakuni who besieged Mecca in September 683. The death of Caliph Yazid saved Abd Allah because the Umayyad army raised the siege and departed. He then sent delegations to various corners of the Arab world seeking recognition as a caliph. His authority was recognized in Arabia, Iraq, and parts of Syria and

Egypt, effectively splitting the caliphate into two parts. However, his attempts to overthrow the Umayyad caliphs Marwan I and Abd al-Malik failed in 684–690; Abd Allah's troops were defeated at Kufa in 685, Harura in 687, and Maskin on the Lesser Tigris in 690. By early 690, the Umayyads reclaimed most of the regions and reduced Abd Allah's authority to Mecca alone. In 692, al-Hajjaj ibn Yusuf led a new Umayyad invasion of Hejaz and laid siege to Mecca for the second time. The town was bombarded and its holy sites damaged, but Abd Allah resisted for six and a half months before he perished on the battlefield. His body was beheaded and displayed on a gibbet.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Ali ibn Abi Talib; Amr ibn al-As (al-Aasi); Bassorah, Battle of (Battle of the Camel) (656); Hajjaj ibn Yusuf ath-Thaqafi, al-; Umayyad Caliphate.

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Abd Allah ibn Iskandar (1533/1534–1598)

The greatest of the Shaybanid khans of Transoxania. Abd Allah was born to Iskandar Khan, the lord of Afarinkent, around 1534 and rose to prominence in his twenties, when he became the lord of Karmina in 1551. He successfully defended his realm against the lords of Tashkent and Samarkand and gradually extended his possessions. The death of the powerful Nawruz Ahmad Khan of the Uzbeks in 1556 provided him with an opportunity to assert supremacy in the region and, in 1557, Abd Allah conquered Bukhara, which he turned into his capital. In 1560, he had his feeble father proclaimed the khan of Uzbeks but kept the real authority in his own hands before becoming a khan himself in 1583. His long reign was filled with campaigns and struggles against neighboring khans as well as the descendants of Nawruz Ahmad Khan. Abd Allah successfully subjugated Balkh in 1573–1574, Samarkand in 1578, Tashkent and the Sir in 1582–1583, and the Ferghana Valley in 1583. By the early 1580s, Abd Allah's campaigns subdued much of Transoxania and reached as far as the Ulu-Tau (Ulugh Tagh) ridge, which separates the basins of the Sary-Su and the Tyurgai (in modern-day southeastern Kazakhstan). In 1587–1588, he crushed the revolt in Tashkent, and between 1588 and 1594 he conquered Badakhstan, Khurasan, Gilan, and Khorezm. In the mid-1590s, he plundered the Kashgar and Yarkand regions and extended his influence

to Turkestan. The last year of his life was overshadowed by his son's rebellion, which, however, he quickly subdued. More menacing was the invasion of the Kazakh nomads, who initially gained the upper hand over Abd Allah but then suffered defeats between Tashkent and Samarkand. A talented military leader, Abd Allah also distinguished himself as a capable statesman: he established effective administration, promoted trade and commerce, funded wide-ranging construction works, and surrounded himself with scholars and artists. Abd Allah was assassinated in Samarkand in early 1598, and the powerful Khanate of Bukhara that he bequeathed to his son quickly collapsed as the subjugated provinces rebelled and his son was assassinated.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Abbas the Great.

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Abd al-Qadir (Abdelkader) (1808–1883)

Algerian leader who staunchly opposed French colonial expansion. Abd al-Qadir was born near Mascara in September 1808. He became emir of Mascara when his father Mahi-el-Din died in 1832. By then Algeria was under French occupation, which King Charles X of France authorized in 1830. Abd al-Qadir united the tribes of western Algeria and began a prolonged campaign of harassment of French forces. Throughout the two-decade-long conflict (1832–1834, 1835–1837, 1840–1847), Abd al-Qadir showed himself as a charismatic leader of exceptional military and organizational ability. He scored a victory at La Macta in June 1835 but failed to prevent French forces from capturing Mascara in December 1835. In 1836, he was again defeated at Sikkah and chose to compromise with the French, agreeing to the Treaty of Tafna in May 1837. Over the next two years, he established an efficient government in interior Algeria, through which he sought to contain continued French expansion. In 1840, Marshal Thomas-Robert Bugeaud de la Piconnerie assumed command of French forces in Algeria and began a major offensive against the interior tribes. After defeats at Tlemcen (1842) and Smala (1843), al-Qadir retreated to Morocco, where he raised a new army. However, he suffered a major defeat at the Isly River (1844), which

deprived him of Moroccan support. He also faced and suppressed a rebellion in the Dahra region. After organizing a new army, he engaged the French at Sidi Brahim, but lost the battle and fled to Morocco, where he eventually surrendered to the French in December 1847 in exchange for safe passage to the Levant. Despite the promise, the French detained al-Qadir in France until 1852, when he was freed by Napoleon III. He settled down in Damascus, where he died on May 26, 1883. In 1860, he saved large numbers of Christians from a violent mob of Druze and Maronite fanatics, a deed for which he was awarded France's highest order, the Legion of Honor.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Algeria, French Conquest of (1830–1857); French Colonial Policy in Africa (1750–1900); Tafna, Treaty of (1837).

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Abd al-Qadir (Abdelkader) founded an independent Islamic state in western Algeria during the 1830s. After a long struggle against the French Army, he was defeated, captured, and exiled in 1847. (Library of Congress)

Abd Al-Rahman Al-Ghafiqi (eighth century)

Abd al-Rahman Ibn Abd Allah al-Ghafiqi, commander of the army that unsuccessfully invaded France in 732, was from the Ghafiq clan. The clan contributed a unit to Musa Ibn Nusayr's army, which had invaded the Iberian peninsula in 712. Many then settled in al-Andalus (the Islamic region of the Iberian peninsula) while remaining part of the Kalb tribal federation, a major element within pre-Islamic and early Islamic Arab society. For this reason the Ghafiq clan continued to be involved in rivalry between the Kalb and Qays tribal factions.

One of these first Ghafiq settlers or *baladiyun* was probably Abd al-Rahman Ibn Abd Allah. He first appeared in written sources during a failed Muslim siege of Toulouse in southern France in 721, where he was credited with getting the defeated army back to Narbonne. Under the Umayyad Caliphate's military structure, a commander could designate successors in case he was killed, and this was probably how al-Ghafiqi first became governor or wali of al-Andalus. However, he was not acceptable to the governor of North Africa, who still had overall responsibility for al-Andalus, probably because of rivalry between the Kalb and Qays factions.

Abd al-Rahman al-Ghafiqi was also considered one of the tabi'un or "disciples" who formed a religious aristocracy within early Islam, second only to the ansar "helpers" and sabaha "companions" who had known the Prophet Muhammad personally. During the crisis that followed Caliph Hisham's dismissal of the previous oppressive governor of al-Andalus, a caliphal emissary consulted the local Muslim troops. They favored the pious, honest, generous, and brave al-Ghafaqi, who was also supported by the religious establishment in al-Andalus. Though defeated and killed at the battle of Poitiers in 732, Abd al-Rahman al-Ghafiqi's reputation remained intact and was to some extent inherited by his descendants, who continued to live near Seville.

David Nicolle

See also: Spain, Arab Conquest of (711–718); Tours, Battle of (732); Umayyad Caliphate.

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Abd al-Rahman III (889/891–961)

One of the most illustrious rulers of the medieval Islamic world, Abd al-Rahman III was Spain's first ruler to claim the title of caliph. Famous for his tolerance of non-Muslims living in his realm and his many public works projects, al-Rahman was a patron of business, the arts, and scholarship. He was also renowned for his ability to prevent Christian and Muslim rivals from encroaching on his territories, and he maintained Umayyad control over Islamic Spain during his half-century reign.

Al-Rahman was probably born in 889 or 891 in Córdoba, Spain. A member of the Umayyad tribe, al-Rahman was the grandson of Abd Allah, the emir of Córdoba. His grandfather—in a classic example of royal success at all costs—killed his own son over fears that he would be usurped by him. As a consequence, al-Rahman became Abd Allah's successor. In fact, many scholars have speculated that another motivation for Abd Allah to kill his son was to elevate his grandson's political chances, as he expressed a strong affection for al-Rahman's intelligence, cunning, and wit.

His grandfather's opinion proved correct. When Abd Allah died in October 912, al-Rahman ascended to the position of emir of Córdoba. Though al-Rahman was only in his twenties, the people of Córdoba immediately embraced their new leader and lauded him as a brilliant young man and a dynamic personality. This dynamism was enhanced quickly when, in the first week of his reign, al-Rahman set out to halt a series of rebel attacks that had plagued Córdoba in the final years of his ailing grandfather's reign. Crypto-Christian Arabs (who practiced Christianity in secret) and Muslim Arabs from anti-Umayyad tribes had established themselves in remote forts around the city, attacking trade and security in the area. Within 10 days, al-Rahman personally exhibited the head of a rebel in the center of Córdoba to rapturous applause by his people. He immediately garnered a reputation as a stern and forceful leader, a reputation that would grow throughout his long reign.

Annual campaigns against rebels were a hallmark of the first decades of al-Rahman's rule. His biggest rival, the crypto-Christian Umar ibn Hafsun of Bobastro, maintained a fierce rebellion against Córdoban hegemony in Islamic Spain until his death in 917. Once Umar ibn Hafsun's followers were neutralized, Córdoba was able to assert control over the territories he and other anti-Córdoba forces had controlled, including Seville and Toledo. After 933, no Arab-ruled areas of Spain existed outside of Córdoban control.

Despite his pacification of other Arabs, al-Rahman was confronted by attacks from the Christian regions of northern Spain. One of the main crises he faced early in his reign came in 913, when the kingdom of León sacked the Islamic city of Evora and slaughtered the Muslims living there. Outrage at this event spread throughout Islamic Spain, and Córdoba was no exception. By 920, al-Rahman had

launched a full-scale assault against the Christian Spanish kingdoms of León and Navarre; after a campaign in 924, he had pushed the Christians back far enough that they would not threaten Córdoba for another 15 years. When León's new king, Ramiro II, faced al-Rahman in battle at Simancas in 939, the Muslims were defeated. Bruised but not beaten, al-Rahman spent the next 11 years waiting for Ramiro's death and keeping the Christians at bay. In 950, Ramiro died, and a brutal civil war between the Christians of northern Spain ensured al-Rahman's supremacy over Iberia for the remainder of his rule.

The Iberian Peninsula was not the only location for conflict for al-Rahman and Córdoba. Rival Islamic rulers in North Africa, known as the Fatimids, were rivals of the Spanish Arabs. Not only did the Fatimids profess a different version of Islam than the Umayyads, but they were also particularly furious with al-Rahman when he declared himself the caliph—or temporal ruler and defender of the Islamic faith for all Muslims—in 929. This break with both the Abbasids of Iraq and the Fatimids of North Africa was the final straw for the Fatimids, who were also struggling to assert total domination over the North African trans-Saharan trade without Umayyad interference. Throughout his reign, al-Rahman supported a series of incursions into Fatimid territory in North Africa, and although he was not able to conquer the Fatimids, his persistence and self-proclaimed status as al-Nasir li-Din Allah ("Protector of God's Religion") and caliph of all Muslims gave him an unparalleled prestige in the western regions of the Islamic world.

Under al-Rahman, Spain flourished economically. The stability that came with his political consolidations and military victories allowed al-Rahman to create pure gold and silver monetary mints. With such stability, trade flourished in Córdoba, and coins dating from al-Rahman's era were accepted throughout the Islamic world. Moreover, religious minorities in Córdoba—the city's Jews and Christians—were allowed to flourish, making al-Rahman famous throughout the world for his tolerant rule. He spent large sums of money to expand the infrastructure of Córdoba, including major renovations and additions to the Great Mosque of the city. At the height of his reign, Córdoba had more than 100,000 households and businesses and 3,000 mosques, churches, and synagogues. Hundreds of libraries and bookshops also flourished in Córdoba, making the city famous throughout the world as a center of learning.

Al-Rahman reigned for 49 years, until his death on October 15, 961. He was succeeded by his son, al-Hakam II. The legacy of his dynamic era of leadership over one of Islamic Spain's most illustrious cities continues to stand as one of the most interesting periods of Muslim history.

Nancy Stockdale

See also: Fatimids; Reconquista.

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Abd el-Krim, Mohamed Ben (ca. 1882–1963)

Moroccan nationalist, guerrilla leader, and head of the Rif Republic. Mohamed ben Abd el-Krim was born in 1880 (or 1882), in Ajdir, Morocco, and was a member of the Beni Urriaguel tribe. The son of a qadi (judge), Abd el-Krim received both a traditional Muslim education and a Spanish education in Melilla, and he spoke Spanish fluently. In 1906, the Spanish government hired him as an Arabic interpreter in the Bureau of Native Affairs in Melilla, and from 1906 to 1915, he also worked for the Spanish newspaper, *El Telegrama del Rif*.

Abd el-Krim's transformation from being pro-Spanish to being anti-Spanish began during World War I, when he was incarcerated from 1915 to 1916 for his anti-French sentiments and activities in the Rif. After the war, he returned to Ajdir and began his struggle for Riffian independence. By 1921, the Spanish Army had been moving deeper into the Yebala in the west against el Raisuni, and toward Alhucemas Bay in the Rif, from Melilla, in the east. A 14,000-man army under the command of General Manuel Fernández Silvestre was annihilated by Abd el-Krim's army in July: more than 8,000 men died at Annual. Spanish troops were driven all the way back to Melilla. The "disaster of Annual" led to the fall of the acting government and to the dictatorship of General Miguel Primo de Rivera in September 1923. With reinforcements from Spain, the Spanish Army, with the Foreign Legion and Regulares in the vanguard, was able to slowly regain the territory that had been lost in a matter of weeks. During this time, Abd el-Krim founded the Rif Republic and established its capital in Ajdir. The beginning of the end for Abd el-Krim came in April 1925 when he attacked French forces in Morocco, which led to a Franco-Spanish alliance. The combined military forces of Spain (General José Sanjurjo Sacanell) and France (Marshal Henri Philippe Pétain) were able to carry out a successful amphibious landing at Alhucemas Bay in September. In less than a year, the Riffians were on the verge of total defeat.

Certain that the Spanish would execute him for his rebellion, Abd el-Krim surrendered to the French on May 26, 1926, in Targuist. Between 1926 and 1947, Abd el-Krim and his extended family lived in exile on French-controlled Réunion Island in the Indian Ocean. In 1947, he was granted asylum by Egypt and lived in Cairo until his death on February 5, 1963.

José E. Alvarez

See also: Annual, Battle of (1921); Rif War (1920–1927).

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Abdali, Ahmad Shah (1723–1773)

A major political and military figure in Afghanistan and northwestern India, Ahmad Shah Abdali, also known as Baba-i-Afghan (father of the Afghan nation), ruled Afghanistan from 1747 to 1773 and created an empire that stretched from the Indian Ocean to the Amu Darya River. The son of the Abdali tribal chief, he began his career under Nadir Shah, commanding tribal cavalry and earning the reputation of being a good general. After Nadir's assassination in 1747, Ahmad was elected shah and crowned in Kandahar, which he turned into his capital. He then launched widespread military campaigns to secure and expand his authority. Starting in 1748, he led eight major expeditions into India, annexing Lahore and Multan in 1752, sacking Delhi and Agra in 1756–1757, conquering Punjab by 1759, and crushing the Maratha Confederacy in the Third Battle of Panipat on January 14, 1761. Although defeating the Mughal forces, he allowed the reigning Mughul emperor to remain in control, but by title only. In the 1760s he sought (unsuccessfully) to crush the Sikhs but faced domestic tumult that compelled him to surrender Punjab to them. Yet, Ahmad Shah's campaigns had a number of major consequences for the Indian subcontinent. They contributed to the sharp decline of the Mughal Empire, facilitated the rise of the Marathas in India's southwest and the Sikhs in Punjab, and aided in the emergence of Britain's East India Company as a political power in India. His successors proved incapable of continuing his success and maintaining the empire, which disintegrated by early 19th century.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Afghan-Maratha War (1758–1761); Iran, Wars of Succession (18th Century); Nadir Shah; Panipat, Battles of (1398, 1526, 1556, 1761).

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Abdallah ibn Sa'd ibn Abi Sarh (d. ca. 657)

Leader of the first Arab incursion into Ifriqiya (north Africa) in 647. Caliph Uthman appointed Ibn Abi Sarh to govern Egypt in place of Amr ibn al-As in 645; previously Ibn Abi Sarh was sub-governor of the Upper Egypt. He successfully reformed the financial and administrative system the Arabs had inherited from the Byzantines in Egypt. He repelled a Byzantine attack on Alexandria in 646 and began the development of a Muslim navy, which later defeated the Byzantines at the Battle of the Masts (off the coast of Lycia) in 654. Ibn Abi Sarh defeated the Byzantine exarch Gregory at Sbaitla (Subaytila) in 647 but was reluctant to risk his forces for further exploration of northwestern Africa and returned to Egypt after the Byzantines had paid a substantial tribute. In 651–652, Ibn Abi Sarh led an expedition to Nubia, where he was unable to conquer territory. However, he signed a special treaty, known as the *baqt*, that proclaimed peace between Muslims and the Nubians and required the latter to send gifts of slaves, while the former responded with gifts of food. Ibn Abi Sarh's heavy-handed governing and tax collection, however, provoked an uprising in Rajab in January 656 when he was on a visit to Aqaba. The dissenters appealed to Caliph Uthman for redress against Ibn Abi Sarh, and the caliph publicly promised them support. However, on their journey back, the dissenters intercepted caliph's messenger, who was carrying orders to Ibn Abi Sarh to suppress the revolt. Incensed at such deceit, the dissenters returned to Medina and played an important role in the murder of Uthman in 656.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: North Africa, Muslim Conquest of; Nubia, Relations with Egypt.

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Abdallah Pasha Kopruluzade (d. 1735)

Ottoman statesman and commander-in-chief. The son of the grand vizier Mustafa Pasha Kopruluzade, he married the daughter of the famous grand vizier Fazil Mustafa Pasha and gained prominence as the military commander of Constantinople (*qaim-maqamı*). In later years he held various posts as governor of Khania, Khios, and Sivas before being appointed the vali of Van (eastern Anatolia) and commander-in-chief for the Ottoman campaign against Tabriz in 1723. Abdallah

Pasha gained considerable success capturing Nahçıvan, Ardamil, and Karabagh in the summer of 1724, and he sacked Tabriz, the last Ottoman conquest of the city, in August 1725. In 1726, Abdallah became the governor of Raqqa (Syria) and in later years he governed Candia, Egypt, Euboia, and Qaraman. By early 1730s, the Ottoman Empire faced the growing power of Nadir Shah, who moved to reclaim Iranian influence in the Caucasus and Iraq. In 1735, Abdallah Pasha was appointed commander-in-chief of the Ottoman forces to deal with the Iranian threat. He managed to raise the Iranian siege of Ganja (January 1735) and forced Nadir to retreat from Kars (May 1735). But in the decisive battle at Baghavard on June 14, 1745, Nadir Shah inflicted a decisive defeat on the Ottoman forces and Abdallah Pasha was killed in the battle.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Baghavard, Battle of (1735); Nadir Shah; Ottoman-Safavid Wars.

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Abdul Rahman, Campaigns of

The late 19th century saw the rise of a charismatic Afghan amir, Abdul Rahman, whose campaigns welded scattered and feuding tribes into the kingdom of Afghanistan. His father, Muhammad Afzal Khan, the governor of Balkh, appointed young Abdul Rahman governor of the Tashqurghan (Khulm) district in the Samangan Province. The young man soon assumed the command of the army of Balkh and successfully campaigned against the Uzbek tribes in Qataghan and Badakhshan. He supported his father's claims to the Kabul throne and engaged in a power struggle against his uncle Amir Shir Ali Khan, whom he defeated at Sayyidabad (1866), Qalat (1867), and the Panjshir Pass (1867). Although he managed to place his father on the Kabul throne in 1866, Amir Shir Ali Khan returned three years later to overthrow him, driving Abdul Rahman into exile for the next 10 years.

After the death of Amir Shir Ali in early 1879, Abdul Rahman Khan returned to Afghanistan leading a large army. In July 1880, Britain recognized Abdul Rahman as "Amir of Kabul and its Dependencies," although the precise extent of his authority remained unclear. As many tribes rejected his authority, the "Iron Amir" found

it necessary to extend his sovereignty by sword to every corner of Afghanistan. He proceeded to methodically attack and subdue his rivals, capturing Kandahar, Herat, and Kunar in 1881 and Maimana in 1883 and suppressing the Shinwari revolt in 1883 and the Ghilzai Rebellion in 1886–1887. In 1888, he crushed his last major rival, Muhammad Ishaq Khan, at the Battle of Ghaznigak. At the same time, Abdul Rahman faced an uphill struggle against the Hazara people, who raided nearby communities and harassed trade and communications from their mountainous Hazarajat region in central Afghanistan. Abdul Rahman organized three campaigns against the Hazaras in 1881–1883 that forced most of the Hazaras tribespeople to pay tribute. Yet, the Hazaras of the Oruzgan province refused to recognize his rule. Taking advantage of the fact that the Hazaras were Shia, Abdul Rahman branded them as infidels and had his chief mufti (canon lawyer) issue a fatwa (legal opinion) declaring them infidels. Declaring a holy war on the Hazaras, Abdul Rahman organized Sunni Pashtuns, Ghilzais, Durranis, and other tribesmen for a new campaign in 1891. For more than a year the amir failed to make headway against the tough Hazaras, and only concerted attacks from Turkestan, Kabul, Ghazni, Herat, and Kandahar led to the Hazara defeat in late 1893. To weaken the Hazaras' hold on the region, Abdul Rahman enslaved thousands of the Hazaras and resettled Durrani and Ahmadzai Ghilzai tribesmen onto their lands.

By early 1890s, Abdul Rahman was also concerned about Russian penetration of the Pamir region and British expansion into eastern Kafiristan. Concerned that one of these European powers would seize Kafiristan and try to expand into his lands, Abdul Rahman decided to subdue the fierce Kafirs to his authority first. He began his campaign in the fall of 1895, intentionally choosing to conduct a winter war so as to deprive the Kafirs of safety in mountains. He led a multipronged invasion that targeted Kafiristan from several directions at once and subdued the local tribesmen in less than two months. When he died in 1901, Abdul Rahman had subdued and integrated virtual all tribes in Afghanistan, laying the foundation for a centralized state.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Amanullah Khan; Anglo-Afghan War (1878–1880); Anglo-Afghan War (1919).

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Abdulkerim Nadir Pasha (1807–1883)

Ottoman commander, marshal (1876). Born in Chirpan (Ottoman Bulgaria), he graduated from the military academy in Istanbul, participated in the Russo-Ottoman War of 1828–1829, and was sent to Vienna to continue his education (1836–1841). During the Crimean War (1853–1856), he commanded the Army of Anatolia, leading several assaults against the Russian forces based in Gyumri. After the Ottoman defeat at Kadiklar in December 1853, he was court-martialed but was acquitted and appointed governor of Thessaloniki. In 1862, he served under Omer Pasha in Montenegro and later commanded Ottoman troops in Crete (1867–1868). Under Sultan Murad V, he became the minister of war in 1876 and sought limited military reforms before being dismissed by Sultan Abdulhamid II. The same year he commanded Ottoman troops sent to subdue revolt in Bosnia-Herzegovina, which was supported by Serbia, and he was granted the title of the marshal for his success against the Serbs. During the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877–1878, he was given command of the Ottoman troops protecting the Danube River but was unable to prevent the Russians from crossing the river. In late July 1877, he was removed from command and exiled to the island of Rhodes, where he died six years later.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Crimean War (1853–1856); Herzegovinian Revolt (1875); Ottoman-Montenegran Wars; Russo-Ottoman War (1877–1878); Russo-Ottoman Wars.

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Abid al-Bukhari

Army of black slaves assembled by Mawlay Ismail, ruler of Morocco. Ismail used his army to secure his position against competing factions in Morocco, strengthening the power of the state against the tribes. Other slave armies have existed in Islamic history, but Ismail's Abid is probably the most famous and is definitely one of the last such armies. It was most active in the first half of the 18th century.

Morocco was a country in disarray during the 17th century. The Sufi sect of Islam had spread among the people, especially among the rural population. Because their religion differed markedly from that of their political leaders, the population tended to look to their local tribes for support and allegiance. Combined with this was the growing encroachment of European power into North Africa. Morocco was

more isolated from the centers of Islamic power than its neighbors, Algeria and Tunisia. Different families seized power in Morocco, often supported by militias from Castile or Catalonia. Portuguese conquests of seaports led to declining trade throughout Morocco.

The most important ruler of Morocco before the 18th century was Sultan al-Mansur, who reigned from 1578 to 1603. He and his family claimed authority because of their descent from the Prophet Muhammad, combining both religious and legal grounds for governing. The major export under Mansur was sugar, which was exported to European markets. After Mansur died, his family went into a political decline, matched by an economic decline, as American sugar squeezed Moroccan sugar out of the European market. In 1660, the Alawi dynasty came to power. In 1664, Mawlay al-Rashid seized control of Fez, the most important city, and proclaimed himself sultan. He continued to expand his control over more of Morocco until his death in 1672.

Mawlay al-Rashid was succeeded by Mawlay Ismail, the greatest ruler in the dynasty. Ismail was faced with a difficult situation. His authority was contested by tribal leaders, who controlled many parts of the country. One of his first solutions was to form an army he could depend on. The traditional Moroccan account indicates that Ismail was told that many black soldiers who had fought for al-Mansur were still alive, so he immediately assembled them. A different source indicates that the soldiers of the Abid were Sudanese who voluntarily came to Morocco to fight for Ismail. Regardless of which account is correct, the first soldiers of the Abid al-Bukhari were assembled between 1674 and 1676. By 1679, they were in action against tribesmen who rebelled against the central authority of Ismail.

One advantage of slave armies was that they depended on the ruler for everything. They were devoted to his success, not their own. What set the Abid al-Bukhari apart was that Ismail recruited his soldiers locally. Although some sources indicate that he bought all the black slaves available in Morocco for his army, others indicate that the soldiers of the Abid al-Bukhari were members of the Haratin. The Haratin were indigenous people of Morocco, an ancient tribe with darker skin than the rest of the population. They were also either landless farmers or specialists in such crafts as metalworking, butchering, or mule-driving. The Haratin had no ethnic affiliations and were generally scorned by the lighter-skinned population. Although legally free, the Haratin were regarded as inferior and lacked any political or economic power. The religious customs of the Haratin also contained distinct differences from that of the rest of the Moroccan population. By exploiting this difference in language, appearance, and religious practices, Ismail was able to establish an army that depended on his authority and would fight against the tribal leaders who threatened it.

The Abid al-Bukhari was kept apart from the rest of the population. Ismail concentrated his soldiers in garrisons at Mashra al-Ramal and Meknes, Ismail's capital.

He eventually assembled approximately 150,000 black slaves. To keep the soldiers isolated, Ismail procured women to be their wives. The families lived together in military communities. Each year, those men who were of military age were assembled for the sultan's campaigns. The soldiers were well trained and well armed by Moroccan standards. Each was required to take an oath that bound him to service to the sultan, Allah, and brotherhood to each other. The Abid al-Bukhari was supplemented by soldiers from tribes who were loyal to Ismail and attracted by tax exemptions and rights to land.

The general population in Morocco resented being taxed to support the Abid al-Bukhari, which they saw as an occupying force. The hostility grew throughout Ismail's long reign, ensuring the continued loyalty of his slave army. The soldiers gained a reputation for brutality. Ismail and the Abid al-Bukhari campaigned for at least 15 years before the major resistance to his rule was put down. Fortified posts garrisoned by members of the Abid were established in troublesome areas to prevent further outbreaks. Most parts of Morocco that had been seized by European powers were recovered by Ismail and the Abid al-Bukhari. Significant foreign relations were established with European powers, and Morocco was respected as an important African power.

When Mawlay Ismail died in 1727, the Abid al-Bukhari was the most important power in Morocco. Between 1727 and 1757, 12 proclamations of sultans were made. Several of Ismail's sons reigned multiple times. Each time, the Abid al-Bukhari made and unmade sultans based on their own interests. Not until 1757 was a sultan able to discipline the Abid al-Bukhari. Leaders who might prove too ambitious were eliminated, and the Abid al-Bukhari lost its special distinction as a slave army, set apart from the rest of the population.

Tim J. Watts

See also: Al-Mansur, Ahmad ibn Muhammad; Moroccan War of Succession.

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Abu Awn (d. ca.784)

Prominent Abbasid general and governor of Egypt and Khurasan. Little is known about his early life. He was probably born in Gorgan and may have been a cattle

dealer in his youth. He supported the Abbasid cause and is first mentioned in relation to raising funds for the Abbasids in Gorgan in 747. When the Abbasid Revolution began, Abu Awn quickly demonstrated his military talents, defeating the Umayyad forces at Shahrezur (749) and then on the Greater Zab River (750). He then successfully pursued the fugitive Umayyad caliph Marwan II to Egypt. He became the second Abbasid governor of Egypt in 751 and successfully subdued a Coptic revolt. In 752–753, he led a military expedition into Libya and suppressed a revolt in Palestine. In 761, Abu Awn was sent to suppress a rebellion in Khurasan, which he successfully accomplished. In 776, he received the governorship of Khurasan, one of the most important and powerful provinces in the caliphate. His later life remains obscure, and the last that is known about him is Caliph Mahdi's visit to his deathbed in 784.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Abbasid Revolution (747–751); Abbasids; Umayyad Caliphate; Zab, Battle of (750).

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Abu Muslim Khorasani (d. 755)

Prominent Arab commander and one of the key leaders in the Abbasid Revolution. His early life remains obscure because of the scarcity of sources, which disagree on his date (718–727) and place of birth (Merv or Isfahan) and family origins. Most sources, however, agree that Abu Muslim grew up in Kufa, which, in the early eighth century, became a center of anti-Umayyad unrest. The Abbasids, descendants of the Prophet Muhammad's uncle exploited such sentiments in their favor, asserting that the caliphate was restricted to Muhammad's family. Exposed to such ideas, Abu Muslim was recruited by the Abbasid agents and in 745–746 was sent to Khurasan to gain support for the Abbasid cause. In early 746, Abu Muslim received instructions to openly proclaim the Abbasid cause and raised the black standards, signaling the beginning of the revolt. Over next few months, Abu Muslim strengthened his position through continued missionary activity and defeated an army sent by the Ummayad governor of Khurasan, which only further enhanced his reputation and garnered new allies. In 746–747, Abu Muslim's forces captured Herat, Balk, and Nesa and, by early 748, the city of Merv itself. In 748–749, he repeatedly defeated the Umayyad forces sent against him and captured Nishapur,

Gorgan, Hamadan, and Nehavand. Invading northern Iraq, Abu Muslim's forces inflicted a decisive defeat on the Umayyad caliph Marwan on the banks of the Greater Zab River and declared the Abbasid Abu al-Abbas as Caliph al-Saffah. After the Abbasid Revolution, Abu Muslim remained in Khurasan, where he exercised absolute authority. Suspicious and jealous of Abu Muslim's power, the caliph even considered assassinating him but died in 754. Upon ascending the throne, his successor, al-Mansur, faced a revolt, which Abu Muslim suppressed in late 754. Yet relations between Mansur and Abu Muslim quickly deteriorated. In early 755, the caliph promised to guarantee safe passage to Abu Muslim if he returned to court to ask forgiveness. Arriving at the palace, Abu Muslim was assassinated by Mansur's agents on February 13, 755. After his death he became a legendary figure and was even regarded as a messiah in some regions.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Abbasid Revolution (747–751); Abbasids; Zab, Battle of (750).

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Abulustayn (Elbistan), Battle of (1277)

Major battle between the Mamluks and the Mongols on April 15, 1277. The initial Mongol invasion of Syria and Palestine, organized by Hulegu Khan, resulted in the Mamluk victories at Ayn Jalut and Homs in 1260. For a variety of reasons neither Hulegu nor his successor made any serious attempts to exact revenge on the Mamluks and their allies or to reconquer Syria for the next 21 years. The Mamluks used this period to reform their forces and establish political alliances (e.g., with the Crusader states and the Golden Horde) to be better prepared for the future wars against the Ilkhan Mongols. Between 1261 and 1277, the Mamluks and the Mongols were engaged in prolonged border skirmishing, with neither side willing or able to undertake a major attack. In 1277, however, the Mamluk leader Baybars became concerned about the Mongol expansion into the Sultanate of Rum and launched a preemptive invasion into Asia Minor. Marching through Palestine and Syria, Baybars led his army across the Taurus mountains via the Aqcha Darband pass. During the crossing, the Mamluk advance guard under Sunqur al-Ashqar surprised a Mongol detachment and captured a few prisoners who informed Baybars that the main Mongol army under Tudawun, supported by the contingents from the Rum Sultanate and Georgia, was bivouacked near the town of Abulustayn. On April 15, the

Mamluks descended from the mountain passes onto the plain of Abulustayn, where the Mongol army was already arranged. According to surviving sources (e.g., Bar Hebraeus, al-Mansuri), the Mongol army was deployed in 11 units (*atlab*), each about 1,000 men strong. The Georgian contingent—some 3,000 men strong—was kept as a separate *tulb* while the Rumi troops were arranged separately from the main force because the Mongols did not trust them.

The battle began with a spirited Mongol and Georgian attack that smashed through the Mamluk army's center, drove back the left wing, and threatened to turn its right wing. In this critical moment, Baybars demonstrated remarkable composure as he exploited his numerical superiority by bringing up reinforcements, strengthening threatened sectors, and launching a counterattack. The Mongols and Georgians were driven back, but instead of retreating, they dismounted and continued to fight to the death. In the end, most of the Mongol army perished, including its leaders. Contemporary sources disagree on precise numbers but refer to some 6,000–10,000 losses; Bar Hebraeus states that some 5,000 Mongols and 2,000 Georgians died in the fighting. The victory allowed Baybars to limit Mongol authority and extend his influence to the Sultanate of Rum. It also provoked open hostilities between the Mamluk Sultanate and the Mongol Ilkhanate which resulted in the Battle of Homs (1281).

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Baybars I; Homs, Battles of (1260, 1281, 1299).

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Aceh War (1873–1903)

A prolonged and sporadic conflict waged by the Muslim population of Aceh in northern Sumatra against Dutch rule. An estimated 4,000 Dutch and 25,000 Acehnese died in the fighting. Aceh had been an independent sultanate for four centuries before the Netherlands established its presence in the region. Although Aceh retained independence, the sultanate became increasingly influenced by the Dutch. In 1824, the Treaty of London divided insular Southeast Asia into spheres of influence, recognizing the Dutch sphere of influence in Sumatra. By the mid-19th century, the issue of trade on Sumatra became an issue of contention between

the Dutch and British, and a new Anglo-Dutch treaty in 1871 acknowledged the Dutch control of Sumatra in return for Dutch recognition of Britain's right of equal trade in the Indies. By 1873, however, the Dutch became concerned about negotiations between the United States and the Aceh sultanate. The Dutch, considering Aceh to be within their sphere of influence, decided to conquer the area and sent two expeditions to Aceh in 1873. The initial expedition in March 1873 was poorly prepared and was forced to retreat after its commander was killed. Later the same year, the Dutch mounted a better-planned and better-equipped invasion, capturing the capital Banda Aceh and declaring Aceh part of the Netherlands Indies in January 1874. The Acehnese rallied around sultan Muhammad Dawot, and local ulama and Dutch forces became involved in a prolonged guerrilla war in the countryside. This war, however, drained the colonial treasury, and public opinion in the Netherlands became increasingly critical of the colonial administration. The Dutch initiated a massive campaign of pacification in 1884, but the Acehnese guerrilla campaign continued until 1903, when the region was finally pacified and Muhammad Dawot was forced to submit. Still, isolated resistance continued as late as 1912.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Acehnese Rebellion (1953–1959); Indonesian War of Independence (1945–1949).

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Acehnese Rebellion (1953–1959)

A prolonged uprising of Muslim Acehnese rebels in northern Sumatra against the annexation of the state of Aceh to the republic of Indonesia. In 1949, after the withdrawal of the Dutch government, the newly formed Indonesian government faced a major challenge in the Aceh region where Teungku Daud Beureueh, military governor of Aceh before its annexation, launched an armed rebellion against the government of President Sukarno in September 1953. The revolt was prompted by the government's decision to abolish the status of Aceh as an autonomous province within Indonesia and merge it with the neighboring North Sumatra province. To gather wider support, Beureueh declared that his struggle was part of the Darul Islam movement, which began in West Java in the late 1940s and had the goal of creating a federal Islamic state in Indonesia. The Acehnese rebels waged a low-intensity conflict for four years until a cease-fire was concluded in March 1957. By then, the Indonesian government, facing turmoil in other provinces that sought

similar self-rule, chose to compromise. The Indonesian government made Aceh a separate province and, in 1959, the province received the status of "special district," which gave it autonomy in matters of education, religion, and local law. This concession satisfied a greater part of the rebels and the insurgency gradually declined, although Daud Beureueh and his supporters continued to fight until early 1960s.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Aceh War (1873–1903); Indonesian War of Independence (1945–1949).

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Acre, Siege of (1189–1191)

The siege of Acre (modern 'Akko, Israel) was the determinative military action of the Third Crusade (1189–1192). The Muslim leader Saladin had captured and garrisoned the port city in the aftermath of his great victory at Hattin in 1187. Guy of Lusignan, king of Jerusalem, was released from captivity in 1188 and began collecting forces from among the Franks of Jerusalem and new arrivals from the West. In August 1189, Guy marched to Acre and set up camp on the hill of Toron to the east of the city. Saladin marched to Acre's relief but was unable to dislodge Guy or prevent fleets from bringing reinforcements from all over western Europe. The Christians dug a double line of ditches across the Acre peninsula, protecting themselves from Saladin's field army and the city garrison. A long struggle of attrition ensued, a combination of naval blockade, artillery duel, and trench warfare. Twice Egyptian galley fleets broke through, only to be immobilized in the harbor, their crews needed to man the walls. The remnant of the German expedition arrived in October 1190, that of Philip II Augustus of France in April 1191, and that of Richard I of England on June 8. Early in July sections of the wall were brought down by mining.

Forced to stay permanently at arms and fearing the consequences if Acre were taken by storm, the heroic but now exhausted garrison surrendered on July 12. They were to be ransomed in return for 200,000 dinars, the release of 1,500 prisoners held by Saladin, and the restoration of the relic of the True Cross, all to be handed over by August 20. As the banners of the kings of France and England were raised over Acre, so too was the standard of Leopold V, duke of Austria, leader of the small German contingent. Richard's soldiers tore it down, as neither he nor Philip had

This engraving from the 19th century shows the successful siege of the city of Acre by Christian Europeans during the Third Crusade in 1191. A crusader triumvirate formed in 1189 consisted of English, French, and German armies under the command of Richard the Lionhearted, Philip II Augustus, and Frederick I Barbarossa respectively. Frederick died before reaching Acre, but the crusaders were able to take the city through persistent sieges by Richard. (Ridpath, John Clark, *Ridpath's History of the World*, 1901)

any intention of letting Leopold claim a share of the booty. By August 20, Saladin had not paid even the first installment of the ransom: perhaps he could not; perhaps he was trying to delay things. The crusaders wished to advance toward Jerusalem and could not afford to leave 3,000 prisoners behind in Acre. In the afternoon the captives were slaughtered; only the garrison commanders were spared. According to the chronicler Ambroise, the Christian soldiers enjoyed the work of butchery.

For Saladin the loss of the city and the Egyptian fleet was a heavy blow. For nearly two years the siege gripped the attention of Muslim and Christian worlds; Western contemporaries compared it to the siege of Troy. The fact that Saladin remained nearby throughout the siege demonstrates its importance in his eyes. Its outcome made possible the century-long survival of the coastal rump of the kingdom of Jerusalem.

John Gillingham

See also: Saladin; Third Crusade (1187–1192).

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Acre, Siege of (1291)

The siege of Acre (modern 'Akko, Israel) by the Mamluks of Egypt, lasting from April 5/6 to May 28, 1291, resulted in the Muslim conquest of the city and brought about the end of the Latin kingdom of Jerusalem. After an attack by Italian crusaders on the Muslim population of Acre in August 1290, the Egyptian sultan Qalawun repealed a 10-year truce that had been concluded with the kingdom in 1283 and moved against Acre. Qalawun died shortly after he left Cairo (October 10, 1290), but his son al-Ashraf Khalil arrived before Acre on April 5, 1291 with a large army. The Mamluks concentrated their attacks on the St. Anthony's Gate complex linking Montmusard with the old city and on the northeastern point, which was fortified by a barbican (King Hugh's Tower) and a tower (King Henry's Tower) at the outer wall and another tower (the Accursed Tower) at the inner wall. Sorties by the Templars and Hospitallers in mid-April failed, resulting in heavy Frankish casualties.

On May 8, King Hugh's Tower had to be abandoned, and it collapsed on May 15. The following day, as the Muslims attempted to storm the city, they were fended off by a sortie of the Hospitallers. On May 18, the Mamluks attacked the fortifications between St. Anthony's Gate and the Accursed Tower with full force and managed to enter the city. There were insufficient vessels for the inhabitants to escape by sea. Those unable to escape found refuge in the Templar castle, and they were offered unhindered retreat in exchange for its surrender. On May 25, Muslim troops entered the castle to supervise the Franks' departure, but as they supposedly molested the Frankish women and children, they were killed by the Templar garrison. When the marshal Peter of Sevrey went to Khalil to explain the incident, he was seized and beheaded. Meanwhile, the Muslims had undermined the castle walls, which collapsed on May 28, ending the siege. The fall of Acre marked the end of the Frankish states in Outremer. The Mamluks' systematic destruction of Acre and other coastal cities made any future return of the Frankish population unviable.

Jochen Burgtorf

See also: Mamluk Sultanate; Qalawun.

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Acre, Siege of (1840)

Ancient seaport and fortress of Acre, on the coast of modern-day Israel, and a strategic position of the first order since the dawn of recorded time. In a region where land transport before 1900 was poor because of the adverse geography of mountains, deserts, and lack of water for draft animals, it provided a vital link between armies moving north or south and their seaborne supplies. Consequently, it was heavily fortified and subject to many sieges.

In 1840, the British and Turks were active on the Syrian coast, facing the powerful armies of Mehmed Ali, pasha of Egypt. Ali had captured Acre in 1833 along with the area now covered by Israel, Lebanon, and Syria. In 1839, Ali, seeking an independent throne, had annihilated the Turkish army and threatened to overthrow the empire.

Anxious to maintain Turkey as a regional power and an economic client, the British sent a small fleet to the Syrian coast. This force, although commanded

by Admiral Sir Robert Stopford, was largely directed by Foreign Secretary Lord Palmerston and driven by his friend Commodore Sir Charles Napier. The fleet quickly cut Egyptian logistics by blockading Alexandria and sweeping the seas of their shipping. The British then landed Turkish troops and raised a rebellion in Lebanon before storming Sidon from the sea and forcing the Egyptians out of Beirut with combined operations. Having seized all the coastal positions save Acre, the British had to act quickly, before the weather on the coast deteriorated in mid-November.

Finally, on November 4, 1840, eight ships of the line, six frigates, three smaller sailing warships, and four steamers attacked the fortress. The plan was for a heavy naval bombardment to open a breach in the sea walls for an assault by marines. However, after two hours, a shell from one of the steamers penetrated the main powder magazine, causing a massive explosion inside the city.

Defensive fire quickly subsided, and the Egyptians then evacuated the city that night. The war was over, and Mehmed Ali was reduced to his old status. British success was based on the professional use of naval artillery, aggressive tactics, and a commitment to the strategy of coastal assault. The lessons of this campaign underpinned British deterrence for the next generation.

Andrew Lambert

See also: Egyptian-Ottoman Wars; Ibrahim Pasha; Mehmed Ali.

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Adrianople, Battle of (1362)

An important Ottoman victory leading to the conquest of Adrianople by the Ottoman sultan Murad I. By the time of Orhan's death and Murad's accession to the sultanate in 1360, the Ottomans had captured and colonized some important towns and forts, such as Tzympe, Malgara, and Bulair. After his rise to power, the new sultan launched an operation to conquer Western Thrace, and the main target of this expedition was Adrianople.

The conquest of Adrianople was carefully planned by Murad and his generals. Lala Shahin was made the commander of the Ottoman forces in Thrace and given the title of *beylerbeyi*. Three Ottoman armies set out on a joint operation; the main

force under Murad marched toward Adrianople, while the other two, led by Lala Shahin and Evrenos Bey, secured the rear and occupied important strategic points to prevent attacks by the Serbians and Bulgarians.

The army of Adrianople marched out to face the advancing Ottomans, and a decisive battle was fought between Bunar Hissar and Eski Baba in which the Byzantine forces were routed. Adrianople was occupied by Murad and became the capital of the Ottomans until the capture of Constantinople in 1453. The Byzantines were unable to recover from this campaign in which they lost Thrace and Constantinople was cut off from the rest of the Balkans, while it gave the Ottomans a strong position from which they could attack Europe and maintain their hold on Anatolia.

Adam Ali

See also: Balkans, Ottoman Conquest of the; Byzantine-Ottoman Wars.

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Adrianople, Treaty of (1444)

Armistice negotiated between the Ottoman Sultan Murad II and John Hunyadi, Hungarian leader, at Adrianople (Edirne) on June 12, 1444, and later ratified by the Treaty of Szegedin. The treaty was negotiated in the wake of the failed Varna Crusade against the Ottomans. Under the terms of this 10-year truce, Murad agreed to return to Anatolia and returned Serbian territory captured since 1427 to the exiled Serbian leader George Brankovic. Ottoman rule was acknowledged in Bulgaria in return for Murad's recognition of the autonomous state of Serbia and Hungarian control over Wallachia.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Murad II; Varna Crusade (1444).

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Adrianople, Treaty of (1713)

Signed on June 24, 1713, at Adrianople (Edirne), the treaty ended the Russo-Ottoman War of 1711–1713. Its main articles repeated provisions of the 1711 Treaty of Pruth, which compelled Russia to surrender Azov and the territory along the Orel River to the Ottoman Empire. Nevertheless, the treaty was quite advantageous to Russia because it allowed the Russian government to divert its resources to the struggle against Sweden. The treaty remained in effect under the 1720 Treaty of Constantinople.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Constantinople, Treaty of (1720); Pruth, Treaty of (1711); Russo-Ottoman Wars.

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Adrianople, Treaty of (1829)

Treaty concluding the Russo-Ottoman war of 1828–1829. It was signed on September 14, 1829, in Adrianople by Russia's Count Aleksey Orlov and the Ottoman Empire's Abdul Kadyr-bey. Russia, whose forces had advanced as far as Adrianople during the war, abandoned most of its conquests beyond the Danube; however, Russia gained territory at the mouth of the Danube and acquired substantial territories in the Caucasus and southern Georgia. The Ottomans recognized Russia's possession of western Georgia and the khanates of Yerevan and Nakhichevan, which Iran had ceded to Russia in the Treaty of Turkmenchay (1828). The Ottomans recognized the autonomy of Serbia, agreed to the removal of their troops (except for the frontier garrisons), and agreed to end the collection of taxes in return for Serbian payment of a fixed annual tribute to the sultan. They also accepted the autonomy of the principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia, which were under Russian protection, and fixed the border between the Ottoman Empire and Wallachia on the thalweg of the Danube. The Porte also recognized the autonomy of Greece, which achieved full independence in 1830. Russia was granted the same capitulatory rights enjoyed by the subjects of other European states. The treaty opened the Dardanelles to all commercial vessels, and Russia was granted the same capitulatory rights enjoyed by other European states.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Russo-Ottoman Wars; Turkmenchai, Treaty of (1828).

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Afghan Civil War (1928–1929)

Also known as the Afghan Reformist War, the Afghan civil war began when Amanullah Khan (1892–1960), emir of Afghanistan, faced stiff resistance to his modernization program. Amanullah Khan, who came to power after his father's assassination in 1919, greatly admired the modernizing policies of Kemal Atatürk in Turkey and Reza Shah Pahlavi in Iran and hoped to replicate them in Afghanistan. After a successful war against the British in 1919, Amanullah began introducing far-reaching reforms to jump-start Afghanistan's modernization. He introduced a constitution that proclaimed equality and personal freedoms and that promoted education and Western clothing. However, his reforms were quickly

challenged by the conservative circles of Afghan society, particularly the religious leaders (ulama), who launched the Khost Rebellion in 1924. Although Amanullah was able to subdue it by 1925, he faced a more powerful revolt of the Shinwari tribespeople (supported by antireformist forces) in November 1928. By mid-January 1929, Amanullah abdicated in favor of his weak older brother, but his decision was rejected by the antireformist forces, whose leader, Habibullah Kalakani, seized Kabul and proclaimed himself emir. In response, Amanullah assembled an army at Kandahar and marched on Kabul to retake the throne in the spring of 1929. However, he was defeated en route and fled from the country. Afghan society then descended into a civil strife as various pretenders sought to claim the throne. The conflict ended when General Muhammad Nadir Khan, Amanullah's cousin, rallied his supporters and defeated Habibullah, taking Kabul in October 1929. Claiming the title of shah, Muhammad Nadir pushed through the reforms and restored constitutional authority by 1932.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Amanullah Khan; Anglo-Afghan War (1919); Kemal Atatürk, Mustafa; Reza Shah Pahlavi.

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Afghanistan, Soviet War in (1978–1989)

War that destroyed the U.S.–Soviet détente of the 1970s; inaugurated a new, dangerous stage in the Cold War; and badly weakened the Soviet military and economic establishments. The Soviet-Afghan War represented the culmination of events dating to April 1978, when Afghan communists, supported by left-wing army leaders, overthrew the unpopular, authoritarian government of Mohammad Daoud and proclaimed the People's Democratic Republic of Afghanistan. Although the extent of Soviet involvement in the coup remains unclear, Moscow certainly welcomed it and quickly established close relations with the new regime headed by Nur Mohammad Taraki, who was committed to bringing socialism to Afghanistan.

With the ambitious, extremely militant foreign minister Hafizullah Amin as its driving force, the Taraki regime quickly alienated much of Afghanistan's population by conducting a terror campaign against its opponents and introducing a series of social and economic reforms at odds with the religious and cultural norms of the

country's highly conservative, Muslim, tribal society. Afghanistan's Muslim leaders soon declared a jihad against "godless communism," and by August 1978 the Taraki regime faced an open revolt, a situation made especially dangerous by the defection of a portion of the army to the rebel cause.

As Afghanistan descended into civil war, Moscow grew increasingly concerned. Committed to preventing the overthrow of a friendly, neighboring communist government and fearful of the effects that a potential Islamic fundamentalist regime might have on the Muslim population of Soviet Central Asia, specifically those in the republics bordering Afghanistan, the Soviets moved toward military intervention. During the last months of 1979, the Leonid Brezhnev government dispatched approximately 4,500 combat advisers to assist the Afghan communist regime while simultaneously allowing Soviet aircraft to conduct bombing raids against rebel positions. Although Soviet Deputy Defense Minster Ivan G. Pavlovskii, who had played an important role in the 1968 Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, counseled against full-scale intervention in Afghanistan, his superior, Defense Minister Dmitry Ustinov, convinced Brezhnev to undertake an invasion, arguing that only such action could preserve the Afghan communist regime. He also promised that the Soviet presence there would be short.

Brezhnev ultimately decided in favor of war, the pivotal factor arguably being the September 1979 seizure of power by Hafizullah Amin, who had ordered Taraki arrested and murdered. Apparently shocked by Amin's act of supreme betrayal and inclined to believe that only a massive intervention could save the situation, Brezhnev gave approval for the invasion. Beginning in late November 1979 and continuing during the first weeks of December, the Soviet military concentrated the Fortieth Army, composed primarily of Central Asian troops, along the Afghan border. On December 24, Soviet forces crossed the frontier, while Moscow claimed that the Afghan government had requested help against an unnamed outside threat.

Relying on mechanized tactics and close air support, Soviet units quickly seized the Afghan capital of Kabul. In the process, a special assault force stormed the presidential palace and killed Amin, replacing him with the more moderate Barak Kemal, who attempted, unsuccessfully, to win popular support by portraying himself as a devoted Muslim and Afghan nationalist. Soviet forces, numbering at least 50,000 men by the end of January 1980, went on to occupy the other major Afghan cities and secured major highways. In response, rebel mujahideen forces resorted to guerrilla warfare, their primary goal being to avoid defeat in the hopes of outlasting Soviet intervention.

Moscow's invasion of Afghanistan had immediate and adverse international consequences, effectively wrecking the détente, which was already in dire straits by December 1979 thanks to recent increases in missile deployments in Europe. Having devoted much effort to improving relations with Moscow, U.S. president

Jimmy Carter believed he had been betrayed. He reacted swiftly and strongly to the Afghan invasion.

On December 28, 1979, Carter publicly denounced the Soviet action as a "blatant violation of accepted international rules of behavior." Three days later, he accused Moscow of lying about its motives for intervening and declared that the invasion had dramatically altered his view of the Soviet Union's foreign policy goals. On January 3, 1980, the president asked the U.S. Senate to delay consideration of SALT II (the second Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty). Finally, on January 23, in his State of the Union address, Carter warned that the Soviet action in Afghanistan posed a potentially serious threat to world peace because control of Afghanistan would put Moscow in a position to dominate the strategic Persian Gulf and thus interdict at will the flow of Middle East oil.

The president followed these pronouncements by enunciating what soon became known as the Carter Doctrine, declaring that any effort to dominate the Persian Gulf would be interpreted as an attack on U.S. interests that would be rebuffed by force if necessary. Carter also announced his intention to limit the

Afghan guerrillas stand with arms raised atop a Soviet armored personnel carrier in 1980. (Hulton Archive/Getty Images)

sale of technology and agricultural products to the USSR, and he imposed restrictions on Soviet fishing privileges in U.S. waters. In addition, he notified the International Olympic Committee that, in light of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, neither he nor the American public would support sending a U.S. team to the 1980 Moscow Summer Games. The president called upon America's allies to follow suit.

Carter also asked Congress to support increased defense spending and registration for the draft, pushed for the creation of a Rapid Deployment Force that could intervene in the Persian Gulf or other areas threatened by Soviet expansionism, offered increased military aid to Pakistan, moved to enhance ties with the People's Republic of China (PRC), approved covert Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) assistance to the mujahideen, and signed a presidential directive on July 25, 1980 providing for increased targeting of Soviet nuclear forces.

Carter's sharp response was undercut to a certain extent by several developments. First, key U.S. allies rejected economic sanctions and an Olympic boycott. Second, Argentina and several other states actually increased their grain sales to Moscow. Third, a somewhat jaded American public tended to doubt the president's assertions about Soviet motives and believed he had needlessly reenergized the Cold War.

Ronald Reagan, who defeated Carter in the November 1980 presidential election, took an even harder stand with the Soviets. Describing the Soviet Union as an "evil empire" that had used détente for its own nefarious purposes, the Reagan administration poured vast sums of money into a massive military buildup that even saw the president push the development of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI)—labeled "Star Wars" by its critics—a missile defense system dependent on satellites to destroy enemy missiles with lasers or particle beams before armed warheads separated and headed for their targets. The Soviet response was to build additional missiles and warheads.

Meanwhile, confronted with guerrilla warfare in Afghanistan, the USSR remained committed to waging a limited war and found itself drawn, inexorably, into an ever-deeper bloody quagmire against a determined opponent whose confidence and morale grew with each passing month. To make matters worse for Moscow, domestic criticism of the war by prominent dissidents such as Andrey Sakharov appeared early on, while foreign assistance in the form of food, transport vehicles, and weaponry (especially the Stinger antiaircraft missile launchers) from the United States began reaching the mujahideen as the fighting dragged on.

Neither the commitment of more troops, the use of chemical weapons, nor the replacement of the unpopular Kemal could bring Moscow any closer to victory. Accordingly, by 1986 the Soviet leadership, now headed by the reformist General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev, began contemplating ways of extricating itself from what many observers characterized as the "Soviet Union's Vietnam."

In April 1988, Gorbachev agreed to a United Nations mediation proposal providing for the withdrawal of Soviet troops over a 10-month period. One month later the departure of Soviet military forces, which had grown to an estimated 115,000 troops, commenced—a process that was finally completed in February 1989.

Although the Soviets left Afghanistan with a pro-communist regime, a team of military advisers, and substantial quantities of equipment, the nine years' war had exacted a high toll, costing the Soviets an estimated 50,000 casualties. It seriously damaged the Red Army's military reputation, further undermining the legitimacy of the Soviet system, and nearly bankrupted the Kremlin. For the Afghans, the war proved equally costly. An estimated 1 million civilians were dead, and another 5 million were refugees. Much of the country was devastated.

Bruce DeHart

See also: Afghanistan, U.S. War in (2001–); Ahmad Shah Massoud; Osama bin Laden; Taliban.

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Afghanistan, U.S. War in (2001–)

American-led invasion of Afghanistan that began on October 7, 2001 with the purpose of toppling the Taliban government and killing or capturing members of the Al Qaeda terrorist group, which had just carried out the terror attacks of September 11, 2001. The Taliban had sheltered Al Qaeda and its leader, Osama bin Laden, on Afghan territory and provided the terrorists with bases, training facilities, and quite possibly financial support. The war is also known under its code name, Operation Enduring Freedom.

The United States faced major problems in planning a war against the Taliban and Al Qaeda. Prime among these were logistical concerns, for Afghanistan is a landlocked country quite distant from U.S. basing facilities. American planners decided that an alliance would have to be forged with the Afghan United Front (also known as the Northern Alliance), an anti-Taliban opposition force within

Afghanistan. The Northern Alliance would do the bulk of the fighting but would receive U.S. air support, along with assistance, advice, and cash from U.S. special operations forces.

The war began on October 7, 2001, with American air strikes intended to knock out the Taliban's antiaircraft defenses and communications infrastructure. However, desperately poor Afghanistan had a very limited infrastructure to bomb and the initial air attacks had only minimal impact. Al Qaeda training camps were also targeted, although they were quickly abandoned once the bombing campaign began. U.S. special operations forces arrived in Afghanistan on October 15, at which time they made contact with the leaders of the Northern Alliance.

The first phase of the ground campaign was focused on the struggle for the northern city of Mazar-i-Sharif, which fell to the Northern Alliance forces led by generals Abdul Dostum and Muhammed Atta on November 10, 2001. The fighting around Mazar-i-Sharif was intense, but U.S. air strikes, directed by special operations forces on the ground, did much to break Taliban and Al Qaeda resistance. As the fighting progressed, the Taliban and Al Qaeda improved their tactics and combat effectiveness. Camouflage and concealment techniques were also enhanced, helping to counter American air power. However, the Taliban's limited appeal to the population meant that the regime could not withstand the impact of a sustained assault. The repressive rule of the Taliban ensured that the Taliban never widened its base of support beyond the Pushtun ethnic group from which they originated.

Northern Alliance forces captured the Afghan capital of Kabul without a fight on November 13. On November 26, a besieged garrison of 5,000 Taliban and Al Qaeda soldiers surrendered at Kunduz after heavy bombardment by American B-52s. Meanwhile, an uprising by captured Taliban fighters held in the Qala-e-Gangi fortress near Mazar-i-Sharif prison was suppressed with great brutality in late November.

The scene of the fighting then shifted to the city of Kandahar in southern Afghanistan. Because the Taliban had originated in Kandahar in the early 1990s, they were expected to put up a stiff fight for the city. Kandahar was attacked by Northern

U.S. Army soldiers search a cave for enemy forces in the mountains of Afghanistan, April 6, 2004. (Department of Defense)

Alliance forces led by generals Hamid Karzai and Guyl Agha Shirzai, with U.S. special operations forces coordinating the offensive. The Taliban deserted Kandahar on December 6, and Taliban leader Muhammad Omar and the surviving Taliban elements went into hiding in the remote mountain regions of Afghanistan and Pakistan. The fall of Kandahar marked the end of Taliban rule in Afghanistan, only nine weeks after the beginning of the bombing campaign. On December 22, 2001 an interim administration, chaired by Hamid Karzai, took office.

Despite the rapid and efficient progress of Operation Enduring Freedom, Taliban and Al Qaeda elements remained at large in Afghanistan, and the operation had failed to capture or kill either Osama bin Laden or Muhammad Omar. Bin Laden was believed to be hiding in mountain dugouts and bunkers located in the White Mountains near Tora Bora. A 16-day offensive in early December 2001 failed to find bin Laden. For this offensive, the United States once again relied on Northern Alliance ground troops supported by U.S. special operations forces and U.S. air power. Later there would be charges that this offensive had been mishandled, and an opportunity to take bin Laden was lost. Bin Laden escaped, probably into Pakistan through the foreboding but porous border that separates Afghanistan from Pakistan.

Despite the failure to capture or kill bin Laden, the United States could point to notable success in its War on Terror by the end of 2001. The Taliban had been deposed and Al Qaeda was on the run, with many of its members and leaders having been killed or captured. This occurred despite the fact that the United States had only deployed about 3,000 service personnel to Afghanistan by the end of the year, most of them special operations forces. The U.S. death toll had been remarkably light; only two deaths were attributed to enemy action. Estimates of Afghan fatalities are approximate at best. Possibly as many as 4,000 Taliban soldiers may have been killed during the campaign. Afghan civilian deaths have been estimated at between 1,000 and 1,300, with several thousand refugees dying from disease and/or exposure. Another 500,000 Afghans were made refugees or displaced persons during the fighting.

The United States attempted a different approach in March 2002 when Al Qaeda positions were located in the Shah-i-Khot Valley near Gardez. On this occasion, U.S. ground troops from the 10th Mountain Division and the 101st Airborne Division led the way, along with special operations forces from Australia, Canada, and Germany and Afghan government troops in an offensive code named Operation Anaconda. Taliban reinforcements rushed to join the Al Qaeda fighters, but both were routed from the valley with heavy losses.

Since 2002, the Taliban and Al Qaeda remnants have maintained a low-level insurgency in Afghanistan. Troops from the United States and allied countries, mainly from North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) member states, remain in Afghanistan operating ostensibly under the banner of Operation Enduring Freedom. An upsurge of Taliban insurgent activity beginning in 2006, however, has necessitated a series of coalition offensives that inflicted heavy casualties on the Taliban

but failed to defeat it. In early 2009, the U.S. government announced plans to dispatch up to 30,000 additional troops but also proposed a timeline for their withdrawal; in November 2010, the NATO summit approved the planned handover of responsibility for security from international troops to Afghan forces by 2014. With the arrival of new American troops, the coalition forces launched new offensives, most notably the Marja offensive, in southern Afghanistan but struggled to end the Taliban insurgency; the American drone operations, however, proved to be successful in decimating the insurgent leadership. Still, doubts about the war's successful ending intensified following the release of the classified U.S. diplomatic cables by WikiLeaks in 2010, revealing that the European Union was no longer convinced in the success of the military mission in Afghanistan. Tensions also developed between the United States and Afghan President Karzai, who had made efforts to distance himself from Washington and to reach out to the Taliban leaders to initiate peace talks. As of early 2011, about 97,000 United States troops served in Afghanistan as part of an international force totaling 140,000. Limited, conditions-based withdrawals are due to start in July 2011 ahead of the scheduled 2014 transition. On May 2, 2011, Osama bin Laden was killed in Abbottabad, Pakistan, in an operation conducted by American military forces and the Central Intelligence Agency. While his death is a significant blow for al Qaeda, few expect military operations in Afghanistan to end in the nearest future.

Paul W. Doerr

See also: Al Qaeda; Osama bin Laden; Taliban; Terrorism.

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Afghan-Maratha War (1758–1761)

After the assassination of Nadir Shah of Iran in 1747, the empire he had created had broken up into several parts, of which Afghanistan fell under the rule of Ahmad Shah Abdali (1722–1772). Ahmad Shah actively campaigned to expand his sphere of influences and, in 1748–1751, he annexed the Punjab region and campaigned against the declining Mughul Empire, where he seized enormous booty and placed

a puppet ruler, Alamgir II, on the Mughal throne under control of his son Timur Shah. To counter Afghan expansion and restore their influence in north India, Balaji Rao, the peshwa of the Marathas, sent Raghunathrao and Malharrao Holkar to Punjab, where the Sikhs revolted against the Afghan authority in early 1758. The Marathas, assisted by the Sikhs, defeated the Afghans and captured Attock, Peshawar, and Multan in the spring of 1758. Ahmad Shah reacted swiftly, declaring a jihad against the Marathas and returning to India in the fall of 1759. He ejected Maratha garrisons from the northwest Indian fortresses and, after receiving support from the Rohilla tribes, crossed the Indus in late October 1759. The Maratha army under Dattaji Sindhia suffered a defeat at Taraori on December 24, 1759, and at Barari Ghat on the Yamuna River on January 9, 1760. With the Maratha army in disarray, Ahmad Shah sacked Delhi once more time, overthrowing Alamgir and placing Shah Alam II on the Mughul throne.

After Dattaji Sindhia's death, the Marathas regrouped under Malharao Holkar, but Ahmad Shah repelled their attacks using his superiority in firepower. To turn the tide of war and recover lost ground, Peshwa Nana Saheb sent Sadashiv Rao Bhau to lead a new Maratha offensive into the north. Leading a massive army of some 300,000 men (though only 70,000 were soldiers), Sadashiv Rao Bhau left Patdur in March 1760 and captured Delhi in August but then spent almost three months idling. Lacking supplies to feed his tens of thousands of camp followers and money to pay his troops, he sought to engage the Afghans in a decisive battle. Although the Marathas scored a victory over the Afghans at Kunjpura in mid-October 1760, they soon came across the main Afghan army of Ahmad Shah Durrani near Panipat, where, on January 14, 1761, they suffered a devastating defeat. The Marathas lost up to 80,000 soldiers and civilians and tens of thousands were captured and ransomed. Despite his victory, Ahmad Shah soon withdrew from India, which descended into long civil strife as various political factions fought for power. The Battle of Panipat seriously weakened the Maratha state and cleared the way for later British supremacy as the British East India Company was able to take advantage of internal turmoil to establish itself as the major power in India by early 19th century.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Abdali, Ahmad Shah; Panipat, Battles of (1398, 1526, 1556, 1761).

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Ager Sanguinis, Battle of (1119)

A battle fought in the Ruj Valley (Syria) in 1119 between the Franks of Antioch, under Roger of Salerno, and a Turkish coalition led by the Artuqid leader Ilghazi. The name of the battle (Ager Sanguinis means "Field of Blood") reflects its disastrous outcome for the Christian forces. The most detailed account of the fray was written by the chancellor of Antioch, Walter, who was an eyewitness to events. His account contrasts the defeat in 1119 with Roger's successful campaign against the Turks in 1115, which had culminated in victory at Tell Danith. In 1119, Ilghazi had collected a large army, said to have numbered 40,000, to attack Antioch as part of a campaign to secure Aleppo for himself. It is likely that Roger's earlier success at Tell Danith had made him overconfident: although he appealed for help from King Baldwin II of Jerusalem and Count Pons of Tripoli when he heard of the threat, he did not wait for reinforcements to arrive, but on June 20 he led out the army of Antioch. Ilghazi was informed by his scouts of the Antiochene army's weakness, and he decided on an immediate attack. He surrounded the enemy camp and Roger was forced to give battle. Few of his knights escaped the slaughter, and Roger himself was killed.

The Christian prisoners of war were treated with brutality both on the battlefield and in Aleppo: most of them were put to death in ways graphically described by Walter the Chancellor. However, the Turks did not follow up their victory as was undoubtedly expected. The principality of Antioch was effectively defenseless, with its army destroyed and its prince killed, but the Latin patriarch, Bernard of Valence, rallied the inhabitants and sent an urgent message to summon help from Baldwin II of Jerusalem. Meanwhile, Ilghazi devoted himself to celebrating his victory, so much so (his detractors reported) that he became ill. This gave time for Baldwin to bring up his troops. He consulted Patriarch Bernard and Roger's widow, Cecilia (Baldwin's sister), and it was decided that the king of Jerusalem would act as regent of the principality during the minority of the acknowledged heir, Bohemund II, who was a boy of 10 and still in Italy. Baldwin then brought the Turks to battle at Hab (1119); the outcome was ambiguous, but it ended the Turkish threat for the near future.

Susan B. Edgington

See also: Didgori, Battle of (1121).

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Agha Muhammad Khan Qajar (1742–1797)

Shah of Iran (1789–1797), the founder of the Qajar dynasty. Born in 1742, he was the eldest son of the chief of the Qavanlu clan of the Qajars and played an important role in the Iranian political life of the early 18th century. Yet, Muhammad's grandfather was executed by Shah Tahmasp II and his father became a fugitive; in one of the skirmishes, a rival clan managed to capture young Muhammad and had him castrated, hence his title of agha, which was usually given to court eunuchs. Agha Muhammad grew up in an Iran torn apart by ongoing political rivalry between various tribes and groups. In 1759, his father lost control of western Iran to Karim Khan Zand, and Agha Muhammad was captured and kept at the Zand court in Shiraz. He spent 16 years at Karim Khan's court, well treated but a prisoner nevertheless. In 1779, upon Karim Khan's death, an internecine war broke out between his successors, allowing Agha Muhammad to escape. For the next 10 years he was involved in a prolonged struggle for power and gradually succeeded in establishing his authority in Iran's northern provinces. In 1781, he repelled a Russian naval expedition seeking to establish a fort near Ashraf. In 1782–1784 he conducted a successful campaign against Ali Murad Khan Zand, one of the claimants of the Zand throne, becoming undisputed master of the northern half of Iran. He moved his capital to Tehran, where he was enthroned (but not crowned) by 1789, laying the foundation for the Qajar dynasty.

In 1790–1794, Agha Muhammad continued his struggle against other pretenders. Although his army suffered repeated defeats at the hand of a young Zan prince, Lotf Ali Khan, Agha Muhammad eventually triumphed over the Zands, sacking their last refuge in Kerman, where all males were either killed or blinded and up to 20,000 women and children were enslaved. By then, Agha Muhammad controlled most of Iran, which allowed him to start reclaiming former Safavid-controlled territories as well. He first turned to the Caucasus, where the Georgian kingdom of Kartli-Kakheti, once a Safavid tributary, sought alliance with Russia against Iran and Ottoman Empire. Agha Muhammad demanded Georgian recognition of his sovereignty and, upon being rejected, invaded south Caucasia in 1796. The Georgian army, heavily outnumbered, was defeated at Krtsanisi in September 1795 and the Georgian capital, Tiflis (Tbilisi), was razed. After capturing Erivan, Agha Muhammad crowned himself shah of Iran in March 1796, girding himself with a sword of the Safavid shah Ismail. The same year he planned a campaign to reclaim Khurasan, but it was never implemented because of new troubles in Georgia. The Georgians refused to accept his dominion, and late in 1796, Russian troops finally arrived to conquer the Caspian littoral. Although the Russian troops were soon recalled, Agha Muhammad decided to conduct a second campaign in Caucasia to resolve the remaining challenges. As he was camped north of the Araz River, his servants (one of them Georgian) whom he

had condemned to execution, sneaked into his tent and assassinated him. Through his ruthlessness, austerity, military competence, and political shrewdness, Agha Muhammad succeeded in reclaiming much of Iran, which he bequeathed to his successors. Yet, his failed campaigns in eastern Georgia resulted in the Russian annexation of this kingdom and opened the way for the Russian expansion into southern Caucasia.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Iran, Wars of Succession (18th Century); Karim Khan Zand; Russo-Iranian Wars.

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Ahmad Bey of Tunis (1806–1855)

Ruler of Tunis who initiated important reforms designed to strengthen Tunisia's military forces. Succeeding his brother as the ruler of Tunis in 1837, Ahmad sought to break away from the Ottoman Empire. He borrowed many ideas and institutions from the West as he sought to modernize the country and the armed forces. He pursued an ambitious industrialization plan, abolished the sale of black slaves in 1841, and abolished slavery in 1846. He established a military school at the Bardo Palace, inaugurated the practice of conscription, invited European military instructors to Tunis, and sent Tunisian cadets to France. As a result of his reforms, he created a fleet of 12 frigates purchased from France and a Western-style army, which he sent to fight with France, Britain, and the Ottoman Empire against Russia during the Crimean War (1853–1856). However, tax increases, necessary to pay for his reforms, caused revolts in 1840, 1842, and 1843. In 1845, the Ottoman Empire formally recognized Ahmad Bey as an independent sovereign.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: French Colonial Policy in Africa.

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Ahmad Gran (ca. 1506–1543)

Ahmad ibn Ibrahim, nicknamed "Gran" (the left-handed), was the Muslim leader of the invasion of Ethiopia during the 16th century. He was born around 1506 in Adal and joined the retinue of al-Jarad Abun, who was one of the emirs opposed to the peaceful policies the Walashma dynasty of Ifat extended toward Ethiopia. When Abun died, Gran took his position and overthrew Abu Bakr, the last Walashma sultan, and took the title of imam.

Gran transformed his Somali and Afari nomadic followers into a powerful striking force and started raiding Ethiopia. In 1529, he decisively defeated Ethiopian emperor Lebna Dengal (Dawit II) at the Battle of Shembera Kure (Shimbra Kure) and then followed it up with new victories at Antukyah and Amba Sel in 1531. These victories allowed Ahmad Gran to conquer most of Ethiopia by 1535, while his nomadic forces devastated Ethiopian highlands as they swept through the region. Unable to defeat Ahmad Grand, Emperor Lebna Dengal sought help from Europe but died in a battle in 1540. The new emperor, Galawdewos, continued seeking help from Europe and soon received some 400 Portuguese musket men. Rallying his forces, he then engaged Ahmad Gran. Because of the unruly nomadic nature of his forces, Gran also sought assistance from the Ottomans, who supplied him with 800 disciplined soldiers armed with muskets. In the Battle of Wofla (August 28, 1542), the combined Ethiopian and Portuguese forces were defeated, and half of the Portuguese, including their leader Cristóvão da Gama (the son of the famous explorer Vasco da Gama), perished in battle. Feeling secure after his latest victory, Gran dismissed his Ottoman troops. Despite their recent defeat, Galawdewos's army and the remaining 200 Portuguese soldiers attacked Gran near Lake Tana on February 21, 1543. During the battle a Portuguese musketeer shot and killed Gran, whose death proved a turning point as the Muslim forces scattered from the battlefield. After Gran's death the Sultanate of Adal continued to exist, but it no longer posed a major threat to Ethiopia.

Adam Ali

See also: Portuguese Colonial Wars in Arabia.

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Ahmad Shah Massoud (1953–2001)

Known as the "Lion of the Panjshir," Ahmad Shah Massoud was one of the leading fighters in the campaign to expel Soviet troops from Afghanistan in the 1980s. He later entered politics, serving as minister of defense in the government of Burhanuddin Rabbani in the early 1990s. During the ensuing civil war, Massoud became the leader of the militias making up the Northern Alliance, fighting against the radical Islamist Taliban movement.

Massoud was a young engineering student in Kabul when communists overthrew the Afghan monarchy and seized power in 1973. A devout Muslim, Massoud opposed the new regime's militant atheism and took part in an abortive revolt, fleeing to Pakistan when it failed. In Pakistan, Massoud, along with Rabbani and other exiles, received military training from the Pakistani intelligence services, eager to oust the Afghan communist government. In 1979, with the Afghan regime riven by infighting, Massoud crossed back into Afghanistan and launched a new rebellion. As Soviet troops invaded Afghanistan in December 1979, the rebels subsequently declared a jihad (holy war) on the Soviet Union and its Afghan allies.

Massoud organized resistance to the invasion in his native Panjshir Valley, establishing a network of small bands capable of independent operation. These mujahideen successfully repulsed an assault on the strategically vital valley by Afghan communist forces and then beat off repeated attempts by Soviet troops to seize the valley. After the Soviets finally succeeded in taking the Panjshir in 1984, Massoud reorganized his troops from a redoubt in the Hindu Kush mountains, harassing the occupiers and goading them into a disastrous offensive that left the mujahideen once again in command of the Panjshir. These exploits led to the emergence of the legend of the Lion of the Panjshir. They also led to a growing rivalry among the various mujahideen commanders, and Massoud fell afoul in particular of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. The more malleable Hekmatyar was favored by the Pakistanis and by a growing legion of Arab volunteers financed by the Saudi construction heir Osama bin Laden.

When the last Soviet troops had left Afghanistan in February 1989, an all-out civil war between the Afghan communists and the competing mujahideen

groups engulfed the country. Rabbani and Massoud were seemingly victorious by 1992, capturing Kabul and driving out the communists. Massoud became minister of defense in the new government, but the fighting continued, now largely along ethnic lines (Massoud was a member of Afghanistan's Tajik minority). By 1995, a new force had emerged in the civil war (again with Pakistani backing), a Pashtun-dominated Islamic fundamentalist group comprising former seminary students and known as the Taliban. With a reputation for piety and incorruptibility, the Taliban scored a series of stunning military success, capturing Kabul in September 1996.

Massoud and Rabbani again retreated to the Panjshir. Now facing a common enemy, Massoud, Rabbani, Hekmatyar, and other veteran commanders combined their forces into the Northern Alliance, continuing the battle from remote northern Afghanistan. The suave, French-speaking Massoud was the Northern Alliance's liaison with the outside world and most effective spokesman (in the West and with Iran and Russia). He repeatedly warned Western leaders that Taliban-style extremism was a threat to them as well.

Meanwhile, the Taliban, under the leadership of Mullah Mohammed Omar and with financial and logistical help from Pakistan, established an extreme theocracy across Afghanistan. It also provided a haven for the fugitive bin Laden and his Al Qaeda jihadist network. In September 2001, with Northern Alliance fortunes at low ebb, Massoud agreed to a television interview with journalists from an Arab news organization. The two journalists were in fact Al Qaeda operatives, carrying a camera packed with explosives. The cameramen detonated their bomb at the start of the interview, killing themselves and Massoud on September 9, 2001.

Two days later, Al Qaeda launched its attacks on New York and Washington, D.C. The killing of Massoud had removed the most effective potential partner the United States had in Afghanistan and cemented the alliance between Al Qaeda and the Taliban. Nonetheless, U.S. forces invaded Afghanistan in October 2001, removing the Taliban and installing a Northern Alliance–led government, for whom Massoud remains a hero and martyr.

Jeffrey Mankoff

See also: Afghanistan, Soviet War in (1978–1989); Afghanistan, U.S. War in (2001–); Al Qaeda; Northern Alliance; Osama bin Laden; Taliban.

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Ahmadabad, Battle (1572)

Major battle between the Mughals and Gujarat on September 2, 1572. After Mughal emperor Humayun's invasion and the subsequent death of its sultan, Bahadur, in 1537, the kingdom of Gujarat experienced almost four decades of civil strife and upheaval that greatly weakened it. Despite their success, the Mughal forces had later withdrawn from the region as Humayun faced greater challenges elsewhere. In 1572, Emperor Akbar returned to Gujarat, where he faced two groups of opponents, the Gujarati themselves and the Mirzas, the Timurid descendants who resisted the Mughal expansion. Akbar led just 3,000 horsemen against Sultan Muzaffar II of Gujarat. At Ahmadabad, he defeated a much larger (reportedly 20,000 men strong) Gujarati force and occupied the town. While staying at Ahmadabad, Akbar received the news that the mirzas, led by Ibrahim Mirza, had gathered their forces to attack him. Anticipating their moves, Akbar defeated them at Sarnal (December 24) and then took over Gujarat, which remained part of the Mughal Empire for the next 200 years.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Akbar.

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Ajnadain, Battle of (634)

One of the first major battles between the Byzantine forces defending Syria and Palestine and the Arabs expanding northward from the peninsula at the start of the Islamic conquests. Little is known about the battle itself. It was probably fought around July 30, 634 southwest of Jerusalem. The initial attach toward Syria was stopped by a Byzantine army led by Theodorus, brother of Emperor Heraclius. However, Khalid ibn al-Walid made a dramatic forced marched across the Syrian desert and brought the much-needed reinforcements and the combined Muslim force decisively defeated the Byzantine army. The battle opened the route for the Arab advance into Syria and marked the escalation of an Arab–Byzantine conflict that eventually led to the decisive the Battle of Yarmouk and ended the Byzantine dominance of the region.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Khalid ibn-al-Walid; Yarmouk (Yarmuk), Battle of (636).

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Akbar (1542–1605)

Abu-al-Fath Jalal-ud-Din Muhammad Akbar was the third emperor of the Muslim Mughal dynasty in India. Akbar reconquered lands lost during the reign of his father, Humayun, consolidated an empire that extended over most of India, and reformed the administration of the empire. By doing so, he brought a stability that allowed the Mughals to remain in firm control of most of India throughout the 17th century.

A descendant of Genghis Khan, Akbar was born in the deserts of Rajasthan on October 15, 1542, to Humayun, exiled from his throne in Delhi, and the empress Hamida. Humayun and Hamida soon left for Afghanistan and put Akbar under the care of the emperor's brother, Askari. By the time Humayun and Hamida were reunited with their three-year-old son in 1545, Akbar had already shown prowess as a wrestler, besting his older cousin. Akbar's responsibilities as heir to the throne involved more than sport, but this, rather than his studies, remained the primary interest of the high-spirited young prince. Abul Fazl, the chronicler of Akbar's reign, noted that the astrologers had calculated the exact time for Akbar to begin his first formal lesson, and when the auspicious moment arrived, "that scholar of God's school had attired himself for sport and disappeared."

But Akbar was to be thrust into a position of even greater responsibility at a very young age. Humayun retook the imperial cities of Delhi and Agra in 1555 but died from a fall the next year, before he was able to vanquish all rival claimants to his throne. Akbar, only 13 years old, was enthroned at Kalanaur on February 14, 1556, and Bayram Khan was installed as his regent. Their first order of business was to fend off the three rival claimants from Afghanistan. Over the next several years, Akbar and Bayram Khan captured and killed Hemu at Panipat, defeating a much larger force than their own, and also defeated Sikandar. The third rival, Adil Shah, was killed in battle against the ruler of Bengal. Over the next 10 years, Akbar established control over all of northern India. Yet he was able to do so increasingly through peaceful means. In 1562, he married the daughter of the raja of Amber (Jaipur), a Hindu princess, without forcing her to accept the Muslim faith. Thus, he was able to bring the raja into his empire by winning his allegiance, rather than defeating him in battle. Marriage alliances became an important practice in his efforts to extend and consolidate his empire, especially with the warlike Rajputs of Rajasthan.

At about the time of his alliance with the raja of Amber, Akbar had ended his tutelage under the Harem party, a group of Sunni Muslims who had replaced the

Shiite Bayram Khan as regent two years earlier. Now taking full responsibility for running his country, a maturing Akbar proved to be interested in more than conquest. Throughout his reign, he showed an interest in learning, building, implementing administrative reform, and acting as a benign ruler to the diverse peoples in his empire. In 1546, by lifting the ban on the construction of Hindu temples and abolishing the pilgrimage tax imposed by his predecessors, Akbar won the allegiance of many Hindus. He encouraged interfaith discussions among Muslims, Hindus, Parsis, and Christians and made himself an arbiter on points of Islamic law. In 1570, he began building at Fatehpur Sikri, which became his new capital. Though a great achievement in architecture and powerful evidence of his command of great financial resources, the city was abandoned in 1586 because of an inadequate water supply.

Akbar's reforms of the empire's administration were among his most important achievements. He took personal responsibility for military appointments

Young Akbar, by Persian court artist Abd al-Samad, depicts a young Akbar, the third Mughal emperor of India, 16th century. (Corel)

and promotions, promoted officers on merit only, and paid all officers in cash. This made for a more centralized system, controlled by the emperor, and replaced a system in which personal loyalties could fragment the Mughal military. To collect revenues for the empire, Akbar developed a system of assessing and collecting taxes on agricultural lands that his subjects perceived as customary to India. This system ensured a constant source of revenue without continual conquest.

Akbar did resort to conquest again in the latter part of his reign, however. During the 1580s, he brought Kashmir under his rule and established his firm control in the northwest as far as the city of Kabul, in Afghanistan. He extended his rule into the Sind (in present-day Pakistan) in 1591. At the same time, he moved his armies further south in peninsular India, annexing Orissa, Cooch Behar, and large parts of Bengal in the east and taking new lands as far south as northern Ahmadnagar (in present-day Maharashtra) in the west.

When Akbar was away in the central province in 1600, his son and designated successor, Prince Salim, impatient to take the throne, began a rebellion against his father. Salim proclaimed himself king of Allahabad and refused his father's entreaties to come to Agra and explain his actions. When Akbar sent his friend and prime minister, Abul Fazl, to Allahabad in 1602 to bring Salim back, Salim had Abul Fazl killed. Salim finally returned to Agra in 1604 and submitted to Akbar, who, despite his anger, forgave his son.

By the early part of the 17th century, Akbar had established the Mughal Empire's control over much of Afghanistan and Pakistan and all of India north of the Godavari River, and he had also ensured its existence and stability for years to come. His legacy to India and his successors was a strong, stable, and centralized empire that had the loyalty of its subjects and displayed a growing cultural vitality. On his deathbed, Akbar confirmed Prince Salim, who took the name of Jahangir, as his successor. He died on October 27, 1605.

Dave Compton

See also: Ahmadabad, Battle of (1571); Bayram Khan.

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Akhal-Teke Expeditions (1879, 1880–1881)

Two military expeditions launched by Russia to occupy the Akhal-Teke region in present-day Turkmenistan. In the mid-19th century, Russia embarked on rapid expansion into south-central Asia. Driven by the interests of border security, commerce, and a great power rivalry with Britain, Russia expanded into the Kazakh steppes in 1830s–1840s, capturing Tashkent in 1865 and Kokand and Bukhara in 1868. Among the various tribes that Russia subdued, the fierce Akhal-Teke Turkmen proved to be particularly troublesome. Between 1871 and 1878, Russia conducted several raids against the Turkmen but was unable to exert control over the tribe and its imposing Geok-Tepe city-fortress. In 1879, after the successful Russo-Ottoman War, the Russian government turned its attention to the Turkmen, sending a major detachment of some 4,000 men under General A. Lomakin to seize Geok-Tepe. On September 9, Lomakin reached Geok-Tepe but, forced to march across the Russian desert, brought only a few cannon and limited ammunition. After a brief bombardment of the fortress, Lomakin, eager for victory, ordered a premature frontal assault that produced heavy losses among the attackers and allowed the Teke warriors to counterattack. Some 700 Russians were killed outright; and hundreds more were captured, and few survivors managed to escape. The defeat at Geok-Tepe was one of the most humiliating defeats for the contemporary Russian army and caused great outcry in Russia.

To avenge the defeat, General Mikhail Skobelev was given command of some 13,000 men and more than 100 cannon. After carefully planning the expedition, Skobelev slowly advanced toward Geok-Tepe, establishing a supply network to sustain his troops on the campaign. On December 23, 1880, he laid siege to the fortress, which was defended by about 25,000 Turkmen (bearing antiquated arms) who made several sorties against the Russians. After almost a month-long siege, on January 24, 1881, the Russian miners successfully detonated a mine that opened a breach in the fortress wall and allowed the Russian infantry to assault the fortress. The fighting soon turned into a slaughter as Russian soldiers raped, looted, and massacred the inhabitants of Geok-Tepe for the next three days. The number of Turkoman dead remains unknown but is usually estimated at 8,000–15,000 lives; the official Russian losses amounted to 268 killed and 669 wounded, although real losses were certainly higher. Skobelev justified the massacre by stating that "I hold it as a principle that the duration of the peace is in direct proportion to the slaughter you inflict upon the enemy. The harder you hit them, the longer they remain quiet."

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Central Asia, Russian Conquest of.

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Akkerman, Convention of (1826)

Treaty concluded between Russia and the Ottoman Empire on October 7, 1826, in the town of Akkerman (Belgorod-Dnestrovsky, Ukraine). Under its provisions, the Ottoman Empire accepted Russian demands with respect to territories in the Caucasus, Balkans, and Danubian river basin. The Ottomans agreed to evacuate their forces from the Danubian principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia and recognize the right of local councils (*divans*) to elect *hospodars* (rulers) with the approval of both powers. The Porte had to cede to Wallachia control over Giurgiu, Braila, and Turnu on the Danube River and agreed to the free navigation of Russian commercial vessels through the Dardanelles and Bosporus. The convention also required Ottoman recognition of Serbia's autonomy and the return of Serbian territories taken in previous years. Sultan Mahmud II's rejection of the convention triggered the Russo-Ottoman War in 1828.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Russo-Ottoman Wars.

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Akroinon, Battle of (739)

The Battle of Akroinon was major clash between the Umayyads and the Byzantines that took place in 739 in Asia Minor. The chronicle of Theophanes gives a detailed account of this expedition. Sulayman was the commander of the Umayyad army, which was divided into three parts: 10,000 light troops were sent west to reconnoiter ahead of the main army, 20,000 horsemen were sent to Akroinon, and 60,000 men led by Sulayman himself brought up the rear. The Syrian force at Akroinon was surrounded by Emperor Leo III and his son Constantine and crushed in the battle. The commanders Malik and Abd Allah perished along with 13,200 of their men; the remaining 6,800 managed to escape and rejoined the other parts of the army

in Syria. On the other hand, Sulayman's rear guard and the reconnaissance force caused a lot of damage and devastation while campaigning in Asia Minor. Overall, however, the campaign was a failure because of the defeat at Akroinon, which pushed the Arabs out of western Asia Minor, and because this massive expedition returned to Syria without having taken any towns or fortresses. This disaster also greatly weakened the Umayyad dynasty, which was overthrown one decade later.

Adam Ali

See also: Byzantine-Muslim Wars (to 1035); Umayyad Caliphate.

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Al Qaeda

International radical Islamic organization, the hallmark of which is the perpetration of terrorist attacks against Western interests in the name of Islam. In the late 1980s members of Al Qaeda (Arabic for "base" or "foundation") fought with the mujahideen against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. The organization is, however, best known for the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks against the United States, the worst such attacks in the history of that nation. The founding of Al Qaeda, which is made up of Salafi (purist) Sunni Muslims, is shrouded in controversy.

Al Qaeda was established sometime in 1987 or 1988 by Sheikh Abdullah Azzam, a mentor to Osama bin Laden. Azzam was a professor at King Abd al-Aziz University in Jidda, Saudi Arabia. Bin Laden attended that university, where he met and was strongly influenced by Azzam.

Al Qaeda grew out of the Mujaheddin Services Bureau that Azzam established in Peshawar, Afghanistan. Bin Laden funded the organization and was considered the deputy director. This organization recruited, trained, and transported Muslim volunteers from any Muslim nation into Afghanistan to fight the jihad (holy war) against the Soviet armies in the 1980s. Radical groups such as the Gamaat Islamiya and the Egyptian Islamic Jihad developed the credo for Al Qaeda, basing their beliefs in turn on many ideas, including those of Sayyid Qutb, an executed member of the Muslim Brotherhood, and Muhammad Abd al-Salam Faraj, whose influential pamphlet "al-Farida al-Gha'iba" ("The Missing Duty") asserted the primacy of armed jihad to overthrow apostate Muslim governments. Azzam adopted and expanded

on these arguments, and bin Laden applied them to the government of Saudi Arabia, which he believed was too closely allied with the West. Thus, armed struggle should combat the far as well as the near enemy to create a new Islamic society.

After the mysterious death of Sheikh Azzam in November 1989, perhaps at bin Laden's behest, bin Laden took over the leadership of Al Qaeda. He has continued to work toward Azzam's goal of creating an international organization of mujahideen (soldiers) who will fight the oppression of Muslims throughout the world. Al Qaeda actually has several goals: to destroy Israel, to rid the Islamic world of the influence of Western civilization, to reestablish an authentic Islamic form of government throughout the world, to fight against any government viewed as contrary to the ideals of Islamic law and religion, and to aid Islamic groups trying to establish an Islamic form of government in their countries.

No attacks by Al Qaeda are known to have occurred against Israel. The most damaging Al Qaeda attack by far has been the September 11, 2001, attack on the United States. The genesis of Al Qaeda's great antipathy toward the West—in particular the United States—can be traced back to the 1991 Persian Gulf War, precipitated by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on August 2, 1990. Bin Laden, originally a well-to-do Saudi Arabian, allegedly offered to commit Al Qaeda mujahideen fighters to the defense of Saudi Arabia in case of an Iraqi move on that nation. The Saudi government declined the offer and instead decided to permit the stationing of hundreds of thousands of U.S. and coalition soldiers in Saudi Arabia during the run-up to the war. This move enraged bin Laden, who perceived the presence of foreign troops in Saudi Arabia as a blatant acknowledgment of the political linkage between his government and the United States. He also portrayed this as a religious failing, for Saudi Arabia is home to both Mecca and Medina, the holiest places in all of Islam. When he condemned the stationing of troops in Saudi Arabia, bin Laden was expelled from the kingdom and his citizenship was revoked. He then took up temporary residence in the Sudan.

Once in Sudan, bin Laden began training Al Qaeda fighters and is believed to have carried out an abortive assassination attempt against Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak in 1994. Under intense international pressure led by the United States, Sudan expelled bin Laden and Al Qaeda leadership in late 1996. From Sudan, they traveled directly to Afghanistan, where the Islamic fundamentalist Taliban regime had already ensconced itself. The Taliban not only protected Al Qaeda but in all probability helped arm it, and by doing so gave to it an air of legitimacy, at least in Afghanistan. In 1998, bin Laden joined forces with leaders from the Egyptian Islamic Jihad and several other radical organizations, all of whom vowed to wage a holy war against Israel and its allies. In August of that year, Al Qaeda carried out what are thought to be its first overseas attack against Western interests. That month saw the bombings of the U.S. embassies in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, and Nairobi, Kenya. More than 200 people died in the attacks, and another 4,000 were wounded.

In October 2000, Al Qaeda also carried out an attack on the U.S. Navy guided missile destroyer *Cole* in the Yemeni port of Aden in which 17 U.S. sailors perished.

The organization of Al Qaeda has a majlis al-shura, or consultative council, form of leadership. The amir al-muminin (commander of the faithful) is bin Laden, followed by several other generals, and then additional leaders of related groups. Some sources say that 24 related groups are represented on the consultative council. The council consists of four committees: military, religious-legal, finance, and media. The leader of each of these committees is selected personally by bin Laden and reports directly to him. All levels of Al Qaeda are highly compartmentalized, and secrecy is the key to all operations.

Al Qaeda's ideology has appealed to both Middle Eastern and non–Middle Eastern Muslim groups. A number of radical Islamic terrorist groups have also initiated an association with Al Qaeda via public declarations, such as al-Qaeda fi Bilad al-Rafidayn (in the land of the two rivers, meaning Iraq) and al-Qaeda fi Jazirat al-Arabiyya (of the Arabian Peninsula). Nevertheless, Al Qaeda continues to be the central force of world terrorism because of the media attention given to its occasional pronouncements and the September 11 attacks.

Al Qaeda's most horrific deed has undoubtedly been the September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States. The attacks, which killed an estimated 2,976 people,

A video still released by Al Jazeera television shows Osama bin Laden with Egyptian jihad leader Ayman al-Zawahri in at an undisclosed location in 2001. (AP/Wide World Photos)

were carried out by the hijacking of four commercial jetliners, two of which were flown into New York City's World Trade Center, destroying both towers. A third jetliner was crashed into the Pentagon outside Washington, D.C., and a fourth, supposedly bound for the White House or the U.S. Capitol, crashed in a western Pennsylvania field, killing all onboard. It has been alleged that Al Qaeda inspired the March 2004 Madrid train bombings that killed nearly 200 and the July 2005 London subway bombings that killed 52. Although Al Qaeda took responsibility for the latter, there is no irrefutable evidence linking Al Qaeda to either attack, although it is believed that the perpetrators borrowed Al Qaeda tactics to pull them off.

The War on Terror, initiated since the September 11 attacks, resulted in an invasion of Afghanistan and the toppling of the Taliban in late 2001. This conflict has kept Al Qaeda on the run ever since. Some of the leadership has been killed, but bin Laden has thus far apparently eluded capture or death. Since the 2003 Anglo-American invasion of Iraq, Al Qaeda was thought to have supported the growing insurgency in Iraq, which became a virtual full-blown civil war during 2006. Since 2007, U.S. and coalition forces have enjoyed some success in purging Iraq of Al Qaeda operatives. Although most Arab and Muslim governments have tried to distance themselves from Al Qaeda and its operations, there can be little doubt that the group enjoys support among significant elements of the populations of these countries.

Bin Laden has been able to put most of the radical Islamic terrorist groups under the umbrella of Al Qaeda. Indeed, its leadership has spread throughout the world, and its influence penetrates many religious, social, and economical structures in most Muslim communities. Today, the upper-echelon leadership of Al Qaeda continues to elude American intelligence and Western armies in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The membership of Al Qaeda remains difficult to determine because of its decentralized organizational structure. Nevertheless, by early 2005, U.S. officials claimed to have killed or taken prisoner two-thirds of the Al Qaeda leaders behind the September 11 attacks. On May 2, 2011, Osama bin Laden was killed in Abbottabad, Pakistan, in an operation conducted by American military forces and the Central Intelligence Agency. While his death is a significant blow for Al Qaeda, many experts believe that it would have limited operational effect on Al Qaeda, which has become highly decentralized.

Al Qaeda continues to periodically release audiotapes and videotapes, some featuring bin Laden himself, to comment on current issues, to exhort followers to keep up the fight, and to prove to Western governments that it is still a force to be reckoned with.

Harry Raymond Hueston

See also: Afghanistan, U.S. War in (2001–); Iraq War (2003–); Osama bin Laden; Terrorism.

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Al Qaeda in Iraq

Al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) is a Sunni jihadist terrorist organization that has taken root in Iraq since the 2003 Anglo-American–led invasion of that nation. The U.S. government has characterized AQI, sometimes referred to as Al Qaeda in Mesopotamia, as the most deadly Sunni jihadist insurgent force now in Iraq. Other sources and experts argue that this designation is exaggerated, as the group is merely one of more than 40 similar organizations, and that the claim was made symbolically to rationalize the idea that coalition forces are fighting terrorism in Iraq and thus should not withdraw precipitously.

Opponents of the continuing U.S. presence in Iraq have argued that the 2003 invasion sparked the growth of Salafi jihadism and suicide terrorism in Iraq and its export to other parts of the Islamic world. AQI first formed after the invasion and toppling of the Iraq regime, under the name Jama'at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad (group of monotheism and jihad) under Abu Musab al-Zarqawi.

Al-Zarqawi had fought in Afghanistan in the 1980s and 1990s, and upon going to Jordan he organized a group called Bayt al-Imam with the noted Islamist ideologue Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi (Muhammad Tahir al-Barqawi) and other veterans of the war in Afghanistan. He was arrested and imprisoned but released in 1999. Returning again to Afghanistan, and setting up camp in Herat, he reportedly took charge of certain Islamist factions in Kurdistan, from there moving into Iraq and, for some time, into Syria. Once Mullah Krekar, the leader of the Kurdish group Islamist Ansar al-Islam was deported to the Netherlands in 2003, certain sources claim that al-Zarqawi led some 600 Arab fighters in Syria.

Tawhid wal-Jihad was blamed for, or took credit for, numerous attacks, including bombings of the Jordanian embassy; the Canal Hotel, which killed 23 at the United Nations headquarters; and the Imam Ali mosque in Najaf. It is also credited with killing Italian paramilitary police and civilians at Nasiriya and numerous suicide attacks that continued through 2005. The group also seized and beheaded hostages. A video of the savage execution of U.S. businessman Nicholas Berg, murdered in Iraq on May 7, 2004, reportedly by al-Zarqawi himself, was followed by other killings of civilians.

The group has targeted Iraqi governmental and military personnel and police because of their cooperation with the American occupying force. AQI's recruitment videos have highlighted American attacks and home searches of defenseless Iraqis and promise martyrdom. Estimates of AQI members have ranged from 850 to several thousand. Also under dispute are the numbers of foreign fighters in relation to Iraqi fighters. Foreign fighters' roles were first emphasized, but it became clear that a much higher percentage (probably 90 percent) of fighters were Iraqi—members of the Salafi jihadist, or quasi-nationalist jihadist, groups.

In October 2004, al-Zarqawi's group issued a statement acknowledging the leadership of Al Qaeda under Osama bin Laden and adopted the name al-Qaeda fi Bilad al-rafidayn (Al Qaeda in Iraq). The Iraqi city of Fallujah, in the western Anbar province, became an AQI stronghold. U.S. forces twice tried to capture the city, first from April 4 to May 1, 2004. The Fallujah Guard then controlled the city. U.S. military and Iraqi forces conquered the city during November 7 to December 23, 2004, in extremely bloody fighting.

Al-Zarqawi formed relationships with other Salafist jihad organizations, announcing an umbrella group, the Mujahideen Shura Council, in 2006. After al-Zarqawi was reportedly at a safe house in June 2006, the new AQI leader, Abu Ayyub al-Masri, announced a new coalition, the Islamic State of Iraq, which included the Mujahideen Shura Council.

Al Qaeda, along with other Sunni Salafist and nationalist groups, strongly resisted Iraqi and coalition forces in Baghdad, Ramadi, and Baqubah and continued staging very damaging attacks into 2007. However, by mid-2008, U.S. commanders claimed dominance over these areas. Nevertheless, AQI was acknowledged to still be operative southeast of Baghdad in Jabour, Mosul, Samarra, Hawijah, and Miqdadiyah. The United States believes AQI's diminished presence is attributable to the Anbar Awakening, which enlisted numerous tribes, including some former AQI members, to fight Al Qaeda. The Americans further believe AQI has been diminished because of the troop-surge strategy that began in early 2007. Since then, bin Laden has urged the mujahideen to unify in the face of these setbacks.

AQI has strongly influenced other jihadist groups and actors, particularly through its Internet presence. In sparking inter-sectarian strife in Iraq, the group has also damaged Iraqi postwar reconstruction and has tapped into the intolerance of many Salafi groups and voices as well as other Sunni Iraqis and Sunni Muslims outside Iraq who have been threatened by the emergence of Shia political parties and institutions that had suffered under the Baathist regime under Saddam Hussein.

Sherifa Zuhur

See also: Afghanistan, U.S. War in (2001–); Iraq War (2003–); Osama bin Laden; Terrorism.

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Ala al-Din Khalji (Alauddin Khilji) (r. 1296–1316)

Talented commander and statesman, Ala al-Din played an important role in the establishment of the Islamic administration in India. Born Juna Khan, he was the nephew of Jalal al-Din Firuz Khalji, who ascended the throne of Delhi as the sultan in 1290, and was initially appointed as the governor of Kara (northeastern India) in 1292. An ambitious man, he soon organized several audacious expeditions against neighboring Hindu Deccan states, raiding Malwa in 1292 and Devagiri in 1294. Two years later he murdered his uncle to claim the title of sultan.

During his 20-year-long reign Ala al-Din Khalji conducted a number of campaigns that greatly expanded his authority. He conquered Gujarat in 1297–1298, Ranthambhor in 1299–1301, Chitor in 1303, Malwa in 1305. Threatened by the Mongol expansion from Central Asia, he successfully repelled several Mongol attacks on northwestern India between 1296 and 1308. The first Mongol invasion, directed against Punjab, was defeated by the sultan's brother Ulugh Khan near Jaran Manjur in February 1298; the Mongol losses are said to be numbered at 20,000 killed and thousands captured. At the same time Ala al-Din's lieutenant Zafar Khan defeated the Mongols in lower Sind. A great threat for the sultan's authority came from the Mongol invasion, led by Qutlugh Qocha, in 1299. Taking advantage of Ala al-Din's preoccupation in Gujarat, Qutlugh Qocha led some 100,000 men directly to Delhi but was intercepted by the sultan (with about 30,000 men) at Kili. In subsequent battle, Zafar Khan, who commanded Ala al-Din's right wing, crushed the Mongol flank and secured victory, although he perished in battle. Over the next few years Mongols conducted repeated raids into northwestern India but usually retreated without fighting a pitched battle. This changed in 1302 when Taraghai, Qutlugh Qocha's successor, rallied 120,000 men and penetrated deep into northern India, forcing Ala al-Din to seek shelter behind the walls of Delhi. The sultan was unable to defeat the Mongols who, however, unexpectedly withdrew from India after two months of plundering. The Mongol invasions in 1305 were also defeated, first at Amroha and then on the banks of the Ravi River, allowing Ala al-Din to launch punitive expeditions into the Mongol-controlled territories in Afghanistan.

The struggle against the Mongols also forced the sultan to reorganize his military. He built and strengthened various fortresses lying in the path of the Mongol advance. He established a large standing army (mustaqim) that counted up to 400,000 horsemen; the latter were divided into the *murattab*, a heavily armored horseman, and the *duaspa*, one not equipped with horse armor. To cover the costs of maintaining such a vast force, the sultan also introduced a series of tax reforms.

After securing the northern front, Ala al-Din turned to the south again and resumed his conquest of the Hindu states, dispatching his army under the capable Malik Kafur. The famously wealthy Kingdom of Devagiri was conquered in 1307, followed by the conquest of Warangal (1309–1310), whose ruler had to pay immense bounty. In 1310, Ala al-Din's forces attacked the Kingdom of Dwarasamudra and overthrew its Hoysala dynasty. The following year witnessed the fall of Madura in the extreme south. Thus, by 1313, Ala al-Din had created a vast empire that stretched from the Himalayas in the north to the Cape Comorin (Kanyakumari) in the south. The campaign produced immense booty, which included tens of thousands of horses that the sultan used to maintain his army; 20,000 horses were captured in Arangal alone in 1310 and another 5,000 in Ma'bar in 1312. The sultan's army also gained a great number of high-quality war elephants—Kafur's campaigns alone produced more than 500 elephants, which he delivered to Delhi. Ala al-Din introduced systematic administration in the Delhi Sultanate and greatly contributed to the consolidation of the Islamic rule and spread of Islam in India. He died after a prolonged illness (most likely dropsy) in 1316.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Delhi Sultanate; India, Muslim Conquest (to 16th Century); Mongols

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Al-Adil (ca. 1144–1218)

Prominent Muslim commander, lord of Upper Mesopotamia (r. 1193–1198) and Damascus (r. 1198–1200), and sultan of Egypt and Syria (r. 1200–1218). Born Al-Adil Abu Bakr around 1144–1145, he was brother to the famous Saladin, earned the title of Sayf ad-Din (The Sword of Religion), and was known as Saphadin in the

West. Al-Adil began his career under his brother Saladin, whom he loyally served until the latter's death in 1193. He came to prominence during Saladin's conquest of Egypt in 1174–1175 and, after his brother's departure to Syria, Al-Adil replaced him in Egypt, demonstrating considerable administrative and military talents as he suppressed domestic revolts and dealt with Crusader threats. From Egypt he energetically supported the policies of his brother and contributed to his success against the Franks during the Third Crusade. Thus, he was present at the conquest of Jerusalem and participated in Saladin's negotiations with Richard the Lion-heart. In early 1190, he was given Upper Mesopotamia to rule, and after the death of Saladin in 1193, he tried to mediate between his nephews, who became embroiled in the struggle for the sovereignty. After failing to secure peace, he actively participated in the power struggle and developed a series of shifting alliances that led to his dispossessing his nephews of their lands and power. After seizing Damascus in 1198, al-Adil was able to establish his authority over the Ayyubid empire by 1200 when he reclaimed Egypt from Saladin's grandson, al-Mansur. This success was partially due to the quiet period between the fourth and fifth crusades, which allowed Al-Adil to concentrate resources on consolidating his power. Yet, in 1217–1218, he faced the Crusader invasion of Egypt (the Fifth Crusade) and was unable to prevent the loss of Damietta. He did not live to see the fall of Damietta and died in August 1218. Upon his death, the sultanate passed to his son, al-Kamil, who brought the war against the crusaders in the Nile Delta to a successful conclusion.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Fifth Crusade (1217–1221); Saladin; Third Crusade (1187–1192).

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Al-Afal (d. 1122)

Military vizier, and effectively dictator, of Fatimid Egypt (1094–1122). A Muslim convert of Armenian origin, al-Afal was the son and successor of Badr al-Jamali, whose military intervention in 1073 in the civil war that ravaged Egypt restored order in the country and kept the Fatimids in power. Al-Afal misjudged the aims of the First Crusade (1095–1099) and offered the Crusaders cooperation against the Saljuks. His military response to the advance of the Crusaders on Jerusalem was

slow, and the army he dispatched to Ascalon (modern Tel Ashqelon, Israel) suffered a bitter defeat by the Crusaders (August 12, 1099).

In the wake of the defeat, al-Afal introduced military reforms and incorporated Turkish military slaves into the Fatimid army. Under his rule Egypt enjoyed a period of stability and prosperity, but the privileged position of Ismaili Islam in the country was eroded. However, in 1122 al-Amir, the ruling caliph, had al-Afal assassinated and took the reins of power into his own hands.

Yaacov Lev

See also: Fatimids; First Crusade (1096–1099); Ismailis.

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Al-Afshin, Haydar ibn Kawuz (d. 841)

Haydar al-Afshin, senior commander of the Abbasid Caliphate's armies from ca. 836 to 839, came from mountainous eastern Transoxania, on the borders of what are now Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. He was the son of Kawaz, the last Turkish prince of Ushrusana, who had himself sworn allegiance to the caliph and converted to Islam around 823. Haydar was recruited by the Abbasid prince al-Mu'tasim before the latter became caliph, was made governor of Barqa in eastern Libya, crushed an Egyptian revolt in 831, and was credited with recruiting al-Mu'tasim's Maghribi, or "Western," guard from Egyptian Arab Bedouins. After al-Mu'tasim became caliph, Haydar al-Afshin commanded a successful two-year campaign to crush Babik, a rebel who had long defied Abbasid authority around northern Iraq. Haydar was selected because, coming from Ushrusana, he was an expert in mountain warfare. He was also a careful commander, relying upon meticulous planning, restraining overenthusiastic subordinates, and turning around defeated foes.

During this campaign Haydar al-Afshin used what were, for the Abbasid army, new tactics. Instead of the rapid raids that characterized previous Islamic campaigns, he gathered a very large army that advanced steadily, consolidating its gains by building fortifications, defending its own positions with field fortifications, sending forward numerous reconnaissance forces, and paying great attention to its lines of communication. Haydar subsequently commanded a column during a two-pronged Muslim invasion of the Byzantine Empire in 838, again being responsible for the most mountainous sector. Here his units were ambushed by a large

Byzantine army under the emperor himself, yet Haydar rallied his confused troops and won a significant victory. However, Haydar al-Afshin was subsequently implicated in a revolt against the caliph's authority in Iran, was accused of trying to bring back the pre-Islamic Zoroastrian religion, and starved to death in prison.

David Nicolle

See also: Abbasids; Byzantine-Muslim Wars (to 1035).

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Al-Amin, Muhammad (d. 813)

Abbasid caliph from 809 to 813. His short reign is highlighted by the Abbasid civil war that was fought in Khurasan between him and his brother, Abd Allah al-Mamun, from 810 until to his death (the civil war did not end until 833). Their father, Harun al-Rashid, had determined the succession by choosing al-Amin as his heir and making al-Mamun the ruler of an autonomous Khurasan. The two brothers swore to uphold their father's succession arrangements. However, within a year of Harun's death al-Amin started to undermine al-Mamun's rule in Khurasan and tried to bring the region under central control. When al-Mamun refused to comply with Al-Amin's wishes, he was removed from the succession and the caliph sent a massive force of 40,000 Abna under the leadership of Ali ibn Isa against him. Al-Mamun's smaller Khurasani army of 5,000 men was commanded by a Persian named Tahir ibn Husayn. The two armies met near Rayy in May 811, and in the ensuing battle Ali ibn Isa was killed and Al-Amin's forces were routed.

Tahir marched west defeating every army al-Amin threw in his path and was joined by another of al-Mamun's commanders, Harthama Ibn Ayan, and together they besieged Baghdad in August 812. The siege lasted for a year, during which time most of the Abna defected to Tahir. In response, al-Amin armed the populace of Baghdad in a final bid to salvage his position. However, despite their efforts the defenders were overwhelmed by Tahir and Harthama's battle-hardened armies, which took the city in September 813. Al-Amin tried to flee to Harthama, who had been his father's friend, in east Baghdad hoping to make a deal with him. However, Tahir intercepted the fleeing caliph and had him executed.

Adam Ali

See also: Abbasids; Harun al-Rashid.

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Al-Anfal Campaign (1987–1988)

A military campaign undertaken by Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein and his Baathist regime against the Kurdish population in 1987–1988. Embroiled in a prolonged conflict with Iran, the Iraqi government considered the Kurds to be a major domestic threat and potential fifth column for Iran because of the Kurdish demands of autonomy in northern Iraq. In early spring 1987, Saddam Hussein named Ali Hassan al-Majid as secretary-general of the administrative zone called the "Northern Bureau," which controlled Iraqi Kurdistan. Al-Majid, who soon earned the grisly moniker of "Chemical Ali," launched a series of attacks on Kurdish villages, destroying settlements and resettling thousands of Kurds to detention centers in other regions of Iraq. The Kurds resisted this forcible relocation and clashes erupted between them and government forces. In response, the Baathist regime sanctioned the mass killing of anyone who refused to leave his or her village.

The Al-Anfal campaign consisted of eight major stages that lasted between February 23 and September 6, 1988, and featured ground offensives, aerial attacks, firing squads, and widespread use of chemical warfare. One of the goals of the Al-Anfal Campaign was Arabization of Iraq's north, and the depopulated Kurdish villages were settled by Arabs from Iraq's southern regions. Precise losses among the civilian Kurdish population remains unclear, but an estimated 100,000 to 150,000 Kurds fell victim to the regime's brutality, many of them gassed to death. In total, about 4,000 Kurdish villages and towns, more than 1,700 schools, and hundreds of mosques were destroyed. The SF/4008 directive, issued by al-Majid in June 1987, specified that "all persons captured in [Kurdish] villages shall be detained and interrogated by the security services and those between the ages of 15 and 70 shall be executed after any useful information has been obtained from them." (Black 1993, 81).

After the U.S. invasion of Iraq, Saddam Hussein and six other government members were tried for crimes committed during the Al-Anfal Campaign. Found guilty of crimes against humanity, Hussein was executed in December 2006, and al-Majid was hanged in January 2010.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Hussein, Saddam.



A humanitarian worker carries an injured Kurdish girl to a hospital after being evacuated to Switzerland in March 1988. The girl was one of many victims of a nerve gas attack by Saddam Hussein's Al-Anfal. (AP/Wide World Photos)

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Alarcos, Battle of (1195)

Battle fought on July 19, 1195, between an alliance of Almohads, led by Abu Yusuf Ya'qub al-Mansur and the Castilian army of King Alfonso VIII. The Castilian forces had been raiding Almohad territory around Seville since 1190. In 1195, Al-Mansur decided to deal with these incursions. He landed at Tarifa on June 1 and advanced on Cordoba. Alfonso VIII gathered his forces and marched to Alarcos, where a new castle was under construction. Alfonso did not wait for reinforcements, which were being raised by King Alfonso XI of Leon. Therefore, he would

be heavily outnumbered. On the day of battle Alfonso placed his 8,000 knights in a vanguard commanded by the Lord of Vizcaya. Alfonso himself commanded the infantry. Vizcaya ordered the cavalry to charge the center of the Almohad forces, which were predominantly archers. Al-Mansur held the elite of his forces in reserve. The charge of the Castilian knights smashed through the Almohad line, but the heavy cavalry were quickly surrounded by the sultan's forces and came under accurate archery fire. The sultan then led his personal guard forward and was seen fighting in the front ranks. Alfonso advanced with his infantry, but he could not make any impression on the Almohads, and it was clear that he had been defeated. The survivors of his cavalry force sought refuge in the unfinished fortifications. The Castilian army had effectively been destroyed, and many fortifications in the area surrendered; the Almohads, however, had also suffered heavy losses, and Al-Mansur withdrew to Seville.

Ralph M. Baker

See also: Almohads; Reconquista.

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Albanian-Ottoman Wars (1444–1468)

This conflict started after Gjergj Kastrioti "Skanderbeg" decided to lead a revolt against Ottoman rule. Previously, Skanderbeg had served in the Ottoman army but had become disenchanted with their harsh repression of minor disturbances in the 1430s. In 1438, he had resigned from his government position at Krujë, and with the outbreak of fighting in Hungary, Skanderbeg thought it was the time to launch a rebellion, joining forces with the guerrilla bands that had been formed by Gjergj Arianiti in 1432.

In March 1444, the League of Lezhë was formed to unite the various tribal leaders (Gjergj Arianiti, Nikollë Pal Dukagjini, Andrea Topia, and others), opposed to Ottoman rule. Some of them, like Skanderbeg, had served in the Ottoman forces and were able to use this training to launch a number of surprise attacks. After the initial success of the rebellion, the Ottomans sent reinforcements into the region. Although some European powers extolled Skanderbeg's heroism, they did not send any soldiers or weapons, so over a few years, the Ottomans were able to drive back the rebels, managing to retake most towns and the important coastal region.

On May 14, 1450, a large Ottoman force attacked the rebel base at Krujë. After a siege lasting four months, the Ottomans were forced to withdraw as winter approached. The Ottoman capture of Constantinople in 1453 allowed the Ottomans to deploy more soldiers to Albania, and in June 1466, Mehmet II led some 150,000 soldiers into Albania, sacking large parts of the countryside. The Albanians were forced back into the highlands, and reduced to guerrilla attacks on the Ottomans, although Skanderbeg continued to rely on minor support from Venice. Skanderbeg's death at Lezhë in 1468 marked the end of the war, although isolated attacks continued until 1479.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Constantinople, Siege of (1453); Mehmed II; Varna Crusade (1444).

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Alcazarquivir, Battle of (1578)

A decisive Moroccan victory over the Portuguese forces, this "Battle of Three Kings" (known as the battle of Wadi al-Makhazin among Arab historians) had a profound impact on the history of Portugal and Morocco. King Sebastian of Portugal had aspired to military glory that would rival that of the neighboring Spain, and he was determined to expand Portugal's influence in northwestern Africa. The immediate cause for the expedition was the request of Abu Abdallah Mohammed II Saadi, the sultan of Morocco, for help to recover throne that his uncle Abu Marwan Abd Al-Malik had taken from him in 1576. By 1578, the young Portuguese monarch had organized a major expedition that was not only ill conceived (Sebastian ignored admonitions of his uncle Philip II of Spain) but also poorly planned and executed. After landing at Arzila, Sebastian's army of 20,000 men was joined by Abu Abdallah Mohammed II's allies (3,000–6,000 men) and marched toward Alcazarquivir, encountering a superior Moroccan force of Abd Al-Malik not far from it. Sebastian's army consisted mainly of Portuguese infantry, German mercenaries, and a few Italian musketeers. They were supported by a largely light cavalry force of Abu Abdallah Mohammed II. Abd Al-Malik's army was mainly cavalry, but at its core was a modern, well-armed force that was equipped with firearms and cannon.

In the battle fought on August 4, 1578, almost the entire Portuguese army, including King Sebastian and Abu Abdallah Mohammed, was slain or captured. The battle reaffirmed the power of Morocco, although Sultan Abd al-Malik also died during the battle. The defeat ended Portugal's ambitions of creating an empire in northwestern Africa, and the death of King Sebastian started the events that ended Portugal's independence and led to the union of Portugal and Spain under Philip II of Spain. The battle interrupted Portuguese land trade in Africa, and ransoms for the captive nobles proved to be extremely burdensome for the economy. Bereft of its administrative and military elite, it took Portugal decades to recover from the consequences of Alcazarquivir.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Al-Mansur, Ahmad ibn Muhammad.

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Alexandria, Sack of (1365)

The capture of the port of Alexandria was the climax of a crusade launched by King Peter I of Cyprus. Acre, the last major Christian stronghold in the Holy Land, fell to the Mamluk sultanate in 1291. In the subsequent decades there had been much talk of a major crusade. In the mid-14th century, King Peter, whether out of practical concern for Cyprus's economy and security or genuine religious zeal, actively promoted the idea of renewed crusading. In 1362, he visited several European courts seeking support for a crusade, and by 1365, he managed to gather French, English, Cypriot, Hospitaller, and other forces at the Island of Rhodes. Peter set the city of Alexandria as the objective of the crusade because the city was the greatest and richest port of the Mamluk sultanate and the gateway to Cairo. The Christian fleet approached the city on October 9 and made a surprise attack the same day. By the following day, the Crusaders broke through the defenses and the city was ruthlessly pillaged and laid waste over the next three days. Defenders and townspeople were indiscriminately slaughtered, irrespective of age and sex.

Although Guillaume de Machaut's claim of 20,000 slain Alexandrians is no doubt exaggerated, the city itself was razed, and thousands of its citizens were killed; about 5,000 were captured and taken away as slaves, and more than 70 ships were filled with loot. As the Crusaders pondered their next move, they received the news that a large Mamluk army was approaching. King Peter argued for defending the city, but most of the Crusaders preferred to abandon it, which was immediately done. The sack of Alexandria was the last significant crusade to carry out an actual attack on a major target in or near the Holy Land. Despite its initial success, it brought no long-term strategic benefits for the Crusaders.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Mamluk Sultanate.

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Alexandropol, Treaty of (1920)

Signed on December 2, 1920, the Treaty of Alexandropol ended a war between the Turkish revolutionary government (Grand National Assembly of Turkey) and Armenia and led to the end of a separate Armenia state. The Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, signed between Russia and the Central Powers on March 3, 1918, ended the war between Russia and the Ottoman Republic, forcing Russia to return territories captured since 1877. Before the Ottomans could reestablish their authority in this region, they were defeated by the Allies, and an independent Democratic Republic of Armenia was established in December 1918. The Western powers quickly recognized the new state. In June 1920, Armenian soldiers clashed with Turkish tribes along the border. Turkish soldiers under General Kazim Karabekir invaded western Armenia in response on September 20. Despite strong resistance, the Armenians were forced out of prewar Turkish areas. In response, they massacred local Muslim populations.

The European powers refused to help the Armenians, and Karabekir captured the important city of Alexandropol on November 6. Karabekir's terms for peace included the cession of half of the Armenian territories and the virtual disarming of the state. When the Armenians refused, Karabekir threatened to occupy all of

Armenia, forcing the Armenians to sign the treaty in Alexandropol. Armenia renounced the provisions of the Treaty of Sevres, which called for establishment of a vast Armenian state, and accepted the territorial division established in the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. Two days later, a Bolshevik army invaded the remaining Armenian territory and established a soviet republic. In 1921, Turkey and the Soviet Union signed the treaties of Moscow and Kars, which formalized the situation and established the present borders.

Tim J. Watts

See also: Kars, Treaty of (1921); Sèvres, Treaty of (1920); Turkish-Armenian War (1920).

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Algeciras Conference (1906)

International conference that met in Algeciras, Spain, to resolve the First Moroccan Crisis between France and Germany about the establishment of a French protectorate over Morocco.

In 1904, France wanted to establish a protectorate over Morocco and had obtained the support of Britain and Spain. The German chancellor Bernhard von Bülow opposed this increase in French control and decided to test the new friendship between Britain and France, who had recently signed the Entente Cordiale. Kaiser Wilhelm II visited Tangiers, Morocco, on March 31, 1905, and made a provocative speech favoring Moroccan independence. France and Germany mobilized troops, which moved toward their respective borders.

To resolve the crisis peacefully, delegates of 13 nations met at Algeciras, Spain, from January 16 to April 7, 1906. The German representative discovered that he only had the support of the delegate from Austria-Hungary. Because France, supported by Britain, Russia, Italy, Spain, and the United States, controlled the conference, Germany decided to accept a face-saving compromise on March 31, 1906 that was signed on May 31, 1906.

According to the agreement, the Sultan of Morocco, Abdelaziz, kept control of the police force in the six port cities, but France received control of Morocco's political and financial affairs. On June 18, Abdelaziz ratified the agreement by personal decree.

The Algeciras Conference solved the First Moroccan Crisis but worsened tensions between the Triple Entente and the Triple Alliance. It strengthened the ties

between Britain and France and Britain and Russia, who signed a bilateral agreement the following year. Angered by the humiliation, Kaiser Wilhelm II contributed to a Second Moroccan Crisis in 1911.

Robert B. Kane

See also: Morocco, French Conquest of.

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Algeria, French Conquest of (1830–1857)

The conquest of Algeria was initiated in the last days of the Bourbon Restoration by Charles X as an attempt to increase his popularity among the French people, bolster patriotic sentiment, and expand French influence in North Africa.

In 1827, a diplomatic incident led to Algiers being blockaded by the French Navy for three years. On April 28, 1827, Hussein Dey of Algiers, while demanding explanation from Pierre Deval, the French consul, for France's failure to pay a 30-year-old debt, struck the consul with a fly whisk and called him a wicked rascal. King Charles X of France used this slight against his diplomatic representative to first demand an apology from the dey, and then to initiate a blockade against the port of Algiers. The blockade lasted for three years until Charles X ordered an invasion. The French army of 38,000 men, led by General Louis Auguste Victor de Ghaisne, comte de Bourmont, landed near Algiers on June 14, 1830, and during a three-week campaign, it inflicted a series of defeats on Algerian forces, capturing Algiers on July 5 and ending more than 300 years of Ottoman presence in the region. However, this was not the end of local resistance to the French. Ahmad Bey ben Mohamed Chérif, the bey of Constantine, led the local Berber population in a fierce resistance to the French occupation forces, as did Abd al-Qadir, emir of Mascara, who established his base in western Algeria and staged a large number of raids against the French. In 1834, France formally annexed the occupied areas of Algeria and created a colonial administration that was led by a governor general responsible to the minister of war.

The French then directed their attention to defeating the continued Algerian resistance. Despite their attempts to crush Abd al-Qadir's insurgency, it endured,

The French forces landing near Algiers during the French invasion of Algeria. (Keystone-France/Gamma-Keystone via Getty Images)

compelling the French to accept the Treaty of Tafna in May 1837, which recognized French conquests in Algeria but also surrendered much of Algeria to al-Qadir's sovereignty. But the French effectively broke the terms of the agreement when they stormed Constantine in October 1837. This led to Abd al-Qadir's launching fresh attacks, and by 1839, he effectively controlled two thirds of the country. To put an end to this, in 1840, King Louis Philippe appointed a new commander in chief, Thomas Robert Bugeaud, who pursued a vigorous campaign using mobile columns that struck at the supply centers of Abd al-Qadir. In May 1843, the French army inflicted a heavy defeat on Algerians at Smala, forcing Abd al-Qadir to withdraw into Morocco and continue his campaign from there. However, Bugeaud again defeated Abd al-Qadir and his Morrocan allies at Isly (1844) and then at Sidi-Brahim (1845), effectively ending al-Qadir's resistance. While al-Qadir's forces were being subdued, the French also led a series of expeditions into the Aurès Mountains, where Berber resistance remained strong until late 1849. By then nearly all of northern Algeria was under French control, and the government of the Second Republic declared the occupied lands an integral part of France, creating three départements (local administrative units) under a civilian government. The last stronghold of Algerian resistance was the mountainous area of Kabylia, which the French gradually conquered in 1856–1857. This victory

effectively ended the conquest of Algeria, although isolated resistance continued for many years.

Ralph M. Baker

See also: Abd al-Qadir (Abdelkader); French Colonial Policy in Africa; Tafna, Treaty of (1837).

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Algeria Civil War (1992–1999)

Algeria gained independence after a brutal conflict with France in 1962. The country faced grave difficulties as a member of the international community from the start. A shortage of civil servants and skilled workers and a traumatized populace all hampered efforts at economic development. President Ben Bella, for his part, believed a state-centered economy was best suited to Algerian needs, but he increasingly appropriated most power to himself. Partly for that reason, he was overthrown in June 1965 by his defense minister, Colonel Houari Boumedienne, a prominent guerrilla leader. Boumedienne continued the socialist orientation of Algeria during his term in office (from 1965 to 1978) but still kept the country in the hands of a trusted group of military officers. Boumedienne's death in December 1978 and the accession to the presidency by Colonel Chadli Benjedid several weeks later brought a considerable loosening of the bonds of dictatorship but also an increase in corruption and inequality among Algerian citizens. In this environment, and parallel with the rise of Islamic fundamentalism elsewhere, Algerian Islamists rapidly acquired a higher profile, taking advantage of broadly based and violent protests against the Benjedid government in October 1988 to press for the institution of Islamic norms, based on the sharia, the Muslim legal code.

President Benjedid reacted to the unrest and the Islamist upsurge by briefly making Algeria probably the most democratic Arab country in the world between 1989 and 1992. But the military establishment—unwilling to face the prospect of an Islamist regime after the primary Muslim fundamentalist group, the Front Islamique de Salut (Islamic Salvation Front), achieved notable successes at the

ballot box in elections in 1990 and 1991—forced Benjedid to resign in January 1992 and canceled all further elections. Political power devolved to the Haut Conseil de l'Etat (High State Council, or HCE), an improvised body without constitutional or popular legitimacy. The Islamist groups refused to accept being deprived of power and driven underground, and so, over the following decade, they waged a war of extreme brutality against the Algerian security forces, which responded with atrocities of their own. More than 100,000 Algerians were thought to have been killed by 2001, often in horrific circumstances—particularly in rural areas, where whole villages were sometimes wiped out, whether by the Islamists or the army few outsiders could know. Gen. Liamine Zéroual, the HCE leader in the late 1990s, recognized the utter despair of his compatriots (and the relative weakness of the Islamists) and therefore facilitated—in controversial electoral circumstances—the election of former foreign minister Abdelaziz Bouteflika to the presidency in April 1999. High hopes were generated by Bouteflika's election, and a "civil harmony" program of amnesty and disarmament for the fundamentalists raised expectations further. However, a continued high level of violence, renewed Berber protest, and an endemic lack of true democracy all made Algeria's plight in 2001 as seemingly intractable as it appeared to be 10 years earlier.

Anthony G. Pazzanita

See also: Algerian War (1954–1962).

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Algerian War (1954–1962)

Eight-year military effort by France (1954–1962) to maintain its hold on its last, largest, and most important colony. France regarded the Algerian War as part of the larger Cold War and tried unsuccessfully to convince its North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) partners that keeping Algeria French was in the best interests of the alliance. Unsupported by its allies, France found itself increasingly isolated in diplomatic circles. Ultimately, it experienced a humiliating defeat and a colonial exodus.

For 130 years, Algeria had been at the core of the French Empire. France conquered Algiers in 1830 and expanded the territory. Algeria became the headquarters of the French Foreign Legion (at Sidi Bel Abbès) and home to the largest number of European settlers in the Islamic world. In 1960 there were 1 million Europeans (colons) in Algeria. Unique among French colonies, Algeria became a political component of France, as Algiers, Constantine, and Oran were made départements of the French Republic and had representation in the French Chamber of Deputies. Nonetheless, Algeria was not fully three French départements, as only the European population enjoyed full rights there. The colon and Muslim populations lived separate and unequal lives, and the Europeans controlled the bulk of the wealth. During this time, the French expanded Algeria's frontiers deep into the Sahara.

The Great Depression of the 1930s affected Algeria's Muslims more than any experience since their conquest, as they began to migrate from the countryside into the cities in search of work. Subsequently, the Muslim birthrate climbed dramatically because of easier access to health care facilities. While the colons sought to preserve their status, French officials vacillated between promoting colon interests and promoting reforms for the Muslims. Pro-Muslim reform efforts ultimately failed because of political pressure from the colons and their representatives in Paris. While French political theorists debated between assimilation and autonomy for Algeria's Muslims, the Muslim majority remained largely resentful of the privileged status of the colons.

The first Muslim political organizations appeared in the 1930s, the most important of these being Ahmed Messali Hadj's Mouvement pour le Triomphe des Libertés Démocratiques (MTLD). World War II brought opportunities for change that increasing numbers of Algerian Muslims desired. After the Anglo-American landings in North Africa in November 1942, Muslim activists met with American envoy Robert Murphy and Free French general Henri Giraud concerning postwar freedoms but received no firm commitments. As the war in Europe was ending and the Arab League was forming, pent-up Muslim frustrations were vented in the Sétif Uprising of May 8, 1945. Muslim mobs massacred colons before colonial troops restored order, and hundreds of Muslims were killed in a colon reprisal that was termed a "rat-hunt."

Returning Muslim veterans were shocked by what they regarded as the French government's heavy-handed actions after Sétif, and some (including veteran Ahmed Ben Bella) joined the MTLD. Ben Bella went on to form the MTLD's paramilitary branch, the Organization Speciale, and soon fled to Egypt to enlist the support of President Gamal Abdel Nasser. Pro-independence Algerian Muslims were emboldened by Ho Chi Minh's victory over French forces at Dien Bien Phu in Vietnam in May 1954, and when Algerian Muslim leaders met Ho at the Bandung Conference in April 1955, he told them that the French could be defeated.

Ben Bella and his compatriots formed the Front de Libération Nationale (FLN) on October 10, 1954, and the FLN revolution officially began on the night of October 31 to November 1. The FLN organized its manpower into several military districts, or wilayas. Its goal was to end French control of Algeria and drive out or eliminate the colon population. Wilaya 4, located near Algiers, was especially important, and the FLN was particularly active in Kabylia and the Aurès Mountains. The party's organization was rigidly hierarchical and tolerated no dissent. In form and style, it resembled Soviet-bloc communist parties, although it claimed to offer a noncommunist and non-Western alternative ideology, articulated by Frantz Fanon.

As France increased the number of its military forces in Algeria to fight the growing insurgency, French officials sought support from NATO partners in the Algerian War, arguing that keeping Algeria French would ensure that NATO's southern flank would be safe from communism. As part of France, Algeria was included in the original NATO charter. Washington's position, nonetheless, was that European colonial empires were obsolete. Furthermore, U.S. officials believed the United States could positively influence decolonization movements in the developing world.

The Arab League promoted Pan-Arabism and the image of universal Arab and Muslim support for the FLN. The French grant of independence to Tunisia and Morocco in March 1956 further bolstered Algeria's Muslims. When France, Britain, and Israel invaded Egypt in the Suez Crisis of 1956, the United States and the Soviet Union condemned the move, and the French, unable to topple Nasser, were forced to contend with an FLN supply base that they could neither attack nor eliminate.

On August 20, 1955, the FLN attacked colon civilians in the Philippeville massacre, and colon reprisals resulted in the deaths of several thousand Muslims. The year-long Battle of Algiers began in September 1956 with FLN operative Saadi Yacef's terrorist-style bombing campaign against colon civilians. Meanwhile, other FLN leaders targeted governmental officials for assassination. The FLN movement faced a setback on October 22, however, when Ben Bella was captured.

In December 1956 and January 1957, battle-tested French troops with combat experience in Indochina arrived in Algeria to restore order in Algiers. Among them were General Raoul Salan (commander in chief), paratrooper commander Major General Jacques Massu, and Colonels Yves Godard and Marcel Bigeard, both of whom were adept at intelligence gathering and infiltration. Massu's men made steady headway, and Goddard himself captured Saadi Yacef in September 1957. The Battle of Algiers was now won. The 1965 film *The Battle of Algiers*, produced by Gillo Pontecorvo and Saadi Yacef (with money provided by the FLN), garnered international support for the FLN, as it depicted the French simply as brutal occupiers. The French used torture to force FLN operatives to talk, while others were

murdered in the process. The FLN, on the other hand, also routinely murdered captured French soldiers and colon civilians.

Despite victory in Algiers, French forces were not able to quell the Algerian rebellion or gain the confidence of the colons. Some colons were fearful that the French government was about to negotiate with the FLN. In the spring of 1958, colon Ultra groups began to hatch a plan to change the colonial government. Colon veteran Pierre Lagaillarde organized hundreds of Ultra commandos and began a revolt on May 13, 1958. Soon, tens of thousands of colons and Muslims arrived outside the government building in Algiers to protest French government policy. Massu quickly formed a Committee of Public Safety, and Salan assumed leadership of the body. Salan then went before the throngs of protesters. Although the plotters would have preferred someone more frankly authoritarian, Salan called for the return to power of General Charles de Gaulle. Although de Gaulle had been out of power for more than a decade, on May 19 he announced his willingness to assume authority.

Massu was prepared to bring back de Gaulle by force if necessary, but military options were not needed. On June 1, 1958, the French National Assembly made de Gaulle premier, technically the last premier of the Fourth Republic. Algeria had managed to change the political leadership of the mother country.

De Gaulle visited Algeria five times between June and December 1958. At Oran on June 4, he said about France's mission in Algeria that "she is here forever." A month later, he proposed a budget allocation of 15 billion francs for Algerian housing, education, and public works, and that October he suggested an even more sweeping proposal called the Constantine Plan. The funding for the massive projects, however, was never forthcoming, and true Algerian reform was never realized. It was probably too late, in any case, for reform to affect the Muslim community of Algeria.

Algeria's new military commander, General Maurice Challe, arrived in Algeria on December 12, 1958 and launched a series of attacks on FLN positions in rural Kabylia in early 1959. Muslim troops loyal to the French guided special mobile French troops called Commandos de Chasse. An aggressive set of sorties deep in Kabylia made much headway, and Challe calculated that by the end of October his men had killed half of the FLN operatives in Kabylia. A second phase of the offensive was to occur in 1960, but by then de Gaulle, who had gradually eliminated options, had decided that Algerian independence was inevitable.

De Gaulle braced his generals for the decision to let go of Algeria in late August 1959 and then addressed the nation on September 19, 1959, declaring his support for Algerian self-determination. Fearing for their future, some Ultras created the Front Nationale Français and fomented another revolt on January 24, 1960, in what came to be known as the "Barricades Week." Mayhem ensued when the police tried to restore order, and many people were killed or wounded. General Challe and the colony's governor, Paul Delouvrier, fled Algiers on January 28, but the next day

de Gaulle, wearing his old army uniform, turned the tide via a televised address to the nation. On February 1, army units swore loyalty to the government. The revolt quickly collapsed. Early in 1961, increasingly desperate Ultras formed a terrorist group called the Secret Army Organization, which targeted colons whom they regarded as traitors.

The generals' putsch of April 20–26, 1961, seriously threatened de Gaulle's regime. General Challe wanted a revolt limited to Algeria, but Salan and his colleagues (Ground Forces Chief of Staff General André Zeller and recently retired Inspector General of the Air Force Edmond Jouhaud) had all prepared for a revolt in France as well. The generals had the support of many frontline officers in addition to almost two divisions of troops. The Foreign Legion arrested the colony's commander in chief, General Fernand Gambiez, and paratroopers near Rambouillet prepared to march on Paris after obtaining armored support. The coup collapsed, however, as police units managed to convince the paratroopers to depart, and army units again swore loyalty to de Gaulle.

On June 10, 1961, de Gaulle held secret meetings with FLN representatives in Paris and then on June 14 made a televised appeal for the FLN's Provisional Government to come to Paris to negotiate an end to the war. Peace talks during June 25–29 failed to lead to resolution, but de Gaulle's mind was already made up. During his visit to Algeria in December, he was greeted by large pro-FLN Muslim rallies and Muslim anti-colon riots. The United Nations recognized Algeria's independence on December 20, and on January 8, 1962, the French public voted in favor of Algerian independence.

After the failed coup, a massive exodus of colons commenced. Nearly 1 million returned to their ancestral homelands (half of them went to France, and most of the rest went to Spain and Italy). Peace talks resumed in March at Évian, and both sides reached a settlement on May 18, 1962.

The formal handover of power occurred on July 4 when the FLN's Provisional Committee took control of Algeria. In September, Ben Bella was elected Algeria's first president. The Algerian War resulted in about 18,000 French military deaths, 3,000 colon deaths, and 300,000 Muslim deaths. Some 30,000 colons remained behind, including the socialist mayor of Algiers, Jacques Chevallier. They were ostensibly granted equal rights in the peace treaty but instead faced official discrimination by the FLN government and the loss of much of their property. The FLN remained in power until 1989, practicing a form of socialism until changes in Soviet foreign policy necessitated changes in Algerian internal affairs.

William E. Watson

See also: Algeria, French Conquest of; French Colonial Policy in Africa; North Africa, Role in World War II; Sétif Uprising (1945).

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Algiers Agreement (1975)

Diplomatic accord between Iraq and Iran designed to settle outstanding issues between the two nations and avert war. The Algiers Agreement of March 6, 1975, known also as the Algiers Accord, was an agreement mediated by Algerian president Houari Boumedienne at a March 1975 meeting of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). The accord was approved by Shah Reza Pahlavi II of Iran and President Saddam Hussein of Iraq. Essentially, the agreement attempted to resolve territorial disputes between the two countries involving common borders as well as water and navigation rights. It provided for continuing Algerian participation in an ongoing Iranian–Iraqi dialogue that would occur at alternating meetings in Tehran and Baghdad. The Algiers Agreement also established an Iraqi–Iranian joint commission intended to refine and monitor the agreement's provisions and resolve any further disputes.

The agreement resulted in a formal treaty signed on June 13, 1975, which stipulated the Constantinople Treaty of 1913 and the Proceedings of the Border Delimitation Commission of 1914 as the basis for determining the Iranian–Iraqi border. Iran and Iraq agreed that the thalweg, or the median course of the Shatt al Arab River, Iraq's only outlet to the sea, formed the river border between the two countries even though the shifting course of the Shatt al Arab had given rise to some of the original disputes. They further consented to resolve ownership of disputed islands and other territories related to the waterway, to end subversive infiltrations of each other's country, and to resolve issues related to other border disputes, such as Khuzistan. Although not part of the agreement, the shah used the agreement's termination of subversive activities clause to withdraw Iranian support for the Kurdish rebellion against Iraq.

In the end, both parties failed to comply with the terms of the accord, and the festering, unresolved territorial issues that it was designed to address led in part to

Algerian president Houari Boumedienne mediated discussions between Iran and Iraq during the March 1975 meeting of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC). The agreement produced by this meeting became the Algiers Agreement. (Bettmann/Corbis)

the destructive Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988). This in turn led to a general destabilization in the Middle East.

Richard M. Edwards

See also: Constantinople, Treaty of (1913); Hussein, Saddam; Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988); Reza Shah Pahlavi.

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Ali Bey al-Kabir (1728–1773)

Mamluk ruler of Egypt in 1760–1773. He was born in northwestern Georgia and his father was a priest in the Georgian Orthodox Church. He was kidnapped and sold into slavery in 1741. Two years later, he was purchased in Cairo and gradually rose

in influence, reaching the top office of sheikh al-balad in 1763. During the Russo-Ottoman War of 1768–1774, Ali Bey broke the Mamluk-Ottoman Treaty of 1517 and deposed the Ottoman governor in 1768. The following year, he proclaimed Egyptian independence, stopped the annual tribute to the Ottoman Empire, proclaimed himself a sultan, and had his name struck on local coins. In 1770–1771, Ali Bey successfully campaigned in the Hejaz, Palestine, and Syria, capturing Damascus in June 1771. However, his initial success faltered when the Mamluks turned against each other, and in 1772, Ali Bey was defeated and fled to Acco (Acre) in Syria. After rallying his forces, he tried regaining his power but was again defeated at al-Salihiyya in April 1773. He was captured in battle and later executed in Cairo on May 8, 1773.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Mamluk Sultanate; Russo-Ottoman Wars.

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Ali ibn Abi Talib (d. 661)

The cousin and son-in-law of the Prophet Muhammad, Ali was the fourth caliph who played an important role in the history of the caliphate. The Prophet took him into his household when he was six to relieve his uncle, Abu Talib, from financial difficulties. Thus, Ali was brought up as if he had been a son of Muhammad. At the age of 10 he was the first male to accept Islam. Ali's military career began after the emigration of Muhammad and his followers to Medina in 622. He proved himself in battle on several occasions during the lifetime of the Prophet and is looked upon as a champion of Islam. At the battles of Badr and Khandaq and the conquest of Khaybar he distinguished himself both in single combat against the champions of the enemies and in the thick of battle. While at the battles of Uhud and Hunayn he stood near the Prophet and defended him when the tide turned against the Muslims. Thus, through his courage and conduct on the battlefield Ali gained a legendary reputation in Muslim traditions.

In 656, Ali became the fourth caliph or successor of the Prophet, who had died in 632. Ali did not participate in the Ridda Wars or in the great conquests during the reigns of the first three caliphs, but he retired to a life of religious studies and

compiling the Koran. He also aided the caliphs in legal matters due to his vast knowledge of the Koran and the sunna.

After the murder of Uthman, Ali was elected caliph in Medina. However, there was much opposition to his policies. Many prominent Muslims also condemned him for not punishing Uthman's murderers. Ali marched to Basra where Talha, Zubair, and Aisha, the prophet's wife, had mustered an army in opposition to him and defeated them at the Battle of the Camel in 656. The next year he faced Muawiyah, the governor of Syria and the late caliph's cousin, at Siffin in Syria. As the battle turned in the favor of Ali, the Syrians raised pages of the Koran on their spears and demanded to resolve the quarrel through arbitration. Ali agreed to arbitrate; in the process, however, he not only lost his most zealous supporters, who wished to fight (they believed he sinned and betrayed Islam by agreeing to arbitration, and became the Kharijites), but also lost the arbitration. Muawiyah was proclaimed caliph by his followers, and he and Ali ruled different parts of the empire until Ali's death in 661, after which Muawiyah became the sole ruler. While he prayed at the Great Mosque of Kufa, Ali was killed by a Kharijite in revenge for his massacre of thousands of Kharijites at Nahrawan in 658 and for accepting to arbitrate at Siffin. Muawiyah was also targeted for assassination for his impiety, but he survived the attack.

Adam Ali

See also: Badr, Battle of (623); Bassorah, Battle of (Battle of the Camel) (656); Khandaq, Battle of (627); Muawiyah; Muhammad, Campaigns of the Prophet; Muslim Civil War (First); Siffin, Battle of (657).

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Al-Mansur, Ahmad ibn Muhammad (1549–1603)

Seventh ruler of the Saadi dynasty whose reign marked the zenith of the Saadian Morocco and earned him the epithets of al-Mansur (victorious) and al-Dhahabi

(golden). The son of Sultan Muhammad al-Mahdi, he was cast into a turbulent political life of Morocco at an early age. After the death of his father and his brother Abdallah's accession to the throne in 1557, Ahmad and his brothers Abd al-Mumin and Abd al-Malik feared for their safety and fled to Tlemcen and then to Algiers and Istanbul. Their apprehensions were well founded as Abd al-Mumin was soon assassinated by Abdallah's henchman. The brothers spent 17 years abroad: Abd al-Malik distinguished himself in the Ottoman service and Ahmad remained largely in Algiers. Abdallah's death in 1574 allowed Abd al-Malik and Ahmad to assert their rights to crown, and in 1576, Abd al-Malik, with the Ottoman military support, captured Fez and became a sultan. Ahmad recognized his elder brother's ability and henceforth remained his loyal lieutenant. He participated in the 1576 invasion of Morocco and was tasked with pursuing the dethroned sultan Abu Abdallah Muhammad. One of Abd al-Malik's first acts as sultan was to recognize his brother as his heir and to grant him the vice-royalty of Fez. Abd al-Malik, however, soon faced a powerful challenge from Abu Abdallah Muhammad, who fled to Portugal and convinced the Portuguese king Sebastian to organize a military expedition to Morocco. The campaign was resolved at the famous battle of Alcazarquivir (Kasr al-Kabir) where the Moroccans scored a decisive victory, but all three leaders (Abd al-Malik, Abu Abdallah Muhammad, and King Sebastian) perished. Thus, Ahmad was proclaimed the new sultan of Morocco in the evening of August 4.

Ahmad proved to be a capable ruler who successfully overcame the difficulties that awaited him upon inheriting the crown. He used the booty taken at Alcazarquivir and ransoms extorted for prisoners to amass a vast fortune to suppress mutinies of the troops and rebellions in the provinces. He centralized the administrative system, reorganized tax collection, promoted trade and commerce with European states, developed agriculture, and supported public works that brought grandeur to his capital city. Sultan Ahmad introduced important military reforms, creating a largely mercenary army that featured Moors from Spain and European renegades and was increasingly reliant on gunpowder weapons. By 1590, the army possessed large numbers of cannon, muskets, and arquebuses. With the support of the reformed army, he was able to deal successfully with any domestic challenges and brought Morocco to the forefront of international politics.

An astute statesman, Ahmad recognized Ottoman sovereignty but also skillfully played the Ottomans and the European powers (France, Portugal, Spain, and England) against one another to assert Moroccan authority. He initially developed friendly relations with Spain, but after the destruction of the Spanish Armada by the English in 1588, he sought friendship with England. In 1600, he dispatched an envoy to negotiate an Anglo-Moroccan alliance, but it never materialized. Sultan Ahmad was much more militaristic when it came to West Africa, and he conducted a series of successful campaigns to secure the profitable trade routes in the Songhai Empire. In 1581, Ahmad took control of the clusters of oases in the Tuwat and

Tigurarin regions, way stations for the caravans crossing the Sahara but also strategically important bases for long marches through the desert to the south. Ten years later, Ahmad's small but well trained army routed the Songhai forces at Tondibi, captured the cities of Gao, Djenne, and Timbuktu and plundered much of Songhai; after this conquest, Ahmad became known as al-Dhahabi (golden) because of the immense amount of gold that was sent back to Morocco. According to the Arab chroniclers, the conquest of Sudan provided Ahmad with so much gold that he was able to pay his civil servants and army in pure gold dinars. The sultan was so captivated with the gold-producing regions of West Africa that he instructed his men to explore the River Niger and had a number of brigantines built in Morocco that were disassembled, packed up as separate components, and transported by camels across the Sahara. Yet, Ahmad never succeeded in organizing or consolidating his control over sub-Saharan regions, and his armies eventually had to retreat.

The start of the new century proved to be challenging for Ahmad. Morocco was struck by years of drought, bad harvests, and epidemic that devastated the country. In addition, Ahmad's son Muley al-Shaykh had rebelled with the intention of seizing the throne. In October 1602, Ahmad marched against his own son, whom he successfully defeated and imprisoned. But while on campaign he died of the plague on the outskirts of Fez on August 20, 1603. His death left the country in a state of confusion and prompted a long power struggle among his descendants.

From Moroccan chronicles, we know that Ahmad was a tall, well-built man with rounded cheeks, a golden-brown complexion, black hair and eyes, and remarkably white teeth. He loved horses and hunting, and precious stones were his biggest weakness; throughout his reign, Ahmad sent trustworthy merchants all over Europe in search of unique precious stones. He received an extensive education in Islamic religious and secular sciences, including law, poetry, grammar, lexicography, geometry, arithmetic and algebra, and astronomy. A great book collector, he amassed one of the most magnificent libraries of manuscripts, which fell into the hands of the Spanish in 1616 and currently resides in the Biblioteca Real of the palace of El Escorial outside Madrid.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Alcazarquivir, Battle of (1578); Moroccan War of Succession; Songhai Empire (15th–16th Centuries); Tondibi, Battle of (1591).

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Almohads

A political movement and dynasty that ruled North Africa and al-Andalus from the mid-12th to mid-13th centuries. The name is derived from the Arabic al-Muwaidun (those who assert the unity of God).

The founder of the movement was Muhammad ibn Tumart, who began to preach a message of Islamic revival among the Mamuda Berbers of the Atlas Mountains in the 1120s. An attack on Marrakech in 1130 failed, and he died soon after. The movement was taken over by his lieutenant Abd al-Mu'min, who established his control by ruthless purges of any opponents. In 1147 he conquered Marrakech and destroyed the remnants of the Almoravid regime.

In 1147, the first Almohad troops entered al-Andalus, and in 1148 Seville was taken, but progress was halted by Almohad campaigns in North Africa, which led to the conquest of Constantine and Bejaïa (Bougie) in 1152–1153. After this triumph, Abd al-Mu'min set about consolidating his control over the Almohad political apparatus. His sons were appointed governors of provincial cities in North Africa and al-Andalus, and the descendants of the original Council of Ten (an inner council of Tumart's original followers), who had dominated the movement in its early days, became a sort of hereditary aristocracy, a privileged ruling class. Abd al-Mu'min took the title of caliph, implying both political independence and religious leadership.

The core of the Almohad army consisted of the original Berber supporters of the dynasty, who were said to have numbered 10,000 and were usually quartered in Marrakech, except when they were on campaign with the caliph. Unlike the Almoravids, the Almohads coopted native Andalusi military leaders, and families like the Banu Azzun of Jerez were to play an important role in Almohad campaigns in the Iberian Peninsula.

In 1155, the Almohads took Granada from the last of the Almoravid governors, but Valencia and Murcia remained independent under the control of Ibn Mardanish, a local Muslim ruler closely allied to the Castilians. The caliph meanwhile was busy with the struggle against the Normans of Sicily in Tunisia, where Tunis was taken by the Almohads in 1159 and the last Norman outpost at Mahdia in January 1160. In 1163, the caliph assembled a vast army at his new fortress city of Rabat, intending to cross to al-Andalus, but he died before the expedition could set out.

He was succeeded by his son Abu Yusuf Ya'qub (1163–1184), a cultured and bookish man who built up a large library and entertained leading intellectuals like Ibn Tufayl and Ibn Rushd (known to Christendom as Averroes) at his court. He was not, however, a great warrior, and the Almohad position in al-Andalus was continually threatened, by Geraldo Sem Pavor in the west, who took Trujillo and Evora, and by Ibn Mardanish of Murcia in the East.

In 1172, the caliph launched a major military expedition against Castile. Morale was boosted by the death (from natural causes) of Ibn Mardanish. After an unsuccessful attempt to take the small Castilian town of Huete, the Almohad army descended on Ibn Mardanish's heartlands around Murcia. Ibn Mardanish's family were received into the caliph's favor and, for the first time, all the Muslims of al-Andalus (except for the Balearic Islands) were under Almohad rule. However, the great expedition had failed to recover any territory from the Christians.

When the caliph left al-Andalus in 1176, the secure position began to decline immediately. In 1177, Cuenca fell to the Castilians, and the Portuguese sacked Bejaïa in 1178 and began raiding the Algarve at will. In 1180, the caliph decided that Tunisia, where the Bedouin Arabs presented a continuing problem, was the most pressing concern, and he did not return to Marrakech until 1182. In 1184, he led an attack on Santarém on the river Tagus but was surprised in his tent and killed.

His son and successor, Abu Yusuf, who took the title of al-Mansur (victorious), was a robust military man. His first task was to cross the Strait of Gibraltar and secure his position in Marrakech. He may have intended to return to al-Andalus and avenge his father's humiliating death, but he first had to deal with problems in North Africa. It was not until 1188 that some sort of Almohad control was reestablished.

In 1190, he turned his attention to al-Andalus and led an expedition against the Portuguese fortresses in the Tagus Valley, but he failed to take the Templar castle at Tomar, and disease in the army forced him to retreat to Seville and then to Morocco. In 1195, he set out to al-Andalus again. He led his army north from Córdoba, and on July 17 he met and defeated the troops of Alfonso VIII of Castile at Alarcos in the plain of Calatrava. In 1196, he led his army through Extremadura and sacked the newly settled city of Plasencia. In 1197, he raided around Madrid and Guadalajara, but though the countryside was ravaged, no strong points were captured.

In 1198, al-Mansur returned to Marrakesh, where he died in January 1199. He was succeeded by his son al-Nair (1199–1213). In 1203, the Almohads enjoyed a success when a naval expedition of 130 ships took the Balearic Islands from the Banu Ghaniya dynasty. In 1209, the Christians in al-Andalus began raiding the area around Córdoba, and in 1211 the caliph gathered his forces at Rabat and crossed the strait. He captured the castle of Salvatierra, used as a base by the military Order of Calatrava. The next year Alfonso VIII of Castile marched south with a force that included the king of Aragon and contingents from all the kingdoms of Spain. Al-Nair went to meet him but was decisively defeated at the Battle of Las Navas de Tolosa (July 12, 1212). The caliph fled ignominiously back to Marrakech, where he died the next year.

The caliph was succeeded by his young son al-Mustanir (1213–1224), whose death led to a series of succession disputes that effectively paralyzed the Almohad caliphate. Meanwhile, the Almohad governors in al-Andalus had to try to defend

themselves. Beginning in 1230, Ferdinand III of Castile began the series of campaigns that were to result in the conquest of the whole of al-Andalus apart from the kingdom of Granada, but by this time the Almohads were largely irrelevant, their last rulers engaged in succession disputes in Marrakesh and vain attempts to resist the rise of the Marinid Berbers.

Hugh Kennedy

See also: Almoravids; Navas de Tolosa, Battle of las (1212); Reconquista.

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Almoravids

The name Almoravids, from the Arabic al-Murabiun (fighters for the faith), is conventionally given to the religious movement and dynastic state that dominated al-Andalus and modern Morocco from the late 11th century to the 1140s.

The movement was founded by ʻAbd Allah ibn Yasin in the 1050s. He preached a harsh and literalist version of Islam, which was easy to comprehend but left little scope for imagination or intellectual discussion. He found an audience among the Lamtuna tribe, a section of the Berber anhaja confederation that dominated the western Sahara. He was welcomed by Yahya Ibn Umar and his brother Abu Bakr, whose descendants were to provide the dynastic leadership of the Almoravid Empire.

By 1054, they had secured control of the trade route that led from Sijilmassa in southern Morocco to the gold-producing areas of ancient Ghana, on the upper Niger River. Ibn Yasin then began to preach in Morocco, but after some initial success, he was killed in 1059. Leadership of the movement was assumed by Yusuf ibn Tashfin. In 1070, the Almoravids founded the city of Marrakech, which was to be the effective capital of both the Almoravids and their Almohad successors.

Ibn Tashfin took the title of amir al-Muslimin (prince of the Muslims) but not the title of caliph; the Almoravids professed their loyalty to the Sunni Abbasid caliphs in distant Baghdad. In 1083 Ibn Tashfin took Ceuta on the Strait of Gibraltar and so effectively completed his control of Morocco. Al-Muʻtamid of Seville (1069–1091) and other Taifa rulers invited Ibn Tashfin to cross the straits to help them to resist the Christian advance. On October 23, 1086, their combined armies

defeated Alfonso VI, king of Castile, at Sagrajas (Zallaqa), northeast of Badajoz. The Almoravids then returned to Morocco.

In the summer of 1088, Ibn Tashfin and the Almoravids crossed to Spain again and joined forces with the Taifa kings to besiege Aledo, between Granada and Murcia. Rivalries between the Taifa kings undermined the military effort, and Ibn Tashfin and his men were obliged to return to Morocco without having achieved anything.

When Ibn Tashfin came again in 1090, he was determined to act on his own. Between 1090 and 1094, he and his nephew Sir ibn Abi Bakr took over Granada in 1090, Seville in 1091, and Badajoz in 1094. Only Valencia, taken by El Cid in the summer of 1094, and Zaragoza eluded Almoravid control. Until around 1117, Almoravid influence in the Iberian Peninsula continued to expand. In 1102, the Almoravids took Valencia from El Cid's widow, Jimena. On the death of Ibn Tashfin in 1106, power passed easily to his son Ali, while the death of Alfonso VI in 1109 led to prolonged disputes among his heirs. In 1110, al-Musta'in, ruler of the last independent Taifa kingdom (Zaragoza), was killed fighting the Aragonese at Valtierra, and the pro-Almoravid party in the city expelled his son and handed the city over. In 1112 and 1114 Almoravid armies were able to use their new base in the Ebro Valley to raid Catalonia and reach the foothills of the Pyrenees.

The Almoravids never formed more than a small ruling military elite in al-Andalus, distinguished from the local people by their Berber language and their veils. Ibn Tashfin advised his son to maintain 17,000 horsemen in the country, including 4,000 in Seville, the Almoravid capital, and 1,000 each in Córdoba and Granada. Power was concentrated in the hands of the ruling dynasty and a small number of related families, all from the Lamtuna tribe. No native Andalusi Muslims played an important role in the military. The Almoravids ruled in cooperation with Andalusi civilian elites, notably the qais (judges) of the main cities, who became increasingly influential political figures at this time.

After 1118 the Almoravids' power began to wane as their prestige was undermined by military failure. Their armies had proved their ability to defeat the Christians in battle at Sagrajas in 1086 and Uclés in 1108, but they proved much less effective at siege warfare. This showed most obviously in the failure to retake Toledo from the Castilians. In 1109, Almoravid forces moved up the Tagus Valley, and Talavera was taken. The lands around Toledo were ravaged, but the city held out.

After 1118 the military balance began to tilt in favor of the Christians. This shift began first in the Ebro Valley, where the dynamic king of Aragon, Alfonso I "the Battler," took Tudela in 1114 and Zaragoza in 1118. In the winter of 1125–1126, Alfonso led a raid deep into Muslim territory, and his army wintered in the countryside around Granada while the Almoravid forces looked on helplessly.

Under the leadership of Tashfin ibn Ali, the Almoravids recovered something of their military initiative in the 1130s, and in 1136–1137, Muslim forces were

able to operate north of the Tagus and capture the castle at Escalona. However, the urban militias of Christian towns such as Avila and Toledo raided far into Muslim territory: in 1133 the army of Toledo reached the walls of Seville and killed the governor.

Meanwhile, the Almoravids were threatened by the rise of a rival movement in Morocco, the Almohads. In 1130, the Almohads attacked Marrakech, and by the early 1140s they controlled most of Morocco. After 1132, ʻAli ibn Yusuf became increasingly reliant on a Christian military commander, Reverter the Catalan, and his Christian troops. In the 1140s the position of the Almoravids declined rapidly. In 1143 the ineffective ʻAli ibn Yusuf died and was succeeded by his much more competent son Tashfin. In 1144 Reverter was killed in action, and Tashfin himself suffered the same fate in March 1145. His shadowy successors could do little, and in March 1147 the Almohads stormed Marrakech, massacring the remnants of the Almoravid elite. With the fall of Tangier and Ceuta in May–June 1148, Almoravid rule in North Africa was over.

In al-Andalus, Almoravid military failure led to popular revolts. Almoravid rule survived in Granada until 1155, while the Banu Ghaniya, a branch of the Almoravids, held the Balearic Islands until 1203.

The Almoravid nomad warriors were effective in open warfare but much less so in sieges or garrison duty. They also failed to recruit military support among the Andalusi Muslims. When the first generation had passed on and the regime was challenged in Morocco and the Iberian Peninsula, Almoravid rule soon vanished.

Hugh Kennedy

See also: Almohads; Reconquista.

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Alp Arslan (ca. 1030–1072)

Alp Arslan was the son of Chagri Beg and nephew and heir of Toghrul Beg. He was the second sultan of the Saljuk dynasty and ruled from 1063 to 1072. He was born around 1030 and started to lead his father's armies at an early age, defeating the Ghaznavids on several occasions and raiding Buyid territories in the west. Alp Arslan also assisted Toghrul Beg against Ibrahim Inal's rebellion in Persia, and they defeated him near Rayy in 1059.

Alp Arslan succeeded his father as the ruler of Khurasan and Tughrul Beg, who died childless in 1063. Thus, he was able to unite all the Saljuk domains under his rule. The Abbasid caliph, al-Qaim, confirmed Alp Arslan with all the rights and positions he had bestowed upon Toghrul Beg, including the title of sultan. However, despite this, Alp Arslan had to deal with several rebellious relatives who challenged his rule and centralizing policies. In 1063–1064 he defeated and killed Qutlumish, a cousin, who rebelled in the Caspian region. He also got rid of his half brother, Sulayman, without much difficulty. Quward, the sultan's uncle, also revolted in Kerman in 1064, but Alp Arslan forced him to submit and later pardoned him.

After securing his position within the sultanate Alp Arslan set out on a series of military campaigns on the eastern and western frontiers of the Saljuk Empire. He marched in force against the Qarakhanids and reinforced their submission to the Saljuk Sultanate, while maintaining his father's peace agreement with the Ghaznavids. However, Alp Arslan's greatest campaigns were launched from Azerbaijan against the Byzantines, Armenians, and Georgians. He had to lead the unruly Torkomans that formed a large part of his army on attacks against these Christian neighbors to appease their desire for war and booty. The conquests achieved through this campaign helped to secure Azerbaijan's borders and funneled the energies of the Turkoman tribesmen into raiding westward, rather than disturbing the peace within the Saljuk domains.

Being a devout Sunni Muslim, Alp Arslan planned to conquer Syria and Egypt and put an end to the Ismaili Fatimid Caliphate. As he campaigned in Syria, the sultan heard that the Byzantine emperor, Romanus Diogenes, was marching east with a large army. Alp Arslan, after gaining the submission of Aleppo, abandoned his plans to march on Egypt and gathered his forces to face this new threat. The two armies clashed at Manzikert in August 1071. Despite being outnumbered, the Saljuks scored a decisive victory because of low morale, poor communications, and defections (Turkic mercenaries) in the Byzantine army and the Saljuks' high mobility and organization. Romanus was captured, but Alp Arslan released him shortly after the battle. This victory opened up Anatolia for future Turkic conquests.

Alp Arslan died in 1072 while he was campaigning against the Qarakhanids in Transoxania. He was mortally wounded by a prisoner who was brought before him. Before his death he named his son, Malik Shah, as his successor.

Adam Ali

See also: Byzantine-Saljuk Wars; Georgian-Saljuk Wars (11th–13th Centuries); Malik Shah; Manzikert, Battle of (1071); Saljuks.

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Amanullah Khan (1892–1960)

Amanullah Khan led Afghanistan through dynamic changes during the first half of the 20th century. He obtained its independence from Great Britain and initiated important policies in foreign affairs and domestic politics.

Amanullah Khan was the third son of Afghanistan's ruler, Habibullah Khan. He was born on June 1, 1892, and seized power after political opponents assassinated his father on February 20, 1919. Under Habibullah, Amanullah had maneuvered himself into a strong political position, supervising the treasury and the army. He used this connection to circumvent his two older brothers and become emir, or prince. By the end of 1919, he had gained the support of most tribal leaders, extended his control into the cities, and imprisoned those family members who refused to swear loyalty to him.

Amanullah began his rule at a momentous time. After the Russian Revolution of 1917, Great Britain and Russia assumed a position they had been accustomed to years earlier: competition over which nation would control Afghanistan. Back in the 19th century, Britain had established domination over the country, but Amanullah realized that conditions had changed, that the British had been exhausted by the recently concluded World War I, and that Russia might give him assistance. He launched a dramatic assault against British control. At his coronation, he declared Afghanistan fully independent and then attacked the British troops. Although the fight stalemated and Amanullah did not get all he wanted in either the ensuing armistice or a negotiated settlement in 1921, he did get some recognition from Britain of Afghanistan's right to make its own foreign policy, a course he began to pursue anyway.

In the 1920s, Amanullah established diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and several other nations, and to show his country's real independence, he elevated his title from emir to king. He received assistance from the Soviet Union, but it vacillated, determined largely by what Russia considered the magnitude of the British threat.

On the domestic front, Amanullah modernized the military by establishing an air force in 1921 and sending troops to France, Italy, and Turkey for training. He advanced women's rights, abolished slavery and forced labor, introduced secular education, and began schools for the nomads. The Afghan Constitution of 1923 guaranteed civil rights and established a national legislature.

With the adoption of a new constitution, trouble soon erupted. Amanullah's reforms antagonized important elements in Afghan society. The tribes distrusted his centralization of power, many traditional Muslims disliked his efforts to emancipate women, and the army opposed his reduction of military pay. In 1928, tribesmen revolted in Jalalabad, and as the rebels advanced on Kabul, the capital, several army units deserted to their side. In January 1929, Amanullah abdicated in favor of his oldest brother, who after ruling for only three days, gave way to a Tajik tribal leader.

Amanullah tried to regain power later in 1929 when he led an army toward Kabul. He failed, however, and in May fled to India before going into exile in Italy. He died on April 25, 1960, in Zurich, Switzerland. A later king, Mohammad Nadir Shah, who ruled from 1929 to 1933, abolished most of Amanullah's reforms. Nevertheless, Amanullah is still remembered for gaining Afghanistan's modern independence and developing a more progressive state.

Neil Hamilton

See also: Afghan Civil War (1928–1929); Anglo-Afghan War (1919).

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Amasya (Amassia), Treaty of (1555)

Peace treaty signed between the Ottoman and Safavid empires on May 29, 1555, ending the Ottoman-Safavid War of 1532–1555. Under the treaty, the two powers divided southern Caucasia and Asia Minor into two parts: Iran received Azerbaijan, eastern Armenia, eastern Kurdistan, the Georgian kingdoms of Kartli-Kakheti, and the eastern part of Samtskhe, and the Ottomans claimed all of western Georgia, Arabia, Iraq, and western Armenia and Kurdistan. Kars was declared neutral, and its fortress was destroyed. The peace lasted until an Ottoman offensive in 1578 sought to take advantage of a period of Iran's weakness under Shah Muhammad Khodabandeh (1578–1587).

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Ottoman-Safavid Wars.

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Amgala, Battles of (1976–1979)

A water source in the east of Saguia el-Hamra (Western Sahara), Amgala was the site of a series of battles between Morocco and the Polisario Front. The Polisario Front emerged as a student movement against Spanish colonialism in Western Sahara in 1971. Two years later, the movement began an armed struggle against the Spanish authorities and, using guerrilla tactics in 1973–1975, eventually compelled Spain to hand over the northern part of Western Sahara to Morocco. Amgala played an important role in the ensuing conflict between the Polisario Front and Moroccan troops, becoming a key staging point for refugee evacuation. Algerian troops were deployed at Amgala to assist with the exodus. In January 1976, Moroccan forces stormed the locality, killing several dozen Algerian soldiers. The incident brought Morocco and Algeria to the brink of the war before Algeria chose to withdraw its forces. However, Algeria began providing arms and training to the Polisario, who recaptured Amgala in the spring of 1976. The Moroccans reclaimed it in another battle in May 1977.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Western Sahara War (1971–1991).

Sahrawi women dig holes for emergency shelter near the Algerian border in November of 1977. Part of the Polisario Front, they are backed by Algeria against Morocco in their fight for independence. (1977 Getty Images)

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Amr ibn al-As (al-Aasi) (ca. 585–664)

Arab general who conquered Egypt during the early Arab expansions. A contemporary of the Prophet Muhammad who converted to Islam before the fall of Mecca, Amr ibn al-As rose to become one of the leading Arab generals during the initial Arab conquests. Throughout his career, Amr served on numerous important missions. His first major expedition took him to Oman on behalf of the Prophet to convince the local rulers to convert to Islam. Amr succeeded on this mission, but during his stay in Oman the Prophet died, prompting Amr to return to Medina. Abu Bakr, Muhammad's successor, gave Amr command of the army to invade Palestine in 633. Although reports of this invasion were conflicting, Amr was responsible for the conquest of the Byzantine territories west of the Jordan River. In addition, Amr took part in the Battle of Yarmouk and the capture of Damascus. Amr's major achievement was yet to come. In 640, Amr led another army of conquest into Egypt. There remains some debate on whether Amr did this on his own initiative or whether the caliph Umar directed him to invade Egypt. In either case, Umar ostensibly approved of it, as Amr did receive reinforcements and the conquest ended in 642 with the capture of Alexandria. Afterward, Amr contributed greatly to the administration of Egypt and built the city that became Cairo. His career in Egypt, however, was short-lived as the caliph Uthman recalled him to Medina.

After this, Amr remained absent from major military events until the Battle of Siffin in 657, when Muawiyah and Ali battled for the caliphate. Amr sided with Muawiyah and led the cavalry. The battle ended more or less in a draw, and the dispute was settled through arbitration. Before the decision came, however, Amr was able to occupy Egypt and remove Ali's factions from power there in 658. Amr remained governor of Egypt until his death.

Timothy May

See also: Byzantine-Muslim Wars (to 1035); Egypt, Arab Conquest of (640–642); Muhammad, Campaigns of the Prophet.

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Anglo-Afghan War (1839–1842)

Located to the northwest of India, Afghanistan is strategically important because it connects the Middle East and Central Asia with South Asia (the Indian subcontinent). Foreign invaders, including Persians, Alexander the Great, Mongols, Arabs, and Turks crossed Afghanistan to invade South Asia. Britain, which dominated South Asia, feared Russia's southern expansion across Central Asia toward Afghanistan and India. This led to British intervention in Afghanistan to depose Dost Mohammed, emir of Afghanistan whom British deemed pro-Russian, from the Afghan throne and reinstall the pro-British Shah Shuja. In March 1839, 19,000 British and Indian troops commanded by Lieutenant General John Keane, invaded Afghanistan through the Bolan Pass. They occupied the capital of Kandahar without opposition in April and defeated Dost Mohammed's forces at Ghazni in July. Shah Shuja temporarily regained his throne and Dost Mohammed fled. Most British-led forces then returned to India, leaving an occupation force of about 8,000 men.

Although Dost Mohammed was subsequently defeated in battle and exiled to India, the British occupation was faced with a mostly hostile Afghan population. Akbar Khan, an insurgent leader and son of Dost Mohammed, forced the British to withdraw from the city of Kabul in January 1842. Major General William Elphinstone commanded the retreating force of 4,500 British and Indian soldiers, which was accompanied by 12,000 civilians. Despite being promised safe passage, the British column was continually attacked and eventually massacred. The besieged British garrison at Ghazni, lacking artillery and water, surrendered and was also slaughtered. The besieged British garrisons at Kandahar and Jalalabad survived, and a relief force from India under General George Pollock defeated Afghan opposition and captured Kabul in September. British forces withdrew to India in October, and Dost Mohammed returned to the Afghan throne.

Glenn E. Helm

See also: Anglo-Afghan War (1878–1880); Anglo-Afghan War (1919); Dost Mohammed.

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Anglo-Afghan War (1878–1880)

This war, known in Britain as the Second Afghan War, started with the British invasion in November 1878. Upon succeeding his father as the emir of Afghanistan, Sher Ali Akbar Khan (1825–1879) made diplomatic overtures to Russia while snubbing the British efforts to negotiate with him. Concerned about the potential growth of Russian influence in the region, Britain launched an invasion on November 20, 1878. General Sir Frederick Roberts led 35,000 Anglo-Indian troops from India, occupying strategic frontier passes and defeating an Afghan army under Sher Ali at Peiwar Kotal on December 2. The Afghan emir fled and was replaced by his son Yakub Khan (1849–?), who agreed to negotiate a treaty of peace with Britain in May 1879. A British envoy, Sir Louis Cavagnari, was installed in Kabul in July. Cavagnari's presence effectively meant British control of the Afghan foreign policy, which caused growing discontent among many Afghans

On September 3, 1879, Kabul witnessed the start of an Afghan revolt that claimed the lives of Cavagnari and other British officials. Enfuriated by this massacre, the British army marched into Afghanistan, routed the Afghan force at Charasia on October 6, 1879, and captured Kabul six days later. The revolt also prompted the abdication of Yakub Khan, who sought British protection. Despite initial success, the British could not suppress the uprising. The Afghan tribal chiefs then decided to raise a large force to attack Roberts, and on December 23, at the Battle of Sherpur, 100,000 Afghans attacked Roberts. Although the British line broke, Roberts was able to flank the Afghans and won the day. Sir Donald Stewart was then put in charge of the mop-up operations that restored British control until June 1880 when Ayub Khan (1854–1914), Yakub Khan's brother, claimed the Afghan throne. With an army of 15,000 men, Ayub marched on Kandahar and inflicted a severe blow on the British force under General G. R. S. Burroughs at Maiwand on July 27, 1880. Ayub then besieged the British garrison of Kandahar. Sir Frederick Roberts led a relief expedition, and, after a forced march from Kabul, he surprised and routed Ayub's troops at Kandahar on September 1. The Battle of Kandahar ended the Second Afghan War and led to the establishment of a pro-British government under Amin Abdur Rhaman Khan (r. 1880–1901).

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Anglo-Afghan War (1839–1842); Anglo-Afghan War (1919); Central Asia, Russian Conquest of; Kandahar, Battle of (1880).

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Anglo-Afghan War (1919)

During World War I (1914–1918), Afghanistan had remained neutral, although King Habibullah showed some sympathy toward the Central Powers and accepted a German military mission in Kabul. Britain was also concerned about the spillover effect from the Russian Civil War. On February 19, 1919, King Habibullah was assassinated and his son, Amir Amanullah, became king. The new ruler championed a radical group that became known as the Young Afghan movement, taking its inspiration from the Young Turks of the late 1900s. Avowedly nationalist and against any foreign interference in the country, Amanullah proclaimed Afghanistan fully independent. Britain perceived this as a threat to its colonial hold on India. British efforts to exert pressure on Amanullah backfired as the king proclaimed a jihad (holy war) against Britain and sent 10,000 troops across the Indian border on May 3, 1919.

The declaration initially took the British by surprise, but they quickly regrouped under General Reginald Dyer (1864–1927) and counterattacked, driving the Afghans from the Bagh provinces by mid-May; the British Air Force also conducted air raids against Afghan settlements and towns, including Kabul and Jalalabad. The British then invaded Afghanistan and advanced as far as Dakka before Amanullah sued for peace. On August 8, 1919, in the Treaty of Rawalpindi, Britain acknowledged Afghan independence in return for an Afghan pledge to stop attacks along the Afghan-Indian border. Nevertheless, Afghan guerrillas continued sporadic attacks. In November 1921, the Treaty of Rawalpindi was reaffirmed, and the British discontinued their practice of subsidy payments.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Amanullah Khan; Rawalpindi, Treaty of (1919–1921).

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Anglo-Egyptian Treaty (1936)

Treaty signed in London that spelled out the relationship between Britain and Egypt. Driven by strategic and economic interests in the Suez Canal and economic interests in cotton production, the British took over Egypt in 1882. The British government had promised to withdraw "once order had been restored," but they remained in Egypt. In 1914, Britain declared Egypt a protectorate, but eight years later, the British ended the protectorate and declared Egypt to be a sovereign, independent kingdom. This was mere window dressing, however, for Britain continued to dominate Egyptian affairs through its advisers, who controlled the key organs of state, including internal security. Nonetheless, the threat posed to the security of the region by Italy's invasion of Ethiopia in 1935 led to negotiations between London and Cairo and a treaty between the two nations, signed in London on August 26, 1936.

According to this treaty, Britain and Egypt entered into an alliance whereby Britain pledged to defend Egypt against outside aggression and Egypt promised to place its facilities at Britain's disposal in case of war. Recognizing the vital importance of the Suez Canal to Britain, Egypt allowed Britain to garrison 10,000 troops and 400 pilots in the Canal Zone and to provide for their barracks at Egyptian expense. In return, Britain would evacuate all other Egyptian bases except the naval base at Alexandria, which it would be allowed to maintain for eight more years.

All British personnel in the Egyptian Army and police were to be withdrawn, but a British military mission would remain to advise the Egyptian Army to the exclusion of any other foreigners. Also, Egyptian officers were to train abroad only in Britain. Egypt had the full right to expand the size of its armed forces. On the thorny matter of the Sudan, Britain promised to allow unrestricted immigration of Egyptians into the Sudan. Egyptian troops were also allowed to return there. Britain agreed to work for the removal of the capitulations and for the admission of Egypt to the League of Nations. The British high commissioner would be replaced by an ambassador. The treaty was to be of indefinite duration, but negotiations for any changes would be permitted after a 20-year period.

In effect, Britain retained its right to protect security through the canal and compromised on a number of other issues, including that of the protection of British citizens and foreigners. Left unresolved was the question of the future status of the Sudan. Despite some criticism of it, the Egyptian parliament ratified the treaty on

December 11, 1936. Although many Egyptians thought of this treaty as marking their independence, because the action of 1922 had been a unilateral one by Britain alone, in fact the British continued to exercise considerable control over the Egyptian government.

Spencer C. Tucker

See also: Egypt, British Colonialism in.

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Anglo-Iranian Agreements

A series of treaties signed between Britain and Iran between 1901 and 1933. In the first treaty, signed in 1901, Iran granted a major concession to William K. d'Arcy: a 60-year oil-drilling monopoly in Iran. In return, Shah Mozaffar al-Din Shah Qajar received £20,000, an equal amount in shares of D'Arcy's company, and a promise of 16 percent of future profits. After 1909, this concession was in the hands of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (APOC), which discovered several major oil fields (e.g., in Kirkuk in 1927) and greatly profited from the advantageous terms of the agreement. This caused a public outcry in Iran, which saw the D'Arcy agreement as squandering national wealth. Iranian attempts to revise the agreement and increase royalties met British objections.

In the second treaty, signed on August 9, 1919, at Tehran, Britain and Iran sought to improve their relations after World War I. Britain recognized Iran's independence, promised economic assistance and help in modernizing Iranian administrative bureaucracy and military and promoting trade and agriculture. In return, British access to Iranian oil fields (including five northern provinces formerly under the Russian sphere of influence) was guaranteed. The agreement was denounced as hegemonic by other powers that had their own interests in accessing Iranian oil fields, and it provoked an angry response in the Iranian parliament (Majlis), which denounced the treaty in June 1921.

The third treaty, concluded on May 28, 1933, was negotiated to ensure a more equitable financial compensation for APOC's exploitation of oil in Iran. The agreement called for the company to pay Iran fixed sums for every ton of oil exported.

The treaty limited APOC's power by restricting its operations to 250,000 square miles of territory; in 1938, the company's oil extraction was limited to only 100,000 square miles. The company promised to employ more Iranians, give laborers better pay, and invest in schools, hospitals, and roads. Despite the new agreement, Iran was still unsatisfied with the terms as APOC paid Iran only a small fraction of revenues it received and failed to deliver on its investment promises. Calls for nationalization of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (or AIOC, as APOC became known) increased by early 1950s. In 1951, the Majlis, led by charismatic Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadeq, voted to nationalize AIOC. This action caused a major political crisis as foreign powers refused to buy Iranian oil and AIOC withdrew from Iran. It also contributed to the decisions by the United States and United Kingdom to organize a coup d'état to overthrow Mossadeq's government in 1953.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Iran during World War I; Iran during World War II.

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Anglo-Iranian Oil Crisis (1951–1953)

The Anglo-Iranian oil crisis began on April 26, 1951, when Iran's new nationalist leader, Mohammad Mossadeq, moved to nationalize his nation's oil reserves. The crisis ended on August 19, 1953, when Mossadeq's government was overthrown in a U.S.-sponsored coup d'état. Mossadeq's nationalization measures came largely at the expense of the British-controlled Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, which had been exploiting Iranian oil reserves for years. The crisis highlighted the differing communist-containment policies carried out by the British Foreign Office and the U.S. State Department in the Middle East. It can also be viewed as an early attempt by a developing nation to break free from Western imperialism and colonial control. The fact that the crisis involved oil also showcases just how critical cheap and abundant oil supplies were to the West.

During 1951–1953, there was an ongoing diplomatic crisis among Iran, the United Kingdom, and the United States over Mossadeq's actions. Beginning in November 1951, Mossadeq asked Western nations that had purchased Iranian oil in the past to confirm their current orders with the newly nationalized Iranian oil industry. The British took immediate action by pressuring purchasing nations not to cooperate with Mossadeq's request.

At first, the United States took a rather neutral stance in the crisis, siding completely with neither London nor Tehran. The Americans' chief concern was keeping Iranian oil out of Soviet control rather than saving the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. U.S. secretary of state Dean Acheson urged Britain to accept Iran's nationalization and instead aim at maintaining control over the technical aspects of oil production. Throughout much of 1951, the United States regarded Iran's continued alliance with the West as a priority over British economic interests.

President Harry Truman sought to broker a settlement between Tehran and London based on the acceptance of Iranian nationalization in return for British control over oil production and drilling. At the same time, British officials were divided over whether launching a war against Iran was a viable option to ending the standoff. The British Foreign Office seemed willing to entertain the idea of military force, but British prime minister Clement Attlee steadfastly opposed it.

Nevertheless, the British government refused to negotiate with the Iranians and instead opted to impose economic sanctions on Mossadeq's regime. On September 10, 1951, Britain took measures to prevent purchases of Iranian oil on the international market.

Meanwhile, the United States and Britain were moving closer together on ending the crisis. Throughout the autumn of 1951, the Truman administration became less neutral. As time went on, the U.S. State Department trusted Mossadeq less and



Prime Minister of Iran Mohommad Mossadeq, ca. 1951. (Bettmann/Corbis)

less. From January 1952 on, the United States became increasingly concerned about Iran's internal economic stability. The United States maintained that Mossadeq was now increasingly likely to turn to Moscow to stabilize Iran's economy. By the spring of 1952, these concerns led the Americans to view regime change as a viable path to ending the crisis. Between the end of 1951 and July 1952, the Americans hoped that this would happen as a result of the dispute between Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi of Iran and Mossadeq over which of the two would control the Persian Army. In the fall of 1952, Tehran broke diplomatic relations with London.

In January 1953, Dwight D. Eisenhower became president of the United States. The failure of diplomacy, coupled with the Eisenhower administration's eagerness to end the crisis, opened the door for the coup d'état of August 1953. The Eisenhower administration supported regime change in Iran in a coup organized by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). U.S. policy makers were particularly alarmed at the possibility that Mossadeq would bring the communists to power in Iran. Supported by the British government as well and carried out on August 19 of that year, the coup returned Shah Pahlavi to power. The British and U.S. governments then established an Anglo-American oil consortium on April 12, 1954.

Simone Selva

See also: Anglo-Iranian Agreements.

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Anglo-Iranian War (1856–1857)

Conflict between Great Britain and Iran over spheres of influence in Afghanistan. The immediate cause for the war was the Iranian attempt to take control of neighboring Herat, which had historically recognized the suzerainty of the Iranian shahs. However, located at key military and trade routes, Heraat was also the object of interest of the British authorities in India in the context of the Great Game, the famous Anglo-Russian rivalry in Central Asia. In light of the Russo-Iranian wars of the early 19th century, Britain believed Iran could be influenced by Russia and opposed Nasser al-Din Shah's attempt to take control of Herat. After its declaration of war on November 1, 1856, Britain dispatched a squadron with a 10,000-man expeditionary

force into the Persian Gulf. The British captured the island of Kharg on December 4 and, landing ashore on December 9, they captured the port town of Bushire the following day. Receiving intelligence on the superior Iranian force at Shiraz, the British expedition commander Major General Foster Stalker remained at Bushire and requested reinforcements. The second division, led by Brigadier General Henry Havelock, landed in Iran in January 1857; the entire expeditionary force was then placed under commander of Major General James Outram. On February 7, 1857, the British defeated the Iranian army under Khanlar Mirza at Khushab (Khoosh-Ab) but did not pursue the enemy and instead retired back to Bushire.

Changing their direction of attack, the British then advanced up the Shatt al-Arab waterway to Mohammerah (Khorramshahr), not far from Basra, where they arrived by March 24. The Iranian garrison retreated without a fight, and, after occupying it on March 27, the British advanced to Ahvaz, upstream on the Karun River, where Khanlar Mirza's forces were deployed. However, the Iranians withdrew once more, and the British occupied Ahvaz on April 1. Just days later the British were informed about the peace that was signed between Iran and Britain in Paris on March 4. Under the terms of the treaty, Iran was to withdraw from Herat, refrain from further interference in the affairs of Afghanistan, and cooperate in suppressing the slave trade in the Persian Gulf. The British agreed to not shelter opponents of the shah in their embassy and received the right to appoint consuls at their discretion in Iran. The British expeditionary force soon left the occupied Iranian territories to return to India, which was in the midst of the Indian Mutiny.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Anglo-Iranian Agreements.

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Anglo-Iraqi Treaty (1930)

Agreement between the British government and the British Mandate government of Iraq that went into force on November 16, 1930, giving to the British exclusive

commercial and military rights in Iraq once that nation became independent in 1932. The Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930 was in reality a redrafting of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1922. Neither agreement offered the Iraqis anything in return and both engendered much antipathy in Iraq. The 1922 treaty was the result of the newly created British League of Nations mandate, which encompassed modern-day Iraq, and political unrest among various Iraqi factions. Angered that Iraq was not to become independent but rather a British-administered mandate after World War I, a coalition of Shia and Sunni Muslims in Iraq precipitated a major revolt in 1920 against British occupation forces. The Kurds in northern Iraq also revolted against the British presence, hoping to form their own nation.

In 1921 Iraqi and British leaders convened in Cairo in an attempt to bring the Iraqi revolt to an end. There it was agreed to allow Iraq more (but still limited) autonomy, under a newly installed Hashemite king, Faisal Ibn Hussein. The arrangement was a clear compromise that was to allow for continued British influence in Iraq while appeasing—to a limited extent—the Iraqi nationalists who had fomented the 1920 uprising. The agreement resulted in the 1922 Anglo-Iraqi Treaty. The Iraqi assembly, however, dragged its feet in ratifying the agreement, as many nationalists were displeased with the vague assurances of independence at some unspecified time in the future. Nor were they pleased by Britain's continuing influence in Iraqi affairs. Nevertheless, after British authorities threatened to circumvent the new Iraqi constitution and rule by decree, the Iraqis reluctantly acceded to the agreement in 1924.

Between 1924 and 1930, the situation in Iraq had stabilized, and King Faisal ruled in such a way as to keep the British contented and the nationalists from fomenting a revolt. Beginning in 1927, British-owned oil companies discovered massive petroleum reserves in Iraq, which made the nation all the more important to London. Because of this find, and the impending end of the British Mandate in 1932, London hoped to negotiate a new treaty with the Iraqis, building on the 1922 agreement and guaranteeing British control of Iraqi oil and keeping out potential adversaries who might have viewed Iraq with strategic interest (Germany and the Soviet Union, in particular).

As a sop to Iraqi nationalists, the November 16, 1930, Anglo-Iraqi Treaty mapped a path toward independence after 1932. However, London clearly held most of the cards during the negotiations and insisted that it be granted wide-reaching commercial rights in Iraq, including ownership of Iraqi oil fields. Equally important, the treaty gave London extensive military rights in Iraq, allowing it to garrison troops there and/or use it as a base for future military operations.

Iraqi nationalists were incensed by the treaty, which appeared to offer the Iraqis nothing in return for the commercial and military concessions given to London. Critics were quick to point out that the 1930 agreement had essentially been dictated to the Iraq government, and that the negotiations were a smoke screen designed to

keep ardent nationalists from participating in them. Not surprisingly, the treaty was not looked upon with much favor in Iraq.

The Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930 was invoked by the British in 1941, when they moved troops into Iraq and occupied it during much of World War II. This move had been necessitated by an Iraqi coup that had seen its leaders attempting to ally themselves with the Axis Powers. The British did not vacate Iraq until 1947. At that point, London attempted to foist another agreement on the Iraqis that would have given it even more influence in Iraqi affairs, but the Iraqis balked and nothing came of it. The Anglo-Iraqi Treaties of 1922 and 1930 clearly sowed the seeds of great nationalist-driven resentment in Iraq and helped set the stage for the political instability in Iraq that endures to the present.

Paul G. Pierpaoli

See also: British Mandates.

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Anglo-Iraqi War (1941). *See* Iraq during World War II.

Anglo-Jordanian Defense Treaty (1948)

Mutual defense agreement between the British and Jordanian governments signed on March 15, 1948. The 20-year accord bound each country to come to the other's aid if attacked, permitted British air bases on Jordanian soil, provided British military officers for Jordan's Arab Legion, and granted Jordan a £10 million annual subsidy.

Although independent from British mandatory rule in 1946, Jordan remained a functional British colony. The defense treaty, which built on the 1923, 1928, and 1946 Anglo-Transjordanian Agreements, fully codified Jordan's military and financial dependence on Great Britain.

Most importantly, John Bagot Glubb (Glubb Pasha), an Arabic-speaking British officer, commanded the Arab Legion, which protected British interests by defending the Hashemite monarchy from external and internal threats. The annual subsidy was paid directly to Glubb, while British officers held all Arab Legion command positions and made all decisions regarding financing, training, equipping, and expanding the Jordanian military.

In spite of the treaty, Britain remained aloof during the Israeli War of Independence (1948–1949). However, the British did support the Jordanian annexation of the West Bank in 1950. This move doubled Jordan's population, but the predominantly Palestinian newcomers upset the kingdom's delicate ethnic balance. From 1952 to 1956, Israeli attacks on the West Bank, mounted in retaliation for infiltration and fedayeen raids, did not activate the treaty, and Britain turned down numerous Jordanian requests for offensive military assistance.

Jordan became more strategically vital to Britain after the withdrawal of the latter's troops from Egypt in 1954. The success of Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser in negotiating this withdrawal prompted King Hussein of Jordan to seek a similar agreement. This desire became embroiled in 1955 negotiations urging Jordan to join the Baghdad Pact, a British-inspired regional defense alliance. Accession to the pact contained the promise of revising the increasingly unpopular defense treaty.

In January 1956, however, the Jordanian parliament publicly declared its opposition to the kingdom's joining the Baghdad Pact. Pressure from Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Syria, along with Palestinian and nationalist domestic opinion, instead provoked calls to repeal the Anglo-Jordanian Treaty and remove British officers and influence. Egyptian propaganda reminded the Jordanian people of the loss of much of Palestine, the Arab Legion's weak response to Israeli retaliatory attacks, and Britain's behind-the-scenes control of Jordan.

To protect his position, Hussein dismissed Glubb and 11 other British officers on March 1, 1956. The Jordanian Army then began a process of Arabization. On October 25, 1956, Jordan allied itself with Egypt and Syria.

March 1957 brought Jordan's official abrogation of the Anglo-Jordanian Defense Treaty. The British evacuated their forces, Jordan officially purchased their bases, and the Egyptians and Saudis replaced the annual subsidy. After the 1958 coup in Iraq, British soldiers temporarily returned to Jordan at the king's request, but the other Arab countries and the United States soon superseded Britain as Jordan's benefactors.

Andrew Theobald

See also: Arab-Israeli War (1948); Arab-Israeli War (1956); Arab-Israeli War (1967); Arab-Israeli War (1973); Arab Legion; Baghdad Pact (1955); Glubb, Sir John Bagot.

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Anglo-Ottoman Convention (1838)

Myriad attempts by the European Great Powers to expand their influence into the Ottoman Empire in the early 19th century, particularly in regional commerce, led to various diplomatic treaties to impose European hegemony in the region. Known collectively as the "Capitulations," these treaties forced the Ottoman Empire to acquiesce to European commercial demands at the expense of their national sovereignty. A weakened Ottoman Empire, already fraught with regional unrest, particularly Egypt, had been forced to comply with British commercial demands vis-à-vis their economic sovereignty.

The Anglo-Ottoman Convention of 1838 expanded British merchant rights' within Ottoman territories, such as attaining the right of travel and free trade, establishing direct relations with producers of goods, and having their commercial disputes resolved by tribunals and not Islamic law or courts. By allowing British merchants direct access to producers, this convention did not allow for the establishment of Ottoman state monopolies over particular products and manufactures, eliminating potential sources of revenue for Ottoman authorities. Moreover, by creating a legal framework that eliminated the influence of the Islamic courts over the day-to-day operations of European commerce and thus an important cultural institution that signified Ottoman sovereignty it ensured extraterritorial privileges to British merchants. The convention also compelled the Ottoman state to enforce higher duties on exports, which benefited British imports while not allowing the Ottomans to compete in the international economy.

In 1838, under the leadership of Mehmed Ali, Egyptian forces defeated the Ottomans in Syria, in a bid for independence. However, the Great Powers, primarily the British, forced an Egyptian withdrawal in 1841. British pressure on Egypt forced them to comply under the terms of the Anglo-Ottoman Convention as well, severely disrupting Egyptian abilities to expand their own commercial networks.

Abraham O. Mendoza

See also: Egyptian-Ottoman Wars; Mehmed Ali; Russo-Ottoman Wars.

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Anglo-Ottoman War (The Dardanelles Expedition) (1807)

Unsuccessful British attempt in February 1807 to force the Ottoman Empire (Turkey) to abandon its war with Russia by threatening Constantinople with the Royal Navy. In late 1806 Britain found itself in the uncomfortable position of having two allies drifting toward war with one another. One of these was Russia, whose massive armies served as the only remaining counterweight to Napoleon's ambitions to continental dominance after the French victories over Austria in 1805 and Prussia in 1806. The other was the Ottoman Empire, which Britain had traditionally supported to prevent any other power from gaining control of the Black Sea Straits (the Bosporus and the Dardanelles), which provided access between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean Sea.

Despite British opposition, French influence in the Ottoman Empire grew through the efforts of their ambassador, General Horace-François Sébastiani, as a result of which Sultan Selim III declared war on Russia on December 27, 1806, as the final culmination of a series of moves between the rivals in the Balkans. The presence off Constantinople—located directly on the Bosporus—of HMS *Canopus*, an 80-gun ship of the line, failed to deter the declaration, and a frigate evacuated British civilians. The British naval commander in the Mediterranean, Vice Admiral Sir Cuthbert Collingwood, had anticipated trouble and begun to assemble forces. A small squadron of three ships of the line, one frigate, and one sloop, followed later by another five line-of-battle ships and smaller vessels, was placed under the command of Vice Admiral Sir John Duckworth. This show of force, however, did no more than had the *Canopus* to deter Selim, and Duckworth resolved to execute his instructions and deliver the British government's ultimatum to the sultan to end the war with Russia.

Duckworth's squadron forced its way into the Dardanelles on February 19, 1807, after defeating the Ottoman defenses, both afloat and ashore. Safe in the Sea of Marmora, the British admiral demanded that the sultan expel Sébastiani and declare his intention to make peace with Russia within 24 hours, or else face the bombardment of his largely defenseless capital. The British effort had achieved surprise, and Selim initially seemed inclined to accept the ultimatum, but foul weather forced the British squadron to shelter away from the city. This delay gave the sultan and his government time to find their resolve and resist British demands. The population of the city, ably guided by Sébastiani and a small staff of French engineers, assembled more than 1,000 guns on the shores to defend the capital.

Unable to overcome the Turks with his small squadron, Duckworth took advantage of favorable winds and currents to retreat back through the Dardanelles into the Mediterranean. The return passage was to prove more costly than the initial forcing into the straits, however, as Duckworth suffered damage to his ships and casualties among their crews. This experience in mind, Duckworth refused to make

a second effort against Constantinople without the reinforcement of troops on land, even with assistance from Russian naval forces.

This failure at Constantinople, in spite of the difficulties Duckworth faced, ruined his reputation at home. The Russo-Turkish War continued without much enthusiasm on either side until 1812, and despite Britain's aggressive action and the losses suffered and inflicted by the Royal Navy, no official Anglo-Turkish War resulted, though an expedition was dispatched to Egypt the following year, with disastrous consequences for British forces there.

Grant Weller and Marie Weller

See also: Russo-Ottoman Wars; Selim III.

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Anglo-Russian Convention (1907)

Treaty of accord between Great Britain and Russia that resolved their escalating conflict over influence in Iran and Afghanistan. The convention was designed to protect the interests of the two powers and limit their rivalry in Iran in light of the rising German Empire. Iran was divided into spheres of influence: Russia controlled the north and Britain held sway in the southeast. A neutral zone in central Iran remained under exclusive Iranian control.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Anglo-Afghan War (1878–1880); Anglo-Afghan War (1919); Iran during World War I.

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Anglo-Sudan War (1883–1899)

With Great Britain's growing power in Egypt during the 1880s, the British also inherited Egypt's problems. Primary among them was the situation in Sudan. The

Egyptian conquest of Sudan had begun under Muhammad Ali in 1819. The Sudanese people resented their Egyptian masters, and in 1881 they rallied around Muhammad Ahmad ibn Abdullah, who claimed to be the Islamic Mahdi sent to deliver Sudan from foreign oppression. With growing support, the Mahdi's forces besieged the main Egyptian military base at El Obeid in 1882.

In an attempt to relieve El Obeid, an 8,500-man Egyptian army led by British colonel William Hicks was quickly organized. Unaware that El Obeid had already fallen and its vast military stores had been captured by the Mahdi, Hicks and his force marched out from Khartoum. Meeting the Mahdi forces on November 3, 1883, outside El Obeid, the British/Egyptian force was routed, and Hicks and his European staff were killed. With the collapse of the Hicks expedition, British policy shifted as all British and Egyptians were extracted. The evacuation was overseen by British general Charles George Gordon. Rather than shepherding the British presence from the Sudan, Gordon and his small force dithered in Khartoum. They soon discovered that they were trapped, as the forces of the Mahdi surrounded the city. Heated debate commenced as to whether the British would launch a rescue of Gordon or cut their losses and abandon the Sudan. On September 19, 1884, a relief expedition was finally dispatched under the command of Garnet Wolseley. The expedition, however, arrived too late, as Khartoum fell on January 25, 1885, and Gordon and his entire garrison were slaughtered. Wolseley's relief force reached Khartoum two days later. After the fall of Khartoum, British forces withdrew from Sudan, allowing the Mahdi forces absolute control of the region. On June 22, 1885, the Mahdi died, and control of Sudan passed to Khalifa Muhammad Ahmad Abdullah.

By 1896, French expansion from the west had begun to threaten the Sudan, and with it the Lower Nile and British Egypt. Establishing British control over Sudan became vital to keeping the French at bay. In June 1896, an Anglo-Egyptian army, under the command of Major General Horatio Herbert Kitchener, advanced up the Nile to Sudan. Over the next two years, Kitchener and his force proceeded south toward Khartoum, laying railway lines to facilitate supplying the force. Khalifa Abdullah made little attempt to halt the British advance, instead gathering his forces at the Mahdi capital of Omdurman. On September 1, 1898, Kitchener's force of 25,000 Britons, Egyptians, and Sudanese faced an estimated 50,000 Mahdist outside Omdurman. Underestimating the firepower of the British, the Mahdi army was destroyed in the two-day battle. Khalifa Abdullah and the remnants of his force fled south, only to be captured and executed. With the destruction of the Mahdi forces, the British established their control over Sudan.

Robert W. Malick

See also: Khartoum, Siege of (1884–1885); Mahdiyya Movement in Sudan; Omdurman, Battle of (1898).

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Ankara, Battle of (1402)

A decisive confrontation in the period of the later crusades between the huge armies of the Ottoman sultan Bayezid I and the Mongol ruler of central Asia, Timur Lenk (Tamer-lane), who eventually carried the day, thus putting a temporary halt to the expanding Ottoman sultanate and indirectly giving the beleaguered Byzantine Empire breathing space for another half century.

The battle was hotly contested in the plain of the river Chubuk (Turk. Çubuk-ovasi) north of Ankara on July 28, 1402. From its defensive hilly position, the heterogeneous Ottoman army sustained a fierce attack by the Mongol cavalry and was eventually overrun on account of the defection of its Turkoman vassals (whose emirs took Timur's side) and despite the heroic defense of Bayezid's Christian vassals, particularly the Serbs who held the sultan's left flank. Timur, reputedly in a secret plot with the Byzantine regent John VII Palaiologos, seized Bayezid (who was to die in captivity in 1403) and one of his sons, Musa Çelebi; he then captured the town of Brusa, along with Bayezid's treasures, and consequently shattered Ottoman domination over much of northwestern and southern Anatolia, reestablishing several of the Turkoman emirates (beyliks), while a fierce civil war began among Bayezid's sons (1402/1403–1413).

Alexios G. C. Savvides

See also: Bayezid I; Timur.

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Ankara, Pact of (1939)

Treaty, concluded on October 19, 1939, between Britain, France, and Turkey, pledging "mutual assistance in resistance to aggression should the necessity arise."

Turkey pledged not to enter into any conflict with the Soviet Union while Britain and France agreed to loan Turkey £25 million to purchase military supplies from them and £18.5 million to release their frozen balances with Turkey. The agreement provided for repayment of both loans, at 4 percent and 3 percent, respectively, over a 20-year period.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Kars, Treaty of (1921).

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Annual, Battle of (1921)

Spanish military disaster at the hands of Abd el-Krim and his Riffian tribesmen in July 1921. While the columns of General Dámaso Berenguer Fusté advanced successfully into the western zone (Yebala), another Spanish column, led by the impetuous General Manuel Fernández Silvestre, advanced toward Alhucemas Bay. Silvestre, spurred on by King Alfonso XIII, pushed deeper into the Rif while failing to disarm the tribesmen and secure his flanks in his mad dash to get to Alhucemas Bay. By the summer of 1921, his army had occupied Monte Arruit and proceeded to cross the Amekran River, the demarcation line for Abd el-Krim's Riffian tribal lands. At the outpost of Abarrán, in June 1921, Silvestre's advance began to unravel when Riffian tribesmen attacked this outpost. In quick succession, one outpost after the other was overrun by the Riffians, or abandoned, including the important outpost at Igueriben on July 16.

The Spanish retreat culminated with the attack on Annual, the major base in the zone, on July 22–23. Surrounded by Abd el-Krim's army of roughly 3,000 men, Silvestre ordered his army of about 14,000 men to retreat toward Melilla. The retreat turned into a major rout as panic-stricken soldiers fled for their lives only to be cut down by the Riffians. Silvestre committed suicide and more than 8,000 Spaniards were killed and another 500 or so taken prisoner and held for ransom. The Riffians chased the Spanish all the way to the outskirts of Melilla, and only the arrival of the newly created Foreign Legion from Ceuta prevented its fall. What had taken 12 years of blood and treasure to conquer had been lost in a matter of days. Spain's defeat at Annual was the worst colonial military defeat in history, surpassing the Italian defeat at the hands of King Menelik II and the Ethiopians at Aduwa on March 1, 1896.

José E. Alvarez

See also: Abd el-Krim; Rif War (1920–1927).

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Antioch, Battles of (1097–1098)

Two consecutive sieges of the city of Antioch (mod. Antakya, Turkey) during the First Crusade (1096–1099). In the course of these sieges, the crusaders invested and captured the Turkish-held city (October 20, 1097–June 3, 1098) but were then themselves besieged by a relieving Turkish army, which they defeated four weeks later (June 2–28, 1098).

The Crusaders seem always to have recognized the importance of Antioch: Stephen of Blois, one of their leaders, wrote to his wife from Nicaea (mod. İznik, Turkey) that they were only five weeks' march from Jerusalem, "unless Antioch resists us" (Hagenmeyer 1901, 140). The hope of speedy progress sprang from their knowledge of the fragmentation of the Saljuk sultanate after the death of Tutush I, ruler of Syria (1095), which left his territories divided between his sons Riwan at Aleppo and Duqaq at Damascus. Their rivalry enabled men like Yaghisiyan, Saljuk governor of Antioch, to enjoy great independence, while the sultan, Barkyaruq (1095–1105), was viewed with deep suspicion by all the powers of Syria.

The Crusaders could count on support from the Armenian lands to the north, east, and west, which they had liberated during their march, a process solidified when Baldwin of Boulogne seized Edessa (mod. Şanliurfa, Turkey) in March 1098. An English fleet had captured St. Symeon, the port for Antioch, and Laodicea in Syria, a major maritime city to the south, establishing close connections with Byzantine Cyprus, which would serve as a supply base throughout the siege. When a Genoese fleet put into St. Symeon on November 17, the skills and equipment it brought enabled the army to build a fortified bridge of boats across the river Orontes and a fortress called Malregard to protect their camp north of the city. On March 4, 1098, another English fleet arrived, enabling the besiegers to build the crucial Mahommeries Tower, which blockaded the Bridge Gate. Yet, when the Crusade first reached Antioch, the idea was floated (perhaps by the imperial representative, Tatikios) of a distant blockade, the method used when the Byzantines reconquered it from the Arab Hamdanid dynasty in 969. However, the Crusaders rejected this idea, probably because of the need to keep the army together, and established themselves along the north wall in front of the gates between Mount Staurin and the Bridge Gate. Communications with St. Symeon were precarious, depending on the bridge of boats and subject to attack from the Bridge Gate.

Although the Western sources present the siege as a noble and continuous struggle, it was effectively a close blockade, probably punctuated by a series of truces,

In this 19th-century engraving, crusaders ascend a fortress wall during the Battle of Antioch. (Ridpath, John Clark, *Ridpath's History of the World*, 1901)

and there was never a general assault. The Crusader army had suffered badly crossing Asia Minor, and its cavalry was reduced to about 700 in number. It had been attacked from enemy outposts to the north and feared relief expeditions would never reach them. By December 1097 the army was starving and a foraging expedition was mounted into Syria. On December 31 it encountered a relief expedition sent by Duqaq of Damascus in an effort to undermine Riwan. In a drawn battle near Albara, the crusaders halted this expedition, but their failure to gather booty plunged the army into a profound crisis of supply, prompting Tatikios to return to Constantinople to hasten imperial assistance. Riwan moved to reassert his control over Antioch, but on February 9, 1098, Bohemond led all the surviving Crusader cavalry and successfully ambushed Riwan's great army as it approached the city. The Crusaders thus survived a great crisis and by early March to strengthen their defenses, they had built the Mahommeries Tower outside the Bridge Gate and blockaded the St. George Gate to the south. Under this severe pressure, one of the tower commanders, Piruz, agreed to betray his section of the wall to Bohemond (in late May). At the same time, news arrived of the approach of a huge relief army sent by the sultan under Karbugha of Mosul; this enabled Bohemond to extort a promise from the other leaders that he could have possession of the city if the Byzantine emperor did not come to their relief. On the night of June 2–3, the crusaders entered the city, which was sacked, although the citadel held out under its Turkish garrison.

The very next day, Karbughā appeared before Antioch, having wasted time in a fruitless three-week siege of Edessa designed to please some of his allies. He established a camp 5 km (about 3 miles) north of the city and drove in all the Crusader outposts. Another camp was then set up close to the citadel and an effort was made to storm the city through the citadel, but the attempt failed because the crusaders were able to block the narrow route down to the city. The Crusaders were starving and frightened, to such an extent that there were substantial desertions and Bohemond set part of the city on fire to flush out the timorous. However, in this hour of crisis a series of visionaries came forward proclaiming God's trust in his people; these events culminated in the discovery of the Holy Lance in the cathedral by a Provençal pilgrim named Peter Bartholomew on June 14, which greatly lifted Crusader morale.

On June 28, the army broke out from the Bridge Gate escorted by so many clergy that it seemed like a religious procession. Religious ardor played a major role in the ensuing victory, but so did the military prudence of Bohemond, who had been placed in command and who held back his own men as a reserve. But the decisive factor was that Karbughā had dispersed his forces: as his troops near the Bridge Gate were pushed back, those from outside other gates were drawn piecemeal into the battle. It took time for Karbughā to realize what was happening and mobilize his massive cavalry forces in the main camp; by the time they arrived the battle was lost, and the bulk of his forces never engaged. The Siege of Antioch had been an enormous strain on the Crusader army, but its capture ensured the continuation of the Crusade. The city remained in Christian hands until 1268.

John France

See also: First Crusade (1096–1099); Jerusalem, Siege of (1099).

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Antioch on the Meander, Battle of (1211)

The battle, also known as Alasehir, between the Saljuks and the Empire of Nicaea. Kay Khusraw attacked Theodore Lascaris, who claimed the imperial throne, in Western Anatolia on the pretext of assisting Alexios III, who was deposed after

the fall of Constantinople in 1204. Lascaris's army consisted of 2,000 cavalry, including 800 Latin mercenaries. Kay Khusraw's army probably numbered between 5,000 and 11,000 men. However, exaggerated figures ranging from 5,000 men to more than 100,000 soldiers are given for the Saljuks in some sources. The Nicaeans won the battle thanks to the bravery and hardiness of the Latin mercenaries, who were almost completely annihilated in the fight. Kay Khusraw died in the battle, his forces were routed, and Lascaris secured Western Anatolia.

A legendary account states that Lascaris was unhorsed in the battle, but Kay Khusraw allowed him to remount and leave. Upon seeing their leader fall the Nicaeans fled, and the Saljuk forces lost all semblances of order as they chased them off the field. In the route the sultan was left alone and was killed by a Frank. This left the Saljuk army confused and demoralized and Lascaris's counterattack routed them and ensured his victory.

Adam Ali

See also: Saljuks.

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Aqaba, Battle of (1917)

An important victory for Arab tribesmen revolting against the Ottoman Turks. The capture of Aqaba allowed the British to supply money and weapons directly to Arab forces operating on the desert flank of the fighting in Palestine. At the outbreak of World War I, the Ottoman Empire included the Arabian Peninsula. A growing sense of Arab nationalism led to tensions that increased during the war, which the British encouraged against their enemy, Turkey. The British high commissioner in Egypt, Sir Henry McMahon, exchanged letters with Sharif of Mecca Husayn ibn Ali and promised British support for a revolt. On June 5, 1916, Husayn called his Hashemite clan to rebel, and the Arabs soon overran a number of Turkish garrisons. With British artillery support, the Arabs captured Mecca from the Turks. They also tried to capture Medina but were rebuffed. This latter failure caused many Arabs to lose heart, but at this point British captain T. E. Lawrence arrived to gather information about conditions. After meeting with Husayn's son Faisal, Lawrence recommended that the Arabs form a guerrilla army and avoid pitched battles with the Turks. Lawrence was then confirmed as the British representative to Husayn and served as Faisal's chief of staff.

Faisal's forces did not confront the Turkish force marching to recapture Mecca and instead attacked the Turks' line of communications and tied down the Turkish VII Corps of four infantry divisions. Lawrence realized the value to the Arabs of holding a port through which British support could flow. As a consequence, in April 1917, Lawrence formulated a plan to capture Aqaba, at the head of an arm of the Red Sea running along the eastern Sinai. This plan did not have the support of Lieutenant General Sir Archibald Murray, British commander-in-chief in Egypt. On May 9, nonetheless, Lawrence left Wejh with 1,000 men for Aqaba. He took a circuitous path going almost as far north as Damascus. In the process Lawrence made contact with Arab leaders in Jordan, securing an additional 4,000 fighting men from them. During their march, Lawrence and his men destroyed several miles of railroad tracks and fought the Turks at Fuweila and Aba-el-Lissan, completely destroying the Turkish force on July 2. Lawrence convinced the Arabs to take prisoners and treat them well in an effort to encourage other Turkish garrisons to surrender. The Arabs continued to push south to approach Aqaba from the land side. Garrisons along his route most often surrendered without fighting, surprised at the size of the Arab force that grew with each success. The Arabs overran the outermost defenses at Khadra, and on July 6 they swept into Aqaba. There was little fighting, and the Turkish garrison of some 300 men and a few German advisers surrendered.

Lawrence then rode across Sinai to inform the British command in Egypt of his success. Vice Admiral Rosslyn Wemyss, Royal Navy commander-in-chief at Egypt, immediately shipped food and arms to enable the Arabs to hold Aqaba. Faisal moved his headquarters to Aqaba, and a regular army of Arabs, formed in Egypt of Arab prisoners of war captured in Egypt by the British, was established there. Aqaba became the chief base for the Arab Revolt, serving as the conduit of arms, propaganda, and money from the British to the Arabs for the remainder of the war.

Tim J. Watts

See also: Arab Revolt of 1916–1918; Husayn ibn Ali; Lawrence, Thomas Edward (Lawrence of Arabia).

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Arab Legion

Police and combat force founded in 1920 and dominated by Arabs in the British Mandate for Palestine. The Arab Legion was originally organized as a 150-man

Arab police force under the leadership of British Army lieutenant colonel Frederick Gerard Peake (later Peake Pasha, major general). The unit was increased in size to almost 1,000 men within the year and was renamed the Reserve Mobile Force.

When the British recognized Abdullah as emir of Transjordan, Abdullah's civil police force was combined with the Reserve Mobile Force as the Arab Legion on October 22, 1923. Peake served as its first commander. For more than 30 years, British officers commanded the legion. It held primary responsibility for policing the capital of Amman and its environs, leaving border security for Transjordan to the newly created Transjordan Frontier Force.

In November 1930, British Army major John Bagot Glubb (later Glubb Pasha, lieutenant general) became Peake's assistant. In March 1931, Glubb created the Arab Legion's Desert Patrol, a motorized unit composed mostly of Bedouin, to end tribal opposition to Abdullah's authority across Transjordan's vast desert regions. Glubb assumed command of the 2,000-man legion upon Peake's retirement in March 1939.

During World War II, Emir Abdullah assumed a pro-Allied stance, allowing the Arab Legion to support the efforts of Britain in the Middle East. The legion participated in the April–May 1941 British offensive against the recently proclaimed pro-Nazi government of Rashid Ali al-Gaylani in Iraq. The legion also played a major role in the relief of the British garrison at the Royal Air Force base at Habbaniya and in the liberation of Baghdad. The legion then joined the Allied operation against Vichy French forces in Syria, playing major roles in the Palmyra and Sukhna offensives in June 1941. So impressed were the British with the legion's performance that it was greatly enlarged, eventually reaching 16,000 men.

The Arab Legion was stationed in the Sinai Desert in 1942 in anticipation of German field marshal Erwin Rommel's advance across Egypt but was not committed after the Afrika Korps was halted at El Alamein. Although several draft plans called for the legion to deploy to the Italian theater of operations, the command was largely used for the remainder of the war to guard vital communications and strategic resources in the Middle East.

On May 25, 1946, Transjordan became an independent kingdom under King Abdullah. The Arab Legion was then reduced in size to 4,500 men. Thirty-seven British officers under Glubb remained with the legion, while a group of Arab junior officers were groomed for the day that the British would leave the mandate.

As tensions grew between Jews and Arabs in the dissolving British Mandate for Palestine, most of the British officers in the Arab Legion temporarily withdrew their services. Although the legion had been designed primarily as a desert force, it saw most of its action around Jerusalem. Glubb opposed this, fearing it would lead to house-to-house fighting. The legion defeated the Jewish Kfar-Etzion bloc settlements south of Jerusalem in May 1948.

The camel corps of the Arab Legion in Jordan as seen in 1946. (Library of Congress)

When Israel declared its independence on May 14, 1948, King Abdullah ordered Glubb to enter the Old City of Jerusalem, seize the Jewish Quarter, and engage the armed Jewish Haganah in the fight for the New City of Jerusalem. Meanwhile, two regiments of the Arab Legion bypassed Jerusalem for Latrun to fend off enemy reinforcements and hold the hills of Judea for the Arabs.

Although in sharp contrast with other Arab forces, the Arab Legion fought on a par with the Israelis but nonetheless suffered heavy losses in the fight for the New City of Jerusalem and finally was forced to withdraw. The legion managed to hold the Old City, where supply problems led to a surrender of the Jewish Quarter on May 28. In June, the fighting shifted to the Latrun area. The Arab Legion successfully fended off heavy attacks by the elite Palmach, which intended to seize Latrun. By mid-July it was clear that the legion had held.

When the Rhodes negotiations finally established a permanent armistice on April 3, 1949, the Kingdom of Jordan could lay claim to East Jerusalem, Hebron, Nablus, and Judea (commonly referred to as the West Bank) thanks to the efforts of Glubb and the Arab Legion. Of the Arab forces, only Glubb's legion turned in an exemplary performance. After the Israeli War of Independence, the size of the Arab Legion was set at three brigades. Two legion brigades were assigned to the Jordanian-controlled West Bank in an effort to stop Palestinians from crossing over into Israel and to stop Israeli reprisal attacks against fedayeen harbored in the West Bank. The legion also dealt with internal disputes aimed at discrediting the young

King Hussein of Jordan, who assumed power a few months after his grandfather, Abdullah, was assassinated on July 20, 1951.

Within the Arab Legion there was a rising tide of anti-British sentiment, known as the Free Officers Movement, led by a clique of young Arab officers assigned to the legion. On March 1, 1956, King Hussein dismissed Glubb from his command along with all British officers in the legion. After more than 25 years of service to Abdullah, Hussein, and the legion, Glubb was evicted from Jordan and subsequently returned to Britain. Brigadier General Rade Einab became the first Arab commander of the legion but was soon replaced by Ali abu Nowar, a friend of the young king and a leader among the Free Officers. Later in 1956, the elite Arab Legion was amalgamated with Jordan's National Guard into the Royal Jordanian Army, an army that still retains many of its British traditions.

Thomas D. Veve

See also: Arab-Israeli War (1948); Arab-Israeli War (1956); Glubb, Sir John Bagot.

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Arab Revolt of 1916–1918

Uprising during World War I by the Arab peoples of north, central, and western Arabia against Ottoman rule. Since the 16th century, the Ottoman government in Constantinople had controlled the area of Syria, Palestine, Iraq, the western provinces of Saudi Arabia, and part of Yemen. Much of the region's population of about 6 million was nomadic. In 1908, the Young Turks came to power in Turkey and promoted Turkish nationalism at the expense of other nationalities of the empire, which the Arabs and other peoples resented. The new government also sent troops into Arab lands and introduced conscription, both of which angered the Arabs.

Under the terms of the Turkish constitution of 1909, the Arab peoples of the empire sent representatives to the Imperial Parliament in Constantinople, where they openly supported Arab rights. At the same time newspapers and political organizations, some secret, sprang up in the Arab lands and promoted Arab nationalism.

Damascus and Beirut were centers of this activity but were too close geographically to central Turkey to risk overt action. Arab power was in fact diffuse and largely wielded by local chieftains who had little ability to initiate hostilities against Constantinople on their own.

The center of the Arab nationalist movement was the Hejaz region of central Arabia, which contained the holy cities of Mecca and Medina. The region was connected to Turkey by means of the Damascus-Medina (Hejaz) Railway. Sharif of Mecca Husayn ibn Ali was nominal head of the Hejaz. His position was strengthened by his senior position in the Muslim religious hierarchy as a direct descendant of the Prophet Muhammad. Husayn saw the railway as an infringement on his control and had long hoped for an independent Arab kingdom under his rule. World War I provided that opportunity.

As early as February 1914, Husayn had been in communication, through his son Abdullah, with British authorities in Cairo. Abdullah met with the British high commissioner in Egypt, Lord Kitchener, and told him that the Arabs were prepared to rebel against Constantinople in return for British support. The British were skeptical, but the entrance of the Ottoman Empire into the war on the side of the Central Powers changed their attitude. Both Sir Harold Wingate, British governor-general of the Sudan, and Sir Henry McMahon, Kitchener's successor as high commissioner in Egypt, kept in touch with Husayn.

In the spring of 1915, Husayn sent his third son, Emir Faisal, to Damascus to reassure Turkish authorities there of his loyalty and to sound out Arab opinion. Faisal had favored the Turks, but the visit to Damascus and the profound discontent of the Arab population he discovered there reversed this view.

Husayn then entered into active negotiations with McMahon in Cairo. Husayn promised to declare war on the Ottoman Empire and raise an Arab army to assist the British in return for British support for him as king of a postwar Pan-Arab state. The British agreed and soon were providing some rifles and ammunition to the Arabs. Meanwhile, the Turks were endeavoring to stamp out Arab nationalism in Damascus by executing a number of Arab nationalist leaders. Many other Arab patriots fled south to Mecca, where they urged Hussein to take up arms. The Turks were well aware of the Arab preparations and beginning in May 1916 blockaded the Hejaz from arms shipments and began a buildup of their forces in Damascus. The actual revolt was initiated by the dispatch of Turkish troops to reinforce their garrison at Medina. Outside Medina on June 5, 1916, Husayn's eldest son Ali and Faisal officially proclaimed the start of the Arab Revolt.

Joined by 30,000 tribesmen, Faisal immediately led an assault on the Turkish garrison at Medina, but the Turks drove off the attackers. The Arabs did succeed, however, in cutting the railway to the north of the city. To the south, Husayn led an attack on the 1,000-man Turkish garrison at Mecca, taking the city after three days of street fighting. Another Arab attack shortly thereafter against the port city

of Jidda was also successful, supported by the British Royal Navy seaplane carrier *Ben-my-Chree*, which was based at Aden. Other cities also fell to the Arabs. In September, the 3,000-man Turkish garrison at Taif, the last city in the southern Hejaz held by the Turks, surrendered to Arab forces supported by British-supplied artillery.

On November 2, Husayn proclaimed himself "King of the Arab Countries." This created some embarrassment for the British government with the French. Finally, the Allies worked out a compromise by which they addressed Husayn as "King of the Hejaz." Husayn largely left leadership of the revolt to his four sons. A number of Arabs in the Turkish Army, including officers taken prisoner in the fighting, helped provide a leadership cadre for the Arab Army. Military strength of its four main forces commanded by Husayn's sons fluctuated wildly, and few of the men involved, who ranged widely in age, were trained.

In October 1916, the Turks managed to drive the Arab Army south of Medina and reopened the railway. The British sent a party of advisers to Husayn, and Arabist captain T. E. Lawrence became Faisal's official adviser, successfully urging Faisal to resume the offensive. Rather than meet Turkish power head on, the two men initiated a series of hit-and-run raids over northern Arabia that took advantage of the support of the local populations and forced the Turks to divert increasing numbers of troops to the region.

In the spring of 1917, Faisal received pledges of Arab support from Syria once military operations reached there. In July 1917, Lawrence led an attack that captured Aqaba, which then became Faisal's chief base, while forces under Abdullah and Ali contained the Turkish garrison at Medina and protected Mecca. Faisal's northern wing of the Arab Army was the revolt's chief military force and acted on the right flank of Lieutenant General Edmund Allenby's British forces in Palestine. In the autumn of 1917, Lawrence, who understood and effectively practiced guerrilla warfare, led a series of successful attacks on Turkish rail traffic. Allenby's calls for diversionary attacks by the Arab Army produced a series of raids that diverted 23,000 Turkish troops from participating in the fighting in Palestine. Faisal also cooperated closely with Allenby in the Megiddo Offensive and, with 30,000 men, led the revolt's climactic action, the entrance into Damascus in October 1918.

The Arab Revolt had immense repercussions in the Arab world in fueling Arab nationalism. It helped free the Arab lands from Turkish rule and led to the formation of Arab states. But the victorious Allies thwarted Husayn's ambitions. McMahon's pledge to Hussein preceded by six months the 1916 Sykes-Picot Agreement between the British and French governments, a breach of promises made to the Arabs that in effect set up British and French spheres of influence in the Middle East. Ultimately, much of the territory was awarded as mandates to Great Britain and France under the League of Nations. Faisal received Syria but was deposed and became king of Iraq under British protection. Abdullah became king of the newly

created Transjordan. Husayn declared himself caliph of Islam in March 1924 but was forced to abdicate as king of the Hejaz to his son Ali when Abd al-Aziz Al-Saud (Ibn Saud) conquered most of the Hejaz.

Spencer C. Tucker

See also: Aqaba, Battle of (1917); Damascus, Fall of (1918); Hejaz Railroad, Attacks on (1916–1918); Husayn ibn Ali; Ibn Saud; Lawrence, Thomas Edward (Lawrence of Arabia); Medina, Siege of (1916–1919); Saudi-Hashemite War (1919–1925).

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Arab Revolt of 1936–1939

General revolt among Arabs in the British Mandate for Palestine. Although the uprising was aimed primarily at British interests in the area, attacks against Jews were far from uncommon. Although it failed to redress immediate concerns, the revolt had a lasting impact on Britain's policies in the mandate and on the Arab and Jewish communities.

The revolt was the culmination of growing Arab unrest over Jewish immigration and land purchases in Palestine and economic dislocation from increased urbanization and industrialization. It was, in fact, the most severe of a number of communal disturbances between Jews and Arabs dating from the early 1920s. Despite its failure, the Great Revolt (as the Arabs call it) marked the dawn of a distinctive Palestinian Arab nationalism.

The problems that triggered the unrest grew in part from events outside the region. Growing anti-Semitism in Eastern Europe and Nazi control of Germany beginning in 1933 led to an increase in Jewish immigrants entering Palestine. At the same time, growing land purchases by Zionists in Palestine had led to the expulsion of large numbers of Arab peasants from lands on which they had been tenant farmers. These dislocations were also part of a deepening economic crisis that gripped the region as Palestinian agricultural exports to Europe and the United States declined in the midst of the Great Depression (around 1930–1940).

The many landless Arabs, often forced into slums erected around large cities, formed the rank and file of the revolt. The leadership, however, existed on two levels. The first was a more politically conscious Arab elite dominated by two rival clans: the Husseini family led by Haj Amin al-Husseini, the mufti of Jerusalem,

and their rivals, the Nashashibis, represented by Fakhri al-Nashashibi. The second element (and the true center of the revolt's leadership) resided among local committees that had emerged in Jerusalem, Nablus, Jaffa, Tulkarm, and elsewhere.

Tensions among Arabs, Jews, and British administrators in Palestine had been building for several months prior to the revolt's outbreak in April 1936. It was clear that a surge of Islamic extremism had accompanied growing economic dislocation among Palestinian Arabs. Sheikh Izz al-Din al-Qassam, a Syrian-born, Egyptian-educated cleric, had been preaching fundamentalist Islam and calling for a jihad (holy war) against both Britons and Jews. At the same time, he was assembling a host of devoted followers, mostly from landless Arabs in the Haifa area. After his followers murdered a Jewish policeman near Gilboa, al-Qassam died in a shootout with British troops on November 20, 1935. His death triggered major nationalist demonstrations among Arabs throughout Palestine. At the same time, the British discovered an arms cache in a shipment of cement barrels intended for a Jewish importer, which fed rumors among Arabs that the Jews were arming for a war against the Arabs. These developments essentially pushed the tension-ridden atmosphere in Palestine into outright rebellion.

The Arab Revolt officially began in April 1936 in the hill country around Tulkarm and spread rapidly. The young nationalists who formed the local committees took the lead. Anxious to gain control of the revolt and to maintain their own credibility, the Husseini and Nashashibi clans formed the Arab Higher Committee to provide rhetorical, financial, and material support for the uprising. During the first six months of the revolt, 200 Arabs, 80 Jews, and 28 British soldiers and policemen died in clashes.

Initially, British reaction was somewhat restrained. Indeed, London hoped that the disturbances would blow over without forcing recourse to measures that might scar Anglo-Arab relations. British authorities imposed no death sentences in response to any of the killings. Only in September 1936 did British authorities impose martial law. Eventually, the government sent 20,000 troops from Britain and Egypt and recruited 2,700 Jewish supernumeraries to contain and quell the disturbances.

The reaction of the Jewish community in Palestine was also restrained. The Jewish Agency for Palestine acted to strengthen its self-defense force (the Haganah) and fortified settlements, leaving suppression of the revolt to the British. As the uprising continued and attacks on Jewish settlements increased, the Palestinian Jews resorted to aggressive self-defense, including ambushes of rebel Arab bands and reprisals against neighboring Arab villages suspected of harboring guerrillas. This doctrine of harsh reprisals developed by the Zionist leadership during the revolt became a permanent fixture of Zionist military policy.

In the first months of the revolt, the British succeeded—through the use of night curfews, patrols, searches, and ambushes—in pushing Arab rebels out of the towns. By mid-May 1936, rural Palestine had become the center of gravity of the revolt and

would remain so until the revolt's end in 1939, and leadership remained centered in the local committees. The Arab Higher Committee was increasingly paralyzed by rivalries between the Husseini and Nashashibi clans and never asserted control over the rural bands, although it did provide money, arms, and rhetorical support.

By the autumn of 1937, 9,000–10,000 Palestinian fighters, augmented by non-Palestinians brought in and financed by the Arab Higher Committee, were roaming the countryside. They were often motivated as much by the desire for loot as by nationalist zeal. Internecine violence among rival families resulted in more deaths among the Arabs than action by the British or Zionists. The rebels' practice of extorting food and other valuables from Arab peasants damaged the rural economy and increasingly alienated the rebels from their base of support. To pacify the countryside, the British shrewdly exploited divisions among the Arabs and used combined British-Zionist Special Night Squads (the best known of which was commanded by Captain Orde Wingate) that ambushed rebel bands, launched retaliatory strikes against Arab villages suspected of harboring guerrillas, and carried out targeted assassinations against rebel leaders.

The Arab Revolt collapsed in 1939 in the face of eroding support in the countryside, the arrest or exile of the senior leaders (including Haj Amin al-Husseini, who eventually wound up in Nazi Germany), lack of cohesion in the revolt's organization and leadership, and mounting British pressure. Nevertheless, the revolt had profound consequences for the mandate and the Arab and Zionist camps. The intensity of the uprising stunned British officials in Jerusalem and London and led the government to send a commission chaired by Lord William Robert Peel to Palestine in late 1936. The Peel Commission Report, which appeared in July 1937, proposed the partition of Palestine into a Jewish area and a much larger Arab area. This marked the first time partition had been proposed as a solution to the Palestine issue. The violence subsided for a time—nearly a year—as the Peel Commission did its work. But both sides essentially rejected the proposal, and fighting ramped up considerably in the fall of 1937. The British eventually backed away from the Peel Commission proposals in the face of opposition from both Arabs and Jews.

More shocking for Palestinian Jews was the implementation of the British government White Paper of May 1939, which restricted Jewish immigration and land purchases over the next 5 years and promised an independent Palestinian Arab state in 10 years if the rights of the Jewish community were protected. From the Jewish perspective, the White Paper represented a surrender to Arab violence and intimidation. It also closed Palestine to European Jews at a time when anti-Jewish violence in Germany and Eastern Europe was intensifying. Indeed, the measure permanently damaged relations between Britain and the Jews in Palestine.

The worst damage, however, was to Palestinian Arabs. Although the Great Revolt gained a permanent place in Arab nationalist mythology, in the short term the

Arabs were left with the consequences of a failed revolt. Most of the political leadership was in prison, was exiled, or had left politics disgusted and disillusioned. The end of the revolt relieved many Palestinian Arabs who could now resume their normal lives and recoup some of their economic losses. Even so, blood feuds between families that had supported the uprising and those that had opposed it were to disrupt society and paralyze political life for years. The Palestinians had to depend on the Arab states in the region with baneful consequences, leading up to the Israeli War of Independence (1948–1949).

The Arab Revolt spontaneously unraveled throughout 1939 so that by year's end clashes and armed violence had largely ended. Nevertheless, the casualty figures were grim indeed. It is estimated that about 5,000 Arabs, 400 Jews, and 200 British soldiers and officials died in the uprising. And despite the summoning of 20,000 additional British troops and as many as 15,000 Haganah fighters, it took the better part of three years to conquer the revolt.

The overall legacy of the Arab Revolt, then, was the further poisoning of relations between Arabs and Jews and the further alienation of the British from both communities. The revolt also led to the separation of the Arab and Jewish economies, which had previously been somewhat integrated. This would burden Palestinian Arabs with poverty, high unemployment, and homelessness for the succeeding two generations. The divisions among Arab, Jew, and Briton remained largely dormant during World War II, but they would resurface with even more violence in the postwar years.

Walter F. Bell

See also: Arab-Israeli War (1948); Arab-Israeli War (1956); Arab-Israeli War (1967); Arab-Israeli War (1973); British Mandates.

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Arabi, Ahmed Pasha (ca. 1840–1911)

Charismatic Egyptian Army officer and an ardent nationalist leader who repeatedly challenged the authority of the khedive (viceroy) of Egypt by threatening a military coup. Arabi eventually became the war minister but was dismissed; with

the army in open defiance, he was reinstated by an increasingly impotent khedive. Arabi's actions eventually resulted in confrontation with the British and the defeat of the Egyptian Army.

Sayed Ahmed Bey Arabi—Arabi Pasha—born around 1840, claimed to be descended from Hussein, the grandson of the Prophet Muhammad. The son of a small village sheikh, Arabi was conscripted into the Egyptian Army at age 14. Tall, intelligent, and hardworking, he caught the attention of his superiors. Three years later, Arabi was commissioned a lieutenant. Soon he became an aide-de-camp to the progressive ruler Mohammed Ali and was promoted to lieutenant colonel within three years.

After Ismail became khedive in 1863, Arabi fell out of favor and his once-promising military career stagnated. His personal discontent increased, especially during the debacle of the Egyptian Army's invasion of Abyssinia (1875–1876). The British persuaded the Ottoman sultan to depose Ismail and replace him with Tewfik, Ismail's son.

Loss of sovereignty, indebtedness, and related issues were keenly felt by many Egyptians. Arabi became a leader of the nationalists who were trying to overthrow foreign domination. On February 1, 1881, and again on September 9, Arabi and other colonels used the threat of a coup by their troops to issue ultimatums to Tewfik for government and military reforms. On both occasions, the khedive gave in to Arabi's demands.

In February 1882, Arabi became the war minister. The British and French sent a joint naval squadron that arrived at Alexandria late in May 1882, and demanded the dismissal of Arabi. The khedive consented and his entire government resigned in protest. The Egyptian Army was in open defiance and the country was in chaos. Arabi was reinstated as war minister. Riots erupted in the afternoon of June 11, 1882 in Alexandria; more than 50 Europeans were killed and many more injured, including the British consul.

British ships bombarded the Egyptian fortifications at Alexandria on July 11, 1882, the same day Arabi was appointed commander in chief. Later in July, the British sent an expeditionary force to Egypt, under the command of General (later Field Marshal Viscount) Sir Garnet J. Wolseley. The force began to disembark at Alexandria on August 12, 1882, but after a ruse, the British troops reembarked. After the British secured the Suez Canal, the troops landed at Ismailia.

Arabi seems to have eventually ascertained Wolseley's actual plan. After moving to the main Egyptian Army camp at Tel el-Kebir, Arabi attacked the British at Kassassin on September 9, 1882, and was strongly repulsed. Arabi commanded the Egyptian forces at Tel el-Kebir and was decisively defeated by the British on September 13. After the British crushed the Egyptian Army, they hurriedly advanced to Cairo, hoping to prevent a rumored burning of the city.

When the British arrived in Cairo on September 14, 1882, they learned that Arabi was in his house there. Later that evening, Arabi and other senior Egyptian Army

officers surrendered their swords, and with the arrival of Wolseley in Cairo the following day, Arabi's rebellion came to an end.

In December 1882, Arabi was brought before an Egyptian military court and charged with rebellion. He pleaded guilty and was sentenced to death. The British government, concerned about further unrest if Arabi were executed and made a martyr, recommended leniency. The khedive commuted Arabi's sentence to "perpetual exile." Arabi was transported to Ceylon, and in 1901 he was permitted to return to Egypt, where he died in 1911.

Harold E. Raugh Jr.

See also: Egypt, British Colonialism in; Egypt, British occupation of (1882).

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Arab-Israeli War (1948)

A watershed conflict called the War of Independence by Israelis and *al-Nakba*, or "the catastrophe," by Arabs. The names indicate the differing perspectives of the belligerents as well as the results of the fighting. The war officially began almost immediately upon the establishment of the Jewish state in May 1948, and by the time hostilities ended early in 1949, the Arabs found themselves defeated and in disarray.

The war arose from the conflict between Jews and Arabs that had developed especially during the period of the British Mandate over Palestine (1919–1947). The two groups competed over a host of issues, but the most contentious of these were Jewish immigration and land purchases. The conflict had led to civil strife in the interwar era, and this broke out again with renewed vehemence after World War II. The British failed to arrest the conflagration and turned the problem over to the United Nations (UN). In November 1947, the newly created UN resolved on the creation of a Jewish state in part of what had been the British Mandate. Although much of Palestine was supposed to become an Arab state, neither the Palestinians nor other Arabs would accept what they considered the injustice of

Counterattack by the Arab Liberation Army volunteers at the Palestinian village of al-Qastal that was taken by Israeli forces in April 1948 during the Israeli War of Independence. (PalestineRemembered.Com)

the UN decision. Thus, within hours of the proclamation of the State of Israel on May 14, 1948, a major war erupted between Israel and the Palestinians as well as Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, and Iraq.

The actual fighting in the war can be divided into three stages, which were divided by two cease-fires. The first period of combat lasted about a month and did not go well for the Jews. Jordan's Arab Legion wrested the Old City of Jerusalem from the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), threatened West Jerusalem, and occupied the West Bank. In the meantime, the UN tried to mediate the dispute and imposed an arms embargo on the belligerents. Although diplomats managed to arrange a truce, hostilities broke out again in early July. In the 10 days of fighting that marked the second phase of the war, the tide of battle turned. The IDF captured important objectives along the Tel Aviv–Jerusalem corridor and likewise achieved successes further north in the Lower Galilee. UN negotiators again intervened and managed to arrange a cease-fire, which lasted until October. In the final phase of the war, the IDF decisively defeated the Egyptians, took the Negev, advanced into Gaza and the Sinai, captured the Upper Galilee, and crossed the frontier into Lebanon.

By the time the UN got the belligerents to accept a truce in January 1949, Israel had won a major victory and possessed lands beyond those originally intended for it. Yet, in the war's aftermath, the Arabs would not accept a comprehensive peace. Moreover, the Palestinians found themselves without a state as the Jordanians had conquered the West Bank and East Jerusalem and the Egyptians had taken Gaza. More than 700,000 Palestinians were refugees. The humiliation that the Arabs suffered redounds even to this day.

George L. Simpson Jr.

See also: Arab-Israeli War (1956); Arab-Israeli War (1967); Arab-Israeli War (1973); Arab Legion; Intifada, First; Intifada, Second.

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Arab-Israeli War (1956)

War that followed Egyptian President Gamal abdel Nasser's nationalization of the Suez Canal in July 1956. The act antagonized the British and the French, who had a vital stake in the waterway. Pressed by American president Dwight Eisenhower not to use military force, London and Paris adopted diplomacy and measures short of war to try to resolve the issue. When such efforts failed, Great Britain, France, and Israel colluded on a plan to defeat Egypt. The Israelis were willing to participate in the scheme because they faced a deteriorating security situation. Their hostility toward Nasser arose because Egypt remained in a state of belligerency with Israel after the 1948–1949 Arab-Israeli War, prevented shipping from reaching the Jewish state through Suez and the Gulf of Aqaba, abetted escalating fedayeen, or guerrilla, raids directed at Israel, and was in the process of acquiring weapons from the Soviet Bloc.

Following a prearranged plan, Israel initiated hostilities on October 29 by sending the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) into the Gaza Strip and the Sinai. The swiftness of the IDF assault caught the Egyptians by surprise, as did the insertion of paratroopers near mountain passes in the Sinai. IDF units quickly enveloped Egyptian positions while Israeli armor drove deep into the peninsula and the Israeli Air Force provided close air support. Great Britain and France next issued an ultimatum to Egypt and Israel to disengage and withdraw their forces at least 10 miles from the Suez Canal. The Israelis complied with the demand, but Nasser would not. London and Paris meanwhile gave cover to their allies by vetoing a U.S.-sponsored Security Resolution that called for an immediate Israeli withdrawal from Egyptian territory. On October 31, British and French aircraft began bombing Egyptian targets. Over the next few days, the IDF routed the Egyptians, and about the only thing Nasser could do as the Israelis captured the Sinai was to sink some vessels transiting the canal to prevent its use. With the landing of British and French paratroopers at key locations along Suez on November 5, it looked as if the Egyptian cause was lost. Yet, that was not the case.

The reason for the reversal of fortune rested mainly in Washington. Eisenhower was angered at his allies' secrecy and at Israeli adventurism, and he exerted strong pressure against them. With the Soviet Union threatening to send volunteers to help the Egyptians and the fear that the conflict might get out of control, Eisenhower cut off military aid to Israel and refused to support Britain and France financially

or with oil. Feeling betrayed by the United States, both the European powers accepted a cease-fire and agreed to withdraw their troops on November 6. Two days later, under intense pressure from Washington, Israel ceased hostilities as well. In retrospect, although Nasser had failed on the battlefield, he had won an enormous political victory by standing up to the "imperialists," and his victory catapulted him to fame in the Arab world.

George L. Simpson Jr.

See also: Arab-Israeli War (1948); Arab-Israeli War (1967); Arab-Israeli War (1973); Arab Legion; Intifada, First; Intifada, Second; Nasser, Gamal Abdel.

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Arab-Israeli War (1967)

A watershed event in the history of the Middle East. In a mere six days, Israeli forces inflicted a catastrophic defeat on Egypt, Syria, and Jordan and captured lands reaching from the Golan Heights to the Suez Canal. Its occupation of this territory became the centerpiece of the Arab-Israeli dispute, and the repercussions from the conflict still echo today.

Hostilities between the Israelis and their Arab neighbors followed an escalating crisis born of the embers of the 1956 Suez War. Exacerbating the problem was the dispute over the headwaters of the Jordan River, not to mention Israel's development of a nuclear capability. Fedayeen, or guerrilla, attacks into Israel and the reprisals that ensued, continued to stoke the fire of enmity between the two sides, as did dogfights wherein the Israeli Air Force (IAF) downed Syrian MiGs. Thus, when a false report that Israel had mobilized several brigades along the Syrian border came to the attention of Gamal Abdel Nasser in the spring of 1967, the Egyptian president decided to come to the aid of Damascus. Nasser sent Egyptian forces into the Sinai and got the United Nations (UN) to remove troops that had served as a buffer since the end of the Suez War. He next closed the Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli shipping. For its part, Israel mobilized its reserve forces and put together a government of national unity. Jordan publicly weighed in with Egypt and Syria, so many in Israel were deeply alarmed. All the while, the United States and the UN sought to resolve the crisis peacefully, but such attempts proved futile.

The brief, but decisive, war erupted on June 5, when the IAF suddenly struck Egyptian airfields. Within a few hours, the IAF had taken care of the Egyptian Air Force, and it moved on to take out the Syrians and achieve air superiority. On the

ground, Israeli forces inflicted devastating losses on the Egyptians, rapidly enveloped their units in the Sinai, and raced to the Suez Canal. When Jordan entered the war, the Israelis struck decisive blows and captured the Old City of Jerusalem and the West Bank. The Israelis next turned north. They overran Syrian units in the Golan and had a clear path to Damascus when Israel accepted the ceasefire that ended the conflict on June 10. It is also noteworthy that, while these events were occurring, the Soviet Union supported the Arabs and the United States backed the Israelis.

The results of the Six-Day War were profound. It was without doubt a resounding victory for the Israelis. Yet, it was also a humiliation to the Arabs, who had lost yet another round of fighting to the Jewish state. Besides the territory that had changed hands, the conflict aggravated the regional refugee problem with perhaps a half million Palestinians uprooted according to UN estimates. The failure likewise led to the fall of several Arab governments. Nonetheless, Arab leaders remained steadfast in their opposition to Israel.

George L. Simpson Jr.

See also: Arab-Israeli War (1948); Arab-Israeli War (1956); Arab-Israeli War (1973); Arab Legion; Intifada, First; Intifada, Second.

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Arab-Israeli War (1973)

War, known as the Yom Kippur War by Israelis and the Ramadan War by Arabs, between Israel and Egypt-Syria fought for three weeks in October 1973. The Arabs won major victories in the opening phase of the conflict and threatened to overwhelm the Jewish state, but Israel managed to recover from its initial losses and overcame its Egyptian and Syrian foes by the end of the hostilities.

When Egypt and Syria attacked Israel on October 6, 1973, they stunned the world. The Arabs had suffered defeat only six years earlier in the Six-Day War and few believed they were capable of fighting another round so soon. Hoping to regain lost territories in the Sinai and Golan, however, Egypt concluded a covert military alliance with Syria and conducted a successful campaign of strategic deception to keep the Israelis in the dark concerning their preparations for war. Israel's intelligence failure proved profound, and it was only on the eve of the conflict that officials realized that hostilities were imminent.

The initial Arab assault was almost a complete success. The Egyptians crossed the Suez Canal more rapidly than the Israelis thought possible and enveloped their fortifications on the east bank of the international waterway. Likewise, Syrian armor and infantry thrust deep into the Golan and overwhelmed Israeli defenses. When the conflict commenced, the Arabs had a huge advantage in numbers, but they also used new weapons in innovative ways. Thus, surface-to-air missiles shot down Israeli aircraft that tried to provide close air support to beleaguered ground units while infantry units used antitank missiles to crush armored counterattacks. Israel's failure to employ combined arms properly proved a lethal lesson, and led to despair on the part of its leaders.

Nevertheless, as the conflict continued and Israel became fully mobilized, the tide of battle turned. While Moscow made up for the losses of its Arab client states, Washington supplied the Israelis with arms. In the meantime, the Israelis developed tactics to counteract those of their Arab enemies. In the north, the Israelis and the Syrians fought desperately until the latter were defeated. In the Sinai, the Egyptians meanwhile tried to relieve their Syrian allies by launching a new offensive. The result was a major defeat for Cairo and a shift in momentum in the fighting. Israeli units mounted new attacks and crossed the Suez Canal in force before Egypt understood what was happening. The United Nations tried to establish a lasting cease-fire while Israeli units encircled an Egyptian army. Violations of agreements, however, led to the threat that the superpowers would actively align themselves with their surrogates. Nearing the brink of such a confrontation, decision makers had second thoughts, and the war finally came to an end on October 26.

Although the Israelis were in a position to inflict a decisive defeat on the Arabs when the fighting halted, the fact that they had not finished off the Egyptians led both sides to claim victory in the wake of the conflict. With both sides able to bargain from a position of strength, a diplomatic path toward peace accords lay open.

George L. Simpson Jr.

See also: Arab-Israeli War (1948); Arab-Israeli War (1956); Arab-Israeli War (1967); Arab Legion; Intifada, First; Intifada, Second.

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Arafat, Yasir (1929–2004)

Palestinian nationalist and leader of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) (1969–2004). Born Mohamed 'Abd ar-Rauf al-Qudwa al-Husayni on August 24,

1929, in Cairo, Egypt, Yasir Arafat became involved in smuggling arms to Palestinians who were fighting the British and the Jews when he was a teenager in Cairo. He fought against the Jews in Gaza in 1948, a struggle the Arabs lost.

Arafat studied briefly at the University of Texas before completing his engineering degree at the University of Faud I in Egypt, from which he graduated in 1956. As a student, he served as president of the Union of Palestinian Students; in 1952, he joined the Muslim Brotherhood. After a brief stint in the Egyptian Army during the 1956 Suez Crisis he moved to Kuwait, where he formed his own contracting company.

In 1958, Arafat founded al-Fatah, an underground guerrilla group dedicated to liberating Palestine. In 1964, he left his job, moved to Jordan, and devoted all his energies to organizing raids against Israel. That same year, the PLO was formed. Arafat fought in the 1967 Six-Day War, allegedly escaping from Israel disguised as a woman. Gradually, al-Fatah came to dominate the PLO, and in February 1969 Arafat became chairman of the PLO.

After skirmishes with Jordanian authorities, Arafat was forced to relocate the PLO to Lebanon in 1970. During much of the 1970s he spent considerable time reorienting the PLO's emphasis from Pan-Arabism to Palestinian nationalism. During the Lebanese Civil War, which witnessed brutal fighting between Lebanese Muslims and Lebanese Christians, the PLO sided with the Muslims. Arafat moved the PLO to Tunisia in 1982. In the 1980s he regrouped his organization, which had

Yasir Arafat speaks before the United Nations General Assembly in New York on November 14, 1974. (AP/Wide World Photos)

sustained heavy losses during the fighting in Lebanon. The PLO received important monetary aid from Iraq and Saudi Arabia during the 1980s, and in 1988 Palestinians declared a formal State of Palestine. With that, Arafat announced that the PLO would renounce all forms of terrorism and would recognize the State of Israel, a radical departure in the organization's philosophy.

In 1993, the PLO participated in the Oslo Accords and hammered out a peace deal with Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Rabin. The PLO located to the West Bank in 1994, an important first step toward the creation of an autonomous Palestinian state. In 1996 Arafat was elected head of the new Palestinian Authority, which was to provide governance, security, and other services to Palestinians in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. However, Israeli-Palestinian relations deteriorated rapidly upon the 1996 election of the rightist Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu.

Despite efforts by U.S. president Bill Clinton to preserve peace between Israel and the PLO in the summer of 2000, negotiations broke down, and radical groups such as Hamas and the Islamic Jihad commenced the Second Intifada. This began four years of violence in Israel and the Occupied Territories. Arafat was increasingly marginalized, and in 2004 U.S. president George W. Bush declared that the PLO leader was ineffective and that it was impossible to negotiate with him.

Arafat developed a mysterious illness and went to Paris for medical treatment, where he died on November 11, 2004. As of this writing, the future of the Palestinian cause remains very much in question, although Arafat's successor, Mahmoud Abbas, has taken tentative steps toward reaching some common ground with Israel.

Amy H. Blackwell

See also: Intifada, First; Intifada, Second; Palestine Liberation Organization.

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Armenian Massacres

Armenians claim that they are descended from Hyak, a grandson of the biblical Noah. For more than 3,000 years their homeland has been the region around Lake Van and Mount Ararat. Their greatest political empire was under Tigranes the Great in the first century BC. His empire stretched from the Caspian Sea to the Mediterranean. In the fourth century AD, Armenia became the first nation to convert to

Christianity. The Armenian Orthodox Church was instrumental in helping Armenians survive centuries of Turkish rule. In the 1870s, nationalistic movements in the Ottoman Empire stirred Armenians to press for greater rights. In response, the Turks repressed them in various ways, including using the Kurds as surrogates to harass the Armenians through violent means. Before World War I, territorial advancement of the Russian Empire had led to the creation of a Russian Armenia. During the war, the Russian government recruited thousands of Armenians to join the army and fight against the Ottoman Empire. In 1914, there were perhaps 2 million Armenians living in the Ottoman Empire. In 1915, leaders in Constantinople, notably Interior Minister Mehmet Tâlat Pasha, Minister of War Enver Pasha, and Minister of the Navy Djemal Pasha, decided that the Armenians were a threat to Turkey and needed to be eliminated. The Turkish ruling Triumvirate found a pretext for the massacre in the claim that the Armenians were openly supporting the Russians.

The Turkish government planned to proceed in stages. First, they would kill the chief Armenian leaders. The Turks would then disarm Armenian soldiers in the Ottoman army and place then in labor battalions on the railroads, where they might be killed off in small groups. The Turks would then move against outlying Armenian villages, endeavoring to kill all their inhabitants. Finally, the cities would be emptied of their Armenian populations. The Turks planned to kill many of the men and teenaged boys. Those who remained, chiefly women and children, would be sent on forced marches to the eastern desert areas. Worn down by exhaustion and starvation, only a minority were expected to survive.

On the night of April 23, 1915, a coordinated Turkish government operation led to the arrest of hundreds of Armenian leaders. Many were executed or soon died in confinement. A few were saved by the intervention of U.S. ambassador Henry Morgenthau and others. As further punishment for "supporting the Russians," the Triumvirate ordered local authorities to forcibly relocate Armenians in Anatolia to Aleppo and then to remote mountainous or desert locations in the Mesopotamian desert, such as Deir es Zôr on the Euphrates River. These relocations were actually extermination marches during which most of the Armenians were murdered, beaten, and raped by Kurds or vengeful Turks. Estimates of the number of Armenians who died from violence, starvation, or disease as a result of this policy range from 600,000 to 1.5 million people.

In some locations, Armenians resisted the removals. At Musa Dagh (Mount Moses) on the Mediterranean Sea near Antioch and the Orontes River in the late summer of 1915, Armenians held out against the Ottoman army for 50 days. More than 3,000 Armenians in this location were eventually rescued by the French navy. With evidence of the massacre widespread, the German and Austrian embassies warned Turkish authorities that this policy would provide the Allied Powers with strong propaganda material. When the Turks rejected the appeals, however, Berlin

Armenian orphans board barges bound for Greece at Constantinople, ca. 1915. The Turkish government arranged for the genocide of the Armenian people. (Library of Congress)

and Vienna took no further action for fear of alienating their ally. Indeed, the plight of the Armenian people became a powerful propaganda tool for the Allied side. Secret negotiations between Djemal Pasha and the Allies from December 1915 until March 1916 that might have ended the massacre came to naught, largely because of French and British desire to secure territory in the Middle East at Turkish expense.

The March 3, 1918 Treaty of Brest Litovsk ended fighting between the Ottoman Empire and Russia, but the region remained in flux. A Transcaucasian Federative Republic of Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Armenia soon collapsed. The Turks recovered Erzincan, Erzurum, Kars, and Alexandropol to reach their 1914 border in the spring of 1918 and then attempted to drive east to establish a link with historic Turkistan and the Turkic peoples beyond the Caspian Sea. They were halted on May 23, 1918, in the Battle of Sardarapat, and on May 28, 1918, an Armenian Republic was declared in Tbilisi by the Armenian National Council. The Treaty of Batum of June 4, 1918 ended hostilities between Armenia and Turkey.

After the Paris Peace Conference, on August 10, 1920, the Allied Powers signed the Treaty of Sèvres with Turkey. It recognized an independent Armenia with boundaries to be submitted to the U.S. president for arbitration. On November 22, 1920, the Wilson administration drew the border between Turkey and Armenia from the Black Sea to include the areas of Trebizond, Erzincan, Bitlis, Van, and all of Lake Van, including the land to the south for about 25 miles, and then east

to the Persian border. Turkish leader Kemal Atatürk rejected this provision of the treaty and mounted an operation that drove the Armenians east.

On December 2, 1920, after Turkish military victory, the Armenians were forced to accept the terms of the Treaty of Alexandropol, which effectively placed the border at approximately the present border. Shortly afterward, Armenia became a republic in the Soviet Union. To this day the Turkish government denies that any wartime massacre of Armenians ever occurred.

Andrew J. Waskey

See also: Alexandropol, Treaty of (1920); Kars, Treaty of (1921); Sèvres, Treaty of (1920); Turkish-Armenian War (1920).

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Army of Islam

An Ottoman-Azeri military unit active in the concluding years of World War I. It was established at Gandja following the treaty of friendship signed by the Ottoman Empire and the Azerbaijani Democratic Republic in 1918. The Army of Islam eventually consisted of about 8,000 Ottoman regulars and about 10,000 Azeri and Daghestani irregulars under command of Nuri Pasha (brother of Enver Pasha). It played an important role in defeating the Baku Soviet and capturing Baku in September 1918. After the signing of the Mudros Armistice, the unit was disbanded and its members joined the newly established military forces of the Azerbaijani Democratic Republic.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: World War I (Mesopotamian Theater).

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Arsuf, Battle of (1191)

A battle between the armies of the Third Crusade (1189–1192), commanded by King Richard I of England, and the Muslims under Saladin. After the capture of Acre (mod. ‘Akko, Israel) in July 1191, Richard’s next objective was Jaffa (mod. Tel Aviv-Yafo, Israel), the port nearest Jerusalem. The Crusaders’ march began on August 25 and became the classic demonstration of the tactic known as the fighting march. The Crusaders’ right was protected by the sea and by their fleet, which included Egyptian galleys captured in Acre. Half their infantry screened the left flank of the knights, alternating with the other half, which marched with the baggage train between the knights and the sea. Heat and incessant harassing by Saladin’s mounted archers meant that the pace was painfully slow, but so long as the Crusaders stayed in formation they could not be halted. Eventually, Saladin realized that he would have to risk committing the main body of his own troops. At Arsuf (north of mod. Herzliyya, Israel) on September 7 his action finally provoked the Crusader rear guard into launching a premature charge. Only Richard’s reaction, immediately and massively reinforcing the rear guard’s attack, while still managing to hold other contingents in reserve, conjured victory out of imminent chaos. Three days later the Crusaders reached Jaffa, where they had to choose between advancing toward Ascalon (Tel Ashqelon, Israel), as Saladin feared, and turning inland, toward Jerusalem.

John Gillingham

See also: Saladin; Third Crusade (1187–1192).

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Artah, Battle of (1164)

A defeat of the Franks of northern Outremer and their allies by Nur al-Din, Muslim ruler of Aleppo. After Nur al-Din sent part of his forces to Egypt under his general Shikuh to counter the invasion mounted by King Amalric of Jerusalem, he opened up a second front by besieging the town of Harenc, which had been retaken by the Franks in 1158. A large Christian relieving army was assembled from the troops of Bohemond III of Antioch, Raymond III of Tripoli, Joscelin III of Courtenay, and the military orders, together with Armenian and Byzantine contingents, amounting to some 600 knights plus infantry. Nur al-Din’s numerically superior forces retreated and then gave battle in the plain of Artah on August 11, 1164, his troops

employing a feigned flight to split the Christian forces, most of whom were killed or captured. The captives included Bohemond, who was ransomed shortly after, and Raymond and Joscelin, who were to remain prisoners for a decade. Harenc capitulated the day after the battle, and the frontier of Antioch was once more pushed back to the line of the river Orontes.

Alan V. Murray

See also: Nur al-Din.

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Asabiyya

The ties that bound early and medieval Muslim military classes together were separate from their family ties. Nevertheless, asabiyya "tribal solidarity" remained strong, if only within tribal armies. Meanwhile istina' was the sense of obligation between soldiers and their commander or "patron". In a more general sense, a feeling of group identity was called sinf. This could be based upon economic class or cultural or ethnic background. It was often seen amongst leaders who had served in the same armies or who rose in rank and power together. By the 10th century AD, the public swearing of mutual oaths of loyalty became an important, if not particularly effective, means of cementing relationships between rulers, officers, and men. Gifts of clothes, arms, armor, and horse harness similarly enabled a ruler to reward his followers, because social and military status was indicated by the richness of a person's appearance. However, the strongest sense of mutual obligation was that between slave-recruited soldiers who had been purchased, trained, and freed by the same purchaser-patron, especially those freed at the same time. The loyalty binding such ghulam or mamluk soldiers together was again called istina', as was the loyalty felt by a "client" or man from a humble family or tribal origin to the individual or tribe that had accepted him, and sometimes also his family, as members of the "superior" group. As such istina' often linked up with the asabiyya feeling of family or tribal loyalty to form a broader group solidarity.

David Nicolle

See also: Sharia, War and; War and Violence in the Koran.

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Assassins

"Assassins" is a pejorative term applied to the Nizaris, a sect of the Ismaili branch of Shia Islam in the Middle Ages. In 1094, the Nizaris broke away from the main body of the Ismailis in Egypt in the course of a dispute between two rivals for the succession to the Fatimid caliphate, al-Musta'li and Nizar. Although al-Musta'li was invested as caliph in Cairo, Hasan al-abba, an Ismaili anti-Saljuk agitator in Persia, declared his support for the cause of Nizar, who had disappeared under mysterious circumstances. In the late 11th and early 12th centuries the Nizaris enjoyed considerable support in the great towns of the Syrian interior and made determined attempts to take control in Damascus and Aleppo.

The Assassins frequently resorted to political murder in the furtherance of their aims; indeed, the English word assassin derives from the Arabic term *ashishiyya*. It was once thought that the *ashishiyya* were so called by their enemies either because their leader, "the Old Man of the Mountains," used drugs (hashish) to delude his followers into believing they were being given a foretaste of Paradise in his garden or because the Assassins resorted to taking drugs to steel themselves to perform their bloody acts. On balance it seems more probable that those who called them *ashishiyya* meant more vaguely to insinuate that the Assassins were the sort of low-life riffraff who might take drugs; in this period hashish-taking tended to be confined to city slums.

By the 1130s, the Assassins' attempts to take control in the Syrian cities had failed, and they withdrew to a mountainous part of northwestern Syria, where they took possession of a group of fortresses in the Jabal Bahra region: Masyaf, al-Kahf, Qadmus, Khariba, Khawabi, Rusafa, Qulay'a, and Maniqua. Masyaf was the headquarters of the Syrian Assassins. In 1126, they were given the town of Banyas by Tughtigin, atabeg of Damascus, but they held it for only a few years, an Assassins attempt to seize power in Damascus having failed in the meantime. Although the Assassins also harbored the ambition to take control of Shaizar, several of their attacks on the place were unsuccessful; they held it only briefly in 1157 after an earthquake had leveled its walls. In 1090, the radical Ismaili preacher Hasan al-abba had established himself at Alamut, a strong fortress in the northwestern Persian province of Daylam, and a few years later, when the succession dispute broke out in Cairo, he declared his support for the Nizari line.

From their bases in Syria and Persia the leaders of the Assassins masterminded a program of political murders. The impressive list of their victims included Sunni, Shiite, and Frankish leaders. They included Niam al-Mulk, the Saljuk vizier (1092); Jana al-Dawla, emir of Homs (1103); the Fatimid vizier al-Afal (1121); al-Bursuqi, governor of Mosul and Aleppo (1126); the Abbasid caliph al-Mansur ibn al-Mustarshid (1135); and Count Raymond II of Tripoli (1152). The assassination of Raymond and other Franks notwithstanding, in general the Assassins outrages and the divisions they caused worked to the advantage of the Frankish principalities. They posed a major threat to Saladin, and in 1174 a couple of Assassins reached the sultan's tent before being struck down. In 1176, Assassins made another attempt on Saladin's life. He launched an abortive siege of Masyaf before reluctantly coming to terms with Sinan, the leader of the Syrian Assassins.

In 1192, for reasons that remain mysterious, Assassins struck down Conrad of Montferrat in Tyre (mod. Soûr, Lebanon). It is conceivable that they acted at the behest of Henry of Champagne. In 1194, the latter visited al-Kahf to confirm the alliance between what was left of the kingdom of Jerusalem and the sect. Other 13th-century assassinations include the deaths of Raymond, son of Prince Bohemond III of Antioch, in 1213, and Philip of Montfort, in 1270, at the behest of the sultan Baybars, and the wounding of Prince Edward of England in 1272. Joinville provided the most vivid account of the Syrian Assassins in the 13th century, as he related a visit of Brother Yves the Breton as an emissary of King Louis IX of France in 1252 to their leader, known to the Westerners as the "Old Man of the Mountains" (the term Old Man is a literal translation of the Arabic *shaykh*). According to Yves, when the Old Man of the Mountains went out riding, he was preceded by a man bearing an axe, to the haft of which many knives were attached, and the bearer of the axe would cry out, "Turn out of the way of him who bears in his hands the death of kings!" (Joinville and Villehardouin 1963, 280).

During the 13th century the Assassins paid tribute to the Hospitallers and the Templars in northern Syria. According to Joinville, this was because the masters of those orders did not fear assassination, for the Nizaris knew they would be replaced by masters just as good. It is more likely that the tributary relationship reflected the strength on the ground of the orders based in Margat (mod. Marqab, Syria) and Tortosa (mod. Tartus, Syria). In a series of campaigns from 1265 to 1271, the Mamluk sultan Baybars captured the Assassin castles and made the sect his tributaries. He and his successors also employed them as a kind of state assassination bureau, using them, among other things, to attack enemies in the Mongol Ilkhanate of Persia. However, after the 14th century this practice seems to have been discontinued, and one hears little of what had become a remote, rustic group of villages inhabited by harmless sectarians.

The end of the Assassins in Persia happened earlier. They were unwise enough to challenge the growing power of the Mongols, and in 1256 the general Hulegu

was dispatched by the great Mongol khan Mongke in Qaraqorum to capture Alamut and the other Assassin castles nearby. The grand master Rukn al-Din surrendered to safe conduct but was subsequently put to death. Alamut had been a major center of Ismaili learning, and the place possessed an impressive library of esoterica, which the Persian historian Juvayni inspected on Hulegu's orders. Although the Nizari Ismailis were quite widely feared and detested throughout the Muslim world, they survive today in India and elsewhere as a respectable and prosperous community whose leader is the Agha Khan.

The folklore of the Assassins in Western literature is at least as interesting as their real history. Writers like Marco Polo, John Mandeville, and Felix Fabri produced the most fantastical stories about a paradise of drugs and houris in a mountain fastness presided over by the sinister Old Man of the Mountains. Their stories in turn inspired poetry and romances produced in the 18th and 19th centuries.

Robert Irwin

See also: Al-Afal; Baybars I; Hulegu; Ismailis; Middle East, Mongol Invasion of the; Saladin.

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Aurangzeb (1618–1707)

The last of the great Mughal emperors of India, it was during his reign that the empire reached its zenith. Yet at the same time that Aurangzeb's zeal led him to expand the empire, his intolerance of non-Muslims reversed the policies of his predecessors and ultimately weakened his hold over his subjects.

Aurangzeb was born as Muhi-ud-Din Muhammad in the Dhod region of northern India on November 3, 1618. He was the third son of the Mughal emperor Jahan

Shah and his primary wife, Mumtaz Mahal (for whom the Taj Mahal was built). At the time of his birth, the Mughal dynasty already ruled over much of what is today India, Pakistan, and parts of Afghanistan.

The name Aurangzeb means "Ornament of the Throne" and was given to the prince when he was still quite young. He was raised at his father's court, where he proved to be a serious youth and a devout Muslim. While his brothers studied metaphysics and history, Aurangzeb devoted his full attention to studying the Koran, which he claimed to have learned by heart. Though he would later rule an empire with a vast Hindu population, he ignored the study of the language of his subjects, concentrating instead on the learned languages of Persian, Arabic, and later Turkish.

When he was 18 years old, Aurangzeb was appointed by Jahan Shah to the first of a series of important administrative offices. He served as governor of the fertile Deccan province, where he brought the recalcitrant people of the region under submission. In 1644, however, his tenure in the Deccan ended when he either resigned or was removed from his post by his father. Aurangzeb apparently suspected that his elder brother Dara Shikoh had made his father suspicious of him, and this contributed to a growing enmity between the two. Aurangzeb was soon reconciled to his father, however, and in 1646 led troops with distinction in a campaign against the Uzbeks and the Persians to the west.

In 1657, Jahan Shah became gravely ill. Tensions between Aurangzeb and his older brother Dara Shikoh, whom his father had chosen as his successor, soon erupted into civil war. By the time Jahan Shah recovered, his sons were locked in a life or death struggle for their father's kingdom. Finally, in May 1658, Aurangzeb defeated his brother at the Battle of Samugarh. He made his father a virtual prisoner in Agra and claimed the throne for himself. He took the title Alamgir, meaning "Conqueror of the World." In consolidating his power, he had several family members, including his nephew, several of his brothers, and one of his sons, executed.

Aurangzeb's empire was a heterogeneous collection of Muslim, Hindu, and Sikh communities. During his reign, he fought an endless series of campaigns against recalcitrant subjects and hostile neighbors. In the north, his kingdom was threatened by nomadic Turks and Persians, while in the south, the Maratha ruler Shivaji challenged Mughal authority as he raided and plundered the cities of the empire. Sivaji posed the greatest threat to Aurangzeb, as his army sacked the important Mughal port of Surat twice. In dealing with the Maratha threat, Aurangzeb proved himself to be a talented general and diplomat. He reconciled Sivaji to Mughal rule and gave him a position within his administration. He also scored several military victories against his northern neighbors.

In co-opting his enemy Sivaji, Aurangzeb was following a time-honored Mughal practice of integrating hostile elements into the empire. However, after 20 years on the throne, Aurangzeb's attitude toward the non-Muslim subjects of his empire

Mughal prince Aurangzeb takes his father, Jahan Shah, prisoner in 1658. (Library of Congress)

began to harden. A devout Muslim since his youth, he became increasingly intolerant of the Hindus within his empire. In 1679, he imposed a tax on all non-Muslims, the jizya, a move that contributed to a revolt by the Hindu Rajputs in 1680. Aurangzeb's own son Akbar joined the rebels against his father. Though he reached an agreement with the Rajputs, other revolts soon followed.

Aurangzeb returned to the Deccan, where he had served as governor under his father, and defeated several independent kingdoms in 1686. He went to war against the Marathas, this time led by Sivaji's son Sambhaji. Though Aurangzeb captured and executed Sambhaji in 1689, the Marathas continued to resist Mughal rule and fought a protracted war of resistance with guerrilla tactics that kept Aurangzeb's troops committed, but victory elusive. As Aurangzeb became mired deeper in the Maratha war, his control over his northern territories slackened. The Sikhs in Punjab revolted under their guru Tegh Bahadur, as did their neighbors the Jats.

Aurangzeb's wars of expansion and pacification also created an economic crisis in his empire. He dealt with it by putting more pressure on the non-Muslims. He promoted Muslims over Hindus within his administration and encouraged the destruction of Hindu shrines and temples. He taxed Hindus merchants and offered cash incentives to those who converted to Islam.

Aurangzeb died of old age on March 3, 1707. In keeping with his austere and devout nature, he was not buried in traditional Mughal style, in an opulent

mausoleum, but in a simple unmarked grave. After his death, several of his sons were killed in a bitter succession dispute. By the time a victor emerged, the great Mughal Empire was vulnerable to revolt from its subjects and attack from its neighbors.

James Burns

See also: Akbar; Babur; Mughal-Safavid Wars.

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Auspicious Incident (1826)

The Auspicious Incident was the forced abolishment of the Janissaries in the Ottoman Empire by Sultan Mahmud II in 1826. The Janissary corps, the first Ottoman standing army, was established during the 14th century and facilitated the expansion of the Ottoman Empire. Initially a force of about 1,000 infantrymen, by the 17th century, the Janissaries were a powerful military force of 40,000 infantrymen able to dictate policy to the Ottoman government. By the 18th century, however, the size of the corps had increased to more than 100,000 infantrymen. By this time, the Janissaries had ceased to serve as an effective military unit and violently rejected attempts by the Ottoman government to modernize the military. In 1807, the Janissaries deposed Sultan Selim III, who tried to modernize the Janissary corps.

In 1826, Mahmud II announced that he was about to form a professional army trained by Western Europeans. The Janissary corps, not unexpectedly, revolted. The sultan, however, was prepared for the insurrection, and unleashed the Sipahis, the mounted elite cavalry of the Ottoman Empire. The Janissaries around Constantinople retreated to their massive barracks in Thessaloniki. On June 15, 1826, the Sipahis bombarded the barracks with artillery fire, resulting in the incineration of an estimated 10,000 Janissaries. The remaining Janissaries were either killed (often by angry mobs), exiled, or able to blend into society. The Auspicious Incident allowed the sultan to implement a modernized Ottoman army.

Michael R. Hall

See also: Janissaries; Mahmud II; Ottoman Army (Early 19th Century).

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Austro-Ottoman Wars

The Austrian and Ottoman empires had a long history of rivalry and conflict. The Ottoman expansion into Serbia and Hungary in the 15th century led to Ottoman raids on Austrian territory and prolonged Austro-Ottoman Wars, which shaped the history of both empires.

Early Conflicts

Ottomans initially raided the southern regions of Austria between 1408 and 1426 but subsequent decades saw more serious attacks. Sultan Suleiman's successful invasion of Hungary, which resulted in the destruction of the Hungarian army at Mohacs in 1526, opened the way for systematic Ottoman attacks on Austrian territory. Furthermore, the Ottoman threat allowed the Habsburgs, the ruling dynasty of Austria, to unite the crowns of Austria, Hungary, and Bohemia. In 1515, the treaty of alliance, concluded between Holy Roman Empire Maximilian I and King Uladislaus II Jagiello of Hungary and Bohemia, specified that if one dynasty died out, the other would take over the kingdom. The death of King Louis II Jagiello at the battle of Mohacs allowed Archduke Ferdinand of Austria, Maximilian's grandson, to become king of Hungary and Bohemia, eventually inheriting the Austria crown as well.

Austro-Ottoman War of 1529–1533

Ferdinand's succession, however, faced local resistance, notably from János Szapolyai (John Zápolya), who claimed the crown of Hungary. Ferdinand successfully campaigned in Hungary, capturing several major fortresses, including Buda-Gyor, Komarom, Esztergom, Buda, and Szekesfehervar and defeated Szapolyai in a few engagements. However, Ferdinand was unable to unseat his rival, who sought Ottoman help and recognized Sultan Suleiman's suzerainty. In 1529, the Ottoman forces under Petry Rareş, *voivod* of Moldavia and Suleiman's vassal, defeated Ferdinand at Feldioara (southern Transylvania). Furthermore, to protect his vassal, Sultan Suleiman launched a major invasion of Austria proper in 1529. The Ottoman siege of Vienna (September 27–October 14, 1529) ended after the Ottoman forces compelled Suleiman to withdraw, but it had a profound effect on

the Austrians who offered to give up the whole of Hungary to Szapolyai on the condition that at his death it should revert to Ferdinand. After peace negotiations failed, hostilities resumed in 1530. In the absence of the Ottoman army, the Austrians captured several cities in Hungary. But Suleiman returned in 1532 when he led some 200,000 men from Constantinople at the end of April. Holy Roman Emperor Charles mobilized his army and sought support from other European states. Fortunately for the Austrians, the Ottoman army did not reach Vienna, as it became bogged down at Güns (Köszeg) where Austrian garrison heroically defended the fortress for three weeks in August. Sultan Suleiman showed his great admiration for the enemy's gallantry, inviting the Austrian commandant to his camp, where he was cordially received and awarded a robe of honor, and posting guards in the breach in the wall to prevent his troops from entering during respite. The dogged defense of Güns convinced Suleiman to give up on besieging Vienna, which was much more fortified. After campaigning in Styria and parts of Lower Austria, he returned to Istanbul in early November. Austrians were more successful on the seas, where Andrea Doria, Emperor Charles's admiral, had successfully operated against the Ottoman fleet and captured Coron, one of the strongest Ottoman coast fortresses in the Morea, Patras, and a few others forts.

Fearing another Ottoman invasion, the Habsburgs sought to compromise, and Suleiman, concerned about the rising Iranian power in the east, was quite willing to negotiate. In early 1533, a truce was concluded, in which Suleiman demanded the keys of Gran in token of Austrian submission and homage; he later generously returned them without insisting on the surrender of the fortress. The formal Treaty of Constantinople was negotiated in June 1533. Ferdinand gave up his claims on Hungary, so the status quo was kept in Hungary, which meant Szapolyai retained his crown under Ottoman suzerainty. Austria agreed to pay annual tributes of 30,000 guldens. The treaty survived for seven years, although it was violated on several occasions because neither Szapolyai nor Ferdinand were fully satisfied with it. In 1537, Austrian attempt to capture the Ottoman fortress at Essek (Osijek) resulted in a disastrous defeat at Djakovo. The new Treaty of Nagyvárad (February 1538) confirmed Szapolyai as the ruler of Hungary, and Ferdinand was recognized as heir to the Hungarian throne if Szapolyai died childless.

Austro-Ottoman War of 1540–1547

In 1540, Szapolyai died, but a short while before his death, his wife bore him a son, John II Sigismund Szapolyai. Ferdinand refused to recognize his succession (Suleiman did) and besieged the Hungarian capital city of Buda. He soon faced an Ottoman invasion as Sultan Suleiman sought to strengthen his authority in Hungary. The Ottomans defeated the Austrians at Buda and occupied central Hungary. In the Treaty of Gyula (December 29, 1541), Austria and the Ottoman Empire agreed to

partition Hungary: the Habsburgs received the western and northern regions, the Ottomans received central Hungary, and the eastern regions became the Ottoman client principality of Transylvania ruled by John Sigismund. However, hostilities soon resumed. The Austrians' attempt to avenge their defeat by seizing Algiers and Tunis led to another disastrous failure. In 1543, Suleiman captured all fortresses leading to Buda, including Grau and Stuhlweissenberg, the largest in the area. Distracted by a new war against the Safavid Iran in the east, the sultan entrusted the Hungarian theater to his lieutenants, who successfully campaigned in Styria, Carinthia, and Croatia in 1544. Hard pressed, the Austrians sued for a truce in 1545, but hostilities continued until 1547 when the Treaty of Edirne (Adrianople) was signed, confirming provisions of the Treaty of Gyula.

Austro-Ottoman War of 1551–1553

The Peace of Edirne was signed for a period of five years but lasted only three. By 1550, George Martinuzzi, who acted as a regent to John Sigismund, concluded an alliance with the Austrians to drive the Ottomans from Hungary. Although the Allies gained some success and defeated the Turks at Deva, their relations soon soured, and Ferdinand had Martinuzzi assassinated in 1551. The Ottoman counterattack soon reclaimed lost ground as the Turks captured major fortresses, including Temesvar and Szolnok, but failed to overcome determined Austrian resistance at Erlau (Eger) in 1552. An armistice ended the hostilities in 1553, but a formal peace treaty came only 10 years later; it confirmed the terms of the 1547 accord, keeping Hungary divided into Austrian (Royal) Hungary, Ottoman-held Central Hungary, and Transylvania.

Austro-Ottoman War of 1566

After the failed Ottoman siege of Malta (1565), the 72-year-old Sultan Suleiman turned to Hungary, where he wanted to offset his failure at Malta and punish Holy Roman Emperor Ferdinand I, who refused to pay the tribute. In 1566, the sultan's army invaded southwestern Hungary and besieged Szigetvár, whose Croatian commander Miklos Zrinyi led a valiant defense that destroyed most of the fortress and its garrison but inflicted heavy losses on the Turks. Suleiman died during the siege on September 6, but his death was concealed from the army until the fortress was stormed on September 8. Informed of the sultan's death, the Ottoman army returned to Constantinople (Istanbul) carrying Suleiman's embalmed body for burial.

Austro-Ottoman War of 1591–1606

The conflict known as the "Long War" was caused by intermittent border strife between Austrian and Ottoman Hungary that intensified in 1591. Two years later,

Croatian forces inflicted a heavy defeat on the Bosnian Ottoman army at Sissek (Sisak), which provoked a war. In 1594–1595, with Pope Clement VIII's help, Austria established an alliance with Transylvania, Moldavia, and Wallachia. In 1595, Austrians reclaimed Gyor, Esztergom, and Visegrád, while Michael the Brave of Wallachia successfully campaign on the Lower Danube, seizing Giurgiu, Silistra, Nicopolis, and Chilia. In late August 1595, Michael celebrated one of the most important Romanian victories over the Ottomans at Călugăreni, but could not exploit it due to lack of support from his allies. The Ottomans still managed to occupy Bucharest and Târgovişte but the suffered a series of defeats at the hands of Transylvanian-Wallachian forces at Târgovişte, Bucharest, and Giurgiu.

Alarmed by these setbacks, Ottoman sultan Mehmed III came to Hungary to led his troops personally. In 1596, he captured Erlau (Eger), and in October, he snatched victory from the jaws of defeat at Mezokeresztes; with his troops fleeing en masse, Mehmed personally led a desperate charge with remaining troops and turned the tide of battle. For the next five years the war became a battle of fortresses, in which Austria gradually gained key fortresses in central Austria, although its attack on Buda failed in 1598. In 1599, the Austrian peace overtures were rebuffed by the sultan, whose new offensive led to the capture of Kanizsa (1600), but also to a defeat at Stuhlweissenberg (1601). In Transylvania, the situation improved in the favor of the Ottomans after tensions among the allies split the coalition. In 1599, Michael the Brave invaded Transylvania and scored a victory at Şelimbăr, causing the defection of Sigismund Báthory of Transylvania to the Ottoman side. Threatened by Wallachian success, the Austrian army under Giorgio Basta invaded Transylvania, and defeated Wallachian army at Mirăslău (September 1600). Michael was later assassinated on Basta's orders. In August 1601, the Austrian army defeated Sigismund Báthory at Guruslău, and later scored another victory over Transylvanians at Braşov (1603). After Austrian defeat at Buda, in 1605, Ottomans seized Esztergom, Visigrad, Veszperm, and Palota, thus regaining much of the land lost since 1595. In Transylvania, István Bocskay launched anti-Austrian uprising (1604), recognizing Ottoman sovereignty in exchange for military aid. The Long War ended with the Peace of Zsitvatorok (1606), which marked first major check of the Ottoman expansion and stabilized the Habsburg-Ottoman frontier for half a century.

Austro-Ottoman War of 1663–1664

The new conflict between Austria and the Porte broke out after the invasion of Poland (1658) by Prince György Rákóczi II of Transylvania, an Ottoman vassal who, however, acted without sultan's permission. To reign in the unruly vassal, Grand Vizier Mehmet Pasha Koprulu conducted a successful campaign (1660) in Transylvania that claimed Rákóczi's life and annexed the region to the Porte. Rákóczi's successor, Transylvanian prince János Kemény, fled to Vienna seeking Habsburg

support against the Turks. Holy Roman Emperor Leopold I, desiring to bring Transylvania under his influence and prevent the spread of Ottoman authority, pledged support to Kemény. In 1663, after the Habsburgs rejected Ottoman demands to evacuate Transylvania, Fazil Ahmad led some 100,000 Ottoman troops into Hungary and besieged the strategically important fortress of Nové Zámky (Neuhäusel, in Slovakia). The small Austrian army under Count Raimondo Montecúccoli was too weak to attack the Turks and sought protection on the fortified island of Schutt, which protected the eastern frontier of Austria. The Nové Zámky fortress offered a determined resistance to the Turks, who captured it only in the end of September. With the winter fast approaching, Fazıl Ahmet Koprulu decided to winter in Serbia and resume the offensive in the spring.

The threat of a major Ottoman invasion—the first since the time of Suleiman the Magnificent—of Austria prompted Leopold I to seek a wider alliance with European states. The Imperial Diet voted a levy of money and troops from the Holy Roman Empire, and King Louis XIV of France, traditional enemy of the Habsburgs, chose to set aside his grievances and dispatched 4,000 men under Jean de Coligny to assist the Imperial army under Montecúccoli.

Fazıl Ahmet Koprulu resumed the offensive in the spring of 1664 but conducted it very slowly. To avoid devastation of the Habsburg land, the Austrians chose to reach a peaceful settlement with the Porte, and negotiations began at Vasvar (Eisenburg) in late July. However, while they were under way, the Imperial and Ottoman armies continued to fight. As the Turks advanced, Montecúccoli chose to wait for the Turks behind the Raab River (in western Hungary) and shadowed their march along the right bank of the river. On August 1, Fazıl Ahmet Koprulu found a convenient place near Szentgotthárd (St. Gotthard) Abbey to cross the Raab. But while his army was in the midst of the crossing, it was surprised by Montecúccoli, who exploited the fact that the Turks could only move across the river in small detachments that could be defeated piecemeal. Nevertheless, the Turks fought fiercely and broke the Austrian center, which was formed by the troops dispatched by the Imperial Diet. The Austrian right wing, however, held ground while the impetuous attack of the French on the left wing proved to be decisive. The Turks were driven across the river, abandoning most of their artillery and suffering heavy losses.

Simultaneously, another Habsburg army, operating in north Hungary, won a series of smaller victories against Kutschuk Mehmet Pasha, most notably at Levice. Despite these victories, Emperor Leopold chose to accept the Treaty of Vasvar with the Turks.

Austro-Ottoman War of 1683–1699

The Treaty of Vasvar held for 20 years before it was broken by another war. The Great Turkish War, however, was not limited to Austrian-Ottoman conflict but

rather involved other European states that united into anti-Ottoman coalition. Relations between Austria and the Ottoman Empire remained tense. Austrian positions in Royal Hungary remained tenuous and faced resistance from the Kuruc movement led by Imre Thokoly. In 1682, Thokoly recognized Ottoman sovereignty, and Austria's attempt to subdue him prompted an Ottoman response. The Ottoman invasion of Austria in 1683 almost succeeded in capturing Vienna before the Austrian-Polish forces under King John III Sobieski of Poland scored a major victory at Vienna (September 1683) and drove them out of northwestern Hungary. Pope Innocent XI helped create the Holy League, which consisted of the Holy Roman Empire, Venice, and Poland (Russia joined in 1686). The Poles conducted campaigns in Moldavia in 1686 and 1691, while Venetians attacked Ottoman interests in Dalmatia, Morea (southern Greece), and the eastern Mediterranean. The Ottomans repelled Russian invasions of the Crimea (an Ottoman vassal) in 1687 and 1689 as well as attacks on the Ottoman fort of Azov in 1695–1696. Yet, the fate of the war was decided on the field of Hungary, where the Ottomans suffered defeats at Gran (Esztergom) and Neuhäusel (1685), Buda (1686), and Mount Harsan (near Mohacs, 1687). By the end of 1687, southern Hungary and much of Transylvania came under Hapsburg (Austrian) control, and Austrian operations extended into Serbia, where Habsburg forces celebrated victories at Belgrade (1688) and Nis (1689). Sultan Suleiman II's counterattack into Transylvania and Serbia was at first successful and led to the conquest of Belgrade in 1690, but the Ottomans then suffered defeats at Slankamen (1691) and Grosswardein (Oradea, 1692). Austria then became distracted by the War of the Grand Alliance against France and turned away from the Ottoman front for almost five years. In 1697, as an Ottoman army marched from Belgrade toward Hungary, an Austrian army under Prince Eugene of Savoy routed it at the Battle of Zenta on September 11. This crushing defeat compelled the sultan to accept peace negotiations, which resulted in Treaty of Karlowitz on January 26, 1699. The Ottoman Empire, although retaining Serbia, accepted Austria's control of all of Hungary (except the Banat of Temesvar), Transylvania, Croatia, and Slavonia and recognized Venice's influence in Morea and Dalmatia as well as Poland's presence in Podolia.

Austro-Ottoman War of 1716–1718

The Treaty of Karlowitz maintained peace between Austria and Ottoman Empire for 15 years. Both empires waged wars on other fronts, however, and Sultan Ahmad III concentrated his efforts on reclaiming lands in Greece, which resulted in the start of the Venetian-Ottoman War in 1714. Austria accused the Turks of breaking the treaty by endangering Venetian interests and made a defensive alliance with Venice in 1716. The Austrian army, led by the brilliant commander Prince Eugene of Savoy routed the Turks at Peterwardein on the Danube River on August 5,

1716, and captured the Banat of Temesvar, the only remaining Ottoman region in Hungary. The following year, the Austrians invaded Serbia, defeating the Ottoman army and capturing Belgrade in August 1717. With the Austrians controlling much of Serbia and western Wallachia, the Ottomans sued for peace. In 1718, the Treaty of Passarowitz confirmed Austrian gains in Hungary, Serbia, and Wallachia.

Austro-Ottoman War of 1737–1739

In 1735, Russia and the Ottoman Empire became embroiled in a war that, two years later, involved Austria as well. A Russian ally since the late 1720s, Austria closely watched the Russian campaigns in Crimea in 1736–1737 and, after a series of Russian victories and alarmed by Russia's ambitions, it joined the war in July 1737. The Ottoman army, however, proved to be much better prepared than its Crimean ally. The Turks inflicted several major defeats on Austria, most notably at Banja Luka (1737) and Grocka (1739), and forced them to sue for peace. The Treaty of Belgrade, signed in 1739, proved to be a sweet retribution for the Ottomans, who compelled Austria to surrender Belgrade and parts of Wallachia.

Austro-Ottoman War of 1787–1791

Until the end of the 18th century, Austro-Ottoman relations remained relatively peaceful and focused on commercial and diplomatic contacts. The Russo-Ottoman War of 1787–1791 changed that. Empress Catherine II of Russia shared her Greek Project—partitioning of the Ottoman Empire—with Emperor Joseph and convinced him to take part in Russia's war against the Porte. In 1783, Austria supported Russia's annexation of the Crimea, an Ottoman vassal state, which strained Austro-Ottoman relations. When the Porte declared war on Russia in August 1787, Austria joined as Russia's ally, hoping to reverse territorial losses suffered in 1739. Early on, however, the Austrians suffered a major defeat at Karánsebes (September 1788), allowing the Turks to launch devastating raids deep into the Banat of Temesvar. Although Austrians later recovered their position, and even captured Belgrade, unrest in the Netherlands and Hungary, compounded by Prussian hostility, compelled Vienna to end the war at all costs. The Treaty of Svishtov (Sistova) reestablished the prewar situation, with only minor Austrian territorial gains in Croatia.

Later Relations

The Austro-Ottoman War of 1787–1791 was the last major conflict between these two states. Occupied with events in Europe, Austria abandoned its expansionist policy in the Balkans for decades to come while the Ottoman Empire became embroiled in a prolonged conflict with Russia. Austria remained neutral during the

Crimean War (1853–1856), which proved to be beneficial for the Ottoman Empire. Russian expansionism in the Balkans and the spread of Pan-Slavism and nationalism among the Slav peoples brought the Ottoman Empire and Austria closer as Vienna sought to restrain Russia's influence in the region. Austria, while interested in the partition of the Ottoman Empire, perceived it as undesirable because it would strengthen Russian positions and create difficulties with Slav peoples in the Balkans. In 1878, after Russia's triumph over the Ottomans, Austria succeeded in containing Russian gains in the region and even secured permission to occupy Bosnia and Herzegovina, which remained under nominal Ottoman rule. The Bosnian issue proved to be fateful for both empires. In 1908, Austria annexed Bosnia, provoking a confrontation with Serbia that eventually contributed to the start of the World War I. Austria and the Ottoman Empire fought as allies in the Great War and both perished as a result of it.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Belgrade, Siege of (1456); Belgrade, Siege of (1521); Belgrade, Treaty of (1739); Koprulu, Fazıl Ahmet Pasha, Malta, Siege of (1565); Mezokeresztes, Battle of (1596); Mohács, Battle of (1526); Mohács, Battle of (1687); St. Gotthard Abbey, Battle of (1664); Suleiman the Magnificent; Vasvar, Treaty of (1664); Vienna, Siege of (1529); Vienna, Siege of (1683); Zenta, Battle of (1697).

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Ayn Jalut, Battle of (1260)

A major military engagement in which a Mongol army commanded by Ketbugha Noyon was decisively defeated by a Mamluk army from Egypt near Ayn Jalut (the Spring of Goliath), a village situated between the towns of Bethsan and Nablus (in mod. West Bank), on September 3, 1260.

The Mongols under Chinggis (Genghis) Khan, his sons, and his senior commanders had invaded the northeastern regions of the Islamic world in 1220. During the next 40 years they swept all before them, overthrowing or reducing to submission virtually every Muslim ruling dynasty in central Asia, Persia, Afghanistan, and Anatolia, culminating in Hulegu's conquest and virtual destruction of Baghdad in 1258. In January 1260, a Mongol army seized Aleppo in northern Syria, and on March 1 of that year entered Damascus, the governing center of Mamluk Syria. In response, a substantial Mamluk army was sent from Egypt to halt the Mongol advance. It was commanded by Sultan Qutuz, while its vanguard was led by Baybars al-Bunduqdari, who himself became sultan later that year.

Most sources agree that the Mongol army was outnumbered by that of the Mamluks, although the widely accepted figures of 120,000 Mamluks fighting a mere 10,000 Mongols are probably a great exaggeration. The Mongols were also supported by numerous Christian allies or auxiliaries. Ketbugha Noyon attacked and drove back the Mamluks' left wing, perhaps relying on the Mongols' reputation for invincibility. The Mamluks were, however, a disciplined foe who knew they were the last Islamic power capable of halting the Mongol advance. Most of the Mamluk army then swept around to attack the advancing Mongols in the flank or rear, perhaps having lured them into a preplanned trap. As a result the Mongol army in Syria was crushed and its commander, Ketbugha Noyon, was captured and executed by the Mamluks.

Hulegu, the Mongol khan of Persia and other conquered Islamic territories in the Middle East, was infuriated by this unprecedented reverse and prepared a major punitive expedition. However, political problems at the heart of the Mongol Empire, following the death of the Great Khan Mongke almost exactly a year earlier, prevented this plan from being carried through.

David Nicolle

See also: Baybars I; Hulegu; Homs, Battles of (1260, 1281, 1299); Mamluk Sultanate; Middle East, Mongol Invasion of the.

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Ayyubids

A Muslim dynasty of Kurdish origin. Its name derives from Saladin's father, Ayyub, although it was the successes of Saladin himself that established it. After Saladin's death in 1193, the Ayyubids ruled Egypt until 1250 and Syria for another decade. They also had minor branches in Mesopotamia and Yemen. Like the Buyids and Saljuks of Persia before them, they governed as a loose-knit and often discordant confederacy.

Ayyub and his brother Shirkuh both hailed from Dvin in Armenia; they fought for the Turkish warlord Zangi and his son Nur al-Din, Saladin's two great predecessors in the fight against the Franks. Saladin accompanied Shirkuh on three expeditions to Egypt in the 1160s. After Shirkuh's death in 1169, Saladin assumed power in Egypt in the name of Nur al-Din and overthrew the Shiite Fatimid regime there. Although a rift developed between the two men, it never developed into open warfare as Nur al-Din died in 1174. That same year Saladin dispatched his brother Turan Shah to conquer Yemen.

During much of Saladin's first decade as an independent ruler (ca. 1174–1184), he was occupied with subjugating his Muslim opponents and creating a secure power base in Egypt and Syria for himself and his family. Then, from 1185 onward, he turned his full attention to the Franks. In 1187, he achieved his famous victory against the army of the Kingdom of Jerusalem at the Battle of Hattin and reconquered the city of Jerusalem for Islam. The Third Crusade (1189–1192), launched in response to this loss, ended in truce and stalemate. Saladin died a year later; despite his prestigious successes, he had failed to rid the Levant of the Franks, who regrouped at their new capital of Acre and still controlled crucial Mediterranean ports. Saladin's brother, the austere Sayf al-Din al-Adil (known to the Franks as Saphadin), had acted as his principal, indeed indispensable, helper in governing his empire, both administratively and militarily. His involvement in drawing up the peace treaty with Richard the Lionheart in 1192 was especially valuable.

Saladin did not envisage a centralized state as his legacy. Instead, he bequeathed the three main provinces of his empire (Cairo, Damascus, and Aleppo) to his sons, hoping that this arrangement would ensure lasting Ayyubid power. But his desired father to son succession did not take root, nor did primogeniture prevail among Saladin's successors. Within the clan, might was right. After Saladin's death, al-'Adil's role as senior family member asserted itself; indeed, Saladin's sons were no match for al-'Adil's long experience and diplomatic skills. By 1200, he had reorganized Saladin's inheritance plans in favor of his own sons, deposed Saladin's son al-Aziz Uthman in Cairo, and secured the overall position of sultan for himself. Only in Aleppo did Saladin's direct descendants continue to rule: Saladin's son al-Zahir, after submitting to al-'Adil, was allowed to keep his territory, which remained in his family until the Mongol invasion of 1260. In this complicated power

struggle after Saladin's death, a key role was played by the regiments of mamluks (slave soldiers) recruited by Saladin (the Alaiyya) and his uncle Shirkuh (the Asadiyya). Al-'Adil was greatly assisted by the alaiyya. Saladin's expansionist aims were continued under al-'Adil, who masterminded the Ayyubid acquisition of more Zangid and Artuqid territories. He secured his northeastern frontier in 1209–1210, established truces with the Franks that lasted for most of his reign, and traded with the Italian maritime states.

In 1218, shortly after the arrival of the Fifth Crusade (1217–1221), al-'Adil died, allegedly of shock. He was succeeded by his son al-Kamil, whose brothers, al-Mu'azzam and al-Ashraf, supported him in this crisis, but after Damietta was recovered, this short-lived family solidarity gave way to disunity and conflict. The main contenders in the long and convoluted power struggle that followed were al-Kamil and his brother al-Mu'aam at Damascus. By 1229, al-Kamil, with the help of al-Ashraf in Mesopotamia, emerged as principal ruler of the Ayyubids. In 1226, al-Kamil, an astute politician, had already begun negotiations with Holy Roman Emperor Frederick II to bolster himself against al-Mu'aam and to deflect the imminent crusade. However, by the time Frederick arrived in Acre in 1228, al-Mu'aam had already died. Secret negotiations between al-Kamil and Frederick resulted in the Treaty of Jaffa (1229); in it al-Kamil ceded Jerusalem to Frederick, who was permitted to fortify the city, but al-Kamil kept a Muslim enclave, including the Aqsa Mosque and the Dome of the Rock. This piece of realpolitik caused widespread disapproval on both sides, and even al-Kamil's own preachers protested outside his tent. The Muslim chronicler Sib Ibn al-Jawzi recorded that when al-Kamil gave Jerusalem to Frederick "all hell broke loose in the lands of Islam" (al-Jawzi 1951–1952, 2: 653). However, some modern scholars have interpreted the Treaty of Jaffa more positively, viewing al-'Adil and Frederick as farsighted in their attempts to obtain a more lasting peace and to maintain the holy sites of both Islam and Christianity under the protection of their own adherents.

The death of al-Kamil in 1238 ushered in another turbulent period. His dispossessed eldest son, al-ali Ayyub, who had been sent to rule Upper Mesopotamia, disputed the succession in Egypt. He deposed his brother al-'Adil II and took power in Cairo in 1240. While he was in Hisn Kayfa, al-ali Ayyub had allied with a group of Qipchaq Turks: they were known as the Khwarezmians because they had fought in central Asia for the ill-fated ruler of Khwarezm, Jalal al-Din, against the Mongols in 1220s. After his death (1231), the Khwarezmians joined the service of al-ali Ayyub as mercenaries. In 1244, under their infamous leader Berke Khan, they sacked Jerusalem, to general condemnation. They then joined Ayyub's army near Gaza and fought that same year against three Ayyubid princes and the Frankish forces. The Battle of La Forbie (Harbiyya) was a clear victory for al-ali Ayyub and his Khwarezmian allies. Ayyub took Jerusalem (August 1244) and then Damascus (1245). The Ayyubid prince of Homs destroyed the Khwarezmians in 1246.



Al-ali Ayyub fell ill at the time of the Crusade to the East led by Louis IX, king of France (1248–1254). The Crusaders occupied the city of Damietta in 1249; later that year al-ali Ayyub died while encamped at Mansura on the delta. In 1250 the Crusaders were defeated by the sultan's own slave troops (the Bariyya mamluks). Then, in a coup d'état, they murdered Turan Shah, the son and heir of al-ali, and

terminated Ayyubid rule, raising one of their own number to the rank of sultan and thus inaugurating the Mamluk sultanate.

Carole Hillenbrand

See also: Al-Adil; Fifth Crusade (1217–1221); Hattin, Battle of (1187); Jalal al-Din; Mamluk Sultanate; Middle East, Mongol Invasion of the; Nur al-Din; Saladin; Third Crusade (1187–1192).

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B

Babak (d. 838)

The leader of a major uprising against Arab rule in southeastern Caucasia and western Iran from 816 to 837. The son of a petty tradesman, Babak, as a youth, was an apprentice to a craftsman in Tabriz, where he became an adherent of the Kurramiya sect, which preached neo-Mazdakism. In 816, he assumed the leadership of the sect, claiming divinity, and launched a massive uprising against the Abbasid Caliph al-Mamun (813–833). The Arab forces were expelled from almost all of southeastern Caucasia and northwestern Iran. The uprising continued for more than two decades as the Abbasid caliphate proved unable to effectively combat the rebels because of its preoccupation with the Byzantine Empire and another revolt in Egypt. As these challenges were overcome by 833, Caliph al-Mutasim concentrated his resources on subduing the Babak uprising. His commander, al-Afshin, established lines of fortifications and supply lines and pursued a policy of winning over Babak's supporters, which gradually weakened the rebellion. Babak suffered a severe defeat near Hamadan in 833 and al-Badhdh in 837 and was unable to stem the Abbasid advance. Babak went into hiding in Armenia but was betrayed and captured. He was paraded on an elephant in the streets of Samarra and then brutally executed in January 838.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Abbasids; Al-Afshin, Haydar ibn Kawuz.

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Babur (1483–1530)

The founder of India's Mughal dynasty and its first emperor, ruling from 1526 to 1530. He was a descendant of Genghis Khan and Timur and was known for his military and political abilities as well as his poems and diaries.

Babur was born Zahir-ud-din Muhammad on February 15, 1483, in Fergana in present-day Uzbekistan. His father, Umar Shaykh Mirza, was the ruler of the small principality of Fergana. For many years, his father tried to restore his ancestors' legacy by recovering Samarkand, Timur's old capital. After succeeding his father, Babur twice occupied Samarkand, in 1497 and 1501. In 1501, his troops were crushed by Uzbek ruler Muhammad Shaybani, and Babur lost both Samarkand and his hereditary possessions in Fergana. Forced to retreat to Afghanistan, his troops took Kabul in 1504.

Babur made one more unsuccessful attempt to take Samarkand in 1511 but, defeated, decided to concentrate on expansion elsewhere. A charismatic leader, he inspired his followers to go to India. He entered the Punjab in 1519, starting a war with Sultan Ibrahim Lodi. The governor of the Punjab, Dawlat Khan Lodi, encouraged Babur, since he was increasingly unhappy under the sultan's rule. After many years of unsuccessful campaigns, Babur launched his fifth, and first successful, expedition against the sultan in 1526. On April 21, the decisive First Battle of Panipat resulted in a complete victory for Babur's small army. The decisive advantage was new artillery acquired by Babur from the Ottoman Turks. Within a few days, Babur occupied Delhi and Agra.

To consolidate his power in the North, Babur needed to defeat the Rajputs, descendants of Ephtalite conquerors who had created numerous chiefdoms and principalities in central India and who did not accept any supreme authority. Babur also had problems with his own supporters, who were suffering in the Indian heat and wished to return home. By using threats, reproaches, promises, and appeals, he managed to convince them to stay. They met the Rajput confederation, headed by an experienced and ambitious military leader, Rana Sanga, on March 16, 1527, at Khanua, 37 miles west of Agra. Babur's army defeated the Rajputs in 10 hours and dispersed them.

Babur next had to deal with Afghan chiefs who had captured Lucknow while he was at war with Rana Sanga. In 1528, he turned to the east and crossed the Ganges River. On May 6, 1529, he crushed Mahmud Lodi's army in a battle near the river of Ghaghara. Having defeated his major adversaries, Babur was free to establish his new empire in northern India, stretching from Qandahar to the borders of Bengal. He did not initiate any administrative innovations in the occupied country, however. He set up no Mughal officialdom and let all of the traditional political institutions remain. Rather, Babur's rule was contained through supreme control over local chiefs. Such a policy left numerous unsolved conflicts for his son Humayun to deal with after Babur's death. Consolidation of the empire was finally achieved by Babur's grandson, Akbar.

A talented military leader, Babur was equally famous for his literary works. He enriched traditional forms of Central Asian poetry and described his adventurous

life in a brilliant narrative entitled *Babur Nameh* (published in English as *Memoirs of Babur* in 1921 and 1922). Written in Turkic (Chagatai), the book is remarkable as both a source of Central Asian and Indian history and as a realistic depiction of people and events. Babur Nameh gives a lively and compelling account of the wide range of interests, tastes, and sensibilities that make Babur comparable with Italian author Niccolò Machiavelli. Babur's son Humayun became seriously ill in 1530, and Babur reportedly offered his life to God in exchange for his son's. Humayun recovered, but Babur's health began to fail. He died within the year.

Alexei Pimenov

See also: Akbar; India, Muslim Conquest (to 16th Century); Panipat, Battles of (1398, 1526, 1556, 1761); Timur.

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Badr, Battle of (623)

The first major battle between the Muslims and the Meccans on March 15, 624. After Muhammad's migration from Mecca to Medina (Yathrib), the hostilities between Muslims and the Meccans quickly escalated. After a skirmish near Nakhlah, the force of more than 300 Muslims encountered the Meccan force of about 1,000 men at Badr, about 90 miles south of Medina. The Muslim planned to raid a Meccan caravan, but it was warned of the danger and received reinforcements under Abu Jahl. According to the Arab traditions, a force of 300 men would never have thought of attacking a force of 1,000, and it would have tried to avoid the superior force, without giving the impression of running away from it. But the Prophet Muhammad, who commanded the Muslims, took up strong defensive positions, blocking Meccan access to water wells. The battle began with champions from both armies selected to fight in individual combats, and three Muslims (Hamza ibn 'Abd al-Muttalib, Ali, and Ubayda) engaged and killed three Meccans (Utba, Walid ibn

Utba, and Shayba). The two armies then attacked each other with arrows before a general attack began. Instead of traditional hit-and-run skirmishes, the Muslims fought as a disciplined body with an order of battle and succeeded in breaking the Meccan lines. The Koran describes the Muslim attack in many verses, which refer to thousands of angels descending from Heaven at Badr to slaughter non-Muslims. The Muslim casualties were 14, those of the Meccans between 50 and 70 killed and as many captured. Among the captives, several known bitter enemies of Islam were put to death, and the rest were held for ransom.

The battle was the first major victory for a small Muslim host and was an important event in the rise of Islam. It allowed the survival of the fledgling religion, making it clear that Muhammad was a serious threat to Mecca and gaining him political credibility among other tribes. In religious terms, the victory at Badr appeared to the Muslims as God's vindication of their cause and as proof of the truth of Muhammad's mission. The battle is one of the few battles specifically mentioned in the Koran and in later years it became one of the greatest marks of glory for survivors to say that they had fought at Badr. Most contemporary knowledge of the battle comes from traditional Islamic accounts, both hadiths and biographies of Muhammad, written decades after the battle.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Ali ibn Abi Talib; Khandaq, Battle of (627); Muhammad, Campaigns of the Prophet.

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Badr Al-Jamali (d. 1094)

The Fatimid vizier and military commander who ruled as a virtual dictator of Fatimid Egypt for more than 20 years. An ethnic Armenian, Badr was purchased as a slave (mamluk) by the Syrian emir Jamal al-Dawla, showed great administrative talent, and made his name in Syria, where he served twice as the Fatimid governor of Damascus and Acre and successfully repelled the Saljuk invasions. In 1073–1074, the Fatimid caliph al-Mustansir, facing increasing internal disorder and encroachment of tribal forces, invited Badr to help him restore the order. Badr insisted on bringing his own army, and over the next few years, he ruthlessly rid the country

of all opposition, successfully subduing the Delta and Upper Egypt and repelling the Saljuk invasion of Egypt. His success resurrected the caliphate, allowing it to survive for another century.

After restoring central authority Badr emerged as a virtual ruler of Egypt as he held the titles of commander-in-chief, vizier, and chief justice. Although notorious for his iron rule and harsh repression, Badr also brought order and prosperity to the country and left a rich legacy of buildings that are still visible in Cairo. In the 1080s, he revived the Egyptian capital, reinforcing it with a second tier of fortifications that included three monumental gates (the Bab al-Futuh, Bab al-Nasr, and Bab al-Zuwayla). Despite his incessant campaigning (1078–1079, 1085–1086, and 1089–1090), Badr was less successful in Syria, where the Saljuks captured Damascus and much of Syria. Before his death, just months before the death of al-Mustansir, Badr managed to have his son al-Afdal Shahinshah designated as heir to all of his offices. Like his father, Al-Afdal maintained the real authority in Egypt for almost three decades.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Fatimids; Mamluk Sultanate; Saljuks.

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Baghavard, Battle of (1735)

Decisive battle between the Ottoman and Iranian armies near Yerevan. After the Afghan invasion of 1722, Iran experienced more than a decade of civil strife that saw the rise of several warlords. One of them, Nadir Shah, proved to be most successful and gradually secure much of the former Safavid empire. His attempts at restoring Iranian authority, however, clashed with the Ottomans who had exploited Iranian weakness to occupy much of Iraq and southeastern Caucasia. Nadir successfully campaigned in Iraq in late 1733 and in Shirvan (southeastern Caucasia) and Armenia in 1734–1735. He besieged the Ottoman-held Yerevan, forcing the Ottoman serasker Abdullah Pasha Koprulu to march against him with some 80,000 troops. As the Turks crossed the Arpa Chay River, Nadir left Yerevan with an 18,000-man strong advance guard and the main Iranian army of 40,000 men

followed behind him. Nadir found the Ottoman army deployed near Baghavard (also known as Eghvard or Murad-Tappa) on June 14.

The battle began in the afternoon when Nadir, without waiting for the main army, launched an attack with 3,000 men to lure the Ottomans out of their camp and threaten the Ottoman artillery, which was deployed unsupported. The Iranian attack surprised the Ottomans and resulted in the Ottoman artillery being captured or forced to retreat, allowing Nadir to use his own artillery to target Ottoman troops. Nadir then exploited the confusion that spread among the Ottomans to charge with his cavalry. The Ottoman serasker failed to counter these attacks, and the Ottoman troops, in general, performed slowly and disconnectedly; an Armenian catholicos who witnessed the battle wrote that the Ottoman cannon had fired only two or three times, whereas the Iranian cannon had made 300 rounds or more. The Ottoman army soon broke ranks and fled; Abdullah Pasha Koprulu was almost captured during his flight but fell from his horse and was beheaded by an Iranian soldier called Rustam. Contemporary sources claim that the Ottoman army lost 40,000 killed, wounded, and captured, but this number (half of the army!) seems to be exaggerated. Still, the Ottoman casualties were heavy (including 32 cannon and an enormous baggage train) and, beside the commander-in-chief, several other prominent commanders were also killed while the troops were pursued for several miles back to the Arpa Chay River. After the battle, Nadir was able to occupy parts of Armenia and Georgia, capturing Ganja (July 9), Tiflis (August 12), and Yerevan (October 3). The defeat also made the Ottomans more receptive to Iranian peace offers, and diplomatic negotiations soon followed.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Baghavard, Battle of (1745); Nadir Shah.

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Baghavard, Battle of (1745)

Decisive battle between the Ottoman and Iranian armies near Yerevan. In the 1740s, Nadir Shah of Iran launched a series of campaigns to restore Iranian influence following years of decline. After successful campaigns in Central Asia and Caucasus,

Nadir made peace overtures to the Ottomans, which were rejected. In 1743, the Ottomans and Iranians resumed hostilities. Nadir besieged several Ottoman cities in Iraq but failed to gain any decisive results and agreed to a ceasefire. After a quick campaign in the Caucasus, Nadir Shah camped near Yerevan in 1745. To engage him, two Ottoman armies advanced, one toward Qars and the other further south to Mosul. Nadir sent part of his army to engage the latter army and prepared to fight the former himself. On August 7, he left Yerevan and camped on the battlefield of Baghavard, where he scored a decisive victory over the Turks in 1735. By August 9, the Ottoman army of 140,000 men, led by Yegen Muhammad Pasha, arrived and formed up for battle. To negate Ottoman superiority in firearms, Nadir instructed his infantry to fire one volley before engaging the enemy with their sabres. In the subsequent battle, the fighting was fierce and victory seemed unclear until Nadir's cavalry charge on the Ottoman flank drove that army back to its fortified camp, where the Iranian army surrounded it and cut off supplies. After several days, Ottoman levends (irregulars) mutinied and killed Yegen Muhammad Pasha before fleeing in utter confusion, leaving their artillery and baggage to the victors. The Ottomans lost up to 28,000 men, almost half of them dead. The Iranian victory, which cost Nadir up to 8,000 men, compelled the sultan to accept the peace treaty that was signed in September 1746 in Kordan, northwest of Tehran. The sultan recognized Nadir as a shah and agreed to the proposed frontiers, exchange of ambassadors, and protection of pilgrims.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Baghavard, Battle of (1735); Nadir Shah.

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Baghdad, Battle for (2003)

Major battle during the Anglo-American invasion of Iraq that ended with the capture of the Iraqi capital and the collapse of Saddam Hussein's government. On the eve of the invasion, the U.S. Army, wishing to avoid costly urban fighting, developed a plan to isolate Baghdad with a pincer movement of its infantry divisions from the east and west. Once the city was surrounded, the U.S. Army planned to use

a combination of air strikes, special forces incursions, and armored and mechanized infantry raids to weaken city's defenses and force the collapse of the government. However, as the invasion unfolded in the spring of 2003, the U.S. forces (Third Infantry Division) reached the city faster than expected and, in light of weak Iraqi resistance in the days prior, decided to engage the city's defenses without waiting for reinforcements. The first attack began on April 5 when U.S. armored battalion attacked Baghdad. Over the next four days, the U.S. forces overwhelmed the Iraqi defenses and captured key areas throughout the city, including its airport and bridges over the Tigris River. By April 9, the Iraqi resistance became sporadic and the Baathist regime effectively collapsed. Saddam Hussein and his two sons fled from the capital, leaving Baghdad to the U.S. forces.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Basra, Battle for (2003); Fallujah, Battles for (2004); Hussein, Saddam; Iraq War (2003–).

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Baghdad, Battle of (1733)

Major battle between Ottoman and Iranian armies over the control of Iraq. In early 1733, Nadir Shah invaded Iraq seeking to reclaim lands formerly belonging to Iran. Leading an army of about 100,000 men (accompanied by up to 200,000 noncombatants), Nadir occupied Samarra, Najaf, Karbala, and other Iraqi towns before besieging Baghdad. Lacking heavy artillery, the Iranians were unable to create a breach in the massive walls of the city, which was vigorously defended by the Ottoman garrison under Ahmad Pasha. By mid-July, Ahmad Pasha was willing to negotiate surrender when he received the news of a relief army of 80,000 with 60 cannon, led by the former grand vizier and experienced commander Topal Osman Pasha, advancing against the Iranians. Nadir was compelled to leave part of his army at Baghdad and set off with 70,000 men to face Topal Osman. The decisive battle took place near the Tigris River, not far from Baghdad, on July 19, 1733. The Ottoman army was deployed on a rolling terrain with the river behind them, as was the wind, which blew the sand toward the Iranian position.

Nadir began the battle by launching his cavalry advance guard, which the Ottomans repelled. The khan then advanced with the main army organized in three

Battle for Baghdad, April 5–10, 2003



groups and, after a fierce fight, he forced the Ottoman center to fall back to its camp. Topal Osman then committed his reserves, which restored the tide of war, while some Kurdish and Arab units changed sides and attacked Nadir Khan's flanks. After nine hours of fighting, and as the Iranian army wavered in the face of Ottoman surge, the khan's horse was wounded, causing him to fall. Believing their commander had been killed, many Iranian troops panicked and retreated from the battlefield, abandoning baggage and artillery (18 guns and 500 zamburaks). Both sides suffered heavy casualties: the Ottomans lost up to 20,000 men and the Iranians as many as 30,000 troops. This victory allowed the Ottomans to relieve Baghdad on July 24 and protect Anatolia from a probable invasion. More importantly, the defeat at Baghdad negated most of Nadir's earlier accomplishments in Iraq and was the one of the worst setbacks in his brilliant military career.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Nadir Shah.

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Baghdad, Fall of (1917)

British capture of the capital of Mesopotamia during World War I. Baghdad was one of the four most important cities in Islam. Although its capture had little real military value, the British victory had an important psychological impact. The British had deployed troops to Mesopotamia in October 1914 to protect the oil fields and refineries there. It remained a secondary theater for them and the Turks. As with other such ventures, however, occupation of part of Mesopotamia led to a desire to occupy more. For the British, and for the Indian army that contributed the majority of the British Empire forces in this theater, capturing Baghdad seemed to be the logical goal. Baghdad was the "City of the Caliphs" and a communications center with more than 140,000 people. The first Allied attempt to capture Baghdad ended in disaster when Major General Charles Townshend's 12,000-man force was surrounded and forced to surrender at Kut-al-Amara in April 1916. In September 1916, General Frederick Maude took command in Mesopotamia, and British Empire strength there was increased to five divisions. Maude also worked

to improve logistical support. Although warned to keep casualties at a minimum, that November Maude received permission to take the offensive. In December, enjoying a considerable numerical advantage, Maude advanced up the Tigris River toward Baghdad. He cleared the fortified Khadairi Bend by the end of January 1917 and then attacked Kut. Using his greater numbers and mobility to good advantage, Maude crossed the Tigris upstream of Kut, threatening the Turkish line of retreat. Turkish commander General Kiazim Karabekir's XVIII Corps sustained significant losses in men and equipment but managed to withdraw to Baghdad. Maude halted his army at Aziziyeh on February 27. Then, on March 5, he opened his drive on Baghdad. Three days later Maude's advance guard reached the Diyala River, 10 miles east of Baghdad. That night the British forces attempted an immediate crossing, but the Turks defeated them with heavy losses for the attackers. A similar attempt the next night was beaten back, and a small party of British soldiers was trapped on the Turkish side of the river. The Turkish defenders were part of Halil Pasha's Sixth Army. Halil had about 12,500 men, mostly in the XVIII Corps. Another 20,000 men of the XIII Corps were en route but failed to arrive in time. Halil had most of his men defending along the Diyala River, which entered the Tigris River from the left bank. Although he considered destroying the irrigation system to flood the British positions, Halil chose not to do so. Blocked at the Diyala, Maude moved two divisions to the right bank of the Tigris on March 9, hoping to surprise Halil.

Efficient reconnaissance by German aircraft warned of the British moves. Halil then ordered nearly all of his troops to move to the left bank and take up a position to protect Baghdad from the south, leaving only one regiment to hold the Diyala line. In the predawn hours of March 10, the British attempted another river crossing to rescue their trapped comrades on the other side. The Turkish position now collapsed, and the British quickly threw a bridge across the Diyala. By morning, Halil could see British columns advancing on Baghdad. A sandstorm halted operations for the day, allowing Halil time to ponder his alternatives. That night he ordered Baghdad evacuated. The Turks destroyed those supplies they could not move. On the morning of March 11, the first British soldiers marched into Baghdad, while the Turks took up new positions to the north.

Tim J. Watts

See also: World War I (Mesopotamian Theater).

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Baghdad, Siege of (812–813)

The siege of Baghdad took place between August 812 and September 813 and was the closing act of the civil war between al-Amin and al-Mamun, the sons of Caliph Harun al-Rashid, vying for control of the Abbasid caliphate. After the defeat of Caliph al-Amin's forces at the Battle of Rayy on May 1, 811 and further defeats in Al-Ahwaz, al-Amin was forced to withdraw all his remaining forces back to Baghdad. The troops of al-Mamun, under the command of Tahir ibn Husayn arrived at Baghdad in August 812 and laid siege to the city. Although the center of the city was defended by a circular wall, most of the population lived outside of these fortifications, and Tahir would have to capture these suburbs first. Tahir ordered a large number of siege engines to be built, including many stone-throwing mangonels. In response, al-Amin's troops built their own siege weapons for defense. Much of the fighting consisted of both sides bombarding each other's positions, and during these barrages many civilians were killed. Gradually, Tahir pushed into the city helped by the fire from mangonels he deployed on boats on the Tiber. His troops won a series of house-to-house battles at the al-Shammasiyyah gate and advanced closer toward al-Amin's palace. By September 813, al-Amin tried to negotiate safe passage, but Tahir ordered him to hand over his sceptre and seal. Al-Amin refused and tried to escape by boat, but his vessel was intercepted. Al-Amin was killed, and his head was placed on top of the Al-Anbar gate of the city. Tahir was now able to inform Al-Mamun that the city had been taken in his name.

Ralph M. Baker

See also: Abbasids.

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Baghdad, Siege of (1258)

The devastating siege and sack of Baghdad by the Ilkhanate Mongol army under Hulegu Khan. By the 13th century, Baghdad had served as center of the Islamic world for almost 500 years. Even though the once united Abbasid caliphate had entered its twilight, Baghdad remained an important intellectual, cultural, and religious center. Starting in the 1220s, the Islamic world faced a grave threat from the east as

the Mongol hordes of Genghis Khan conquered the Central Asia and parts of Iran. In 1251, the Great Khan Mongke resolved to extend his authority to the Abbasid caliphate. His brother, Hulegu, was given command of a considerable army and tasked with extending Mongol power into western Asia. The Mongol army was drawn from various parts of the Mongol empire and included military contingents from Georgia and Armenia and engineers from China. In 1256, Hulegu directed his men against the infamous sect of Assassins that had terrorized much of the Middle East since the 11th century. After destroying Alamut, the Assassins' stronghold, Hulegu then advanced on Baghdad. Abbasid caliph al-Mustasim (1242–1258) failed to make proper preparations for the invasion, rejected demands to recognize Mongol authority, and sent a haughty and insulting letter to Hulegu. "O young man," he wrote, "who have barely entered upon your career and who, drunk with a 10 day success, believe yourself superior to the whole world, do you not know that from the East to the Maghreb, all the worshippers of Allah, whether kings or beggars, are slaves to this court of mine, and that I can command them to muster?" The caliph, however, failed to recognize the grave danger of confronting the Mongols.

In January 1258, the Mongols reached the Tigris River and approached Baghdad. Al-Mustasim tried to engage them, but his attack failed abysmally near Baghdad when the Mongols broke the dikes and flooded the Muslim camp. Many of the Muslim troops drowned, and the Mongols killed those who survived. By late January, the Mongols took positions on both sides of the river, placing the city under a siege. The Chinese engineers constructed siege engines and began bombarding the city in early February; lacking stone projectiles, the engineers improvised with stumps of palm trees and foundations from the occupied suburbs of Baghdad. Al-Mustasim tried to negotiate and offered to swear fealty to Hulegu, but it was too late: The Mongol leader would only accept unconditional surrender. By February 10, Baghdad's walls were breached and the Mongol army launched the final assault. What followed remains one of the most tragic examples of wonton destruction of human lives and property. For days, the Mongols and their Christian auxiliaries murdered and plundered, destroying Baghdad's famous libraries, hospitals, palaces, and mosques. "They swept through the city like hungry falcons attacking a flight of doves, or like raging wolves attacking sheep, with loose reins and shameless faces, murdering and spreading terror," lamented a Muslim chronicler (Spuler 1972). The chroniclers report that none of the invaders set about the] task with greater relish than the Georgian contingent, which desired to avenge centuries of harassment at the hands of caliphs. As many as 100,000 people (although some exaggerated accounts claim 800,000 to 1 million) died in the looting of Baghdad. Caliph Al-Mustasim watched his citizens being slaughtered, and then lost his own life on February 15. Out of respect for his dignity as a religious leader, Mustasim's blood was not shed visibly; instead, he was sewn up in a carpet and trampled to death by horses. Thus, after more than 500 years, the Abbasid caliphate came to an end, even though Abbasid shadow caliphs survived in Egypt until 1517. Baghdad

never recovered from this wholesale destruction and continued to linger in the shadow of its former glory for centuries to come.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Abbasids; Assassins; Hulegu; Middle East, Mongol Invasion of the.

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Baghdad, Siege of (1401)

During his campaigns in Iran and Iraq, Timur (Tamerlane) sought to reduce the influence of Sultan Ahmad Jalayir, who controlled territory from Azerbaijan to southern Iraq, with his capital in Baghdad. In 1393, Timur led a surprise attack and, marching from Fars to Mesopotamia in just eight days, he arrived to Baghdad on August 29. Caught unprepared, Sultan Ahmad could do nothing but abandon the city and retreat to Syria. Although the sultan destroyed the bridges over the river, Timur had had the foresight to equip his troops with the necessary materials (e.g., beams, planks) to cross the river, and they captured the city without a fight. The population of Baghdad was treated relatively leniently but had to pay a heavy war indemnity. Upon his departure, Timur left a small garrison in Baghdad. In 1394, Sultan Ahmad returned from Syria to reclaim the city. The sultan's ostentatious lifestyle, however, caused much resentment in the devastated city, and by 1397, a conspiracy was hatched against the sultan, who had to bring Kara Koyunlu tribesman to restore order in Baghdad. In 1400, after his victorious campaign in Anatolia and Syria, Timur turned his attention to Baghdad. In March 1401, Timur led his army to the city, which resisted his attacks for 40 days. Finally it was taken by storm on July 9, 1401. Enraged by the city's resistance, Timur ordered the massacre of all of its residents, except for Muslim theologians and dervishes. In the subsequent bloodbath, tens of thousands of people were killed, and the city was largely destroyed, its fortifications and public building demolished.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Timur.

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Baghdad, Siege of (1638)

Ottoman siege of Baghdad as part of the prolonged Ottoman-Safavid struggle for control of Iraq. In 1504, the Safavid shah Ismail captured Baghdad during one of his campaigns. Thirty-nine years later, the Ottomans conquered it during the reign of Sultan Suleiman the Magnificent and retained it in their possession for the next nine decades. The Iranians managed to reclaim it only in 1624, and subsequently defended it against several Ottoman attacks. Finally, in 1638, Sultan Murad IV organized an expedition to drive the Safavids outs of Iraq. By then, Baghdad boasted massive fortifications. The Ottoman observer Ziyaeddin Ibrahim Nuri described city walls that were 50 cubits (25 meters) tall and between 10 and 7 meters wide, reinforced by earthen ramparts to withstand artillery bombardment and protected by a wide and deep moat. The city walls featured 114 towers (*kule*) between the North Gate (Imam-i Azam) and the South Gate (Karanlik Kapu), and another 97 towers ran west, parallel to the Tigris; between these 211 towers were numerous crenels (*beden*). The Safavid garrison commander Bektash Khan made extensive repairs to fortifications that were damaged in previous sieges and built extensive outworks to prevent the enemy from approaching the walls.

The Turkish army, with the sultan at its head, left the capital in May 1638 and, traveling through Konya, Aleppo, and Mosul, reached Baghdad in mid-November. To overcome the city's defenses, Sultan Murad IV brought 24,000 military laborers (*beldar*) and 8,000 miners and sappers (*lagimci*). He deployed his infantry to trenches and placed cavalry on flanks and behind trenches to protect against Safavid sorties. The Ottoman *beldar* and *lagimci* then began building a zigzag trench (*siçan yolu*) and defensive batteries that, once completed, directed their fire against the city defenses. At the same time, the miners dug tunnels underneath the walls, successfully opening a wide breach. After a 40-day siege, the Ottomans stormed the city on December 25 and massacred most of the city residents. The following year Iran sued for peace and ceded Baghdad and much of Iraq to the Porte.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Ismail, Shah; Ottoman-Safavid Wars; Suleiman the Magnificent.

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Baghdad Pact (1955)

Treaty of mutual cooperation and mutual defense among the nations of Turkey, Iraq, Pakistan, Iran, and Great Britain agreed to on February 4, 1955. The Baghdad Pact, also known as the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) or the Middle East Treaty Organization, was part of Western efforts to establish regional alliances to contain the Soviet influence. In the end, the Baghdad Pact failed because Arab leaders saw it as an attempt by the West to continue its colonial domination over the region. As the Cold War developed in the late 1940s and early 1950s, the U.S. government adopted a policy of communist containment. In Europe, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was formed in 1949. President Dwight D. Eisenhower's administration continued this process along other borders of the Soviet Union. The Middle East was viewed as a key area, in large part because it was the main source of oil for the West. The British government was expected to be the key to the formation of an alliance here because it already had extensive relations with the Arab states. As such, British diplomats laid the groundwork for regional defense agreements. The first attempts included Egypt, but the government of President Gamal Abdel Nasser was more interested in Pan-Arab agreements that excluded Britain. Indeed, Egypt refused to join a proposed Middle East Defense Organization in 1953, causing that initiative to collapse.

The United States and Britain therefore tried to create an alliance among the northern tier of Arab states. Turkey was already a NATO member, and its status as a Muslim nation helped to encourage other Muslim countries to consider defensive alliances with the Western powers. In February 1954, Turkey and Pakistan signed a pact of mutual cooperation, one of the first in the region. After much diplomatic activity, on February 24, 1955, Turkey and Iraq signed the Pact of Mutual Cooperation, which became better known as the Baghdad Pact and was aimed at preventing Soviet aggression. The treaty included language inviting members of the Arab League and other interested nations to join. Britain signed the alliance in April 1955, and the Royal Air Force received the right to base units in Iraq and to train the Iraqi Air Force. Pakistan joined in September and Iran on October 12, 1955. The United States remained a shadow member of the group but did not officially join as American relations with Israel might have prevented Arab members from joining. A permanent secretariat and permanent council for the alliance was created and headquartered in Baghdad.

Premiers of Iran, Iraq, Pakistan, and Turkey pose with British Foreign Secretary Harold MacMillan at the inaugural meeting of the Baghdad Pact in Baghdad, Iraq, in November 1955. (AP/Wide World Photos)

Nasser viewed the Baghdad Pact as an attack on his own vision of Pan-Arabism. He therefore immediately attacked the pact as being Britain's way of continuing its colonial presence in the Middle East. At the time, Nasser had great prestige in the Arab world as a nationalist and an opponent of Israel, and his condemnation of the treaty caused ordinary Arab peoples to oppose it. Jordan had been expected to join the Baghdad Pact, but riots there convinced King Hussein I to withdraw his support. Syria refused to sign the treaty, instead forming a union with Egypt known as the United Arab Republic. Even Lebanon, which requested Western assistance to help settle a civil war in 1958, refused to join the pact. Saudi Arabia also opposed the pact because it feared Iraq would become the dominant regional power. The Baghdad Pact received a serious blow in October 1956 when Britain joined France and Israel in an invasion of Egypt in reaction to the Suez Crisis. The U.S. government opposed the attack and helped force its allies to withdraw. The action discredited Britain across the Middle East. In an attempt to keep the Western orientation of the

pact, the United States joined the Military Committee of the organization in 1958 and funneled military assistance and other funds through the pact's organizations.

The gravest threat to the Baghdad Pact occurred on July 14, 1958, when Iraqi officers overthrew King Faisal II and the Iraqi monarchy. The new Iraqi government, sympathetic to Nasser, withdrew Iraq from the Baghdad Pact on March 24, 1959. That same year, the United States officially joined the alliance, which changed its name to the Central Treaty Organization. The alliance proved to be weak, however. When Pakistan and Iran became involved in conflicts with India and then Iraq during the 1960s, they tried to invoke the alliance, but Britain and the United States refused to be drawn into the regional conflicts. As a result, Pakistan and Iran came to regard the alliance with considerable cynicism. CENTO declined in importance as the British Empire continued to contract. In 1968, Britain withdrew its forces from the Persian Gulf, making British bases on Cyprus the closest ones to the Middle East. In 1974, budget cutbacks forced Britain to withdraw specific troop commitments to CENTO. After that, CENTO became a chiefly symbolic structure rather than an effective defensive mechanism. In 1979, Iran left CENTO after the overthrow of Shah Reza Pahlavi. Pakistan withdrew in 1979 as well, and with it, the CENTO and the vestiges of the Baghdad Pact had collapsed entirely.

Tim J. Watts

See also: Cold War in the Middle East; Nasser, Gamal Abdel.

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Bakhchisarai, Treaty of (1681)

Treaty between Russia, the Ottoman Empire, and the Crimean khanate to end the Russo-Ottoman War of 1676–1681. Signed in January 1681 at Bakhchisarai (Crimea), the treaty proclaimed a 20-year truce and set the Dnieper River as the borderline between the Ottoman and Russian realms. The sultan then recognized Moscow's sovereignty in eastern (left bank) Ukraine, including Kiev, and over the Zaporozhian Cossacks, or Sechs, and Russia recognized Ottoman control of southern and southwestern Ukraine. Both sides agreed not to settle the territory between the Southern Bug and Dnieper rivers. The Crimean Tatars and Nogai tribes retained

the right to live as nomads in the southern steppes of Ukraine, and the Cossacks retained the right to fish in the Dnieper and its tributaries and to sail on the Dnieper and the Black Sea.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Russo-Ottoman Wars.

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Balak ibn Bahram (d. 1124)

The Artukid ruler who fought with great success against the Crusaders. As the lord of Khartbirt (Khartpert, Harput) beginning in around 1113, Balak conducted several successful operations against the Crusader states. In 1120 he routed the Crusader army near Arzangan, capturing its leader, Theodore Habras, Count of Trebizond. Two years later he besieged Edessa and captured Count Joscelin of Edessa, Count Galeran of Birejik, and 60 other prominent Edessan knights. Balak's victory prompted King Baldwin II of Jerusalem to act, and in the spring of 1123 the Frankish army embarked on a campaign against Balak, who was besieging the fortress of Karkar. Yet, Balak lifted his siege and swiftly marched against Baldwin, whom he surprised while crossing the bridge over the Sendja (Nahr al-Azrak, Bolam Su), a tributary of the Euphrates River. In the subsequent battle, Balak routed the Franks and captured the king. He refused to ransom Baldwin except in exchange for huge territorial concessions. He also exploited the fact that the Franks in the Levant had become leaderless to turn to his fellow Artukids and consolidate his authority in the region. In May to July 1123 he captured Harran and Aleppo, emerging as the leader of the Artukid clan. He then turned back to the Franks. He marched north to Edessa, invading the region of Dalik and Tel Bashir, which he burned and plundered. He chose to ignore the city of Edessa and targeted Antioch. In August 1123, he captured Albara and laid siege to the powerful fortress of Kafartab.

Meanwhile, Balak's Crusader prisoners—including King Baldwin and Count Joscelin—languished in prison in Khartbirt. They managed to get a message out and, with the help of local Armenians, organized a daring raid on the fortress that seized the imagination of contemporary chroniclers. Disguising themselves as peasants, the Armenians from Behesni managed to enter the castle, massacre

the garrison, and deliver Khartbirt to Baldwin; Joscelin hastened to Antioch and Jerusalem in search of troops to aid Baldwin. Balak learned about the loss of his capital, treasure, and harem just days later. He immediately lifted the siege and marched to Khartbirt, which he besieged in September. Aware that the impregnable fortress was built on a hill of limestone, he dug several tunnels, propped up by wooden beams, beneath Khartbirt and then methodically destroyed the beams to bring down the walls. On September 16, the fortress was captured and, although Baldwin and a few valuable prisoners were spared, the Armenian garrison and the few remaining local inhabitants were all massacred. The Crusader relief army, led by Count Joscelin, arrived too late to rescue Baldwin, who was moved to Harran. In the spring of 1124, Balak launched new offensives against the Franks, first targeting the mutinous ruler of Menbij, who had sided with Joscelin. Although Balak quickly captured the town, the citadel resisted his troops. Joscelin organized a relief army from Antioch and Edessa to rescue Menbij, but Balak defeated it and forced it back to Tel Bashir. Returning to Menbij, he decided to personally position the siege artillery and was mortally wounded by an archer from the citadel's wall and was buried in a tomb at Aleppo.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: First Crusade (1096–1099); Second Crusade (1147–1149).

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Balkan Wars (1912–1913)

Series of sharp and bloody conflicts in southeastern Europe that led to World War I. Most of southeastern Europe had come under Ottoman domination by the end of the 14th century. During the 19th century, nation-states emerged from the weakened structure of the Ottoman Empire. These states, including Bulgaria, Greece, Montenegro, and Serbia, all harbored irredentist aspirations against the Ottomans, and many of these aspirations overlapped, especially in Macedonia. For some time these rivalries precluded the formation of a Balkan alliance directed against the Ottomans. The Young Turk revolution in 1908 and its objective of an Ottoman revival, however, engendered closer cooperation among these Balkan states. An opportunity for the realization of their nationalist objectives arose when the weakness

of the Ottomans became apparent during the Italo-Ottoman War of 1911–1912. With the support of Russia, which sought to regain the position lost in southeastern Europe during the Bosnian Crisis of 1908–1909, Bulgaria and Serbia signed an alliance in March 1912. This alliance contained provisions for the rough division of Ottoman territories, including a partition of Macedonia into a Bulgarian zone and a contested zone to be arbitrated by the Russian czar. Bulgaria and Serbia then signed bilateral agreements with Greece and Montenegro during the spring and summer of 1912. Other than the Bulgarian-Serbian agreement, the Balkan allies made little effort to arrange the division of any territories conquered from the Ottomans.

The fighting between Montenegro and the Ottoman Empire began on October 8, 1912. Bulgaria, Greece, and Serbia entered the war on October 18. Each of the Balkan allies separately confronted their common enemy. The most important theater was in Thrace, where a strong Bulgarian offensive overcame Ottoman resistance at Kirk Killase (Lozengrad) and at the massive battle raging from Buni Hisar to Lyule Burgas. At the same time, the Bulgarians surrounded and besieged the Ottomans at Adrianople (Edirne). The Bulgarian offensive thrust the Ottomans to the final defensive positions at Chataldzha (Çatalca), about 20 miles outside of Constantinople. Only on November 16–17 did Ottoman forces rally to defeat a Bulgarian attempt to cross the Chataldzha lines and seize their capital. Smaller Bulgarian units, meanwhile, proceeded against little opposition into western Thrace and toward Salonika.

Elsewhere, the Greek army advanced in two directions against slight opposition. The northwesterly thrust moved into Epirus and besieged Janina (Ioannina). The northeasterly push overran Thessaly and entered Salonika only a day ahead of the Bulgarian unit moving south from Bulgaria with the same objective. An uneasy condominium ensued in that city. The Greek navy held the Ottoman fleet at bay and seized the Aegean Islands. One section of the Montenegrin army advanced into the Sandjak of Novibazar while most of the rest of the Montenegrin force besieged the northern Albanian town of Scutari (Shkodër). The main part of the Serbian army easily defeated the Ottomans at Kumanovo in northern Macedonia and then proceeded to take most of the rest of Macedonia. Meanwhile, other Serbian units occupied Kosovo. By the time the warring parties agreed to an armistice on December 3, the only territories in Europe remaining to the Ottomans were the besieged cities of Adrianople, Janina, and Scutari; the Gallipoli Peninsula; and the part of eastern Thrace that was behind the Chataldzha lines.

While the Balkan allies and the Ottomans assembled in London on December 16 to negotiate a peace settlement, the ambassadors of the Great Powers convened nearby to direct the course of the peace settlement and to protect their own interests. This ambassadors' conference, on the insistence of Austria-Hungary and Italy, recognized the independence of an Albanian state that some Albanian notables had

proclaimed in Vlorë on November 28. This state blocked Serbian and Montenegrin claims to territories on the eastern shore of the Adriatic Sea. These claims had the strong support of Russia. At the same time, the Austrians demanded that Serbian troops evacuate those portions of northern Albania occupied that autumn. Talks between the Balkan allies and the Ottomans soon stalled, mainly over the issue of Adrianople, and hostilities resumed on February 3, 1913.

On March 6, Janina fell to the Greeks. On March 26, the Bulgarians, with Serbian help, took Adrianople. The Montenegrins and assisting Serbian units bogged down around Scutari. Only on April 23, after the departure of the Serbs under pressure from the Great Powers, did the Montenegrins succeed in entering the city. Nevertheless, the major powers, especially Austria-Hungary, refused to sanction a Montenegrin occupation of Scutari because the London ambassadors' conference had assigned it to the new Albanian state. After threats and a show of force, together with the promise of generous subsidies, the Montenegrins evacuated Scutari. On May 30, 1913, the Balkan allies and the Ottomans signed a peace treaty in London. With the Treaty of London, the Ottoman Empire ceded its European territories west of a straight line drawn between Enos and Media (Enez-Midye).

By then, however, the loose Balkan alliance was disintegrating. The Serbs sought compensation for Albania in Macedonian areas assigned to Bulgaria by the alliance

A photograph of the battlefield during the Siege of Adrianople, November 3, 1912–March 26, 1913, in the Balkan Wars. (Library of Congress)

treaty but occupied by Serbia during the previous autumn fighting. At the same time, the Bulgarians and Greeks were skirmishing over Macedonia. On May 5, 1913, the Greeks and Serbs signed an agreement directed against the Bulgarians. A feeble Russian attempt at arbitration in June failed. On the night of June 29–30, the Bulgarians launched probing attacks against Serbian positions in Macedonia. The Greeks and Serbs used these attacks to implement their alliance, and the Second Balkan War resulted. Greek and Serbian counterattacks thrust the Bulgarian forces back. Taking advantage of the situation, Romanian and Ottoman troops joined in the attack on Bulgaria. The Romanians objected to the establishment of a strong Bulgaria on their southern frontier and sought compensation in the town of Silistra and in southern Dobruja. The Ottomans sought to recover Adrianople. The Bulgarians found themselves attacked on all sides. The result was a Bulgarian catastrophe. With no aid forthcoming from any Great Power, the Bulgarians had to seek terms. In the Treaty of Bucharest (August 10, 1913) with Greece, Montenegro, and Serbia and the Treaty of Constantinople (September 30, 1913) with the Ottoman Empire, the Bulgarians acknowledged complete defeat and the loss of much of the gains from the First Balkan War.

The two Balkan wars changed the map of southeastern Europe. A fragile Albanian state emerged, largely dependent on the Great Powers. Serbia acquired Kosovo and much of Macedonia, almost doubling its territory. Serbia and Montenegro divided the Sandjak of Novibazar between them. Montenegro also gained small areas on its southern border with the new Albanian state. Greece obtained clear title to Crete and also obtained Epirus, including the city of Janina; a large portion of southern and western Macedonia, including Salonika; and the Aegean Islands. Bulgaria, even after defeat in the Second Balkan War, gained central Thrace, including the insignificant Aegean port of Dedeagach, and a piece of Macedonia around Petrich. Romania obtained southern (Bulgarian) Dobruja. The Ottomans managed to regain eastern Thrace, which remained its only European possession.

The Balkan wars were the first armed conflicts on European soil in the 20th century and presaged World War I. Mass attacks against entrenched positions, concentrated artillery barrages, and military use of airplanes made their first appearances in European warfare. The two wars resulted in at least 150,000 military dead, and the Bulgarians and Ottomans suffered the heaviest losses. Many more soldiers were wounded and missing. These wars also brought about the deaths from disease of tens of thousands of civilians, and many more were displaced. The Balkan wars left a legacy of frustration for the Bulgarians and Ottomans, providing a basis for continued conflict in the World War I. They also imparted a sense of inflated success among the Greeks, Romanians, and Serbs. On two occasions during the Balkan wars, Austria-Hungary had resorted to threats of force against Serbia to protect Albania. The Austrians would make one more such threat in October 1913 before finally resorting to force. Less than a year after the signing of

the Treaty of Bucharest, war again erupted in southeastern Europe, but this time the Third Balkan War metamorphosed into the World War I. Within the next five years, all of the participants in the Balkan wars would become involved in further disastrous and costly conflicts. Many of the same battlefields of the Balkan wars, such as Salonika, Gallipoli, and Dorian, again saw fighting. During World War I, the populations of southeastern Europe again made great sacrifices for nationalist aims.

Richard C. Hall

See also: Constantinople, Treaty of (1913); Italo-Ottoman War (1911–1912); London, Treaty of (1913); Young Turks; World War I.

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Balkans, Ottoman Conquest of the

Ottoman expansion into the Balkans began early in its excursions against the Byzantine Empire in the 14th century. Okhan, son of Osman (founder of the Ottoman dynasty), was stationed in northeastern Anatolia across the Dardanelles from Constantinople, putting him in an advantageous strategic position to strike the capital of Byzantium. However, he sometimes cooperated in joint ventures with the Byzantines in military engagements against common enemies from Europe. In one of these western sojourns into the Balkans, Turkish forces began their expansion into the Slavic Balkan states surrounding the Byzantine Empire. Ottoman attacks on Serbia, particularly the Battle of Maritsa (1371), broke that kingdom up into various states. Moreover, Turkish forces had also met initial stubborn resistance from local Slavic states, such as Bosnia, which were unable to replenish their troop numbers over the long term. In contrast, Ottoman forces were able to muster troops from their conquered territories despite their losses. Over the next several centuries, after endemic warfare in the Balkan region, Ottoman forces were able to wear down and eventually conquer all the major Slavic states piecemeal, with the exception of Croatia.

The first major engagement of a major Balkan state was the confrontation between the Ottoman Empire and Serbia that culminated in the Battle of Kosovo in 1389. Despite a series of losses against Slavic states in the Battle of Pločnik against the Serbs (1386) and the Battle of Bileća against the Bosnians (1388), Ottoman sultan Murad I moved his forces toward Serbia through Kosovo, arriving in Pristina on June 14, 1389. On June 28, 1389, Ottoman and Serbian forces met on the battlefield at Kosovo Field. Despite having the initial advantage in battle after an advantageous first charge, the Serbians were defeated after a crushing Turkish cavalry and infantry counterattack. However, despite their victory, Turkish forces were utterly destroyed amid this Pyrrhic victory given the ability of Serbian forces to inflict a stubborn defense in spite of their loss. Moreover, Murad died in the midst of the battle. After their forces were annihilated, Serbian elites were forced to concede to Ottoman dominance, paying tribute and supplying troops to the Turks.

At this point, Ottoman forces concentrated their efforts on destroying the remnants of Byzantium. Murad's successor, Bayezid laid siege to Constantinople in 1395. This led to a concerted effort led by Hungary against the Ottomans. However, they were utterly defeated by Bayezid at the Battle of Nikopolis (1396), thus

ensuring Ottoman hegemony in the region. At this point, the Turks transferred their capital from Bursa to the city of Edina in Thrace in the Balkans. Despite losses in the Middle East, the Ottomans were able to expand in the Balkan region at the expense of the ebbing Byzantine Empire, already in a long protracted decline. When Mehmed II became sultan in 1451, he pursued the final conquest of the Byzantine Empire, taking Constantinople in 1453 after a long siege. Symbolically, it was made the capital city of the Ottoman Empire, indicating the base of power that the Ottomans now held in the region. At this point, Mehmed II captured the outlying regions of Greece not under Ottoman control.

The remaining independent Balkan states were subsequently conquered piecemeal by the Ottomans over the next century. In 1459, the Serbian city of Smederevo was taken. Bosnia was finally taken in 1463. Montenegro was conquered in 1499, and despite a valiant effort (particularly in resisting Turkish forces during the siege of 1456), the city of Belgrade was taken in 1521 along with the adjacent territories of Hungary. Croatia was able to resist Turkish forces for far longer than other Slavic states, despite its strength being slowly depleted in the long term. Late in the 16th century, Croatian resistance was able to hold Turkish forces at bay given their fortified cities. However, after the Battle of Sisak (1593), where Ottoman forces fought against the Croatians and their Habsburg Austrian allies, Croatia was able to maintain its independence from further Ottoman incursions. Ottoman forces chose to expand into Central European territories, threatening the Habsburg domains.

Abraham O. Mendoza

See also: Bayezid II; Belgrade, Siege of (1521); Byzantine-Ottoman Wars; Kosovo, Battle of (1389); Mehmed II; Nikopolis, Crusade of (1396).

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Balta Liman, Convention of (1849)

Treaty, signed on May 1, 1849, in Balta Liman, between Russia and the Ottoman Empire in response to the revolutions of 1848. Starting in France in February 1848, revolutionary activity swept through Europe causing turmoil in Italy, Austria, Prussia, and the Germanic states. In concluding this agreement, Russia and the Ottoman Empire promised to take measures to control the internal politics of the Danubian principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia to prevent revolutionary

movements there. The hospodars, who ruled these principalities, would be nominated by the Ottoman sultan and approved by Russia, thus replacing the former system by which the principalities selected their own leaders. The convention remained in effect for seven years.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Russo-Ottoman Wars; Hunkar Iskelesi, Treaty of (1833).

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Bandung Conference (1955)

The Bandung Conference (also known as the Asian-African Conference) was held in Bandung, on the island of Java in Indonesia, from April 17 to 24, 1955. It was attended by representatives from 29 nation-states in Asia and Africa, most of them new. There were also observers from organizations representing African Americans and Greek Cypriots, as well as a delegation from the African National Congress. Sukarno, the Indonesian president (1945–1965), wanted the assembled governments to stake out a nonaligned position in relation to the escalating Cold War between the United States and its allies, on the one hand, and the Sino-Soviet bloc, on the other. Jawaharlal Nehru, the prime minister of India (1947–1964), was also enthusiastic about such a project, and the delegation representing the Chinese government was sympathetic, despite its alliance with the Soviet Union. The conference produced a declaration that emphasized the need for greater cooperation between the former colonies of Asia and Africa and the governments of what would increasingly become known as the Third World.

The meeting in Bandung paved the way for the establishment of the Movement of Non-Aligned Countries in 1961. But the growing rivalry between the Indian and Chinese governments and the Indian government's improved relations with the United States by the end of the 1950s undermined many of the initiatives inspired by the Bandung Conference. More broadly, as the trend toward decolonization gained speed in the early 1960s, the complex dynamics and conflicting goals of nationalist movements in Africa and Asia often subverted efforts to unite the governments of the Third World. A plan to hold a second conference in Algeria in June 1965 was shelved when the politics of the Sino-Soviet split directly affected efforts to organize the meeting and when the Ben Bella government was toppled by the Algerian military. In September 1965, Sukarno, the sponsor of the 1955 Asian-African Conference, was marginalized by a U.S.-backed military dictatorship under

General Suharto; Nehru, another major leader of the Bandung era (which stretched from the 1950s to the late 1970s), had died in office in May 1964.

Between the 1960s and 1980s, the nonaligned movement continued to meet approximately every three years. But meetings have been less frequent since then, and as an organization, it has played no significant role in world affairs. In fact, by the beginning of the 1990s—when the Indonesian government, under President Suharto, took over the chairmanship—the movement had become obsolete.

Mark T. Berger

See also: Baghdad Pact (1955); Cold War in the Middle East; Non-Aligned Movement.

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Bapheus, Battle of (1301)

An important battle between the Byzantine Empire and the rising Ottoman state led by Osman I; in Ottoman chronicles, it is often described as the Battle of Yalak-Ovasi. Fought in the summer of 1301, the battle is sometimes considered the starting point for Ottoman sovereignty. This important battle was part of Osman's campaign to capture Nicaea (modern-day Iznik), a key Byzantine town in western Asia Minor that served as the interim capital city of the Byzantine Empire from the Fourth Crusade in 1204 until the recapture of Constantinople by the Byzantines in 1261. By the late 13th century, the rising Ottoman state, seeking to expand its territory, repeatedly clashed with the Byzantines, who had suffered a number of raids by the Ottomans.

Around 1300–1301, Osman, the leader of the Ottoman Turks who had declared his independence from the Saljuk Turks in 1299, attempted to capture Nicaea, laying siege to it. Under blockade and suffering from a famine, the town garrison finally succeeded in sending a messenger to Emperor Michael IX Palaiologos in Constantinople, who dispatched Hetaireiarches Mouzalon with some 2,000 men to relieve the city. Both Byzantine and Ottoman sources provide some details on what happened next. Byzantine historian George Pachymeres described Osman setting up an ambush, making a surprise attack at Telemaia, and then engaging the enemy at Bapheus, where the numerical superiority of 'Osman's troops, the noncooperation of the local Byzantine militia, and the lack of discipline among the Byzantine soldiery led to a decisive Byzantine defeat. According to Ottoman chronicles, the

Byzantine emperor sent a relief army by sea to Nicaea, which arrived at Yalak-Ovasi (the coastal plain on the southern shores of the Gulf of Izmit [Nicomedia]) and began to land to make a surprise attack on Osman' s troops. Informed through a Greek spy of the enemy's plan, Osman, who had received aid from the sultan of Konya and local Turkoman lords, lay in ambush and defeated the enemy. The date of the battle is usually given as June 27, 1302, but that date has been rejected by the Byzantinists, most of whom agree on July 27, 1301. The victory at Bapheus was the first major victory for Osman, securing his sovereignty and bringing him great fame and reputation among the Turkoman lords.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Byzantine-Ottoman Wars.

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Barbarossa Hayreddin Pasha (d. 1546)

Hayreddin Pasha or Khayr al-Din (Khidir) Pasha, also known as Barbarossa because of his red beard, was a famous corsair and the admiral of the Ottoman navy. He was born in 1466 at Metellin. His father was a Rumelian Sipahi who settled on the island after its conquest. Hayreddin and his brothers Ishaq, Elias, and Arudj practiced commerce and piracy in the Mediterranean during the reigns of Bayezid II and Selim I. The brothers were able to conquer several towns on the coast of North Africa including Algiers. Hayreddin was left in possession of all these conquests in 1519 after Elias died fighting the Knights of Rhodes and Ishaq and 'Arudj fell in battle against the Spaniards.

Hayreddin faced both the Spaniards and the independent Arab principalities of North Africa alone. Thus, he sought the protection of the Ottoman Empire and swore allegiance to Selim I, making Algiers and Tunis Ottoman provinces and extending the reach of the empire into the western Mediterranean. Much of the remainder of Hayreddin's career was occupied with fighting the Spaniards and their allies in the Mediterranean. His main antagonist was the Genoese admiral Doria.

In 1533, Hayreddin was invited to Constantinople by Sultan Suleiman I. He was made the grand admiral of the Ottoman fleet and received the rank of governor general of the Islands. Over the next years Hayreddin ravaged the coats of Italy and

repelled Christian attacks on North Africa on several occasions. When the Venetians joined the conflict, he captured almost all of their islands in the Archipelago.

In 1538, Hayreddin's fleet of 120 ships faced the combined fleets of Spain, Venice, and the papacy, which consisted of 70 ships and 138 galleys led by Doria, at the Battle of Preveza. Hayreddin's daring tactics, which involved cutting the enemy line, and his superior seamanship gained the Ottomans an important victory despite the enemy's superior numbers and armaments. However, under cover of night the defeated allied fleet managed to retreat without heavy losses.

In 1543, Hayreddin set out on his last campaign, which was conducted in conjunction with the French fleet. This attempt to capture Nice, however, failed because of the shortcomings on the part of the French. Hayreddin spent the last years of his life in pious works and died in 1546 and was buried at Beschiktasch on the Bosporus.

Adam Ali

See also: Barbary Corsairs; Bayezid II; Kemal Reis; Piale (Piyale) Pasha; Selim I; Turgut Reis; Venetian-Ottoman Wars.

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Barbary Corsairs

A corsair was a private individual who commanded an armed vessel and sailed the seas against the enemy of his country and his faith at his own risk and profit, covered by letters-patent issued by his government. There was a legal distinction between a corsair and a pirate. In theory, the former acted within the limits of the law and the latter outside it. In everyday practice there was hardly any difference in their performance. Nor was there any dissimilarity between Muslim and Christian corsairs. Both sought the same prey: the commercial trading vessel, flying any flag, friend or foe. Prizes were made by both: at sea by seizing other vessels and on land by raiding coastal towns and villages. Such were the Barbary corsairs. Their states, as their name suggests, were in the Barbary region on the North African coast.

Algiers (mod. Alger, Algeria), Tripoli (mod. Tarabulus, Libya), and Tunis were the leading Barbary regencies. They owe their origin to two closely related factors. First, there was the corsairs' reaction to Spain's systematic conquest of strategic points on the North African coast: Melilla (1497), Mers el-Kebir (1505), Oran (1509), Algiers, Bejaïa (Bougie), and Tripoli (1510). Second, there was the same corsairs' resort to the increasingly powerful Ottoman sultan at Constantinople for aid and protection in their war against imperial Spain. In return they recognized him as their religious and political leader, from whose expanding empire they were now allowed to recruit armies that helped maintain internal political stability in the Barbary States and defended them from foreign invasion. They also made their wide corsairing activity possible.

The Barbary corsairs succeeded in conquering and exploiting the fertile hinterlands of the cities of Algiers, Tripoli, and Tunis, upon which they built strong military states, a prosperous economy, and a flourishing trade in agricultural products. The latter were exchanged for manufactured goods (such as war matériel and shipbuilding) from friends and foes alike in Christian Europe. Each state (with Algiers leading the way) soon developed into a semiautonomous Muslim base, from which the Barbary corsairs operated in the endless holy war between Islam and Christianity. The corsairs also had long-term effects on the Christian Mediterranean. Their widespread activities necessitated sounder defenses on both land and sea on the part of Christian governments. On land they dictated the building of coastal towers, massive walls, and other structures; on sea merchant fleets became more strongly armed and preferred to sail in convoy. But the Barbary corsairs also encouraged Christian states (such as the Papal States, Livorno, and Hospitaller Malta) to send their own navies to seek them out and capture them. The slave trade flourished.

The history of the Barbary corsairs is generally divided into three distinct phases. The first is known as the grand heroic phase (1520s–1580), the period of their participation alongside the Turkish armada in the Ottoman Empire's struggle against Spain and its allies for mastery of the Mediterranean. Charles V's full-scale Spanish crusade against Tunis (1535), his disaster at Algiers (1541), the Ottoman reconquest of Tripoli from the Hospitallers (1551), the long unsuccessful Muslim Siege of Malta (1565), and the Battle of Lepanto (1571) were successive stages punctuating this crusading phase. The second phase is known as the mercantile phase (1580–ca. 1650). By now, corsair activity had been allowed to develop into an economic jihad (holy war), an important industry with the pursuit of gain as its main driving force. Galley fleets sailed out to raid Christian commerce. Spain's shipping and that of its European colonies (such as Naples, Sardinia, and Sicily) were potential targets, and so was the shipping of Hospitaller Malta and of states at formal war with the Ottoman Empire. England, France, and Holland were generally not among the corsairs' enemies. This in part reflected these trading nations' greater military and naval capacity, which could impose truces and peace treaties on the Barbary

corsair states at will; in part, it depended on their often changing perceptions of the "Turk." About one-seventh of the value of the booty (human and material) made by the Barbary corsairs was assigned, in harmony with precepts in the Koran, to the state that had covered the corsairs with letters-patent. Other fixed proportions went to port officials and brokers and to finance the upkeep of the harbor. The rest was shared equally between the ship owners and the crew. The third phase (from mid-17th century to 1830), known as the declining phase, was marked by the increasing, almost exclusive, participation of the state. The activity of the Barbary corsairs was brought to an end in 1830 with the French conquest of Algiers.

Victor Mallia-Milanes

See also: Algeria, French Conquest of (1830–1857); Barbarossa Hayreddin Pasha; Barbary Wars; Lepanto, Battle of (1571); Malta, Siege of (1565).

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Barbary Wars (1783–1815)

The Barbary States was the term applied in Europe to the North African provinces (modern-day Algieria, Tunisia, and Libya) of the Ottoman Empire. For centuries Barbary pirates, sailing corsairs, had captured merchants and raided towns looting and capturing Christians to sell as white slaves. Rejecting a policy of appeasement, the United States defeated the Barbary pirates in two wars, the Tripolitan War of 1801–1805 and the Algerine War of 1815.

The Tripolitan War began February 26, 1801, when Tripoli declared war after the U.S. government refused to meet its demands. The Tripolitan pirates regularly raided merchant ships to demand tribute for the right to sail their seas and to offer for ransom the sailors they took into slavery. Most European countries chose to pay the tribute demanded. The newly established United States followed suit and, starting in 1796, regularly paid tribute to Algiers. Popular opinion was, however, against such policy, and Charles Cotesworth Pinckney's now-famous statement—"Millions for defense, but not one cent for tribute"—had gained popularity. In

1801, with the addition of several powerful frigates to its standing naval force, the new administration under President Thomas Jefferson refused to comply with Tripoli's demands for tribute, and on February 26, 1801 the pasha opened hostilities. On July 24, 1802, Commodore Richard Dale, commanding the American squadron, blockaded Tripoli. On June 2, 1803, Captain David Porter raided the Tripoli harbor with an amphibious landing, the first American action on a hostile foreign shore. In August 1804, Tripolitanian ships and Tripoli's harbor defenses were attacked. In 1805, William Eaton marched an American force across the desert from Alexandria to attack Tripoli. Eaton captured Derna on April 28. On June 4, a peace treaty was signed between Tripoli and the United States.

After the American victory in the first Barbary War, the United States became embroiled in a larger struggle for mastery in the Atlantic, which eventually led to the War of 1812. The Barbary pirates exploited this opportunity to resume attacks on American merchant vessels and hold their crews for ransom. The United States initially recommended paying tributes, but after the conclusion of the war with Britain, Washington turned its attention to the issue of piracy. The Algerine War began in early March when the U.S. Congress authorized deployment of naval squadron against Algiers. On June 28, Commodore Stephen Decatur, commanding an American squadron, arrived at the port of Algiers, having captured a couple of Algerian warships along the way. He threatened to bombard Algiers if a peace treaty was not signed at once. On June 30, a treaty, its terms dictated at the mouth of a cannon, was signed. Decatur then sailed for Tunis and Tripoli, where he forced their rulers to sign a peace treaty. This effectively ended the war with the Barbary pirates. A second American squadron visited the ports of the Barbary States a few weeks later to reinforce the will to comply with their treaties.

Andrew J. Waskey

See also: Barbary Corsairs; Tripolitan War.

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Bardo, Treaty of (1881)

Treaty establishing a French protectorate over Tunisia. In 1881, after a raid by the Tunisian Kroumer tribe on Algeria, France organized an expeditionary force

against Tunisia. The French met little resistance and compelled Muhammad as-Sadiq, bey of Tunisia, to accept the treaty on May 12, 1881. The accord, also known as the Treaty of Al-Qasr as-Said, kept the Tunisian monarchy intact but greatly reduced its authority. France's resident minister received the authority to direct Tunisia's foreign affairs, and a French general took charge of the Tunisian army.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Ahmad Bey of Tunis; Algeria, French Conquest of (1830–1857); French Colonial Policy in Africa.

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Basian, Battle of (1203)

A decisive Georgian victory over a Muslim coalition at Basian (near Erzurum in modern Turkey). Following the rise of powerful Georgian kingdom under King David IV the Builder (r. 1089–1125), the reign of Queen Tamar of Georgia (r. 1178–1213) underscored Georgian might after a large Muslim coalition was defeated in battle at Shamkhor in 1195. Alarmed by the Georgian success, Rukn al-Din Sulayman Shah II, sultan of Rum (r. 1196–1204), rallied the Muslim principalities of Asia Minor against Georgia. A massive Muslim army advanced toward the Georgian borders in 1203 and was met at Basian by a much smaller Georgian force under David Soslani, king consort to Tamar. The Georgians initially made an unexpected attack with their advance guard and spread confusion among the enemy troops. The sultan managed to rally his forces and counterattack, but he was surprised by coordinated flanking attacks, which routed his forces. The bitterly contested battle caused heavy casualties on both sides. The victory at Basian secured Georgian preeminence in the region. Exploiting her success in this battle, Queen Tamar annexed Arran and Duin in 1203 and subdued the emirate of Kars, the Armen-Shahs, and the emirs of Erzurum and Erzincan. In 1204, she provided military and political support to Alexios Komnenos in establishing the empire of Trebizond. The Georgians then invaded Azerbaijan, advancing as far as Ardabil and Tabriz in 1208 and Qazvin and Khoy in 1210. These victories brought Georgia to the summit of its power and glory, establishing a pan-Caucasian Georgian Empire stretching from the Black Sea to the Caspian and from the Caucasus Mountains to Lake Van.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Didgori, Battle of (1121); Georgian-Saljuk Wars (11th–13th Centuries).

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Basmachi Revolt (1918–1924)

A widespread popular revolt against Bolshevik rule in then-Soviet Central Asia after the Russian Civil War; communism represented a threat to the religion of Islam and the traditional tribal hierarchy of such Turkic peoples as the Uzbeks, Kazakhs, and Kyrgyz.

The center of the revolt took place in the Fergana Valley in Turkmenistan, a region that had a tradition of opposition to previous Russian imperial rule. Turkmenistan as a whole had experienced considerable economic dislocation during World War I through the collapse of the cotton market, which was further exacerbated by resentment against labor conscription from 1916 to 1917.

Consequently, when the Bolsheviks dissolved the autonomous government at Kokand in Turkmenistan in January 1918, tribal and religious leaders raised a revolt. A former bandit from Kokand known as Irgash was recognized as the first Basmachi commander, but an Uzbek elder, Madamin Bek, proclaimed his own provisional government in the Fergana. That initial revolt was successfully suppressed by the Bolsheviks, but new centers of resistance emerged at Bukhara and Khiva in 1920. The emir of Bukhara named another Uzbek, Ibrahim Bek, as Basmachi commander in chief.

At their peak in 1921, the Basmachi probably had 20,000 men, but even though well mounted and highly mobile, they had little military training and were poorly armed. They were also divided by tribal rivalries. A brief unity was attained through the efforts of the former Turkish leader in World War I, Enver Pasa, who defected to the Basmachi after having been invited to Russia by Vladimir Lenin in 1919. However, Enver was killed on August 4, 1922, and no other Basmachi leader was as successful in uniting them. Nonetheless, they did pose a substantial threat to Bolshevik control of Turkmenistan and caused considerable damage by attacking cotton mills, communications, and the irrigation system. As a result, when appointed to command the Soviet Army in Turkmenistan in 1919, Mikhail Frunze initiated political concessions to divide the Basmachi from their popular support.

Throughout the 1920s, concessions continued with the suspension of forced labor and land confiscation and the reopening of Islamic schools. However, the Bolsheviks had little intention of maintaining those concessions longer than necessary;

most were reversed once the revolt had been crushed. Frunze also prepared for a renewed military effort by reorganizing the Soviet forces. Large numbers of troops were eventually deployed, including newly raised Islamic units. During the final phase of the revolt, between 1929 and 1931, Semen Budenny used artillery and aircraft against Basmachi villages.

The Soviets also pursued the Basmachi into Afghanistan, which forced the Afghans to take steps to prevent infiltration into Soviet territory. By 1929, most of the leading Basmachi had been eliminated or driven into exile, and their numbers were reduced to no more than 1,000 or 2,000. Ibrahim Bek attempted to launch new raids from Afghanistan but was captured and executed in June 1931; the former ruler of Khiva, Dzhunaid Khan, was defeated in the Karakum Desert in October 1933.

Sporadic resistance continued through the 1930s, but the main revolt had ended. For the Soviet Army, the experience of the revolt had been invaluable, and its lessons were absorbed by the principal Soviet theorist of counterinsurgency, Mikhail Tukhachevsky.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Central Asia, Russian Conquest of; Enver Pasha.

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Basra, Battle for (2003)

Battle between British and Iraqi forces during the Anglo-American Invasion of Iraq for control of the city of Basra in southeastern Iraq near the Shatt al-Arab Waterway and the Persian Gulf. The battle began on March 23 and ended with the British capture of the city on April 7. At Basra, the British pursued a strategy considerably different from that followed by their American coalition partners during the invasion of Iraq. The British major general Robin Brims, in charge of the 1st Armored Division, surrounded Basra but allowed anyone who wanted to leave the city to do so. To further limit civilian casualties and damage to the city infrastructure, Brims also avoided shelling the Iraqi positions inside the city. The British strategy proved effective in greatly reducing the civilian loss of life but also allowed many Iraqi soldiers and officials to escape and fight in the subsequent insurgency. After a week of blockade, the British forces began launching raids into the city on March



31, inflicting heavy damages on the Iraqi defenses. On April 6, Brims launched a major assault on the city, taking it under control by the end of the following day.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Baghdad, Battle for (2003); Fallujah, Battle for (2004); Hussein, Saddam; Iraq War (2003–).

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Bassorah, Battle of (Battle of the Camel) (656)

A major battle that took place between Caliph Ali and his opponents on the outskirts of Basra in Iraq. The prophet's wife, Aisha, and two of his prominent companions Zubair and Talha opposed the new caliph Ali ibn Abi Talib because of his policies and his failure to punish Caliph Uthman's murderers. The rebels set out from Mecca with all the funds and supporters they could muster and headed for Basra, where they tried to mobilize the Iraqis. Upon arriving at Basra, the rebel army was met and resisted by Ali's governor. The caliph's supporters were defeated, the governor was driven out of the city, and those Basrans who had participated in the siege of Uthman's home and his murder were put to death. In response, Ali marched from Medina to Kufa to rally support and then moved on Basra where he arrived with 12,000–20,000 fighters. Talha, Zubair, and Aisha met the caliph with 30,000 men. However, many Basrans remained neutral or were swayed by Ali's appeal to them and abandoned the cause of the rebels, tipping the scales in Ali's favor.

Some accounts state that Ali, Talha, and Zubair agreed on a truce before the battle. However, those in Ali's army who had participated in Uthman's murder launched a surprise attack on the rebel army at dawn because they were afraid that peace and agreement between the two sides would lead to their demise. Talha and Zubair retaliated, thinking that Ali had betrayed them; Ali thought likewise and ordered a full attack. The ensuing battle saw the rebel army defeated, and both Talha and Zubair were killed in the fighting. Aisha was captured, but Ali honored her and allowed her to retire in Medina with a pension. This battle is also know as the Battle of the Camel because Aisha urged her followers on while she was mounted on a camel in the midst of the battle. This victory turned Iraq into Ali's power base; he consolidated his position there, made Kufa his capital, and then turned his attention to dealing with his opponents in Syria.

Adam Ali

See also: Ali ibn Abi Talib; Muslim Civil War (First); Siffin, Battle of (657).

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Batum (Batumi), Treaty of (1918)

Agreement between the Democratic Republic of Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Turkey signed on June 4, 1918, in Batumi. During World War I, the Ottomans launched a successful offensive in the spring of 1918, forcing the Transcaucasian Federation, which united three Caucasian states, to sever all relations with Russia. In March 1918, the Bolshevik government of Russia negotiated the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, in which they surrendered large territories within Georgia and Armenia to the Ottoman Empire. The Transcaucasian delegation, led by Akaki Ckhenkeli, refused to accept the Brest-Litovsk provisions, and the Ottomans, in response, renewed their offensive—capturing Erzurum and Batumi. As the Transcaucasian Federation disintegrated into the independent states of Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan, a conference was held at Batumi that ended in the signing of three agreements. The first made peace between the Ottoman Empire and Georgia and guaranteed the frontiers set by the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk. The second reduced Armenia to Ottoman vassalage as it granted the Turks a significant part of Armenian territory and compelled Armenia to disband its army and rely solely on Turkish forces to maintain peace domestically and to guarantee the religious and cultural freedom of Muslims. The third agreement established Ottoman control over the strategic railway in Georgia. The disastrous terms of the Treaty of Batum led to the surrender of Georgian and Armenian lands, including the districts of Batumi, Kars, Akhalkalaki, Akhaltsikhe, Alexandropol, Echmiadzin. However, obligations to adhere to these humiliating terms ended upon Turkey's defeat by the Allies in World War I (1914–1918).

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Alexandropol, Treaty of (1920); Kars, Treaty of (1921); World War I (Caucasian Front).

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Baybars I (d. 1277)

Mamluk sultan of Egypt and Syria (1260–1277). Baybars was by origin a Kipchak Turk, born in the southern Russian steppe in the 1220s. As a 14-year-old boy, he was enslaved and sold to Aydakin al-Bunduqdar, an emir of the Ayyubid sultan al-ali Ayyub. In 1246, his master fell into disgrace, and Baybars became one of the Bariyya mamluks (military slaves) of al-ali Ayyub. After Ayyub's death, the mamluks killed his successor Turan-Shah, and seized power in 1250, establishing the Mamluk sultanate. The new Mamluk sultan built up his own military household, so that from this point the history of the sultanate was marked by continuing power struggles of the different Mamluk groups. After the victory of the Mamluks over the Mongols at the battle of 'Ayn Jalut (1260), Baybars killed sultan Qutuz and leading officers of the Bariyya elected him to be the new sultan.

Having usurped the sultanate from the Ayyubids, the Mamluk regime suffered from a problem of legitimization from the beginning. Thus, when descendants of the Abbasid family arrived in Cairo in 1261, Baybars took the opportunity to revive the caliphate, which had been ended by the Mongols when they conquered Baghdad in 1258. The newly installed caliph, al-Mustanir Billah, made Baybars the sole universal sultan of all Islamic territories and of lands yet to be conquered. This investiture not only served as a means of legitimating his rule but was also the announcement and authorization of a program of expansion. Because Baybarse supported them financially by establishing pious foundations for mosques and schools, the religious classes (Arab. *ulama*) also tried to bolster Baybars's authority by highlighting his services to Islam.

After the Battle of 'Ayn Jalut, the Mongols had fled back across the river Euphrates, and Baybars's predecessor Qutuz made the first arrangements for Mamluk rule in Syria and Palestine. While the Ayyubid emirs of Hama, Homs, and Kerak were confirmed in their principalities, governors were appointed for the two most important cities, Aleppo and Damascus. Yet because the Mongols had not given up their aspirations of conquering Syria, Baybars had to strengthen his regime internally and to integrate his conquests into his domains. Thus in 1263, he placed Homs and Kerak under direct Mamluk control. He continued the Ayyubid policy of destroying the fortifications of the conquered Frankish cities of Outremer on the coast to prevent their being used as bridgeheads by future crusades. Further inland he captured the Frankish strongholds one after another.

The Mamluk regime was based mainly on its powerful army, which had been built up by Baybars. During his reign the Egyptian army was greatly enlarged by the purchase of large numbers of slaves for the sultan's military household (the Royal Mamluks) and the households of the emirs. Baybars also took care of the quality of the army, emphasizing military training and inspecting his troops regularly. By 1260–1261, Baybars had organized a postal system (Arab. *barid*) with post stations

set up at regular intervals along the routes between Egypt and Syria, where horses could be changed. This service was primarily meant for military purposes and was restricted to use by the sultan. Because the Mamluk army was concentrated in Cairo when not on campaign, it was necessary to be informed quickly of any Mongol or Frankish attack to be able to react. Baybars also restored and built roads and bridges in Syria and Palestine to improve the infrastructure of his realm.

Another important means of consolidating his regime was Baybars's far-reaching diplomatic activities. The Mamluks were always on the lookout for allies and tried to create a second front to weaken their opponents. Baybars formed an alliance with Berke, the khan of the Golden Horde, against their mutual enemy, the Ilkhanate of Persia. He also established good relations with the Byzantine emperor Michael VIII Palaiologos to prevent any threat to the import of military slaves from the Caucasus.

In 1261, Mamluk rule in Syria and Palestine was still unstable, so the Franks at Acre tried to take advantage of this situation and set out to attack a group of Turkomans on the Golan. They were severely beaten and thereafter did not dare launch a major attack against the Mamluks. Nevertheless, in the first years of his reign, Baybars had to come to some kind of understanding with the Franks to pursue his war against the Mongols. For this reason, a treaty was concluded in 1261 with the Franks of Acre. It was largely a renewal of the agreement of 1254 between the ruler of Damascus, al-Nair Yusuf, and the Franks. According to this treaty, the lands extending to the river Jordan were tributary to the Franks. However, Baybars pursued a quite different policy toward the principality of Antioch. Prince Bohemond VI had remained a close ally of the Mongols even after the battle of 'Ayn Jalut, and so Baybars raided his territory regularly to punish him for his cooperation with the Mongols and to wear down his military strength.

In 1265, having repulsed another Mongol attack on Bira, Baybars had averted the danger from the Mongols for the time being, and he turned his attention to the Frankish states. He conquered Caesarea and Arsuf, destroying their fortifications and harbors. From that point on, Baybars launched attacks against the Franks nearly every year to systematically reduce their power and territory. In 1266, the Mamluk army invaded Cilicia as a punishment for its support of the Mongols. They inflicted a heavy defeat on the Armenians, devastating their capital of Sis: this defeat marked the end of the political importance of the kingdom of Cilicia. In 1268, Antioch was conquered, and the Frankish states of Outremer were reduced to the county of Tripoli and the residual kingdom of Jerusalem around Acre.

In 1271, Baybars was now at the height of his power and undertook his last great campaign against the Frankish states. He conquered Krak des Chevaliers from the Hospitallers and was about to attack Tripoli (mod. Trâblous, Lebanon). At this moment, the last crusade army arrived in Palestine, led by Prince Edward of England, who had made plans with Abaka, the Ilkhan ruler, for a joint attack

against Baybars. However, Edward's contingent consisted of only a few hundred men, and the force sent by Abaka was also modest in size. As soon as Baybars offered a truce to Bohemond VI of Antioch and sent an army against the Mongols, they withdrew from Syria. Thus ended the only attempt of Franks and Mongols to act together against the Mamluks. Edward stayed in Outremer until 1272 without achieving anything, and he left Acre after narrowly escaping the assault of an assassin sent by Baybars.

At the end of his reign, Baybars tried to gain a decisive advantage over the Ilkhanate by conquering the Saljuk sultanate of Rum, which was a Mongol protectorate. He defeated the Mongols heavily in the Battle of Elbistan (April 1277) and was enthroned as sultan of Rum. However, lacking local support, he had to withdraw only a few days later. On July 1, 1277, he died in Damascus.

Johannes Pahlitzsch

See also: Abaka; Ayn Jalut, Battle of (1260); Berke Khan; Golden Horde—Ilkhanid Wars; Hulegu; Mamluk Sultanate; Middle East, Mongol Invasion of the; Qalawun; Rum, Sultanate of.

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Bayezid I (d. 1403)

Ottoman sultan (r. 1389–1402). Bayezid I came to the throne on the death of his father, Murad I, who was killed at the Battle of Kosovo Polje (June 23, 1389) fighting against the Serbian leader Lazar. His reign was one of great territorial expansion. The Byzantines were reduced to a position of dependency, Emperor Manuel II Palaiologos being forced to accompany Bayezid on campaign, while the Ottoman state continued to be a center of commerce, particularly with Genoa and Venice, with whom there was constant diplomatic contact. Bayezid campaigned effectively against his various Turkish rivals in Anatolia, annexing the states of Aydin and Menteşe on the western coast, defeating the Isfendiyaroghlari in the north, and

successfully defeating his major rival, the state of Karaman, based round Konya (Ikonion). Further east, Bayezid defeated Burhan al-Din, the ruler of Sivas (Sebasteia), and took Malatya (Melitene) from the Mamluks, the rulers of Egypt and Syria. For the Byzantines, whose capital Constantinople was now under Ottoman threat, and for the European powers, in particular King Sigismund of Hungary, Bayezid represented a major danger. A Crusader force, composed of troops from Hungary, England, Germany, and France, was assembled but was crushingly defeated in 1396 at the Battle of Nikopolis on the Danube, west of Ruse (in mod. Bulgaria).

By the end of Bayezid's reign, the Ottomans had taken Bulgaria, controlled Wallachia, had advanced into Hungary, and had moved into Albania, Epiros, and southern Greece. Their advance was greatly helped by the divisions between the Frankish and Greek lords in the Peloponnese. In the east, Ottoman control stretched over most of what is modern Turkey. Bayezid's whirlwind conquests were not to last, for in 1402 he was defeated at the Battle of Ankara by Timur, the founder of the Timurid dynasty in eastern Persia and central Asia, who invaded from the east. Bayezid was captured (dying later in captivity), and the Ottoman state was plunged into a period of civil war.

Kate Fleet

See also: Ankara, Battle of (1402); Kosovo, Battle of (131389); Nikopolis, Crusade of; Timur.

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Bayezid II (d. 1512)

Ottoman sultan (r. 1481–1512). On his accession, Bayezid II was faced with discontent caused by the fiscal rule of his father, Mehmed II, and by civil war with his brother Cem (or Djem). Cem, once defeated, fled to the Hospitallers on Rhodes, who later moved him to France and then, in 1489, handed him over to the pope. From 1483, Bayezid paid an annual sum, first to the Hospitallers and then to the pope, to ensure that Cem was kept in safe custody. With Cem in Christian hands, Bayezid was forced to adopt a pacific policy toward the West, ratifying the 1479

treaty with Venice, making a five-year truce in 1482 with King Matthias Corvinus of Hungary, and, in 1490, undertaking not to attack the Papal States, Venice, or Rhodes. This was not entirely a period of peace, however. In 1483, the Ottomans annexed Herzegovina; in 1484, they invaded Moldavia; and, from 1485 to 1491, they were at war with the Mamluk sultanate.

In 1494, Cem fell into the hands of King Charles VIII of France, who, after his invasion of Italy and capture of Rome, announced a crusade against the Ottomans in January 1485. Cem, however, died in February, and Charles's crusade came to nothing. After this time Bayezid was freer in his dealings with the West. In 1498, the Ottomans raided into Poland. In 1499, they attacked Venetian territories, taking Naupaktos (1499), Modon, Coron, and Navarino (1500), and Durrës (1502), all of which remained lost to Venice under the peace treaty of 1503. From that point on, Ottoman attention turned to the east and to the Safavids of Persia.

Bayezid's reign ended in April 1512 when he was forced to abdicate by his son Selim. Not a warlike man, Bayezid tended to be more conciliatory than his father. He established the Ottomans as a major Mediterranean naval power, introduced a systematic codification of customary law, and instituted fiscal reform.

Kate Fleet

See also: Mamluk Sultanate; Mehmed II; Selim I; Venetian-Ottoman Wars.

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Bayram Khan (d. 1561)

One of the founders of the Mughal Empire in 16th-century India. He helped Humayun to recover part of his lands. After Humayun's accidental death, Bayram Khan became regent and general for Humayun's son, Akbar. He oversaw the defeat of Akbar's enemies and the establishment of the Mughal government in India.

Bayram Khan's birth date is often given as 1524, but he was actively fighting by 1535. His family was related to the former rulers of Persia, and he was a Shiite Muslim, though most Mughals were Sunni. He soon entered the service of Mughal emperor Humayun. In 1535, Bayram Khan provided the idea for taking the fortress

of Champaner when he suggested that iron spikes be driven into the mortar of an unwatched wall; Mughal soldiers then climbed the spikes and captured the fortress.

Bayram Khan had risen to a leadership position during Humayun's campaigns against his great Afghan enemy, Sher Shah. Humayun was decisively defeated by Sher Shah at the Battle of Kanauj in 1539, and Bayram Khan was captured during the battle, but he managed to escape and return to Humayun. Humayun's brothers turned against him, however, and refused to help the emperor recover his empire. After wandering through much of northern India for several years, Humayun accepted Bayram Khan's advice and fled to Persia. The shah of Persia greeted Humayun with a mixture of warmth and veiled threat. He humiliated Humayun, a Sunni Muslim, by making him follow the rituals of the Shiite sect. Still, the shah provided money and troops to Humayun in exchange for a promise of territory.

In 1545, Humayun, who had now made Bayram Khan his chief adviser, led a Mughal and Persian army to Kandahar. Bayram Khan traveled to Kabul on a diplomatic mission to win other Afghan nobles over to Humayun's side. Kandahar fell in September 1545; although Humayun had promised to turn it over to the Persians, he kept control over the city. He appointed Bayram Khan governor of Kandahar and marched on Kabul. For several years, Humayun fought against his brothers and other nobles for control over Afghanistan. Bayram Khan helped by ably administering Kandahar and providing support for Humayun. He was also active diplomatically and convinced many nobles to ally themselves with Humayun. By 1554, Humayun had conquered all of Afghanistan.

Bayram Khan joined Humayun in late 1554 in Kabul to help with the reconquest of India. He led the main Mughal army into India. After early Mughal successes, the Afghan rulers in Delhi dispatched an army of 30,000 against Bayram Khan. At Machiwara, on May 15, 1555, he attacked the Afghans, although he had only 3,000 men to their 30,000. To even the odds, Bayram Khan attacked at night. Luckily, a fire broke out in the Afghan camp, which allowed the Mughals to see their enemy while remaining invisible. The Afghans fought bravely but finally were routed just before dawn. The victory allowed the Mughals to occupy nearly all of Punjab Province.

Bayram Khan then marched on Delhi but was intercepted by an Afghan army of more than 80,000 men with many elephants. Bayram Khan called on Humayun to bring his troops, and they united at Sirhind. The Mughals had between 5,000 and 10,000 men. On June 22, 1555, the two armies battled. Bayram Khan commanded the center of the Mughal line and held firm against most of the Afghans. The Mughal cavalry swept around the Afghan flanks and routed the army after a long fight. Humayun and his men captured Delhi, reestablishing the Mughal Empire in India.

Humayun named his 13-year-old son, Akbar, governor of Punjab. Bayram Khan was named as his tutor and was the real governor. Bayram Khan and Akbar marched with an army to take up their positions, but before they had settled in, they learned that Humayun had died. When answering the evening call to prayer on January 24,

1556, Humayun (possibly under the influence of opium) had fallen down the stairs of his library. He died two days later.

Humayun's death caused a succession crisis among the Mughals. To buy time, Bayram Khan dressed a man up like Humayun to pretend that he was the emperor. On February 14, 1556, Bayram Khan revealed the truth and had Akbar proclaimed emperor. Because he was still a minor, Bayram Khan was named regent and protector. Akbar's hold on power was tenuous; some Mughal nobles were reluctant to accept Akbar as emperor and were arrested by Bayram Khan.

Moreover, the Mughals had just returned and faced opposition from other Muslim and Hindu leaders. The most important was a Hindu general named Hemu. Hemu nominally was the commander of Ali Shah, Muslim king of Chunar, but he soon raised an army and declared himself king. Hemu was determined to drive the Mughals from India. He easily captured Agra in the fall of 1556. When he marched on Delhi, the Mughal governor Tardi Beg retreated with little resistance. Many Mughals advised Akbar to leave India and return to Afghanistan. Bayram Khan refused to give up, however. He and Akbar marched with the small army at their command to stop Hemu. To encourage the Mughals, Bayram Khan executed Tardi Beg. He was later accused of executing Tardi Beg to get rid of a Sunni rival for the emperor's attention.

The two armies met at the Second Battle of Panipat on November 5, 1556. Hemu had 100,000 men and 1,500 elephants, while Bayram Khan had only 20,000 men and no elephants. Hemu successfully defeated the wings of the Mughal army, but his elephants could not cross a ravine that protected the center. Bayram Khan rallied his troops and outflanked the Hindu army. When Hemu attempted to rally his troops, he was seriously wounded by an arrow in the eye. His soldiers broke and ran. After the battle, Bayram Khan had the still-living Hemu brought to Akbar. He encouraged the young emperor to slay Hemu with his own sword, which Akbar did. The victory ensured the survival of the Mughal Empire in India.

From 1557 to 1560, Bayram Khan guided the new state's affairs. He established a solid government and put things in order. He was insecure about his position, however, and used his power to eliminate potential rivals. He also promoted members of the Shiite sect, provoking criticism from Sunni Mughals. Bayram Khan could be harsh, arbitrary, and overbearing. When Akbar turned 18, he determined to assert himself and dismiss Bayram Khan. After securing the support of the army, Akbar went to Delhi for his own protection. He then dismissed Bayram Khan as minister. Bayram Khan was urged to rebel, but he was reluctant at first. When insulted, Bayram Khan staged a half-hearted revolt but soon surrendered. He met with Akbar and agreed to travel to Mecca in exile. On the way, he was assassinated on January 31, 1561, by an Afghan whose father Bayram Khan had killed in battle.

Tim J. Watts

See also: Akbar; Panipat, Battles of (1399, 1526, 1556, 1761); Sher Khan Suri.

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Belgrade, Siege of (1456)

Ottoman siege of Belgrade from July 4 to 22, 1456, broken when a relief force led by John Hunyadi, defeated the Ottoman forces in a battle outside the city. Having captured Constantinople in 1453, Mehmed II had set his sights on expansion into Hungary. His invasion force of around 100,000 reached Belgrade on July 4. Mehmed deployed almost 200 guns in his siege lines and guarded the Danube and the marshes to the northeast of the city. Hearing that Belgrade was encircled, John Hunyadi, a Hungarian noble, sought to raise troops to relieve the city. The Vatican had sent Cardinal Giovanni Capistrano to Hungary to preach a crusade against the Ottomans, and this helped to raise a large body of irregular troops. In total, Hunyadi had around 45,000 men. He arrived at Belgrade on July 14 and broke through the naval blockade, sinking three Ottoman galleys. Hunyadi was now able to reinforce the garrison. However, Mehmed's guns had breached the fortifications of the city in a number of places, and on July 21, he ordered an assault. Although his Janissaries were able to break through into the city, they could not capture the citadel. The following day Christian forces raided the Ottoman lines. This attack was reinforced by forces under the command of Capistrano, despite the fact that Hunyadi had instructed his forces not to bring on a general engagement. Fearing, however, that his army would be defeated piecemeal, Hunyadi ordered a general advance. Ottoman forces were caught off guard and began to flee. The 5,000 Janissaries stood firm around Mehmed, who himself was injured by an arrow. As night fell, the Ottoman army withdrew, bringing the siege to an end.

Ralph M. Baker

See also: Balkans, Ottoman Conquest of the; Mehmed II.

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Belgrade, Siege of (1521)

The Ottoman Turkish forces were well aware of the strategic importance of the Serbian city of Belgrade in terms of their westward expansion into Central Europe after advancing into the Balkans. However, the city had been able to hold against larger Turkish forces given the strength of its fortifications, its secure position, and the resilience of its defensive forces. To advance into Hungary against Louis II, Belgrade had to be taken to secure control of the Danube and adjacent access points into the Hungarian realms. After nearly a century of sieges and attacks, under the leadership of Sultan Suleiman the Magnificent, Turkish forces lay siege once more to Belgrade on August 28, 1521, this time successfully.

With Turkish reinforcements arriving after the fall of the city of Sabac, Ottoman siege engineers used mining to breach the walls of Belgrade. In the meantime, Serbian forces were able to hold so long as their defensive walls stood firm. However, with the collapse of their fortifications and the rapid influx of Turkish forces into the city, Serbian forces were unable to withstand. They were rapidly overwhelmed by superior numbers, and the city subsequently fell. This allowed Ottoman forces to secure control of the region and the path lay open for Central Europe and the subsequent war with Hungary. Moreover, this engagement secured Turkish control over Serbia for nearly three centuries.

Abraham O. Mendoza

See also: Suleiman the Magnificent.

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Belgrade, Treaty of (1739)

Agreement signed in Belgrade on September 18, 1739, between the Ottoman Empire and Austria to conclude the Austro-Ottoman War of 1737–1739. Austria ceded control of northern Serbia, including Belgrade, and parts of Wallachia and Bosnia, thus losing territories gained in 1718. The Austrian ally, Russia, continued the war, however, until concluding the Treaty of Nissa in October.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Austro-Ottoman Wars; Nissa, Treaty of (1739); Russo-Ottoman Wars.

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Berke Khan (d. 1266)

Ruler of the Golden Horde from 1257 to 1266. Berke Khan became ruler after the death of his brother, Batu Khan, in 1255.Not much is known about Berke's early career; however, he was Batu's representative at the enthronement of Guyuk in 1246 and Mongke in 1252.

Berke was the first important Mongol to convert to Islam, and some of the Arab and Iranian sources state that it was his outrage at his cousin Hulegu's massacre of the populace of Baghdad and his treatment of the Abbasid caliph that caused the war between the Golden Horde and the Ilkhanate in 1262. However, both sides claimed the Caucasus and Azerbaijan, and Berke also feared that if Hulegu conquered Syria and Egypt he would become too powerful and reduce him to vassalage. This conflict dragged on for years with neither side being able to claim full victory. Initially, Hulegu was victorious and was able to capture some land. However, Berke counterattacked in January 1263, and a major battle was fought at the Terek River in which the Ilkhanate's army was routed with heavy losses. A long-lasting alliance was signed with the Mamluk sultanate after this victory, which helped to contain the Ilkhanate.

Berke also faced Genghisid enemies in the east. He lost Khwarezm, the western steppe of Chu, and Otrar to Alghu, the Chagatai Khan, between 1262 and 1266. Berke was unable to respond to these losses because his main forces were tied down fighting the Ilkanate in the Caucasus. On the western front the forces of the Golden Horde, led by Nogai, were successful against the rebellious Daniel of Gilica in 1258–1259 and against the Byzantines in 1265. Berke died in 1266 and was succeeded by Batu's grandson, Mongke Temur.

Adam Ali

See also: Golden Horde—Ilkhanid Wars; Hulegu; Middle East, Mongol Invasion of the.

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Berlin, Treaty of (1878)

Final act of the Congress of Berlin, June 13–July 13, 1878, by which Britain, Austria-Hungary, France, Germany, and Italy revised the Treaty of San Stefano, signed earlier on March 3, that Russia had imposed on a defeated Ottoman Empire.

On April 24, 1877, Russia, self-declared protector of the Slavic nationalities in the Balkans, declared war on the Ottoman Empire. By the end of 1877, Russia, after fighting in the Balkans and the Caucasus Mountains, had defeated the Ottoman armies and was advancing on Constantinople. On January 31, 1878, Russia accepted an Ottoman truce offer. On March 3 at San Stefano, Russian negotiators dictated a treaty that recognized the independence of Romania, Serbia, Montenegro, and a "great" Bulgaria.

The Great Powers, alarmed at an independent and pro-Russian "Greater Bulgaria," called the Congress of Berlin to modify this treaty. They established two separate autonomous principalities, Bulgaria and Eastern Rumelia, and returned the Macedonian region to Ottoman rule, undoing Russia's plans for a Greater Bulgaria. The new treaty also recognized the independence of Romania, Serbia, and Montenegro. Finally, Austro-Hungary would administer the Ottoman province of Bosnia-Herzegovina and the Sanjak of Novi Pazar, territorially still a part of the Ottoman Empire. A provision of the treaty, which would serve as a model for the League of Nations' Minorities System, provided special legal status to some religious groups and to non-Turkish minorities.

The three newly independent states subsequently proclaimed themselves kingdoms (Romania in 1881, Serbia in 1882, and Montenegro in 1910). Bulgaria united



The Congress of Berlin in 1878, after the painting by Anton von Werner. At the Congress, German chancellor Otto von Bismarck, in the center shaking hands with the Russian envoy Pyotr Andreyevich Shuvalov, acted in the role of "honest broker" in depriving the Russians of their gains from the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877–1878 and dealing with the nationalism emerging among the Balkan peoples. (Singer, Isadore, ed. *The Jewish Encyclopedia*, 1901)

with Eastern Rumelia in 1885 and proclaimed full independence in 1908. Austria-Hungary annexed Bosnia in 1908, sparking another major crisis.

Robert B. Kane

See also: Russo-Ottoman War (1877–1878); San Stefano, Treaty of (1878).

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Black Guard (Morocco)

The Black Guard in Morocco, often known as the *bukhari*, were the personal guard of the Emperor Mawlay Ismail (r. 1672–1727). As well as being his bodyguard, they also served as his crack soldiers in battles and his major force to put down palace revolts. The soldiers gained their name because they originally came from Guinea in West Africa, and many had come to Morocco as slaves. Trained at Meknes, the capital of Mawlay Ismail, they were taught how to fight in battle and were indoctrinated to be utterly loyal to the leader. The younger ones, those about 12 to 15 years old, served as the actual bodyguards to Mawlay Ismail, following him and standing around him at court. They were dressed in silks, were armed with a scimitar and a polished musket, and were always bareheaded, their heads shaven. The reason for choosing the younger boys to guard the Emperor himself was that they could be trained to kill at the emperor's whim and were immune to cries for mercy or pleas from those about to be killed. The mothers of the boys who served as the emperor's bodyguard often worked in the harem.

Older members of the Black Guard were used to control slaves, and freed Christian slaves wrote of their cruelty. Known to flog slaves for the most minor of infractions, they were responsible for maintaining law and order in Meknes.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Ghulams; Ismail, Mawlay; Janissaries.

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Bonn Agreement (2001)

Agreement reached among Afghan leaders in Bonn, Germany, on December 5, 2001, to create a governing authority for Afghanistan in the aftermath of the toppling of the Taliban regime several weeks earlier. Sponsored by the United Nations, the Bonn Agreement produced the Afghan Interim Authority (AIA), a temporary governmental entity that was inaugurated on December 22, 2001. The Bonn Agreement was designed to stabilize Afghanistan and bring an end to the 20-year civil war there. The AIA would be made up of 30 Afghans, headed by a chairman. It would have a six-month mandate followed by a two-year period under a transitional authority. At the end of the two years, national elections were to be held and a permanent Afghan government established. Hamid Karzai was chosen to chair the AIA; he became interim president after the loya jirga (grand assembly) was convened on June 22, 2002, and then president of Afghanistan in 2004. The Bonn Agreement also stipulated the creation of the Afghan Constitution Commission, which was charged with drafting a new Afghan constitution that would be subjected to a future plebiscite. In the meantime, the AIA was asked to use the 1964 Afghan constitution until the new one could be drawn up. The agreement also established a judiciary commission to help rebuild Afghanistan's judicial system and specifically called for the creation of a national supreme court.

German chancellor Gerhard Schroeder, German foreign minister Joschka Fischer, UN envoy in Afghanistan Lakhdar Brahimi, rear from left, attend the Bonn Agreement signing ceremony with the delegation leaders, front from left, Houmayoun Jareer of the Cyprus delegation, Sayed Hamed Gailani of the Peshawar delegation, center, and Abdul Sirat of the Rome delegation, right, at the German government's guesthouse Petersberg in Koenigswinter near Bonn in December 2001. (AP/Wide World Photos)

Another important accomplishment of the Bonn Agreement was a mandate to create a development and security mission to be led by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Approved by the United Nations Security Council on December 20, 2001, this mission became the NATO-led International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and was charged with pacifying and stabilizing Afghanistan and continuing the hunt for Taliban and Al Qaeda insurgents there. Today, the ISAF continues its work in Afghanistan and is the umbrella command organization for all allied military efforts and operations in Afghanistan.

Paul G. Pierpaoli

See also: Afghanistan, U.S. War in (2001–).

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Breadfield, Battle of (1479)

Decisive battle between the Hungarian and Ottoman forces fought at Breadfield Zsibód (Şibot) near the Maros River on October 13, 1479; the battle is known as Kenyérmezei csata in Hungarian and Ekmek Otlak Savaşı in Turkish. In the 1470s, the Ottoman Turks began gradually expanding into Hungarian territory and conducted annual raids to harass the frontier region. In early 1479, upon hearing about major Ottoman military preparations, King Matthias Corvinus (r. 1458–1490) of Hungary ordered Stephen Báthory, the *voivode* of Transylvania to mobilize Hungarian forces. The Turks, led by Ali Kodsha Bey and Basarab cel Tânăr, a Wallachian prince, invaded Transylvania in October and sacked several towns before camping at Breadfield. There, on October 13, they fought a decisive battle against the Hungarian army under Báthory. The battle ended in a decisive Hungarian victory that secured the Hungarian borders.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Hungarian-Ottoman Wars (1437–1526).

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British Mandates

Mandates were granted to Britain and France at the settlement of World War I at Versailles in 1919 as an expeditious way of dealing with the former colonies of the Central Powers. The mandate system was set up in tandem with the organization of the League of Nations to grant the Entente powers the responsibility of administering former German and Ottoman colonies. The mandate system worked on the logic that the newly liberated colonies were not capable of self-government, but with European administration, after a number of years or perhaps decades, peoples living under mandates would be allowed to self-govern and eventually gain independence. In reality, the populations of the mandates found themselves transferred from the domination of one colonial master to another.

During World War I, British involvement in the Middle Eastern theater of war was characterized by the manipulation of Arab and Jewish nationalism in addition to attempting to placate French ambitions in the region. In addition to the Sykes-Picot Agreement (1916) with France and the Balfour Declaration (1917) promising a Jewish homeland in Palestine, British strategy in the region and the potential for expanding its regional influence were complicated by its provision of support and military aid to Arabs fighting against the Ottomans. Initially, British military objectives involved securing a wedge in the Ottoman Empire to allow the opening of a second front in the East and increased links with Russia. As first lord of the Admiralty and a key war cabinet member, Winston Churchill's stubbornness on opening up a second front in Anatolia led to the Gallipoli fiasco, which resulted in the butchering of Australian and New Zealander Army Corps troops at the hands of the Ottomans. The failure of this policy shifted British strategy from direct military engagement to one of using diplomacy and intelligence to wield nascent Arab nationalism as a tool against the Central Powers to supplement British military strength in the region. Ironically, the Foreign Office already had plans with France to divide the Middle East from the spoils gained from the Ottomans through the Sykes-Picot Agreement.

After the war, with the assignment of mandates under the authority of the League of Nations, Britain found itself with the responsibility of administering Palestine, Transjordan, and Iraq in the Middle East and Tanganyika (Tanzania) in Africa. Having formerly backed Arab nationalism and now serving as a mandate power in the Middle East soured Britain's relations with former allies in Arabia and Mesopotamia. The British Royal Navy's switch from coal to oil also gave Britain a motive to administer Iraq as British oil companies converged on Mosul in the northern region of Iraq. The tenuous relationship with France during the war complicated matters further because of disagreements over French ambitions in the region and France's feeling that it had not gotten all the spoils it deserved according to the conditions of the Sykes-Picot Agreement. Arabs saw the Sykes-Picot agreement as evidence of British duplicity during the war because the agreement contradicted

a series of correspondences between the British high commissioner in Egypt, Sir Henry McMahon, and Sharif Hussein of Mecca.

After the war, to appease the Arab nationalists, the British retracted the Balfour Declaration, which had promised a Jewish homeland in Palestine to Zionists in Europe and Palestine (seen as potential allies against the Central Powers in the war). The retraction, however, was largely ignored. Jewish immigration to Palestine continued, albeit in limited numbers, but this was enough to enrage local Arabs against the British authorities. Clashes between Palestinian Arabs and Jewish migrants became endemic. Both sides distrusted Britain's motives in the region and the seeds were planted for the Arab-Israeli conflicts of the later 20th century.

British strategic objectives in the region involved securing communication and trade links with India, the most important and lucrative imperial dominion, and ensuring oil supplies for the Royal Navy. However, the high cost of World War I meant Britain had to cut military expenses considerably, resulting in the British military's overreliance on the innovative tactic of aerial bombardment. Revolts in Iraq and Palestine were dealt with severely through this new military procedure. Although cost-efficient and versatile, the aerial bombardment spawned further resentment against Britain's presence in the region.

From the interwar period to the end of World War II Britain's global influence dwindled dramatically. Iraq was granted independence in 1922 after ensuring its alliance with Britain. Partly because of the depleted state of the British military presence in the region, some Arab nationalists in Palestine and Iraq began to sympathize with German National Socialism to counter British occupation and Jewish migration into Palestine. While living in exile in Germany throughout the war, the mufti of Jerusalem, Muhammad Amin al-Husayni, rallied for National Socialist support of an independent Arab state; the defeat of Germany dashed any hope of German assistance toward that end.

World War II exhausted Britain's military and financial resources, leading to a loosening of ties in the region. Transjordan emerged as a fully independent state in 1946. Britain's frustration with Arab and Jewish infighting in Palestine and Zionist terrorist attacks against their own occupational forces led them to abandon the problem to the newly formed United Nations. This led to the creation of the State of Israel in May 1948.

The long-term impacts of the British system of mandates in the Middle East and Africa were the instability created by artificial borders, and resentment toward the practice of supplanting previous colonial domination with benign international authority while simultaneously propping up Arab nationalists. This instability in the region led to infighting between Shia and Sunni Muslims in Iraq and between Israelis and Palestinians in the Levant.

Abraham O. Mendoza

See also: Sykes-Picot Agreement (1916); World War I.

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Bucharest, Treaty of (1812)

Treaty between Russia and the Ottoman Empire that ended the Russo-Ottoman War of 1806–1812. Signed at Bucharest on May 28, 1812, the treaty gave Russia a slice of land between the Dniester and Prut rivers in eastern Moldavia but forced it to surrender Wallachia, parts of Bulgaria, and certain territories in the western Caucasus (e.g., Poti and Anapa) that were captured during the war. The Russo-Ottoman border was established at the Pruth River, and the Ottoman Empire agreed to grant Serbia autonomy, which nullified the gains of Serbian rebellion since 1804. The peace treaty, quite favorable to the Turks, was urgently needed because Russia was facing the Napoleonic invasion. Yet, Sultan Mahmud II was displeased with the outcome, and the Ottoman negotiators were beheaded on his orders in Istanbul. Nevertheless, the treaty granted the sultan a much needed respite from war and allowed him to concentrate on domestic challenges.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Russo-Ottoman Wars.

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Buczacz, Treaty of (1672)

Polish-Turkish peace concluded on October 18, 1672, at Buczacz (Buchach, Ukraine). The treaty followed a successful campaign by the Ottoman Turks, who had seized the Polish Ukrainian province of Podolia. By the treaty, Poland ceded Podolia to the Turks, recognized Cossack hetman (leader) Pyotr Doroshenko as ruler of the western Ukraine and a vassal of the Ottoman sultan, and agreed to pay an annual tribute of 220,000 ducats (gold coins) to the sultan. Although Poland's

King Michael Wisniowiecki accepted the treaty, the Polish diet refused to ratify it, and the war resumed under John III Sobieski, elected Poland's new king in 1674 after Michael's death.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Busza, Treaty of (1617); Polish-Ottoman Wars.

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Busza, Treaty of (1617)

A peace treaty between the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the Ottoman Empire signed in Busza (Bose) near the Jaruga and Dniester rivers on September 23, 1617. The Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth agreed to cede the Khotyn to the Ottomans and to stop interfering in the internal affairs of Ottoman vassals in Transylvania, Moldavia, and Wallachia. The commonwealth also pledged to prevent Cossacks raids on the Ottoman lands, and the Turks promised to stop the Crimean Tatar raids. The treaty proved short-lived as both sides violated its provisions, leading to the Polish-Ottoman War (1620–1621)

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Buczacz, Treaty of (1672); Polish-Ottoman Wars.

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Byzantine-Muslim Wars (to 1035)

In 629, the Byzantine Empire successfully concluded a long series of wars with the Sassanian Iran. As a result, the Byzantines recovered territory in Palestine, Lebanon, and Syria but had little time to organize administration or defense there before the Muslim incursions. An initial Muslim Arab invasion in 629 was defeated by Byzantine forces at Mutah, but in 630, a Muslim expedition forced the submission of the town of Aqaba. A more earnest Arab effort at conquest began in 633 and 634, when Caliph Abu Bakr sent four armies, perhaps totaling 20,000 men, into Syria. By the end of 634, the Arabs had won a series of victories, most notably at Bosra,

Ajnadayn, Marj-al-Rahit, and Fahl. In 635, the Muslim armies occupied Damascus and Homs for the first time, but they were forced to abandon the cities in the face of a Byzantine counteroffensive led by Emperor Heraclius (r. 610–641). This counteroffensive ended on August 20, 636, when the Byzantine forces suffered a catastrophic defeat in the Battle of the Yarmouk. As a result of this victory, Muslim armies overran most of Palestine and Syria, save only for a portion of Syria granted a one-year truce. This allowed Christian Arabs to flee into Byzantine territory before hostilities resumed. After the truce expired, Muslim forces resumed offensive, taking over the remainder of Syria and Palestine. In December 639, Arab forces invaded Egypt and Mesopotamia and raided Cilicia and Anatolia. The deaths in 641 of the Byzantine emperors Heraclius and Constantine III (r. 641), and then the removal, through a coup, of the emperor Heraclonas (r. 641), created political instability in Constantinople. As a result, no effective aid was given to the isolated Byzantine forces in Egypt. Arab armies were able to complete their invasion of Egypt, and moved on Cyrenaica in 642.

After these initial disasters, the Byzantines turned to positional warfare, attempting to hold the major cities while letting interior areas go. Although this policy slowed the Muslim advance by forcing Arab armies to take the time to seize fortified points, in the long term the strategy was doomed to failure. The cities could not be held without also securing the agricultural hinterland that supplied them. In 642, the Arab invasion of Armenia began. Within 20 years, despite constant Byzantine efforts to control Armenia, the Muslims had successfully converted the region into a client state. In 650, the Arabs invaded Cyprus, which later became a Byzantine/Arab co-dominion by treaty. In the 650s, the Arabs turned attention to the Persian Empire and to further conquests in North Africa. Although raids remained frequent, the Byzantine Empire was able to gain control of the Taurus mountain passes leading into Anatolia, thereby blocking further Arab conquests. In 648, an initial Arab invasion of the Byzantine province of Africa was bought off by local officials. The years 653–654 saw further Arab assaults on Cyprus, Crete, and Rhodes. At the same time Muawiyah, the governor of Syria, developed the first Muslim naval fleet, and in 655, the Muslim navy led by Abdullah bin Sa'ad bin Abi'l Sarh defeated a Byzantine fleet commanded by Emperor Constans II (r. 641–668) in a naval battle, known as the Battle of Masts or Battle of Phoenix, off the coast of Lycia. The Byzantine defeat opened the eastern Mediterranean to further Muslim expansion. However, by 656, the Muslim offensive stalled as the ascension of Ali ibn Abi Talib to the caliphate split the Muslim community and led to a Muslim civil war that lasted until 661.

After the assassination of Caliph Ali in 661, Caliph Muawiyah launched a new offensive against the Byzantine Empire, seizing the city of Calcedon on the Bosporus in 668. The following year, the Muslim crossed the Bosporus to attack the Byzantine capital, Constantinople, but were repelled by the Byzantines at Amorium. In

670, the Muslim invasion of Africa began in earnest but was met with firm resistance. In 674, the Muslims attempted to seize Constantinople by a siege but failed after four years; in 677, the Byzantine navy decisively defeated the Muslim navy at Syllaeum in the Sea of Marmara, which greatly contributed to the lifting of the siege the following year. As a result, the Muslim advance in Asia Minor and the Aegean was halted, and an agreement to a 30-year truce was concluded soon after.

Over the next two decades both the Caliphate and the Byzantine Empire were occupied securing their domains and waging minor skirmishes against each other. Full-scale war began in 696–699, when a second Arab expedition to Africa led to the seizure of Carthage and Utica, ending the Byzantine presence in North Africa. Byzantine efforts to recover their possession proved unsuccessful, and this led to further political instability in Constantinople, where three emperors were overthrown between 711 and 717. At the same time, in 711, the Muslims breached the Taurus barrier and advanced into Anatolia. Unable to stop the Arab advance, the Emperor Anastasius II (r. 713–715) began preparing the defenses of the capital. In 716, another Muslim assault on Constantinople failed, but in 717, an Arab force of 120,000 men and 1,800 ships besieged the capital. The Bulgarians, hoping to take the city for themselves, attacked the Arabs, who were forced to build two sets of siege works, to contain the Byzantines on one side and to keep out the Bulgarians on the other. In September, the Muslim fleet appeared but was driven off by the Byzantines using Greek fire. The Muslim army thus remained trapped in its siege works during an unusually harsh winter. A fleet of 600 ships was sent to replenish the Muslim forces. The ships landed near Chalcedon to avoid the Byzantine fleet. The crews of the Muslim fleet, mostly Egyptian Christians, defected en masse to the Byzantines. After a Muslim reinforcing column was destroyed near Nicaea and an epidemic had broken out among the Muslim forces near Constantinople, Caliph Umar finally ordered a retreat in August 718. The Muslim retreat was not opposed, but surviving Muslim ships were attacked, and their fleet was further damaged by storms.

Between 718 and 741, a series of raids and counter raids ravaged Anatolia. In this period, Byzantine strategy embraced not only positional defense but also a policy of intercepting Muslim raids returning from plundering expeditions. These tactics proved moderately successful and gave rise to a series of Byzantine epic poems and legends about border raiders and defenders, most notably the epic poem *Digenes Akrites.* In 739, Emperor Leo III gained a major victory over the Muslim forced led by Sulayman, the brother of Umayyad caliph Hisham ibn Abd al-Malik (723–743) at Akroinon. In 741, Emperor Constantine V (r. 741–775) took advantage of the political instability in the Umayyad caliphate to begin a campaign to regain lands lost to Muslims. In mid-740s, he gradually pushed the Byzantine frontier forward, recapturing parts of Syria, and, in 746, his fleet defeated a Muslim navy near Cyprus and took control of the island. As the Ummayad dynasty fell to the Abbasid

attacks, Constantine campaigned in southern Caucasia, reclaiming parts of Armenia in 751–752. The Byzantine expansion continued under Constantine's successor, Leo IV (r. 775–780), who defeated the Muslim at Germanicopolis in 778 and reclaimed most of Anatolia. Nevertheless, Muslim attacks and raids on the Byzantine territories continued. The death of Leo IV in 780 left the Byzantine crown to his young son, Constantine VI, who was only nine years old. Constantine's mother Irene served as a regent and, facing a renewed Muslim offensive initiated by Caliph al-Mahdi (r. 775–785) In 783, the Abbasid army reached the Bosporus, near which they defeated the Byzantines at Nicomedia (Izmit or Kocaeli), forcing Irene to sue for peace, accept a three-year truce, and pay tribute. In 786, the new Caliph Harun al-Rashid (r. 786–809) began fortifying his borderland territories in preparation for an invasion of the Byzantine Empire. In 797, Abbasid forces advanced to the Byzantine cities of Ephesus and Ancyra (Ankara), forcing Empress Irene to reinstate the payment of previously agreed tributes.

In 802, Nicephorus I (r. 802–811) seized the Byzantine throne and broke the truce with the Abbasids agreed upon by Empress Irene. In response, Harun al-Rashid led an army across the Taurus Mountains of Anatolia in 803 and seized the Byzantine city of Heraclea Cybistra (Eregli). Although Nicephorus sued for peace, he soon broke the truce once again, provoking another Abbasid retribution. Harun al-Rashid's armies won victories on land and at sea, defeating the Byzantines at Krasos in 805, capturing Tyana and Ancyra (Ankara) in 806, and ravaging Rhodes and Cyprus between 805 and 807. The Byzantine emperor was compelled to sue for peace once more. The subsequent death of Harun al-Rashid in 809 and the succession struggle enveloping the caliphate allowed Nicephorus to concentrate on other threats to his power before being killed in a battle against the Bulgars in 811.

Over the next two decades, both sides were occupied with internal turmoil. Besides the threat from the Abbasids, the Byzantine Empire came under attack from other Muslim states. Thus, in 824, Crete fell to Abo Hafs Omer al-Baloty's Iberian Muslims who were exiled from Spain by the Umayyad emir Abd-ar-Rahman I (r. 796–822). Three years later, Ziyadat Allah, the Aghlabid emir of Tunisia, attacked Sicily. Meantime, Abbasid caliph al-Mamun (r. 813–833), having secured his authority, resumed attacks against the Byzantine territories in 830–832—Palermo fell in 831—and forced Emperor Theophilus (r. 829–842) to accept heavy tribute in 833. After al-Mamun's death, Theophilus sought to recover lost ground and led a Byzantine army into northern Iraq in 837, capturing several Abbasid fortresses. Caliph al-Mutasim (r. 833–842) retaliated in 838, and his army, led by Khaydar ibn Kavus-Afshin, defeated Theophilus in the Battle of Dazimon on the Halys River in July 838 and sacked the Byzantine stronghold of Amorium. However, al-Mutasim's plan to besiege Constantinople failed when the Abbasid fleet was destroyed in a storm. In 841, the Byzantine emperor and caliph agreed to a truce, but sporadic attacks continued: Muslims sacked Messina in 842 and Enna in

859, and the Byzantines, led by Petronas, uncle of Emperor Michael III (836–867), attacked Damietta in 853 and defeated Muslims near Amida (Diyarbakir) in 856. However, four years later Emperor Michael III suffered a defeat on the Euphrates River in northern Syria and the two sides soon concluded a truce. The armistice lasted only three years, and in 863, Omar, emir of Melitene, invaded Anatolia, sacked Samsun and campaigned in Paphlagonia and Galatia. But the Byzantines intercepted him on return, and in the decisive battle of Poson, the Muslim army was almost entirely destroyed and Omar was slain. This victory was celebrated with great pomp at the Hippodrome in Constantinople.

The victory at Poson produced a seven-year lull in the Byzantine-Muslim hostilities. The Abbasid caliphate, meanwhile, suffered a major domestic turmoil, which the Byzantines immediately exploited. Emperor Basil (813–886) launched a major campaign into Syria and Iraq, defeating the Abbasid forces on the upper Euphrates River at Samosata (Samsat) in 873 and capturing Zapetra. Although he later suffered defeat at Melitene, he launched an expedition to drive Muslims from Sicily and southern Italy, where Bari was besieged and captured in 875. Basil failed to drive the Muslims out of Sicily, where Syracuse was in the Muslim hands, but he secured Tarentum (Taranto) in 880 and in Calabria in 885.

In the 10th century, Byzantine defense efforts began to show real results. In 900, Leo VI (r. 886–912) invaded the emirate of Tarsus and campaigned in Armenia. In 926, Romanus Lecapenus (r. 920–944) renewed the attack upon the Arabs and sacked Melitene. In 927, the emir of Melitene submitted to the empire, and in 928 the city received a Byzantine garrison. The Abbasid initially expelled it, but in 933 and 934 the Byzantines systematically occupied the fortresses around Melitene and around the city of Samosata. Melitene was eventually taken and all non-Christians were forced to leave. Samosata was taken and razed in 936. In 940, Saif al-Dawla, the gifted Hamdanid general, successfully campaigned in Armenia and raided Byzantine territory up to Colonia before John Curcuas, grand domestic, drove him back. In 941–943, John Curcuas launched a counteroffensive, sacking a number of cities in Armenia and Mesopotamia and besieging the city of Edessa; he withdrew only after the governor of the city agreed to surrender the Mandylion, a cloth said to bear the imprint of the face of Christ. The relic and Curcuas were accorded a triumphal entry into Constantinople. However, in late 944, the Byzantines were soundly beaten by Saif al-Dawla near Antioch. Constantine VII (r. 913–959) assumed full power in 944 and, with his generals, Nicephorus Phocas, John Tzimisces, and Basil the Grand Chamberlain, conducted a successful raiding war against Saif al-Dawla, who repelled first invasion in 948 but was forced to give ground in subsequent attacks. Byzantine efforts to recapture Crete, Sicily, and Italy were less successful, and Muslim forces repeatedly defeated forces sent to those places. Encouraged by Byzantine losses, Saif al-Dawla organized an ambitious raid from Tarsus to the Theme of Charsianum, where he defeated the Byzantines in the valley of the Lycus.

But on the return trip, Saif al-Dawla was ambushed and defeated by Leo Phocas in a mountain pass between Lycandus and Germanicea. Rejecting the Byzantine offer of truce, Saif raided Melitene and Lycandus in 951, successfully campaigned in the border regions in 953–954, and rebuilt the strategic fortresses of Adata and Samosata. In the spring of 956, Saif defeated the rising Byzantine general John Tzimisces but suffered a naval defeat at the hands of Cibyrrhaeots. Three years later John Tzimisces raided southern Armenia and northern Mesopotamia, sacking Dara and Samosata and decisively defeating Saif's main army. The Byzantines fared worse in Italy, where their attacks failed in Calabria and Sicily in 958–959.

Constantine's successor, Romanus II (r. 959–963), reorganized Byzantine forces in an effort to intensify the war against the Arabs. In 960, a massive expedition under Nicephorus Phocas landed on Crete. Phocas's army killed thousands of Muslims and besieged the principal city of Chandax from 960 until the spring of 962, when it finally fell. A raid into Syria by Saif in that year was defeated by Byzantine forces in a pass through the Taurus. After capturing Chandax, Nicephorus Phocas attacked and defeated the emir of Tarsus and took several towns in Anatolia and Syria. Phocas then marched against Saif al-Dawla in Aleppo, and evading Saif's main force, he fell upon the poorly prepared defenses of Aleppo, which he overcame. Upon his return to Constantinople, Phocas found that Romanus II had died in a hunting accident, and he assumed imperial power.

Nicephorus Phocas (r. 963–969) continued the war against Saif, taking the town of Mopsuestia, as well as Tarsus in 965. The following year, Saif al-Dawla asked for a truce and exchange of prisoners, which the Byzantines accepted. In 967, Saif al-Dawla, the dauntless Muslim commander who had fought the Byzantines for decades, died. Nicephorus exploited this opportunity to expand Byzantine control of Armenia and Syria, clearing Cyprus of its Arab garrison. Yet, the Byzantine emperor was murdered in 969 and John Tzimisces (r. 969–976) seized power in a coup. During his reign, Aleppo ceded control of its coastal territory to Byzantium, which now bordered the Fatimid caliphate of Egypt and the Hamdanid emirate of Mosul, both of which were willing to expand at the expense of Byzantine or Arab neighbors. Tzimisces thus found himself fighting against the Fatimids in 971 and 975 and against the Hamdanids from 972 to 974. Tzimisces was able, in the end, to subject most of Syria and Lebanon to direct Byzantine government or tributary status. He died before these conquests could be followed up, and was succeeded by Basil II (r. 976–1025), the greatest ruler of medieval Byzantium. Basil II faced civil disorder in the early part of his reign, but his Arab neighbors were too weak to take advantage of the situation. Basil was strong enough in the 990s to drive off Fatimid attacks upon the emirate of Aleppo, now a Byzantine client state.

Fatimid attempts at naval warfare were equally unavailing. An Egyptian fleet burned in 996 in a mysterious fire. A second fleet was defeated off of Syria by the Byzantines. The Fatimid caliph, al-Aziz, then died, and rebellions broke out over

the succession. Basil II turned his attention to Byzantine territories in Europe. He signed a 10-year truce with the Fatimids in 1001, which he renewed periodically for the rest of his reign. Basil refused to respond to Fatimid and Hamdanid attacks on Aleppo; the city fell to the Fatimids in 1015, only to be lost to them in a revolt in 1025. At this point, Byzantine attentions became fixed elsewhere, with few exceptions. Romanus III (r. 1028–1034) forced the surrender of Edessa in 1031 and attempted to purchase the city of Aleppo. The offer was refused. The Fatimids renewed the 10-year truce in 1036, and the Byzantine frontier was secured by the presence of a client state, the Mirdanid emirate, in what is now modern Syria and Iraq. Though raids would occasionally continue, the initiative in Muslim expansion had passed from the Arabs to a group of Islamic mercenaries brought in by the Arabs, the Turks.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Abbasids; Ali ibn Abi Talib; Byzantine-Saljuk Wars; Constantinople, Siege of (1453); Fatimids; Muawiyah; Saif (Sayf) al-Dawla.

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Byzantine-Ottoman Wars

Founded in the late 13th century in northwestern Anatolia by Osman (d. ca. 1324), the Ottoman Empire developed rapidly from a small and insignificant Turkish state into a powerful state. The Ottomans expanded quickly against the Byzantines, defeating them near Nikomedia (mod. İzmit, Turkey) in 1302 and capturing various Byzantine towns. Under Orhan (d. 1362), the Ottomans took Bursa (1325), which became the Ottoman capital until the conquest of Adrianople (mod. Edirne, Turkey), followed by Lopadion (mod. Ulubat) in 1327, Nicaea (mod. İznik) in 1331, and Nikomedia in 1337. The Ottomans crossed onto European soil when they were called in to assist Byzantine emperor John VI Kantakouzenos in the civil war (1341–1347) with his rival John V Palaiologos. Kantakouzenos, whose daughter Theodora married Orhan, kept his alliance with the Ottomans throughout his reign, and several times Ottoman forces were called in to fight for him. In 1354, the Ottomans took Gallipoli (mod. Gelibolu) and other towns in Thrace.

Under Murad I (1362–1389), the Ottoman advance into Europe was swift and effective. The defeat of the Serbian despots of Macedonia, Vlkaşin, and Ugleşa, at the Battle of Çirmen on the Maritsa River (1371) opened the way into the Balkans. The Ottomans took Philippopolis (mod. Plovdiv, Bulgaria), Zagora, and, probably, much of Bulgaria. The czardom of Turnovo, too, fell under Ottoman suzerainty, and Serbia and Bosnia came under Ottoman attack. In Greece, the Ottomans took Thessalonica (mod. Thessaloniki) in 1387.

In 1365, Emperor John V, worried by the Ottoman advance, attempted without success to negotiate an alliance with the king of Hungary. He did, however, receive help from his cousin, Amadeus VI, count of Savoy, who seized Gallipoli in 1366. John also sent an embassy to Pope Urban VI and went himself to Rome in 1369, prepared, in return for help, to offer to unite the Greek Church with the Roman. Western concern was evident in 1372 when Pope Gregory XI proposed an anti-Ottoman alliance between the Byzantine emperor, the king of Hungary, and the Latin lords of Greece. Concern was not sufficient, however, and an alliance was reached between the Ottomans and the Byzantines in 1373. From that point on, the Ottomans played more and more of a role in internal Byzantine politics, as the Byzantines descended into civil war between John V and his son Andronikos IV, backed by the Ottomans and the Genoese. Andronikos paid heavily for this support, both in financial terms and by having to return Gallipoli to Murad. Murad next supported John, who reentered Constantinople. By the time of the settlement, negotiated through the Genoese in 1381, the Byzantine emperor had been reduced to the position of a vassal of the Ottoman ruler.

After Murad's death at the Battle of Kosovo Polje (June 23, 1389), Bayezid I (1389–1402) began a whirlwind expansion into southeastern Europe. Bayezid moved into Bulgaria, which became an Ottoman possession by 1395. The Byzantines, too, found themselves increasingly under Ottoman domination. Manuel II Palaiologos, who became emperor in 1391, was forced to accompany the Ottoman ruler on campaign a year later. Constantinople came under Ottoman siege in 1394 and was to remain so until 1402.

Fear of the growing might of the Ottomans caused increasing consternation in Europe. King Sigismund of Hungary, engaged in a power struggle with the Ottomans over control of Serbia, sought allies among the Western rulers for a united offensive. A crusade was organized involving forces from Hungary, Germany, France, and England. At the Battle of Nikopolis (1396), the European forces were wiped out by the Ottomans.

Emperor Manuel II turned in desperation to the West. In 1397, he approached the pope and the kings of France, England, and Aragon. The only response was the arrival of Marshal Boucicaut, sent by Charles VI of France to Constantinople with a force of 1,200 soldiers in 1399. In the same year Manuel set off for England and France in an attempt to drum up support. He was not to return for three years. The Ottomans moved into Albania, Epiros, and southern Greece, while, at sea, they harassed the Aegean islands and attacked Venetian shipping. What ultimately saved

the West was not a crusading movement or European unity but the rise of a major military power to the East.

Sweeping out of Central Asia, the nomad conqueror Timur crushed the Ottoman forces at the Battle of Ankara in 1402, capturing Bayezid and plunging the Ottoman state into civil war. Timur's victory was a great relief for the European powers, including the Byzantine Empire. Bayezid's son Suleyman, who had fled to the European territory of the Ottoman state immediately after the battle, was forced to negotiate a peace treaty, concluded in early 1403, with the Byzantines, Venice, Genoa, and the Hospitallers of Rhodes. Although undoubtedly weakened, Suleyman remained a major player in the Balkans, while the European powers were still rent by internal divisions, and, like Suleyman, threatened by Timur. Nevertheless, Suleyman made considerable concessions to the various signatories of the treaty.

In 1411, Prince Suleyman was defeated and killed by his brother Musa, who was himself killed by another son of Bayezid I, Mehmed I (1413–1421). Mehmed I followed a peaceful policy, concluding a treaty with Serbia and with the Byzantines, who had supported him during his struggle with his brother. At the same time Emperor Manuel tried to interest the Venetians in a scheme against the Ottoman ruler. Venice, out to conclude its own agreement with the Ottomans, refused to be drawn in. At this point Manuel appears to have released an Ottoman pretender, the son of Suleyman, a tactic he had apparently adopted earlier in the civil war between Musa and Mehmed. The son was captured by Mehmed and blinded.

Ottoman raiding in European territories continued through 1415. Negotiations began to form an anti-Ottoman league in the Aegean, involving Emperor Manuel, the Genoese rulers of Chios and Mytilene, the Hospitallers, and Venice, but it came to nothing. In 1416, the Venetians had a significant victory over the Ottoman naval forces, defeating and killing the Ottoman admiral. With the sea now somewhat safer, the Venetians had no real interest in Manuel's proposal in 1417 for a naval alliance with the Genoese and the Hospitallers. The Byzantines tried again in 1420 to organize an anti-Ottoman alliance.

Gradually, Mehmed gained control in Anatolia, western Anatolia, and northeast Bulgaria. In 1420, he took the Genoese colony at Samsun on the Black Sea coast. In Europe he captured Valona (mod. Vlorë, Albania) and a large part of southern Albania and reduced Mircea of Wallachia to vassal status.

Successfully surviving the challenge of his uncle Mustafa, backed by Byzantium, Murad II (1421–1444 and 1446–1451) laid siege to Thessalonica, which ultimately fell in 1430, and to Constantinople in 1422. The emergence of a fresh challenge to the throne, by Murad's brother Mustafa, who was supported by Emperor Manuel, saved the Byzantine capital. Murad defeated and killed Mustafa in January 1423. Late in the same year the new Byzantine emperor John VIII Palaiologos set off to Venice in an attempt to win Western support against the Ottomans. During his absence, his regent Constantine concluded a treaty with Murad (February 1424). Venice was more interested in a potential anti-Ottoman alliance with Hungary, proposed

by Sigismund in 1425, but, suffering from the considerable expense involved in defending Thessalonica, which it had received from Andronikos Palaiologos, Venice sought peace with Murad. An agreement was made between the governor of Gallipoli and the Venetian Andrea Mocenigo, captain-general of the sea, but not ratified by Murad. Once again civil war in Byzantium, this time between John VIII and his brother Demetrios, drew the Ottomans into Byzantine politics. Demetrios called in Ottoman help for an attack on Constantinople, which lasted until August 1442.

Through the later 1420s and 1430s, Murad campaigned in Serbia and Albania, which were brought under direct Ottoman rule. Hungary, weakened by a civil war after the death of King Albert II, saw its fortunes improve after the victories in Wallachia in 1441 and 1442 of John Hunyadi, the voivod of Transylvania. Although in themselves of no great significance, these victories gave a great psychological boost to Murad's enemies, who now entered into an anti-Ottoman alliance. At the Council of Florence (1439), Byzantine emperor John VIII had already accepted the union of the Latin and Greek churches in return for an attack by Christian forces against the Ottoman Empire. Pope Eugenius IV, for whose prestige a successful crusade would have been most advantageous, backed the enterprise, which also offered much to Hungary, Serbia, and Venice, ensuring the security of its territories in Greece and its shipping in the Aegean Sea. In preparation for this crusade, peace was organized between the warring factions in Hungary, and Karaman, the perennial Ottoman enemy in Anatolia, was brought in. In 1443, Ibrahim, the ruler of Karaman, attacked Murad, apparently urged to do so by the Byzantine emperor, but with no help forthcoming from John VIII, Ibrahim made peace the same year.

During the winter of 1443–1444, the Ottomans clashed with the forces of Hungary, Serbia, and Transylvania. Although the Christian forces did not win a great victory, the winter campaign was viewed as a success in Europe and gave further encouragement to the crusade movement. In November 1444, Murad met the crusader forces at Varna, where the Christian forces were routed. A further attempt at a crusade was made along the Danube in 1445 involving the Byzantines, Burgundy, Wallachia, Hungary, and Transylvania. Nothing much came of this campaign. An attempt the following year by the pope to persuade Venice to provide galleys for a new campaign was unsuccessful, Venice having concluded a treaty with Mehmed II in early 1446. Mehmed II's second reign (1451–1481) began dramatically for the Europeans with the conquest of Constantinople (1453). The Genoese settlements of Old and New Phokaia (on the western coast of Anatolia) and Enez in western Thrace fell in 1455 and 1456. Mehmed campaigned in the Peloponnese in 1458 and took Athens. Serbia fell in 1459 and Bosnia in 1464. In 1461, Mehmed extinguished the Byzantine Empire of Trebizond on the Black Sea coast of northeastern Turkey.

Kate Fleet

See also: Bayezid I; Bayezid II; Constantinople, Siege of (1453); Mehmed II; Nikopolis, Crusade of (1396); Timur; Varna Crusade (1444).

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Byzantine-Saljuk Wars

Wars between the Saljuk Turks and the Byzantine Empire aided by European Crusaders. It saw the shift of the balance of power from the Byzantines to the Saljuk Turks and later the Ottoman Turks, leading to the ultimate destruction of the Byzantine Empire in 1453. First used as mercenary troops by the Abbasid caliphs, the Saljuks came to dominate political life of the caliphate by mid-11th century. After 20 years of raids on the Byzantine territories, the Saljuk Turks attacked the town of Caesarea in 1067 and captured Iconium two years later. Although they were driven back from both places soon afterward, the Saljuks continued their attacks leading to the decisive battle at Manzikert on August 19, 1071. There the Byzantines used static Roman tactics with two lines drawn up; the Saljuk Turks relied on their cavalry to harass their enemy as they retired in the evening. Most of the major fighting then took place with the Turks surrounding and destroying most of the Byzantine army and capturing the Byzantine Emperor.

The defeat at Manzikert led to a civil war in the Byzantine Empire between the potential successors, which allowed the Saljuk Turks to conquer parts of Asia Minor (Anatolia) and Palestine, including Jerusalem, from 1071 until 1096. Their success compelled Emperor Alexius to appeal for help to the Western Europe, which contributed to Pope Urban II's decision to proclaim a Crusade to recapture Jerusalem and protect the Byzantine Empire in 1096. The Crusaders were able to defeat the Saljuk Turks at Dorylaeum in July 1097 and then captured Antioch in 1098 and Jerusalem in 1099. They eventually formed the Crusader Kingdoms, which proved to be uncomfortable allies of the Byzantines. But their wars against the Saljuk Turks did allow the Byzantines to retake some of its lost territories in Asia Minor. John II Comnenus (1118–1143) conducted numerous campaigns in Asia Minor that forced the Saljuks onto the defensive and gained the Byzantines

control of much of western Asia Minor. However, his successor, Emperor Manuel Comnenus, proved unable to maintain such successful expansion. Leading an attack on the Saljuk capital of Iconium in 1176, he suffered a defeat at the Battle of Myriokephalon in September 1176 and was forced to call off his attack. Nevertheless, the Byzantines remained a force to be reckoned with as shown in their victory at the Battle of Hyelion and Leimocheir in 1177.

The death of Emperor Manuel led to a long period of political struggle. In 1183, Emperor Alexius was deposed by Andronicus II, who was in turned killed in 1185. After years of weak rulers, the Byzantine Empire faced its first major crisis with an attack by the Crusaders of the Fourth Crusade in 1204. The Crusaders sacked Constantinople, and although the city was rebuilt afterward, it was only a shadow of its former self. The Byzantine Empire splintered into three main parts: the Latin Empire, the Empire of Nicaea, and the Despotate of Epirus. This fragmentation allowed the Turks to take advantage of their weakness and, in 1207, the Saljuks of Rum captured Antalya. Nevertheless, the Nicaean Empire managed to survive and gradually reclaimed some parts of the Byzantine Empire. In 1211, Emperor Theodore Laskaris of the Nicaea gained a decisive victory over the Saljuks of Rum, whose sultan, Kaykhuisraw I, was killed in battle. The Empire of Nicaea recaptured Constantinople in 1261 and regained control of Greece in later years, restoring the Byzantine Empire. But its success was limited in Asia Minor. The Saljuk Turks were so weakened by the Mongol attacks that their empire collapsed in early 14th century. Their decline led to the rise of the Ottoman Turks, who resumed attacks on the Byzantine Empire and ultimately destroyed it in 1453.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Byzantine-Muslim Wars (to 1035); Byzantine-Ottoman Wars; Manzikert, Battle of (1071); Rum, Sultanate of.

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C

Călugăreni, Battle of (1595)

Decisive battle between the Ottoman Empire and the Wallachian forces of Prince Michael the Brave. After Prince Michael's revolt against the Ottoman authority, a massive Ottoman army (up to 100,000 men) led by Grand Vizier Sinan Pasha crossed the Danube River to restore its authority in Wallachia. Prince Michael's much smaller army (about 16,000) initially turned to hit-and-run tactics but eventually faced half of the Ottoman army on the swampy field near Călugăreni (south of Bucharest). Fought on August 23, the battle resulted in an Ottoman defeat, largely because of the Wallachian ability to exploit terrain to their advantage and conduct skilful flanking attacks. Despite his victory, which claimed up to 15,000 Ottoman lives, Prince Michael was forced to retreat in the face of the remaining Ottoman army. By October, Sinan Pasha captured Bucharest and Târgovişte but then faced a joint army of Michael the Brave, Transylvanian prince Sigismund Báthory, and the Habsburgs, which forced the Ottomans to withdraw from Wallachia by the end of the year.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Austro-Ottoman Wars.

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Camel, Battle of the. *See* Bassorah, Battle of (Battle of the Camel) (656).

Camp David Accords (1978)

Peace agreement reached between Egypt and Israel in September 1978 at Camp David, the U.S. presidential retreat in rural Maryland. During 1977 and 1978, several remarkable events took place that set the stage for the Camp David negotiations. In autumn 1977, Egyptian president Anwar Sadat indicated his willingness

to go to Israel for the cause of peace, something no Arab leader had done since the creation of the Jewish state in 1948. On November 19, 1977, Sadat followed through on his promise, addressing the Israeli Knesset (parliament) and calling for peace between the two nations. The Israelis welcomed Sadat's bold initiative but took no immediate steps to end the state of belligerency, instead agreeing to ministerial-level meetings in preparation for final negotiations. In February 1978, the United States entered into the equation by hosting Sadat in Washington, with both President Jimmy Carter and Congress hailing the Egyptian leader as a statesman and courageous leader. American adulation for Sadat led to greater cooperation by the Israelis, and they agreed to a summit meeting in September at Camp David.

For two weeks in September 1978, Sadat, Carter, and Israeli prime minister Menachem Begin hammered out a framework for an agreement, but not before both sides were forced to make serious concessions. Begin insisted that Sadat separate the Palestinian issue from the peace talks, something no Arab leader had been willing to do before. Israel also demanded that Egypt negate any former agreements with other Arab nations that called for war against Israel. Sadat bristled at Begin's demands, which led to such acrimony between the two men that they met in person only once during the entire negotiation process. Instead, Carter shuttled between the two leaders in an effort to moderate their positions. After several days of little movement and accusations of bad faith, directed mostly at Begin, Carter threatened to break off the talks. Faced with the possibility of being blamed for a failed peace plan, Begin finally came to the table ready to deal. He agreed to dismantle all Jewish settlements in the Sinai Peninsula and return it in its entirety to Egypt. For his part, Sadat agreed to put the Palestinian issue aside and sign an agreement separate from the other Arab nations. On September 15, 1978, Carter, Sadat, and Begin announced that an agreement had been reached.

In reality, there were still many details to work out, and Carter and his secretary of state, Cyrus Vance, made numerous trips to the Middle East during the next several months to finalize the agreement. One guarantee that the United States made was to help organize an international peacekeeping force to occupy the Sinai after the Israeli withdrawal. The United States also promised $2 billion to pay for the relocation of an airfield from the Sinai to Israel and made guarantees of economic assistance to Egypt in exchange for Sadat's signature on a peace treaty.

Finally, on March 26, 1979, in a White House ceremony, Sadat and Begin shook hands again and signed a permanent peace treaty, normalizing relations between their two nations. When the accord was reached, all sides believed that other Arab nations, particularly the pro-Western regimes in Jordan and Saudi Arabia, would soon follow Egypt's lead and sign similar agreements. They were mistaken. Other Arab states and the Palestine Liberation Organization denounced the Camp David Accords and Sadat for having sold out the Arab cause. Egypt was expelled from the Arab League, and several Middle Eastern nations broke off diplomatic relations

U.S. president Jimmy Carter signs the Camp David Peace Treaty on March 26, 1979 in Washington, D.C. Partners in this historic peace agreement were Egyptian president Anwar Sadat (seated to Carter's right) and Israeli prime minister Menachem Begin (on Carter's left). The treaty was a product of the Camp David Accords, agreements reached through intensive negotiations in September 1978 at the presidential retreat in Camp David, Maryland. (Jimmy Carter Library)

with Cairo. Not until the mid-1990s would another Arab nation, Jordan, join Egypt in normalizing relations with Israel. The Camp David Accords were, without doubt, Carter's greatest foreign policy success and earned Begin and Sadat the Nobel Peace Prize.

Brent Geary

See also: Arab-Israeli War (1948); Arab-Israeli War (1956); Arab-Israeli War (1973); Arafat, Yasir; Palestine Liberation Organization; Sadat, Anwar.

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Candian War. *See* Venetian-Ottoman Wars.

Caucasian War (1817–1864)

Russian conquest of the North Caucasus regions of Chechnya and Daghestan. After the annexation of Georgian kingdoms and principalities (1801–1810), Russia expanded its authority into Azerbaijan in 1803–1813. However, Russian authorities faced the daunting problem of dealing with the North Caucasian mountaineers. Russia first established its presence in the region in the 16th century, when several fortresses were constructed on the Terek River between 1567 and 1588. Peter the Great campaigned in the region in 1722–1723, expanding the Russian territories along the Caspian coastline. Russia initially resorted to indirect rule using various tribal alliances. However, as the Russian authorities tried to secure their control over the region, relationships with the local populations of Kabarda, Chechnya, and Daghestan rapidly deteriorated. The late 18th century saw a succession of anti-Russian movements, including the widespread uprising of Sheikh Mansur in Chechnya in 1780s. The mountaineers soon allied themselves with the Ottomans and attacked Russian interests during the Russo-Ottoman Wars in 1787–1791 and 1806–1812. Russia, meanwhile, was engaged in the wars against Napoleon and was not able to direct the necessary resources to deal with the problems in the Caucasus.

By 1815, however, the Napoleonic Wars were over, and Emperor Alexander chose General Alexei Yermolov to extend and secure Russian influence in North Caucasus and Transcaucasia. A capable but ruthless man who believed "we must reign by force, not appeals," Yermolov launched a methodical conquest of Chechnya and Daghestan. In 1817, Yermolov began constructing new lines of Russian fortifications near the foothills of the Caucasian mountains and launched the systematic destruction of the forests to prevent raids and ambushes. He was most active against the Chechens, whom he drove across the Sunzha River in 1818. Yermolov then built two fortified camps, Pregradnii and Narzanovskoe, and one fortress, Groznyi, and connected them by means of a series of fortified lines to Vladikavkaz, the main Russian city in North Caucasus. Yermolov then turned to Daghestan, where he established the fortress of Vnezapnii in the main pass into Daghestan and connected it with fortifications to Groznyi. In 1818, Yermolov faced a widespread uprising in the northeastern Caucasus and responded with merciless reprisals and systematic conquest. By late 1819, he had succeeded in subduing northern Daghestan and destroying the Kazikum khanate. To secure his communications with

Transcaucasia, Yermolov began constructing a new road in the Terek River Valley, which later became the famous Georgian Military Road. His decisive actions soon pacified the eastern North Caucasus, but he faced an uphill struggle in the western part of the mountains, where powerful Circassians, supported by the Ottomans, refused to acknowledge Russian sovereignty despite Yermolov's incessant campaigning in 1821–1824.

During the Russo-Iranian (1826–1828) and Russo-Ottoman (1828–1829) Wars, Russia defeated its opponents and secured its claims to southern Caucasia, which changed the geopolitical situation in the Caucasus to Russia's favor. Deprived of active Ottoman and Iranian aid, the North Caucasian mountaineers now faced the Russian attacks. In March 1827, Yermolov was replaced with General Ivan Paskevich who continued his methodical approach to the conquest. At the same time, Chechnya and Daghestan saw the emergence of a Sufi mystical movement, Muridism, that emphasized holy war against Russia and established the Naqshabandi Tariqat groups that became the main motive force behind northeastern Caucasian resistance. In 1828, Ghazi Muhammad was proclaimed an imam of Chechnya and declared a holy war against the Russian expansion into North Caucasus. In May 1830, he launched a major attack on Khunzakh, the center of the Avaria region in Daghestan, but suffered defeat. After repelling a Russian punitive expedition at Gimry, Ghazi Muhammad raided Tarki and Kizlyar, besieged the Russian fortresses of Burnaya and Vnezapnaya, and captured Derbent in 1831, bringing Chechnya and parts of Daghestan under his control.

In September 1831, Paskevich was replaced by General G. Rozen, who launched major expeditions to drive the Chechens back. The Russian reclaimed most of Daghestan and besieged Ghazi Muhammad at Gimry, which was stormed in October 1832. Ghazi Muhammad died during this battle and was replaced by Gamzat Bek as the leader (imam) of the resistance movement. Gamzat Bek captured Khunzakh in August 1834 but was assassinated weeks later. In late 1834, Shamil was elected as the third imam.

A shrewd and talented man, Shamil played a central role in the North Caucasian resistance to Russia for 25 years. He regrouped the Chechen forces and divided his territory into districts, each under control of a naib who combined military and administrative authority. He established q new recruitment system and reorganized the Chechen and Daghestani forces, introducing military structure and strict discipline; by 1840s, Shamil even established his own artillery foundry and manufactured gunpowder.

Shamil conducted wide-ranging raids throughout the eastern North Caucasus, prompting Russian punitive expeditions, which invariably failed to subdue the fiery imam. In 1834–1835, Russian forces drove Shamil's mountaineers out of parts of Avaria. In 1837, Russian general Karl Faesy captured Khunzakh and Untsukul but suffered heavy losses that compelled him to negotiate an armistice with

Shamil. Hostilities resumed two years later when the new Russian commander-in-chief of the Caucasus, General E. Golovin, organized a major invasion of Chechnya. General Pavel Grabbe led a strong detachment to Shamil's mountain stronghold of Akhulgo (Ahulgo), where the Chechens withstood an 80-day siege. Escaping from Akhulgo, Shamil regrouped his forces in Chechnya, engaged the Russians on the Gekhi forest and on the Valerik River (July 1840), and launched guerrilla warfare throughout Chechnya and Daghestan. By 1843, the Russians were forced to retreat, allowing Shamil to reclaim Chechnya, Avaria, and most of Daghestan.

In 1844, Emperor Nicholas I of Russia appointed General Mikhail Vorontsov as the new commander-in-chief of the Caucasus. Vorontsov launched a new wave of Russian offensives into Chechnya and Daghestan. Shamil's forces were defeated at Kabarda in 1846, Gergebil in 1848, and Temir-Khan-Shura in 1849. Although Shamil received Ottoman support during the Crimean War (1853–1856), he was unable to break through the Russian fortified lines that surrounded Chechnya and Daghestan. The Russian repeated victories over the Turks, depriving Shamil of much needed help. In 1857 Russian authorities organized a large and well-equipped expedition, led by Generals N. I. Evdokimov and A. I. Baryatinsky, to finally subdue Shamil. The Russians began a methodical campaign of razing villages and depriving Shamil of an area of operation. In April 1859, they captured Shamil's stronghold at Vedeno, forcing the imam to seek shelter at Gunib. Surrounded and blockaded, Shamil was forced to surrender to the Russians on September 6, 1859. The capture of Shamil was a major blow to the North Caucasian resistance movement and deprived it of a strong and capable leader. In 1859–1864, Russian forces penetrated deep into northwestern Caucasus, gradually subduing Kabarda and Circassia and completing the conquest of the Caucasus.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Central Asia, Russian Conquest of; Russo-Iranian Wars; Russo-Ottoman Wars; Shamil.

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Cecora (Ţuţora), Battle of (1620)

A major battle between the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the Ottomans. In 1617, the Commonwealth and the Ottoman Empire signed the Treaty of Busza, pledging to end their hostilities and stop interfering in each other's internal affairs. However, the treaty proved short lived and, as the tensions between the two powers intensified, they began preparing for a new round of fighting. The Ottomans planned to launch a major campaign in 1621. The Commonwealth Sejm (the Polish parliament) initially refused to release funds the hetmans (military commanders) had asked for to fund the campaign, but, urged by the Habsburgs, it later decided to send the Commonwealth force (which was neither sufficient in numbers nor fully prepared) in a preemptive strike against the Ottomans. Led by Hetman Stanisław Zółkiewski, the Commonwealth army of some 9,000 men marched to Cecora (present day Romania) to attack Khan Temir (Kantymir) of the Budjak Nogais (Budjak Horde). As the Poles reached Moldavia in September, the local *hospodar* rebelled against the Ottomans and supported the Commonwealth. The Ottomans responded by diverting a major army, which was sent against the Habsburgs, to deal with the Polish threat. Led by Iskender Pasha, the *beylerbeyi* of Oczakov (Ozi), the Ottoman army of about 20,000 men reached Cecora on the Prut River in mid-September, surprising the Polish army. Between September 17 and October 6, the Poles put up a heroic defense and made a fighting retreat before suffering a crushing defeat and the death of Zółkiewski. Encouraged by this success, the Ottomans sent Tatar raiders into southern Poland and then launched a major invasion of Moldavia in 1621, which resulted in the Battle of Khotyn (Hotin, Chocim).

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Busza, Treaty of (1617); Polish-Ottoman Wars.

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Central Asia, Russian Conquest of

A decade-long process of gradual Russian expansion into and conquest of the Central Asian states. Russia's conquest of Central Asia was similar in many ways to the colonial expansion of other Western powers at the same time. As in Britain or France, the Russian elites cherished the belief that Russia had a civilizing mission

to be accomplished by way of geographical expansion into Asia. This belief was particularly strengthened in the wake of Russia's humiliation in the Crimean War (1853–1856), when Russia was eager to restore its military prestige and position among the European powers. The Central Asian khanates had limited means to resist the Russian expansion. Divided and feuding, the local khans and emirs had little, if any, understanding of the outside world and made no serious attempts to unite against Russia, oftentimes exploiting Russian pressure on a neighboring state to enrich themselves.

Russia's initial expansion into the Central Asian states can be traced to the 16th century, though it was of a limited nature. In the early 18th century, Russian rulers began a more systematic expansion into the Kazakh steppes. In 1715, Peter the Great, exploiting internal feuds in the Kazakh khanates, dispatched two military expeditions (one, from Astrakhan to Khiva, under the command of Prince Bekovich-Cherkasskii and another, from Tobolsk up the Irtysh River, led by Lieutenant Colonel Buchholtz) to conquer the steppes, but both ended in military disasters. Nevertheless, the Russian government continued to interfere in the steppes, and a number of Kazakh khans and tribal leaders acknowledged Russian authority between 1731 and 1740. The Russian drive south soon clashed with the northward expansion of the khanates of Kokand and Khiva. At the same time, domestic challenges, military involvement in Europe, and conquests in the Balkans and the Caucasus delayed Russian expansion into Central Asia for a century, and Russian interference, for the most part, was minimal. In 1839–1840, a Russian military expedition was organized against Khiva but suffered greatly from poor weather and enemy attacks. The failure of this expedition forced Russia to temporarily give up on the idea of conquering Khiva and instead first strengthen its authority in the Kazakh steppes. In 1840s, Russia built a series of fortresses to project Russian military power into southern regions of the Kazakh steppes. This alarmed the khanate of Kokand, and the Russian gradual advance to the Syr Darya caused a conflict between Russia and Kokand in 1852. The following year, General Petrovskii, governor general of Orenburg, successfully campaigned on the lower Syr Darya, capturing the Kokandian stronghold of Aq Masjed.

Starting in mid-19th century, Russian authorities gradually devoted more attention to this region. Planned in 1854, the expansion into the Central Asian regions south of the Syr Darya had been delayed by the Crimean War and was not undertaken until 1863. Between 1858 and 1863, Russian authorities conducted numerous reconnaissance missions, which made them familiar with the region and facilitated the conquest. In 1863, the Kirghiz mountainous regions south of Lake Issyk Kul were annexed to Russia, and in December 1863, Emperor Alexander II demarcated a new imperial border that run through Suzak (east of Syr Darya) and Awlia-Ata (Jambul in Kazakhstan), annexing Chimkent (in southern Kazakhstan) and Turkestan to his realm. In 1864, Russian foreign minister Alexander Gorchakov wrote

the famous memorandum "A Justification for Russian Advance in Central Asia" that highlighted Russia's mission to civilize the "half-savage nomad populations" of Central Asia. The same year, the Russian troops under Major General Mikhail Chernyaev marched into Turkestan. Although his first attack on Chimkent was repelled by Molla Alemqul of Kokand in July 1864, the Russians returned later the same year, expelling the Kokandians and capturing the city in September. In the fall, Chernyaev marched to Tashkent, where he was too initially repelled by the local garrison. Still, the Russians occupied vast territories between the Aral Sea and Lake Issyk Kul, which were now united into the Turkestan region, with Chernyaev as its first military governor. In 1865, taking advantage of Bukhara's attack on Kokand, Chernyaev invaded Kokand, routed the Kokandians in a battle near Tashkent in May, and stormed the city on June 29. The khanate of Kokand retained nominal independence until 1876 when, after a series of local revolts, it was annexed as the Fergana region to the governorate-general of Turkestan.

The Russian authorities then turned their attention to Bukhara's khan Amir Mozaffar al-Din, who demanded Russian withdrawal from Kokand. In late 1865, Russian and Bukharan troops clashed south of Tashkent, and in January 1866, Chernyaev crossed the Syr Darya River and invaded the Bukharan territory, although he was soon repelled at Jizak. He was replaced by General D. Romanovskii, who routed the Bukharan army, led by Amir Mozaffar al-Din himself, near Irjar in May 1866 and captured Kojand, Ura-Tube, Jizak, and Yani-Qyurghan by the spring of 1867. In July 1867, the newly conquered territories were united into the governorate-general of Russian Turkestan (first governor general was General Konstantin Petrovich Von Kaufman, who was given almost unlimited authority, including the right to wage wars, conduct diplomatic negotiations, and conclude treaties) with its headquarters at Tashkent. In April 1868, Emir Mozaffar al-Din proclaimed a holy war on Russia but was routed by Kaufman on the Chopan-Ata heights near Samarkan on May 1, 1868. The following day, the Russian army occupied Samarkand, once the capital of Timur's empire. On June 2, the Bukharans suffered another devastating defeat on the Zirabulaq heights which forced Emir Mozaffar al-Din to sue for peace by the end of the month. He ceded all territories conquered by Russian up to that point and agreed to pay war indemnity.

After the conquest of Bukhara, the Russian authorities turned to Khiva. In late 1869, the Russians established Krasnovodsk on the eastern coastline of the Caspian Sea, which served as their base of operations in the region. Over the next three years several Russian expeditions reconnoitered the desert, despite protests from Khan Muhammad Rahim II of Khiva. In 1873, Kaufman led a major invasion of Khiva, which overwhelmed the Khivan resistance and captured Khiva on June 10. Throughout the summer of 1873, Kaufman conducted punitive expeditions against local Turkoman tribesmen before forcing Khan Muhammad Rahim II (on August 24) to ceded his territory to Russia and pay a war indemnity.

With Kokand, Bukhara, and Khiva conquered, Russia turned to the Turkoman but faced an uphill struggle against the local tribespeople. In 1879, the Russian expedition under General A. Lomakin was defeated by the Teke Turkoman at their famous Geok-Tepe fortress. The defeat at Geok-Tepe was one of the most humiliating defeats for the contemporary Russian army and caused great outcry in Russia. To avenge the defeat, General Mikhail Skobelev, with some 13,000 men and more than100 cannon, returned to the fortress in late 1880 and had it completed destroyed after a month-long siege in January 1881. In 1881–1885, as a result of campaigns of Generals Mikhail Annenkov and Mikhail Skobelev, Russia annexed the Transcaspian region and extended its authority to Ashkhabad, Merv, and Pendjeh. The Russian expansion in Central Asia formally ended with the signing of agreements with China in 1894 and Britain in 1895, which demarcated Russia's boundaries in the Pamirs and recognized its conquests in the Central Asia.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Akhal-Teke Expeditions (1879, 1880–1881); Caucasian War; Russo-Afghan Conflict (1885).

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Cezayirli Ghazi Hasan Pasha (d. 1790)

One of the greatest Ottoman admirals (*kapudan pasha*), Hasan Pasha was bought as a slave by a merchant from Rodosto (Terikdagh). After obtaining his freedom, he became a janissary and participated in the Austro-Ottoman War of 1737–1739, distinguishing himself at the Battle of Krozka (Hisarjik) in 1739. After the war he served in Algiers (hence his name *Cezayirli*, meaning "from Algiers") and later became beg of Tlemcen. However, he soon quarreled with the governor of Algiers and had to flee to Spain, where he was well received by King Charles IV. After brief service in Spain and Naples, he returned to the Porte where Sultan Mustafa III gave him command of a warship, and by 1766, he already commanded a flagship (*kapudana*). He participated in the Russo-Ottoman War of 1768–1774 and distinguished himself at the Battle of Chesma, where he was able to save the vessels under his

command and was the only Ottoman commander to emerge with his reputation intact. In 1770, he conducted a daring attack on the Russian-controlled island of Lemnos, for which he was given the rank of kapudan pasha and title of ghazi. In 1773, to improve Ottoman naval training, Hasan Pasha opened a naval school, which eventually became the storied Muhendishane-i Bahri Humayun (Imperial Naval Engineer School) in 1784. In 1773–1774, he was sent to the Danubian front, where he served as the serasker of Ruse and fought against Russian armies. After the war ended in 1774, he returned to his post of kapudan pasha. He conducted successful operations against the mutinous lords in Syria in 1775–1776 and Morea in 1779. In 1780, he sailed to Egypt, where he forced the Mamluks to resume payment of tribute, which they had been refusing to do for years. In 1780s, Hasan Pasha was preoccupied with reorganizing the Ottoman navy, laying the foundation for career naval service. In 1786–1787, he once again led the Ottoman navy to Egypt, where the Mamluks rebelled against the Ottoman governor. He successfully subdued the Mamluk revolt and forced their leaders to continue paying tribute. As soon as he restored order in Egypt, he was sent to the Black Sea to participate in the Russo-Ottoman War (1787–1791). He failed to break the Russian siege of the Ottoman fortress of Ochakov, and the reinforcements he delivered were routed on the shore. Returning to Constantinople, Hasan Pasha became the serasker of Izmail and took over the command of the Danubian front, becoming the grand vizier in January 1790. He died of an illness in late March 1790 and was buried in Shumla. The modern city of Chesme features a statue of Hasan Pasha along with that of the lion he domesticated while in Africa and that accompanied him on campaigns.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Austro-Ottoman Wars; Barbarossa Hayreddin Pasha; Ottoman Navy (World War I); Piale (Piyale) Pasha; Russo-Ottoman Wars; Turgut Reis.

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Chaldiran, Battle of (1514)

Major battle between the Ottoman Empire and the rising Safavid Iran that allowed the Turks to maintain authority in eastern Anatolia. The conflict was prompted by the Safavid shah Ismail's support for the Turkoman tribes, who were in open revolt against the Ottomans, and the spread of the Shiism in Anatolia. In 1514, Sultan Selim I launched a campaign against Ismail and the two armies finally met at Chaldiran, northeast of Lake Van in eastern Anatolia, on August 23. Deployed

behind a barrier of wagons, the Ottomans exploited their superiority in artillery and firearms to repel the repeated charges of Ismail's traditional cavalry, which suffered heavy losses and fled from the field. The magnitude of the defeat can be discerned from the fact that Ismail's entire harem, including his wives, fell into the Turkish hands. After the battle, Selim captured Tabriz on September 7 but was unable to press on because of the discontent among the Janissaries. Still, the victory at Chaldiran marked the Ottoman expansion into eastern Anatolia and the halt of the Safavid expansion to the west. For Shah Ismail personally, this defeat also meant the loss of the aura of invincibility and certain divinity that he claimed. His confidence seemed to have been shattered because he never again participated in a military campaign.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Ismail, Shah (Safavid); Ottoman-Safavid Wars; Selim I.

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Char Bouba War (1644–1674)

A protracted conflict between the Sanhaja Berber tribes and the Maqil Arab tribes; the conflict is also known as Shar Buba or the Mauritanian Thirty Years War. After migrating from Yemen to northwestern Africa, the Maqil Arabs, especially the Beni Hassan tribes, sought to escape the authority of the Merinid dynasty in Morocco and seized new pasture lands in the south. Their expansion, however, led to a 30-year conflict with the nomadic Sanhaja Berbers led by Nasir ad-Din, a *marabout* (holy man) of the Lemptouna tribe. The war ended in the defeat of the Berber tribes, which were compelled to accept the Treaty of Tin Yedfad in 1674. Under its terms, the Berbers pledged to give up warfare, convert to Islam, and acknowledge their status as zenaga (vassals) to Arabs. The Arab victory had a profound impact on the region as it led to widespread cultural and linguistic Arabization.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Franco-Trarzan Wars.

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Chernomen, Battle of (1371)

A major battle between the Ottoman and Serbian forces at the Maritsa River near the village of Chernomen (today Ormenio in Greece) on September 26, 1371. The Ottoman army was commanded Lala Shahin Pasha, and the Serbian forces were under the command of the Serbian king Vukaşin Mrnjavčević and his brother despot Uglješa. Threatened by the Ottoman expansion into the Balkan peninsula, the Serbs decided to make a surprise attack on the Ottoman capital Edirne while Sultan Murad and most of the army were in Anatolia. Despite a surprise attack, the superior Ottoman tactics led to a decisive Serbian defeat that claimed the lives of the Serbian king and his brother. After the battle, the Ottomans extended their influence to Macedonia and parts of Greece.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Balkans, Ottoman Conquest of the.

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Chesma, Battle of (1770)

The Battle of Chesma, fought July 5–7, 1770, was the most significant battle of the Russo-Ottoman War of 1768–1774 and the worst naval defeat suffered by the Ottomans since Lepanto in 1571. When war between Russia and the Ottoman Empire broke out in 1768, Russian naval squadrons were sent to the Mediterranean for the first time. By the summer of 1770, nine ships-of-the-line and three frigates, along with lesser vessels, were operating against the Ottomans. The Ottoman fleet, commanded by Kapudan Pasha Hüsameddin, was at least twice as large, but suffered from a lack of aggressiveness and training. The Ottoman fleet assumed a defensive position north of Chesma (Çeşme), on the Anatolian coast near the island of Chios.

The Russian fleet, under Admiral Aleksei Orlov, attacked the Ottomans on July 5. Ten ships-of-the-line were anchored in a first line, and six others were in a second line covering the gaps. The Russian plan was to sail from the south and engage the first line. Ottoman fire was heavy, but aimed at the Russian rigging. The leading Russian ship drifted into the Ottoman ship opposite. Both ships quickly caught fire and blew up. The remaining Ottoman ships cut their anchor cables and fled into Chesma harbor. Orlov was determined to destroy the Ottoman fleet and

began a bombardment of the harbor. After a day of preparations, three Russian ships-of-the-line and two frigates entered the harbor in the early morning of July 7. Their fire set one Ottoman ship-of-the-line on fire. Meanwhile, four fireships also attacked the Ottoman fleet. Their crews' task was to ram an enemy ship, set their own ship on fire, and escape. Two of the fireships failed, but the third set fire to an Ottoman ship-of-the-line. Fire from the two burning Ottoman ships spread to others in the crowded harbor. Russian landing parties were able to save one enemy ship-of-the-line, but the remaining ships-of-the-line were destroyed. At least six frigates and many smaller vessels were also burned, completely destroying the Ottoman fleet. The Russians remained in control of the Mediterranean for the remainder of the war.

Tim J. Watts

See also: Lepanto, Battle of (1571); Russo-Ottoman Wars.

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Cilicia War. *See* Franco-Turkish War (Cilicia War) (1920).

Cold War in the Middle East

The Cold War began with most of the Middle East controlled directly or indirectly by the United Kingdom and France, with a strong U.S. presence. As elsewhere, the region became a pawn in the Cold War. By the early 1960s the West European empires no longer existed, and the United States and the Soviet Union were the major players in the region, vying for influence over and control of resources and strategic locations. Yet the countries in the Middle East were often able to use this competition to their benefit by seeking economic, political, and military support and allying with the highest bidder, changing sides as circumstances warranted or advocating neutrality as a means of presenting an alternative to superpower domination in the world.

In 1946, Iran became the first major Cold War hot spot in the Middle East. Even before the end of the war the Soviet Union had backed the leftist Tudeh Party, which supported Iranian oil concessions to the Soviets. The Soviets controlled much of northern Iran and, after the war, supported establishment of communist republics there. Although Britain and the United States withdrew their forces from Iran after

the war, the Soviets remained, preventing Iran from reestablishing control of all of its territory and demanding oil concessions in return for withdrawal. Iran agreed. The United States and Britain took the issue to the United Nations (UN), and this, with the oil concessions, convinced the Soviets to withdraw troops in May 1946. The communist governments collapsed, and Iran canceled the concessions and curtailed Tudeh influence.

This episode was a prelude to many confrontations between the Cold War powers in the Middle East. Iran continued as a front in the Cold War for many years, including the Central Intelligence Agency's successful efforts in 1953 to overthrow the Mossadeq government in Iran because of supposed Soviet influence. Iran then became a member of the Baghdad Pact, one of the links in worldwide alliances opposing the Soviet Union. Iran continued to be an ally of the United States until the overthrow of the shah in 1979, toward the end of the Cold War. After that, Iran under Ayatollah Khomeini was almost equally opposed to both the United States and the Soviet Union, one being named the "Great Satan" and the other the "Little Satan."

After Iran, the next Cold War arena in the Middle East was British Palestine. After World War II, Britain reduced its presence and costs outside Europe. France would do the same but more reluctantly. The Arab Middle East smelled the possibility of independence from the European empires. The United States and the Soviet Union were viewing the area as a future arena of competition.

In tandem with the British removal of forces, Israel's Labor Zionist government under David Ben-Gurion declared independence on May 14, 1948. The United States recognized the new state the same day the Soviet Union did, on May 18. A series of battles between Israel and invading Arab forces resulted in an Israeli victory and a cease-fire in early 1949. Israel was admitted to the UN in May 1949. At this time, Israel enjoyed support from both the United States and the Soviet Union.

The two superpowers had varying motivations; the United States realized that as the West European powers began to withdraw a strong presence in the Middle East would be crucial to secure vital petroleum resources and prevent the Soviet Union from exercising a strong influence. Both sides provided substantial aid to Israel. Israel continued to be a focal point during the Cold War, but over time the United States prevailed.

The Cold War continued to shape the Middle East from the 1950s until the fall of the Soviet Union. The competition ranged from North Africa in the west through Afghanistan in the east. As Morocco asserted its independence from the West in the late 1950s, it played both sides against each other. In 1959, Morocco obtained a U.S. agreement to return control of air force bases to Morocco while also persuading the Soviets to provide military assistance. This did not result in Morocco's long-term commitment to the Soviets, and the United States later regained influence. In the mid-1980s, Algeria obtained Soviet military aid in the form of air defense missiles. This too did not result in a sustained shift toward the Soviet Bloc.

Both superpowers vied for influence in Afghanistan after World War II. This included a loan of US$3.5 million in 1954, countered by smaller amounts of aid from the United States during the 1950s. But the Soviets gained ground when a liberal member of the royal family, Mohammad Daud Khan, served as prime minister from 1953 to 1963. A royal power struggle left Daud outside government in 1963, but he returned after a coup in 1973. Although he leaned toward the Soviets, Daud refused to be a puppet and did not bow to demands for more communist participation in government. This, along with opposition from traditional Muslims to a move toward secular government, led to a coup during April 27–28, 1978, in which Daud lost his life and the monarchy was abolished. Unwilling to leave events in Afghanistan to chance, the Soviet Union sent troops across the border on December 27, 1979, and installed a government favorable to them under Babrak Karmal. Soon after, Soviet troops spent nearly a decade unsuccessfully battling anticommunist insurgents.

Egypt was the focus of a Cold War struggle that began with the end of British control in the early 1950s. As elsewhere, local leaders played both sides for their national and regional goals. Key players were Gamal Abdel Nasser and Anwar Sadat, both of whom courted both sides, changing allegiances or professing neutrality as opportunities arose. The construction of the Aswan Dam on the Nile provides an insight into how intense and complex the Cold War was. After the Cold War the Middle East faced an entirely different set of circumstances. The United States and its allies were the most powerful force in the area, but regional conflicts took on a greater importance to the peoples of the Middle East.

Daniel Spector

See also: Afghanistan, Soviet War in (1978–1989); Arab-Israeli War (1956); Arab-Israeli War (1973); Baghdad Pact (1955); Khomeini, Ruhollah; Nasser, Gamal Abdel; Non-Aligned Movement; Sadat, Anwar.

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Constantinople, Siege of (1453)

An Ottoman military operation lasting 54 days (April 6 to 29 May 1453), which culminated in the conquest of the Byzantine imperial capital (mod. İstanbul, Turkey) by Sultan Mehmed II Fatih. For almost two months the 7,000 Greek defenders, assisted by about 3,000 Western mercenaries (mostly Genoese under Giovanni

Longo Giustiniani), held out against an enemy whose numbers were nearly 10 times greater, as well as a devastating artillery pounding that destroyed a significant section of the city's western walls.

This was the third Ottoman siege of Constantinople following earlier abortive attempts by Sultans Bayezid I in 1394–1399 and Murad II in 1422. The inevitable fate of the city had already been heralded after the Turkish defeat of the Varna Crusade of 1444. Preparations for the impending siege became apparent with the Turks' construction of the massive castle of Rumeli Hisar (Castle of Europe), known also as Boghaz Kesen (Throat Cutter), from March to August 1453 on the western shores of the narrowest part of the Bosporus, facing the older Anadolu Hisar (Castle of Anatolia), built in 1395/1396 by Bayezid I. Mehmed proceeded to isolate the city from possible help by sending his general Turakhan Begh to invade the Morea and by having Karadja Begh dismantle Byzantine fortifications in the Sea of Marmara and on the Black Sea coastline (autumn 1452). A belated and minimal Western force consisting of Venetians and Genoese, who had the support of Pope Nicholas V, arrived in Constantinople in late 1452 or early 1453, just before the huge Ottoman forces assembled before its western walls (March and early April). The siege commenced around April 6. Despite a temporary respite in the blockade brought about by the Genoese Francesco Lecanella (called "Flantanellas" in Byzantine sources), who succeeded in entering the Golden Horn (mod. Haliç) with one Byzantine and three Genoese ships (April 20), it became even tighter when the Turks managed to haul 72 vessels on oiled wooden planks overland behind the suburb of Galata from the Bosporus into the Golden Horn (April 22). This move thus neutralized the protective Byzantine chain that had sealed the Golden Horn since April 2, and allowed the besiegers to build a floating bridge across the inlet, consequently forcing the besieged to divide their attention. Even then the stout defense of the city made Mehmed oscillate between the advice of his generals Zaghanos Pasha and Shihabeddin to proceed tenaciously and the counsel of his grand vizier, Khalil Pasha Djandarli, to lift the siege (May 25). The latter was suspected of consulting with the besieged (he was later executed), so Mehmed carried on with the operations.

The end was precipitated after the breaching of a large section of the ramparts and the controversial opening of a small secret underground gate on the northern section of the walls called Kerkoporta (probably because of careless defending on the part of some Byzantines), through which the Ottomans, who also breached the Charisios Gate further to the north, entered the city. Giustiniani received a serious wound and was forced to leave his post, and Emperor Constantine Palaiologos (who had flatly refused to capitulate to Mehmed's terms on May 21) was killed along with a handful of defenders near the Gate of Romanos, at about the center of the western walls, on the early afternoon of Tuesday, May 29. Some of the defenders succeeded in fleeing in Venetian and Genoese ships.

The fall of Constantinople caused consternation in western Europe. The victorious sultan entered the city, which was to become his empire's new European capital

Mehmed II and his men enter Constantinople following their successful siege of the Byzantine capital. Mehmed's victory in 1453 marked the irrefutable end of the Byzantine Empire and significant progress in the western spread of Islam. Nineteenth-century European engraving. (Ridpath, John Clark, *Ridpath's History of the World*, 1901)

in succession to Adrianople (mod. Edirne, Turkey). After three days of looting, during which Mehmed gave strict orders not to destroy monuments, he began to colonize his new capital with Muslim populations from his eastern provinces and Christians from the recently conquered Greek and Balkan territories. Finally, in 1454, the conqueror granted important privileges to the Greek Orthodox patriarch Gennadios II, who was thus recognized as the ethnarch (head of the community) of the Orthodox peoples within the Ottoman Empire.

The capture of Constantinople is generally considered to mark the final fall of the Byzantine Empire, although some outposts of medieval Hellenism actually outlived Constantinople by several years: the despotate of Morea until 1460/1461, the empire of Trebizond until 1461, the semiautonomous state of Thessaly until 1454/1470, and the autonomous state of Epiros until 1449/1479.

Alexios G. C. Savvides

See also: Byzantine-Ottoman Wars; Mehmed II; Varna Crusade (1444).

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Constantinople, Treaty of (1479)

Treaty signed on January 25, 1479 ending the 15-year war between the Republic of Venice and the Ottoman Empire. After decisive Ottoman success, Venice was forced to accept disadvantageous terms of the treaty. Although they retained Dulcigno, Antivan, and Durazzo, the Venetians ceded Scutari and other territories on the Dalmatian coastline, as well as the Greek islands of Negroponte (Euboea) and Lemnos. Venice also agreed to pay a tribute of some 10,000 ducats per year to acquire trading privileges in the Black Sea.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Venetian-Ottoman Wars.

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Constantinople, Treaty of (1562)

Peace agreement concluded in 1562 by Holy Roman Emperor Ferdinand I and Ottoman Sultan Suleiman I, formalizing a truce signed in 1547 between the Holy Roman Empire and the Ottoman Empire. The treaty confirmed the Habsburg influence in western and northern Hungary while central Hungary remained under Ottoman control; Transylvania retained a degree of independence, but under Turkish authority.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Austro-Ottoman Wars.

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Constantinople, Treaty of (1700)

Treaty signed at Constantinople (Istanbul) on July 3, 1700, between Russia and the Ottoman Empire, confirming the provisions of the 1699 Treaty of Karlowitz. Russia retained control of the strategic fortress-cities of Azov, Taganrog, Pavlovsk, and Mius. Both sides agreed to maintain a military-free zone in their border regions. The treaty ended the tribute from Russia to the Crimean khanate (and the Porte) and obligated the Porte to restrain Crimean khans from raiding into Russian territory. The Ottomans also agreed to accept a Russian government representative at Constantinople and to free all Russian prisoners of war.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Karlowitz, Treaty of (1699); Russo-Ottoman Wars.

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"Perpetual Peace" between Russia and the Ottoman Porte signed in Constantinople on November 16, 1720. The two powers pledged to maintain "permanent and perpetual peace, and true and sincere friendship." Russia recognized Azov and the surrounding territories as Ottoman possessions and agreed to demolish the fortress of Taganrog. Russia also agreed to recognize the Ottoman authority in the Crimea and promised not to interfere in Poland's affairs. Both powers pledged to guarantee the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Polish state. The two states also pledged to allow merchants of both nations to trade and travel safely from one state to another. The Porte allowed the Russians to make pilgrimages to Jerusalem and other holy places without paying any taxes.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Adrianople, Treaty of (1713); Pruth, Treaty of (1711); Russo-Ottoman Wars.

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Constantinople, Treaty of (1832)

Treaty signed on July 21, 1832, at the Constantinople Conference between the Great Powers (Britain, France, and Russia) and the Ottoman Empire. The treaty, in essence, marked the end of the Greek War of Independence, which had led to the establishment of modern Greece as an independent state free of the Ottoman Empire. The treaty outlined the boundaries of the new Greek kingdom that were recognized by major powers. The sultan had agreed to recognize the kingdom of Greece and to evacuate Greek regions that were still under Ottoman occupation in return for an indemnity of 40 million Turkish piastres. The Ottomans retained the Fort of Punta, a key point in their defenses of Prevesa, but they pledged to permit safe passage of Greek vessels through the Gulf of Arta. Those wanting to quit Greek or Ottoman territories and sell their estates were given 18 months to so. The Great Powers guaranteed a Greek loan of £2.4 million and recognized King Otto's accession to the ranks of European monarchs.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Greek War of Independence (1821–1832).

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Constantinople, Treaty of (1913)

Treaty concluded in Constantinople (Istanbul) on September 29, 1913, between Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire (Turkey) to conclude the Second Balkan War (1913). During the war, the Ottomans took advantage of Bulgaria's weakness to reclaim territory lost in the First Balkan War. The two countries agreed to resume diplomatic relations, exchange prisoners, and establish a general amnesty. The treaty compelled Bulgaria to accept the Ottoman control of Adrianople (Edirne) and surrender territory up to the Maritsa River.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Balkan Wars (1912–1913).

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Covadonga, Battle of (ca. 718 or 722)

Often described as the first major defeat of the Muslim Arabs in Spain, this battle served as an important symbol of Christian resistance in medieval Spanish history and is often used to mark the beginning of the Christian reconquest of Spain. Following their initial invasion of 711, the Muslim Arabs defeated the existing Visigoth kingdom and overran almost all of Spain. The Christian forces rallied under the leadership of Pelayo (ca. 718–737), said to be a distant relative of the defeated Visigoth king Roderick, who through his success, became the first king of Asturias. The highly dramatic Chronicle of Alfonso III (9th century) praises Pelayo for refusing to submit to Muslim rule and retreating to the Cantabrian Mountains, where he made a last stand in a mountain cave that was surrounded by an enormous Muslim army. With divine help, the chronicle asserts, Pelayo managed to defeat the Muslims, many of whom died in a divinely inspired earthquake. However, historians have little evidence that this battle indeed took place. It may have been just a small skirmish that later became shrouded in myth and served as a symbol for Christian resistance to the Muslim rule in Spain.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Reconquista.

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Cretan War. *See* Venetian-Ottoman Wars.

Crimean War (1853–1856)

A major conflict between Russia and the Ottoman Empire, aided by France, Britain, and Sardinia. Although the war revealed the military and administrative ineptitude of both sides, it was Russia that suffered a humiliating defeat. The problems started

when France and Russia became embroiled in a dispute over control of religious sites near Jerusalem. When the Ottoman government allowed Roman Catholics equal rights with Greek Orthodox Christians in 1852, Russia (the self-appointed protector of the Orthodox Church) began to place strong military and political pressure on the Ottoman sultan. After the Ottomans allowed the Anglo-French squadron to sail through the Dardanelles, Russia deployed troops to the borders of Moldavia and Walachia, both of which were under Turkish rule, sent a commission to Constantinople to seek Russian rights to protect Orthodox Christians, and suggested to the British ambassador a plan to partition Turkish territories. The commission failed and Russia occupied Moldavia and Walachia under the protests of France and Britain. The Ottoman government declared war on Russia on October 16, 1853. Government officials in France and Britain who wanted to maintain the balance of power in Europe decided to support the Turks and declared war on Russia in March 1854.

The Crimean War was fought on three main fronts. On the Danubian front, some 82,000 Russian troops under General M. Gorchakov faced Omar Pasha's army (about 150,000 men). General V. Bebutov's corps (30,000) was tasked with countering Abdi Pasha's army (up to 100,000 men) on the Caucasian front. In the Caucasus, the war began in November 1853 with the Ottoman offensive toward Aleksandronopol and Tiflis. The Russian forces successfully repelled this attack, scoring major victories at Akhaltsikhe (November 26) and Bashgedikler (December 1). The cold winter weather caused a lull in operations in the Caucasus until the spring of 1854. Meantime, the Russians launched an offensive on the Danubian front but failed to break through the Ottoman positions at Oltenitsa (early November). The Ottoman counterattacks were repelled at Cetati, Giurgiu, and Keleres between January and March 1854. On November 30, 1853, the Russian navy secured its supremacy in the Black Sea after its decisive victory at Sinope, which exposed the Ottoman capital to direct Russian attack.

Alarmed by the Russian success, Britain and France sent their joint fleet to protect the Ottoman coastline in the Black Sea in January 1854, prompting Russia to declare war against them on February 21. In March 1854, Russia launched a major offensive in the Danubian theater, crossing the Danube at Braila, Talata, and Izmail and occupying Isaccea, Tulcea, and Macin. In May, the strategic fortress of Silistra was besieged, and anti-Ottoman uprisings were incited in Bulgaria. After Austrian threats, Russia was forced to abandon its newly acquired territory, move its army across the Danube, and allow Austria to occupy Moldavia and Wallachia. In the Caucasus, Mustafa Zarif Pasha regrouped the Ottoman forces, incited North Caucasian mountaineers to attack Russian forces in eastern Georgia, and launched offensives toward Alexandronopol and Kutaisi. The Ottoman attacks failed in all directions. During the summer of 1854, Russian routed the Ottomans on the Chorokh River (June 16) and the Chingil Pass (July 29), captured the fortress of Bayezid on July 31,and won a major battle over the main Ottoman army at Kuruk-Dar on August 5.

The Russian victories over the Turks were negated by the Anglo-French-Sardinian invasion of the Crimea, where the tide of war turned against Russia as it suffered defeat at Inkerman, Alma, Chernaya, Malakov, and Sevastopol. Russian troops were more successful in the Caucasus. The Ottoman attack in Abkhazia was repelled by General I. Bagration-Mukhranskii on the Inguri and Tskhenistskali rivers in early November while General Nikolai Muravyev launched an offensive toward Erzurum and captured the strategic fortress of Kars on November 28. Nonetheless, Russian defeats in the Crimea decided the outcome of war and forced Emperor Alexander II to sue for peace. The Treaty of Paris (1856) reduced the prestige and territories of Russia and maintained the Ottoman Empire without strengthening it. Moldavia and Walachia (which would unite as Romania in 1858) became self-governing territories under the guardianship of European powers. The treaty also demanded that Russia remove her warships on the Black Sea and that the Danube River remain open as an international commercial river.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Russo-Ottoman Wars.

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Crusades. *See* First Crusade (1096–1099); Second Crusade (1147–1149); Third Crusade (1187–1192); Fifth Crusade (1217–1221); Sixth Crusade (1228–1229); Seventh Crusade (1248–1254); Eighth Crusade (1270); Ninth Crusade (1271–1272).

Cuarte, Battle of (1094)

An important Christian victory that prevented the spread of the Almoravid authority to the eastern coast of Spain. In June 1094, Rodrigo Diaz de Vivar, better known as the Castilian warrior and adventurer El Cid, captured the great Muslim city of Valencia. In response, the Almoravid emir Yusuf ibn Tashfin dispatched a

major force under his nephew Muhammad to reclaim the city. The Muslim army reached Valencia in the fall of 1094 and besieged the city while El Cid appealed to Alfonso VI of León-Castille for assistance. In October, El Cid made a sudden attack out of the fortress and targeted the enemy camp at Cuart de Poblet, where he defeated the Almoravids and forced them to end the siege. The victory allowed the Christians to raid deep into the Almoravid Andalusia, but they could not sustain their success. After the death of El Cid, the Almoravids reclaimed Valencia.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Almoravids; Reconquista.

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Cyprus, Turkish Invasion of (1974)

The Turkish Invasion of Cyprus in 1974 had long-reaching roots into the previous generations. After a centuries-long Ottoman dominance, Cyprus came under British administration (while remaining under the sultan's sovereignty) following the Cyprus Convention of 1878. Britain was interested in the island as a means of protecting its interests in the eastern Mediterranean and Asia Minor. In 1914, as World War I pitted the Ottoman Empire against Britain, the British government annexed the island; after the war the newly independent Turkish Republic recognized the loss of Cyprus in 1923. After World War II, Britain, in the throes of a dying colonial era, began to strengthen its positions in certain Middle Eastern areas to take advantage of their strategic locations. One of these areas was Cyprus, a small island less than 100 miles from Turkey and the Levant region, which had a very lucrative position near the Suez Canal. British forces set up two military bases on the southern coast of the island and antagonized the Greek Cypriots living there by denying *enosis* (union) with the country of Greece. In 1955 the pro-enosis National Organization of Cypriot Struggle (EOKA), led by Lieutenant Colonel George Grivas, launched a terror campaign to force the British off the island and join Cyprus to Greece. Its operations, however, alarmed the Turkish Cypriot minority (less than 20% of the population), which rejected union with Greece and demanded either cession to Turkey or partition of the island. The UN tried to mediate between the two sides, but failed to reach a compromise. Meanwhile, in 1959/1960, Britain, Greece, and Turkey negotiated an agreement that made Cyprus an independent republic, guaranteed its territorial integrity and allowed Britain to maintain military presence on the island. The new Cypriot republic sought to ensure relative representation of

both Greek and Turkish communities; the Turkish Cypriots, despite being one-fifth of the population, were given the post of vice-president, two-fifths of posts in the army and three-tens of civil service and the parliament.

The first elections in July 1960 produced, as expected, a Greek-dominated government; Archbishop Makarios III became the first president, while Fazil Kuchuk became vice-president. Despite earlier agreements on power sharing, the long-standing tensions between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots quickly reappeared and intensified. The Turkish Cypriots felt as if they were devolved into a second-class status in a Greek-dominated state. Dismayed, they withdrew from the government in 1963 and the next few years saw increased violence between the two Cypriot communities. The Turkish Cypriots fared worse in this fighting and lost considerable territory while Nicosia was divided into two parts, separated by the British-controlled Green Line. In 1964, the UN deployed a multinational peacekeeping force but despite its efforts a new round of fighting broke out in northwestern provinces of Cyprus. With the Turkish Cypriots on the run, Turkey began to interfere in the fighting, sending air force and contingents of Turkish officers to lead the resistance. Greece also became actively involved in the war as its officers clandestinely landed on the island to train and lead Greek Cypriot forces. By 1967, the Cypriot internal fighting threatened to evolve into a open conflict between Greece and Turkey; the latter's ultimatum resulted in the Greek withdrawal from the island. In 1968 and 1973, Archbishop Makarios was reelected by an overwhelming majority but his policies to claim greater independence for Cyprus soon caused a rift with Greece. On July 15, 1974, a group of the Cypriot National Guard, led by Greek officers, organized a coup against Makarios and join Cyprus to Greece. Makarios escaped and Nikos Sampson was proclaimed new president of Cyprus. Just five days later, on July 20, 1974, Turkey counterattacked to prevent Cyprus's union with Greece and protect its Turkish Cypriots. The invasion, code-named Operation Atilla, took place in two stages and ended in August 1974, when Turkish troops occupied the northern third of the island. At the same time, the Greece-supported military junta fell and a democratic government of Cypriot Greeks took power. In February 1975, the Turkish Cypriots announced the establishment of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus (TFSC), claiming that their goal was not independence but federation with Cypriot Greeks. Yet, after eight years of inter-communal talks and some progress on creating a bizonal federation, the TFSC unilaterally proclaimed itself the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) in May 1983, effectively splitting the island into two states. The UN condemned this move and only Turkey recognized the TRNC's independence. Over the last 28 years, the UN has launched several peace efforts to resolve this long-standing conflict but they have all failed, as neither side showed willingness to compromise.

Trey Bernard

See also: Greco-Turkish War (1919–1922).

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D

Damascus, Arab Conquest of (635)

After the Muslim defeat of a Byzantine force at Marj al-Suffar (Golden Meadow), between Damascus and the Golan Plateau (traditionally dated February 635), the Byzantine army retired to Damascus. Here an officer named Thomas reportedly commanded the garrison, and the senior civilian official was Mansur Ibn Sarjan, a Christian Arab "financial administrator." Mansur was a political opponent of the Byzantine emperor Heraclius, supporting the Syriac Christian bishop rather than the Greek Orthodox bishop of Damascus. The Muslim siege reportedly lasted six months. The Muslim forces were too few to surround the city, so they blockaded each gate while the defenders awaited the emperor's relieving army. The Arab commander Khalid ibn al-Walid also sent cavalry to Thaniyat al-'Uqab (Eagle's Pass), northeast of Damascus, to watch for Emperor Heraclius.

A column of Byzantine cavalry was driven back and the nonappearance of any relief sapped the garrison's morale, though several sorties were attempted. During one sortie the garrison commander Thomas was wounded in the eye by an arrow. There are several versions of how Damascus actually fell, though they agree that the Muslims entered from two directions. Khalid Ibn Walid's troops supposedly broke through the walls from the east, while Abu Ubaidah's men negotiated the opening of the western gate. Nevertheless, it was Khalid Ibn al-Walid who drew up the surrender document on September 4, 635. This was generous to the defeated Christians, and only the Rumi, that is, the Byzantines of Greek origin, were excluded from a general amnesty.

David Nicolle

See also: Khalid ibn al-Walid; Yarmouk (Yarmuk), Battle of (636).

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Damascus, Fall of (1918)

Turning point in the Palestine-Syria campaign and an important event for Arab nationalism. Damascus was an ancient political, economic, and cultural center, and Arab nationalists regarded its possession as vital for establishing a sovereign Arab state.

After virtually destroying General Otto Liman von Sanders's Turkish-German Yıldırım (Thunderbolt) Army Group in the September 1918 Battle of Megiddo, Lieutenant General Sir Edmund Allenby, commander of the British Egypt Expeditionary Force (EEF), issued orders for the rapid seizure of Damascus by Lieutenant General Sir Harry Chauvel's Desert Mounted Corps of three cavalry divisions. However, the terms of the Sykes-Picot Agreement between France and Britain and consideration for Britain's Arab allies made it advisable to avoid prejudicing future possession of the city. Hence Allenby's orders provided for the encirclement of Damascus, trapping any Ottoman troops defending it. British forces were not to enter the city before Prince Faisal's Northern Arab Army, except in the event of compelling tactical reasons.

Some 40,000 Turkish and German troops were widely dispersed and unable to offer effective resistance, except on September 29 when the Australian 3rd Light Horse Brigade drove about 5,000 troops from their positions about 9 miles southwest of Damascus. Only the eastern route from the city remained open when the EEF arrived on October 1. The Turks had already begun to evacuate Damascus, although 12,000 troops remained in their barracks awaiting capture. Damascus was in fact taken at least three times within a 24-hour period. Tasked with cutting the Turkish retreat route north of the town by occupying the Homs road, men of the 3rd Australian Light Horse Brigade found it impossible to reach their objective without crossing the northern part of Damascus, so early on October 1 the Australian troopers were in fact in the city itself, capturing the Dummar train station and several hundred Turkish soldiers. Next, on the afternoon of October 1, a detachment of the 4th Light Horse Brigade under Lieutenant Colonel M. W. J. Bourchier that had reached the southern outskirts of Damascus was notified of apparent unrest in the city after it was abandoned by the Turkish Fourth Army. Bourchier sent troops to protect public property and was thus the second British commander to occupy the Syrian capital in violation of orders. In the evening he was ordered to withdraw his guards.

Other events anticipated an Arab takeover. Before Ottoman forces marched out of Damascus, they entrusted the interim administration to some leading citizens who acknowledged King Husayn ibn Ali, sharif of the Hejaz and Prince Faisal's father, as their ruler. These citizens formed a committee that surrendered the town at least twice on the morning of October 1, once to the Australian Light Horse and once to Sharif Nasir, the sharifian leader in the Damascus area. Later, Lieutenant

Colonel T. E. Lawrence traveled to Damascus and accepted its surrender from Shukri Al-Ayyubi, a high-ranking Ottoman officer and Arab nationalist, whom he immediately appointed military governor. To serve the Arab cause, Lawrence wrote in his book *Seven Pillars of Wisdom* that sharifian troops were the first forces into Damascus; this is at least highly unlikely.

Unrest soon broke out in Damascus; there was an attempted rebellion late on October 1, and the following day Chauvel had to order troops into the city to quell unrest. Chauvel discovered a confusing situation brought on by different Allied authorities supporting competing Arab factions. Only after the restoration of order was the Syrian capital finally handed over to Arab authority. The EEF took almost 20,000 Turkish troops prisoner in and around Damascus, virtually eliminating the Ottoman Fourth Army as a fighting force. Only about 4,000 German and Ottoman troops remained in the area south of Aleppo.

Dierk Walter

See also: Arab Revolt of 1916–1918; Husayn ibn Ali; World War I (Palestine and Syria).

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Dandanqan, Battle of (1040)

Battle between the Ghaznavids led by Sultan Masud and the Saljuks led by Tughril Beg and his brother Chagri Beg. The clash in the desert near Dandanqan decided the fate of the two groups forever. Masud inherited a strong position from his father, Mahmud. His northern borders were secure, the grand coalitions of the Indian princes had been destroyed by Mahmud in the east, and the regional dynasties of Iran were vassals and tributaries of the Ghaznavids. Despite this advantageous position, Masud's situation began to deteriorate in the west as several vassals shook off Ghaznavid rule. In the north, Khwarezm was lost and there was an ever mounting pressure from the Qarakhanids and the Turkoman tribes of the steppes.

The large Ghaznavid army that faced the Saljuks at Dandanqan was demoralized by previous losses and by their ruler's inefficiency and jealousy toward his successful emirs, several of whom he had killed or imprisoned. Furthermore, their supply lines were overstretched and the heavily armed Ghaznavid army was running out of water. Tughril and Chaghri's light cavalry was able to defeat the larger Ghaznavid force, which included elephants, because of their mobility and because many of the Ghaznavid ghulams who had served those emirs defected, fed up with suffering the jealousies and insecurities of Masud. The defeat at Dandanqan cost the Ghaznavids their possessions in Khurasan and Iran and allowed the Saljuks to establish themselves as a major power. Masud was deposed and killed by his own emirs in 1041.

Adam Ali

See also: Saljuks.

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Dar al-Islam and Dar al-Harb

The two basic categories—the Abode of Islam and the Abode of War—of political space in Islamic law. Dar al-Islam designates the area under Muslim rule in which Islamic law operates and war is neither necessary nor permissible; Dar al-Harb is territory not under Muslim control. The inhabitants of the Dar al-Harb, the harbis, are non-Muslims who have received a call to convert to Islam. This concept of political space reflects the political unity of the Muslim community (the umma) under Muhammad and the early caliphs. Muhammad and his successors offered their non-Muslim neighbors the choice of conversion or warfare. Because the most fundamental roots of the Sharia are the Koran and the hadith, the findings of the jurists inevitably reflected the early decades of Islam rather than the eighth and ninth centuries when Islamic jurisprudence developed.

The jurists clearly regarded the expansion of the Dar al-Islam to absorb the entire Dar al-Harb as a fundamental duty of Muslim rulers, but they did not envision continuous warfare, given the severe restrictions on the waging of offensive jihad. Two of the four major schools of Sunni law, the Hanafis and the Shafi'is, both envision intermediate territories, Abodes of Truce (Dar al-Muwada'ah or Dar al-Sulh), where the rulers have reached a truce with the Muslims, generally in return for the payment of tribute.

Although the concepts of Dar al-Harb and Dar al-Islam form the basis of political space in Islamic law, they have had little impact on actual statecraft. While

Muslim rulers have occasionally referred to or made use of these concepts, they have not and do not make them the basis of their external policies. Even the contemporary states that claim to govern in accord with the Sharia—the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and the Islamic Republic of Iran—have routine diplomatic relations with non-Muslim states.

Doug Streusand

See also: Sharia, War and; War and Violence in the Koran.

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Dardanelles Campaign (1915)

Naval campaign in which the British and French sought to secure control of the Dardanelles Straits from the Ottoman Empire. Early in World War I, Turkey entered the conflict on the side of Germany and the Central Powers. This created serious supply problems for Russia, as it terminated that country's access to its Western allies by sea from the Mediterranean and through the Dardanelles, Sea of Marmora, and Bosporus into the Black Sea. The Russian government appealed to London for relief, and British leaders, especially First Lord of the Admiralty Winston Churchill, sought a means to respond.

Churchill and Secretary of State for War Field Marshal Horatio Earl Kitchener discussed means whereby this might be accomplished, including inducing Greece to join the war on the Allied side and sending troops to the Dardanelles Peninsula to silence the shore batteries guarding the entrance to the straits. Once this had been accomplished, British capital ships would then steam for Istanbul. The British assumed that bringing the Turkish capital under powerful naval guns would drive that country from the war. Churchill, who disliked inaction, also sought a means of utilizing the Royal Navy in peripheral operations that might shorten the war. He hoped that the plan would expose the Central Powers to a new avenue of attack and reduce the threat of a Turkish attack on British interests in the eastern Mediterranean, especially the Suez Canal.

The original plan came to naught when Greece refused to join the war. At the end of December 1914, Secretary of the War Cabinet Lieutenant Colonel Maurice Hankey suggested that three corps of the new British army units then being raised

in Britain be assigned the task. Most British and French generals opposed this, especially the French who believed that a decision in the war would be reached only on the Western Front in France. First Sea Lord Admiral Sir John Fisher agreed with the plan, but only if it was "immediate" and troops were employed. Kitchener also agreed, especially after a strong appeal from the Russians, but he opposed sending troops. Churchill was determined to press ahead with the plan, utilizing ships alone.

After considerable debate, the British War Council decided on a naval operation alone. Churchill and its other advocates had no doubt that the plan would succeed, driving Turkey from the war while bringing some of the Balkan states in on the Allied side. Fisher agreed to supply some older battleships, and the French also agreed to furnish naval assistance. While the plan was bold and offered great promise, Churchill and its other principal supporters failed to see what Fisher and others grasped—that for the plan to succeed it would require the presence of troops. Churchill did not understand the vulnerability of ships to fire from shore, their inability to silence guns, and the need for troops to go ashore and carry out that task. Although the naval division was available, it was not deployed.

In January 1915, the operation's commander, British Vice Admiral Sackville Carden, gathered an impressive Allied naval force at Lemnos Island, 60 miles from the entrance to the Dardanelles. A reluctant Fisher even supplied the new dreadnought battleship *Queen Elizabeth* and battle cruiser *Inflexible*, the presence of which was believed necessary to deal with the former German battle cruiser *Goeben*, then in Turkish service. The French committed a squadron under Vice Admiral Émile Guépratte. Ultimately, Carden's force included the *Queen Elizabeth*, the *Inflexible*, 16 old predreadnought battleships (four French), and 20 destroyers (six French). Thirty-five minesweepers and a seaplane carrier were also dispatched.

The French battleship *Bouvet* suffers damage by Turkish mines. The Dardanelles Naval Campaign supported the ground troops during heavy combat in the Battle of Gallipoli in 1915. (Reynolds and Taylor, *Collier's Photographic History of the European War*, 1916)

On February 19, the Allies launched an attack against the outer Turkish forts at the entrance of the Dardanelles, but bad weather closed in and suspended operations. The Turks were now fully alerted. On February 25, the Allies renewed their attack, overpowering the shore defenses. The Turkish and German garrisons withdrew, and Allied landing parties went ashore at Kum Kale and Sedd-el-Bahr at the mouth of the straits, destroying the Turkish guns. On March 2, Carden reported to London that, weather permitting, he hoped to complete his mission and be at Istanbul in two weeks.

The Turks now reinforced with troops and brought up two dozen 15-cm (5.9-inch) field howitzers, supplied by the Germans. The battleships were not vulnerable to fire from the howitzers but the minesweepers were, and unless the latter completed their task the battleships could not carry out the next phase of the campaign. British efforts to conduct sweep operations at night were only partially successful. Meanwhile, Churchill pressed Carden to proceed, even to the point of losing some of his ships, before the Germans could send submarines. He also provided intelligence information that the Turks were running out of shells.

Carden dreaded the possibility of losing some of his big ships, and on March 16, two days before the main attack was to occur, his health broke. Rear Admiral Sir John de Robeck took over and on the morning of March 18 led his big ships up the channel. The ships began to shell the forts at Chanak Kale and Kilid Bahr at a range of some eight miles. The Turkish coastal guns and mobile batteries kept up heavy fire against them. Robeck ordered in his second wave to go closer to the forts. Then he ordered in a third wave.

By this time, the main Turkish guns had been virtually silenced. Matters then, however, began to turn against the Allies when the French battleship *Bouvet* took a shell in one of her magazines and blew up, sinking within two minutes with the loss of 640 men. That afternoon the British battle cruiser *Inflexible* struck a mine and was crippled but was able to withdraw. A few minutes later the battleship *Irresistible* also struck a mine and was disabled. Robeck then ordered a withdrawal for the night with the battleships *Ocean* and *Swiftshire* to remain and organize a tow for the *Inflexible*. Instead of concentrating on the salvage operation, the *Ocean* shelled shore installations and was also hit by an explosion that disabled her steering. The *Swiftshire* then retired. That night there was a great explosion, and no trace of the two remaining British ships could be found. Later it was learned that they had run into a small undetected Turkish minefield laid just 10 days before that Allied seaplane patrols had not detected.

Despite these serious losses, Robeck was very close to success. The Turks had expended more than half their ammunition, including almost all that for the heavier guns, the only ones capable of challenging the battleships. In addition, the Allied naval bombardment had severely damaged the Turkish forts and devastated several towns that dominated the straits. Unaware of how close the attack had come

to success, on March 22 Robeck abandoned the offensive over the opposition of his chief of staff Captain Roger Keyes and Churchill in London. The War Council let the decision of the force commander stand. The attempt to force the straits with warships alone had cost the Allies 700 lives, three battleships sunk and two

crippled, and damage to other ships. It also compelled Churchill's resignation from the Admiralty.

With the failure to force the straits with ships alone, efforts shifted to an amphibious landing on the peninsula. On April 25, 1915, some 75,000 Allied troops under British General Sir Ian Hamilton went ashore in landings on both sides of the straits. The Gallipoli shoreline was very rugged and offered only a few small strips of beach that would support the landings. The Turks held the high ground and managed, thanks in part to irresolute British leadership, to contain the landings. Both sides reinforced, but the land fighting settled into trench warfare and stalemate. By early January 1916 the Allies evacuated the peninsula, the only successful aspect of the operation. This route to Istanbul remained blocked for the rest of the war. The door to Russia remained shut, increasing pressures in that country that would lead to revolution in 1917. Instead of a morale-building victory, the French and British had found only failure.

James H. Willbanks

See also: Gallipoli Campaign (1915–1916); Ottoman Army (World War I); Ottoman Empire, Entry into World War I; Ottoman Navy (World War I).

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Dardanelles, British Expedition to the (1807). *See* Anglo-Ottoman War (The Dardanelles Expedition) (1807).

Dawud Pasha (1767–1851)

The last of the powerful Mamluk governors of Iraq. Beginning in the early 18th century, a succession of powerful Georgian mamluks ruled Baghdad, often extending their authority to southern Iraq. Presiding over a tributary system, the mamluks maintained fragile political order in the region, extracted the revenues and defended the region against internal or external challengers. Although the Ottoman sovereignty was acknowledged, the mamluks usually refused to accept material limitations on their rule. Starting in 1749, Iraq had been under the rule of mamluks who nominally recognized Ottoman authority. Born in Georgia, Dawud Pasha was

kidnapped and sold into slavery in his youth. He was eventually bought by Suleiman Pasha, governor of Baghdad. Dawud Pasha's good looks, learning, and ostentatious piety contributed to his rapid advance, as did his marriage to the governor's daughter. Under the patronage of Suleiman Pasha, he became treasurer, *daftardar* (financial officer), and *kahya* (deputy governor). In 1817, he obtained the title of pasha and ruled Iraq for the next 15 years.

Dawud Pasha proved to be a capable administrator and manipulative politician who exploited factional and tribal rivalries to his advantage. Emulating Mehmed Ali of Egypt, he sought to modernize Iraq. He developed a strong central administration and restored peace to the country by ruthlessly subduing rebellious tribes. He removed or exiled tribal leaders not loyal to him and placed a number of his supporters at the heads of the tribes; his conflict with the Kurdish tribes, however, faced opposition from Iran and contributed to the mounting tensions between the Porte and Iran, which led to war in 1821. Although he failed to end the system of capitulations due to British pressure on the Porte, Dawud Pasha pursued comprehensive plans for economic revival of Iraq. He carried out numerous public works and built canals and various buildings. In 1826, he completed the al-Nil canal and irrigation system, which revived Iraqi agriculture. He facilitated the establishment of new manufactures (many of them designed to meet the needs of his army) and promoted trade and commerce. He ensured the safety of highways and facilitated transport of goods by land and water. He hired European experts to modernize his military forces. In 1823, during the Ottoman-Iranian War, he stopped the Iranian invasion of Iraq and later helped the Ottoman authorities quell the Janissary revolt. However, his persistent insubordination, particularly his delay in sending the contribution demanded by the Ottoman government after the Russo-Ottoman War of 1828–1829, caused Sultan Mahmud to remove him from power. In 1831, as Iraq was reeling from a terrible plague and drought, the Ottoman army, under Ali Pasha of Aleppo, defeated Dawud Pasha and ended the era of the mamluk rule in Baghdad. Captured and delivered to Istanbul, Dawud Pasha was well treated and later appointed to important offices throughout the empire. In 1843, he was appointed guardian of the Holy Shrines of Medina, a position he held until his death in 1851. He was buried opposite the tomb of Caliph Osman (Othman).

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Ottoman-Iranian Wars (18th–19th Centuries); Russo-Ottoman Wars.

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Definitive Treaty (1812)

Treaty of military alliance between Iran and Britain. Also known as the Treaty of Friendship and Alliance or the Tehran Treaty of 1812, it marked a major change in Iran's foreign policy after the failed Treaty of Finkenstein (1807) between Iran and France. The treaty, consisting of 12 articles and signed on March 17, 1812, was based on the Preliminary Treaty negotiated by London and Tehran in March 1809. Under its terms, Iran pledged to declare all alliances formerly contracted with European powers null and void and promised to stop any European power that might attempt to cross her territory to reach India. Britain pledged financial aid (200,000 tomans) or troop reinforcements if a European power attempted to invade Iran. The treaty also made provisions for British officers to train the Iranian army and for an increased Iranian naval presence on the Caspian Sea. Britain promised not to interfere in the conflicts between Iran and Afghanistan, and the shah pledged to provide military aid if Afghans attacked the British interests. The treaty quickly became problematic as during the Russo-Iranian War of 1804–1813 Britain found itself in a difficult position of having to assist Iran against Russia with whom London was allied against Napoleonic France. While British officers, serving as observers, aided the Iranian army against Russia, the British government pushed for renegotiating the Definitive Treaty, which led to the signing of the Tehran Treaty of 1814.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Anglo-Iranian Agreements; Anglo-Iranian War (1856–1857); Russo-Iranian Wars.

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Delhi Sultanate

A series of Turko-Afghan Muslim dynasties that ruled India from Delhi during the 12th through 16th centuries. The sultanate had its origins in the capture of Delhi by Muhammad Ghuri in 1192. After Ghuri's assassination in 1206, one of his generals, Qutb-ud-Din Aybak, who had been a slave in the military, declared

himself sultan; that was the beginning of the Slave dynasty and the Delhi sultanate. Qutb-ud-Din's successor, Iltutmish, had also been a slave in the military. Iltutmish succeeded Qutb-ud-Din in 1211. During his reign, he kept the Mongol army out of Delhi and took several strategic cities. After Iltutmish died in 1236, he was succeeded by his daughter, Sultana Razia (Raziyya). However, she was deposed after only a few years. Following a power struggle, Ghiyas-ud-Din Balban gained effective control of the government in 1246 and officially became sultan 20 years later. Balban continued to keep the Mongol army at bay during his reign, which lasted until 1287.

The Slave dynasty finally fell in 1290 when Jalal-ud-Din Firuz Khalji took control, beginning the Khalji dynasty. He was soon murdered and succeeded by his nephew, Ala al-Din Khalji, who led conquests all over India and spread Islamic rule throughout the subcontinent. As his predecessors had done, Ala al-Din held off the Mongols and expanded the sultanate's power base. In 1325, the Tughluq dynasty replaced the Khalji dynasty. The Tughluq dynasty was founded by Ghiyas-ud-Din Tughluq, but he was soon replaced by Muhammad ibn Tughluq, who tried to reorganize several administrative aspects of the sultanate. Initially, he also continued the expansion of the empire. Muhammad was an unpopular ruler, though, and his reign saw many revolts. By the time of his death in 1351, much of the territory he and previous sultans had gained was once again under Hindu control, including the Deccan Plateau in southern India, which was controlled by the newly established Bahmani sultanate.

Muhammad ibn Tughluq's successors were unable to maintain a unified empire, and central control was gradually reduced. The Delhi sultanate was effectively ruined when the Turko-Mongolian leader Timur sacked Delhi in 1398. The Sayyid dynasty (1414–1451) followed the Tughluq and was in turn followed by the Lodi dynasty (1451–1526), but neither could claim much real power. The Delhi sultanate was ended once and for all with the establishment of the Mughal Empire following the First Battle of Panipat in 1526.

Amy H. Black

See also: Ala al-Din Khalji (Alauddin Khilji); Babur; India, Muslim Conquest (to 16th Century); Panipat, Battles of (1398, 1526, 1556, 1761).

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Delhi, Sack of (1739)

Capture and looting of the Mughul capital by the forces of Nadir Shah; one of the lowest points of the once-mighty Mughal Empire. The amount of loot that was taken from the city was almost beyond belief. The Persian conqueror, Nadir Shah, allowed the Mughal emperor to remain on his throne and even advised him on how to do a better job of governing.

By 1739, the Mughal Empire had declined in power. The emperor, Muhammad Shah, was a weak ruler and had already lost several provinces to the Marathas. He made the mistake of giving aid to the Afghans in their war against the Persians. The ruler of Persia, Nadir Shah, decided to punish the Mughals for their interference after he defeated the Afghans. He sent two envoys to Muhammad Shah to ask that he not allow Afghan refugees to enter Mughal lands, but Muhammad Shah ignored his request. With 50,000 men, Nadir Shah forced Kabul to surrender in September 1738. He then marched toward the Punjab region and captured the Khyber Pass. His army brushed aside the Mughal soldiers guarding Jamrud and Peshwar. On December 27, he crossed the Indus River at Attock and defeated the governor of Lahore. Muhammad Shah had ridiculed Nadir Shah for attacking with such a small force, but he finally had to take the invasion seriously. His advisers convinced him



The throne of the Mughal emperors, known as the Peacock Throne, at the Red Fort in Delhi, India. Nadir Shah took the jewel encrusted gold throne to Persia after he sacked Delhi in 1793. (Shutterstock)

that he had to lead the army personally to stop the Persian invaders. He gathered a huge army of almost 300,000 men and 2,000 elephants. The Mughal army marched to Karnal, where it entrenched near the canal of Ali Mardan Khan. Nadir Shah arrived near Karnal several days later.

Nadir Shah decided to bypass the Mughal encampment. He slipped around the flank and set up an ambush on part of the Indian army under Burhan-ul-Mulk, governor of Awadh. He captured the governor's baggage train, and when Burhan-ul-Mulk tried to recapture it, a pitched battle ensued. Burhan-ul-Mulk's troops made up the right wing of the Mughal army, and Muhammad Shah and his other commanders refused to come to their aid. The Battle of Karnal took place on February 24, 1739. The Indian soldiers fought bravely, but they were overwhelmed by the heavy musket fire from the Persians. The Mughals were routed and retreated to their entrenched camp. Burhan-ul-Mulk advised Nadir Shah to negotiate a ransom with Muhammad Shah. The shaken emperor agreed, and Nadir Shah allowed him to return to Delhi.

Nadir Shah entered Delhi in a triumphant parade on March 20. The next day was the Persian New Year's Day, and Nadir Shah ordered prayers for him be recited in all the mosques in Delhi. On March 22, Indian residents of Delhi began to riot against the Persian occupiers. Some Persians were killed, and a rumor spread through his soldiers that Nadir Shah had been assassinated. On March 23, Nadir Shah ordered his soldiers to begin to massacre the inhabitants of Delhi. The slaughter went on for eight hours before Muhammad Shah managed to convince Nadir Shah to call it off. Between 20,000 and 30,000 Indians were killed. The soldiers also looted and burned much of Delhi.

Nadir Shah assessed a ransom against every citizen of Delhi. Before leaving, he lectured Muhammad Shah on the art of government. He allowed Muhammad Shah to remain in power, as Nadir Shah had not intended to conquer or destroy the Mughal Empire. He did annex the province of Kabul, though. The treasure that the Persians took from Delhi was staggering. They took 700 million rupees and carried off the crown jewels, the famous Kohinoor diamond, and the Peacock Throne, which was encrusted with jewels. The Persians took much furniture and household valuables from the palaces as well. One thousand elephants, 7,000 horses, 10,000 camels, and skilled craftsmen from Delhi were also part of the booty. Nadir Shah's baggage train stretched for miles on the trip back to Persia.

Tim J. Watts

See also: Karnal, Battle of (1739); Nadir Shah.

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Devshirme System

As the Ottoman conquests spread rapidly across the southeastern Balkan peninsula in the 1360s, the Ottomans enlisted numerous prisoners of war as soldiers, just as previous Islamic rulers, including those of pre-Ottoman Turkish Anatolia, had done. Yet it was the remarkable devshirme system of recruitment that caught the attention of outsiders. This effectively enslaved some of the sultan's own non-Islamic subjects and was therefore illegal under Islamic law, which stipulated that conquered non-Muslims should be demilitarized and protected. The devshirme—in practice if not in theory—also involved virtually enforced conversion to Islam, which was certainly contrary to Islamic law. This devshirme system probably began in the 1380s, though the word itself did not appear in written records until 1438, around the time infantry and cavalry recruited in this way became military elite. For the next two centuries or more the devshirme supplied the Ottoman state with its most dedicated servants, both military and administrative. The principle was based upon recruiting one child from every 40 non-Muslim households, roughly once every five years. In its fully developed form this devshirme system enlisted between 1,000 and 3,000 youths per year. It would begin with an edict from the sultan. A middle-ranking officer accompanied by several Surucu "drovers," a secretary, and a supply of uniforms, then went to the selected area where Christian priests were responsible for assembling boys with their certificates of baptism. Not all devshirme conscripts entered the Janissary corps, however. The best were trained for government service as administrators and bureaucrats. The next best were selected for the kapi kulu, or palace, cavalry regiments, the remainder becoming Janissary or Bostanci infantry, though those of lowest ability may have been employed as government laborers.

Once the shocking novelty of the devshirme wore off, many families actually volunteered their children for such a potentially good career. Both Christian and Muslim parents reportedly offered bribes so that their children would be accepted. Officially, however, the only Muslims included in the devshirme were Bosnian Slavs whose families had converted to Islam. They normally skipped the first stage of training and went directly into an elite Bostanci unit. In 1568, a few sons of retired Janissaries were allowed into the corps, and from 1582 onward freeborn men were permitted to become protégés of the Yeniceri Agasi, or Commander of Janissaries. By the mid-16th century many soldiers apparently favored phasing out the devshirme, thus opening up opportunities for their own offspring, and within

a couple of generations most recruits were probably such sons of Janissaries. Finally, in 1594, the ranks were officially opened to all Muslim volunteers, and the devshirme effectively stopped in 1648. However, the accompanying training system remained in place and a final, though unsuccessful, European devshirme was attempted in 1703. By then, the main source of "human booty" was via the Crimean Tatar khanate of the Ukraine and southern Russia, but even that ended with the Russian annexation of Crimea in 1783.

David Nicolle

See also: Janissaries; Ottoman Army (Early 19th Century).

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Dhofar (Dhufar) Rebellion (1965–1975)

A prolonged insurrection in the Sultanate of Oman. The rebellion began as a series of sporadic attacks against the Omani government in protest of despotic policies of Sultan Said bin Taymur. The revolt was centered in the Dhofar province of Oman, where, by 1965, the insurgents, led by tribal leader Mussalim bin Nafl, established the Dhofar Liberation Front (DLF), After receiving clandestine Saudi support, the DLF increased the intensity of attacks, targeting the British air base at Salalah, oil company installations, and the sultan himself in 1966. The government's punitive policies only further escalated the conflict as they alienated increasing numbers of tribespeople, who then joined the rebel forces. By 1968, the rebels embraced radical communist ideology and proclaimed the establishment of the Popular Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arabian Gulf. Supported from abroad (by nations such as China and South Yemen), the rebels established bases in the newly established People's Democratic Republic of Yemen and launched major attacks on coastal cities in Oman, occasionally targeting the administrative center of Dhofar, Salalah. The insurgency reached its height in 1970 when attacks were carried out

on Omani military installations. In the ensuing political turmoil, Sultan Said was overthrown by his son Qabus who sought international help against the rebels (Britain, Jordan, India, and Iran responded) and launched vigorous counterinsurgency operations throughout the country. The Omani military was expanded and modernized with the help of British instructors. Iranian military assistance allowed the Omani military to build a series of defensive fortified lines that gradually squeezed the rebel-controlled territory. By 1972, the rebels were driven into the mountains, and by 1975, the last rebel-held town, Rakhyut, was recaptured. In October 1975, the Omani forces suppressed the remaining rebel pockets and declared the 10-year conflict over on December 11, 1975.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Yemen, Civil War in (1962–1970); Yemenite War (1979).

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Didgori, Battle of (1121)

A conflict between the kingdom of Georgia and a Muslim coalition at Didgori near Tbilisi in August 1121. The settlement of large numbers of nomadic Turkomans in Transcaucasia in the late 11th century turned the occupied territory into pastures, undermining local agriculture and economy. In 1089, a bloodless coup d'état forced King Giorgi II of Georgia to abdicate in favor of his 16-year-old son David IV. In 1099, taking advantage of the arrival of the First Crusade in Syria and Palestine (1096–1099), David ceased paying annual tribute to the Great Saljuks and stopped their seasonal migrations into Georgia. He then continued his expansion throughout southern Transcaucasia and Armenia in 1105–1120. In 1118, he also reorganized the Georgian army, resettling some 40,000 families of Kipchaks from the northern Caucasus, who provided him with a steady supply of manpower.

Concerned about the rapid rise of this Christian state, in 1121 the Great Saljuk sultan Mahmud formed a coalition of Muslim states and declared a holy war on Georgia. The coalition included the Artuqid ruler Najm al-Din Ilghazi; Toghrul ibn Muhammad, the Saljuk ruler of Arran (in modern Azerbaijan) and Nakhichevan; Dubays ibn Sadaqa, from Hilla on the west coast of the Persian Gulf;

and Tughan-Arslan, lord of Arzin, Bidlis, and Dvin. Īlghazi had just celebrated his great victory over the Franks of Antioch at the Battle of Ager Sanguinis (1119) and enjoyed a reputation as an experienced commander. The size of the Muslim army is still a matter of debate, with numbers ranging from a fantastic 600,000 men (as given by Walter the Chancellor and Matthew of Edessa) to 400,000 (Smpadt Sparapet's Chronicle), while estimates of Georgian historians vary between 100,000 and 250,000 men. Although all of these numbers are exaggerated, all sources indicate that the Muslims made massive preparations and vastly outnumbered the Georgians. In midsummer 1121, the Muslim troops advanced along various routes to Georgia and bivouacked on a plain near Didgori, about a day's march from Tbilisi, in early August. The Georgians mustered some 56,000 men, including 500 Alans and 200 Franks from the Holy Land. On August 11, 1121, King David split them into two divisions with a larger force under his personal command and a smaller detachment, under his son Demetre, hidden in reserve behind the nearby heights with orders to strike the enemy flank at a given signal.

According to David's battle plan, on the morning of August 12 about 200 cavalrymen left the Georgian camp and rode over to the enemy side, indicating that they wanted to defect. The Muslim commanders not only allowed them into the camp but also gathered to meet them. At a signal, the Georgians attacked them, killing and wounding most of the Muslim leadership. Observing confusion in the enemy camp, King David ordered a general attack on the enemy positions while Prince Demetre charged the enemy flank. With their leadership in disarray, the Muslims in the front line failed to offer any resistance, while those at the rear soon became so disorganized that the entire army eventually fled in disorder. The Georgian troops pursued them for three days, putting many to the sword. After their triumph, Georgian armies were victorious in the neighboring territories of Armenia, Shirwan, and the northern Caucasus, greatly expanding Georgia's sphere of influence. The Battle of Didgori entered Georgian national consciousness as "the miraculous victory" (Georg. *dzlevai sakvirveli*) and is one of the apogees of Georgian history.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Ager Sanguinis, Battle of (1119); Basian, Battle of (1203); First Crusade (1096–1099); Georgian-Saljuk Wars (11th–13th Centuries).

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Diu, Battle of (1509)

Naval battle that reaffirmed Portuguese dominion of the Indian Ocean. Diu is a small island with a sheltered anchorage, three to four fathoms in depth, at the mouth of the Gulf of Cambay (Khambhat). Diu is separated from the mainland of Gujarat by narrow shallows.

After Vasco da Gama opened the sea route from Portugal around Africa to India in 1498, the Portuguese sought to control the flow of trade, generally through force. They cowed local princes into concessions, but many fought back, including the ruler of Calicut and the Muslim shah and Gujarati merchants of Cambay. Arab traders, who had long dominated the westbound trade of India, sought assistance from the Mamluk sultan of Egypt against the Portuguese Christian interlopers. In 1508, the Mamluks, with the help of Ragusan shipwrights, constructed six armed round ships and six war galleys at Suez and sent them to aid the Gujaratis. Thus far the Portuguese had prevailed. They usually sailed in line with their big carracks and handier caravels, depending on cannon to avoid boarding fights and beating their more numerous but less well gunned foes. In 1502, Vasco da Gama defeated the fleet of Calicut and established his base of operations at Cochin. In 1508, Lourenço de Almeida, son of the Portuguese viceroy of India and a brilliant naval commander, defeated off Chaul (near Bombay) a Malay fleet from Malacca. Soon after, the combined Gujarati and Egyptian fleet, including the ships and galleys from Suez, cornered and overwhelmed Almeida's fleet at Chaul. Almeida was killed.

Viceroy Francisco de Almeida mobilized all available forces to avenge his son's death and recover Portuguese control of the Indian Ocean. To prevent interference, he detained his appointed successor, Afghans de Albuquerque. With 19 ships and caravels and more than 1,200 men, mostly Portuguese, Almeida sailed from Cochin, bombarding hostile ports en route. On February 21, 1509, he caught the combined Egyptian Gujarati fleet, along with allies from Calicut, in the anchorage at Diu.

In the Portuguese epic *The Lusiads* (*Os Lusíadas*, 1572) Luis de Camoens, himself a later veteran of service in India, vividly describes Almeida's triumph. Almeida used his cannon to good effect to scatter the motley fleet of Calicut, smash the "cautious" Egyptian galleys of Malik Yaz, then shoot up and board the Gujarati ships of Mir Hussein, filling the bay with dismembered bodies. In one bloody action Almeida shattered Muslim naval power in the western Indian Ocean. It was a victory of better-gunned sailing ships over a larger fleet of galleys and smaller vessels in confined waters and lacking the support of fortifications.

At Jiddah in 1517 the overconfident Portuguese would encounter galleys backed by forts and meet defeat. The Portuguese did not occupy Diu until 1535, and then by treaty with Bahadur Shah of Gujarat. Fortified, it withstood massive sieges in 1538 and 1545.

Almeida's victory at Diu provided the foundation on which Albuquerque consolidated Portugal's Asian empire.

Peter O'M. Pierson

See also: Mamluk Sultanate; Portuguese Colonial Wars in Arabia.

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Djerba, Battle of (1560)

Decisive naval battle between the Ottoman and Spanish fleets. The mid-16th century proved to be unsuccessful for Spanish efforts to contain Ottoman operations in the Mediterranean Sea. The Ottoman victory at Preveza in 1538 was followed by victories over Holy Roman Emperor Charles V in Algiers in 1541 and Tripoli in 1551. By 1558, the Ottoman navy led by Piale Pasha raided the Balearic Islands and the Spanish coastline. In response, King Phillip II of Spain dispatched Juan, Duke of Medinaceli, who captured the nearby island of Djerba (March 7, 1560). However, this initial success was short lived. On May 11, the Christian fleet was destroyed at anchor by Admiral Piale Pasha and the Corsair Turgut Reis. The surviving European troops found refuge in the fort where a 5,000-strong garrison under Alvaro de Sande managed to hold out till July 31, 1560. The victory at Djerba marked the height of Ottoman naval dominance in the Mediterranean. Five years later their supremacy would be weakened in the failed expedition to Malta and, even more so, in the decisive defeat at Lepanto in 1571.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Piale (Piyale) Pasha; Preveza, Battle of (1538); Turgut Reis.

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Dorylaion, Battle of (1097)

A battle fought between the armies of the First Crusade (1096–1099) and the forces of Kilij Arslan I (1092–1107), Saljuk sultan of Rum, and his allies on the edge of the Anatolian plateau near the city of Dorylaion (mod. Eskişlehir, Turkey). Qilij Arslan had been absent from his capital of Nicaea (mod. İznik, Turkey) when the Crusader siege began on May 14, 1097, and his attempt to relieve it failed on May 16. On June 19, Nicaea surrendered, and on June 26, the Crusaders began their march across Anatolia.

Neither the reasons for their choice of direction nor the precise nature of their route are known. The sources make clear that, as a result of divided command, their army divided into a vanguard led by Bohemond of Taranto and a larger main force, with substantial elements straggling between the two. This gave Qilij Arslan the opportunity to destroy the vanguard, which was outnumbered by his army of around 6,000, and thus to defeat the whole Crusade in detail. On July 1, the Turks ambushed the vanguard; Bohemond rallied the troops and sent for help, but the cavalry were driven back on their camp in a confused mass of tents, horses, and people. The Turks were drawn into a close-quarter fight lasting from early morning

This 19th-century engraving by Gustave Doré depicts the Battle of Dorylaeum in July 1097. The Muslim contingent was composed of mounted Saljuk and Danishmend Turks; the crusaders were in two divisions under Bohemond I and Raymond IV of Toulouse. The battle was the first major victory for the crusaders. (Ridpath, John Clark, *Ridpath's History of the World*, 1901)

till noon, when the main crusader force routed them. The sources are vague on the precise location but speak of a battle near Dorylaion. The crusaders could hardly have reached that city in the time available, but the encounter was certainly where two valleys meet, and the most likely place is north of modern Bozuyuk.

John France

See also: First Crusade (1096–1099); Rum, Sultanate of; Saljuks.

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Dost Mohammed (ca. 1793–1863)

The first ruler of what is today the country of Afghanistan, Dost Mohammed forged the several tribes in the region into a unified state. He created the first Afghan Army, which eventually destroyed a British force during the First Anglo-Afghan War. Placed in the difficult position of ruling a buffer state between the powerful Russian and British empires, Dost Mohammed proved himself to be a skillful player on the stage of world diplomacy.

Born around 1793 in Kandahar, Dost Mohammed was the son of Painda Khan, a powerful tribal leader in southern Afghanistan. Afghanistan was ruled by several large tribes at that time, all of which were battling one another to increase their power in the region; there were also several internal disputes for leadership of each tribe. There was no formal state of Afghanistan, only large groups of ethnically Afghan peoples. Painda Khan ruled the second most powerful tribe in the region and had been fighting against the most powerful tribe, led by Zaman Shah, for several years. In 1801, Zaman Shah captured Painda Khan and executed him. Painda Khan's favorite son, Fateh Khan, made an alliance with Zaman Shah's younger brother, Mahmud Shah, to destroy Zaman Shah. After they successfully brought Zaman Shah down later that same year (and blinded him in the process, which made him illegible to rule under Islamic law), Mahmud Shah became the dominant leader in the southern region of Afghanistan, and Fateh Khan served as the power behind the throne.

It was against that backdrop of internecine war that Dost Mohammed grew up, eventually joining his brother Fateh Khan. As a young soldier, Dost Mohammed's wild behavior earned him the appellation "Little Wolf," and he soon emerged as one of the most gifted and ambitious of Painda Khan's many sons. Beginning in 1818, Afghanistan was once again plunged into civil war after the murder of Fateh Khan by

Mahmud Shah's son, Kamran Shah. Fateh Khan's 21 brothers swore to avenge him, and during the unrest that followed, most of them succeeded in knocking Mahmud Shah's family from power, assuming control over various cities and provinces in Afghanistan and extending their control to other provinces in the region as well.

In 1826, Dost Mohammed inherited control of the city of Kabul after the death of one of his other brothers. Not only did he now command Afghanistan's largest city, but he had also been Fateh Khan's favorite brother. Those two facts convinced Dost Mohammed to launch a campaign to unite all of Afghanistan under his control. Over the next 10 years, he either convinced his brothers to defer to him or drove them from power. He also conquered several territories in the region that had either remained in the hands of Mahmud Shah's family or were held by other tribal leaders. By 1837, much of the territory that makes up present-day Afghanistan was under his control.

In an effort to consolidate his power, Dost Mohammed focused his attention on creating a modern, standing army. The Afghans had had little contact with Europeans at that point, but Dost Mohammed brought several Western adventurers to his kingdom to shape and train his military force. The American, British, and French soldiers who came to Afghanistan had a formidable task before them. Because tribal government existed in much of Afghanistan, Dost Mohammed could only implement reforms on the small number of troops under his personal command, as local tribal leaders generally rejected any attempt to modernize or reform their forces. An additional leftover from the feudal-tribal system was the selection and elevation of officers based on patronage and influence rather than on merit.

Furthermore, Dost Mohammed's treasury fluctuated tremendously, making it difficult to institute a system whereby his soldiers would get paid regularly. Nevertheless, he made every attempt to bring the soldiers on a regular pay schedule instead of allowing them to earn their incomes through booty and plunder as they had traditionally done. Financial instability also meant that the army had a difficult time maintaining adequate supplies. The army did experience tremendous change during that period, however. Most notable of the many reforms introduced by Dost Mohammed were Western-style uniforms for his troops and the formation of fighting units into infantry, cavalry, and artillery divisions. Afghan forces also became more adept in their employment of weaponry.

Dost Mohammed viewed the establishment of a respectable military force as the key component in unifying Afghanistan politically under his rule. He also introduced some limited reforms that affected the civilian population as well, however, including uniform tax and customs policies, the establishment of the rupee as the country's currency, and a more equitable justice system (although the latter was still highly subject to Dost Mohammed's personal will).

As Dost Mohammed secured his rule within Afghanistan, foreign affairs increasingly claimed his attention. Since the 18th century, Afghanistan had served as a buffer state between the Russian Empire to the north and British-held India to the south, the "jewel" of the British Empire. In the mid-1830s, Dost Mohammed began to see those two great powers as another means to consolidate his hold on his own territory and possibly to reclaim territory that was under the control of other powers in the region. In particular, he was interested in the region of Herat to the west (which was still held by Fateh Khan's killer, Kamran Shah) and Peshawar to the east (which was controlled by India's Maharaja Prince Ranjit Singh).

Dost Mohammed first sought an alliance with the British, offering to help British governor-general Lord Auckland stave off any encroachments by the Russians in return for control over Peshawar (the British had recently brought Ranjit Singh within their sphere of influence). Auckland refused to make any such deal, and in response, Dost Mohammed invited a Russian envoy to his court in 1837. Alarmed by a possible Russian-Afghan alliance, Auckland launched what became known as the First Anglo-Afghan War in 1838, deciding that once the British had beaten Dost Mohammed, they would replace him on the throne with a rival leader, Shah Shuja. The Afghan military proved to be no match for the British, who captured Kabul on July 23, 1839. On November 2, 1840, Dost Mohammed surrendered to the British, who brought him to Delhi and placed him under house arrest.

The war continued, however, and Shah Shuja was unable to establish a hold in Afghanistan. The British also found it impossible to hold the territory they conquered in Afghanistan against the unrelenting pressure of tribal leaders, who harassed British troops and repeatedly severed British lines of communication. The British Army eventually attempted to retreat from Kabul in January 1842, but its soldiers were massacred by the Afghans, led by Dost Mohammed's son Muhammad Akbar Khan. With the British government in India now viewing Afghanistan as a wild, ungovernable place, it allowed Dost Mohammed to return to his country in the hopes that he could restore order.

Dost Mohammed arrived back in Afghanistan later in 1842 and quickly reclaimed his throne. The British invasion had sparked feelings of nationalism among the Afghans, who began to see the advantages of banding together as a single nation for the first time. Those feelings of patriotism and xenophobia, particularly toward the British, greatly assisted Dost Mohammed in regaining control over the Afghan people. He spent the next several years reasserting his authority over the various tribes and regions of the country and was eventually successful in restoring order and unity shortly before his death on June 9, 1863, even capturing Herat just days before he died. Despite his earlier problems with the British, he proved a faithful ally in the years after his restoration, even providing the British with limited support during the Indian Rebellion of 1857. His death plunged Afghanistan

into another period of internecine wars, as his 27 sons battled to succeed him. His third son, Amir Sher Ali, eventually took his place.

Elizabeth Dubrulle

See also: Amanullah Khan; Anglo-Afghan War (1839–1842); Anglo-Afghan War (1878–1880); Great Game.

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Druze-Ottoman Wars

A series of conflicts between the Ottoman Imperial authorities and the Druze population in Syria and Lebanon. The Druze trace their origins to the Ismaili sect of the Shiism and venerated the Fatimid caliph al Hakim (d. 1021) as an incarnation of God. After the caliph's death, the sect was persecuted by the later Fatimid rulers and scattered throughout Lebanon and Syria, where it became politically important in the mid-11th century. The Ottoman-Mamluk War of 1516–1517 and subsequent Ottoman occupation of Syria-Lebanon brought the Druze under the Ottoman authority; Sultan Selim I (1467–1520) initially placated the Druze by naming Fakhr ad-Din (d. 1544) of the house of Ma'n the emir ("native ruler") of the Druze in the Ottoman Empire.

However, throughout the Ottoman period (1516–1918), the Druzes constituted a thorn in the side of the Turks. In 1584, while a convoy of Janissaries was passing through Lebanon, they were attacked and robbed of large sums of money that had been collected as taxes in Egypt and Palestine. Infuriated by such brazen attack, Sultan Murad III (r. 1574–1595) organized a punitive expedition against Yusuf Sayfa in whose district the convoy was robbed. The sultan then accused the Druze leader, Fakhr ad-Din's son Qurqumaz (r. 1544–1585), of organizing the attack and sent Ibrahim Pasha, wali of Egypt, to exact punishment. Ibrahim acted with particular savagery, slaughtering the 600-man Druze delegation that greeted him at Ayn Sawfar and then sacking dozens of villages, killing thousands more. Qurqumaz took refuge in the mountains near Jazzin, where he died after being poisoned by an agent of the Ottoman sultan. He left a teenage son, Fakhr ad-Din II, who assumed the title of amir of Jabal al-Duruz (mountain of the Druze as part of Lebanon was then known) in 1590.

Despite his age and diminutive stature, Fakhr proved to be a rather capable statesman who desired to expand his authority to greater Lebanon and sever his ties with the Porte. A consummate master of diplomacy, he reconciled with the Ottoman authorities and used their support to consolidate his power in northern Lebanon. He continued to maintain friendly relations with Constantinople while also cultivating relations with European states that opposed the Turks. Aware of the Ottoman preoccupation with wars in Europe and eastern Anatolia, Fakhr expanded his authority to southern Lebanon and negotiated an alliance with Grand Duke Ferdinand I of Tuscany in 1608; the agreement contained a secret military provision directed against the Ottoman Empire. Alarmed by this development, Ottoman Sultan Ahmed (r. 1589–1617) sent Hafiz Pasha, wali of Damascus, on a punitive expedition against the rebellious Druze in 1613. At first Hafiz Pasha was unable to penetrate deep into the mountains of Lebanon where Fakhr was established, but the Ottoman blockade of the coast soon forced Fakhr to flee to Italy. He spent five years there, seeking in vain European support against the Porte. In 1618, he reconciled with the new Ottoman Sultan Osman II (1604–1622), who allowed him to return to Lebanon, even though Fakhr continued to maintain close relations with Tuscany. Fakhr quickly reclaimed his authority in north and south Lebanon and even gained new territories that the Porte granted to him in 1622. Two years later the sultan acknowledged him as the lord of "Arabistan," which stretched from Aleppo to Egypt. Yet, Fakhr's continued political ambitions soon led to renewed tensions with the Ottoman authorities, although the Druze leader was able to prevent Ottoman military action in 1625 through a generous bribery to the Ottoman officials at Constantinople (Istanbul) . But by early 1630s, Ottoman Sultan Murad IV (1609–1640), while planning his campaign against the Safavid Iran, could no longer ignore the presence of a rebellious Druze leader whose allegiance seemed to be in question. So in 1633, the sultan ordered Kuchuk Ahmad Pasha, wali of Damascus, to launch a land expedition against Fakhr while the Ottoman fleet under Jafar Pasha blockaded the Lebanese coast. Fakhr's son died gallantly in battle at Wadi al-Taym in 1634. Fakhr retreated deep into the mountains as his calls for help went unheeded in Europe. He was finally captured and beheaded in Constantinople in April 1635.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Fatimids; Mamluk-Ottoman War.

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Egypt, Arab Conquest of (640–642)

Egypt had been part of the Byzantine Empire since the division of the Roman Empire into the Western Empire, ruled from Rome, and the Eastern Empire, including Egypt, ruled from Constantinople. The Persians under Khosrau II managed to capture Egypt in the early seventh century, but the Byzantine Emperor Heraclius retook it soon afterward. Under the Byzantines, Egypt was ruled from the port city of Alexandria. After the death of the Prophet Muhammad in 632, Abu Bakr was appointed caliph and united Arabia under his authority, seeking to expand his rule through Syria and then to Egypt through military conquest and conversion.

After capturing Palestine and Syria, the Muslim armies considered it feasible to attack Egypt from Palestine. This was made easier when the Byzantine practice of dividing their forces into a number of garrisons made this app. As a result, in December 639 about 4,000 Arab soldiers marched to Rafah and received messengers from the caliph. The local commander, Amr ibn al-As, decided not to read the messages as he thought they would probably ask him to call off the invasion. The story was that he crossed into Egypt and then read the message, which told him that if he was still in Palestine then he should not attack, but if he was already on Egyptian soil, then he should proceed. He continued the attack through Sinai and then laid siege to Fayoum before heading south. He received reinforcements from Arabia in June, and in the following month, he defeated the Byzantines at the Battle of Heliopolis. With that success he turned back to Fayoum, captured it, and then took over most of Egypt, entering into a treaty with Cyrus of Alexandria, the Byzantine administrator. The Byzantine emperor Heraclius repudiated the treaty, and this caused problems for the Copts, the Egyptian Christians, some of whom supported the Byzantines, and others the Muslims. In February 641, the Muslim forces marched toward Alexandria, which they captured in September. Subsequently, they took Nubia and then used Egypt for their takeover of northern Africa.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Amr ibn al-As (al-Aasi); North Africa, Muslim Conquest of; Nubia, Relations with Egypt.

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Egypt, British Colonialism in

Technically part of the Ottoman Empire, 19th-century Egypt enjoyed de facto independence from the time Mehmed Ali (1769–1848) became its viceroy in 1805. Under his grandson Ismail (1830–1895), the nation accumulated a tremendous foreign debt that peaked at £91 million in 1875. Even after negotiations reduced this amount, Ismail had to allocate 66 percent of government revenues to paying back European banks and bondholders.

Desperate for ready cash, Ismail sold Egypt's share of the newly opened Suez Canal to Great Britain in 1875. This was hardly enough to cover even a year of expenditures but greatly increased England's interest in Egypt. Four years later, Britain and France forced Ismail to accept Dual Control, under which a British and French administrator supervised the collection and disbursement of all Egyptian revenues. Obstruction to this loss of sovereignty led to Ismail's replacement by his son Tewfik (1852–1892) during the same year.

Under Tewfik, Egypt sought to appease the Great Powers by paying down the debt as quickly as possible. This entailed massive cutbacks in government spending plus a significant increase in the number of French and British advisers to the Egyptian government. A nationalist reaction fueled the rise of the army officer Ahmad Arabi (1841–1911), whose 1881 coup briefly established a new government. As crowds yelled "Egypt for the Egyptians," and with Arabi's regime suggesting renegotiation of the debt, Britain intervened, landing troops at Alexandria and Suez.

Arabi's revolution ended when the Egyptian Army was defeated by a larger British force at Tel el-Kebir (September 13, 1882). Foreign rule ensued, and England dominated Egypt from September 1882 until June 1956. The period of 1882–1914 is often referred to as the "veiled protectorate," when Britain controlled Egyptian affairs behind a screen of Egyptian politicians and civil servants. This veil lifted at the beginning of World War I, when Great Britain openly declared its domination of Egypt.

The veil provided useful diplomatic cover for England, as France, Italy, and Germany sought a diplomatic cause to inject their own authority over Egypt. Outright colonial status for Egypt, without the support of at least one other Great Power, would have placed Britain in a difficult position. The fiction that Egypt was still part of the Ottoman Empire and that British officials were simply advisers allowed room

to maneuver in the complex world of late 19th-century diplomacy. It also diffused local opposition, thus necessitating a garrison of only 5,000 soldiers.

Britain's success is also attributed to a string of energetic proconsuls: Evelyn Baring, Lord Cromer (1841–1917); Eldon Gorst (1861–1911); and Horatio Kitchener (1850–1916). Challenged with paying off the debt by cutting government expenditures while supporting economic expansion and maintaining order, this trio was markedly successful. The three men focused on expanding agricultural production through improved irrigation plus a strenuous anticorruption campaign. By 1889, the Egyptian government produced a surplus; six years later this reached the very considerable figure of £1 million. The debt crisis was over.

Despite economic improvement, Britain's hold over Egypt was never popular outside select financial circles and certain non-Muslim groups. Egyptian Muslims were at best neutral and more frequently were hostile. Native opposition to British domination centered on Abbas II Hilmi (1874–1944) and his protégé, Mustafa Kamil (1874–1908). The former was Egypt's khedive, heir to Tewfik, but very much under the thumb of Baring, Gorst, and Kitchener. The latter, an up-and-coming lawyer, became a powerful nationalist leader and editor of a popular newspaper, *Al-Liwa* (The Standard).

Egyptian nationalists were drawn mainly from the ranks of the Egyptian elites: educators, lawyers, writers, and government officials. Although divided by competing visions for an independent Egypt, most could agree on the need to end British control. Mustafa Kamil argued that this was best accomplished via nonviolent opposition and diplomacy. The latter tactic involved seeking support from France. After 1904's Entente Cordiale, when Britain swapped its interests in Morocco for a similar cession of French interests in Egypt, the focus shifted to the Ottoman Empire.

In a peculiar move for a nationalist leader, Mustafa Kamil convinced his supporters to side with Ottoman authorities over the Taba boundary question (an administrative border between Palestine, then under Ottoman rule, and Egypt, under British control but legally part of the Ottoman Empire, negotiated in 1906), even though Ottoman success would take Egyptian territory. Mustafa Kamil argued that opposing the boundary that the British supported was an act of solidarity with fellow Muslims that was worth the cost of some Sinai desert land. Other Egyptian nationalists, unwilling to travel that road, formed rival political groups: the Party of the Nation and the Constitutional Reform Party. Mustafa Kamil's own Nationalist Party survived Taba but not his death, splintering over leadership issues.

Divided over foreign policy, Egyptian nationalists were also split on the position of Abbas II, who had reduced his support for nationalists while becoming more accommodating to the British. Both Gorst and Kitchener fueled this division, allowing limited political power to a legislative assembly that they hoped would pit

the khedive against the nationalists. The assassination of pro-Abbas prime minister Boutros Ghali (1846–1910) made this separation violently clear.

John P. Dunn

See also: Egypt, British Occupation of (1882); Ismail, Khedive.

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Egypt, British Invasion (1807)

A failed expedition to Egypt undertaken by the British Royal Navy and Army during the Anglo-Ottoman War of 1807–1809. After the French invasion of Egypt in 1798, Britain played an active role in expelling the French from the region. In 1801, a British army landed in Egypt and defeated the French army. Following a peace treaty with France, the British fleet returned the survivors of the French expedition to Egypt back to France. As the hostilities resumed in Europe, Britain became concerned about Sultan Selim III's alliance with Emperor Napoleon. In March 1807, a British army under General Alexander MacKenzie-Fraser landed near Alexandria and captured the town after a four-day siege. The British sought to create an alliance with Mamluks against the Ottomans represented by their governor Muhammad Ali. As the British gradually took control of the Delta region, Muhammad Ali conducted an effective campaign against the British occupation forces that faced daunting logistical problems and suffered defeats at al-Hamad and Rosetta. By the end of September 1807, the British pulled their troops out of Egypt.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Anglo-Ottoman War (The Dardanelles Expedition) (1807); Egypt, British Occupation of (1882).

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Egypt, British Occupation of (1882)

Occupation of Egypt by British forces after anti-European demonstrations over increased European control of Egypt's finances and the British bombardment of Alexandria in July 1882. In 1798, a French army landed in Egypt and quickly defeated the Egyptian army, establishing a brief French occupation that lasted until 1801. After the French withdrawal, the Ottoman Empire reclaimed its authority in the region and, in 1805, Muhammad Ali became governor of Egypt. He sought to modernize Egypt by adopting Western technology and military techniques, creating a vast state that included Egypt, Sudan, and western Arabia; in the late 1830s, the Egyptian army defeated the Ottoman forces and seized control of Syria and Palestine as well. After Muhammad Ali's death in 1849, his successors struggled to maintain Egyptian predominance in the region. The start of the U.S. Civil War caused a cotton shortage in Europe but also resulted in a windfall for Egypt, where cotton cultivation rapidly expanded and attracted European capital. Borrowing for investment and for vice, Egyptian rulers soon incurred heavy debts that further increased after the U.S. Civil War ended and American cotton flooded the market. The construction of the Suez Canal, which was completed in 1869, vastly increased the strategic value of Egypt to European powers, particularly Britain, which sought to protect its interests in India.

Khedive Ismail, a grandson of Muhammad Ali who came to power in 1863, became saddled with growing debts to European banks, which forced him to make humiliating concessions, among them selling Egypt's shares in the Suez Canal Company to Britain and accepting an Anglo-French debt commission that controlled Egypt's finances. The growing Western influence over Egyptian affairs, however, caused the rise of Egyptian nationalists, who objected to both Ottoman overlordship and European control. Many of them united behind army Colonel Ahmed Arabi (Urabi) who led an armed revolt. As the rebellion grew and Ismail took little action, the British and French governments pressured the Ottoman sultan Abdul Hamid II to replace Ismail with his son Tewfik Pasha in 1879. Tensions, however, continued to grow. In April 1882, France and Britain sent warships to Alexandria to bolster the khedive's authority, but their presence produced fear of a European invasion among many Egyptians and provoked riots in the streets of Alexandria; domestic politics soon forced the French government to recall its fleet, leaving the British alone to handle the situation in Egypt. In July 1882, the British admiral considered that the arming of Alexandria's forts by Arabi's supporters constituted a danger to his force,

and on July 11, 1882, he bombarded the city. An expeditionary force under Sir Garnet Wolseley then landed in Egypt, defeated Arabi's army at Tel el-Kebir in the Canal Zone on September 13, 1882, and took control of the country.

The 1882 occupation marked the move toward a British protectorate over Egypt. Khedive Tawfik and his government provided the facade of autonomy, but the British agent and consul general, backed by British troops, became the real power in Egypt. Ironically, the British military intervention, which Khedive Tawfik supported because it prevented his overthrow, had undermined his authority, making his continued rule dependent on continued British presence. In 1883, the British installed Sir Evelyn Baring, Lord Cromer, as consul-general of Egypt. In effect he ruled the country on behalf of the khedive. Cromer introduced wide-ranging reforms that rationalized Egypt's finances, restored Egypt's credit, and promoted economic growth. Britain's unilateral invasion of Egypt gave it an opportunity to replace French influence in the country and to preserve its control over the Suez Canal, now considered a vital route to India. In 1914, Egypt officially became a British protectorate. Although Egypt technically achieved independence in 1922, British troops remained in the country until the declaration of a republic in 1952.

Robert B. Kane

See also: Arabi, Ahmed Pasha; Egypt, British Colonialism in.



Bombardment of Alexandria by the British Royal Navy. (Time & Life Pictures/Getty Images)

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Egypt, French Invasion of (1798–1801)

An effort by the French to gain control of Egypt and remove British influence from the area. After Napoleon Bonaparte's successful campaign in Italy (1796–1797), the French government sought to use his talents elsewhere. Stymied in their wish to invade Britain by a lack of ships, the government decided to send Bonaparte to Egypt. Egypt was especially important to the British trade system, and removal of British influence there would deal both an economic and psychological blow to France's arch-enemy. In addition, France claimed it would liberate Egypt from the often-oppressive rule of the Mamluks and return control to the Ottoman Empire, a French ally.

Bonaparte put together an excellent team that included generals Alexandre Berthier, Jean Lannes, Joachim Murat, Louis Charles Desaix, and Jean-Baptist Kléber. These generals led an army of 35,000 to 40,000 soldiers, more than 1,000 horses, and almost 200 cannon, ferried on the 2,000-mile trip to Egypt by 335 ships. On May 19, 1798, Bonaparte's forces left France. Three weeks later they landed at Malta, an island critical to controlling sea routes in the Mediterranean. Bonaparte deposed the ruling Knights of St. John, eliminated the feudal system, granted religious freedom to Jews, wrote a modern constitution, reorganized the legal and educational institutions, and improved the island's defenses, all in one week's time. Bonaparte then set sail for Egypt.

In July, Bonaparte's forces landed near Alexandria and quickly took that city. Bonaparte then marched with the main force across the desert. The march was brutal, but the French army, upon reaching al-Rahmaniya, found the cool waters of the Nile. After defeating the Mamluk forces of Murad Bey near Shubra Khit (July 13), Bonaparte moved toward Cairo. On July 21, near the famous Pyramids of Giza, the French army defeated the Mamluk forces, where Bonaparte famously addressed his men, "Forty centuries of history look down on you."

Although the Mamluk army was defeated, the campaign suffered a major blow with the discovery that Admiral Lord Nelson's fleet had destroyed the French fleet near Alexandria on August 2. Furthermore, Sultan Selim III, refusing to accept French claim of protecting Ottoman interests in Egypt, declared war on France and mobilized two armies for expedition to Egypt. Then, on October 21 and 22, many

citizens of Cairo rose up in violent opposition to the French occupation. The revolt was put down, but it was clear that the French position was somewhat precarious. Nevertheless, French operations in Upper Egypt met some success as Desaix pursued the Mamluks of Murad Bey. On October 7, 1798, the French defeated a force of Mamluks in a savage battle at al-Lahun but were unable to completely remove Murad Bey's influence in the region. Always elusive, Murad Bey had learned lessons from prior engagements and refused to be brought to battle, leading the French on a merry chase through Upper Egypt. On January 20, 1799, as he rallied his forces, Murad Bey finally engaged Desaix's army in open battle at Samhud but suffered another defeat and retreated as far as Aswan. By the summer, the French had extended their authority to the Red Sea port of al-Qusair.

Meantime, facing an Ottoman invasion of Egypt, Bonaparte chose to attack first. He turned his attention to the Ottoman army approaching through the Holy Land. The French army marched into Palestine, capturing El Arish and Jaffa and laying siege to the fortified city of Acre (Acco). During the siege Bonaparte's forces scored important victories over the Ottoman and Mamluk forces near Nazareth and Mt. Tabor but were unable to take Acre. On May 10, Bonaparte ended the siege and returned to Egypt.

When the second Turkish army arrived by sea at Aboukir, near Alexandria, Bonaparte was ready and his victory there on July 25 removed the Ottoman threat for the foreseeable future. Concerned with developments in Europe, Bonaparte then left Egypt on August 22, 1798, leaving command to General Jean-Baptiste Kléber. The French repelled a second landing of Ottoman troops at Damietta in early November but then faced combined Anglo-Ottoman forces, which included the European-style Nizam-i Çedid troops of the Ottoman army. General Kléber negotiated a French withdrawal with the Ottoman grand vizier at El-Arish on January 24, 1800, but the agreement depended on the availability of British ships to transport the French army back to France. Upon the British refusal to accept the treaty, the war resumed. Yet, on March 20, 1800, Kléber scored a decisive victory over the Ottomans at Heliopolis and reclaimed Cairo and much of Lower Egypt. In the late March, the French faced another major uprising in Cairo but brutally suppressed it by the end of April. Kléber, looking for new troops, organized a Coptic Legion that was equipped and trained in European style, but on June 14 he was stabbed to death by a young Syrian while walking down the street without an escort. Kléber's successor was General Jacques Menou, who converted to Islam and took the name of Abdallah Menou. A less capable leader than Kléber, Menou was disliked in the army and failed to make preparations for the British invasion that came in the spring of 1801.

On March 8, 1801, a British army landed at Abukir Bay and defeated the French forces near Alexandria, which was soon surrounded by the Ottoman and British forces. Another Ottoman army marched through Syria to Egypt while a new

uprising against the French began in Cairo. Although Murad Bey died of the plague, his Mamluk forces continued to harass the French throughout Lower Egypt. In June 1801, the French garrison of Cairo surrendered while Menou capitulated in Alexandria in September. By the terms of Franco-British agreement, the British fleet evacuated the surviving French troops back to France.

J. David Markham

See also: Mamluk Sultanate; Ottoman Army (Early 19th century).

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Egyptian-Arab Wars (1811–1840)

Founded by Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, a theologian from Najd, Wahhabism sought to return to pure Islam by removing false beliefs and the regimes that support them. By the 1790s, Wahhabist movement extended over most of the Arabian Peninsula and gained many adherents, including Emir Muhammad ibn Saud in 1774. The Saudi-led Wahhabis displayed their growing confidence by attacking Iraq, Syria, and the Hejaz. By 1800, the Wahhabist movement was dominated by Abd al-Aziz ibn Saud, who raided the Shia holy city of Karbala in 1802. A year later ibn Saud laid waste to the route to Mecca during the Hajj. Sacred tombs and sites were destroyed, and those who refused to adhere to the Wahhabist doctrines were killed. In 1804, Wahhabists returned to seize Mecca, ousting Sharif Ghalib and closing pilgrimage routes to the city for all non-Wahhabists. The Wahhabists went so far as to remove Sultan Selim III's name from Friday's prayers and replace it with that of the Sauds, therefore usurping a privileged position in the Islamic world.

Unable to defeat the Wahhabists and return the Hejaz to Ottoman control, Selim III turned to Mehmed Ali (Muhammad Ali) Pasha, governor of Egypt. Mehmed Ali used this opportunity to resolve his domestic problem by inviting the Mamluk leaders, who posed great threat to his authority in Egypt, to join his campaign against the Wahhabis. As the Mamluk leaders arrived to the Cairo Citadel on March 1, 1811, the governor's Ottoman troops attacked them from atop the high walls that flanked the roadway and massacred them all. Mehmed Ali then dispatched 15,000 infantry to the Arabian port of Yanbu under the command of his young son Tussun,

whose inexperience proved to be disastrous. Tussun led his army into a Wahhabi ambush at Wadi Safra, where the Egyptian/Ottoman forces suffered heavy losses and retreated.

The Egyptians, however, regrouped and returned later that year. In October 1811, Tussun led his men through the mountains passes into Hejaz and besieged Medina, which was captured after several weeks of siege. By January 1812, Mecca was taken without resistance and the pilgrimage was resumed. For more than a year Tussun's forces sought to win the loyalties of the local chieftains, many of whom sided with the Wahhabists. In September 1813, Mehmed Ali sent reinforcements that launched two unsuccessful expeditions against Taraba, the main settlement of the Baqum Arabs who supported the Wahhabists. The second expedition proved to be particularly disastrous as the Egyptian retreat through waterless territory turned into a rout. Mehmed Ali's attempt to capture the Hejaz port of Qunfidah also failed while the 1814 expedition led by Abdin Bey was routed by the Wahhabis.

Exasperated by these failures, Mehmed Ali personally took charge of the operations against the Wahhabis in 1815. Bringing new reinforcements, he lured the Wahhabi forces into an ambush and defeated them near Taif. He then captured Taraba and Qunfidah, clearing much of Hejaz of the Wahhabi presence. Returning to Mecca, Mehmed Ali had a few dozen prisoners impaled outside the city gates and left Tussun to govern the region.

The Wahhabi resistance continued, and their hit-and-run tactics inflicted considerable losses on the Egyptian troops. In the spring of 1815, an Egyptian detachment led by Thomas Keith was ambushed and its 200-plus men slaughtered. Late the same year Tussun, unbeknownst to his father, and Abdullah ibn Saud, Abd al-Aziz ibn Saud's grandson, negotiated a compromise by which the Wahhabis recognized the authority of the Ottoman sultan, renounced their claims to Mecca and Medina, and agreed to give safe passage to caravans crossing their territory; Tussun agreed to relinquish control of the Qasim region and recognize Wahhabi control of the northern tribes of Arabia. Upon hearing about this agreement, Mehmed Ali refused to ratify it and Ibn Saud made no effort to pledge an allegiance to the Ottoman sultan.

In the fall of 1815, Mehmed Ali organized a new expedition to Arabia to put an end to the Wahhabi problem. He recalled Tussun to Egypt and replaced him with his (much more capable) son Ibrahim, who launched a methodical campaign against the Arab tribes using bribery, threats, and force. In 1817, Ibrahim's troops inflicted a major defeat on ibn Saud's tribesmen near the wells of Muawiyah, and, the following year, captured a Wahhabi stronghold of Dariyah, where they seized Ibn Saud as well. When attempts to reform the Wahhabist ulama failed, dozens were slaughtered in the Dariyah mosque while Abdullah ibn Saud and members of his family were imprisoned and later executed.

The Egyptian influence in Hejaz continued throughout 1820, although the Saudi detachments raided Medina, Mecca, and al-Taif in late 1827. By mid-1830s, Mehmed Ali decided to impose his authority in Najd (central Arabia). In July 1836,

Egyptian troops, commanded by Ismail Bey and carrying artillery, invaded Arabia. The Saudi ruler Faisal tried to avoid fighting by offering to deliver 5,000 camels to Mehmed Ali, but the Egyptians demanded three times higher number of camels, which Faisal could not do. Landing at Yanbu, Ismail marched to Medina and attacked Saudi forces at al-Rass, driving Faisal back to Anaiza by April 1837. The Egyptian army then proceeded deep into central Arabia, capturing Qasim and Jabal Shammar, while Faisal fled to Hufuf in eastern Arabia. In May 1837, Ismail Bey occupied Riyadh, ending Faisal's reign there and putting his rival Khalid ibn Saud on the throne. Although the Egyptian army tried to extend its authority to southern Arabia, it suffered a crushing defeat near al-Hilwa in July 1837, losing hundreds of men and all of its artillery. Seeking to exploit this victory, Faisal besieged Riyadh, where the remaining Egyptian forces was garrisoned, but could not capture it after two months. In early 1838, the arrival of Egyptian reinforcements convinced Faisal that he would not be able to prevail militarily. Choosing to compromise, he agreed to divide Arabia into two parts: eastern Arabia and southern Najd remained under his authority and central and northern Najd submitted to pro-Egyptian Khalid ibn Saud. The agreement proved to be short lived because Mehmed Ali rejected compromise and dispatched Khurshid Pasha to complete the conquest of Arabia. Khurshid Pasha and his reinforcements reached Najd in May 1838 and proceeded to subdue defiant sheikhs in the region. In the fall of 1838, Khurshid, with 4,000 men and 10 guns, surrounded Faisal at Dilam and took the town on December 10, 1838 after a month-long siege. Faisal was captured and sent to Egypt as a prisoner.

The victory at Dilam marked the start of Egyptian occupation on Najd that continued for 18 months. Although Khalid ibn Saud remained on the throne at Riyadh, the real authority was in the hands of Khurshid Pasha and his Egyptian troops. In Asia (southwestern Arabia) the Egyptian army defeated Arab tribesmen in several clashes but could not conquer them and faced continued revolts that lasted until 1840. Khurshid tried to exert Egyptian influence in southeastern Arabia as well, but his attempts to compel local rulers to pay tribute failed and instead alarmed the British, who ordered their local naval commander to use force, if necessary, to protect Bahrain from the Egyptians. In 1839–1840, British residents visited the Trucial Coast and signed agreements with local sheikhs promising British support in case of Egyptian attack. Furthermore, concerned about Egyptian expansion into Yemen, the British seized the port of Aden in 1839. But by then, Egypt was no longer in position to continue its military involvement in Arabia. Under the pressure of European powers, Mehmed Ali ordered the evacuation of Najd and Yemen in March 1840.

Alexander Mikaberidze and Robert Malick

See also: Mehmed Ali.

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Egyptian-Ottoman Wars

Two major conflicts between the Ottoman Empire and its nominal vassal Mehmed Ali of Egypt. In 1821, the Ottoman Empire saw the start of the Greek Revolt, which threatened Ottoman authority in the Balkan Peninsula. Struggling to contain the rebellion, Sultan Mahmud II asked for help from his vassal Mehmed Ali of Egypt, promising him control of Syria and Crete as a reward for military aid. The Egyptian ruler delivered army and navy but could not defeat the Greeks, who were supported by major European powers. Falling out with the sultan over terms of compensation for his Greek effort, Mehmed Ali decided to claim the territories by force and used a personal quarrel with the pasha of Acre as a pretext for war that began in October 1831.

First Egyptian-Ottoman War (1831–1833)

In November 1831, Ibrahim Pasha invaded Ottoman Palestine and scored one quick victory after another, capturing Jaffa (November 12) and Haifa (November 17), while the residents of Jerusalem, Nablus, Tyre, and Tripoli pledged their allegiance to the Egyptians. On December 4, Ibrahim laid siege to the formidable fortress of Acre, which had withstood Napoleon's attacks 32 years earlier, and captured it on May 27, 1832. With its road into Syria now open, the modernized Egyptian army occupied Damascus on June 16 and routed one Ottoman army under Mehmed Pasha at Homs on July 8 and a second Ottoman army under Huseyin Pasha at Bilan (the Syrian Gates) on July 29. Crossing the Taurus Mountains, Ibrahim occupied the strategic cities of Tarsus and Adan on July 31 and halted there to regroup. Confronted with consecutive defeats, Sultan Mahmud II raised a new army of 80,000 men under the Grand Vizier Rescid Mehmed Pasa, but on December 21, 1832, Ibrahim Pasha crushed the Ottomans at Konya and moved toward Bursa, a short distance from the Ottoman capital of Istanbul. Desperate for help, the Porte turned to its historic enemy, Russia, for help and a Russian

naval squadron arrived in Istanbul in February 1833. At the same time, alarmed by Egyptian victories and the Russian interference, France and Britain quickly intervened to mediate the conflict. The Kutahya Convention (May 4, 1833) required Ibrahim Pasha to pull back from Anatolia, but recognized Egyptian control of Greater Syria, Crete, and the Hijaz. Although the immediate threat to his authority was gone, Sultan Mahmud II chose to negotiate a separate defensive accord with Russia at Hunkiar Iskelesi (July 8, 1833), which guaranteed Russian assistance in future wars.

Second Egyptian-Ottoman War (1839–1841)

The Kutahya Convention was more of a truce than a peace treaty. Mehmed Ali used it to secure his authority throughout Greater Syria, Arabia, Crete, Cyprus, and much of the Sudan, creating the largest Egyptian empire in history. In 1838, he ended Egypt's tribute payments to the sultan, effectively proclaiming Egypt's independence. In response, Sultan Mahmud II prepared an army to invade Syria in 1839, but both land and sea expeditions failed. On June 24,1839, Ibrahim Pasha routed the Ottoman army under Hafiz Pasha at Nezib. At the same time, the commander of the Ottoman naval fleet sold out to the Egyptians and surrendered his fleet to Mehmed Ali in Alexandria. With the Ottoman Empire on the verge of collapse, European powers once again rushed to intervene into what became known as the Oriental Crisis of 1840. By the Treaty of London (July 1840), Britain, Austria, Prussia, and Russia pressured the new Sultan Abdulmecid I to recognize the hereditary rights of Mehmed Ali and his heirs over Egypt and parts of Palestine, provided they would continue to recognize Ottoman suzerainty, and restored Syria and Lebanon to the sultan. Believing support would come from France, Mehmed Ali vacillated on accepting this compromise, which prompted European to attack. In the fall of 1840, the Great Powers moved from diplomacy to military action. The British and Austrian fleets cut Ibrahim Pasha's communication line on the sea, blockaded the Nile Delta, and bombarded and destroyed Egyptian forts at Beirut and Acre, where British, Austrian and Ottoman troops landed troops in early November. When European powers threatened Alexandria with bombardment, Mehmed Ali decided to compromise, accepting the terms of the London Convention on November 27, 1840. He renounced his claims to Syria, Crete, and Hejaz and agreed to reduce his naval and military forces, in exchange for the sultan's recognition of his hereditary rule in Egypt and Sudan.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Hunkar Iskelesi, Treaty of (1833); Ibrahim Pasha; Konya, Battle of (1832); Kutahya Convention (1833); London, Treaty of (1840); Mehmed Ali

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Eighth Crusade (1270)

This Crusade was launched by King Louis IX of France in 1270 against Muslim territories in Tunisia. It failed mainly because of the onset of disease. In 1267, about 18 years after his failed crusade in Egypt, Louis IX decided to launch a crusade to aid the embattled Crusader states under attack from the Mamluk forces. The king was advised by his brother, Charles of Anjou, to begin his campaign with an attack on Tunis. Louis believed the bey of Tunis, Abu Abdallah Muhammed, might convert to Christianity. This was not to be the case. Instead, Abu Abdallah Muhammed recruited Moroccan forces to aid the defense of Tunis. On July 18, 1270, the Crusader forces landed and won a series of small engagements against Muslim forces, taking the city of Carthage. Because of a lack of fresh water, Louis's army was soon beset by disease. On August 25, Louis himself succumbed, probably to dysentery, and Charles of Anjou took over direction of the Crusade. He made little progress on the defenses of Tunis and abandoned the siege on October 30, after signing an agreement with the bey that granted trade concessions to Christian merchants and

Louis IX, the leader of the Eighth Crusade, died shortly after landing on the African coastline. (Library of Congress)

allowed clergy to reside within the city. Because of these treaty clauses, the Crusade was deemed to be a partial success.

Ralph M. Baker

See also: Ninth Crusade (1271–1272); Seventh Crusade (1248–1254).

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Elbistan, Battle of. *See* Abulustayn (Elbistan), Battle of.

Enver Pasha (1881–1922)

Ottoman army general and political leader. Born on November 22, 1881, in Constantinople, Enver was among those Ottoman military officers who underwent experimental training in Germany and became convinced that the future of the Ottoman Empire lay in modernization. Graduating from the military academy at Constantinople, Enver entered the army and, as a major serving in Third Army headquarters in Salonika, was part of the Young Turk movement that overthrew Ottoman sultan Abdul Hamid in 1908. Enver then served as military attaché in Berlin (1909–1911), where he made valuable German contacts. During the 1911–1912 Tripolitan War between the Ottoman Empire and Italy, Enver organized Ottoman defenses in coastal cities before being named governor of Banghazi in 1912.

Enver led the coup of January 23, 1912, during the First Balkan War, which gave the Young Turks full power. As one of the triumvirate who controlled the Ottoman state (along with Mehmed Talat Pasha and Ahmed Djemal Pasha) he took the title of pasha. Enver cemented his popularity as chief of staff of the Ottoman armies by recapturing Adrianople on July 22, 1913 during the Second Balkan War. Promoted to brigadier general, Enver became minister of war in February 1914 and conducted a broad purge of the Ottoman officer corps.

The most pro-German of the Ottoman leaders, Enver favored intervention in World War I on the side of the Central Powers. He worked closely with German vice admiral Wilhelm Souchon to bring that about. As the chief architect of Turkish military policy during the war, Enver worked to expand the empire territorially by offensives in the Caucasus region and Russian Central Asia.

Early in the war Enver assumed command of the Turkish Third Army against Russian forces in the Caucasus under General Nikolay Yudenich in a brutal campaign through the mountains of eastern Anatolia that culminated in a disastrous

Turkish defeat at Sarikamish on December 29, 1914. In the campaign Enver lost all but 18,000 men of his original force of 95,000. Along with other Turkish leaders, Enver blamed the defeat on the Armenians, and he supported a program of genocide that diverted resources and eventually led to the deaths of more than a million Armenians.

Enver's interest in the Caucasus intensified after the revolutions in Russia, and his diversion of military resources there deprived the Turks of forces to face the British in Palestine. Enver and the other Young Turks were ousted from power at the end of the war in October 1918, and Enver fled to Germany. In July 1919, a Turkish military tribunal found him guilty in absentia of war crimes (the massacre of Armenians) and sentenced him to death. Enver plotted from Turkistan to overthrow the emerging government of Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk) but died leading Basmachi ethnic troops against the Bolshevik Red Army on August 4, 1922.

Margaret Sankey

See also: Armenian Massacres; Basmachi Revolt (1918–1924); Kemal, Mustafa Ataturk; World War I (Caucasian Front).

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Erzincan, Battle of (1230)

Decisive battle between the Saljuk Turks and the Khwarezmian army of Jalal al-din. After the Mongol conquest of Khwarezm, Jalal al-din, the son of the last Khwarezmian ruler, fled to India and then to Iran, where he was recognized as a sultan by local tribal leaders. Rallying his forces, Jalal ad-Din sought to expand his sphere of influence by threatening the Abbasid caliph of Baghdad with invasion in 1224, leading three attacks on Georgia in 1225–1228, and capturing a strategically important fortress of Khilat (northwest of Lake Van) from al-Ashraf, the Ayyubid sultan of Damascus. In response, al-Ashraf made an alliance with the Saljuk Sultan 'Ala ad-Din Kaykobad (Kai-Qobad) I of Konya. In August 1230, Al-Ashraf and

Kaykobad decisively defeated Jalal al-Din in the battle near Erzincan. The victory proved to be bittersweet. Although Al-Ashraf and Kaykobad removed immediate threat to their territories, they also destroyed the last army that served as a buffer between them and the Mongols.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Abbasids; Jalal al-Din; Saljuks.

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Erzurum, Treaty (1823)

Peace agreement between Iran and the Ottoman Empire. In 1821, the Qajar dynasty of Iran decided to take advantage of the Ottoman preoccupation with the Greek Revolt to claim some territories in Iraq and eastern Anatolia. The Iranian offensive stalled in Iraq but proved to be successful in the north, where Iran's Crown Prince Abbas Mirza won at Khuy (May 1822). On July 28, 1823, the two sides negotiated a peace accord that restored the border as determined by the Treaty of Zuhab (Zohab) (Qasr-e Shirin) in 1639 and the Treaty of Kurdan in 1746. The treaty recognized Iraq (including Baghdad and the Shatt al-Arab), western Caucasia, and Kurdish territories as part of the Ottoman Empire but granted southeastern Caucasia to Iran. The sultan allowed Iranian merchants to enter the Ottoman territory and recognized Iranian claims to sovereignty over some border tribes.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Abbas Mirza; Greek War of Independence (1821–1832); Zuhab (Zohab), Treaty of (Treaty of Qasr-e Shirin) (1639).

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Erzurum, Treaty (1847)

Peace agreement between Iran and the Ottoman Empire determining their international boundary. The treaty came in the wake of the first Treaty of Erzurum (1823),

which established the border along the lines set by the Treaty of Zuhab (1639). In the 1830s, both sides routinely violated the provisions of the 1823 treaty, and in 1843, under the auspices of Britain and Russia, a joint Ottoman-Iranian Commission was set up to discuss the border question. The commission eventually produced the new Treaty of Erzurum. Signed on May 31, 1847, the agreement made Iran to cede its claim to Sulaymaniyya (northeastern Iraq), while the Ottomans recognized Iranian sovereignty over the city and port of Muhammara (Khoramshahr, in southwestern Iran) and the island of Khidhr (Abadan). Although the strategically important Shatt al-Arab remained in the Ottoman hands, Iran obtained the right to navigate it from its mouth to the point of contact of the two countries' frontiers. The Delimitation Commission functioned between 1848 and 1876.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Zuhab (Zohab), Treaty of (Treaty of Qasr-e Shirin) (1639).

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Fallujah, Battles for (2004)

Two major battles between the U.S. Army and insurgents during the American invasion of Iraq. The first battle, codenamed Operation Vigilant Resolve, lasted from April 4 to May 1 and aimed at reclaiming the Iraqi city of Fallujah after Sunni insurgents, supported by Al Qaeda fighters, had seized control of it. The capture of Fallujah was crucial to American pacification plans in all of the Al Anbar Province because the city, about 42 miles west of Baghdad, became a focal point for anti-coalition attacks. As violence increased in March 2004, the U.S. Army limited its presence inside the city to only armed patrols. On March 31, insurgents ambushed security personnel of Blackwater USA, a private contracting company that provided security to the coalition authorities. Four security contractors were killed and their bodies mutilated. In response, the U.S. military deployed the I Marine Expeditionary Force (2,200 marines), supported by air force, under command of Lieutenant General James Conway. The marines blockaded Fallujah on April 4, encouraging the civilian population to leave the city before launching an assault. The number of insurgents in the city was unclear and varied between 15,000 and 20,000 fighters in more than a dozen groups. After days of heavy urban fighting, the marines failed to make significant progress into the city, and political pressure and public opinion in the United States forced the White House to cease operation on April 9. As a result of subsequent negotiations, the United States agreed to turn over security for the city to a newly formed Iraqi militia force, the Fallujah Brigade. On May 1, the marines completely withdrew from Fallujah but established an observation base near the city.

The Fallujah Brigade failed to maintain security and disintegrated by the fall of 2004. The worsening security situation in Fallujah compelled the U.S. Army to initiate a second campaign, code named Operation Phantom Fury (Iraqi name was Al-Fajr, or New Dawn). Lasting from November 7 to December 23, this operation led to a major battle for control of the city. The insurgents used a respite period after the first battle to fortify their positions and stockpile supplies and ammunition. The coalition forces (American, British, and Iraqi) encouraged the remaining civilian population to flee, and artillery and aircraft bombarded the city to soften its defenses starting on October 30. A week later, about 10,000 American soldiers and 2,000 Iraqi troops, supported by the British Royal Marines, launched an assault spearheaded by the heavy armor columns. The coalition's firepower and speed overwhelmed the

American soldiers prepare to enter and clear a building in Fallujah, Iraq on November 9, 2004. (Department of Defense)

insurgents, allowing the coalition troops to secure most of the city by November 15. Over the next month and a half the coalition forces conducted a thorough, house-by-house search of the city to weed out the remaining insurgents. The second battle of Fallujah claimed the lives of 95 U.S. soldiers (560 wounded), 11 Iraqi army soldiers (43 wounded), and about 2,000 insurgents. Most of Fallujah was damaged and an estimated 20 percent of the city's buildings were completely destroyed.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Baghdad, Battle for (2003); Basra, Battle for (2003); Iraq War (2003–).

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Fatah, al-

Palestinian guerrilla organization and political party, whose name means "conquest" in Arabic, founded in exile in 1957 by Yasir Arafat and Khalil al-Wazir. Al-Fatah, or Harakat al-Tahrir al-Watani al-Filastini (Palestine National Liberation Movement), wants to obtain full independence for the Palestinians in a Palestinian state that would include Gaza, between Egypt and Israel, and the West Bank, between Israel and Jordan. Arafat founded al-Fatah to win back the land lost to the Jews in the 1948–1949 Israeli War of Independence. The organization became increasingly important in the 1960s and joined the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) in 1967. In 1969, Arafat gained full control over the PLO. It carried out guerrilla attacks inside Israel and attacked Israeli interests worldwide. Originally based in Damascus, al-Fatah was forced to relocate several times before attaining a political agreement (Oslo Accords) with Israel in 1993.

From the late 1960s to 2006, al-Fatah remained the most powerful group within the PLO and controlled Palestinian politics. During that period, the politics of al-Fatah changed drastically from the military and terrorist actions of the 1960s to the pragmatic politics of a democratic Palestine. In 1994, the Palestinian Authority was established, and al-Fatah dominated the governing body for the next 12 years. However, a number of factions within al-Fatah rejected the goal of peace with Israel and split from the main organization.

Farouk Kaddoumi, the remaining living cofounder of al-Fatah, became the leader of al-Fatah after Arafat's death in 2004. On November 12, 2006, Mahmoud Abbas became president of the PLO. In the 2006 elections for the Palestinian Legislative Council, the rival organization Hamas unexpectedly defeated al-Fatah and formed their government. Since then, al-Fatah and Hamas have fought each other for control of the Palestinian Authority, especially in Gaza.

Robert B. Kane

See also: Arafat, Yasir; Oslo Accords (1993); Palestine Liberation Organization; Terrorism.

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Fatimids

An Arab dynasty that ruled Egypt from 969 to 1171. The Fatimids belonged to the Ismaili branch of Shiite Islam, which recognized the descendants of Hasan and Husayn, the two sons of Prophet Muhammad's daughter Fatima, and Ali, the fourth caliph, as the legitimate rulers of the Muslim community. By the mid-ninth century, the Ismailis were engaged in subversive and revolutionary activities against the Abbasid caliphs of Baghdad. In 909, the establishment of a Fatimid state in Tunisia caused a rupture in the Ismaili movement, when the Carmathians of Bahrain opposed the Fatimid claim to be the imams, that is, the divinely chosen and rightly guided rulers of Islam.

The Fatimids ruled Tunisia and Sicily until 973, when they transferred their state to Egypt, after the conquest of that country by their general Jawhar in 969. The North African phase of the Fatimid state was marked by the establishment of two new capital cities: Mahdia (mod. al-Mahdiyya, Tunisia), built in 916–921, and al-abra or al-Manuriyya (near mod. Kairouan, Tunisia), begun in 946, and occupied until 1053. Mahdia was erected on a peninsula on the coast of Tunisia and marked the Fatimid state's Mediterranean orientation, both with its deep involvement in trade with Muslim Spain, Italy (especially Amalfi), and Byzantium, and with its naval activities against them. The Fatimids also maintained a network of commercial relations with sub-Saharan Africa, where they procured gold and black slaves.

The Fatimid efforts to conquer Egypt were inspired not only by their difficulties in ruling North Africa (exemplified by the rebellion of Abu Yazid in 944–947, which posed a serious challenge to the Fatimid rule) but also, and mainly, by their desire to reach Baghdad and supplant the Abbasid caliphs. The conquest of Egypt in 969 was achieved after some initial failures, and the Near Eastern phase in the history of the Fatimid state began. Immediately after the conquest of Egypt, the Fatimids invaded Palestine and Syria, but their dream of reaching Baghdad never materialized and their always precarious hold over Damascus and Palestine collapsed in the second half of the 11th century with the arrival of the Turkish Saljuks.

The impact of Fatimid rule on Egypt was manifold and outlived the Fatimids in two areas. The establishment of Cairo proved to be a great success. The town became the seat of the Fatimid rulers, a religious and cultural center and magnet for local and foreign merchants. During Fatimid rule in Egypt, a commercial network that connected India and the Mediterranean emerged, and it lasted well into the late Middle Ages, declining only during the Ottoman period. The trade of Egypt flourished, with merchants from the Muslim areas of the Mediterranean (Spain, North Africa, and Sicily), Italy, and Byzantium visiting Alexandria and Cairo in pursuit of spices and goods from India and the East Indies.

The majority of the Egyptian population were Sunni Muslims, with minorities of Christians and Jews. The number of Shiites was small. The Fatimid regime

depended largely on its control of the army, which was mostly made up of non-Egyptians. Although the Fatimid caliph was nominally the head of state, from the second half of the 11th century the actual control of government was usually in the hands of a vizier. The Fatimids used missionaries outside the empire to spread Shiite doctrines, especially among the urban populations of Saljuk-controlled Syria, but there was no attempt to spread Shiism within Egypt, as this would have aroused antagonism within the majority Sunni population.

The Fatimids misunderstood the intentions of the First Crusade (1096–1099) and initially tried to form an alliance with the Crusaders for cooperation against the Saljuks, who supported the rival Abbasid caliphate. As it was the Saljuk territories that came under attack first, the Fatimids were able to take the opportunity to seize the city of Jerusalem from Saljuk control (June 1099). However, they were slow to recognize that Jerusalem was the main goal of the Crusade, and their relieving army arrived too late to prevent the fall of the city to the Crusaders (July 15, 1099). The Fatimid army that camped around Ascalon (mod. Tel Ashqelon, Israel) suffered a humiliating defeat by the Crusaders at the battle of Ascalon (August 12, 1099), allowing the Crusaders to consolidate the territorial achievements up to that point. During the first decade of the 12th century, the Fatimids lost the towns of Arsuf, Haifa, Beirut, Sidon, and Tripoli to the Franks of Jerusalem and Tripoli. The

Al-Azhar mosque and university in Cairo, founded under the Fatimid patronage in 972. (Paul Cowan/Dreamstime.com)

Fatimid land and naval efforts were uncoordinated and their armies hesitant and unable to mount a serious military challenge to the Franks. The fall of Tyre (mod. Soûr, Lebanon) in 1124 came about as the result of lack of cooperation between the Fatimids and the rulers of Damascus, while a contributory factor to the fall of Ascalon in 1153 was a coup that took place in Cairo while the Franks were besieging the town.

An examination of the battles that took place between the Fatimids and the Franks shows that the Fatimids failed militarily because their army collapsed in crucial battles fought in Palestine (1099, 1105, and 1123) because of a lack of cooperation between the cavalry and the infantry. This reflected a sociomilitary problem deriving from the inherent weakness of Muslim multiethnic armies. Traditionally, the Fatimid army was a multiethnic force dominated by a very large component of black slave infantry with a much smaller, but ethnically diverse, cavalry element. In the mid-11th century, the strength of the Fatimid army was probably more than 100,000 soldiers, but the numbers dwindled from that point, and during the 1060s, the army consisted of only 40,000 African infantry and more than10,000 cavalry. The Fatimid multiethnic army was very difficult to handle on the battlefield, because such a heterogeneous force was ridden with ethnic animosities, exacerbated by the different status of freeborn troops and military slaves (Arab. mamluks).

On three occasions (at Ramla in 1105, Ibelin in 1123, and Ascalon in 1153) the navy performed better than the army, but the navy on its own, without the support of the army, achieved nothing. The small Fatimid navy was vastly outnumbered by the European fleets that operated in the eastern Mediterranean in support of the Crusades, and its ability to ship supplies and reinforcements was limited. For this reason the Fatimids were very hesitant about committing their navy to the support of coastal towns that were besieged by the Franks and large European naval forces, as happened at Acre in 1104, Tripoli in 1109, and Tyre in 1124. In any case, naval battles were quite rare events, and only in the summer of 1123, off the south Palestinian coast, was the Fatimid navy involved in a disastrous naval battle with a Venetian fleet. Naval raids were more common, but the shipping lanes used by the European fleets on their way to the Levant were beyond the range of Fatimid warships operating from the Egyptian ports of Alexandria and Damietta. The Fatimid naval failure was a result of European naval superiority combined with geographical and naval factors characteristic of the eastern Mediterranean.

During the 1160s, the Fatimids became entangled in the conflict between Nur al-Din, the ruler of Muslim Syria, and the Franks. Shawar, an ousted Fatimid vizier, managed to involve both Nur al-Din and the king of Jerusalem in the internal affairs of the Fatimid state. Each power coveted Egypt and was ready to do anything to prevent its rival from gaining control of Egypt. Politically the Fatimid state was weak and divided, and the Fatimid army was not a match for the Franks or the forces of Nur al-Din. In economic terms, Egypt was a valuable prize with its rich agricultural



output and flourishing long-distance international trade. The Franks were well informed about Egypt's agricultural potential and are known to have possessed a list of Egyptian villages and the incomes derived from them. The participation of Italian maritime republics in the Crusades also posed a serious dilemma for the Fatimids, as the Italians stimulated trade with India because of their demand for spices and

their presence in Egypt was crucial to maintain the momentum of this trade. Egypt was also dependent on its Mediterranean partners for supplies of timber, iron, and pitch. The Fatimids, like Saladin later on, continued to maintain commercial relations with the Europeans and allowed the presence of Italian and Byzantine merchants in their ports in spite of the wars of the crusades.

Between 1164 and 1171, the armies of Nur al-Din and the Kingdom of Jerusalem fought their wars on Egyptian soil, but the Fatimids were unable to influence the course of events. Eventually, the Franks withdrew from Egypt, and Egypt came under the control of Nur al-Din's general Shirkuh. On Shirkuh's death his nephew Saladin succeeded him as vizier. The Fatimid regime had failed to strike deep roots among the Muslim population of the country during the two centuries of its rule in Egypt, and it was overthrown by Saladin with ease. He broke up the Fatimid army and, on the death of the caliph al-Aid (1171), recognized the religious authority of the Abbasid caliph in Baghdad, which effectively ended Fatimid rule.

Yaacov Lev

See also: Abbasids; First Crusade (1096–1099); Jawhar; Kafur, Abu'l-Misk al-Ikhshidi; Nur al-Din; Saljuks; Second Crusade (1147–1149); Third Crusade (1187–1192).

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Fifth Crusade (1217–1221)

The Crusade began with a commitment to ensure that the Crusader States survived. With Jerusalem controlled by Muslim Egypt, the Fifth Crusade aimed to defeat Egypt and retake Jerusalem. Although the Fifth Crusade came close to succeeding, it ultimately failed and was the last pan-European crusade.

The idea for the Fifth Crusade was formulated by Pope Innocent III in 1213. In April 1214, the Fifth Crusade began to be systematically preached across Europe. The papacy used the Fifth Crusade in two ways: to exploit the quasi-feudal obligation owed to God and to raise revenue for the church from those who would rather pay their way out of their obligation. The latter practice received condemnation and provoked a widespread criticism of the church in the 13th century.

The first to take up the cross in the Fifth Crusade was King Andrew II of Hungary in 1217. Crusaders from Germany, France, England, and Italy were to follow Andrew in April 1218. With crusading spirits high in Christian Europe, the Hungarian king's experience foreshadowed the outcome of the entire Crusade. Andrew was forced to return to Hungary because many of his soldiers could not reach Acre, the capital of the Kingdom of Jerusalem. By the time the reinforcements from northern Europe arrived, King John of Brienne had devised a bold plan to retake Jerusalem. John's plan was to invade Egypt, the heart of Muslim power, and use it as a bargaining chip to regain Jerusalem.

The Crusaders left Acre in May 1218 and laid siege to the Egyptian city of Damietta for 18 months. The events that unfolded during the siege of Damietta embody the fragility of both the Muslim and Crusader States. On the Muslim side, the Egyptians were shocked by the siege at Damietta and the sudden death of their sultan, who was replaced by al Malik al-Kamil. The Egyptians sued for peace several times, offering to rebuild the walls of Jerusalem or the entire territory of Jerusalem. On the crusading side, these peace offerings made the already existing tensions between the crusading leaders worse. The most bitter rivalry was between Cardinal Pelagius and John of Brienne, and it resulted in the latter leaving the Crusade for a time.

John's absence allowed the Egyptians to fortify against any further crusading incursions. In addition, the Crusaders were hindered by the rising waters of the Nile River. Slowed and caught in an unforgiving circumstance, the Crusaders sued for peace in 1221, agreeing to an eight-year truce that required them to leave Egypt.

Tim Barnard

See also: Mansurah, Battles of (1221, 1249); Sixth Crusade (1228–1229).

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Finckenstein, Treaty of (1807)

Agreement between France and Iran concluded in the castle of Finckenstein (East Prussia) on May 4, 1807. The treaty was signed in the midst of Russo-Iranian and Russo-French wars and was sought to create a Franco-Iranian alliance against Russia. Napoleon, emperor of the French, guaranteed the territorial integrity of Iran, recognized eastern Georgia and other south Caucasian polities as Fath Ali Shah's possession, and agreed to help the shah reclaim them from Russia. Napoleon pledged to provide arms and military experts to modernize Iranian forces. The shah agreed to declare war against the United Kingdom, France's enemy, and to expel all Britons from Iran. Iran also agreed to seek the cooperation of the Afghans for a joint invasion of India, then under British control. The treaty proved to be short lived as Napoleon ended the war with Russia in June 1807 and signed the Treaty of Tilsit, which established a Franco-Russian alliance and recognized Russian claims to south Caucasia. Thus, none of the terms of the treaty was realized. Feeling betrayed by the French, Iran turned to Britain and signed a treaty of cooperation in 1809.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Definitive Treaty (1812); Russo-Iranian Wars; Tehran Treaty (1814).

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First Crusade (1096–1099)

The opening salvo of centuries of conflict between Christian Europe and the Muslim Near East. The goals of the First Crusade were to retake Jerusalem for Christendom and turn back the ever-growing threat on the Byzantine Empire from the Saljuk Turks. In the end, the First Crusade marked the departure of insular European Christendom toward a more aggressive and expansionist Europe.

The origins of the First Crusade and the crusading movement derived simultaneously from religious and political motivations. Officially, the movement began in theatrical style in November 1095 when Pope Urban II preached at the Council

of Clermont for Christian knights to take up the cross to aid the Byzantine Empire against the Saljuk Turks. Furthermore, the crusading message to save the Holy Lands of Christendom was coupled with political opportunity in Europe to consolidate the papacy's power over European princes.

Response to the call for a crusade was greater than the papacy's ability to coordinate, so initially the Crusades were a movement with waves of people traveling east rather than a unified army. One of the leaders of the earliest wave, which began in 1096, was the evangelist Peter the Hermit. That wave is popularly called "the People's Crusade" and is considered a separate movement from the official crusading body. The second wave started in the autumn of 1096, as Pope Urban II had planned, led by the leading princes of Europe. Once all the princes reached Byzantine territory in 1097, they began their campaign for Constantinople. Byzantine emperor Alexius I Comnenus demanded that they all swear fealty to him and promise to return to the Byzantine Empire any land recovered from the Saljuk Turks.

At Constantinople, the crusading princes suffered a defeat. At Nicaea, however, they had better luck, as the city surrendered. The main body of Crusaders marched toward Antioch, while a smaller group under Baldwin I of Boulogne split off to march on a string of petty Armenian principalities. Baldwin took over the government of Edessa in 1098 and founded the first of the Crusader States.

The Crusaders' siege during the Battle of Antioch lasted nearly 10 months, and the city was finally captured on June 3, 1098, when a traitor allowed Crusaders into the city to open the gates for their army. At Antioch, Bohemond I declared himself prince and claimed the city for himself. Leaving Bohemond in Antioch, the remaining Crusaders went on to take Tripoli before heading for Jerusalem. When they arrived at Jerusalem on July 8, they were nearly out of supplies. Under Godfrey of



Image from an illuminated manuscript depicting the capture of Jerusalem in 1099 during the First Crusade. (Library of Congress)

Bouillon, the 1099 siege of Jerusalem ended when the city was taken by the Crusaders on July 15, 1099. After their victory, the Crusaders massacred the entire Muslim and Jewish population of the city. In the wake of the massacre, Godfrey was named protector of the Holy Sepulchre, securing Jerusalem for Christendom and ending the First Crusade.

Tim Barnard

See also: Antioch, Battles of (1097–1098); Jerusalem, Siege of (1099); Second Crusade (1147–1149).

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Fortification, Islamic

During the first decades of rapid Islamic expansion the caliphs had little interest in building large defensive structures. Their armies had already captured many from their foes and the early conquests had caused little physical damage. Nevertheless, fortifications were erected in several places. Those within Arabia used existing techniques of mud-brick and rough stone architecture. Fortified residences were also built by various senior people. As a result some of the more fertile parts of the northern Hijaz became famous for fortified and irrigated "pleasure palaces" until at least the late eighth century. Elsewhere many redundant fortifications in areas that had been wartorn frontiers in pre-Islamic times seem to have been converted for peaceful use. The Umayyad century then witnessed a remarkable flowering of ostensibly defensive architecture in the form of what were known as the "desert palaces" of the Fertile Crescent. Although their fortifications were sometimes more apparent than real, the Umayyad ruling elite took the existing model of Romano-Byzantine forts and Ghassanid fortified residences as their pattern. In general, the closer Umayyad fortifications were to their new frontier with the Byzantine Empire, the more real were their defenses. Some almost certainly served as defensible bases for the Ahl al-Sham elite Syrian regiments of the Umayyad army.

Far to the east the early Muslims are also recorded as rebuilding and maintaining the "long-walls" erected by their Sassanian predecessors as barriers to Turkish nomad raids on the cultivated zones. The tower nevertheless remained central to Islamic military architecture, both in urban and rural fortifications. In the early days these were usually solid, merely giving a height advantage to the defenders. The Round City or fortified palatial compound of Baghdad, built between 762 and 765, was by far the most ambitious fortified structure built by the Abbasid caliphs. Its design largely sprang from the Muslim military architects' experience in eastern Iran and Transoxania. The basic concept of a vast imperial palace set within gardens and surrounded by administrative offices and barracks also had more to do with Iranian traditions of a ruler set above ordinary people than it did with Islamic concepts of equality before God. The fully developed *bashura* bent-gates of the Round City of Baghdad were, however, a new feature for the Middle East and seem to have been copied from Central Asia. Being primarily a defense against sudden cavalry attack, such structures were thereafter added as extensions to several gates in other Islamic cities such as Damascus and Cairo. With the fragmentation of the Abbasid caliphate, some successor states built fortifications that were even more sophisticated, though rarely on the same scale. For example, the major 10th-century garrison town of Tarsus in Cilicia had a doubled wall, each with five gates; those in the outer wall were covered in iron and those in the inner wall were entirely of iron. The inner wall of Tarsus had 18,000 shurrafa crenellations and 100 towers, three of which were armed with manjaniq beam-sling mangonels, 20 of which had smaller arada mangonels, and the remainder were manned by troops using crossbows.

The architects who designed the fortifications of Syria and Egypt under Fatimid rule from the 10th to 12th centuries demonstrated particular originality. Cairo was originally the walled palace enclosure of the Fatimid caliphs, though its name of al-Qahira was later applied to the entire city. This enclosure was similar in concept, though not design, to the Abbasid Round City of Baghdad, being rectangular with eight gates and a high brick wall. The surviving Fatimid stone gates of Cairo were erected later in the 11th century when this palace enclosure was extended. The lower part of their towers are again solid, and the main function of such magnificent structures was probably symbolic and political rather than defensive. The Islamic period saw a considerable increase in urban fortification across North Africa. At a later date numerous coastal ribats or fortified garrison outposts were built from Tunisia to Morocco, in Sicily and in Andalusia, as a defense against Christian piracy. However, the design of these western fortifications remained within the Romano-Byzantine styles until the 10th century when more modern ideas were introduced from the east. Around the same time an independent style of fortification began to develop in Morocco and Andalusia using better-quality masonry and larger, more projecting towers. These served as emplacements for increasingly powerful counter-siege artillery. The rammed earth used for building quick fortifications in North Africa

and Andalusia was later combined with brick in a melding of local and eastern traditions. However, the most distinctive western Islamic form of construction was tabia concrete, which developed in Andalusia and spread to Morocco during the 11th and 12th centuries. It not only enabled forts to be erected rapidly but could also speedily repair damaged stone fortifications.

The Ottoman habit of razing the walls of many cities they captured in Europe during the 14th and 15th centuries has left a mistaken impression that they had no interest in fortification. The most impressive early Ottoman fortifications were built to impose blockades during prolonged sieges, for example, those near Bursa and Istanbul. Once the latter was taken, the Ottoman authorities strengthened their new capital by erecting the impressive Yedi Kule (Seven Towers) fort in 1458. Other major Ottoman fortresses guarded vulnerable bottlenecks, as at Gallipoli where Ottoman armies crossed between Asia and Europe, or provided secure storage depots near a frontier. Nevertheless, most Ottoman fortresses look insignificant compared with the palatial castles of Europe. This was because they housed neither a landed aristocracy nor even provincial governors, but were merely military positions consisting of fortifications around barracks and storehouses.

David Nicolle

See also: Muslim Armies of the Crusades; Tarsusi, ʻAli Ibn Murdi al-.

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Franco-Trarzan Wars

A conflict between Muhammad al Habib, the emir of Trarza, and France. The Emirate of Trarza was a Muslim state in the southwest of present-day Mauritania. One of the major Muslim states north of the Senegal River, Trarza emerged in the wake of the Char Bouba War between the Berber tribes and the Maqil Arab tribes that migrated from Yemen to northwest Africa. Emir Muhammad (r. 1827–1860) sought to extent his control to the Waalo Kingdom located south of the Senegal

River by marrying the daughter of the Waalo ruler (brak) in June 1833. However, the prospect of the Trarza Moors becoming a dominant force in the region alarmed the French merchants, who were concerned about their lucrative trade in gum arabic. The French merchants, centered at the island Saint-Louis in the mouth of the Senegal river, lobbied the government to take arms against the Trarza. The French government sent an expeditionary force, which engaged the Trarza in 1833–1835, blockading the Senegal River to prevent grain caravans from reaching Trarza. Still, the fighting proved inconclusive, and after Emir Muhammad diverted the gum trade to the British trading posts, the French traders strongly agitated for making peace with the Trarza in August 1835. Under the terms of the peace, Emir Muhammed gave up his claims to the Waalo.

Yet, another Franco-Trarza War took place in 1854–1858, when the French merchants, with the support from the French Naval Ministry, revived an earlier plan of expansion into the interior to secure French commercial control over the region. The French expansion was led by Governor Auguste Protet and his successor Louis Faidherbe, who became the governor of Senegal in late 1854. Emir Muhammed formed a pact with the neighboring Emirate of Brakna to resist French expansion and launched a raid on Saint-Louis in 1855. Faidherbe's punitive expedition was decisive, and at the Battle of Jubuldu on February 25, 1855, the French defeated the Trarza forces. Emir Muhammad's decision to stop trading with France had a major repercussion, as some of his supporters turned away from him. By 1858, the French expeditionary force advanced upstream of the Senegal, establishing forts and capturing tens of thousands of cattle, sheep, camels, and horses owned by the Trarza. Emir Muhammad was compelled to negotiate an accord that placed Trarza under French suzerainty and forbade further Trarza expansion south of the Senegal River. The peace firmly secured the French presence in the region and marked the formal beginning of French colonialism.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Char Bouba War (1644–1674); French Colonial Policy in Africa (1750–1900).

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Franco-Turkish War (Cilicia War) (1920)

At the end of World War I, the Ottoman Empire collapsed amid political and military turmoil, and many of its former provinces became battlegrounds for new

conflicts. Under the Sykes-Picot Agreement of 1916, Britain and France agreed to partition Ottoman domains, and Cilicia was granted to France in a planned postwar settlement of the region. At the same time, France negotiated an agreement with the leaders of the Armenian national liberation movement who promised to provide military support against the Turks.

As the Armistice of Moudros was signed at the end of the war, France dispatched a military force to secure Cilicia, landing some 15,000 men on November 17, 1918, at the port of Mersin. Most of the troops were Armenians who organized the French Armenian Legion to fight for the creation of an Armenian state. Two days later more French troops landed at Tarsus to establish their headquarters at Adana. Gradually, France took over the Ottoman provinces of Antep, Maras, and Urfa, even briefly—for one day—taking the city of Mardin.

The French faced increasing resistance from the local Turkish population, which was particularly incensed by the French Armenian Legion's actions. The Sutchu Imam incident, when the Armenian troops mistreated the local Turkish populace, provoked clashes in Maras (Kahramanmaraş) in late 1918 and eventually contributed to the outbreak of open hostilities. The Battle of Maras saw almost month-long fighting between the Association for the Defense of National Rights, a group established by former officers of the Ottoman army, and the Franco-Armenian forces, which were ultimately forced to evacuate the city in February 1920. Facing intensifying resistance, the French authorities gradually pulled their troops out of Cilicia and signed the Treaty of Ankara with the Turkish Grand National Assembly in October 1921. France acknowledged Turkish control of Cilicia, and the Turkish authorities accepted the French mandate in Syria.

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See also: Turkish-Armenian War (1920).

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Frankish-Moorish Wars (718–759)

Umayyad raids from al-Andalus into Languedoc started in 718. The 40-year Muslim occupation of Narbonne (719–759), however, signified the actual expansion of the Umayyad caliphate north of the Pyrenees against remnant Visigothic forces and Languedocian and Aquitanian leaders. Narbonne served as the primary base of future Muslim military operations into France. Over the next four decades, Andalusi

Muslims captured nine other French cities and held them for at least part of the time they were in Narbonne (Nîmes, Carcassonne, Avignon, Arles, Bordeaux, Lyons, Autun, Ages, and Béziers). In addition, more than 30 place names remained behind in Languedoc and the Rhône valley attesting to this military activity by Muslim forces in the eighth century. Local Christian aristocrats were unable or unwilling to drive out the Muslims, and the eventual campaign to eliminate the Muslim presence was undertaken by the Franks. A substantial force of several thousand Umayyad troops marched north in October 732, under amir Abd al-Rahman al-Ghafiqi. His objective was to defeat the Aquitanians and to acquire plunder and glory on behalf of the faith. After defeating the Aquitanians at Bordeaux, the Muslims marched to Poitiers, where they sacked the Church of St. Hilary. They had entered the Merovingian Frankish kingdom, but the Franks were alerted to their presence in time for the Merovingian major domus Charles to mobilize his men and intercept them. Charles won the Battle of Tours (October 25, 732), earning the title Martel (the Hammer).

Frankish forces conquered Carcassonne and Nîmes in follow-up operations, but the Muslim leader at Narbonne, Yusuf Ibn Abd ar-Rahman, occupied Arles in 734 and Avignon in 736. Charles occupied Aquitaine in 735 and removed the Muslims from the Rhône valley in 737. His army besieged Narbonne unsuccessfully in 737, but he handily defeated Andalusi reinforcements along the Berre River. Charles's son, Pepin III (who assumed royal control in 751) managed to make contact with Gothic inhabitants in Narbonne, and he took the city with their help in 759, ending the Umayyad presence north of the Pyrenees. The subsequent political realignment favored Charles's heirs, the Carolingians, over local political elites.

William E. Watson

See also: Tours, Battle of (732).

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French Colonial Policy in Africa (1750–1900)

Initially limited to trading posts in Senegal, the French colonial presence grew in the 19th century to include Algeria and then much of northern, western, and central Africa.

France first obtained trading posts on the Senegal River (1638) and in St. Louis (1659) and Gorée (1679). These were captured by Great Britain during the Seven Years' War (1756–1763) and the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars (1793–1815) and were then restored to France under the 1815 Treaty of Paris. The French had little presence in the interior and limited themselves to exports of gum, ivory, and slaves. The latter grew in importance with the development of France's Caribbean colonies in the 18th century.

Colonial rule changed dramatically with the advent of the Second Republic (1848). Slavery was abolished permanently, and inhabitants of Gorée and St. Louis (and later Rufisque and Dakar) were allowed to vote in French parliamentary elections. Louis Faidherbe (governor 1854–1861, 1863–1865) fought Arab warlords and expanded the French presence into the interior.

In northern Africa in 1798, French forces landed in Egypt to block off British access to India. Despite initial successes, the expedition was hampered by epidemics, military setbacks in the Levant, and Britain's naval victory at the Battle of the Nile (1798). The French left in 1801, and Egypt became a British protectorate (1882). France's main remaining asset was the Suez Canal, built by Ferdinand de Lesseps during 1859–1869 and owned by a majority French company until 1956.

Algeria (nominally a province of the Ottoman Empire) was one of the infamous Barbary States that preyed on Mediterranean shipping, but the French invasion of Algeria was initially motivated by more prosaic events. A financial dispute led to a diplomatic incident with the *dey* (governor) of Algiers, leading to a French blockade of the city (1827). French king Charles X, afraid of the political repercussions of the ineffective standoff, sent French troops to occupy Algiers in 1830. His successor, Louis-Philippe, fought the Abd El-Kader rebellion and occupied all of Algeria (1830–1847).

Settlers (the *pieds noirs*) came from France, Italy, Malta, and Spain and acquired vast estates where they produced tobacco, wine, and grain. Military rule was phased out as the European population increased, and three *départements* (administrative units under civilian rule) were created in 1848. Jews, along with a few Muslims who had forsaken some tenets of Islam (the *évolués*), were granted full French citizenship, but most Muslims complained of losing their lands and being denied equal rights.

France battled rival Italian, Spanish, and German ambitions to establish a protectorate over Tunisia (1881) and most of Morocco (1911). Morocco was pacified under the governorship of Louis Lyautey (1912–1916, 1917–1925).

In sub-Saharan Africa, French colonies were long limited to the coast and the Indian Ocean islands of Réunion (1664), Mauritius (1718), and Comoro (1841). The French presence grew considerably, however, when the Berlin Conference (1884–1885) granted France vast tracts of Africa.

The Afrique Occidentale Française (French West Africa, or AOF) was created in 1895 and headquartered in St. Louis and then Dakar. The federation included Côte d'Ivoire (Ivory Coast), Dahomey (Benin), Guinea, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Upper Volta (Burkina Faso) in addition to Senegal. In central Africa, Savorgnan de Brazza (1852–1905) explored Gabon and the Congo (1874–1875) and founded Brazzaville (1880). Thanks to his efforts, the Afrique Equatoriale Française (French Equatorial Africa, or AEF) was created in 1910 and headquartered in Brazzaville. It included Chad, the French Congo (Congo-Brazzaville), Gabon, and Ubangi-Shari (Central African Republic).

France established a protectorate in Djibouti (1885), conquered Madagascar (1895–1896), and gave up its ambitions in the Sudan after the Fashoda Crisis (1898). France ceded part of Cameroon to Germany in 1911 in exchange for Morocco, then regained the entire colony at the Treaty of Versailles (1919), along with Togo.

Appraisals of the French presence in Africa vary considerably. Critics view French colonial rule as an example of naked greed, marked by land appropriations, racial discrimination, theft of local resources, forced labor, and disregard for local customs. Others point to France's civilizing mission (*mission civilisatrice*), the creation of infrastructures, the eradication of slavery, health and education projects, and the work of philanthropists such as Albert Schweitzer in Gabon (1875–1965).

Philippe R. Girard

See also: Algeria, French Conquest of (1830–1857); Egypt, French Invasion of (1798–1801); West Africa, French Wars of Conquest in.

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French Mandates

After the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in World War I, the victorious Allies divided the empire's Arab provinces (present-day Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Jordan, and

Israel) among themselves. During the war Britain, which had occupied the region, promised Faisal ibn Hussein, the leader of the Arab Revolt, leadership of a united state including all these territories but also promised Syria, Palestine, Transjordan, Lebanon, and Mosul to France and promised Palestine to the Zionist movement. In 1918, however, Britain changed the agreements, retaining control over Palestine, Transjordan, and Mosul and leaving the French a free hand in Syria.

Because the assistance of the United States had been crucial to winning the war, Britain and France had to support Woodrow Wilson's Fourteen Points, including the right of self-determination, and were unable to impose direct colonial rule in the conquered areas. Instead, they ruled them as mandates for the League of Nations. The mandates were meant to be stepping-stones on the way to full independence for the local populations, and the occupying powers were supposed to help the populations become ready for independence, but in practice they allowed traditional colonialism to continue under a new guise.

Faisal had set up an independent state in Syria, but in July 1920 the French overthrew his government and established direct rule. France had wanted to rule Syria because of the long-standing French role as protectors of the Christian Maronites in Lebanon and because of the large investments in infrastructure France had made in Syria. Now in possession of the land, France practiced a policy of divide and rule. France separated the Bekaa Valley from Syria and attached it to Lebanon, which before that had consisted only of Beirut and the Lebanon Mountains, and divided the rest of Syria into separately administered states that revolved around Damascus and Aleppo as well as semi-independent areas for the Alawites and the Druze, two minority groups within Syria. These political arrangements changed every few years, making the region unstable. This, combined with the practice of attaching to every Syrian official a French adviser with powers to countermand any order prevented any strong local leadership from emerging, had disastrous consequences after the French withdrew from the region.

In July 1925, a revolt began in the Druze region in response to French land restructuring. Led by Sultan Atrash, the Druze chieftain, the rebels drove the French from the region. News of the Druze successes caused the revolt to swiftly spread through the rest of Syria until in the spring of 1927 large-scale French reinforcements reasserted control. The Great Revolt, as it became known, was extremely destructive, killing 6,000 Syrians and leaving many more homeless. It also led the French to change their system of governance for Syria; rather than assert direct control, the French would rule through local collaborators. The most important of these groups was the National Bloc. Composed of members of Ottoman-era elite urban landowning families and local government figures, the National Bloc engaged in a practice that came to be known as "honorable cooperation." Under this,

they adopted and encouraged the anti-French sympathies of the people while preventing violence on the scale of the Great Revolt. The French, glad to find allies who would control the people for them, accepted them as local elites and ruled through them. Because France was determined to maintain close control and refused to sign a treaty spelling out its intentions and limiting its power, the National Bloc came to have very little power of its own, and the situation remained predictably unstable.

Lebanon, on the other hand, faced a smoother path to autonomy because the pro-French Maronites, though only 30 percent of the population, were the dominant political group. Although France maintained a similar system of shadow advisers, Lebanon suffered no upheavals similar to the Syrian Great Revolt. The conflict between the Maronites and the Muslims, who found themselves forced into a state that did not reflect their aspirations, was no less intense than the anti-French conflicts in Syria but was expressed more civilly through religious and political local leaders. Under the 1926 constitution, which did not provide Lebanon with meaningful independence, members of the government were elected on the basis of religion. The Maronites sought to turn Lebanon into a Mediterranean country looking to Europe, while the Muslims wanted to stand with the other new Arab states against European domination.

In 1936, the election of Leon Blum's Popular Front coalition led to a French reevaluation of its position in Syria and Lebanon. By the end of that year, France had signed treaties with both mandates, providing for semi-independence and alliance under French protection as well as Syria's admittance into the League of Nations. The treaty, however, was never ratified by the French government and was set aside by a new coalition in 1939, which reimposed direct rule and partition and ceded the district of Alexandretta to Turkey to the displeasure of Syria.

On the eve of World War II, Syria and Lebanon were no more prepared for self-government than they had been in 1920. The upheavals of the war did not improve matters. Officers loyal to the collaborationist Vichy regime took control in 1940, but by 1941 renewed revolts had paralyzed the French occupiers, and in July 1941 British and Free French forces expelled the pro-Nazi government. Britain and the Free French agreed to grant Syria and Lebanon immediate independence, but Charles De Gaulle, the Free French leader, reneged on his promise and reestablished direct control. In 1943, however, elections were held under British pressure, and anti-French parties won power. France continued to assert control until 1946, when French exhaustion and another upsurge of violence forced France to withdraw.

Having been forced to wrest independence from unwilling colonial overlords, the new rulers of Syria and Lebanon had no experience in peaceful self-government and were unprepared to make the transition from revolution to peacetime rule. The

two states would meet the challenges that lay ahead with divided and uncertain leadership.

Jesse Ravage

See also: Arab Revolt of 1916–1918; Sykes-Picot Agreement (1916); Syrian Campaign (1941).

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G

Gallipoli Campaign (1915–1916)

The unsuccessful Allied ground effort during World War I to secure the Dardanelles and drive the Ottoman Empire from the war. Although the naval effort to force the Dardanelles had failed, there was political pressure to continue the campaign. This meant the belated injection of land troops.

London had already decided to send out land forces even before the naval bombardment of March 18, 1915. While First Lord of the Admiralty Winston Churchill sought to exhort naval commander Vice Admiral Sackville Carden to greater action, First Sea Lord Admiral John Fisher and Secretary of State for War Field Marshal the Earl Horatio Kitchener concluded that troops would have to be landed on the Gallipoli peninsula at the northern entrance to the Dardanelles.

Kitchener arranged to send the untrained Australian and New Zealand Corps (ANZAC) of two divisions, then in Egypt. On March 10, as originally planned, he also decided to send the crack British 29th Division and the Royal Navy Divisions. The French also agreed to send a division.

General Sir Ian Hamilton commanded the Allied ground force of 75,000 men. No plans had been developed for the deployment of ground forces, but after meeting with Hamilton on March 22, Admiral John de Robeck concluded that army support would be necessary. Captain Roger Keyes, de Robeck's chief of staff, was outraged at this decision, and, after an acrimonious meeting, the War Council decided that the views of the commander on the spot should prevail.

There was little preliminary planning for the Gallipoli landing. Maps were few and inaccurate, and intelligence about Turkish forces was virtually nonexistent. Hamilton also lost valuable time when he chose to concentrate his forces in Egypt. Tipped off by the naval bombardment, the Turks prepared for probable Allied landings. Inspector General of the Turkish Army German General Otto Liman von Sanders took charge of the defense. He had available the Turkish Fifth Army with six widely dispersed divisions. Hilly and rocky, the Gallipoli peninsula was ideal defensive terrain, and Liman von Sanders organized strong positions in the hills immediately behind likely invasion beaches. He was ably assisted by Turkish colonel Mustafa Kemal.

An armada of 200 Allied ships gathered for the landings, supported by 18 battleships, 12 cruisers, 29 destroyers, 8 submarines, and a host of small craft. On

April 25, 1915, Allied troops landed at five beaches around Cape Helles (the extremity of the peninsula) and on the southwest side of the peninsula to the north near Gaba Tepe, at a beach still called Anzac. Turkish opposition was fierce and Allied casualties were heavy, but by nightfall forces were established ashore.

At the same time, French troops landed on the Asiatic side of the straits at Kum Kale, where they met a larger Turkish force. With an advance there impossible, on the 27th the French were lifted off and transferred to Helles. From this point on, the naval aspect of the campaign consisted of gunfire support and resupply activities, during which a number of ships were hit.

The Allied troops were in two lodgments about 15 miles apart, controlling only small pieces of territory. Fighting was virtually trench warfare, with opposing lines often only a few yards apart. The Turks could easily detect in advance any Allied moves to drive them from their almost impregnable positions. Their artillery was also ideally situated to shell the beaches.

Early in May the Allies sent out two additional divisions and a brigade from India. Some ground was gained, but stalemate soon followed. The British then supplied five additional divisions, monitors for shore bombardment, more naval aircraft, and armored landing barges, but Turkish strength increased apace to 16 divisions.

A new naval attack was abandoned in mid-May after the Turks sank the British battleship *Goliath*. Only submarines could make the passage through the narrows to interfere with Turkish shipping. Of the 12 sent (9 British and 3 French), 7 were lost. One, E-14, did get into the Sea of Marmara and sank a troopship with 6,000 men aboard, all of whom perished. E-11 also blew up an ammunition ship. German submarines were also active. U-21 torpedoed and sank two old British battleships, the *Triumph* and the *Majestic*. The Allies landed two of their new divisions

Major General Davies points out a critical hill, Achi Baba on the Gallipoli Peninsula, to general Horatio Herbert Kitchener, as well as to generals Birdwood and Maxwell. Achi Baba overlooked the southern shoreline of the peninsula where the Allies landed during the Gallipoli Campaign. (National Archives)

at Suvla Bay north of Anzac on the night of August 6–7. Mustafa Kemal, now a corps commander, helped contain the landing to little more than a toehold. Reinforced Allied units at Anzac were to break out and seize the high ground to the east of Suvla, which dominated the landing areas, but although Liman von Sanders shifted his resources north to meet the Suvla Bay threat, inept Allied ground commanders wasted this opportunity.

At the end of August the French offered to send out a whole army, and the British found two additional divisions for yet another invasion, planned for November. This was postponed when Bulgaria entered the war on the side of the Central Powers.

By the middle of September the French government concluded there was no hope for the campaign. The British government persisted, unwilling to sacrifice a venture into which so much had been invested. Meanwhile a storm of criticism appeared in the Australian and British press, based on reports by war correspondents about the incompetence of British land commanders. In October 1915, Lieutenant General Sir Charles Monro replaced Hamilton. Pointing out the unsatisfactory nature of the Allied positions ashore and the impending winter, Monro pressed for evacuation. A blizzard at the end of November, the worst in recent memory, resulted in Allied casualties of 10 percent at Gallipoli. Kitchener, who went out to inspect the situation in person, argued for evacuation, and on December 7, London agreed.

Despite Monro's fears of up to 40 percent losses, Kitchener predicted the evacuation would go smoothly. The Allies steadily withdrew supplies by night, and the evacuation was completed during the night of January 8–9, 1916. It was the largest operation of its kind before the extraction of the British Expeditionary Force from Dunkerque in 1940. Much to the astonishment of the Allied command, it was carried out with virtually no losses.

Accurate casualty totals for the entire 259-day campaign are not available. The Turkish official figure of 86,692 killed and 164,617 ill and wounded is undoubtedly too low. A reasonable figure might be 300,000 casualties. Total Allied casualties were about 265,000, of whom some 46,000 died.

The Allied failure meant that the straits remained closed, the Ottoman Empire continued in the war, and easy access to Russia was cut off. The effect of this in bringing about the military collapse of Russia and the Bolshevik Revolution can only be guessed. At the time and for years afterward, Churchill received most of the criticism for the failure. In August 1916, the British appointed a commission to investigate the campaign; at the end of 1917 it concluded that the campaign had been a mistake.

Although the operation had failed, the Gallipoli landing was much studied in the years after the war. The operation used considerable experimentation in naval aviation and landing and resupply techniques, which proved quite influential in the development of U.S. Marine amphibious doctrine in World War II.

If at the beginning of the campaign the Allies had been prepared to commit the resources they ultimately deployed, they would have been successful. The Gallipoli campaign failed because of faulty planning, poor leadership, and indecision.

Spencer C. Tucker

See also: Dardanelles Campaign (1915); Kemal, Mustafa Ataturk; Ottoman Army (World War I); World War I.

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Gandamak, Treaty of (1879)

Agreement between Muhammad Yaqub Khan, emir of Afghanistan, and Britain signed during the second Anglo-Afghan War (1878–1880). As the war broke out in 1878, the British forces rapidly occupied much of Afghanistan, prompting Muhammad Yaqub Khan to sue for peace. Under the provisions of the treaty, Yaqub Khan, in exchange for an annual subsidy of 600,000 rupees, recognized British control over the foreign relations of Afghanistan and accepted a British Mission in Kabul. The British occupied the strategically important Korram and Pishin valleys and the Khyber Pass. The British also pledged to increase commercial contacts and build a telegraph line between Kabul and British India. The treaty proved to be short-lived and was violated by an uprising in Kabul in September 1879, which prompted a resumption in hostilities.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Anglo-Afghan War (1839–1842); Anglo-Afghan War (1878–1880); Anglo-Afghan War (1919).

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Ganja, Treaty of (1735)

A treaty between Iran and Russia signed on March 10, 1735, near Ganja. Under the terms of the treaty, the two powers became allies against the Ottoman Empire and agreed not to enter into separate negotiations with the Porte. Russia agreed to return to Iran the captured territ ories of Derbent and Baku, and Iran granted Russia the right of free trade on its territory. The treaty also confirmed the provisions of the Treaty of Resht, which obliged Russia to return Gilan to Iran, while Iran agreed to recognize King Vakhtan VI on the throne of Kartli.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Nadir Shah; Resht, Treaty of (1732).

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Gayer Khan (d. 1220)

Khwarezmian general who was responsible for the incident that provoked the invasion of the Empire of Khwarezm by the Mongols under Chinggis (Genghis) Khan. Gayer Khan was a kinsman of the Khwarezm Shah Ala-al-Din Muhammad b. Tekesh and served as the governor of Otrar on the northern frontier of the Khwarezmian state. According to some accounts, he coveted the merchandise of Mongol traders who were visiting Otrar and put them to death. Despite Chinggis Khan's demands, the Khwarezm shah, who was told that the merchants were Mongol spies, did not punish Gayer Khan, provoking the Mongol wrath and invasion. In 1219, the Mongol army besieged Otrar, where Gayer Khan held out with his garrison for almost six months. The khan was captured and executed (some accounts refer to molten silver being poured into his eyes and ears) near Samarkand in the early spring of 1220.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Mongols.

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Gaza War (2006)

A large-scale, Israeli-launched incursion into the Gaza Strip that began on June 27, 2006, in response to attacks, allegedly by Hamas, that killed two Israeli soldiers and captured Israel Defense Forces (IDF) corporal Gilad Shalit. This conflict is also known under the Israeli military designation Operation Summer Rains. The stated Israeli intention was to secure the release of the captive soldier and to stop the firing of Qassam rockets from the Gaza Strip into Israeli territory. Many Palestinians, however, believe the Israeli operation was launched in an attempt to topple the Hamas-led government of the Palestinian Authority. Israel carried out strikes against militant Palestinian groups, destroyed infrastructure that the groups used to support their actions, and applied political pressure on the Hamas-led government.

Operation Summer Rains began on June 27 with the Israeli bombing of three bridges and a power plant as Israeli ground troops moved into the Gaza Strip. Also, Israeli fighter jets flew over the summer residence of Syrian president Bashar al-Assad as a warning against his continued support of Hamas and Hezbollah. The following day, Israeli troops entered the Gaza Strip with the aim of securing and destroying Qassam rocket sites. Israeli warships also shelled suspected rocket sites from offshore. Israeli air strikes mainly targeted Hamas training camps and arms caches. Israeli aircraft also dropped thousands of leaflets warning Palestinian civilians to leave their homes in areas of northern Gaza from which it claimed Qassam rockets were being fired.

During the operation, Israeli forces arrested a number of members of the Hamas leadership and members of the Palestinian Legislative Council. Unsurprisingly, this led to charges by many Palestinians, and especially those in Hamas, that Israel was trying to oust the Hamas government that had been democratically elected in January 2006. The operation also destroyed the only power plant in the Gaza Strip, leaving most of the territory without electricity during the brutally hot days of summer. Most Palestinians were also left with no running potable water and no facilities for sanitation and waste processing. This made it difficult for businesses, hospitals, and basic services to function. In addition to the economic consequences of the operation, a building humanitarian crisis in Gaza caught the attention of various international organizations, including the United Nations (UN). Indeed, UN officials decried the toll that the conflict was taking on civilians and urged both sides to resolve their differences peacefully.

By most counts, the majority of Palestinians killed in the Israeli operations in Gaza were militants. However, many civilians also died in the attacks. There was never any conclusive settlement to the crisis, and Gilad Shalit was not returned to Israel. Operation Summer Rains was slowed through a truce agreement between Israel and militant Palestinian organizations on November 26, 2006, although rockets continued to fly from Gaza to Israel through December. Precise casualty figures

Israeli protesters hold a banner depicting Hamas prisoner Gilad Shalit in Jerusalem on September 27, 2006. Gilad Shalit is an Israeli soldier whose imprisonment was a catalyst to the 2006 Gaza War, given the name Operation Summer Rains by the Israeli military. (AP/Wide World Photos)

are difficult to determine, but it is safe to conclude that most casualties occurred among Palestinians.

Daniel Kuthy

See also: Fatah, al-; Hamas; Intifada, Second (2000–2004); Palestine Liberation Organization.

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Gaza, Battle of (1239)

A battle fought on November 13, 1239, at Gaza between a contingent of Crusaders and Franks of the Kingdom of Jerusalem and the Ayyubid forces of Egypt, ending in a devastating Christian defeat. The Crusaders, under Thibaud IV, count of

Champagne (since 1234 also king of Navarre), had decided to fortify the city of Ascalon (mod. Tel Ashqelon, Israel) to protect the southern border of the Kingdom of Jerusalem. While they were marching from Acre to Jaffa (November 2–12, 1239), Egyptian troops moved up to Gaza. Several prominent Crusaders and local nobles, namely Henry of Bar, Amalric of Montfort, Hugh of Burgundy, Walter of Jaffa, Balian of Sidon, John of Arsuf, Odo of Montbéliard, and Richard of Beaumont, ignored the warnings of Thibaud, Peter of Dreux, and the masters of the Templars, Hospitallers, and Teutonic Knights, and decided to lead a group of 400–600 knights against the enemy. Meanwhile, the main army was to continue on to Ascalon.

On November 13, the detached force made a rest stop in a valley surrounded by sand dunes, which it had failed to secure properly, and was surprised by the Muslims. While Hugh of Burgundy and Walter of Jaffa argued in favor of a hasty retreat to Ascalon, Henry of Bar and Amalric of Montfort decided to stay with the infantry and fight. After an initial success of Amalric's crossbowmen, the Christians were lured into pursuing the Muslims, who feigned a retreat. The Muslims subsequently managed to surround the Christians. In the ensuing close combat, Henry was killed, and Amalric and many others were taken prisoner. Meanwhile, Hugh and Walter had reached Ascalon, where they convinced the main army to move to the rescue of the Christians trapped at Gaza. However, help came too late. At the sight of the crusading army, the Muslims merely abandoned their pursuit of the Christians who were fleeing the battlefield.

Following the defeat, the Templars and Hospitallers convinced Thibaud of Champagne to retreat to Acre rather than to pursue the Egyptians and their prisoners. It fell to Richard of Cornwall, in 1241, to have the casualties of the battle buried at Ascalon and to negotiate the release of the prisoners taken by the Muslims. The main sources for this battle are the Eracles, the Gestes des Chiprois, and the historical work of al-Maqrizi.

Jochen Burgtorf

See also: Fifth Crusade (1217–1221); Seventh Crusade (1248–1254); Sixth Crusade (1228–1229); Third Crusade (1187–1192).

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General Treaty of Peace (1820)

First major diplomatic agreement between the tribal states of what Europeans called the Pirate Coast (the southwestern Persian Gulf) and Great Britain. The British authorities were concerned about warfare and piracy in the southern Gulf region (modern-day Abu Dhabi, Ajman, Dubay, al-Fujayrah, Ra's al-Khayman, Sharjah, and Umm al-Qaywayn), which disrupted maritime trade and pearling in the region. In 1819, Captain T. Perronet Thompson arrived at Ra's al-Khayman with a mission of negotiating with local Arab tribes. On January 8 and March 15, 1820, he negotiated and signed an accord that outlawed piracy on land and sea and required tribespeople to end the slave trade. The signing of this treaty laid the foundation for more active British involvement in the affairs of the southern Persian Gulf. New accords were negotiated in 1835 and 1843, and in 1853, Britain's political resident in the Persian Gulf, Colonel A. B. Kemball concluded the Treaty of Perpetual Maritime Peace with the five ruling sheikhs of Abu Dhabi, Dubay, Ajman, Sharjah and Ra's al-Khayman, and Umm al-Qaywayn), who agreed to abide by a total maritime truce in perpetuity; thereafter the area of the Gulf states became known as the Trucial Coast.

Alexander Mikaberidze

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Georgian-Saljuk Wars (11th–13th Centuries)

In 1064, Sultan Alp Arslan led the first successful Saljuk incursion of the southern regions of Georgia, capturing the fortress of Akhalkalaki. In response, in 1067, Georgians raided Arran, which provoked Alp Arslan's second invasion of Georgia in 1068. Over a six-week campaign, the sultan successfully campaigned in central and central-western Georgia, capturing a series of fortresses. With the Georgian king Bagrat (1027–1072) rejecting his demand for tribute, the sultan left Georgia in the fall of 1068. After his departure, Bagrat raided Ganja, whose ruler recognized the Saljuk sovereignty, and recovered some territories lost to Al Arslan. In 1071, the Saljuk victory over the Byzantine army at the crucial battle of Manzikert opened the way for their systematic invasion of the southern Caucasia. Georgian king Giorgi II (1072–1089) gained an important victory over the Saljuks, led by Sarang of Ganja, at Partskhisi in 1074, and even captured the strategic fortress of

Kars, which triggered a Saljuk punitive expedition under Amir Ahmad, who defeated Georgians at Kvelistsikhe.

By 1080, what became known as the "Great Turkish Onslaught" (*didi turkoba*) began in Georgia when the Saljuk tribes arrived in large numbers to settle on Georgian lands and turned the occupied territory into pastures. King Giorgi was forced to recognize the Saljuk supremacy and pay tribute to the sultan. The Saljuk domination continued unchecked for almost a decade during which the country was devastated by enemy invasions, internal dissent, and natural disasters. In 1089, a bloodless coup d'état forced King Giorgi to abdicate in favor of his 16-year-old son David IV, who began an active campaign against the Saljuks. In 1092, after the death of Malik Shah, King David ceased paying the annual tribute to the Saljuks, and, over the next 10 years, he gradually liberated most of eastern Georgia, defeating the Saljuk invasions in 1105, 1110, and 1116. To strengthen his army, King David launched a major military reform in 1118–1120 and resettled about 40,000 Kipchak families (approx. 200,000 men) from the northern Caucasus steppes to Georgia. Recruiting one soldier per family, David raised a 45,000-men strong standing Kipchak army in addition to Georgian feudal troops.

Starting in 1120, King David began a more aggressive policy of expansion. He established contact with the Crusaders in the Holy Land, and there is evidence that the two sides tried to coordinate their actions against the Muslims. In 1121, he achieved his greatest victory as the Georgian army routed a massive Muslim coalition in the Didgori Valley, near Tbilisi. The battle, widely known as *dzlevai sakvirveli* (incredible victory) in Georgia, is considered an apogee of Georgian military history. After his triumph, King David captured Tbilisi, the last Muslim enclave remaining from the Arab occupation, in 1122 and declared it the capital of the Kingdom of Georgia. In 1123–1124, Georgian armies were victorious in neighboring territories of Armenia, Shirwan, and northern Caucasus, greatly expanding the Georgian sphere of influence. By the time of King David's death on January 24, 1125, Georgia became one of the most powerful states in all of the Near East.

Under King Giorgi III (1156–1184), a new wave of Georgian expansion was initiated as Georgian armies seized the former Armenian capital of Ani in 1161 and conquered Shirwan in 1167. His daughter, Queen Tamar, continued the successful foreign policy. In 1195, a large Muslim coalition was crushed in the battle at Shamkhor, and another one at Basian in 1203. The Georgians annexed Arran and Duin in 1203, and, in 1209, their armies captured the Emirate of Kars while the mighty Armen-shahs, the emirs of Erzurum and Erzinjan, and the north Caucasian tribes became vassals. Georgian influence also extended to the southern coastline of the Black Sea, where the Empire of Trebizond, a Georgian vassal state, was established here in 1204. Georgians then carried war into Azerbaijan and northern Persia in 1208–1210, marking the summit of their power as they controlled a vast territory

stretching from the Black Sea to the Caspian and from the Caucasus Mountains to the Lake Van.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Basian, Battle of (1203); Didgori, Battle of (1121); Manzikert, Battle of (1071).

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Gerontas, Battle of (1824)

One of the most decisive naval battles of the Greek War of Independence, which secured Greek control over the strategic island of Samos. In August 1824, a combined Ottoman-Egyptian fleet sought to capture Samos, off the coast of Asia Minor. The victory would secure the sea lanes between Istanbul and Egypt, and would remove a key Greek naval base. An Ottoman defeat on August 5 in the Battle of Samos forced a delay, but by August 29, Egyptian-Ottoman naval forces totaled nearly 100 warships and 300 transports. The Greek fleet under Andreas Miaoulis amounted to 75 converted merchant ships. Although smaller, the Greek ships were more maneuverable.

On August 25, Miaoulis attacked the Ottoman fleet near Gerontas Bay with six fireships, but they failed to do any damage. On August 29, the Ottomans and Egyptians attacked the scattered Greek squadrons. Hampered at first by a lack of wind, Miaoulis attacked with fireships, which set a few Ottoman ships on fire and broke the Ottoman battle line, causing the Ottomans to break off the engagement and sail away. Later attacks cost the Ottomans additional ships and caused them to cancel the invasion of Samos.

Tim J. Watts

See also: Greek War of Independence (1821–1832).

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Ghazi

Ghazi is derived from the Arabic word *ghazw* (razzia), which means a raid or an expedition to gain plunder. The pre-Islamic Arabs conducted raids against one another mainly, but not exclusively, for camels. During the lifetime of the Prophet, the expeditions he led against his polytheist enemies were called *ghazawat* (pl. of *ghazwa*). After Islam spread beyond Arabia, the ghazi ideology and concept developed to become an integral part of the holy war. Thus, ghazis became those warriors who operated along the frontiers of the Muslim world and carried out raids against the infidels. For example, bands of ghazi warriors operated in Transoxania and Khurasan during the Samanid period, and more than 20,000 ghazis joined Mahmud of Ghazna's army that invaded India.

This ideal was enthusiastically embraced by nomadic converts to Islam such as the different Turkic tribes that slowly entered the Middle East from Central Asia. Hence, the Ottoman state, one of the greatest Islamic empires, was established through the ghazi ideal. Osman's West Anatolian principality started off as a small frontier ghazi state and grew in size and wealth through raiding and battling the Byzantines. Thus, it should come as no surprise that several distinguished rulers and generals of Muslim principalities and empires took ghazi as a title of honor and prestige.

The ghazi concept espoused the ideal of holy war against the nonbelievers and expanded the territories ruled by Islam. It was also a means to defend Muslims from outside threats by maintaining the offensive against those threats. Finally, it also aimed at maintaining unity among Muslims and maintaining the control of the rulers (whether they were Rashidun caliphs, Samanid princes, or Ottoman sultans) over their warlike subjects.

Adam Ali

See also: Mahmud of Ghazna; Osman Nuri Pasha; Sharia, War and; War and Violence in the Koran.

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Ghulams

Islamic civilization had a different attitude toward slavery than that seen in western Europe. Slaves were better treated and often had quite honorable status, slavery itself being based on an entirely different principle than it had been in the Roman

Empire, or was in Byzantium and western Europe. Slaves played a minor role in agriculture or industry but became important as personal servants, administrative functionaries, and above all soldiers. The slave-recruited soldier, known as a ghulam or mamluk, who was to become so characteristic of medieval Islamic armies, first made a significant impact on Muslim military recruitment in the Abbasid caliphate during the ninth century. Thereafter a slave could also reach the highest level in Islamic society, eventually including that of a ruler. A military slave was normally freed when his training was complete or when his first owner or commander died, and such military slaves were an elite, even from the earliest days, the Turks being considered the best. Some Turkish slaves were captured in raids by one Central Asian tribe against another, but a greater number probably resulted from a tribal chief selling his own people or when large families sold their own children. Indeed, the career opportunities open to a skillful mamluk or ghulam, and the higher standards of living in the medieval Middle East, meant there was often little resistance to being taken as a mamluk among the Turks of Central Asia.

During the 9th and 10th centuries, those who entered the service of the Abbasid caliphs were generally supplied with Turkish wives, usually of slave origin, and were theoretically forbidden to interbreed with other ethnic groups in an effort ensure the continuation of Turkish fighting capabilities. The mamluk system continued throughout the medieval period. In its fully developed form a khawajah slave merchant was a potential recruit's first master within the Islamic world. He assessed a person's potential and brought suitable candidates to a military slave market such as that in the Citadel of Cairo. The price of these recruits varied considerably, but by the 15th century it averaged 50 to 70 dinar gold coins. By comparison a good warhorse cost 15 to 17 dinars.

The army of the Mamluk sultanate of Egypt was essentially the same as that of the preceding Ayyubid dynasty. All that really changed was the relative status and size of various units and sources of recruitment. Mamluks of slave origin were now not only the military elite but also the ruling elite. The best career opportunities were open to young slaves purchased by a ruler. They then became *kuttub* (students) and were sent to a *tabaqah* (school) for religious, literary, and military education. Here discipline was strict, but at the end of his training each *kuttub* received his *itaqah*, or certificate, of freedom, a uniform, horse, bows, arrows, quivers, armor, and swords.

The evidence suggests that, at least during the late 13th century when the system reached its peak in Egypt and Syria, the existing training system led to attitudes of leadership and loyalty comparable to those of a graduate from a modern military academy. For example, the losses suffered by professional Muslim troops during the final siege of Crusader-held Acre in 1291 reveal that two officers were killed for every 13 men, which was considerably higher than the overall proportion of officers to men. Even during their decline in the 15th century, most mamluks in Egypt and

Syria still went through these military schools, though their training was now perfunctory. The Safavid Iran also saw the development of ghulam troops. Shah Tahmasp conducted several campaigns in Georgia and Armenia, bringing back vast number of prisoners who were forced to convert and received military training as ghulams. However, throughout the 16th century the military and political importance of these ghulams remained relatively insignificant, especially considering that the Qizilbash levies drew an estimated 100,000 troops. In the early 17th century, the most powerful Safavid ruler, Shah Abbas I, greatly expanded the ghulam forces. His campaigns in Georgia and Armenia produced tens of thousands of prisoners, who were settled in Iran and required to supply military levies. The new ghulam regiments created by Abbas included a corps of musketeers (*tufangchiyan*, 12,000 men), an artillery corps (*tupchiyan*, 12,000 men) and cavalry (*qullar* or *ghulaman-I khassa-ui sharifa*, 10,000 men) armed with traditional as well as gunpowder weapons; the royal bodyguard force was increased to 3,000 men and it was drawn exclusively from the ghulam forces. Thereafter, these ghullam men, and in many cases their sons, played a significant role in the Safavid state as soldiers, senior commanders, and administrators.

The system survived well into the 19th century. Another variation on the basic mamluk system evolved in Islamic northern India from the 12th century onward. Here traditional mixed forces of free and slave troops remained a military ideal, and as a result, large numbers of indigenous Hindu troops were enlisted. Nevertheless, the military and political elite of the Sultanate of Delhi remained largely Turkish in origin though Persian in culture, the name "Turk" normally being applied to men of mamluk origin while the term "Khalji" was normally applied to those of free or tribal Turkish origin. A relaxation of the laws of inheritance in the late 14th century also meant that the holder of a military estate could pass it on to his son or even to a favored slave, which had not originally been possible. Another variation was seen at the far western end of the Islamic world, in al-Andalus (Muslim Spain and Portugal), where a primary source of recruitment was central and eastern Europe, many such troops being called Saqalibah or "Slavs."

David Nicolle

See also: Black Guard (Morocco); Devshirme System; Janissaries; Kapikulu Corps.

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Glubb, Sir John Bagot (1897–1986)

British Army officer and commander of the Arab Legion in Transjordan (present-day Jordan) during 1939–1956. Born on April 16, 1897, in Preston, Lancashire, John Glubb was the son of a British Army officer. He was educated at Cheltenham College and the Royal Military Academy at Woolwich. In 1915, he entered the army as a second lieutenant in the Royal Engineers. During World War I, Glubb served with the British Expeditionary Force on the western front in France and was wounded three times, leaving him with a crooked jaw. He continued in British military service after the war and in 1920 was posted to Iraq, where he lived among Arab Bedouin and studied their culture. In the process, he gained a strong command of the Arabic language and earned the respect and friendship of many Arabs. He also studied the political and military strategy of the Turks, especially the rulers of the Saljuk dynasty. The knowledge of tactics he acquired, especially as it related to mobile partisan groups, proved to be of great benefit to his military operations in the Middle East.

The native police force that Glubb organized in the early 1920s played a large part in bringing order to Iraq. In 1926, he was seconded to Transjordan and became the administrative inspector for the Iraqi government. In 1930, he went to Transjordan to become second-in-command of the Arab Legion. Organized in 1920, the Arab Legion was initially a small police force led by British officer Frederick Peake, a major general in the Jordanian Army and known to Jordanians as Peake Pasha.

As second-in-command of the Arab Legion and a brigadier general in the Jordanian Army, Glubb became a close personal friend and trusted political adviser of Jordan's King Abdullah. Glubb organized an effective Bedouin desert patrol consisting of mobile detachments based at strategic desert forts and equipped with communications facilities. Within a few years he had managed to get the Bedouin to abandon their habit of raiding neighboring tribes.

When Peake retired in 1939, Glubb took command of the Arab Legion and made it the best-trained military force in the Arab world. During World War II he led attacks on pro-German leaders in Iraq and on the French Vichy regime in control of Lebanon and Syria. The Arab Legion's Mechanized Regiment provided notable service alongside British forces in the 1941 overthrow of Iraq's pro-Nazi Rashid Ali al-Gaylani regime. The British continued to subsidize the Arab Legion. Through World War II most of its officers were drawn from serving British officers.

Sir John Bagot Glubb, British Army officer and commander of the Arab Legion in Transjordan (Jordan) during 1939–1956, thoughtfully handling his Muslim prayer beads (*Misbaha*) in October 1951. (Charles Hewitt/Picture Post/Getty Images)

For the duration of the war, the Arab Legion provided train guards for the railways from Damascus to Cairo. By 1945, the Arab Legion numbered more than 8,000 men, including 37 British officers. At the conclusion of the war the Arab Legion was downsized to 4,500 men, however.

During the 1948–1949 Israeli War of Independence, Lieutenant General Glubb commanded the Arab Legion against Israel. Although the Arab Legion was the best-equipped and best-trained Arab army, it was relatively small compared to the Israeli forces. The Israeli government, which had been engaged in secret negotiations with King Abdullah, hoped that the Arab Legion would stay out of the war completely. Abdullah, however, ultimately decided that not joining the other Arab states would render his position untenable in the Arab world. After Israeli independence was declared on May 14, 1948, the armies of Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Lebanon, and Jordan invaded Israel. Israeli forces eventually prevailed, and Jordan signed an armistice with Israel on April 3, 1949.

On March 2, 1956, Jordan's King Hussein, bowing to pressure from Arab nationalists, dismissed Glubb as commander of the Arab Legion, which had by then grown to a force of 20,000 men. Although Hussein maintained a cordial relationship with Glubb during and after his dismissal, the Jordanian king sought to placate Arab nationalists who claimed that he was under British control.

Returning to Britain, Glubb was knighted. He retired as a British Army lieutenant general. In retirement he wrote numerous books, including *A Soldier with the Arabs* (1957), *Britain and the Arabs* (1959), and *A Short History of the Arab*

Peoples (1969). Known as Glubb Pasha, he lectured widely on Arab affairs. Glubb died on March 17, 1986, in Mayfield, East Sussex.

Michael R. Hall

See also: Arab-Israeli War (1948); Arab-Israeli War (1956); Arab Legion.

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Golden Horde—Ilkhanid Wars

After the great Mongol conquests and the death of Chinggis (Genghis) Khan, the Mongol empire was divided among his sons. Juchi received the northwestern provinces where the Golden Horde was formed; this dominion was eventually divided among his sons, including Batu and Berke. In the 1250s, Hulegu, the son of Tolui (one of Chinggis Khan's sons), successfully campaigned in Iran and Iraq where he established the Ilkhanate; the term "il-khan" means "subordinate khan," highlighting the Ilkhan's deference to great khans. The relations between the Jochid rulers of Golden Horde and the Ilkhans proved to be tense, particularly because of Berke's conversion of to Islam. Hulegu's campaigns, which resulted in the destruction of the Abbasid caliphate and much devastation in the Islamic realm, caused much resentment in Berke. Also, the Great Khan Mongke granted Hulegu lands in Azerbaijan that had been previously promised to Juchi by Chinggis Khan. This naturally embittered Berke and eventually led to a rupture with Hulegu; some accounts indicate that some Jochid princes and their forces supported Hulegu's invasion of Iran but were later slaughtered on his orders. Berke sought an alliance with the Mamluk sultan Baybars, who had defeated Hulegu's troops at Ain Jalut in 1260.

In 1261, as he was preparing to campaign against the Mamluks, Hulegu faced a series of raids by Berke Khan, which marked the first open confrontation between the Mongols. Hulegu's forces marched north, and initially scored a victory over

Berke's troops before suffering a major defeat on the Terek River in the mountains of the Caucasus. Despite leading eight major invasions across the Caucasus (1265, 1266–1267, 1279–1280, 1288, 1290, 1301, 1319, 1335–1336), the Golden Horde was unable to defeat the Ilkhans or advance beyond the Caucasus. Yet this prolonged conflict also sapped the resources of both states and, most importantly, diverted the Ilkhan attention from further expanding to defending its territory. The threat of joint actions by the Golden Horde and the Egyptian Mamluks remained strong until early 14th century and was resolved only in a peace treaty signed between the Mamluks and the Ilkhans in 1323. The rivalry between the Golden Horde and the Ilkhans all but ended with the former's collapse in 1340s. In the 1380s, it was briefly revived after the rise of Khan Tokhtamysh (Toqtamiš) of the Golden Horde, who challenged his former benefactor Timur over control of southeastern Caucasia. The khan's invasion of Azerbaijan (1386) failed, and Timur's punitive expedition into the Golden Horde greatly contributed to the eventual fragmentation of this state.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Berke Khan; Hulegu; Mamluk Sultanate; Mongols; Timur.

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Gorgin Khan (d. 1709)

Iranian name of King Giorgi XI of Kartli (eastern Georgia), who served as Iranian commander-in-chief and campaigned in Afghanistan. After the death of his father, King Vakhtang V (Shah Nawaz Khan I), Giorgi converted to Islam at the request of Shah Solayman of Iran in order to receive confirmation as ruler of Kartli in 1676. Giorgi, known as Gorgin Khan in Iran, reigned over Kartli for 10 years and sought to lessen Iranian influence there. In 1688, Shah Solayman deposed him and Gorgin Khan initially fled to Ottoman-controlled western Georgia, trying unsuccessfully to reclaim his crown. In the mid-1690s, as relations between Iran and the Ottoman Empire deteriorated, Gorgin Khan was offered the throne of Kartli in return for his support of the Safavids, which he accepted. Nevertheless, disagreements soon prevailed, and Gorgin Khan continued to defy the Safavids, repulsing their incursions in 1694–1695. The new Shah, Sultan Husayn, preferred a diplomatic solution and offered Gorgin Khan amnesty, which he accepted. In March 1697, the Portuguese

envoy, Gregorio Pereira Fidalgo, witnessed the Georgian's arrival at the Safavid palace accompanied by 50 soldiers. Recognizing his courage and skills, Sultan Husayn confirmed Gorgin Khan as the king of Kartli in 1703 but kept him in Iran, appointing him as commander-in-chief of the Iranian army and the governor (beglarbeg) of Kandahar, with orders to pacify the rebel Afghani tribes. In 1704, leading some 4,000 Georgians and 20,000 Iranians, Gorgin Khan defeated the Afghani tribes and made them recognize the Safavid rule. However, his governorship in Afghanistan proved to be heavy handed and oppressive, prompting Mir Vays (Mir Ways), a local tribal leader, to lead a rebellion. Gorgin Khan subdued the revolt and captured Mir Vays, whom he sent to the shah in Isfahan. Mir Vays, through skillful flattery and substantial bribes, lulled the suspicions of the shah, who freed Mir Vays and ordered Gorgin Khan to show moderation and cooperate with the Afghan. Gorgin Khan underestimated the danger he was facing and failed to notice Mir Vays's preparations against him. The Afghans attacked the Georgian garrison in Kandahar in the spring of 1709. Sources vary on the final minutes of the Georgians, some describe them being killed while sleeping in a garden and others portray Giorgi and his entourage's desperate fight at a banquet the Afghans had organized in their honor.

After learning about this disaster, Shah Sultan Husayn dispatched Giorgi's nephew Kaikhosro to suppress the uprising in 1711. This expedition was doomed from the start because the Persian grand vizier, who had intrigued against the Georgian faction, had maintained a secret correspondence with Mir Vays. Kaikhosro initially defeated the Afghan forces and besieged Kandahar but was then defeated in a decisive engagement with Mir Vays. The loss of capable Georgian generals and their elite troops left Iran exposed to future attacks and eventually culminated in the Afghan invasion of 1722.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Gulnabad, Battle of (1722); Isfahan, Siege of (1722).

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Granada, Siege of (1491)

Having taken most of the Moorish kingdom of Granada, on April 26, 1491, Ferdinand II, king of Aragon, began the siege of the Muslim stronghold of the city of Granada, establishing his headquarters in the nearby village of Atqa. Queen

Isabella of Castile remained in the field with her husband Ferdinand, wishing to observe events and hoping to inspire the troops. The ruler of Granada, Muhammad XI, born Abu Abdullah and known to the Spanish as Boabdil, ruled the kingdom of Granada from the Alhambra Palace in the fortified city of the same name. A major confrontation occurred between the two sides in July, which the Spanish won, but there were in fact few such actions. The Moors did attempt a number of small sorties, but all were beaten back.

By September the inhabitants of Granada were in desperate straits, the population of the city having swelled because people from the countryside sought shelter in the city just before the siege. Realizing that relief from Muslim forces in North Africa was not forthcoming and that there was no hope of reversing the situation, Muhammad entered into secret negotiations with King Ferdinand. On November 25, 1491, Muhammad agreed to generous terms of capitulation. The Muslims were to surrender all their artillery and fortresses but were able, for the time being, to continue to practice their religion, keep their own language and customs, be governed by their own laws, and dispose of their property as they wished. They would also be exempt from royal taxation for a period of three years. Muhammad received the small territory of Alpujarras but as a vassal of Castile. These terms were to go into effect in 60 days, but because Muhammad's opponents were protesting this arrangement, the surrender was moved forward, and Ferdinand received the keys to the city from King Muhammad's own hand on January 1, 1492.

The capitulation of Granada marked the end of eight centuries of struggle between Muslims and Christians for control of the Iberian Peninsula and the consolidation of the Spanish kingdoms into one nation. This long religious crusade also resulted in Spanish nationalism being closely identified with the Catholic Church. Despite the terms granted in the capitulation of Granada, the militant Catholicism for which Spain became known soon resulted in the persecution of Muslims and Jews. The Inquisition, established earlier, was widely applied in a Christian effort to homogenize Spanish society. In an end to religious diversity in Spain, Muslims and Jews were given the cruel choice of conversion to Christianity or exile. Those who agreed to convert (the Jews were known as Conversos and the Muslims as Mudejars) were never really trusted by Spanish Christians and became special targets of the Inquisition.

Spencer C. Tucker

See also: Reconquista.

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Great Game

The "Great Game" was the British term for the competition, initially clandestine, between British India and Czarist Russia to gather information about and exert influence and control over the vast, uncharted mountainous regions of Central Asia. The British played the Great Game to protect India, whereas the Russians wanted to keep the British from interfering with their "eastern destiny." The term "Great Game" was reportedly coined by an early British adventurer, Lieutenant Arthur Conolly of the 6th Bengal Native Light Cavalry, who posed as a Persian merchant and tried to reach Khiva in 1830. The Russian statesman Count Karl Nesselrode called the conflict "the tournament of shadows" (Farwell 1989, 106). The Great Game began early in the 19th century and continued until 1907.

In January 1801, Russian czar Paul sent an army of 20,000 Cossacks to invade India. Even though the force met disaster at the Volga River, the czar was not discouraged and tried, without success, to persuade Napoleon Bonaparte to conduct a joint Franco-Russian incursion into India via Afghanistan.

The specter of Russian invasion returned in the 1820s, as the Russians expanded south after their victories in wars against Persia (1825–1828) and Turkey (1828–1829). This began a decade of British exploration in Afghanistan and the surrounding area. British officers who participated in this early stage of the Great Game included Conolly, Lieutenant Alexander "Bokhara" Burnes, and Major Eldred Pottinger.

In 1838, anxious to block possible Persian and Russian encroachment, the British East India Company reached an agreement with Ranjit Singh, the Sikh ruler of the Punjab, and the pro-British Shah Shuja to restore the latter to the Afghan throne. This precipitated the First Afghan War the next year. This conflict witnessed ferocious fighting, including the British invasion of Afghanistan and an uprising in Kabul that resulted in the encirclement of the British force. While evacuating Kabul, this force—consisting of about 4,500 troops (of which 700 were British) and about 10,000 camp followers—was almost annihilated in the frigid mountain passes near Gandamak. A British punitive expedition tried to restore British influence, and the war ended in September 1842. The Russian threat receded.

Imperial rivalry subsided during the following decade. The Second Sikh War ended in 1849, and the British annexed the Punjab as a result. Before and after the Indian Mutiny (1857–1859), the British continued absorbing Indian states, and the Russians expanded further in Central Asia, conquering Samarkand in 1868, then Bokhara, Khiva, and, in 1875, Kokand. In England, the "Forward School" argued

Ranjit Singh, the Sikh ruler of the Punjab. (Hulton Archive/Getty Images)

for military preparations, and the viceroy was directed to take "decided measures for counteracting the danger of the Russian advance in Central Asia and in particular for re-establishing our influence in Afghanistan" (Fredericks 1971, 187).

Afghanistan was in the throes of internal dynastic struggles in the late 1870s, and the emir, Sher Ali Khan, tried to avoid involvement in the Anglo-Russian rivalry. The Russians, however, after their 1878 victory over the Turks, flexed their muscles and sent an uninvited mission to Afghanistan. As Sher Ali was struggling with his cousin Abdur Rahman Khan for the throne, he began to distance himself from the British and sought Russian assistance. The British demanded to send a similar mission to Afghanistan and, rebuffed, issued an ultimatum to Sher Ali. This demand went unanswered, and on November 20, 1878, the British invaded Afghanistan and started the Second Afghan War. British participation in this 1878–1880 war was very costly, although the British were able to establish the pro-British Abdur Rahman on the Afghan throne. The British also reorganized their political and military intelligence organizations.

The Great Game reached its peak during the 1880s, and the rivalry with Russia was more blatant, depending less on secrecy and disguise. Central Asia was "a vast adventure playground for ambitious young officers and explorers on both sides" (French 1994, 36). One of the leading British players during this period was Captain Francis Younghusband.

On March 30, 1885, while discussions were being held to fix the disputed northern boundary of Afghanistan, Russian forces attacked the Afghan town of Penjdeh in the disputed area, killing more than 300 of the Afghan defenders. Afghanistan had been promised aid against aggression by the British, and the Pendjeh Incident almost sparked a war between England and Russia before the crisis was overcome through diplomacy. The Anglo-Russian Boundary Commission continued to meet,

delineating the border between Afghanistan and Russia in 1887. Six years later, the boundary between Afghanistan and British India was fixed by the Durand Line.

Rumors of war persisted through the 1890s and into the 20th century. Russia's defeat in the Russo-Japanese War (1904–1905) contributed to the revolution in St. Petersburg in December 1905. Weakened and humiliated, Russia, under French pressure, agreed to the Anglo-Russian Convention of 1907 and promised to respect India's frontiers. The Great Game was over.

Harold E. Raugh Jr.

See also: Anglo-Afghan War (1839–1842); Anglo-Afghans War (1878–1880); Russo-Afghan Conflict (1885).

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Greco-Turkish War (1919–1922)

War between Greece and Turkish nationalists that occurred as a result of the partition of the Ottoman Empire after World War I and produced continuing animosity between Greeks and Turks. When World War I broke out in 1914, the Ottoman Empire had about 2.5 million Greek-speaking Orthodox Christians in Anatolia. King Constantine of Greece declared neutrality, but the Prime Minister Eleftherios Venizelos hoped to obtain Greek-inhabited eastern Thrace, the islands of Imbros and Tenedos, and parts of western Anatolia around Smyrna (present-day Izmir). When negotiations began with the Allies, the king dismissed Venizelos. Venizelos eventually forced Constantine to abdicate in May 1917, and Greece declared war on the Ottoman Empire. The Treaty of Sèvres, concluded on August 10, 1920, between the Allies and the Ottoman Empire, among other provisions, allocated these territories to Greece.

Meanwhile, after the Armistice of Moudros, signed in October 1918, 20,000 Greek troops occupied Smyrna. The Greeks of Smyrna greeted the Greek troops

as liberators, and the Turkish army put up little opposition to the Greek landings. However, a Turkish nationalist killed the Greek flag-bearer, resulting in shooting that killed 300 to 400 Turks and 100 Greeks. During the summer of 1920, the Greek army launched several offensives that extended Greek control over much of western Anatolia.

In October 1920, the Greek army renewed its advance into Anatolia to pressure Mustafa Kemal, the leader of the Turkish nationalists, to sign the Treaty of Sèvres. The advancing Greeks could not decisively defeat the Turks, who retreated in an orderly fashion. In early 1921, the Greek army resumed its advance but met stiff resistance from the entrenched Turks. On January 11, 1921, the Turkish forces halted the Greek advance at the First Battle of Inonu and defeated the Greeks at the Second Battle of Inonu on March 30. These Turkish military successes caused the Allies to meet in London to consider amending the Treaty of Sèvres. In early July 1921, a reinforced Greek army launched another major offensive against Turkish troops along the Afyonkarahisar-Kutahya-Eskisehir line. The Greeks broke through the Turkish defenses and occupied these strategically important cities but halted for a month. Kemal used this delay to retreat to the east of the Sakarya River and organize defensive lines about 62 miles from Ankara.

In early August 1921, the Greek army advanced on the Turkish defenses. From August 23 to September 13, the fighting seesawed across the Turkish defenses. Then, the Greek army tried to capture Haymana, 25 miles south of Ankara, but the Turks held out. Exhausted by the ferocity of the battle, the Greeks decided to withdraw to their lines of June. The Greeks then retreated to Smyrna.

In March 1922, the Allies tried to negotiate a cease fire between the Greeks and Turks, but Kemal insisted that Greeks withdraw from Anatolia. The Turks then defeated the Greeks at the Battle of Dumlupinar near Afyon on August 30, 1922. On September 9, Turkish troops occupied Smyrna, and the remaining Greek forces evacuated Anatolia. The Turks destroyed the city and killed most of the Greeks left. News of the massacre at Smyrna caused more than a million Greeks to leave Anatolia for Greece. In retaliation, Greece forced about 500,000 Turks living in Greece to immigrate to Turkey. As Kemal's forces advanced toward the Dardanelles and the Bosporus, Italian and French forces abandoned their positions at the straits, leaving the British alone. On October 15, 1922, Britain, France, Italy, Greece, and Kemal signed the Armistice of Mudanya by which the Western allies retained control of eastern Thrace and the Bosporus and the Greeks evacuated these areas. The Treaty of Lausanne, signed on July 24, 1923, recognized the independence of the Turkish Republic, the end of Greek territorial claims in Anatolia, and Greece's acceptance of its prewar borders.

Robert B. Kane

See also: Kemal Atatürk, Mustafa; Lausanne, Treaty of (1923); Moudros, Armistice of (1918); Sévres, Treaty of (1920).

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Greek War of Independence (1821–1832)

The Greek War of Independence (Greek Revolution) was fought to win the Greeks' freedom from the Ottoman Empire. On March 25, 1821, Germanos, Greek Orthodox Bishop of Patras, proclaimed that the struggle for independence had begun. The revolt spread because of the leadership of the Hetairia Philike (Friendly Society), a secret revolutionary society organized in 1814 by Greek merchants at Odessa in Russia.

In 1820, Alexander I. Ypsilantis, who was serving as an officer in the Russian army, became the leader of the Hetairia Philike. Like most of the Hetairia Philike he was a Phanariot from Constantinople. The society's propaganda efforts successfully recruited many Greeks, including the klephts (brigands in the mountains), such as Theodore Kolokotronis; the Maniots; ship captains from Hydra, Spetsae, and Psara; and others. The decision was made to begin the uprising while the Ottoman sultan, Mahmud II, and Ali Pasha of Janina were engaged in a power struggle. In October 1821 the Greeks captured the towns of Tripolitsa and Nauplion.

The Ottoman sultan responded to the revolution with intimidation and terror. Easter Sunday 1821 he executed the Patriarch of Constantinople. Thereafter, hundreds of prominent Greeks were publicly executed. His Muslim subjects were encouraged to attack the Greeks in their communities.

The death of Ali Pasha in February 1822 freed the sultan's armies to crush the Greeks. Successful at first, a Turkish army led by Mahmud Dramali Pasha was destroyed (July 26–28) in the Battle of Dervenakia, which was fought in the narrow mountain pass in the Peloponnese called the Dervenakia . Shortly afterward the Turks at Nauplion surrendered. And on Christmas Day 1822, the Turkish commander of the army that had crushed Ali Pasha committed suicide for failing to take Messolonghi.

In 1824, Mehmed Ali Pasha, ruler of Egypt, sent his son, Ibrahim Pasha, with an Egyptian army to restore Ottoman rule in Greece. In January 1825 his army landed in the Peloponnese, despite opposition by a fleet of Greek ships, and launched a successful campaign. By 1826, the Greek situation was desperate. The arrival of foreign fighters, the philhellenes, men with classical educations who idealized Ancient

Greece, such as Lord Byron made some military contributions, and philhellene financial and political support was to be the deciding factor in gaining Greek independence. France, Britain, and Russia signed the Treaty of London to mediate the conflict, but the sultan's refusal to sign opened the way for Allied intervention. On October 27, 1827, the Allied fleet totally destroyed the combined Ottoman and Egyptian fleet at the Battle of Navarino Bay. A year later Russia declared war and invaded Ottoman Empire. In 1832, the Kingdom of Greece was established; it would be ruled by Prince Otto of Bavaria, who was crowned King Otho I. On July 21, 1832 Sultan Mahmud II signed the Treaty of Constantinople recognizing Greek independence.

Andrew J. Waskey

See also: Constantinople, Treaty of (1832); Egyptian-Ottoman Wars; Mahmud II; Mehmed Ali; Messolonghi, Siege of (1822–1826); Navarino Bay, Battle of (1827); Samos, Battle of (1824).

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Grocka, Battle of (1739)

Major Ottoman victory during the Austro-Ottoman War, which allowed the Turks to reclaim the city of Belgrade. In 1735, Russia and the Ottoman Empire became embroiled in a war that soon involved Austria as well. A Russian ally since late 1720s, Austria watched closely the Russian campaigns in Crimea in 1736–1737 and, after a series of Russian victory and alarmed by Russia's ambitions, it joined the war in July 1737. The Ottoman army, however, proved to be much better prepared and inflicted a major defeat on the Austrians at Banja Luka in 1737. After regrouping, the Austrians, under Marshal Olivier Wallis and Wilhelm Reinhard von Neipperg, counterattacked and encountered the Ottoman army, led by Grand Vizier Mehmed Pasha, near Grocka. The Turks had taken advantageous positions on the heights, where they deployed their artillery. The battle began on July 22 when the Austrians stormed up the hill in uncoordinated attacks that ended disastrously because of the heavy Ottoman fire. The Austrian cavalry, notably the cuirassiers, suffered particularly horrendous losses. After losing about 3,000 killed and 7,000 wounded, Wallis retreated from the battlefield. Four days after the battle, the Ottomans besieged Belgrade. The defeat at Grocka had an enormous impact on the Austrian Court, which was accustomed to the resounding victories of Eugene of Savoy, and forced Austria to sue for peace. The Treaty of Belgrade, signed in Sep-

tember 1739, proved to be sweet retribution for previous losses for the Ottomans, who compelled Austria to surrender Belgrade and parts of Serbia and Wallachia.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Austro-Ottoman Wars; Belgrade, Treaty of (1739).

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Gulistan, Treaty of (1813)

Treaty signed between Russia and Iran in October 1813 to end the First Russo-Iranian War of 1804–1813. Negotiated with British mediation, the treaty confirmed the Russian victory in the war and forced Persia to relinquish its claims to south Caucasia. Iran lost all its territories north of the Aras River, which included Daghestan, all of Georgia, and parts of Armenia and Azerbaijan (e.g., Karabagh, Ganja, Shirvan, Baku). The shah also surrendered Iranian rights to navigate the Caspian Sea and granted Russia exclusive rights to maintain military fleet in the Caspian Sea and capitulatory rights to trade within Iran. Russia in return promised to support Crown Prince Abbas Mirza as heir to the Persian throne after the death of Fath Ali Shah. The treaty established a firm Russian presence in the southern Caucasus, which was further consolidated by the Treaty of Turkmanchai (1828) after another Russo-Iranian War (1826–1828).

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Abbas Mirza; Russo-Iranian Wars; Turkmanchai, Treaty of (1828).

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Gulnabad, Battle of (1722)

Decisive battle between the Afghan forces and the Safavid army. By 1700, the Safavids had lost much of their sway in Afghanistan, and in 1704, the Safavid

Shah Sultan Husayn dispatched a Georgian-Iranian army, led by Georgian king Giorgi XI (Gorgin Khan) to subdue the rebellious Afghani tribes. Gorgin Khan defeated the attackers and forced them to accept the Safavid rule. However, his governorship in Afghanistan proved to be heavy handed and oppressive, prompting an Afghani revolt, led by the Ghilzai tribe chief Mir Vays (Mir Ways), in the spring of 1709. The Afghans defeated the Georgian contingents and expelled the Iranians from Afghanistan. The loss of capable generals and elite troops left Iran exposed to future attacks, which eventually culminated in the Afghan Invasion of 1722. After the death of Mir Vays, his son Mahmud assumed the leadership of a loose coalition of Afghani tribes. In 1722, he invaded Iran and faced the Safavid army near Gulnabad on March 8. The armies were unequal in size but their precise numbers remains unknown; it is unlikely that Mahmud had more than 18,000 men, whereas the Iranian forces had about 40,000 men and two dozen artillery pieces, commanded by Frenchman Philippe Colombe. The Iranians, however, failed to exploit their superiority and suffered from a lack of unified command as the army was divided into several parts to avoid arousing jealousy among its proud commanders.

The battle began with the charge of the Iranian right wing, commanded by the experienced Georgian general Rustam Khan, head of the Safavid royal troops (qullars). He gained considerable success against the Ghilzai left wing and reduced Mahmud to a state of panic. But the Iranians failed to coordinate their attacks. First, 12,000 Arab cavalry that followed Rustam's charge chose to rampage the enemy's camp instead of pressing on the attack. Had the Iranian center, under Vizier Muhammad Quli Khan attacked at that moment, the Afghans would inevitably have lost the day. But the vizier held back, which allowed Mahmud to drive back Rustam Khan. When the Iranian left wing, led by Ali Mardan Khan, finally attacked, the Afghans feigned flight and lured it onto their masked camel guns (zanburaks), which opened fire at point-blank range and devastated the Iranian ranks. The Afghan cavalry charge then broke through and wheeled on the rear of the Iranian artillery, whose crews were slaughtered. The rest of the Iranian army, deployed in the center under vizier's command, fled from the battlefield without even making contact with the enemy.

The decisive defeat at Gulnabad effectively marked the end of the Safavid Empire. The Afghans captured Isfahan after a 6-month siege but were unable to hold on to their Iranian conquests. Their withdrawal created a political vacuum in Iran, prompting a long-term conflict among various pretenders for throne.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Gorgin Khan; Isfahan, Siege of (1722).

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H

Habsburg-Ottoman Wars. *See* Austro-Ottoman Wars.

Hajjaj ibn Yusuf Ath-Thaqafi, al- (661–714)

One of the leading generals of the early Umayyad caliphate. Born in at-Ta'if (in Arabia), al-Hajjaj played an important role in securing the Umayyads in power. He served as governor of Iraq during the reigns of Abd al-Malik ibn Marwan and Al-Walid ibn Abd al-Malik. He participated in the campaign against Abd Allah ibn al-Zubair, who had led a violent opposition to the Umayyads and declared himself caliph. After scoring a victory at Maskin on the Dujayl in 691, al-Hajjaj marched to Mecca, which he besieged for several months before capturing it in late 692; the present building of Kaaba largely represents al-Hajjaj's reconstruction of the damaged original. After governing the Hejaz, he was sent to quell unrest in Iraq, which he accomplished in 699–701. Widely known as a competent but ruthless commander and administrator, al-Hajjaj remained governor of Iraq until his death and played an important role in expanding Arab control into India and Central Asia. He is also credited for introducing the vowel markings to the Arabic script to prevent misreading of the Koran.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Abd Allah ibn al-Zubair; Umayyad Caliphate.

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Hajji Husein Pasha (Mezzomorto) (d. 1701)

Ottoman corsair and admiral, nicknamed "Mezzomorto" (half-dead) because he was severely wounded in a battle. He probably came from the Balearic Islands and became involved in piracy at an early age. He first came to prominence as one of the Barbary corsairs in early 1680s. In 1682, he was offered as a hostage to France after the French admiral Abraham Duquesne bombarded Algiers. Instead, Husein Reis organized a mutiny against the dey of Algiers, seizing power himself. Husein Reis initially targeted French shipping, but in 1684, negotiated a peace with France that was soon broken. He ruled over Algiers for 10 years, earning a fierce reputation for his attacks on Christian shipping. In 1688, his raids provoked another French bombardment of Algiers, but it failed to subdue the unruly corsair. Nevertheless, he chose to leave Algiers and enter Ottoman service in 1688–1689, spending the next few years as a galleon commander (kaliun kapudani). In early 1690s, he earned the title of kaputan pasha and was given command of the Ottoman fleet and governorship of Adana. He conducted a series of successful campaigns against the Venetian fleet throughout the 1690s, distinguishing himself during the capture of Chios in 1695. Two years later he routed the Venetian fleet near the island of Lemnos, and in 1698 he defeated another Venetian force near Mytilene. In 1701, he was dismissed from his position and retired to Chios where he died later that year.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Barbarossa Hayreddin Pasha; Cezayirli Ghazi Hasan Pasha; Piale (Piyale) Pasha; Turgut Reis.

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Hamas

Also known as the Islamic Resistance Movement, Hamas is an Islamic fundamentalist group fighting for the liberation of Palestine. A rival of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), it has committed countless acts of terrorism in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, and Israel and has support among Palestinians living in the United States. In the January 2006 elections to the Palestinian Legislative Council, Hamas achieved an upset victory, winning a majority of the seats in the Parliament.

Hamas was founded by Sheikh Ahmed Yassin in December 1987, at the beginning of the Palestinian Intifada. For his anti-Israeli activities, Yassin was sentenced to life in prison in Israel in 1991 but was released on October 1, 1997. Hamas came to prominence in 1989 as a voice for Muslim fundamentalists living in the West Bank and Gaza, territories that were until May 1994 occupied by Israel. Its armed wing is known as al-Qassam, or the Qassam Brigades, and the organization is based in Gaza, where it has amassed a large following. Hamas representatives also operate from the political headquarters of the powerful Muslim Brotherhood in Jordan, making statements on behalf of Hamas via Muslim Brotherhood legislators. Jordanian intelligence reports indicate that the group's annual operating budget is about US$70 million—nearly all of it used for a social-service network of mosques, hospitals, schools, and other institutions that form Hamas's political base.

As advocates of the complete dismantling of Israel and the building of an Islamic Palestinian state in its place, Hamas differs from the moderate PLO. However, although Hamas has opposed PLO talks with Israel, it has been willing to accept any gains that such a process might provide, including Israel's partial May 1994 withdrawal from the occupied territories. That attitude at one time allowed Israel and the United States to view Hamas as a potential ally in negotiations with the PLO. However, the December 1992 murder of an Israeli border guard by Hamas and the subsequent expulsion of 415 Palestinians from Israel in retaliation destroyed any hopes of negotiations between Israel and Hamas.

During 1993, it came to light that many Palestinian Americans were active in Hamas and that the organization was carrying out an extensive recruitment drive. In September 1993, Hamas agreed to renounce violence after Israel and the PLO signed the historic Oslo Accords to begin an interim period of Palestinian self-rule in the Gaza Strip and the West Bank city of Jericho. However, Hamas remains opposed to the PLO's new ties with Israel and has carried out several fatal attacks on Israeli civilians and border soldiers despite its pledge not to do so.

In August 1994, Hamas officials confirmed PLO announcements that high-level contacts with the PLO were under way and that Hamas would stand in free elections for a Palestinian Council. However, Hamas members continued to commit terrorist acts and killings throughout 1994 and 1995, and Hamas ultimately boycotted the Palestinian legislative elections held in January 1996. The head of al-Qassam, Yahya Ayyash, was killed in an Israeli secret-service hit the same month, inspiring an obscure outcrop of Hamas calling itself Cells of the Martyr the Engineer Yahya Ayyash—the New Pupils to commit a series of suicide bombings in February and March 1996 that killed more than 60 people and injured several hundred more. The senseless slaughter of so many innocent civilians so soon after Yitzhak Rabin's November 1995 assassination immeasurably damaged the hopes for peace that were so high only a few months before.



Sheikh Ahmed Yassin, the spiritual leader of Hamas, was assassinated on March 22, 2004 by Israel's armed forces, sparking outrage in the Palestinian community. (www.passia.org)

Since Rabin's assassination, Hamas has continued to be the second-most powerful Palestinian organization after al-Fatah. In 1998, Hamas reportedly refused an offer by Palestinian President Yasir Arafat to join the Palestinian Authority government. Despite this, Yassin was reported to have attended a 1999 PLO meeting as an observer, suggesting that there had been a thaw between the two groups. Unfortunately, the numerous suicide bombings blamed on Hamas in the early 2000s have served to hamper and all but shut down the entire Israeli-Palestinian peace process. Tensions were exacerbated on March 22, 2004, when Israeli forces assassinated Yassin, and Hamas and its new leader, Abd al-Aziz Rantisi, vowed to avenge his death. Within a month, Rantisi also had been assassinated by Israelis, who pledged to continue targeting Hamas leaders as long as the militant group staged attacks on Israel.

In January 2006, Hamas stunned the country and the world by achieving a surprise upset victory over the ruling al-Fatah government, winning a majority of the seats in the Palestinian Legislative Council. In appealing to voters, Hamas benefited, in part, from public perceptions that al-Fatah was corrupt and incompetent. In the aftermath of the election, the United States, the European Union, and Israel

vowed to end all financial assistance to the Palestinian Authority as long as Hamas remained in power and did not renounce its use of terrorism to attack Israel.

By the end of 2007, Hamas had imposed a more religiously conservative regime on Gaza, which was now largely cut off economically from the rest of the world and more than ever in economic straits. In the meantime, Israel had imposed a blockade against Hamas, and Hamas responded by firing rockets into Israel. In December 2008, after a five-month cease-fire between Hamas and Israel, Hamas militants resumed firing rockets into Israeli territory. The Israelis retaliated with punishing air strikes late in the month, and on January 3, 2009, Israel sent troops into Gaza. The resulting two-week incursion killed an estimated 1,300 Palestinians (159 of them children) and wounded another 5,400. Reportedly, 22,000 buildings were destroyed or damaged, most of them in Gaza city, and the physical damage alone was $1.9 billion. On January 17, 2009, a shaky cease-fire again took hold but, as of 2010, it is occasionally breached by violence.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Arafat, Yasir; Fatah, al-; Gaza War (2006); Hezbollah; Oslo Accords; Palestine Liberation Organization.

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Harran, Battle of (1104)

The Battle of Harran was fought between the Crusader States of Antioch and Edessa and the Saljuk forces of Mosul and Mardin. The outcome was a major defeat for the Christian forces. In 1104, Saljuk forces attacked the County of Edessa. Baldwin II asked for help from the Principality of Antioch and its ruler Bohemond I. The combined Christian forces laid siege to the city of Harran. Saljuk troops from Mosul commanded by Jerkermish and from Mardin led by Sukman marched to the relief of Harran. The two forces met on the plain in front of Harran. For two days the Saljuk forces skirmished with the Crusaders. On the third day, May 7, pretending to flee, the Islamic forces retreated across the Balikh River, encouraging the Christian forces to follow them. The Edessans rushed forward to engage the enemy and were surrounded by the Saljuk cavalry. The Christian troops suffered very heavy casualties, and Baldwin was captured. Bohemond, seeing the defeat of his

ally, did not press his attack and was able to escape to Edessa. Edessa never fully recovered from the battle, and Antioch was forced to seek Byzantine support. The Saljuks had defeated the Christian forces in open battle for the first time since the onset of the First Crusade.

Ralph M. Baker

See also: First Crusade (1096–1099); Saljuks; Second Crusade (1147–1149).

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Harun al-Rashid (d. 809)

Fifth Abbasid caliph (r. 786–809), whose reign is viewed as a golden age for the caliphate, though it was plagued by internal rebellions and costly external wars. The caliphate faced several internal problems during al-Rashid's reign. Fragmentation was already occurring in the westernmost reaches of the empire. In Spain, a rival caliphate was set up by the surviving Umayyads in 755. After a series of revolts and disorder in North Africa, the Idrisid dynasty established itself in al-Maghrib in 788, and the Aghlabids emerged as the autonomous rulers of Ifriqiya. In Egypt, heavy taxation and poor governorship prompted two major uprisings in 788 and 794, though they were suppressed, and Egypt remained under caliphal control. Syria was also in a state of disorder because of fighting between the two tribal factions, the Yemenis and the Mudaris. These tribes also fought the Abbasid army and governors who got embroiled in their conflicts. Al-Rashid sent an army to Syria, which successfully pacified the region in 796.

In Iran and Khurasan there was unrest among local populations disillusioned by the Abbasids, who had promised to improve their conditions. These regions had only been superficially Islamized, and its people were still attached to their local religions and traditions. Thus, their uprisings took on Shiite and Kharijite religious forms, which were closer to their pre-Islamic traditions and beliefs. Al-Rashid's armies put down a series of Alid revolts in Khurasan and the South Caspian region and fought the Kharijites in Sistan, Fars, and Kirman.

Harun al-Rashid personally led expeditions and raids against Byzantium. In 781, an Abbasid army of 95,000 men reached the Sea of Marmara. In 797, al-Rashid led an attack on Byzantium that resulted in some significant advances. Peace was only concluded with Empress Irene because of the threat of a Khazar

A European (and much later) representation of Harun al-Rashid, an Abbasid caliph who ruled Baghdad from AD 786 to 809, when the city was at its cultural and commercial peak, and who subsequently became a major figure in Arabic storytelling traditions. (Hulton Archive/Getty Images)

attack. The caliph and an army of 100,000 men raided Byzantium again in 803 and returned laden with spoils. However, the biggest expedition occurred in 806, when the caliph attacked and took Heraclea and Tyana with a huge army of 135,000 men. The successes of this expedition, and the threat of a Bulgarian attack, forced Emperor Nicephorus to accept a humiliating treaty that forced him to pay tribute and a personal poll tax for himself and his son. Al-Rashid also launched successful naval attacks on Cyprus in 805 and Rhodes in 807, but no permanent gains were made on this front. At the same time al-Rashid faced incursions from the Khazars, who launched booty raids into Muslim territories, including a massive attack on Armenia in 800 that resulted in the devastation of this region. Harun al-Rashid died in 809. His succession arrangement not only divided the caliphate but also caused a civil war between his sons and eroded central power, which resulted in the further partition of the empire and the rise of several autonomous local dynasties.

Adam Ali

See also: Abbasids; Byzantine-Muslim Wars (to 1035).

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Hassan ibn al-Nu'man (Seventh Century)

Prominent Umayyad commander who campaigned in North Africa. In 694, he was sent on a mission to pacify the Berber tribes that had continued to resist Arab control and to reduce the surviving Byzantine strongholds in the region. Hassan captured Kairouan (Kayrawan) and Carthage in 695, followed by his conquests of the remaining Byzantine ports of Satfura and Banzart. Hassan then turned to the Berber problem. A Berber woman whom the Arabs called al-Kahina (the priestess), and who was the chief of the Jawara tribe, had assembled a larger Berber force and refused to acknowledge Arab authority. She defeated the Arab forces on the Nini River (wadi Maskiyana), forcing Hassan to retreat to Cyrenaica, where he awaited reinforcements. Al-Kahina, believing the Arabs were only interested in booty, wrought havoc in the countryside, pursuing a scorched-earth policy that enraged local population, a sentiment that helped the Arabs in their next campaign. Around 701, Hassan returned to Ifriqiya and, in a battle near Qabis, defeated al-Kahina, who was killed in the battle. To pacify the Berbers, he offered good peace terms and recruited thousands of them into the Arab army. Hassan then recaptured Carthage, which the Byzantines had captured in 697 as a result of the Arab retreat to Cyrenaica. Unable to protect the town from future Byzantine threat, he ordered the destruction of its port to make it unusable for the Byzantines and founded a new port at the site of ancient Tarshish (Tunis). He played an important role in establishing Arab administration in the region and, before his departure in 704, developed a sound administrative infrastructure in the region.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: North Africa, Muslim Conquest of; Umayyad Caliphate.

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Hattin, Battle of (1187)

Major Muslim victory over the Christian forces during the Second Crusade of 1147–1149. Hattin is located in Galilee, seven miles west of Tiberius and the Sea of Galilee.

Crusader Reynald of Châtillon, lord of the castle at Kerak on the road between Damascus and Mecca, carried out a series of attacks on Muslim caravans and towns along the Red Sea. When King Guy de Lusignan, of the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem, failed to punish Reynald for these actions, the brilliant Muslim military leader, Egyptian sultan Saladin, vowed to do so and mounted an invasion of Palestine.

On June 26, 1187, Saladin crossed the Jordan River at the head of a force of some 20,000 Ottomans and laid siege to the Crusader stronghold of Tiberius. King Guy's advisers called for an immediate effort to raise the siege. Count Raymond of Tripoli, the ablest of the Crusader generals, whose wife was then in Tiberius, urged Guy to wait. Raymond knew Tiberius was well supplied, and he believed it best to delay any relief effort until Saladin's forces experienced supply problems in the countryside. Also, the extreme heat of summer would make campaigning difficult then. Guy ignored this. He ordered Christian castles and strong points to provide much of their garrisons, and in late June, Guy led a relieving Christian army of approximately 1,200 knights and 18,000 infantry toward Tiberius.

On July 2, the Christian force reached Sephoria, about equidistant between Acre and Tiberius. Again Raymond urged caution, and again he was rebuffed. Although Raymond had warned Guy that there was only one spring accessible to the army along its planned route, the army continued east. Saladin was pleased. He knew how lack of water would affect the heavily armored Crusader force. Saladin immediately sent light cavalry to attack the Christians, bringing them to a halt on July 3 in the middle of the parched and barren land. The Muslim attackers and the heat of the day forced the Christians to take up position near the village of Hattin, next to two mounds known as the Horns.

The Muslim cavalry surrounded the Crusaders and kept harassing their camp during the night of July 3–4. What little water the Christians had was consumed. Saladin also had his men set fire to nearby brush upwind of the crusader camp, blowing smoke into it and making it even more difficult for the men and horses.

The next morning, July 4, Saladin still refused to close with the heavily armored Christians. Bringing up fresh stocks of arrows, he ordered his bowmen to continue their harassing fire. The Christian cavalry charged the Muslims, but this separated the infantry from the cavalry and enabled the Muslims to destroy the latter piecemeal. At the very end of the battle, Raymond and a small force of cavalry cut their way through the Turkish lines, but they were the only ones to escape. The rest of the Crusaders, out of water, their horses dying of thirst, and

under constant harassing fire from Muslim archers, were forced to surrender. Guy was among the prisoners.

Exact casualty totals are unknown, but certainly most of the Christians were either taken prisoner or killed. Although Saladin ordered Reynald executed, he treated Guy well and subsequently released him on the latter's promise that he would not fight again. Raymond later died of wounds sustained in the battle.

Saladin's victory at Hattin led to the Muslim conquest of most of Palestine, the Christian garrisons of which had been so badly depleted to put together the force taken in the battle. Over the next months, Saladin captured Tiberius, Acre, and Ascalon, although Crusaders arriving by sea managed to hold off the Muslims at Tyre. Saladin laid siege to Jerusalem on September 20, and that city surrendered on October 2, 1187. Unlike the behavior of the Christians in the First Crusade, Saladin treated the defeated well.

Most of the Latin Kingdom of Jerusalem had now been lost to the Christians, not to be regained; but the Europeans controlled the Mediterranean Sea and the Christian states soon mounted a new series of crusades in the Holy Land. These crusades, however, were increasingly motivated by secular rather than religious reasons.

Spencer C. Tucker

See also: First Crusade (1096–1099); Saladin; Second Crusade (1147–1149); Third Crusade (1187–1192).

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Hejaz Railroad, Attacks on (1916–1918)

Arab raids that in effect ended the Ottoman control of Arabia. In 1900, Sultan Abdulhamid ordered the construction of the Hejaz railway, which ran from Damascus to Mecca. Partly financed by Muslim donations, the railway was intended to carry pilgrims to Mecca. The sultan also recognized that the railway could easily be extended to the coast of Yemen and be used to move troops to control Arabia and the Wahhabi, a puritanical sect controlled by Ibn Saud.

The roadbed followed the "Frankincense Road" on the east side of the Hejaz escarpment away from the Red Sea. Construction began in 1901 but was stopped in

Laying the rails of the Hejaz Railroad in 1906. The railway was intended to run from Damascus to Mecca but was never fully completed. (Library of Congress)

1908 by the revolt by the Young Turks. The rail line reached from Damascus to Medina, a length of 820 miles. The last 280-mile section to Mecca was never built.

In 1916, the Arab Revolt began with attacks on the rail station at Medina. During 1917 Arab raiders kept more than 25,000 Ottoman troops busy protecting the line. At first the Ottomans kept up with the destruction, but as 1917 progressed so did the unrepaired damage. More significant was the destruction of rolling stock. On December 22 the Arabs captured an entire Turkish troop train.

Arab forces intensified their attacks in 1918, striking both trains and stations. By April attacks had moved north to Ma'an. In June the British began air attacks on Amman, Qatrana, and other places. By September the Ottomans were in retreat toward Damascus, and on September 23 the Arabs took Ma'an. On October 1, 1918, Arab forces occupied Damascus. Medina's Ottoman governor resisted until 1919.

Extensively damaged, the Saudi Arabian section of the line has never been rebuilt. Rusting wreckage from Arab attacks led by Lieutenant Colonel T. E. Lawrence still litters the railway. The Syrian and Jordanian sections of the line provide local transportation.

Andrew J. Waskey

See also: Arab Revolt of 1916–1918; Husayn ibn Ali; Ibn Saud; Lawrence, Thomas Edward (Lawrence of Arabia); Wahhabism; Young Turks.

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Herzegovinian Revolt (1875)

The most significant rebellion in Herzegovina against the Ottoman Empire occurred in mid-June 1875 because of the harsh treatment by the Bosnian rulers of the Ottoman province of Bosnia of the mostly Catholic and Orthodox population. In the 1870s, the Ottoman sultan Abdulmecid I announced a number of reforms that included new rights for the empire's Christian subjects, a new basis for army conscription, and an end to the hated tax-farming system. However, the powerful Bosnian landowners resisted or ignored the reforms, often instituting more repressive measures, including a steadily increasing tax burden, against their Christian subjects.

On June 19, 1875, the Catholics in the Gabela and Hrasno districts of lower Herzegovina, ignited by overtaxing, rebelled against the Ottoman authorities. On July 9, Orthodox Christians around the village of Nevesinje in eastern Herzegovina also rebelled. A general uprising of the entire Christian population in Bosnia and Herzegovina subsequently ensued. More than 150,000 people took refuge in Croatia. The Ottomans responded with both government troops under the recently appointed Bosnian governor and irregular troops led by local landowners.

Because the Ottoman authorities could not suppress the uprisings, the unrest quickly spread to the Christian populations of the other Ottoman provinces in the Balkans. The Ottoman military committed many atrocities during its attempts to suppress the unrest in the Balkan provinces. These atrocities led to Russian intervention in the Balkans to protect the Slavic Orthodox population and to the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877–1878. Russia defeated the Ottoman Empire and imposed significant losses of Ottoman territory in the Balkans with the March 1878 Treaty of San Stefano. Concerned about the establishment of an independent "great" Bulgaria, Otto von Bismarck, the prime minister of Germany, called a European conference in Berlin the following July to rewrite the original treaty. The new Treaty of Berlin still severely reduced Ottoman territories and power in Europe but allowed Austria-Hungary to occupy and govern Bosnia and Herzegovina although the provinces nominally remained under Ottoman sovereignty. Austria-Hungary officially annexed the province in 1908.

Robert B. Kane

See also: Berlin, Treaty of (1878); Russo-Ottoman War (1877–1878); San Stefano, Treaty of (1878).

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Hezbollah (Hizbullah)

Hezbollah, or the Party of God, is a radical Shiite Muslim organization in Lebanon. It was founded by Iranian revolutionary guards who were sent to Lebanon to fight the Israeli invasion in 1982. Syria, which closely monitors and attempts to control political events in Lebanon, allowed the Iranians entry after reaching an agreement that provided for Iranian oil shipments at below-market cost. Iran's interest in Lebanon stems from the fact that a large portion of Lebanon's Muslims profess Shiism—the dominant branch of Islam in Iran.

Hezbollah is believed to have been responsible for a variety of terrorist attacks, including the suicide car-bombing of a U.S. military base in Beirut in 1983 and the kidnapping and murder of Western and Soviet officials and residents in Lebanon. The group is headed by a politburo, though little else is known of its organizational structure. It is based in Beirut, the Bekaa region, and several southern Shiite villages. Hezbollah is a potent political and social force. It runs hospitals and low-cost food cooperatives, awards educational scholarships, and offers interest-free loans to the needy. It also runs its own radio and television stations.

The group's goal initially was to transform Lebanon into an Iranian-style Islamic republic, but that goal was abandoned after a series of armed conflicts with Syria and Syria's closest Lebanese ally, the Amal movement of Nabih Berri. Another factor that moderated Hezbollah's aims was the death of Iran's Ayatollah Khomeini in 1989. Iran, Syria, and Hezbollah subsequently reached an informal agreement that ceded the struggle against Israeli occupation of south Lebanon to Hezbollah in exchange for Hezbollah's acceptance of the realities of the Lebanese political situation and the cessation of kidnappings, which had become an embarrassment to the Syrian government.

As the leading coordinator of Shiite anti-Israel activity, Hezbollah carried out dogged resistance to the foreign presence in Lebanon. Hezbollah guerrillas maintained an active battlefront against many years of Israeli occupation in southern Lebanon, engaging in a tit-for-tat exchange of rockets and heavy artillery fire with

Israeli troops, which accelerated dramatically in early 1995. Hezbollah claimed that Israel, in its quest to demolish suspected Hezbollah hideouts, killed and wounded many Lebanese civilians in attacks on southern Lebanese villages throughout their occupation of the Israeli security zone. After the withdrawal of Israeli troops from Lebanon in May 2000, Secretary-General Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah and Hezbollah declared victory over their enemy and prepared to face the new challenge of winning support in the political arena.

After the September 11, 2001, World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks, the United States included Hezbollah on a list of terrorist organizations for the purpose of freezing any U.S. assets. In July 2006, Hezbollah initiated raids on the border with Israel, killing eight Israeli soldiers and taking two prisoner. On July 13, Israel retaliated with repeated bombings of Lebanon's Rafiq Hariri International Airport and other targets in southern Lebanon thought to be bases for Hezbollah militants. Hezbollah responded with rocket attacks on several northern Israeli cities, leading to weeks of the most intense fighting in decades between Israeli forces and Hezbollah.

At the end of the war, Hezbollah's popularity surged in Lebanon and in the Arab world. The organization offered cash assistance to the people of southern Lebanon who were displaced by the fighting and those in the southern districts of Beirut who had been struck there by the Israelis. Although the government's assistance to the citizens was delayed, Hezbollah disbursed its aid immediately, further gaining in popularity. In 2007–2008, Lebanon's government was paralyzed by a long-standing political crisis in which Hezbollah played the leading role. By May 2008, however, the crisis finally ended, and Hezbollah gained political capital. A new unity government was inaugurated in July 2008 in which Hezbollah controlled one ministry and 11 of 30 cabinet positions. Meanwhile, the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon has taken up position in southern Lebanon. Its mission, however, is not to disarm Hezbollah but only to prevent armed clashes between it and Israel.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Arab-Israeli War (1973); Hamas; Lebanon, Civil War in (1975–1990); Lebanon, Israeli Invasion of (1982); Lebanon, Israeli Operations against (2006).

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Homs, Battles of (1260, 1281, 1299)

The first battle of Homs (or Hims) was fought between the Syrian Arabs and the Mongols who had invaded Syria. After sacking Baghdad, invading Syria, and capturing Aleppo, the Mongol leader Hulegu Khan left a part of his army, about 12,000 troops, under one of his most trusted generals, Ketbugha, in Syria while he himself marched to northwestern Iran. Historians have traditionally explained Hulegu's sudden departure as a response to the news of the death of the Great Khan Mongke and subsequent power struggle over succession. In leaving Ketbugha in Syria, Hulegu certainly underestimated his opponents in Egypt. On September 3, 1260, the Mamluks defeated Ketbugha's Mongol force at Ayn Jalut (Goliath's Well), marking the first important defeat the Mongols suffered. Hulegu was infuriated by this unprecedented setback and organized a punitive expedition under Baydar (some sources refer to Ilge Noyan or Koke-Ilge), who had been one of Ketbugha's officers and had escaped death at Ayn Jalut. The Mongols recaptured Aleppo and advanced into southern Syria. On December 11, 1260, they encountered the Muslim coalition of lords of Aleppo, Hama and Homs, under the overall command of Al-Ashraf, near the tomb of the famous Arab commander Khalid ibn al-Walid at Homs. The battle, which pitted about 6,000 Mongols against about 1,400 Muslims, took place on the outskirts of Homs, where the Mongols deployed themselves into eight formations (*atlab*), the first one containing 1,000 men, and the rest arranged behind it. The Muslim forces were divided into center (under al-Ashraf), right wing (under al-Mansur of Hama), and left wing (led by the emirs of Aleppo). Little is known about how battle unfolded, although historian al-Yunini writes that the Mongols were discomforted by the fog and the sun. In the end, the Muslims, despite their numerical inferiority, emerged victorious. Scholars suggest that the decisive role in the battle was played by Zamil ibn Ali, a Bedouin leader in north Syria, whose troops suddenly appeared in the Mongol rear during the battle. Most of the Mongol army was either killed or captured, including a young Mongol officer who joined the Mamluk army and 34 years later became a Mamluk sultan. The victory at Homs reinforced the Muslim feeling of superiority over the Mongols, and some Mamluk chronicles consider it more important than Ayn Jalut because the Muslims had numerical superiority at Ayn Jalut.

For a variety of reasons neither Hulegu nor his successor made any serious attempts to exact revenge on the Mamluks and their allies and to reconquer Syria for the next 21 years. The Mamluks used this period to reform their forces and establish political alliances (e.g., with the Crusader States and the Golden Horde) to be better prepared for the future wars against the Ilkhan Mongols. Between 1261 and 1277, the Mamluks and the Mongols were engaged in prolonged border skirmishing, with neither side willing or able to undertake a major attack. In 1277, however, the Mamluk leader Baybars became concerned by the Mongol expansion into the Sultanate of Rum and launched a preemptive invasion into Asia Minor, where he defeated the Mongols at Abulustayn.

Baybars did not live long to enjoy the glory of his victory—he died suddenly on July 1, 1277. The new mamluk sultan, Baraka Khan (al-Malik al-Said Berke Khan), proved to be incapable of living up to his father's legacy, and his reign was cut short in 1279 by a group of senior officers led by Qalawun, Baybars's close associate. Although Qalawun became sultan, he faced domestic challenges to his rule. Informed of developments in Egypt and Syria, Abaka Khan was keenly interested in exploiting the infighting among the Mamluks, and in the summer of 1280, he dispatched a large army into Syria under his brother Mengu Temur. The two sides met once again at Homs. The Mongol army of 40,000–50,000 men included large contingents from Georgia (led by King Demetre), Armenia (led by King Leon), and Rum. Qalawun's spies kept him well informed about the enemy's battle plan, and he carefully selected positions at Homs. The Mongol left flank was commanded by Mazuq Agha and Hinduqur; the right wing included the Rumi, Georgian, and Armenian forces; and the center was under Mengu Temur himself. Qalawun divided his forces into six parts; five were placed in the front line, and Qalawun personally commanded the elite royal Mamluks in reserves; the Mamluk forces were probably equal in size to the Mongols and represented virtually all troops the sultanate could muster.

The two armies met early Thursday morning, October 29, between Homs and Rastan. The Mongol army was exhausted from a day-long march and was still stretched out over 15 miles when it encountered the Mamluks. The Mongol right was the first to attack—it routed the Mamluk left wing and pursued it beyond Homs, where the Mongols halted to rest, expecting the rest of the Mongol army to finish up what seemed to be a decisive victory. But the tide of battle soon changed. The Mamluk right wing held firm against early Mongol attacks and its counterattack, supported by the sultan's royal Mamluks, routed the Mongol left wing, which then spread confusion into the Mongol center, where an unnerved Mengu Temur called a retreat. Once the Mongol right wing and center began to withdraw, Qalawun sent most of his army in pursuit. The retreat soon turned into a rout as the Mamluks pursued the Mongols to the Euphrates River, killing and capturing thousands in the

process. Meanwhile, the Mongol right wing returned to the battlefield. Qalawun, surrounded by fewer than 2,000 men, was defenseless but his quick senses saved the situation. He concealed his men, ordering his banners to be furled and the drums to stay silent. The Mongols passed by without noticing the small Mamluk force and, upon learning about the fate of the rest of the army, departed from the battlefield. Thus, by nightfall, the Mamluks scored a major victory over the Mongols. Abaka was furious at the Mongol defeat and immediately began planning another campaign to Syria, but he died in 1282 before accomplishing his goal.

Almost 20 years passed before another Ilkhan attempted to invade Syria. By then, the mighty Mamluk army that Baybars had forged had become but a shadow of its former glory. Lack of unity, lack of command, and overconfidence plagued the army. In 1299, Abaka's grandson, Ilkhan Ghazan, organized a third invasion of Syria, crossing the Euphrates and capturing Aleppo before proceeding south; as on previous occasions, the Mongol army featured contingents from Armenia and Georgia. The young sultan al-Malik al-Nasir Muhammad mobilized the Mamluk forces in southern Palestine, where floods swept away their supply trains, depriving men of food and causing a decline in morale. In early December, the sultan marched north of Damascus to the plains north of Homs. During this three-day march, the Mamluks wore full battle gear, exhausting themselves and their mounts. The two sides met at Wadi al-Khaznadar on December 23, 1299. The Mongols initially suffered a setback as the Mamluk attack caught them unprepared. Many Mongol archers actually fought dismounted, hiding behind their horses. The Mamluk attack was led by about 500 naft (Greek fire) throwers. Yet, Ghazan was able to regroup and counterattack, breaking the Mamluk flank and causing the Mamluks to flee from the battlefield. After the battle, Ghazan pushed south to Damascus before retreating back home. The subsequent Mongol attempt to return to Syria resulted in their defeat at Marj al-Saffar, ending Mongol incursions into Syria.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Abaka; Abulustaun (Elbistan), Battle of (1277); Ayn Jalut, Battle of (1260); Baybars I; Golden Horde—Ilkhanid Wars; Hulegu; Ilkhans; Mamluk Sultanate; Mamluk-Ilkhanid War; Middle East, Mongol Invasion of (1256–1280); Rum, Sultanate of.

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Hulegu (ca. 1217–1265)

Mongol prince and founder of the Ilkhanate, the Mongol state in Persia. Hulegu was born around 1217, the son of Chinggis (Genghis) Khan's youngest son Tolui. In 1253, Hulegu's elder brother, the Great Khan (Mong. qaghan) Mongke, dispatched him west with an army to assume overall command of the Mongol forces operating in Persia and the Caucasus. Having largely annihilated the Ismaili Assassins (1256) and destroyed the Abbasid caliphate in Baghdad (1258), Hulegu entered Syria and captured Aleppo in January 1260. But in the spring he withdrew into Azerbaijan with the bulk of his army, and a smaller force left in Palestine under his general Ketbugha was overwhelmed by the Egyptian Mamluks at Ayn Jalut on September 3, 1260; Syria and Palestine were lost.

Hulegu was unable to avenge this defeat, owing to the disintegration of the empire after Mongke's death (1259) and the outbreak in 1261 of war with his cousin Berke, khan of the Mongols of the Golden Horde. It was probably at this juncture that he established himself as virtually an autonomous ruler in Persia and Iraq, recognized by his brother, the new qaghan Qubilai (Kublai) in the Far East.

In 1262 Hulegu inaugurated a series of Ilkhanid overtures to the Latin West by writing to King Louis IX of France, urging concerted action against the Mamluks. His envoy to Pope Urban IV reported his desire for baptism (ca. 1263). Hulegu's mother, Sorqaqtani, had been a Nestorian Christian, as was his principal wife, Doquz Khatun. Nevertheless, he also manifested a marked interest in Tibetan Buddhism and remained attached to the shamanistic practices of his forebears until his death (February 8, 1265).

Peter Jackson

See also: Abaka; Ayn Jalut, Battle of (1260); Berke Khan; Golden Horde—Ilkhanid Wars; Homs, Battles of (1260, 1281, 1299); Mamluk-Ilkhanid War.

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Hungarian-Ottoman Wars (1437–1526)

Series of wars between the Kingdom of Hungary and the Ottoman Empire, beginning with the Ottoman occupation of Serbia (1438–1439) and ending with the collapse of Hungary in the Hungarian Civil Wars (1526–1547).

Hungarian-Ottoman War of 1437–1438

The failure of Hungarian king Albert II's (1397–1439) crusade in 1437 introduced a new phase of the Ottoman wars of European expansion in the Balkans, which were now waged up to and across the borders of Hungary. The Turks besieged the city of Belgrade and, moving along the Danube River to the south, they also laid siege to Semendria (Smederevo) fortress. Hunyadi defeated the Turks and relieved the fortress spectacularly in 1437. As a consequence, Albert II appointed Hunyadi military governor (*bán*) of Severin in Wallachia (part of Rumania), where he became even more deeply involved with the Turks.

Hungarian-Ottoman War of 1441–1444

In retaliation against Hungary's support for the pretender Mustafa Çelebi and his claim to the Turkish sultanate, the Ottoman sultan Murad II (r. 1421–1451) attacked Hungary in 1440. Hunyardi's army, however, gained victories at Semendria in 1441 and at Herrmannstadt in 1442. To support deposed Serbian despot George Brankoviæ, Hunyadi counterattacked into Wallachia in 1442 and then Bulgaria in 1443. He soundly defeated the Turks at Nish (in Serbia) and then captured Sofia. Joining the forces of King Ladislas III (r. 1434–1444) of Hungary and Poland, Hunyadi defeated Murad's army at the Battle of Snaim (Kustinitza) in 1443, thus destroying Ottoman power in the Balkan region. Fearful of possible future losses, Murad entered into peace negotiations at Szeged, Hungary, on July 12, 1444, which led to a 10-year truce with Hungary; the sultan gave Hungary control over Serbia and Wallachia.

Hungarian-Ottoman War of 1444–1456

Assured by Pope Eugenius IV (1383–1447) that promises made to infidels need not be honored, Hungarian king Ulászlo I (Vladislaus III**)** broke the peace and launched another crusade in 1444. The crusading army was, however, destroyed by Murad at Varna, where Ulászlo was killed. Hunyadi escaped but was defeated by the Ottomans again at Kosovo Polje in 1448. After securing Constantinople in 1453, Murad's son and successor as sultan, Muhammad II (1430–1481), began new attacks on the Hungarians . Hunyadi led a successful expedition against the Ottomans in

Serbia in 1454, forcing the Ottomans to retreat from Semendria to Krusevac. The city of Belgrade was besieged by the Ottomans for three weeks in July 1456, until Hunyadi's troops breached the siege, defeated the Ottomans, and freed the city. Defeated, Muhammad withdrew to Constantinople, but on August 11, 1456, Hunyadi died from an epidemic in his camp. Though Hunyadi's campaigns against the Ottomans ultimately failed to recover territory, they did revitalize and provide leadership for the Balkan peoples' resistance against the Turks, encouraging Skander Beg (George Kastriota) to renounce Ottoman suzerainty and launch the Albanian-Turkish wars for independence.

Hungarian-Ottoman War of 1463–1483

In 1463, Sultan Mehmed II invaded and occupied Bosnia, prompting a winter counterattack by Hunyadi's son, Matthias Corvinus, King of Hungary (r.1458–1490), who recaptured several strategic fortresses and drove the Ottomans back. In the spring of 1464, Sultan Muhammad II the Conqueror besieged the Bosnian fortress of Jajce, but Hungarian forces managed to defend it and northern Bosnia; the rest of the territory fell to the Ottomans by 1483. A large raid by Ali Beg of Smederevo in 1479 was followed by a campaign by Matthias into Wallachia, Serbia, and eastern Bosnia in 1480. Ali Beg's forces captured Srebrenica and briefly restored the frontier defenses. Subsequently, Matthias focused on strengthening the line of fortresses established by King Sigismund along the southern borders of Transylvania and Slavonia through Bosnia to the Adriatic while the Ottomans consolidated their Balkan conquests.

Hungarian-Ottoman War of 1492–1494

In 1492, Sultan Bayezid II (r. 1481–1512) launched a surprise attack on Belgrade but was unable to take the city from the Hungarians. The same year, Holy Roman Emperor Maximilian I (r. 1486–1519) defeated the Ottomans at Villach in Carinthia (southern Austria). But by the first decades of the 16th century Ottoman raiders were penetrating deeper into the frontier zone and inflicting defeats on Hungarian counterattacks inside Croatia and Hungary, notably at Sinj (1508), Knin (1511), and Dubica (1520). The recurrent raids devastated the frontier regions, leaving the fortresses isolated and unsupported in the deserted land. Srebrenica was recaptured by the Ottomans in 1512, completing the Turkish conquest of Bosnia.

Hungarian-Ottoman War of 1521–1526

The last major Ottoman expansion into Hungary began during the reign of Ottoman sultan Suleiman I, nicknamed "the Magnificent" (r. 1520–1566), demanded tribute

from King Louis II (1506–1526) of Hungary. Louis's refusal, with an insult to the Turkish ambassador, led to the Ottoman invasion of Hungary in 1521. The Hungarian fortresses of Sabac and Belgrade were captured in 1521, and Orsova and Knin fell in 1522. Hungary countered the Ottoman threat by concluding an alliance with Safavid Iran and the Holy Roman Empire, but the Ottomans secured support of King Francis I (r. 1515–1547) of France. Advancing up the Danube River, Sultan Suleiman led a massive Ottoman army to the plain of Mohács (present-day southern Hungary) where King Louis assembled his army. There, on August 29, 1526, the two sides fought a decisive battle in which the Hungarians were crushed and Louis drowned in the disorganized flight. The Battle of Mohacs marked the end of the Hungarian kingdom: Hungary was partitioned between the Ottoman Empire, the Habsburg Monarchy of Austria, and the Principality of Transylvania.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Bayezid II; Mehmed II; Mohács, Battle of (1526); Murad II; Suleiman the Magnificent.

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Hunkar Iskelesi, Treaty of (1833)

Defensive alliance between the Ottoman Empire and the Russian Empire. In 1830–1832, the Ottoman Empire struggled to restrain its ambitious vassal Mehmed Ali of Egypt, whose armies occupied Palestine and Syria and threatened to reach Constantinople. In late 1832, the Egyptians scored a decisive victory at Konya that removed the last significant Ottoman force between them and the imperial capital. In early 1833, Sultan Mahmud II turned in desperation to his traditional foe, Russia, for help. Russian emperor Nicholas I, although eager to partition the Ottoman Empire, was unwilling to allow Mehmed Ali's Egypt to gain strength and dispatched an expeditionary force to protect Constantinople in February 1833. Faced with Russian intervention, Mehmed Ali negotiated the Kutahya Convention, which gave him provinces in Syria. Meanwhile, on July 8, 1833, Nicholas and Mahmud negotiated the Treaty of Hunkar Iskelesi to strengthen their newly established relationship. Both rulers pledged to guarantee the territorial integrity of each other's domains. The treaty's secret provisions exempted the Ottomans from providing military help to Russia in exchange to closing the Bosporus and Dardanelles Straits to non-Russian warships.

Upon learning about the treaty, Britain and France became suspicious of its secret provisions, fearing that the provisions had given Russia freedom of action in the Ottoman Empire. During the eight years it was in force, the Treaty of Hunkar Iskelesi was a point of major concern between the Great Powers, which ultimately insisted on replacing it with the London Straits Convention of 1841.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Egyptian-Ottoman Wars; Konya, Battle of (1832); Kutahya Convention (1833); London Straits Convention (1841); Mahmud II; Mehmed Ali; Russo-Ottoman Wars.

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Husayn ibn Ali (ca. 1856–1931)

Sharif of Mecca and king of the Hejaz. Born at Constantinople sometime around 1856 into the family of Hashem, traditionally held as descendants of Muhammad and, therefore, holders of the title sharif or emir, Husayn (Hussein) studied at Mecca starting at age 8. In 1893, Sultan Abdul Hamid II brought Husayn to Constantinople and, although placing him on the Council of State, held him in virtual captivity until 1908, when Husayn was appointed sharif of Mecca on the death of his uncle Abdullah. Although he maintained loyalty to the sultan, Husayn resented the Hejaz railroad as an encroachment on Arab autonomy and feared the Young Turks who came to control the Ottoman government. Husayn had also long hoped for an independent Arab kingdom under his own rule. World War I provided that opportunity.

As early as February 1914, Husayn was in communication with British authorities in Cairo through his son Abdullah. Abdullah met with Lord Kitchener, who was the British high commissioner in Egypt at that time, and told him the Arabs were prepared to revolt against Constantinople if the British would pledge support. The British remained skeptical until the Ottoman Empire entered the war in October 1914. Kitchener was then secretary of state for war in London, and on his advice Sir Harold Wingate, British governor-general of the Sudan, and Sir Henry McMahon, high commissioner in Egypt, kept in touch with Husayn.

Meanwhile, in the spring of 1915, Husayn sent his third son, Emir Faisal, to Damascus to reassure Turkish authorities there of his loyalty but also to sound out Arab opinion. Faisal was originally pro-Turkish, but the visit to Damascus and the profound discontent of the Arab population there completely changed his views.

Husayn then entered into active negotiations with McMahon. Husayn promised to declare war on the Ottoman Empire and to raise an Arab army to assist the British in return for British support for him as king of a postwar pan-Arab state. On June 5, 1916, Husayn initiated the Arab Revolt, and on November 2 he proclaimed himself "king of the Arab Countries," which caused the British government embarrassment with the French. Finally, the Allies worked out a compromise by which they addressed Husayn as king of the Hejaz.

Husayn left the military leadership of the revolt to his four sons. Throughout the revolt, Husayn worried about the ambitions of Ibn Saud. McMahon's pledge to Husayn preceded by six months the Sykes-Picot Agreement between the British and French governments, which represented a breach of the promises made to the Arabs. Husayn was profoundly upset when he learned of the Sykes-Picot Agreement in December 1917, published by the new Bolshevik government of Russia. He refused to sign the peace agreements at the end of the war in protest against the mandate system created by the Paris Peace Conference.

Husayn's son Faisal received Syria but was deposed and became king of Iraq under British protection. Son Abdullah became king of the newly created Transjordan. Husayn declared himself caliph of Islam in March 1924, but he was forced to abdicate as king of the Hejaz, after which his son Ali became king, when Ibn Saud conquered most of the Hejaz. Husayn went into exile in Cyprus and died in Amman, Transjordan, on June 4, 1931.

Spencer C. Tucker

See also: Arab Revolt of 1916–1918; Hejaz Railroad, Attacks on (1916–1918); Ibn Saud; Lawrence, Thomas Edward (Lawrence of Arabia); Saudi-Hashemite War (1919–1925); Sykes-Picot Agreement (1916); World War I.

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Hussein, Saddam (1937–2006)

Iraqi president (1979–2003). Saddam Hussein was born on April 28, 1937, in Al Awjy, near Tikrit. He experienced a difficult childhood, his father dying when Hussein was an infant. At age 20 he joined the Pan-Arab Baath Party. When General

Abdul Karim Qasim overthrew Iraq's King Faisal II in 1958, one wing of the Baath Party opposed the new government.

In 1959, Hussein participated in an assassination attempt on the new prime minister. Hussein was slightly wounded and fled to Syria and later Egypt, where he studied law at the University of Cairo while in exile. He was tried and sentenced to death in absentia.

In 1963, army officers came to power in a coup. Although a number of them were loyal to the Baathists, most were Arab nationalists. The new military government soon crumbled. Returning to Iraq, Hussein was imprisoned in 1964 by the anti-Baathists then in power. Three years later, upon his escape from prison, he became a leading member of the Baath Party, in charge of internal party security. In July 1968, in another coup, the Baath Party took power under General Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr, a relative of Hussein and a fellow Tikriti. Hussein became vice president and vice chairman of the Iraqi Revolutionary Command Council and assumed control of foreign affairs. In 1976, he traveled to France and there met with both politicians and businessmen. This trip led to the building of an Iraqi nuclear reactor in Osiraq with French assistance.

In 1970, Hussein negotiated an agreement with Kurdish rebel leaders in Iraq giving the Kurds limited autonomy. When the agreement broke down, the Iraqi Army attacked Kurdish villages, killing thousands and leading to deterioration in relations with Iran. In 1975, Hussein negotiated the Algiers Accords with Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi of Iran in which Iran withdrew its support for the Kurds in Iraq and received border concessions in exchange for normalized relations.

Hussein built and later maintained his base of political power through intimidation, relying on relatives and fellow Tikritis for support. His de facto rule dates from 1976. In 1979, when President al-Bakr planned to unite Iraq with Syria, also under Baathist rule, Hussein rightly feared for his power. That July, however, al-Bakr resigned, allegedly for reasons of health, leading directly to the Hussein presidency. On July 22 of the same year, Hussein ordered the executions of scores of Baath Party members accused of disloyalty.

After he had consolidated his rule, Hussein worked for social modernization. He created a secular legal framework, adopted a system of social benefits, and granted rights to women. A new health care system, probably the most comprehensive and modern in the Middle East, earned him an award from the United Nations (UN). Iraqi oil reserves and a growing demand for skilled labor brought an influx of foreigners from other Arab countries and Europe to Iraq.

Hussein was an Iraqi nationalist who also supported Pan-Arabism and the Palestinian cause, but many of his social accomplishments were undermined by the long and costly war with Iran, which he instigated and which was fought over territorial, ethnic, and religious issues, but also because he sought to play the central role in the Arab world. As part of the process of enhancing Iraqi power and influence,

he initiated programs to develop weapons of mass destruction (WMDs). But as the Osirak Tammuz I nuclear reactor neared completion, the Israel Air Force carried out a raid in June 1981 that destroyed the facility. Not deterred, Hussein established a chemical weapons program with the assistance of foreign firms, including those in West Germany. Hussein used these chemical weapons in the war with Iran and against the Iraqi Kurdish minority in the north.

During the long war with Iran, Hussein turned to other Arab states and to the West for financial and diplomatic support. The U.S. government, which was not anxious to see fundamentalist Iran triumph, provided military intelligence to Hussein's regime in the form of satellite reconnaissance. Washington also did not take action against Iraq when, on May 17, 1987, an Iraqi Mirage aircraft fired two Exocet missiles at and disabled the USS *Stark*. The attack killed 37 sailors and injured another 21 on board the Oliver Hazard Perry–class frigate. The *Stark* was one of the U.S. warships sent to the Persian Gulf by President Ronald Reagan to keep open the Persian Gulf during the Tanker War.

Hussein's authoritarian government fostered a cult of personality around the leader. The country was filled with his opulent palaces and with statues and posters of him trumpeting his alleged achievements. To thwart assassination, he employed dozens of doubles. Meanwhile, his secret police, intelligence services, and military security maintained a thoroughly oppressive rule with little respect for human rights.



Former Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein on December 13, 2003. Following his capture in Tikrit Hussein's beard was shaven to confirm his identity. (Department of Defense)

Hussein further consolidated his power during the withering Iran-Iraq War, using the conflict as an excuse to eliminate potential rivals and suspected radicals and to attack the Kurds. Aware of the fact that as a Sunni he ruled over a majority of Shiites, he sought to intimidate the latter. The Marsh Arab Shiites in Iraq's southern provinces were driven from their land, and vast swampy areas were artificially laid dry. He firmly repressed the Islamic revival among the Shia in the holy cities and in Baghdad. In the north, the Kurds, although Sunnis, were non-Arabs. Opposed to Hussein's Pan-Arab tendencies, they were also brutally oppressed with mass arrests and wanton killings. Hussein also resettled Arabs in Kurdish areas in an effort to weaken Kurdish nationalism.

Even though Iraq did not share a border with Israel, Iraqi forces participated in each of the wars fought by the Arab community against that country. In 1948, 1967, and 1973, Iraq supported Syria and Jordan militarily.

Hussein was a firm believer in Pan-Arab nationalism and an ardent admirer of Egypt's president Gamal Abdel Nasser, especially after the 1956 Suez Crisis. Hussein was in the forefront of efforts to punish the West by means of an oil embargo for its support of Israel in the 1973 Yom Kippur War. Although Syria was also run by the Baath Party, relations between Iraq and Syria became antagonistic. There were wings of the Baath Party in each country that had supported a union of the two countries, but relations soured so thoroughly that Syria created an alliance with and supported Iran throughout the Iran-Iraq war.

In August 1990, Hussein miscalculated U.S. resolve and Arab opinion and invaded neighboring Kuwait with the intention of incorporating that oil-rich state and using the revenues to pay off massive debts accumulated during the war with Iran. This act led to the formation of a U.S.-led coalition against Hussein. During the resulting Persian Gulf War (1991), he sought to entangle Israel in the war and unhinge the support of Arab states such as Syria and Egypt for the coalition by firing Scud surface-to-surface missiles against Israel. Although this step gained him support from the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and many Palestinians, heavy U.S. pressure on Israel prevented him from realizing his plan of drawing the Jewish state into the war.

Hussein managed to maintain his hold on power despite the crushing defeat of his forces in the war. He took immediate revenge on the Shiites who had risen in the south, killing tens of thousands. The war and its aftermath brought a decade of international isolation and crippling economic sanctions against Iraq.

During 2002–2003, Hussein's belligerence and missteps once again brought intense international scrutiny and allegations by President George W. Bush that Hussein had WMDs. Although this proved not to be the case, in the 2003 Operation Iraqi Freedom, a smaller U.S.-led coalition without any Arab troops invaded Iraq, this time with the intention of overthrowing the regime. Although Baghdad fell on April 9, Hussein eluded capture until December 13, when he was found

hiding at the bottom of a narrow pit dug beneath a mud shack on a sheep farm. He was subsequently brought to trial before an Iraqi Special Tribunal, established by the interim Iraqi government.

On November 5, 2006, the Iraqi Special Tribunal found Hussein guilty in the 1982 deaths of 148 Shiite Muslims, whose murders he had ordered. That same day he was sentenced to hang. Meanwhile, on August 21, 2006, a second trial had begun on charges that he had committed genocide and other atrocities by ordering the systematic extermination of northern Iraqi Kurds during 1987–1988, resulting in as many as 180,000 deaths. Before the second trial moved into high gear Hussein's attorneys filed an appeal, which was rejected by the Iraqi court on December 26, 2006. Four days later, on December 30, 2006, on the Muslim holiday of 'Id al-Adha, Hussein was executed by hanging in Baghdad.

Thomas J. Weiler

See also: Al-Anfal Campaign (1987–1988); Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988); Iraq War (2003–); Persian Gulf War (1991); Reza Shah Pahlavi.

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I, J

Ibn Saud (ca. 1880–1953)

Arab leader and founder of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. Probably born in 1880, Abd ar-Rahman ibn Faysal ibn Turki Abd Allah ibn Muhammad al-Saud was the son of Abd al-Rahman, emir of Riyadh in the Nejd. He was a descendant of Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, founder of Wahhabism, a puritanical form of Islam. When Ibn Saud was a small child, his family was forced to flee into the desert to escape the invading Rashidi. His early years were spent in harsh desert conditions with al-Murrah tribespeople, and his teen years were spent in Kuwait.

In 1902, with a small party of followers, he recovered Riyadh after surprising attack and killing the Rashidi-appointed governor there. Two years later he ruled half of central Arabia. From 1902 until the outbreak of World War I, Ibn Saud fought many actions against tribal enemies and the Turks. With the outbreak of World War I, Ibn Saud had three main enemies: King Husayn ibn Ali, Hashemite ruler of the Hejaz; the Turks; and the Turkish allies, the Rashidi. Advocating Arab neutrality in the Great War, Ibn Saud continued to raid the Shammar tribes of northern Arabia led by the Rashidi. On January 24, 1915, Ibn Saud lost the Battle of Jabbar against the Rashidi. On December 26, 1915, he signed an agreement with the British and spent the next two years pacifying tribal enemies and blockading goods bound for the Turks. Because of enmity between himself and the Hashemites, Ibn Saud did not aid the Arab Revolt.

After World War I, Ibn Saud took Mecca in 1924, and the next year he proclaimed himself king of Hejaz and Nejd. In 1932, he ended more than 1,000 years of Hashemite rule when he proclaimed the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. He suppressed the Ikhwan sect of Wahhabism and granted oil rights to American companies. During World War II Ibn Saud saw that Saudi Arabia remained officially neutral, all the while supporting the Allies. He died at Ta'if on November 9,1953.

Andrew J. Waskey

See also: Arab-Revolt of 1916–1918; Husayn ibn Ali; Ikhwan; Saudi-Hashemite War (1919–1925); Saudi-Kuwait War (1921–1922); Saudi-Ottoman War (1911–1913); Saudi-Rashidi Wars (1887–1921); Wahhabism.

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Ibrahim Pasha (1789–1848)

The eldest son of Egyptian ruler Mehmed Ali, he was a talented officer who commanded his father's troops during campaigns in Africa, Europe, and Syria. Following his conquests, Ibrahim also proved to be a competent administrator in Egypt and Syria.

Ibrahim ibn Mehmed Ali was born in Kavalla, Rumelia (in present-day Greece) in 1789. This area was part of the vast Ottoman Empire, and Ibrahim was the son of Mehmed Ali, an Albanian officer in the army of the Ottoman sultan. In 1798, a French army led by Emperor Napoleon I invaded the Ottoman province of Egypt. Though the Ottoman hold on the province was weak, Mehmed Ali sent an army there to try to eject the French from the Nile Valley. After the departure of the French, Mehmed Ali maneuvered to become khedive of Egypt, a position similar to viceroy of the Ottoman sultan. In 1805, he brought Ibrahim and his brother Tusun to Egypt. Over the next several years, Ibrahim served in his father's government in a variety of positions, including governor of Upper Egypt province. Over the years, Mehmed Ali consolidated his position as the unchallenged ruler of Egypt, and he relinquished this power to Ibrahim in 1848.

Though Mehmed Ali theoretically ruled Egypt as a representative of the sultan, his entire career was devoted to expanding his influence beyond Egypt's borders and winning recognition of his independence from the Ottomans. Ibrahim was instrumental in helping his father to achieve these goals as he led his army in several campaigns on behalf of the sultan. In 1816, the sultan asked Mehmed Ali to send Egyptian troops to quell a rebellion against his authority organized by the Wahhabis, a militant puritan Islamic brotherhood that had seized control of the Hejaz region in western Arabia. It was on this expedition that Ibrahim gained his first military experience. After a victorious campaign, he returned to Egypt.

In 1823, Ibrahim commanded the army that was fighting to expand Egyptian control far down the Nile River into Sudan. After his return from the Sudan, Ibrahim helped modernize his father's army. Then in 1824, Sultan Mahmud II again asked for Egyptian help to subdue a revolt against Ottoman rule, this time in Greece. Led by Ibrahim, the Egyptian Army landed in Greece and successfully conquered the Peloponnesus and Athens. In 1827, however, the British, French, and Russian fleets cooperated to destroy the Ottoman and Egyptian navies at the Battle of Navarino Bay. The defeat forced Ibrahim to withdraw and return to Egypt.

By the 1830s, Mehmed Ali was beginning to challenge Ottoman power rather than pretending to act as its agent. In 1831, a dispute between Mehmed Ali and the Ottoman government led to an Egyptian invasion of Syria. Ibrahim led the Egyptian armies through Palestine to conquer the cities of Acre, Aleppo, Homs, and Damascus and defeated an Ottoman army at Alexandretta. In the wake of this victory, Ibrahim conquered Anatolia, the Turkish heartland of the Ottoman Empire. He then forced the Bailan Pass and crossed the Taurus Mountains in preparation for an attack on the Ottoman capital of Istanbul.

The imperial powers of Europe were committed to the stability of the Ottoman Empire and would not permit Ibrahim to proceed against the Ottoman capital. Ibrahim was forced to sign the Convention of Kutahya on May 4, 1833. In exchange for sparing Istanbul, the agreement recognized Egyptian claims to Syria and Adana, and Ibrahim became the governor of the new Egyptian provinces. As governor, he sought to expand irrigation and encouraged the expansion of modern industries. However, his heavy-handed administrative methods antagonized the Syrians and encouraged anti-Egyptian sentiments among many of his subjects.

At the same time, Sultan Mahmud II had remained unwilling to accept the loss of this territory and began plotting to reconquer it. Ibrahim was able to resist an Ottoman invasion of Syria in 1838. The following year, however, the British joined forces with their Ottoman allies and renewed the attack against Ibrahim. Though Ibrahim won a great victory against the Turks at Nizip on June 24, 1839, the British ultimately forced Mehmed Ali to cede Syria back to the Ottomans. As compensation, Mehmed Ali's position as khedive was made hereditary, ensuring that his family would continue to rule Egypt after his death. This agreement was recognized in the Treaty of London, which was signed in 1840.

In his later life, Mehmed Ali became mentally unstable and, in 1848, relinquished control of the state to Ibrahim. His position as Egyptian khedive was confirmed by the Ottoman sultan. Ibrahim traveled to Istanbul to receive his decree of investiture. He became ill in Istanbul, however, and died shortly after his return to Cairo on November 10, 1848.

James Burns

See also: Egyptian-Ottoman Wars; Konya, Battle of (1832); Kutahya Convention (1833); Mahmud II; Mehmed Ali; Navarino Bay, Battle of (1827); Nizip, Battle of (1839).

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Idris Alawma (ca. 1542–ca. 1619)

The most famous ruler of the West African empire of Kanem-Bornu. Inheriting a state in decline, he reformed the imperial administration, created a modern army, and consolidated his dynasty's hold over the empire.

Idris was born in the Kanem region of what is today Chad sometime around 1542. His father, Mai Ali, was the ruler of Bornu, a state located on the western shore of Lake Chad. Bornu was ruled by the Sefawa dynasty, a family that ruled in the Kanem-Bornu region from the 9th to the 19th centuries. The Sefawa had originally controlled a great empire of Kanuri-speaking peoples from Kanem, the lands on the eastern shore of Lake Chad. However, shortly before Idris's birth, the nomadic community of the Bulala had chased the Sefawa and their Kanuri followers out of Kanem. Idris's mother, Queen Amsa, was descended from Bulala royalty, and when Mai Ali died after only one year on the throne, Amsa took her family to Kanem, where her personal prestige could protect Idris from being killed by rival claimants to the throne of Bornu.

The principal rival in question was Mai Dala, and when he died in 1570, Idris was next in line for the throne. As an adult, Idris was capable of fighting for his aspirations. The deceased king's sister, Aissa Kili, had seized power, but Idris challenged her claim and forced her to relinquish the throne in about 1580. Idris then became mai, or ruler of Bornu. Though in control of the throne, Idris found himself responsible for a state that was in a desperate situation. A prolonged famine had devastated the empire, and hostile neighbors had taken advantage of the dynastic confusion surrounding the death of Mai Ali to raid Bornu's borders. In the west, the neighboring Hausa state raided Bornu; in the north, Tuareg nomads attacked its borders; and in the east, the Bulala threat still loomed. Within the empire, several groups rebelled against the imperial rule of the Sefawas. Many of those rebels were animated by their resistance to Islam and viewed the Kanuri rulers as foreign invaders.

Faced with so many threats, Idris began a reform of his army. He had made the pilgrimage to Mecca during his youth and had learned about firearms during his trip. He now employed several musketeers from the army of the Ottoman Turks to train his troops. No one knows exactly how those Turks came into his service. While some accounts insist that they were mercenaries drawn to Bornu by the opportunities for military service, one contemporary source suggests that they represented a column of Turkish soldiers who had been captured by Idris when they invaded his empire. In addition to those foreign soldiers, Idris recruited the nobles of the kingdom to serve in the cavalry and established a formidable infantry as well. To complete his defenses, he organized a special camel corps to fight the nomads who threatened his desert borders.

In his most significant campaign, Mai Idris led his troops into battle against the Bulala. Though he failed to dislodge them from Kanem, he was able to curtail their threat to Bornu and forced them to recognize his authority. Kanem agreed to pay tribute to the Sefawa court, and a border between the two states was established for the first time. Chronicles from the period report that Idris was almost invincible in the field and won a series of dramatic victories over internal and external enemies. His musketeers had a tremendous psychological effect in a region where firearms were unknown, and their shock value alone apparently won him several battles.

With his eastern border secure, Idris undertook a series of reforms intended to solidify his hold over the empire. Replacing the relatives of his predecessor, he appointed administrators to rule over the various provinces, which had on past occasions declared their autonomy from the empire when they felt powerful enough to do so. He tried to improve the quality and reputation of the magistrates who administered his courts and went so far as to submit his own disputes and questions to them. Idris was a devout Muslim and recognized that Islam could provide his family with legitimacy in a way that would unite the diverse peoples of his empire. During his reign, he attempted to shore up the authority of Muslim clerics in the empire and replace customary law with Islamic law. He was also a great patron of Islamic learning and built hostels and mosques for Bornu's Muslim community. Yet his efforts to foster the spread of Islam within his empire, far from uniting his people, turned many of his subjects against him.

Under Idris, Bornu also experienced a period of economic revival. The kingdom lay across an important trade route connecting West Africa with Egypt and the Middle East, and the peace and stability of Idris's reign encouraged trade throughout Bornu. Traders brought horses, copper, salt, and worked metal from the Middle East and traded it for the ivory and kola nuts from West Africa. Moreover, Bornu reestablished its contacts with the Moroccan trading city of Fez to the north, a city that became an important source of firearms for the Bornu army. Idris financed his reforms and his army by taxing the trade and his peasantry. He also sold captives taken in war to traders in Fez, who exchanged them for guns and horses. Within his empire, Idris encouraged the expansion of the fishing and mining industries. He supported regional trade in those commodities, as well as in other such trade goods as slaves, ivory, and leather.

As Bornu's power grew, Idris developed a reputation throughout North Africa as a wealthy and influential Muslim ruler. Emissaries from Bornu conducted diplomacy with the sultan of Morocco and the caliph of the Ottoman Empire. Idris apparently hoped to form an alliance with the Ottomans against his non-Muslim neighbors. When assistance from the Turkish ruler was not forthcoming, however, Idris turned to the sultan of Morocco for help. Idris died sometime between 1603

and 1619, purportedly on a military campaign against rebels. He was succeeded by one of his sons, and his family went on to rule over the empire of Kanem-Bornu until the 19th century.

James Burns

See also: Al-Mansur, Ahmad ibn Muhammad.

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Ikhwan

The religious and political movement of an Islamic revival, with emphasis on Wahhabi tenets, among the badu (Bedouin) of Arabia. By the early 20th century, Ibn Saud had achieved considerable success in his struggle for supreme authority in the Najd (central Arabia) but lacked stable and broadly based support. He welcomed the preaching of Abdallah ibn Muhammad ibn Abd al-Latif (the qadi of Riyadh) and Shaikh Isa (the qadi of al-Hasa), who emphasized strict observance of fundamental tenets of Islam, loyalty to the brethren, obedience to leaders, and rejection of contacts with the West. The early followers of this movement established their first settlement (*hijra*) in the area of al-Artawiya in early 1913. By 1920, more than 50 Ikhwan *hijras* existed in Arabia, and their numbers quickly grew, exceeding 120 by 1929. Ibn Saud supported and encouraged such sedentariness to bring the badu more closely under his control. The Ikhwan were supposed to give up the habits and duties of the tribal way of life. Ibn Saud gave the Ikhwan money, seed, equipment, and materials to establish their settlements and cultivate lands.

The Ikhwan practiced an austere form of egalitarianism, shying away from wealth and corruption. They banned all kinds of music (except military drums), coffee, tobacco, alcohol, lavish clothing, and gambling. They only answered greetings from fellow Ikhwan and, when meeting a European or Arabs from other regions, buried their faces in their hands so as to avoid being tarnished. They believed anyone who did not join them was polytheistic and subject to death, which explains why their fanaticism in purifying Islam produced many atrocities.

Each member of the Ikhwan *hijra* was subject to conscription, and the conscripts were divided into three categories. The first category included men who were permanently ready for action. The second category comprised reservists, and

conscripts of the third category usually stayed behind in the settlements and were called to action only in times of emergency. When called on a campaign, an Ikhwan had to provide his own camel, arms, and food. The Ikhwan movement provided Ibn Saud with an extremely mobile, tough, and dedicated striking force. The military skills of the Ikhwan and the fear their fanatical zeal inspired in their opponents were important elements in Ibn Saud's campaigns against Asir in 1920, Hail in 1921, al-Jawf in 1922, and Hejaz in 1924–1925. Ibn Saud himself never fully shared the Ikhwan beliefs and was suspicious of their egalitarian trends, but he also skillfully used the Ikhwans for his own ends. Thus, although Ikhwans shied away from contacts with the West, Ibn Saud cultivated relations with Britain and even received regular British subsidies, which he claimed were part of the tribute Muslim rulers collected from the Christians. Yet, this religious fervor also made the Ikhwan difficult to control, and the Saudi leadership was compelled to grant certain freedom of action to the Ikhwan leaders Faisal al Dawish and Ibn Bijad. An unauthorized Ikhwan raid into Kuwait and Iraq in 1927–1928 and the resultant British wrath compelled Ibn Saud to move against his subordinates. Mobilizing the Najdi fighters, Ibn Saud defeated the Ikhwan army at the Battle of Sibilah (March 31, 1929) and destroyed the movement by early 1930.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Ibn Saud; Saudi-Hashemite War (1919–1925); Saudi-Kuwait War (1921–1922); Saudi-Rashidi Wars (1887–1921); Wahhabism.

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Ilkhans

A dynasty of Mongol rulers in Persia (ca. 1261–1353), founded by Chinggis (Genghis) Khan's grandson Hulegu, and viewed as possible allies of the Christian West in the war against the Mamluk sultanate of Egypt.

The term "Ilkhan" appears to mean "subordinate khan." Some uncertainty surrounds the creation of the Ilkhanate around the year 1261, as the Mongol Empire dissolved in civil war. Mamluk sources allege that Hulegu, hitherto merely a lieutenant on behalf of his brother, the Great Khan Mongke, now usurped control over Persia and established himself as a khan on a level with the other regional Mongol rulers. But according to the Ilkhanid minister and historian Rashid al-Din, Mongke had privately intended Hulegu and his descendants to rule the country in perpetuity.

The Ilkhans were repeatedly called upon to repel invasions from north of the Caucasus by their relatives, the khans of the Golden Horde, who claimed the pasturelands of Azerbaijan and northwestern Persia. Hulegu and his successors, prevented from devoting their full attention to the war against the Mamluks, therefore negotiated with the pope and Western monarchs for concerted action against Egypt.

These exchanges became more frequent in the reign of Hulegu's son and successor Abaka, who was in touch with the Crusade of the Lord Edward of England (1270–1272), and whose envoys attended the Second Council of Lyons (1274). Renewed after a brief hiatus in the reign of the Muslim Amad Teguder, they peaked under Arghun (1285–1291). The ambassadors to the West were often Christians, either Nestorians like Rabban Sawma (1287) or expatriate Italians like Buscarello di Ghisolfi (1289), and they emphasized their master's readiness to embrace the Christian faith. Yet no Ilkhan became a Christian, and no synchronized campaign ever occurred. Some Hospitallers from Margat joined an invading army sent into northern Syria by Abaka in 1281, and King Henry II of Cyprus and the Templars endeavored to collaborate with the Ilkhan Ghazan when his forces drove the Mamluks temporarily from Syria and Palestine in 1299–1300, an episode greeted with widespread and unrealistic enthusiasm in Western Europe.

Ghazan's successor, Oljeitu (1304–1316), the last Ilkhan to launch an invasion of Syria or to make overtures to the West, was followed by Abu Said, who in 1323 made peace with the Mamluks. Ilkhanid efforts to secure Western cooperation had failed for various reasons, including logistical difficulties and residual Latin distrust of Mongol rulers who were as yet unbaptized. That Ghazan and Oljeitu were Muslims was apparently unknown in the West, perhaps in part because it did not affect their foreign policy.

Peter Jackson

See also: Abaka; Golden Horde—Ilkhanid War; Homs, Battles of (1260, 1281, 1299); Hulegu; Mamluk Sultanate; Mamluk-Ilkhanid War; Middle East, Mongol Invasion of the (1256–1280); Mongols.

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Inab, Battle of (1149)

A major defeat of the Franks of Antioch under Prince Raymond of Poitiers at the hands of Nur al-Din, Muslim ruler of Aleppo. After the failure of the attempt to

capture Damascus by the Second Crusade (1148), Nur al-Din intensified his attacks on the southern part of the principality of Antioch. In the summer of 1149, he assembled a force of some 6,000 cavalry from his own troops and those of Unur, ruler of Damascus, and moved to besiege Inab, one of the main Antiochene strongholds east of the Orontes. Raymond marched to its relief with a smaller force, which included a band of Assassins under their leader, the Kurd Ali ibn Wafa, and the Muslims fell back, having initially overestimated their opponents' numbers. While Ali counseled a withdrawal, Raymond's vassals pressed for an advance. On June 28, Raymond's troops camped on low ground in the plain between Inab and the marshes east of the Orontes, and during the night Nur al-Din, now apprised of the Frankish strength, surrounded their positions.

The next day (June 29), the Franks tried in vain to fight their way out of encirclement; almost all were captured or killed, including Prince Raymond, whose skull Nur al-Din had mounted as a trophy of victory. Antioch was now left without a ruler, as Raymond's son Bohemond III was still a minor. In the course of the summer Nur al-Din was able to capture all of the remaining Antiochene strongholds east of the Orontes, including Artah, Harenc (mod. Harim, Syria), and Apamea (mod. Afamiyah, Syria); his victory at Inab brought him huge renown in the Muslim world and constituted a major milestone in his career.

Alan V. Murray

See also: Nur al-Din; Second Crusade (1147–1192).

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India, Muslim Conquest (to 16th Century)

The first Muslim contacts with India came as the result of trade. On the eastern and western coasts of India, cities conducted trade with other states along the borders of the Indian Ocean. Trade to the west was largely conducted by Arabs, who had established communities of traders in many major Indian cities. During the seventh century, the message of Islam spread from its Arabian birthplace to the Arab merchants in India.

The first military excursions into India may have been intended to protect Arabian trade routes. Around 711, the Umayyad caliph al-Walid sent forces under the command of Muhammad ibn Qasim into the area of Sind, along the Indus River near what is now the border between Pakistan and India. The invading Muslims

soon established a state in the region. Relations between the Arab Muslim rulers and the primarily Hindu and Buddhist natives were largely positive, and in general, local religious practices were tolerated. That precedent helped set the stage for similar policies of tolerance elsewhere in India after the Muslims gained control. Local Indian officials continued to exercise their responsibilities, and the Muslim rulers adopted many local practices.

Sind was an important source of wealth and ideas for the Islamic world. During the eighth and early ninth centuries, Indian texts and scholars added to Arabs' knowledge in areas ranging from medicine to mathematics and astronomy. Indian physicians enjoyed a high status in the Islamic world, and Indian literature and music influenced Arabian culture. In all those ways, Sind functioned as the first major contact point between the Indian and the Islamic worlds.

Over time, control of the Islamic world largely shifted from the Arabs to the Turks of western and Central Asia. During the latter part of the 10th century, Sebuktigin, a Turkish former slave who had become the ruler of Ghazna (part of modern Afghanistan), started to expand his territories. His son Mahmud of Ghazna continued those conquests into India. He added the area of the Punjab (in modern Pakistan and northern India) to the Ghaznavid realm before his death in 1030. He also made extensive raids deep into other Indian territory, where he looted Hindu temples and destroyed their sacred images.

For the next 150 years, the Ghaznavids were an important presence in northern India. Over time, they lost the western parts of their empire in modern-day Iran and Afghanistan and focused more of their attention on their Indian possessions. Eventually, the main Ghaznavid possessions were centered on Lahore in modern northern Pakistan. Despite Mahmud's destruction of Hindu sacred places, individual Hindus achieved positions of power under Mahmud's heirs.

Lahore became a center of Islamic culture during the later 11th and early 12th centuries: scholars from afar and notable writers of prose and poetry gathered there. Evidence suggests, however, that Muslims continued to come into contact with native Indian culture. For example, the scholar al-Biruni showed a wide knowledge of Indian writing and apparently translated works of scholarship both into and out of the classic Indian Sanskrit language.

During the 12th century, Ghaznavid rule began to be challenged by the Turks of Ghur in present-day Afghanistan. In 1173, two Ghurid brothers took Ghazna from the Ghaznavids. The younger brother, Muhammad Ghuri, used Ghazna as a launching pad for a new invasion of India. Ghuri first established control over the existing Islamic states and their neighbors in upper Sind and the Punjab. In 1186, he brought an end to the Ghaznavid dynasty with the conquest of Lahore. From there, he advanced farther into India to become the dominant power in the Delhi area.

On Ghuri's assassination in 1206, his slave and trusted appointee Qutb-ud-Din Aybak took control of his Indian territories and established the Delhi sultanate, an

Indian state that was essentially independent from the Ghurid homeland. Over the next several generations, the Delhi sultans faced a variety of challenges, including rivalry from other Muslim leaders, counterattacks from Hindu Indian states attempting to regain their independence, and an ongoing threat from the Mongols.

The Mongol threat, however, positively influenced the development of Islamic culture in India. First, the Mongol conquest of Central Asia left the Muslims in India largely isolated politically; they were thus forced to create their own future within India rather than seek empires in Central Asia. Second, the Mongol depredations motivated Muslims from many other areas to flee to India. Those scholars, religious leaders, writers, artisans, and military personnel strengthened the Delhi sultanate, and under various rulers, the Delhi court became a center for Islamic culture and learning.

Indeed, the Delhi sultanate saw advances in several cultural and economic areas. The introduction of the spinning wheel and other innovations revolutionized the Indian cotton industry. The introduction of paper improved the governmental bureaucracy. A new architectural style combined Islamic practices with local influences. New types of music blended Indian, Arabic, Persian, and Central Asian styles. Inevitably, there was some cultural exchange between the Islamic communities and the native Indians, although they continued to be two highly distinct cultures.

In 1398, the famous conqueror Timur—himself a Muslim Mongol—invaded India and sacked Delhi. The Delhi sultanate was reduced to one of a number of contesting states. The stage was thus set for the next great wave of Islamic conquest by the Mughals (descendants of the Mongols) in 1526.

Ellen Bialo

See also: Ala al-Din Khalji; Babur; Delhi Sultanate; Mahmud of Ghazna; Mongols; Muhammad of Ghur, Conquests of; Timur.

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India-Pakistan War (1947)

With Pakistan and India's independence from the British on August 15, 1947, the struggle for control of the kingdoms of Kashmir and Jammu led to war between

Pakistan and India. The British gave Kashmir and Jammu the choice of joining either Pakistan or India, but both kingdoms opted instead for independence. On October 22, 1947, Pakistani forces entered Kashmir under the guise of quelling tribal rebellion in the southwest region of the kingdom; within a week, Pakistani and local tribal forces moved to take the Kashmir capital, Srinagar. When Pakistani and tribal forces reached Uri, they encountered resistance and the advance was slowed. On October 26, the maharaja of Kashmir, Hari Singh, requested Indian assistance. An Instrument of Accession was signed between Kashmir and India providing the requested assistance.

The British government, while still involved in Indian and Pakistani affairs, stepped in to help the Indian forces halt the Pakistani advance. Governor General Lord Mountbatten agreed to provide transport aircraft for Indian forces into Kashmir. At the same time, the acting commander in charge of Pakistani forces, General Douglas Gracy, refused to move to deploy Pakistani forces to counter the impending deployment of Indian troops into the area by aircraft. Because the Indian forces found it difficult to adjust to high-altitude combat and because of delays in the delivery of supplies, Pakistani forces retook some territory from the Indians. Indian forces then conducted a spring offensive, and Pakistan moved more forces into Kashmir to counter the Indian advance. By June 1948, the Indian government turned to the United Nations to help settle the conflict. A negotiated cease-fire went into effect on January 5, 1949. The agreement left two-fifths of Kashmir territory under Pakistani control, and the rest was held by India; Jammu was absorbed by India. Three thousand soldiers on both sides were killed in the fighting. The tension over control of Kashmir has lasted to the present day.

Steve Marin

See also: India-Pakistan War (1965); India-Pakistan War (1971).

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India-Pakistan War (1965)

The second Indo-Pakistani War, which was fought between August 5 and September 23, 1965, was bloodier and more intense than the first and had big ramifications for the conflicts to come for the two neighbors and their status in the world. The Pakistani attack, code-named Gibraltar, started with roughly 30,000 troops, dressed as locals, crossing the line of control in Kashmir.

The first engagements of consequence happened on August 14, when Indian troops in the northern sector advanced deep into the Kashmir region and captured

strategic points within Pakistan. Pakistan, in an attempt to cut off Indian troops in Kashmir, launched a counteroffensive (Operation Grandslam) on September 1, inflicting heavy losses in the Punjab area. Indian air support was countered by the Pakistani air force on the next day. The ensuing tank battles were the biggest and heaviest since World War II; altogether 1,000 tanks went into combat. During the largest tank engagement in the Sialkot region more than 500 tanks are believed to have been used. At the Battle of Assal Uttar on 10 September three Indian armored regiments faced six Pakistani armored regiments, with almost 100 tanks being captured by the Indian side.

With both sides gaining ground but neither able to achieve a decisive victory, the conflict came to a stalemate. The United Nations Security Council called for a cease-fire on September 20, and three days later the fighting ended. Still, in the night of September 22 near the village of Dograi, another engagement was fought. Altogether, India suffered about 3,000 troops killed and lost 128 tanks; Pakistan had about 3,800 casualties and lost 200–300 tanks and 20 aircraft. Although the war as such proved inconclusive (both sides had taken prisoners of war and occupied enemy territory) the United States blamed Pakistan fully for the outbreak and withdrew its support, a gap that was filled mostly by China.

Thomas J. Weiler

See also: India-Pakistan War (1947); India-Pakistan War (1971).

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India-Pakistan War (1971)

Unlike the other conflicts with close connections to the Kashmir issue, the third India-Pakistan War had its origin not in this conflict between the two rival powers on the peninsula but more within Pakistan. Feeling oppressed by the ruling elite in the western part of Pakistan, people in Eastern Pakistan (now Bangladesh) began to revolt. After winning the 1970 general election, the leader of the Awami League, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, was imprisoned on March 25, 1971, and civil war broke out.

When the regular army started its crackdown in the eastern part of Pakistan—the Bengali side claims that up to 300,000 people were killed in the fighting—and up to 10 million refugees began entering India, Prime Minister Indira Gandhi decided

to enter the conflict on the side of the Bengalis in East Pakistan, which is enclosed by India on three sides, and help establish an independent nation. She expressed her full support on March 27, and a massive military buildup was completed by November. On November 23, a state of emergency was declared for all of Pakistan.

In an attempt to re-create the Israeli preemptive strike of 1967, the Pakistani Air Force struck the first blows, beginning with strikes on suspected guerilla camps within India, and, on December 3, Indian airfields. Midnight marked the official beginning of the war. On the next day, the Indian army struck with a three-pronged attack launched from the West Bengal, Assam, and Tipura states, aiming at Dhaka. Air superiority in the eastern theater existed from the very beginning, and an effective naval blockade was established. Far inferior in quantity and quality of equipment, and facing East Pakistan's Liberation Force (Mukti Bahini), the 93,000 Pakistani defenders were quickly and totally overwhelmed, most of them being taken prisoners of war.

On the western front, the Indian forces managed to keep the Pakistani army out of India and even gained ground, though most of this territory was later returned to Pakistan. Air and naval engagements played a bigger role here, but the Pakistani Air Force was overwhelmed by the sheer mass of Indian attacks, and several Pakistani ships were sunk during two naval operations. East Pakistan declared independence on December 6 as Bangladesh. On December 16, Pakistani forces in the East surrendered and a United Nations cease-fire was agreed upon.

Thomas J. Weiler

See also: India-Pakistan War (1947); India-Pakistan War (1965).

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Indonesian War of Independence (1945–1949)

One of the most important periods of political change in Indonesian history, the Indonesian War of Independence helped to refashion the nation into a leftist democracy by 1949.

Since the Russian Revolution of 1917, Marxist-leaning political dissidents in Indonesia had agitated for independence from the Netherlands, which had held the nation as a colonial appendage since the 17th century. The occupation of Indonesia

by Japan in 1942 and the surrender of Japanese forces three years later gave Indonesian patriots the opportunity to declare independence. Nationalist leaders Sukarno and Mohammad Hatta struggled against communist leaders Tan Malaka and Musso over control of the new independent regime.

Fearing anti-Japanese outbreaks by angry Indonesians after the end of World War II, Japanese military leaders of occupied Indonesia obeyed orders by the Allied government to prevent the Indonesians from instituting a revolution. The Japanese allowed its own puppet regime of Indonesian political leaders to remain in power. That stimulated more than 150,000 young Indonesians to clamor for independence. Many of the youth had received military training from Japanese forces. They seized arms and military supplies from the Japanese Army and compelled pro-Japanese Indonesians to recognize an independent Indonesia.

In a strange postwar alliance, Dutch units, reinforced by British Indian brigades and captured Japanese troops, attempted to put down the popular independence movement growing in 1945. The violent Battle of Surabaya, which included British air strikes and naval fire, began on November 10, 1945. An Indonesian victory, it was later named "Heroes' Day" for the patriotism of Indonesian freedom fighters who lost their lives in the engagement. Sukarno was named president on November 14, 1945, though Sultan Sjahrir and Amir Sjarifuddin, prime minister and defense minister, respectively, held the real power. The Netherlands did not recognize the new Indonesian government, and Anglo-Dutch forces landed at Batavia to restore Dutch authority in the region. After yearlong hostilities between the Dutch and British occupiers and the Indonesian People's Army, the two side chose to negotiate and accepted the Cheribon Agreement (1946). Under its terms, the Dutch recognized the creation of the United States of Indonesia under the Dutch crown. The British left Indonesia in November 1946.

However, the agreement soon collapsed because of conflicting interpretations by the Indonesians and Dutch. As disorder spread in Java and other regions, the Dutch authorities turned to repression (summer 1947) to restore order. For the next year, Indonesia saw conflict between the Dutch and Indonesians and struggle between various Indonesian groups, many of which were left leaning. In December 1948, after another round of Dutch-Indonesian negotiations had failed, the Dutch captured Yogyakarta, the Indonesian capital. International opprobrium and guerrilla resistance by Indonesian forces compelled the Dutch to negotiate, and the two sides met again for a round-table conference at the Hague (August 23–November 2, 1949). At its conclusion, the Netherlands agreed to finally recognize Indonesian independence on December 27, 1949.

Jason Newman

See also: Aceh War (1873–1903); Acehnese Rebellion (1953–1959).

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Inonu, Battles of (1921)

Two important battles of the Greco-Turkish War (1919–1922), fought from January 9–11, 1921, and from March 23–31, 1921, near Eskisehir in Anatolia. In early January 1921, a Greek force moved toward Eskisehir from Bursa to attack the Turkish forces, led by Ismet Pasha, the commander of the western front, near Inonu. Fighting began on January 9 and continued into the next day. The Greeks moved additional divisions into the area who pushed the Turkish forces back from the railway station and took a nearby hill, called Metristepe. The local Turkish commander, Fevsi Pasha, ordered his forces to pull back. After capturing the Akpınar-Kovalca line, the Greeks stopped their advance and dug in. The Turks stopped their retreat and dug in. Not feeling ready to attack the larger Turkish force, the Greeks pulled back from Inonu on January 11.

The Battle of Inonu caused the Turkish revolutionaries to centralize control of their army. Also, the prestige gained in the aftermath of the battle helped them to announce their first constitution on January 20, 1921. Internationally, the prestige that the Turks gained helped them begin new negotiations with the Soviet Union that resulted in the Treaty of Moscow on March 16, 1921. After the London Conference (February 21 to March 11, 1921) failed to reconcile the differences between the two sides, the hostilities resumed in mid-March. Determined to make up for the setback of January 9–11, the Greeks prepared a much larger force to seize Inonu. The battle began on March 23, 1921, when Greek troops assaulted Ismet's positions. After four days of fighting, the better-equipped Greeks pushed back the Turks and took the Metristepe. On March 31, after receiving reinforcements, Ismet attacked the Greeks and recaptured Metristepe. In a continuation battle in April, Refet Pasha retook the town of Afyonkarahisar. However, after the Second Battle of Inonu, the Turks failed to encircle and destroy the Greek army, which retreated in good order.

The victory at the Second Battle of the Inonu silenced critics of Mustafa Kemal, who were questioning his delay and failure in countering the Greek advances in Anatolia. Also, in April, Britain, France, and Italy decided to send their representatives to the national government in Ankara. The Greeks, determined to defeat the Turkish nationalists, prepared for even a bigger battle at Sakarya.

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See also: Greco-Turkish War (1919–1922); Ismet Inonu; Kemal Atatürk, Mustafa; Sakarya, Battle of (1921).

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Intifada, First (1987–1993)

A spontaneous protest movement by Palestinians against Israeli rule and an effort to establish a Palestinian homeland through a series of demonstrations, improvised attacks, and riots. The First Intifada (literally, "shaking off") began in December 1987 and ended in 1993 with the signing of the Oslo Accords and the creation of the Palestinian Authority.

The founding of Israel in 1948 created a situation in which Palestinians and citizens of the new Israeli state suddenly found themselves occupying a single body of land but under Israeli control. This basic reality would remain the most contentious issue in the region for decades to come. It also led to an emerging Palestinian national consciousness calling for Israel's destruction. Such anti-Israeli sentiment was generally shared by other Arab nations and by the Arab world at large, and material and military support often followed suit. Although the Palestinians had not resisted under the repressive measures of the 1950s and 1960s, their treatment became even worse later, especially with the ascendance of the Likud Party in Israel. Many Palestinians, especially the young, became more convinced of the need for resistance from 1968 to the early 1970s; then, just as Palestinians experienced even poorer treatment, more property encroachment, and more difficulties, their leadership moved toward negotiation as a strategy. By the time of the intifada, most Palestinians had experienced or knew those who had experienced Israel's de jure or de facto draconian civil and criminal enforcement practices, including torture, summary executions, mass detentions, and the destruction of property and homes.

In 1987, strained relations between Palestinians and Israelis were pushed to the limit when, on October 1, Israeli soldiers ambushed and killed seven Palestinian men from Gaza alleged to have been members of the Palestinian terrorist organization Islamic Jihad. Days later, an Israeli settler shot a Palestinian schoolgirl in the back. With violence against Israelis by Palestinians also on the increase, a wider conflict may have been inevitable.

The tension only mounted as the year drew to a close. On December 4, an Israeli salesman was found murdered in Gaza. On December 6, a truck driven by the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) struck a van, killing its four Palestinian occupants. That same day, sustained and heavy violence involving several hundred Palestinians took place in the Jabalya refugee camp, where the four Palestinians who died in the traffic accident had lived. The unrest spread quickly and eventually involved

other refugee camps. By the end of December, the violence had made its way to Jerusalem. The Israelis reacted with a heavy hand, which did nothing but fan the fires of Palestinian outrage. On December 22, 1987, the United Nations Security Council officially denounced the Israeli reaction to the unrest, which had taken the lives of scores of Palestinians.

The result of the escalating spiral of violence was the intifada, a series of Palestinian protests, demonstrations, and ad hoc attacks ranging from youths throwing rocks at Israeli troops to demonstrations by women's organizations. Although quite spontaneous at first, a shadowy organization, the Unified Leadership of the Intifada, emerged, issuing directives via numbered statements. Along with a series of general strikes and boycotts, the demonstrations caused such disruption to the Israeli state that the government responded with military force. Heated tensions proved a hotbed for further violence, which led to increasingly violent reprisals on both sides. Although the Palestinians had begun by relying on rocks and superior numbers under the auspices of the Unified Leadership, they were soon throwing Molotov cocktails and grenades as well as simply burning tires and using spray paint to write graffiti of the intifada. Israeli rules were such that the Palestinian flag and its colors were banned, so these were displayed by the demonstrators. In the meantime, Israeli defense minister Yitzhak Rabin exhorted the IDF to "break the bones" of demonstrators. Rabin's tactics resulted in more international condemnation and a worsening relationship with Washington, which had already been on the skids. Moshe Arens, who succeeded Rabin in the Ministry of Defense in 1990, seemed better able to understand both the root of the uprising and the best ways of subduing it. Indeed, the number of Palestinians and Israelis killed declined during the period from 1990 to 1993. However, the intifada itself seemed to be running out of steam after 1990, perhaps because so many Palestinian men were in prison by then.

Despite continued violence on the part of Hamas (Islamic Resistance Movement), on September 13, 1993, Rabin, now prime minister, and Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) chairman Yasir Arafat signed the historic Oslo Accords on the White House lawn. The accords, which brought Rabin and Arafat the Nobel Peace Prize, called for a five-year transition period during which the Gaza Strip and the West Bank would be jointly controlled by Israel and the Palestinian Authority; power was eventually meant to be turned over to the Palestinian people.

The First Intifada caused both civil destruction and humanitarian suffering, but it also produced gains for the Palestinian people before it was brought to an end. First, it solidified and brought into focus a clear national consciousness for the Palestinian people and made statehood a clear national objective. Second, it cast Israeli policy toward Palestine in a very negative light on the world stage, especially the killing of Palestinian children. Third, it was seen by some Israelis to indicate that their primary struggle was with Palestinians and not all Arabs. Thus, it

rekindled public and political dialogue on the Arab-Israeli conflict across Europe, in the United States, and in other Middle Eastern states. Fourth, the First Intifada threatened the leadership role of the PLO in Tunis, illustrating the self-mobilization of the population in the territories and leading eventually to friction between the Tunis old guard and younger leadership. Finally, it cost Israel hundreds of millions of dollars in lost imports and tourism.

At the time the Oslo Accords were signed in September 1993, the six-year intifada had resulted in more than 1,000 deaths, most of them Palestinian. It is believed that approximately 1,160 Palestinians died in the uprising, of which 241 were children. On the Israeli side, 160 died, 5 of whom were children. Clearly, the IDF's inexperience in widespread riot control had contributed to the high death toll, for in the first 13 months of the intifada alone, more than 330 Palestinians were killed. Indeed, the policies and performance of the IDF split Israeli public opinion on the handling of the intifada and invited international scrutiny.

In more recent years, continued terrorist attacks by pro-Palestinian interests, Israeli control of the Palestinian territories long beyond the timeline set by the Oslo Accords, and the failure of the accords to proceed have caused unrest in the international community and in Palestinian-Israeli relations. In 2000, a new wave of violent Palestinian protest broke out and would eventually become known as the Second (al-Aqsa) Intifada.

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See also: Arafat, Yasir; Hamas; Intifada, Second (2000–2004); Oslo Accords (1993); Palestine Liberation Organization.

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Intifada, Second (2000–2004)

A popular Palestinian uprising and period of enhanced Israeli-Palestinian hostilities that broke out in 2000 after the collapse of the Camp David peace talks that summer.

The Second Intifada is also called the al-Aqsa Intifada because it began at the al-Aqsa Mosque in the Old City of Jerusalem. On September 28, 2000, Likud Party leader Ariel Sharon, accompanied by a Likud Party delegation and 1,500 police and security forces, entered and moved through the Haram al-Sharif complex, the area of Jerusalem's Old City also called the Temple Mount. There the al-Aqsa Mosque and the Dome of the Rock are located. The enclave is one of Islam's three most holy sites and is sacred to Jews as well. Many observant Jews will not walk on the Temple Mount for fear of desecrating the remnants of the Temple underneath it. Some Jewish and Christian organizations have called for the destruction of the Dome of the Rock or its transfer to an Arab country so that Jews can reclaim the site.

Sharon said that he was investigating Israeli complaints that Muslims were damaging archaeological remains below the surface of the Temple Mount. By agreement, at that time the area was then supervised by Palestinian rather than Israeli security, with Israeli tour guides handing over their charges to their Arab counterparts during the times when the area was open to non-Muslims.

Palestinians believed Sharon's actions demonstrated Israeli contempt for limited Palestinian sovereignty and for Muslims in general. Anger began to build as a result, and soon riots and demonstrations erupted. Israeli troops launched attacks in Gaza, and on September 30, 2000, television footage showed the shooting of an unarmed 12-year-old boy, Muhammad al-Durrah, who was hiding behind his father as Israeli forces attacked. Protests now grew more violent, involving Israeli Arabs as well as Palestinians. For the first time, stores and banks were burned in Arab communities. Thousands of Israelis also attacked Arabs and destroyed Arab property in Tel Aviv and Nazareth during the Jewish holiday of Yom Kippur. On October 12, two Israeli reservists were lynched by a mob at the Ramallah police station, further inflaming Israeli public opinion. In retaliation, Israel launched a series of air strikes against Palestinians.

On October 17, Israeli and Palestinian officials signed the Sharm al-Sheikh agreement to end the violence, but it continued nevertheless. Sharon's election as prime minister in February 2001 heightened Israel's hard-line tactics toward the Palestinians, such as the use of F-16 aircraft for the first time. Both Palestinians and Israelis admitted that the Oslo period was now over. Some Palestinians characterized their response as the warranted resistance of an embittered population that had received no positive assurances of sovereignty from years of negotiations. Others began or encouraged suicide attacks, also new to the situation, as in the June 1, 2001, attack on Israelis waiting to enter a Tel Aviv discotheque and another attack on a Jerusalem restaurant on August 9, 2001. Although some attacks were claimed by various Palestinian organizations, the degree of organizational control over the bombers and issues such as payments made to the families of the bombers remain disputed.

The attacks in public places terrified Israelis. Those in modest economic circumstances had to use public transportation, but most malls, movie theaters, stores, and

day care centers hired security guards. Israeli authorities soon began a heightened campaign of targeted killings, or assassinations, of Palestinian leaders. Some political figures began to call for complete segregation of Arabs and Israelis, even within the Green Line (the 1967 border). This would be enforced by a security wall and even population transfers, which would involve evicting Arab villagers and urban residents from Israel in some areas and forcing them to move to the West Bank.

A virulent campaign against Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) chairman and Palestinian Authority (PA) president Yasir Arafat's leadership began in Israel with American assent, complicating any negotiations between the two sides. Arafat was charged with corruption and with supporting the intifada. Israelis argued that he had actually planned it, a less than credible idea to most professional observers. However, when the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) captured the ship *Santorini*, which was filled with weapons purchased by Ahmad Jibril, head of the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine General Command (a PLO faction that did not accept the Oslo Accords), in May 2001, and with the January 2002 capture of the *Karine-A*, a vessel carrying weapons allegedly from Iran, the anti-Arafat campaign increased.

The regional response to the al-Aqsa Intifada consisted of cautious condemnation by Egypt and Jordan, which had concluded peace agreements with Israel, and calls of outrage from other more hard-line states, such as Syria. In February 2002, Crown Prince Abdullah called for Arabs to fully normalize relations with Israel in return for Israeli withdrawal from the occupied territories. This plan was formally endorsed at an Arab League Summit in Beirut in March, although Israeli authorities prohibited Arafat from attending the summit. Israeli never acknowledged the proposal.

Instead, in response to a suicide bomber's attack on the Netanya Hotel on March 28, 2002, in which 30 Israeli civilians died, the Israeli military began a major military assault on the West Bank. The PA headquarters were targeted, and international negotiations became necessary when militants took refuge in the Church of the Nativity in Bethlehem. Charges of a massacre in the IDF's onslaught on Jenin were investigated, showing a smaller death count of 55.

The Israeli military response to the intifada did not successfully convince Palestinians to relinquish their aims of sovereignty and seemed to spark more suicide attacks rather than discouraging them. In contrast, political measures and diplomacy produced some short interruptions in the violence, which gradually lengthened on the part of some Palestinian organizations and actors. In March 2003, Mahmoud Abbas, under pressure from Israel and the United States, became the first Palestinian prime minister of the PA because the United States refused to recognize or deal with Arafat. On April 30, 2003, the European Union (EU), the United States, Russia, and the United Nations (UN) announced the Road Map to Peace, which was to culminate in an independent Palestinian state.

The plan did not unfold as designed, however, and in response to an Israeli air strike intended to kill Abd al-Aziz Rantisi, the leader of Hamas, militants launched a bus bombing in Jerusalem. At the end of June 2003, Palestinian militants agreed to a *hudna* (truce), which lasted for seven weeks and longer on the part of certain groups. There was no formal declaration that the intifada had ceased, and additional Israeli assassinations of Palestinian leaders and suicide attacks continued. Nevertheless, since 2004 Hamas has respected the cease-fire, and the issues of Israeli withdrawal from Gaza, Arafat's November 2004 death, Palestinian elections, and the Israeli response to their outcome took the spotlight in late 2004 and throughout 2005.

Casualty numbers for the al-Aqsa Intifada are disputed. Approximately 1,000 Israelis had died, and 6,700 more were wounded, by September 2004. By 2003, the Israelis reported that 2,124 Palestinians had been killed, but a U.S. source reported 4,099 Palestinians killed and 30,527 wounded by 2005. Israel's tourism sector has suffered a considerable decline at a time in which inflation and unemployment were already problematic.

An outcome of the al-Aqsa Intifada in the global context of the September 11, 2001, terror attacks on the United States was that Israeli officials have tended to brand all Palestinian resistance, indeed all activity on behalf of Palestinians, as terrorism. This discourse and the heightened violence have lent credence to those who call for separation rather than integration of Israelis with Arabs. Therefore, the building of the security barrier known as the Israeli Security Fence, which effectively cuts thousands of Palestinians off from their daily routes to work or school, was widely supported by Israelis. Similarly, Sharon's idea of withdrawal from Gaza was essentially funded by this idea, but his government had to confront those who were unwilling to relinquish settlements in that area.

The intifada resulted in crisis and despair among some Israeli peace activists and discouraged many independent efforts by Israelis and Palestinians to engage the other. A 2004 survey showed that the numbers of Israelis in general who believed that the 1993 Oslo Peace Accords would lead to settlements declined during the intifada, and greater numbers believed that Israel should impose a military solution on the Palestinians. Such opinions may well have shifted, however, after Israeli attacks on Lebanon in the summer of 2006.

The intifada also had deleterious effects on Palestinians who had hoped for the blossoming of normalcy in the West Bank, particularly as 85 percent of those in Gaza and 58 percent of those in the West Bank live in poverty. Since the outbreak of the intifada, the IDF demolished 628 housing units in which 3,983 people had lived. Less than 10 percent of these people were implicated in any violence or illegal activity.

Another outcome of the intifada was its highlighting of intra-Palestinian conflict. This includes that between the Tunis PLO elements of the PA and the younger leaders who emerged within the occupied territories, between Fatah and Hamas, and

between Fatah and the al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades. Also evident were the difficulties of responding to Israeli demands for security when security for Palestinian citizens was not in force. Some Palestinian Israeli citizens have asserted their Palestinian identity for the very first time as a result of the intifada. The conflict most certainly caused discord in the Arab world as well.

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See also: Arafat, Yasir; Hamas; Intifada, First (1987–1993); Oslo Accords (1993); Palestine Liberation Organization; Suicide Bombings.

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Iran. *See* Abbas the Great; Agha Muhammad Khan Qajar; Anglo-Iranian Agreements; Anglo-Iranian Oil Crisis (1951–1953); Anglo-Iranian War (1856–1857); Chaldiran, Battle of (1514); Gulnabad, Battle of (1722); Iran during World War I; Iran during World War II; Iran, Arab Conquest of; Iran, Islamic Revolution in (1978–1979); Iran, Wars of Succession in (18th Century); Iranian Cossack Brigade; Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988); Isfahan, Siege of (1722); Ismail, Shah (Safavid); Ottoman-Iranian Wars (18th–19th Centuries); Russo-Iranian Wars; Tahmasp I; World War I (Iranian Front)

Iran, Afghan Invasion of (1722). *See* Gorgin Khan; Gulnabad, Battle of (1722); Isfahan, Siege of (1722).

Iran, Arab Conquest of (636–671)

The conquest of Iran began a few years after the Arab Muslim victory at Qadisiyya (636) and the subjugation of Iraq. In fact, Caliph Umar (Omar) had forbidden

his commanders to cross the Zagros Mountains to attack the Iranians after defeating them at Jalula. He intended for these mountains to be the natural boundary between the domains of the Iranians and the Arabs. However, this was not a compromise that Sassanid shah Yazdagird III (632–651) was ready to make, and he issued a call to arms and gathered his forces at Nihawand with the intention of reconquering Iraq. Umar dispatched an army under Numan ibn Amr ibn Muqarrin to face the Sassanid threat and ordered the governors of Basra and Kufa to send troops to support him. The Muslim army of 30,000 men found a numerically superior Persian force in a strong defensive position at Nihawand in 642. The Sassanid soldiers were protected by trenches and spiked obstacles that were meant to impede any advance by Arab cavalry. Despite being more organized, more experienced, and better equipped than the Arabs who had fought at Qadisiyya a few years earlier, the Arab troops were unable to break through the Persian defenses. After two days of futile attacks, the Arabs feigned a retreat to lure their enemies out into the open. This ruse was successful. The Iranians, tasting victory, left their positions to chase the Arabs, who wheeled around and faced them on open ground. The Arabs inflicted a major defeat on Yazdagird III's army, despite its numerical superiority, but themselves suffered heavy losses, including Numan. After Nihavand, the Sassanids were never able to field an army against the Arabs again.

After their victory at Nihawand, the Arabs set out to conquer Iran. However, unlike the conquest of Syria, Egypt, and Iraq, this endeavor was a long, slow process that lasted three decades. Sassanian Iran was rather decentralized, and its different regions were ruled by local princes and dynasties that put up a stiff resistance to the Arab advance. Arab armies set out annually to conquer Iran region by region, sometimes allying with one Iranian prince against another. Nihawand, Rayy, Qum, Ardabil, Hamadan, Istakhr, Merv, and other major centers all fell to the advancing Arabs as they systematically conquered all of Iran. Khurasan was the last province to fall and was fully pacified in 671. However, despite these military successes, rebellions against caliphal rule flared up frequently, even as late as the middle Abbasid period.

Adam Ali

See also: Qadisiyya, Battle of (636); Umayyad Caliphate.

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Iran, Islamic Revolution in (1978–1979)

Iran's Islamic Revolution of 1978–1979 began as an uprising against Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, whose autocratic rule and ties to the West were extremely unpopular in his country. The shah's most determined opposition was organized by the Shiite religious leaders known as ulama. After the fall of the shah's government in February 1979, a referendum held in March revealed near unanimous support for an Islamic republic. The revolution in Iran became an inspiration for Islamic revivalists everywhere and caused a complete overhaul of the U.S. government's Middle East policy.

The Pahlavi dynasty had ruled since 1925, but the shah had been overthrown once before in 1951 and returned to the throne only with the assistance of the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. After that, he appeared to the Iranian people to be overwhelmed by his U.S. advisers. His policies to use Iran's oil wealth to rapidly modernize the country created wide divisions between those who benefited from his westernizing measures and those who did not. His campaign to clamp down on rural landlords, bazaar merchants, and the ulama created a potentially powerful opposition. One fierce critic was a teacher in the sacred city of Qom, Ayatollah Khomeini, who was exiled by the shah.

In 1978, sit-ins by religious students in Qon were fired on by police, which led to a series of riots. Demanding the return of Khomeini from exile in Iraq, the students threatened to continue the riots, but the shah only forced Iraq to expel Khomeini, who then moved to Paris. From there, he was able to organize many other dissidents in exile and influence events in Iran through Western news broadcasts. Rallies, riots, and strikes continued until the shah was forced to cede the government to his vice president, Shapur Bakhtiar, on January 6, 1979.

Khomeini called for the overthrow of Bakhtiar as he set up a Revolutionary Islamic Council. Bakhtiar gave in to popular pressure and allowed Khomeini to return to Iran. Shortly thereafter, the Iranian Army stopped supporting the government as many soldiers joined the demonstrators. On February 11, the government fell. As the founder of the Islamic Republic of Iran and its supreme religious leader until his death in 1989, Khomeini implemented far-reaching government and religious mandates to erase all traces of the shah's Westernization programs. Ironically, his government eventually became as repressive as that of the shah.

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See also: Khomeini, Ruhollah.

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Iran, Wars of Succession in (18th Century)

A series of power struggles that shook Iran between 1725 and 1796. The first conflict began in the wake of the 1722 invasion of the Afghan tribes that resulted in the collapse of the Safavid dynasty; Shah Sultan Husain abdicated and was later executed by the Afghans. This event marked the twilight of the Safavid power but also served as a launching pad for an Afshar Turkoman commander named Nadir Shah. In political chaos that ensued, Nadir chose to side with Tahmasp Mirza, the surviving heir to the Safavid throne. Tahmasp chose him as his principal military commander and gave him the title Tahmasp Quli Khan (servant of Tahmasp). Throughout the 1720s, Nadir gained a series of major victories, first crushing Malek Mahmud Sistani, who claimed the crown, in 1725–1726 and then defeating the Abdali Afghans near Herat in May 1729 and the Gilzi (Ghilzais) Afghans at Mihmandust and Murchakhur in the fall of 1729. He expelled the Afghans from the former Safavid capital of Isfahan, where Tahmasp was installed as a shah but with actual authority in the hands of Nadir. In 1730, Nadir announced the Safavid restoration to the Ottomans, but just two years later he deposed Tahmasp in favor of his infant son, who himself was deposed in 1736 when Nadir Shah became Nadir Shah.

Over the next 10 years, Nadir Shah conducted numerous campaigns that revived the Iranian Empire, which stretched from India to Caucasus. Despite his successes, Nadir had come to be regarded as a cruel and capricious tyrant and faced a number of internal revolts in 1746. A group of Afshar and Qajar officers organized a conspiracy against Nadir and assassinated him in June 1747. His death, however, plunged Iran into another civil war. The empire Nadir forged with his sword disintegrated as soon he breathed his last. His military commanders turned against each other over control. One of them, Karim Khan of the Zand tribe, who exerted influence in southern Iran, entered into an alliance with Ali Mardan Khan, the chief of the Bakhtyari tribe, who controlled central Iran. The two men seized Isfahan in 1757 and restored Shah Ismail III, the grandson of the last Safavid shah, to the throne but retained real power in their hands. After Ali Mardan broke the alliance, Karim Khan had him killed and took control over southern and central Iran. Karim Khan gradually came in control of western Iran, defeating the rival Azad Khan

near Qazvin and extending his authority to Azerbaijan. In the early 1750s, he defeated the rival Qajar tribesmen and limited their authority to Mazanderan. By early 1770s, Karim Khan controlled all of Iran (except Khurasan, where he tolerated the rule of the blind Shah Rukh, Nadir Shah's grandson). He never claimed the title of shah, instead maintaining the powerless Shah Ismail III, grandson of the last Safavid shah, on the throne and ruling as a *vakil* (deputy or regent). His pragmatic and commonsense policies restored peace in his realm, reorganized the fiscal system, promoted agriculture and commerce, and generated a building boom, particularly in his capital of Shiraz.

Karim Khan's death in 1779 marked the start of another period of anarchy as power struggles ensued among his successors until 1789, when Lutf Ali became dominant. Yet, Lutf Ali was not secure in his authority and faced a challenge from the rival Qajar tribesmen who had been so dexterously contained by Karim Khan. The Qajars were led by Agha Muhammad Khan, who, besides political ambitions, had a personal score to settle with the Zand. In 1759, his father lost control of western Iran to Karim Khan Zand and Agha Muhammad was captured, castrated, and kept at the Zand court in Shiraz for 16 years. He was well treated at Karim Khan's court but a prisoner nevertheless. In 1779, upon Karim Khan's death, Agha Muhammad escaped and gradually succeeded in establishing his authority in Iran's northern provinces. In 1782–1784, he conducted a successful campaign against Ali-Murad Khan Zand, one of the claimants to the Zand throne, becoming undisputed master of the northern half of Iran. He moved his capital to Tehran, where he was enthroned (but not crowned) by 1789, laying the foundation for the Qajar dynasty. In 1790–1794, Agha Muhammad continued his struggle against other pretenders. Although his army suffered repeated defeats at the hand of Lutf Ali Khan, Agha Muhammad eventually triumphed over the Zands, sacking their last refuge in Kerman, where all males were killed or blinded and up to 20,000 women and children were enslaved. By then, Agha Muhammad controlled most of Iran and sought to reclaim the former Safavid territories as well. He first turned to the Caucasus, where the Georgian kingdom of Kartli-Kakheti, once a Safavid tributary, had established an alliance with Russia against Iran and Ottoman Empire. Agha Muhammad demanded Georgian recognition of his sovereignty and upon being rejected invaded south Caucasia in 1796. The Georgian army, heavily outnumbered, was defeated at Krtsanisi in September 1795 and the Georgian capital, Tiflis (Tbilisi), was razed to the ground. After capturing Erivan, Agha Muhammad crowned himself shah of Iran in March 1796, girding himself with a sword of Safavid Shah Ismail.

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See also: Agha Muhammad Khan Qajar; Gulnabad, Battle of (1722); Isfahan, Siege of (1722); Karim Khan Zand; Nadir Shah.

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Iran during World War I

Despite its declared neutrality, during World War I Iran (Persia) became a battleground for German, Ottoman, Russian, and British troops. Iran's geographical position on the borders of Russia, India, and the Persian Gulf turned it into a natural target in the political struggle between the Great Powers, primarily between Russia and Britain. Iran in the 19th and early 20th centuries during the Qajar era was characterized by economic and military weakness, disunity, and administrative inefficiency. As such it was unable to resist European pressure. In 1907 an Anglo-Russian Convention had divided Iran into spheres of influence: Russian in the north and center, British in the southeast, and a neutral zone between the two. In March 1915, Russia agreed to British control over the neutral zone, where oil had been discovered in 1908 and where the Anglo-Persian Oil Company had been formed the following year.

The Germans and the Ottomans had as their main objectives destroying the British-controlled oil facilities in Khuzistan and securing access to Afghanistan via Iran. The Ottomans also had perennial ambitions in Transcaucasia. For the Russians and the British, defending their respective positions in Iran and preventing Iran from joining the Central Powers were the most important goals. Many in Iran favored an Ottoman-German alliance because the Ottomans were Muslims fighting against the much-distrusted Russians and British and because the sultan had proclaimed jihad (holy war) against the Allies. Kaiser Wilhelm II of Germany had also posed as a protector of Islam.

Russian forces had occupied northern Iran in 1912. The Ottomans moved into Azerbaijan in the fall of 1914; by May 1916 they were defeated by Russian troops in Ottoman territory. However, the Turks were able to stop the Russian advance and achieve success on the front in southern Iraq against the British. They recaptured Kermanshah and held it until February 1917.

The Ottomans cancelled their participation in the expedition to Afghanistan, however. A German caravan under Captain Oscar von Niedermeyer was able to reach Herat and Kabul, after crossing the Iranian deserts and evading Russian and British forces. The expedition lasted from April to August 1915 but failed to

achieve its main objective of a military alliance with the relatively independent and powerful Afghan ruler against the British in India and Iran.

In 1915, German influence in Iran reached its peak. German agents in southern Iran conducted effective anti-British propaganda, instigating revolts among the Bakhtiari, Qashqai, and Tangistani tribes and assuming control over cities and districts. The most famous of those emissaries was Wilhelm Wassmuss, a former consul in Bushire, who became known as "the German Lawrence." The British area of influence fell under German control, cutting off the British from Tehran and forcing them to divert their troops from Mesopotamia to protect the oil fields in Khuzistan.

To strike back, the British in early 1916 formed a new local armed force, the South Persia Rifles, under the command of General Sir Percy Sykes. By fall 1916, it had recaptured the most important cities from the Germans and linked up with the Russian forces in Isfahan. In late 1917 British forces regained control of the south from the Germans and their tribal allies. By then, the South Persia Rifles had grown to 8,000 men as a result of reinforcements sent from India and Burma.

In Tehran in August 1915, Mustawfi al-Mamalik, a nationalist pro-German leader, became prime minister and initiated secret talks with the Germans. The third Majles (parliament) was also predominantly pro-German and anti-Russian. The Germans were supported by nationalist members of the Democratic Party, Shia clerics, tribal leaders, and the Swedish-officered Gendarmerie. In November 1915, Russian forces marched from Qazvin toward Tehran. The Majles was dissolved, and a provisional government was formed first in Qom; it then moved to Hamadan and finally Kermanshah as the Russian troops advanced. The British and Russian ministers persuaded the young Ahmad Shah (who reigned during 1909–1925) to stay in the capital; his cabinet also remained. By March 1917, as a result of advances by the Russians in western Iran and the British toward Baghdad, the dissident government had to withdraw to Ottoman territory. By late 1917, the Russians and the British occupied most of the Iranian territory.

The Bolshevik Revolution in Russia in November 1917 led to significant changes in the situation in Iran. Most of the Russian military formations there disintegrated, and the British were able to move into territory in the north that was vacated by the Russians. The British also sent expeditions to Transcaucasia, eastern Iran, and Turkistan to find out if they could take advantage of the situation and support resistance against the Central Powers and the communist government of Russia.

According to the March 1918 Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, Russian troops had to pull out of Iran. The armistices of October and November 1918 ended the state of war between Britain and the Ottomans and between Britain and Germany. Though the war was formally over, the British did not withdraw from Iran until 1921. With the Russians having departed earlier, Britain was the sole foreign power dominating Iran. Although Iran served as a battlefield during the war, it was blocked from

presenting its case at the Paris Peace Conference. The war had a devastating effect on every aspect of life in Iran: foreign occupation, humiliation of its powerless rulers, tribal rebellions, separatist nationalist movements, and a famine during 1918–1919 that led to an economic and political crisis in the country.

Elena Andreeva

See also: Iranian Cossack Brigade; World War I.

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Iran during World War II

During World War II, Iran was occupied by British and Soviet troops, and the United States became an important new factor in Iranian politics. Germany had a significant economic influence and presence in Iran before the outbreak of the war, for in the 1930s, Reza Shah Pahlavi (r. 1925–1941), founder of the new dynasty, had turned to Germany for economic assistance. The shah's sympathy toward Germany, which had no tradition of imperial intervention in Iran or the Middle East, was well known, along with his distrust of Britain and the Soviet Union, both of which had dominated Iran in the 19th and early 20th centuries.

When the war began in Europe in September 1939, Reza Shah declared Iran's neutrality. However, after the Germans attacked the Soviet Union in June 1941, Iranian involvement in the war became inevitable. The Soviet Union and Great Britain, Iran's perennial enemies, once again formed an alliance. As German troops pushed eastward and threatened the Caucasus, the strategic significance of Iran grew for the Allies. The Allied objectives in Iran were to protect the British-controlled oil fields in Khuzistan; to use Iran and, in particular, its newly built Trans-Iranian Railroad to channel military supplies to the Soviet Union; and to curb the activities of German agents in Iran.

The British and Soviet representatives in Iran demanded that the government expel German nationals and let the Allies use the railroad to transport war materials.

When Reza Shah refused to comply on the grounds of Iran's neutrality, the Allies invaded and occupied the country. On August 25, 1941, Soviet forces entered Iran from the northwest and the British entered from Iraq. The Allied forces suppressed Iranian military and naval resistance in just three days. Left with no choice, Reza Shah abdicated on September 1941, and his 22-year-old son, Muhammad Reza, succeeded him. Reza Shah was sent into exile and died in 1944 in South Africa.

The fate of Iran in World War II resembled its fate in World War I: once more, Iran was occupied and dominated by foreign powers. The Soviet and British zones of occupation were consistent with the spheres of influence into which Iran had been divided by the humiliating Anglo-Russia Convention of 1907. The Soviets occupied the north, the British took control in the south, and Tehran and other central areas were put under joint Anglo-Soviet protection. In January 1942, Iran, the Soviet Union, and Great Britain signed the Tripartite Treaty of Alliance, whereby the great powers promised to respect the territorial integrity, sovereignty, and political independence of Iran; to safeguard the Iranian economy from the effects of the war; and to withdraw from Iranian territory within six months of the cessation of hostilities.

By the spring of 1942, Iran had severed diplomatic relations with Germany, Italy, and Japan and expelled their nationals. On September 9. 1943, Iran declared war on Germany. Two months later, one of the most important Allied meetings of the war, the Tehran Conference, was held, with the participation of U.S. president Franklin D. Roosevelt, British prime minister Winston Churchill, and Soviet leader Joseph Stalin. Recognizing the help provided by Iran to their war effort, the three Allied leaders promised during the meeting to provide economic assistance to Iran and to address its problems after the war.

The war had a devastating impact on Iran. It lost effective sovereignty to the domination of the occupying powers, and the central government that had been strengthened by Reza Shah became ineffective. Political instability and social disintegration grew, and economic hardship developed. Further, the use of major roads and the Trans-Iranian Railroad for the transportation of supplies to the Soviet Union disrupted Iranian trade; the demands of Allied troops aggravated inflation; and a poor harvest in 1942 led to widespread famine. Short-lived cabinets were unable to deal with the emergency situation, resulting in social unrest and the rise of separatist movements. All of these factors and the new political freedom resulting from the paralysis of a dysfunctional government led to a surge in political activity by various groups and parties. Political conflict among them was encouraged by the occupying powers.

During the course of their involvement, the Soviet Union and Britain revived and intensified their rivalry in Iran, a contest that was an integral part of what had been known as the "Great Game" in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Each side tried to expand its own influence and to limit the other's influence. The

Soviets closed their zone of occupation to free entry. They supported left-wing trade unions in the north and the Communist Party, which had been banned in 1937 but was revived in 1941 under the new name of Tudeh (Masses). The Soviets also patronized the separatist leftist movements in Iranian Kurdistan and Azerbaijan. One result of these Soviet activities was the establishment of an autonomous state of Azerbaijan in December 1945. Meanwhile, the British in the south supported conservative elements, including the tribes, Muslim clerics, and proponents of monarchy. They also sponsored the right-wing, pro-Western, and anticommunist National Will Party.

During the war, Washington became aware of the economic importance of Iran, stemming from its oil and its strategic location. After the United States entered the war, American troops arrived in Iran. The Persian Gulf Command, which eventually numbered 30,000 men, helped orchestrate the movement of supplies from the gulf to northern Iran, where they were handed over to the Soviets. American financial and military advisers were also sent to Iran at the request of the Iranian government. Between 1942 and 1943, a financial mission headed by Arthur Millspaugh worked on reorganizing Iran's finances. A mission headed by Colonel H. Norman Schwarzkopf took charge of the reorganization of the Gendarmerie (rural police).

In the first half of 1944, two American oil companies and then the Soviet government attempted to receive oil concessions from the Iranian government to undermine the monopoly of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company. The Majles (parliament), however, passed a bill, authored mainly by Mohammad Mossadeq, that prohibited oil-concession agreements with any foreign company until after the end of the war.

British and American troops withdrew from Iran in January 1946, whereas the Soviet occupation of the northern provinces of Azerbaijan and Kurdistan lasted until May 1946 when, under pressure from the United Nations, the Soviets withdrew.

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See also: Anglo-Russian Convention (1907); Great Game; Reza Shah Pahlavi.

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Iranian Cossack Brigade

A peculiar unit in the late 19th-century Iranian Army that can best be explained as a result of the confluence of the "Great Game" with the moribund Qajar dynasty. The *Berigad-e qazzaq*, or Cossack Brigade, was operational between 1879 and 1921. It contained Iranian troopers and, until 1920, Russian officers. Along with two other foreign-led units, the South Persia Rifles and Gendarmerie, it was one of the most effective units in the Qajar military. Naser al-Din Shah (1848–1896), attempting to modernize his army, hired French, Austrian, Italian, and Russian advisory teams. Russia, long competing with England for domination of Central Asia, saw such an effort as beneficial for promoting czarist influence over Iran. Over 30 years, upward of 120 Russian officers and noncommissioned officers served as leaders and technical advisers. Up to the last year of its existence, the Cossack Brigade always served two masters: the shah and the czar, and the czar always had the final word.

By 1900, the brigade numbered 2,000 men; two years later, it numbered 8,000 men. Involved in minor military expeditions until the Constitutional Revolution (1906–1911), it then joined reactionary forces to bombard the Majles building in Teheran (June 23, 1908). This action killed hundreds of civilians and permanently blackened the unit's image with Iranian liberals; it survived, however, and even expanded to a division during World War I. Although the 1917 Russian Revolution ended czarist domination over Iran, Russia continued to direct the Cossack Brigade until 1920. Completely Iranianized that year, the brigade fell under the control of Reza Kahn, a former trooper. The new commander used these soldiers to support his 1921 coup d'état, and then as a talent pool to provide officers for his own army.

John P. Dunn

See also: Iran during World War I; Reza Shah Pahlavi.

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Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988)

A protracted military conflict that began in September 1980 when Iraq invaded western Iran along their common border and ended in August 1988 after both sides accepted a cease-fire supported by the United Nations (UN). The Iran-Iraq War can be seen as another phase of the ancient Persian-Arab rivalry that was fueled by 20th-century border disputes and political competition, complicated by the Islamic Revolution in Iran.

The border between Iraq and Iran had been contested diplomatically and sometimes militarily for several centuries. The dispute revolved chiefly around control over the Shatt al-Arab, a waterway that provided Iraq's only outlet to the Persian Gulf. In 1937, the two sides came to an agreement establishing a boundary that gave Iraq control of the Shatt al Arab. Despite the border agreement, relations between Iraq and Iran remained problematic, and a bitter rivalry continued between the two neighboring countries.

There were several contributing factors to this rivalry. First, the border cut across political loyalties. In the north, a large Kurdish population (who are neither Arab nor Persian) straddled both sides of the border. On the southern part of the border, an Arab minority inhabited the oil-rich Iranian province of Khuzestan among a Persian majority. Second, Iraq and Iran were both politically unstable. When either Iraq or Iran experienced a revolution or coup, the other country would exploit the troubled country's political weakness to gain a diplomatic advantage.

In 1975, after a Kurdish rebellion, a militarily weaker Iraq had agreed to a treaty that placed the boundary between Iraq and Iran on a line running down the middle of the Shatt al Arab in exchange for an Iranian agreement to stop supporting Kurdish rebels in Iraq. However, after the fall of Mohammad Reza Shah Pahlavi to Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini's Islamic fundamentalist regime in 1979, the shah's army was disbanded, and Iran lost its military supplier and close ally in the United States. Iraq's Saddam Hussein saw the unstable situation in Iran as an opportunity to reclaim both banks of the Shatt al Arab, as well as Khuzestan, and to punish Iran for its support of Kurdish and Shia opposition in Iraq.

On September 22, 1980, Hussein, using an accusation against Iran of backing an assassination aimed at Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz as a pretext, launched a full-scale surprise attack on Iran that initiated eight years of warfare. Attacking across a 300-mile front, Iraqi troops were initially successful against the disorganized Iranian defenders, advancing into southwestern Iran, securing the far side of the Shatt al Arab, and capturing the port city of Khorramshahr and Ahvaz in Khuzestan Province. However, the Iranians reacted decisively and established a very effective blockade with their navy. Additionally, the Iranian Air Force conducted retaliatory raids that checked the Iraqi advance on the ground. In January 1981, the Iranians launched a counteroffensive, but the Iraqi forces defeated the

attackers, and the war devolved into a protracted stalemate with neither side willing to back down.

Later in 1981, Iraq expressed some willingness to enter into negotiations, but Iranian leader Khomeini declared that Iran would never negotiate with the Iraqi government and would not cease fighting until Hussein's regime was toppled. Iran mobilized irregular forces, including the ill-trained but fanatical fighters of the Revolutionary Guard. Iran now began a series of offensives, which regained Khorramshahr, pushed most of the Iraqi forces out of Iran, and brought the fighting into Iraqi territory. Throughout the summer and fall of 1982, the Iranian attack along the border focused on splitting the south of Iraq, where the majority of the Shiites lived, from the north and capturing the southern city of Basra. The pattern for the fighting of 1982 was that the Revolutionary Guard, supported by the Iranian Army, usually outnumbered the Iraqi defenders, who inflicted heavy casualties on the attackers before falling back.

The Iranian leaders were willing to suffer enormous casualties in sending unsophisticated human-wave attacks against Iraq's better-equipped forces. In February 1984, Khomeini's troops captured oil-rich Majnun Island, strategically situated on the southern front, some 40 miles north of Basra. The Iraqis became more desperate and ultimately resorted to the use of chemical weapons, a tactic reviled by the international community.

In February 1986, the Iranians managed to breach the Iraqi lines and captured the al-Faw (Fao) Peninsula at the southeastern tip of Iraq. In response, Hussein widened the war to civilian targets, launching missiles against Iranian cities, bombing Iranian oil installations, and attacking Iranian shipping in the Persian Gulf. This drew severe reprisals from Iran against Iraqi oil production and shipping, including attacks against ships from countries that had allied themselves with Iraq, such as Kuwait. The attacks on Kuwaiti oil tankers in 1987 led the United States and several West European nations to send naval forces to station warships in the Persian Gulf to ensure oil flow to the rest of the world.

Later, in 1987, the Iranians prepared for what they hoped would be the last round of offensives to end the war and topple the Iraqi government. Tensions mounted as the situation grew critical. In July, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 598 calling for both sides to stop fighting, withdraw to prewar borders, and submit to an international body to determine responsibility for the war. Iraq was ready to negotiate, but Iran, sensing that victory was near, continued its attacks, thought it failed to achieve the victory for which it had hoped.

In 1988, a resurgent Iraq drove the Iranians from the al-Faw Peninsula and several other border areas. As the pendulum swung in Iraq's favor on the battlefield and Iran's economy faltered, Iranian leaders worked to persuade Khomeini to accept UN Resolution 598. Khomeini endorsed the cease-fire in July, and on August 20, 1988, both sides ceased fighting in accordance with the terms of the resolution.

The Iran-Iraq War lasted eight years and resulted in catastrophic destruction in both countries. There are no reliable casualty figures, although estimates hold that the Iraqis suffered an estimated 200,000 casualties. Another 70,000 were taken prisoner by the Iranians. The war probably claimed at least 200,000 Iranian lives and wounded more than 500,000. Estimates suggest that there were more than a million war and war-related casualties on both sides. Some estimates put this figure at close to 2 million. This includes some 100,000 Kurds who were killed by Iraqi forces during the final months of fighting.

The war was also extremely destructive to each country's economy. Estimates vary, but the war's cost, including military supplies and civilian damage, probably exceeds $500 billion for each side. Both Iran and Iraq sacrificed their oil wealth to the war for nearly a decade, and Iraq was forced to borrow heavily, especially from its allies on the Arabian Peninsula.

Negotiations between Iraq and Iran remained deadlocked for two years after the cease-fire went into effect, but in 1990, concerned with securing its forcible annexation of Kuwait, Iraq restored diplomatic relations with Iran and agreed to Iranian terms for the settlement of the war. This included the withdrawal of Iraqi troops from occupied Iranian territory, division of sovereignty over the Shatt al Arab waterway, and a prisoner-of-war exchange.

In the end, virtually none of the issues that started the war were resolved, and the conflict brought no tremendous political change in either country. Hussein, despite having led his nation into a disastrous war, emerged from the war stronger than ever and claimed that Iran's failure to unseat him represented a great Iraqi victory. In Iran, the years of fighting served to consolidate support for the Islamic Revolution.

The Iran-Iraq War contributed to the outbreak of the Persian Gulf War in 1991 because it left Iraq with a strong army and staggering debts to Arab nations, including Kuwait. Indeed, Iraq cited Kuwait's refusal to forgive Iraq's war debt as one reason for invading its oil-rich neighbor.

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See also: Hussein, Saddam; Khomeini, Ruhollah; Persian Gulf War (1991).

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Iraq, Arab Conquest of (632–636)

After asserting control over most of Arabia in the Wars of Apostasy after the Prophet's death in 632, the Muslims turned their attention to their powerful neighbors, the Byzantines and Sassanids. Arab commander Khalid ibn al-Walid led a force to assert control over the borderlands of southern Iraq and the middle and lower Euphrates, successfully defeating the Sassanid border forces and conquering Hira and Ubulla. However, Khalid was ordered to march west and assume command on the Syrian front. At this point, the Sassanids counterattacked, and the Muslims were halted and pushed back after suffering a heavy defeat at the Battle of the Bridge in 634. Despite winning a small victory the next year at the Battle of Buwayb, the Muslims lacked the strength to push forward against the army being assembled by Sassanid shah Yazdagird III (632–651). Saad ibn Abi Waqqas was sent to Iraq with a new army to salvage the situation on this weakened war front.

The Muslim army of 10,000–12,000 men met the Sassanid army numbering between 30,000 and 60,000 men, with a strong contingent of heavy cavalry and war elephants, at Qadisiyya in 636. The battle raged for three days, but in the end the Persians were routed and pursued. Ctesiphon, the Sassanid capital near modern-day Baghdad, was besieged and taken within a few months. The emperor, his officials, and what was left of the army fled east to Hulwan. Ctesiphon became Saad's headquarters, and from there the Muslims issued out to establish control over all of Iraq and to occupy its towns and cities. Meanwhile, a new Sassanid force of 30,000 men marched west in an attempt to reconquer Iraq, but they were met by a 12,000-strong Muslim army at Jalula and defeated. The Arabs pursued them to Hulwan and occupied it. Yazdagird III and his court fled to northern Iran, permanently losing Iraq to the Muslims.

Adam Ali

See also: Khalid ibn al-Walid; Iran, Arab Conquest of (636–671); Qadisyya, Battle of (637).

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Iraq during World War II

Iraq was the object of a peripheral but critical struggle between Great Britain and the Axis powers in 1941. Iraq was a major oil producer (2.5 million tons in 1940), and had that nation sided with Hitler, its location on the Persian Gulf would have enabled Germany to threaten British trade, supplies, and troop movements to and from India. Granted nominal independence by Britain in 1930, Iraq was a Hashemite monarchy. The 1930 treaty that established Iraq's de jure independence also protected British oil interests there and granted Britain military bases at Habbaniya, about 25 miles west of Baghdad, and near Basra.

Iraq was unstable, and there were numerous coups and coup attempts. In December 1938, pro-British General Nuri al-Said came to power. Instability in Iraq increased, however, when King Ghazi I died in an automobile accident in April 1939. As the new king, Faisal II, was only four, his uncle Abdul Illah acted as regent. Meanwhile, Nuri put down an attempted coup by a group of army officers in March 1939 and another in February 1940. Nuri wanted to declare war on Germany but encountered opposition from Iraqi nationalists who sought concessions from Britain first. In consequence, Nuri followed Egypt's lead and declared Iraq's neutrality. Relations with Germany were severed, although those with Italy were not.

Axis successes in the Mediterranean beginning in the fall of 1940 encouraged Iraqi nationalists, who believed the circumstances were right for Iraq to end the remaining British control. Another issue involved the long-standing Iraqi opposition to British policies in Palestine.

In March 1940, Rashid Ali replaced Nuri as prime minister, although Nuri remained in the government as foreign minister. Rashid Ali now came under the influence of four nationalist, pro-Axis Iraqi army generals who called themselves the "Golden Square." In March 1941, however, the regent secured Rashid Ali's resignation because of the latter's pro-Axis connections and reluctance to break relations with Italy. Taha al-Hashimi became prime minister. Axis military successes and hints of Axis aid emboldened the Golden Square, which staged a coup on April 2 that reinstated Rashid Ali in power. He immediately formed a cabinet that contained a number of individuals known to have Axis connections. The regent and Nuri fled.

Encouraged by hints of Axis aid, Rashid Ali refused to honor British demands to enforce provisions of the 1930 treaty that allowed the transportation of British troops from Basra across Iraq. The Iraqi government also positioned troops and artillery around the British bases in Iraq. Fighting broke out at the British air base at Habbaniya on May 2, when Iraqi troops opened fire. The British Air Force immediately went into action, and Britain also dispatched some 5,800 troops, including the 1,500-man Arab Legion from Transjordan under the command of Major John B. Glubb. It was soon obvious that the British would triumph over the five

poorly trained and inadequately equipped divisions of the Iraqi Army unless the Axis powers immediately dispatched assistance.

The German government now brought pressure to bear on the Vichy government of France, which then ordered French High Commissioner of the Levant General Henri Dentz to allowed the transit of Axis aid to Iraq through Syria. Axis arms and equipment then began to be transported via Aleppo to Mosul to assist Rashid Ali, albeit it in insufficient quantities to affect the outcome of the fighting. Meanwhile, British forces broke the siege at Habbaniya. The British occupied Fallujah on May 20 and surrounded Baghdad by the end of the month. Rashid Ali, some supporters, and the German and Italian ministers fled to Iran. In deference to Nuri and Regent Abdul Illah, the British did not enter Baghdad. This decision allowed the remnants of the Golden Square to attack Baghdad's Jewish community and kill some 150 Jews there.

Nuri again became prime minister, with a pro-British administration. Following its return to the British side, Iraq became an important supply center for Allied assistance to the Soviet Union until the end of the war. The government broke diplomatic relations with Vichy France on November 18, 1941, and it declared war on Germany, Italy, and Japan on January 16, 1943, the same day on which it announced its adherence to the UN Declaration.

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See also: Iran during World War II; North Africa, Role in World War II.

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Iraq War (2003–)

The Iraq War of 2003 pitted a coalition led by the United States and the United Kingdom against the government of Iraqi president Saddam Hussein and his Arab Baath

Socialist Party. Hostilities commenced with U.S.-led attacks on March 20, 2003—without the approval of the United Nations (UN)—following months of U.S. and British assertions that Hussein was harboring weapons of mass destruction (WMDs).

The war had much longer-lasting effects in the Middle East and the international community than the Persian Gulf War of 1991. Sparking a great deal of controversy, the Iraq War triggered arguments among UN member states regarding the appropriate action to take and spurred millions of people around the world to march in protest of the military action. In addition, a great deal of suspicion arose regarding the U.S.-led coalition's motives behind the war, with pundits suggesting that the coalition desired to control Iraq's great oil reserves more than to liberate a people long oppressed by Hussein.

Following the Persian Gulf War, the UN imposed sanctions on Iraq calling for Hussein to destroy the country's arsenal of WMDs. Over the next decade, however, Hussein repeatedly evaded attempts by UN weapons inspectors to ensure that the sanctions were enforced. Upon assuming the U.S. presidency in January 2001, George W. Bush and his administration immediately began calling for renewed efforts toward ridding Iraq of WMDs—an endeavor that greatly intensified after the September 11, 2001, World Trade Center and Pentagon attacks.

In Bush's 2002 State of the Union message, he castigated Iraq for continuing to "flaunt its hostility toward America and to support terror" and called the Middle Eastern nation part of "an axis of evil, arming to threaten the peace of the world." In the months that followed, he increasingly spoke of taking military action in Iraq. Bush found an ally in British prime minister Tony Blair, but pressure from citizens of both countries pushed the two leaders to take the issue before the UN Security Council in the form of UN Resolution 1441, which called for UN weapons inspectors, led by Hans Blix, to return to Iraq and issue a report on their findings.

On November 8, 2002, the 15-member Security Council unanimously passed the resolution, and weapons inspectors began work on November 27. On December 7, Iraq delivered a 12,000-page declaration of its weapons program, an insufficient accounting according to Blix, and a month later, Bush stated: "If Saddam Hussein does not fully disarm, we will lead a coalition to disarm him." Bush and Blair actively sought the support of the international community, but their announcement that they would circumvent the UN if necessary ruffled many nations' feathers, most notably drawing the ire of France, Germany, and Russia, all of which pushed for further inspections. Spain joined with the United Kingdom and the United States to propose a second UN resolution declaring Iraq to be in "material breach" of Resolution 1441. Although a small number of other nations pledged their support for military action in Iraq, only Australia committed troops to fight alongside British and U.S. forces.

Blair in particular incurred negative reaction from his country's citizens, and reports indicated he might lose his job. As a result, Blair pushed for a compromise

that would give weapons inspectors a little more time to inspect Iraq. However, with two permanent members of the Security Council—France and Germany—threatening to veto the resolution, the proposal was withdrawn. Undeterred by that set of events, as well as the Turkish government's refusal to allow coalition troops to use Turkey as a platform for a northern invasion of Iraq and increasing protestations by antiwar groups around the world, on March 17, Bush issued an ultimatum to Hussein that he leave Iraq within 48 hours or face military action. Hours before the deadline was to expire, Bush received intelligence information that Hussein and several top officials in the Iraqi government were sleeping in an underground facility in Baghdad. Bush ordered a "decapitation strike" aimed at killing Hussein, and on March 20, around 2:30 a.m. local time, three dozen Tomahawk missiles with 1,000-pound warheads were launched from warships in the Persian Gulf and Red Sea. Three hours later, they hit their targets in Baghdad and were followed immediately by 2,000-pound bunker-busters. The war had started.

Although intelligence reports suggested that Hussein was carried from the facility on a stretcher, it became clear in the coming weeks that the decapitation strike had failed and Hussein was still alive. The U.S.-led coalition troops crossed the border from Kuwait into Iraq on March 20. Armed with new technology that included stealth bombers and smart bombs—which constituted 80 percent of the coalition arsenal, as opposed to 10 percent during the Persian Gulf War—the coalition commenced its "shock and awe" campaign, designed to stun and demoralize the Iraqi Army so it would quickly surrender.

Iraqi soldiers did not surrender with the same celerity as in the Persian Gulf War, but within a matter of days, the coalition had overtaken Iraq's second-largest city of Basra, the port city of Umm Qasr, and Nasiriya. The coalition also destroyed Hussein's government buildings and palaces on the Tigris River in Baghdad, symbolizing the end of the Iraqi regime. Nearly 10,000 Iraqi troops surrendered to coalition forces during those first days. Still, the coalition troops were caught unprepared by some of the Iraqis' guerrilla tactics, including faking surrenders and ambushing troops from the rear. Throughout the fighting, news reporters and camera crews embedded in military units brought live action to television viewers worldwide.

After securing southern Iraq and its oil fields, coalition soldiers began moving toward Baghdad; they secured an airfield in western Iraq and Hussein International Airport (immediately renamed Baghdad International Airport) with little difficulty. On April 5, coalition forces entered Baghdad, and six days later, the United States declared the end of Hussein's regime. One last hurdle remained, and by April 14, coalition forces accomplished it by capturing Hussein's hometown of Tikrit. Formal military action ceased, with fewer than 200 confirmed coalition deaths.

In the weeks after the Battle of Tikrit, coalition forces began searching for WMDs, Hussein, and other top Iraqi officials. Although there was a degree of success in the latter endeavor, the troops were unable to find WMDs or Hussein (though he was

eventually captured by U.S. soldiers on December 13, 2003). Those failures drew criticism from many who already questioned the coalition presence in Iraq, as did the looting of historic treasures from Iraqi museums, which the coalition failed to protect. In addition, though many Iraqi citizens and neighboring countries were very happy to see Hussein's regime toppled, many others protested the continued

presence of coalition forces and the influence they, particularly the United States, would have in the new Iraqi government.

Bush appointed L. Paul Bremer to govern Iraq through the Coalition Provisional Authority, whose stated aim was to reconstruct Iraq as a liberal, pluralist democratic state. The occupation has been plagued by violent resistance, which has greatly hampered the economic and political reconstruction of the country, preventing international aid organizations from working in Iraq and discouraging badly needed capital investment. An interim constitution was signed in March 2004, and on June 28, 2004, sovereignty was transferred to the Iraqi people. On January 30, 2005, Iraq held its first open election in half a century, selecting a 275-member transitional National Assembly. Despite the withdrawal of several Sunni parties from the poll and threats of Election Day violence from insurgents, turnout was high. After two months of deadlock, on April 6 the new legislature elected Kurdish leader Jalal Talabani as president and Ibrahim al-Jaafari as prime minister. In April 2006, Talabani was reelected and Nouri al-Maliki was selected to succeed al-Jaafari as prime minister. The country continues to be racked by sectarian violence as the new government struggles to unite disparate parties and warring factions.

Although Bush declared major combat operations over on May 1, 2003, deadly guerrilla attacks against U.S. troops continued and increased. In addition, major violence broke out between Shiite and Sunni insurgents, causing many observers to begin calling the conflict a civil war. By late 2008, the U.S. public's support for the Iraq War had plummeted. A status of forces agreement was made by the U.S. and Iraqi governments that required U.S. combat troops to leave Iraqi urban areas by the end of June 2009 and to leave the country entirely by the end of 2011. Soon after taking office in early 2009, President Barack Obama announced that most U.S. troops would exit from Iraq by the end of August 2010, with a smaller transitional force remaining until the end of 2011. In July 2010, the United States withdrew its last combat troops, leaving some 50,000 men to serve in advisory and training capacities.

Lori Weathers

See also: Baghdad, Battle for (2003); Basra, Battle for (2003); Fallujah, Battles for (2004); Hussein, Saddam.

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Isfahan, Siege of (1722)

By 1700, the Safavids had lost much of their sway in Afghanistan, and in 1704, the Safavid shah sultan Husayn dispatched a Georgian-Iranian army, led by Georgian king Giorgi XI (Gorgin Khan) to subdue the rebellious Afghani tribes. Gorgin Khan defeated and forced them to accept the Safavid rule. However, his governorship in Afghanistan proved to be heavy handed and oppressive, prompting an Afghani revolt led by the Ghilzai tribe chief Mir Vays (Mir Ways), in the spring of 1709. The Afghans defeated the Georgian contingents and expelled the Iranians from Afghanistan. The loss of capable generals and elite troops left Iran exposed to future attacks that eventually culminated in the Afghan invasion of 1722. After the death of Mir Vays, his son Mahmud assumed the leadership of a loose coalition of Afghani tribes. In 1722, he invaded Iran and routed the Safavid army near Gulnabad on March 8, 1772.

The destruction of the Safavid army took the Ghilzai leader by surprise, and he did not immediately realize the full extent of his victory. Concerned about ambushes, he spent three days on the battlefield before cautiously advancing to Isfahan, which he could have captured had he pursued the Iranians after battle. Mahmud captured Farahabad, Sultan Husayn's favorite castle, without a fight and plundered Julfa, Isfahan's suburb that was populated by Armenian merchants. The Afghans then laid siege to the city while the Safavid leadership continued to show indecision and lack of ability. The shah retained counselors whose advice contributed to the Iranians' defeat and dismissed those who could have helped him. Iranian attempts to negotiate revealed to Afghans the full gravity of situation the Safavid ruler was facing and only encouraged their attacks. Sultan Husayn failed to evacuate the civilian population of Isfahan and instead imposed a general ban on leaving it. Most importantly, he decided to stay inside the capital instead of escaping to provinces to raise fresh troops. Georgians, who had played such a prominent role in the Safavid state and could probably have defeated the Afghans on their own, refused to come to Sultan Husayn's help in light of his earlier mistreatment.

In April, the Ghilzai captured a bridge in the Abbasabad quarter and established a bridgehead. Although the Afghans could not completely surround the city because of the size of their army, Mahmud skillfully deployed his men at crucial points, making it impossible to get in or out of it. Life inside the city quickly deteriorated as supplies ran out and desperate residents turned against each other; within weeks, cannibalism became rife. By August, hundreds of people were dying each day of starvation and disease, their corpses piling up in the city streets. After six months of siege, Sultan Husayn realized that further resistance was futile and capitulated to Mahmud on October 23. At a meeting in the castle of Farahabad, the shah announced his abdication in favor of Mahmud, presenting him with the bejeweled tuft of heron's feathers (*jiqa*), the symbol of monarchy. Two days later Mahmud entered Isfahan in triumphant procession.

The fall of Isfahan marked the twilight of the Safavid dynasty. In 1726, most Safavid princes were massacred and Shah Sultan Huseyn was executed. The Ghilzai supremacy in Iran lasted seven years, but this period was full of domestic turmoil and foreign threats. In the 1730s, Nadir Khan expelled the Afghans and briefly restored the Safavid dynasty to the throne before claiming it for himself. The city of Isfahan, once a crown jewel of Iran, suffered greatly during the siege, its infrastructure damaged or destroyed and its population decimated. The city never recovered from this destruction and was later eclipsed by Shiraz, Mashhad, and finally Tehran.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Gorgin Khan; Gulnabad, Battle of (1722); Iran, Wars of Succession in (18th Century).

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Ismail, Khedive (1830–1895)

Europeans called him "the Magnificent," though Egyptians more guardedly described their ruler as "the Builder." A controversial member of the Mehmed Ali dynasty, Ismail's qualities, or lack thereof, are debated by historians to this day. He dominated much of northeast Africa from 1863 to 1879, spent vast sums of money, initiated several wars, and had a decided impact on the history of Egypt and the Sudan.

Like his father, Ibrahim Pasha, Ismail had a keen interest in things military. He supposedly witnessed Ibrahim's 1839 victory at Nezib, and was a graduate of St. Cyr and the *Ecole Supérieur de guerre*. On becoming wali (governor) of Egypt in 1863, Ismail immediately set about expanding his armed forces. Within a decade his large army had state-of-the-art small arms and artillery, plus a significant cadre of foreign mercenaries to provide technical instruction.

He also borrowed heavily from European banking syndicates, and issued long runs of Egyptian bonds. Although Ismail's continual need for cash was not exclusively related to military spending—he constructed the Middle East's first opera house and helped complete the Suez Canal—the armed forces consumed a considerable portion of these revenues. Having expanded the army from 3,000 in 1863 to nearly 100,000 in 1875, salaries alone were considerable.

Ismail Pasha was the grandson of Mehmed Ali, the great reforming ruler of early 19th-century Egypt. Though he shared his grandfather's zeal for modernization, his ambitious attempts to hasten the development of Egypt drove his nation to bankruptcy and ultimately opened the door to foreign occupation. (Library of Congress)

Ismail used his army to crush Greek rebels on Crete (1866–1867), maintain the Hajj ports in Arabia, and grab territory in the Horn of Africa. Encouraged by mercenary hires like Samuel Baker, Charles Gordon, and Charles Stone, Ismail supported imperial expansion into Darfur, Somalia, and Ethiopia (Abyssinia). On paper, Egypt had a potent military machine, and in small campaigns against poorly organized Sudanese resistors, it was very capable. When facing more serious opposition, like in the Russo-Turkish War (1877–1878) or the Egyptian-Ethiopian War (1875–1884), Egyptian arms fared poorly.

Deposed by his nominal overlord, the Ottoman sultan, who did so with the blessing of the European powers in 1879, Ismail sailed off into a gilded exile. Unlike his father and grandfather, he was incapable of creating or leading a powerful military machine. Indeed, it could be argued that Ismail's military and financial policies sowed the seeds of the Urabi revolution that nearly overthrew the Mehmed Ali dynasty in 1882.

John P. Dunn

See also: Egypt, British Occupation of (1882); Egyptian-Ottoman Wars; Ibrahim Pasha; Mehmed Ali; Russo-Ottoman War (1877–1878).

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Ismail, Mawlay (1645/46–1727)

As sultan of Morocco during the turn of the 18th century, Mawlay Ismail consolidated his power over various desert tribes, fortified his territory's borders, and created an effective slave army. Although hostile to Christianity, Ismail allowed European merchants to trade in his kingdom, and he also established diplomatic relations with France, a country that would influence Morocco for centuries to come.

Ismail was born in 1645 or 1646. His father was the Moroccan sultan Mawlay al-Sharif. Ismail's mother was a slave woman from the western Sudan (the region of West Africa south of the Sahara Desert) who had been given to al-Sharif as a concubine. The Alawi sultans claimed descent from the Prophet Muhammad, which gave them tremendous prestige among their Muslim subjects. Ismail was the fourth ruler from that dynasty, which had originally come to power in Morocco in the 16th century.

During his career, al-Sharif faced resistance from Berber and Arab tribes, as well as the threat of Turkish forces from neighboring Algiers. Historically, the rulers of Morocco had been forced to rely on one of the many tribes within the hazily defined territory of the sultanate for military support. Because there was a great deal of conflict and enmity among those groups, the sultans were constantly confronted with revolts and rebellions from the enemies of their allies. Al-Sharif died in exile from his throne, and it was up to his son Mawlay al-Rashid to regain control for the family. When Rashid died in 1672, his half-brother Ismail succeeded him as sultan.

Unlike his predecessors, Ismail did not ally himself with any of the local tribes for support and protection. He viewed himself as the legitimate ruler of all of the tribal communities in Morocco. To avoid becoming reliant on any one group, he raised a slave army comprising captives taken from the western Sudan. That army, called the Abid al-Bukhari (abid is the Arabic word for slave), freed him from dependence on the Berbers and Arabs. Ismail provided wives for the slave soldiers and instructed them in military drill as well as more practical occupations like carpentry and construction. The children of the Abid were drafted into military service as well, and it is estimated that at the time of his death, Ismail commanded an army of more than 150,000.

During the first 10 years of his reign, Ismail undertook an aggressive campaign of fort and garrison construction. He posted many of his soldiers on his eastern border, where he feared the encroachment of Ottoman troops stationed at Algiers. He also kept troops in the desert to the south to control the nomadic Berbers.

The Turks at Algiers wanted to destabilize the Alawites, and during the reign of Ismail they supported rebellions among the Moroccan tribes. Shortly after Ismail acceded to the throne, his nephew Ahmad rebelled against him with the support of the Turks. However, in September 1673, Ismail defeated the rebels and captured

the city of Fez, an important center of opposition. With Ismail's victory, the Turks turned to the Berber chiefs in the Middle Atlas region, who had been subdued by Ismail's predecessor Rashid. Ismail won a hard-fought campaign against the Berbers and their Turkish allies, and he thereafter was strong enough to mount a series of punitive expeditions to Algiers. By 1686, the Turkish threat to Morocco had subsided, and Ismail had established his authority throughout the kingdom.

Ismail's military conquests allowed him to assert Moroccan influence to the south. His armies took possession of lucrative salt mines in the Sahara and revived contacts with the trading cities to the south of the desert. By 1727, Abid troops were in the Senegal River region, and Ismail's rule extended into present-day Mauritania.

Ismail also had to contend with the influence of Europeans along the northern coast of his territory. When he came to power, both England and Spain occupied forts on the Atlantic coast. As a ruler who claimed his legitimacy through his descent from the Prophet Muhammad, Ismail resented the influence of Christians in the region. His armies were able to expel the English in 1684 and several Spanish garrisons by 1691. However, despite conducting a siege of the city for 20 years, he was ultimately unable to dislodge the Spanish from their enclave at Ceuta. Ismail also supported the activities of the Corsairs, pirate ships that raided Christian merchants in the Mediterranean. At one point he was believed to have been the owner of half of the Corsairs that operated from his ports, and he split the profits with the captains of the other ships.

Though he remained hostile to Christianity, Ismail was willing to work with European powers when necessary. In an effort to dislodge the Spanish, Ismail sent an emissary to the court of the French king Louis XIV in 1682. Ismail hoped that the French would join him in an alliance against the Spanish. He also wanted to negotiate the exchange of Christian hostages being held in Morocco for Muslim galley slaves held by the French Navy. Because such an exchange would have been disastrous for the French Navy, Louis rejected Ismail's proposal. Thereafter, relations between the states deteriorated until diplomatic relations were finally severed in 1718. Despite Ismail's contempt for Christian states and their merchants, he recognized that his treasury needed the revenue that commerce with Europeans provided. Therefore, he permitted Christian traders to settle in his kingdom, though he levied heavy taxes upon them and carefully controlled their activities. When he died in 1727, Ismail was reputed to have left 500 sons, each of whom could claim an equal right to succeed their father. His death sparked a civil war among the claimants to the throne that lasted for 30 years, until the victory of Ismail's son Abdallah.

James Burns

See also: Abid al-Bukhari; Al-Mansur, Ahmad ibn Muhammad.

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Ismail, Shah (Safavid) (1487–1524)

Religious leader and military ruler who founded the Safavid Empire in Iran. He consolidated a Persian empire for the first time in more than 800 years and effected the historic conversion of the country to Twelver Shiism, a minority Islamic sect.

Ismail was born on July 17, 1487, into a family centered in Ardabil, Azerbaijan, that had long been connected to the political and religious leadership of the Turkoman tribes of the region. An ancestor, Sheikh Safi al-Din, was the spiritual leader of a local Sufi order (the Safaviyeh tariqah) that later aligned itself with Shiism. The disciples of this religious order became known as Safavids. The family, in addition to inheriting the leadership of the Safavid movement, also claimed to be related to the line of imams. Imams were the early spiritual leaders of Islam who in Shiite tradition possessed a right to secular rulership through direct descent from Ali, the son-in-law and cousin of the prophet Muhammad. So Ismail's claim to legitimacy was founded on the notion of a hereditary divine right.

Both Ismail's grandfather, Sheikh Junaid, and father, Sheikh Haidar, died in battle. Their legacy was the fusion of Safavid religious zeal with the warrior traditions of ghazi, or combat in the name of the faith, among the tribespeople who supported the Savafids—called Qizilbash (red heads) for their distinctive red turbans. Ismail would eventually ride into battle at their head, but Ismail was only an infant when his father died, and he spent much of his childhood hiding in exile, awaiting his moment.

In 1499, when he was 12, Ismail came forward as the nominal leader of a reinvigorated Safavid movement. His Qizilbash army overcame the massed forces of the dominant Ak Koyunlu (White Sheep) Turkomans at Sharur in 1501. After the Battle of Tabriz, the Safavids took possession of Tabriz, the traditional Turkoman capital. In the seven years that followed, further military success to the south and west enlarged the boundaries of Ismail's growing empire to include most of the area of modern western Iran, eastern Turkey, and much of Iraq. In the process, Ismail's government began to integrate ethnic Turkish and Persian leaders into the imperial administration.

Although he took the title of shah (emperor), to his followers Ismail seemed semidivine: a holy child-emperor who literally represented the return of the prophesied hidden 12th imam to establish a Shiite kingdom on earth. As Safavid forces

spread across the country, they imposed Shiism as the official religion, actively suppressed the institutions of the Sunni majority, and coerced conversions on pain of death. Ismail recruited Arab Shia ulama (religious scholars) to administer the new state religion and funded the creation of new Sufi shrines.

The general triumph of Ismail and the Safavid-Qizilbash coalition represented the juncture of many different social developments of the time. Ismail was an avatar of the perpetual aspiration for religious renewal, but the ground for his holy war against Sunni enemies was prepared by other contexts. The weakening of regional powers in the late 15th century by the rise of the Ottomans and the Uzbeks created the political opportunity, and efforts by the Ottoman Empire and the Ak Koyunlu state to introduce tax reform in the midst of economic decline fomented a backlash against Sunni legalism.

As it grew into a regional military power, the new Safavid Empire encountered hostility from ever-larger opponents. To the east, Ismail expanded Safavid control to the Oxus River by campaigning against Sunni Uzbek tribes. In a decisive battle near the city of Marv (in what is now Uzbekistan), the Safavids ambushed and defeated a larger army in 1510. Ismail reputedly had the skull of the enemy leader, Muhammad Shaybani, refashioned as an ornamented drinking cup; he then sent the cup to another rival, the Ottoman sultan.

To the west, the powerful Ottoman Empire became antagonized by support for the Safavids among its own population in eastern Turkey and Ismail's imposition of Shiism on recalcitrant Sunni subjects. Official persecution of religious minorities on both sides and an exchange of intemperate diplomatic messages prepared the way for war. At one point, Ismail responded to a bellicose message from Sultan Selim I by sending the sultan's secretary a box of opium. It was a pointed sign of disrespect for the sultan, who the gift insinuated was addled by drug use.

In 1514, an Ottoman army equipped with muskets and artillery invaded Safavid territory under the command of the sultan. Ismail's troops, outnumbered and without guns, were defeated at Chaldiran after a bitter struggle. Yet while the city of Tabriz fell to the Ottomans, a mutiny in the Ottoman ranks forced the sultan's withdrawal. In 1517, Safavid forces rebounded by extending their conquests in the northwest over Sunni tribes in modern Georgia. An unsteady recognition of a balance of power between Ottomans and Safavids followed despite border clashes and intermittent warfare during the next hundred years. Ismail died on May 23, 1524, at the age of 36. The Safavid dynasty would rule for two more centuries and establish the basis for the modern nation-state of Iran.

Brad Brown

See also: Abbas the Great; Chaldiran, Battle of (1514); Ottoman-Safavid Wars; Selim I; Tahmasp I.

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Ismailis

An important Shiite Muslim community that has subdivided into a number of major branches and minor groups in the course of a complex history dating back to the middle of the eighth century. Today, the Ismailis number several millions, belong to a variety of ethnic groups, and are scattered as religious minorities in many countries of Asia, the Middle East, Africa, Europe, and North America.

The Ismailis have recognized a line of imams or spiritual leaders in the progeny of Ismail, son of Imam Jafar al-Sadiq (d. 765), a direct descendant of Ali, the Prophet Muhammad's cousin, son-in-law, and the first Shiite imam; hence their designation as Ismaili. By the 870s, the Ismailis had organized a revolutionary movement against the established Sunni-Abbasid order, aiming to install the Ismaili imam to a new Shiite caliphate ruling over the entire Muslim community. The religio-political message of the movement, known as the *da'wa* or mission, was disseminated by a network of *da'i*s or missionaries in many regions, from North Africa to Central Asia and the Indian subcontinent.

The early success of the Ismaili movement culminated in the foundation of the Fatimid caliphate in North Africa in 909. The Ismaili imam now ruled as Fatimid caliph over an important state that soon evolved into a major empire stretching from North Africa to Egypt, Palestine, and Syria. The Fatimid period (909–1171) represented the golden age of Ismailism, when Ismaili thought and literature attained their summit and Ismailis made important contributions to Islamic civilization, especially after the seat of the Fatimid caliphate was transferred to Cairo, itself founded by the Fatimids in 969. The early Ismailis elaborated an esoteric system of religious thought and distinctive institutions of learning.

The early Ismailis split into two rival communities in 899, when a dissident faction (the Qarmatian) refused to recognize continuity in the Ismaili imamate, awaiting the return of their seventh imam, Muhammad ibn Ismail ibn al-Sadiq, as the Mahdi (messiah) and restorer of true Islam. The loyal Fatimid Ismailis, those who recognized the Fatimid caliphs as their imams, experienced a major schism in 1094 revolving around a succession dispute. As a result, the Ismaili community was permanently subdivided into the rival Mustalian and Nizari factions, named after two sons of the Fatimid caliph-imam al-Mustansir (1036–1094) who had both claimed their father's heritage. Al-Mustali (1094–1101) and the later Fatimid caliphs were recognized as imams by the (Mustalian) Ismailis of Egypt, Yemen, and western India. On the other hand, the (Nizari) Ismailis of Iran, Syria, Central Asia,

and parts of India, upheld the rights of Nizar (d. 1095), the original heir-designate of al-Mustansir, and his progeny to the Ismaili imamate.

The Mustalian Ismailis split into a number of major and minor groupings. From the time of the demise of the Fatimid dynasty in 1171, the Mustalian Ismailis were represented solely by the Tayyibi branch, which found its stronghold in Yemen. The Tayyibi Ismailis, whose imams have remained concealed since the 1130s, have been led by *da'i*s with absolute authority. By the end of the 16th century, the Tayyibis split into Daudi and Sulaymani factions. By that time, the Tayyibis of South Asia, known as Bohras and belonging mainly to the Daudi branch, outnumbered their Sulaymani coreligionists in Yemen. The Daudi and Sulaymani Tayyibis have followed different lines of *da'i*s. Both communities have remained rather traditional in their outlook.

The Nizari Ismailis acquired political prominence under the initial leadership of Hasan Sabbah (d. 1124), who founded the Nizari state of Iran with a subsidiary in Syria. The Nizari state, centered at the fortress of Alamut, was made up of a network of mountain strongholds and towns in several regions in the midst of the Saljuk empire. The Saljuk Turks launched numerous unsuccessful military campaigns against the Nizari strongholds of Iran, but the Nizaris also failed to uproot the Saljuks. Hasan and his seven successors at Alamut ruled, as *da'i*s and then after 1164 as Nizari imams, until their state was eventually destroyed by the Mongols in 1256. The Nizaris of Syria, who had numerous military and diplomatic encounters with the Crusaders, were made famous in medieval Europe as the Assassins, the followers of a mysterious "Old Man of the Mountain."

The Nizari Ismailis survived the Mongol debacle in the 13th century. Many of the Iranian Nizaris, who had escaped from the Mongol massacres, adopted Sufi and other external guises to protect themselves against further persecution. By the middle of the 15th century, the Nizari imams emerged in central Iran and initiated a revival in the missionary and literary activities of their community. They were particularly successful in Central Asia and South Asia where large numbers of Hindus were converted and became known locally as Khojas. In the 1840s, the Nizari imam of the time, who had received the honorary title of aga khan (lord and master) from the Iranian monarch, emigrated to India, thereby initiating the modern period in the history of the community. Under the leadership of their last two imams, Sultan Muhammad Shah, Aga Khan III (1885–1957), and Prince Karim, Aga Khan IV, who in 1957 succeeded his grandfather, the Nizari Ismailis have entered the modern age as a progressive community with high standards of education and gender equality. The Nizari Khojas, together with the Tayyibi Bohras, were also among the earliest Asian communities to have settled in East Africa. Since the 1970s, however, most East African Ismailis have immigrated to the West because of the anti-Asian politics of certain African governments.

Farhad Daftary

See also: Assassins; Fatimids; Qarmations; Saljuks.

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Ismet Inonu (1884–1973)

Turkish general and statesman. Born in Izmir, Ismet Pasha was the son of Haci Reshid Bey, a member of the Ottoman bureaucracy. He graduated from the Military School in 1903 and became an artillery officer. He then graduated from the War Academy in 1906. After serving in various posts in the Ottoman military he joined the Nationalist Forces in Ankara in 1920 during the Greco-Turkish War of 1919–1922. Ismet was appointed commander-general of the Western Front Command of the Ankara government in August 1921 after he distinguished himself as a military commander when he checked Greek forces in two battles in January and March 1921 around the small town of Inonu near Eskisehir in Central Anatolia. His name was so much associated with these two battles that he adopted Inonu as his surname in 1934. Ismet Pasha represented the Ankara government at the Mudanya Armistice in October 1922. Then he became the chief negotiator for the Ankara government in Lausanne, Switzerland, in November 1922 to July 1923 for a final Turkish settlement.

After the peace, Ismet Pasha became one of the most prominent figures in the civilian politics of modern Turkey. He served as prime minister in 1923–1937 and became the second president of the Turkish Republic in 1938 after Mustafa Kemal Atatürk died in November of the same year. Ismet Inonu's presidency lasted until 1950 when Celal Bayar (1883–1986) replaced him. Ismet Inonu's political career was far from over, and he was elected as prime minister again in 1961 after the military coup of 1960 and remained in his seat until 1965. Ismet Inonu was one of the most prominent military and civilian figures in early republican history and labeled aptly as the "Second Man" by many after Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founder of the modern Turkish republic.

Bestami S. Bilgiç

See also: Greco-Turkish War (1919–1922); Inonu, Battles of (1921); Kemal Atatürk, Mustafa; Lausanne, Treaty of (1923); World War I.

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Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty (1979)

Landmark peace accord signed between Egypt and the State of Israel on March 26, 1979, in Washington, D.C. The Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty was the culmination of an ongoing peace process between the Israelis and Egyptians that dated to November 1977. It was also the result of the Camp David Accords, signed by Egyptian president Anwar Sadat and Israeli prime minister Menachem Begin on September 17, 1978.

The peace treaty stipulated that the two nations would officially recognize the sovereignty of the other and end the state of war that had existed between them since 1948. It also stipulated that Israel would withdraw from the Sinai Peninsula. Finally, it guaranteed Israel the right of passage through the Suez Canal and recognized that the Straits of Tiran and the Gulf of Aqaba were international waterways subject to international law and maritime guidelines. The Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty was the first such treaty between an Arab state and Israel.

The Camp David Accords of 1978 had emerged from 13 days of intensive negotiations at the U.S. presidential retreat at Camp David. President Jimmy Carter mediated the talks between Sadat and Begin, but it was President Sadat's unprecedented move in November 1977 that had made the historic Israeli-Egyptian peace process possible. On November 19, 1977, Sadat became the first Arab leader in history to visit Israel in an official capacity. He went at the invitation of Prime Minister Begin and addressed the Knesset (Israeli parliament). Sadat's speech offered conciliatory words and a genuine desire to end the conflict between Israel and Egypt, and he laid out specific steps that might be taken to broker an enduring peace. Specifically, he called for the implementation of United Nations (UN) Resolutions 242 and 338, which among other things called for the withdrawal of Israeli forces from land captured in the 1967 Six-Day War. Sadat's visit stunned many Israelis and much of the world.

Most Arab nations, however, were outraged that Sadat would choose to negotiate with the Israelis. Not only did this go against the prevailing Arab philosophy that viewed Israel as a threat and a tool of Western hegemony, but it also meant that Sadat was essentially recognizing the legitimacy of the State of Israel, something no Arab state had been willing to do. Equally troubling to Arab states was that this peace overture was coming from Egypt, at the time the most powerful Arab state in the region and the birthplace of modern Arab nationalism under Gamal Abdel Nasser.

When the Camp David Accords were signed, there was no clear consensus or binding agreement that a formal, comprehensive peace treaty would be signed. Indeed, between September 1978 and March 1979, both parties to the accords had considerable hesitations about signing a formal treaty. Sadat had come under intense pressure from other Arab leaders not to sign a peace agreement. He also encountered resistance within his own country. For his part, Begin was under enormous pressure not to allow the issue of Palestinian independence to enter into any

formal discussions or accords with the Egyptians. Indeed, Begin's refusal to do so nearly torpedoed the peace settlement.

Although Sadat lost the support of most Arab leaders (and Egypt was expelled from the Arab League after the treaty was signed), his government did gain the support of the United States, both diplomatically and economically. In fact, the United States gave Egypt and Israel subsidies worth billion of dollars as a result of the rapprochement. These subsidies continue to the present day. From the Israeli perspective, the peace treaty was a coup because Egypt had now been separated from its Arab neighbors. Yet from a geopolitical perspective, the Israeli-Egyptian peace process led to the breakdown of the united Arab front against Israel, creating a power vacuum of sorts once Egypt fell out of that orbit. This allowed nations such as Iran and Iraq to fill the gap, with disastrous consequences. Only months after the Israel-Egypt Peace Treaty was signed the Iraq-Iran War (1980–1988) broke out, which demonstrated Iraqi president Saddam Hussein's ambitions to become the undisputed Arab leader of the Middle East.

On the other hand, the Camp David process and the resultant peace treaty demonstrated that fruitful negotiations between Arabs and Israelis are indeed possible. Furthermore, it showed that progress toward peace can come only with meaningful dialogue, mutual cooperation, and strong leadership. Nevertheless, it would take another 15 years for a second Arab-Israeli peace treaty to come about, this time between the Jordanians and Israelis. Currently, only Egypt and Jordan have concluded such agreements.

Paul G. Pierpaoli Jr.

See also: Camp David Accords (1978); Hussein, Saddam; Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988); Nasser, Gamal Abdel; Sadat, Anwar.

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Israel-Lebanon Conflict (2006)

A brief war between Israel and the Hezbollah movement based in Lebanon. The conflict began on July 12, 2006, when Hezbollah militants fired rockets at Israeli border

towns as a diversion for an attack on Israeli patrols that claimed lives of several Israeli soldiers and resulted in the couple of a few more. Israel responded with massive air strikes and artillery fire on targets throughout Lebanon that damaged Lebanese civilian infrastructure. The air war was soon followed by a naval blockade and a ground invasion of southern Lebanon, which Hezbollah staunchly resisted. Although Israel declared that the war aimed to release the captured Israeli soldiers, the objectives of the operation went far beyond that stated goal. The war lasted for more than a month and led to massive destruction of Lebanese infrastructure. About 1,200 Lebanese civilians lost their lives and 4,400 were wounded; on the opposite side, 44 Israelis were killed and about 1,500 were wounded. Military losses of Hezbollah remain unclear, whereas Israel officially confirmed 121 killed and 628 wounded. About 750,000 Lebanese were displaced during the war. Failing to achieve its objective, Israel accepted international efforts to end the war. On August 11, 2006, the United Nations Security Council unanimously approved UN Resolution 1701, which called for disarmament of Hezbollah, Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon, and the deployment of the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) force in southern Lebanon. UNIFIL was given an expanded mandate, including the right to use force to prevent resumption of hostilities. The Israeli forces left Lebanon by October 1 and were replaced by Lebanese and UNIFIL troops. The remains of the captured Israeli soldiers were returned to Israel on July 16, 2008 as part of a prisoner exchange.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Hezbollah; Lebanon, Israeli Operations against (2006).

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Italo-Ottoman War (1911–1912)

War between Italy and the Ottoman Empire preceding World War I. On September 29, 1911, Italy launched a war against the Ottoman Empire in the hopes of acquiring the two provinces that constitute present-day Libya in North Africa. Since the 1880s south Italian politicians had pressed the Italian government to acquire a "fourth shore" that might attract the Italian poor. In its quest for new territory, Italy acted with the full support of France, which had received the support of Italy in its acquisition of Morocco. Europeans knew the two provinces as Tripolitania in the west, with the capital of Tripoli, and Cyrenaica to the east. To the Turks, Tripolitania was the province of Tarabulus al-Gharb (Tripoli of the West, to differentiate it

Smoke rises from an Israeli air raid that targeted a bridge, in the Zahrani region, on the Mediterranean coast, southern Lebanon, July 12, 2006. Hezbollah fighters launched a raid into Israel and captured two Israeli soldiers, triggering an Israeli assault with warplanes, gunboats, and ground troops in southern Lebanon to hunt for the captives. (AP/Wide World Photos)

from the Lebanese town of Tripoli), and the eastern province was known as Barqa. To the south of these provinces lay the vast Sahara desert. Estimated population totals for Libya varied from 750,000 to 1.1 million people. Tripoli, the largest city, had a population of 29,000.

The population included almost 200,000 nomads known as Bedouins. A number of other Libyans were seminomadic. Many of the nomads had long-standing tribal relationships that cut across political boundaries. Those in Cyrenaica had close ties to tribes in Egypt, those in Tripolitania to Tunisia, and others in the deep desert were closely related to tribes in Chad. Cyrenaica's tribes were unified under Senussi leadership, and in the other regions the Bedouin tribes had mixed loyalties.

In the war Italy enjoyed a clear advantage at sea. The Italian navy had seven times the tonnage of the Ottoman navy and was better trained. When the war began, the Ottoman navy's battle squadron steamed from Beirut, Lebanon, for the Dardanelles, where it remained throughout the war. Its strong navy enabled Italy to secure its lines of communication to North Africa. Austria-Hungary discouraged naval operations in the Adriatic, but naval operations occurred in the Red Sea, where Italian warships captured or sank more than a half dozen gunboats and other craft deployed by the Turks to suppress piracy and smuggling and to protect hajj pilgrims.

The Italians did not enjoy a similar advantage on land, although they soon captured and occupied the Libyan coastal towns. The Ottoman Empire did all it could to reinforce its garrisons in North Africa, where only one understrength Turkish division was stationed. Local Arabs and Berbers also joined the fight. The Young Turk government sent out two top leaders—Enver Bey and Mustafa Kemal—who traveled to the interior to lead the Bedouins in guerrilla war against the Italians. Volunteers from other Muslim lands also joined the struggle against what was viewed as the "Italian crusade." Although elements of the local population collaborated with the Italians, Turkish and Arab-Berber counterattacks confined the Italians to the coastal region. Resistance by local elements against Italian rule would not end until 1932.

During this conflict, Italy was the first nation to use airplanes to drop bombs (four 5-pound grenades) and propaganda leaflets, conduct a night air attack, and transport military equipment during wartime. Such activities also brought the first diplomatic protests against aerial bombing.

Although the Italians had more than 80,000 troops in Libya by the end of 1911, the conflict was far from resolved. Italy thus sought to widen the war to press the Ottoman leaders to conclude peace. This took the form of a bombardment of Beirut, Lebanon, on February 24, 1912. The Turks rather ineffectively retaliated by expelling all Italians from the Ottoman Empire, an exodus that numbered in the tens of thousands of people. On April 18, 1912, Italian naval units bombarded the Turkish forts at the mouth of the Dardanelles. Although this inflicted some damage ashore, the Italian ships were ultimately forced to withdraw, a move seen by many as an Italian defeat. Turkey retaliated by closing the straits to all commercial traffic, an act that was illegal by international treaty. Within a month Russian pressure led the Turks to rescind their decision.

Italy then took the Dodecanese islands. Operations there began in April. Italy pledged to return the 12 seized islands, including Rodos (Rhodes), at such time as the Ottoman Empire fulfilled all its treaty obligations. Extensive negotiations then followed, leading to the Treaty of Lausanne, signed on October 18, 1912. By its terms Italy gained Libya. Italy continued to occupy the Dodecanese Islands until 1943. During the war Italy suffered 3,431 dead and 4,220 wounded. Turkish and Libyan losses were about 10,000 in combat and another 10,000 dead from reprisals and executions.

The war was the first of three disasters for the Ottoman Empire. The Turks had hurriedly concluded peace as fighting in the Balkans was about to begin, and then in 1914 World War I began. The Italo-Turkish War demonstrated Turkish military weakness, at least in the naval sphere, and revealed the dangers of trying to maintain an ethnically diverse empire.

Jack Greene

See also: Balkan Wars (1912–1913); Kemal Atatürk, Mustafa; Lausanne, Treaty of (1912); World War I; Young Turks.

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Jalal al-Din (?–1231)

Last ruler of the Khwarezmid Empire and a talented military commander who spent years fighting against the Mongols. He was the son of Shah Ala ad-Din Muhammad II, who had the misfortune of provoking Chinggis (Genghis) Khan's invasion. On the eve of the invasion, Shah Muhammad held several councils of war, in which Jalal al-Din suggested advancing with united forces to meet the enemy at the frontier, but his advice was ignored. In 1219–1220, the Mongols invaded Khwarezm and stormed its major cities of Bukhara, Samarkand, and Urgench, leaving behind them a trail of death and devastation. Shah Muhammad II fled and died on an island in the Caspian Sea in December 1220 (or January 1221). Jalal al-Din, who had accompanied his father in his flight and had been present at his deathbed, emerged as a leader of the Khwarezmean resistance but struggled to rally his forces against the Mongols, who closely pursued him. After barely escaping from Iran, he reached Afghanistan, where he was supported by local tribespeople. At the head of about 60,000 men, the sultan spent the winter at Ghazna before engaging and defeating a Mongol army at Parvan. Upon hearing the news, Chinggis Khan dispatched one of his most capable commanders, Shigi-Qutuqu, to subdue Jalal al-Din, who nevertheless scored another decisive victory over the Mongols at Parvan. After a quarrel over the booty captured in this battle, however, Jalal al-Din lost much of his army, just at a time when Chinggis Khan personally advanced against him at the head of his army. Chinggis Khan caught up with the sultan on the banks of the Indus River (fall of 1221), where, despite his desperate position, Jalal al-Din drew up his forces for battle. The Mongols turned both of his flanks, but the center, under the sultan's personal command, stood firm and repelled repeated Mongol charges. Finally, as the Mongols tried to surround and capture him, Jalal al-Din drove his horse over the bank into the turbulent river, a few dozen feet below. As the sultan climbed ashore safe and sound, Chinggis Khan, who watched the sultan's combat attentively, pointed him out to his sons with expressions of amazement and admiration.

Over the next three years, Jalal al-Din stayed in India and Iran, evading Mongol pursuit and trying to rally a new army. He conducted numerous campaigns against local rulers and the Abbasid caliph throughout Afghanistan and Iran, and his successes gradually increased his forces to 50,000–70,000 troops. After capturing Tabriz, he led his army to Georgia, which had been engaged in a long

conflict with the Muslim states in southern Caucasia. He inflicted a crushing defeat on the Georgians at Garhni (Garnisi) in August to September 1225 and captured the old Armenian capital of Dvin. By December, he resumed his campaign against the Georgians and captured the Georgian capital of Tbilisi in early March 1226. The Christian population of the city, except those who saved their lives by apostasy, were subjected to a general massacre that claimed tens of thousands of lives. The defeat of Georgia brought Jalal al-Din's prestige to its zenith. His authority, although tenuous at times, stretched from Tiflis to Isfahan. He remained in Georgia and Armenia for the next five years, investing fortresses and dealing with advancing Mongols and resurgent Georgians. He engaged the former in northern Iran and Iraq in 1227–1228, but most battles went against him, particularly the battle at Isfahan (August 1228), where he barely escaped alive. Returning to Azerbaijan, he rallied his forces just in time to face the revived Georgian army, which he decisively defeated near Bolnisi (Spring 1229). Jalal al-Din then invested and captured a strategic fortress of Akhlat, which alarmed Kai-Qubad, the Saljuk sultan of Rum, who allied with the Ayyubids of Egypt against the Khwarezmean. Jalal al-Din launched a campaign against Rum but was decisively defeated near Arzinjan. By now, he received the news of major Mongol forces advancing from Iran in search of him. Unable to assemble a large army to face them, he escaped into the mountains of Kapan, where, defeated and abandoned, he was murdered (either for his clothes or out of revenge) in a remote Kurdish village in 1231.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Mongols; Rum, Sultanate of; Saljuks.

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Jam, Battle of (1528)

Major victory of Safavid shah Tahmasp of Iran over the Uzbeks. After the death of Shah Ismail in 1524, Iran went through a civil war that critically weakened the state. Such political strife was exploited by the Ottomans in the west and the Uzbeks in the east as an opportunity to attack the Safavid territory. The new Safavid shah

Tahmasp struggled to contain Ottoman expansion but was more successful against the Uzbeks, who, under the leadership of Ubayd Allah Khan, launched several invasions of Khurasan. They raided Herat in 1524 and Mashhad in 1526, returning again to Herat in 1528.

Rushing to relieve the siege of Heart, Tahmasp intercepted the Uzbeks on September 24,1528, at Jam, where he scored a decisive victory. The battle is notable for the Safavid use of new tactics, which they adopted from their neighbors. Like the Ottomans at Chaldiran in 1514 and the Mughals at Panipat in 1526, Tahmasp's men used firearms and artillery (small culverins and swivel guns on wagons) to deadly results. The shah deployed artillery in the center protected with wagons and seasoned troops under his personal command; the *Baburnama*, the famous autobiography of the Mughal emperor Babur, succinctly states that this battle formation was "in the Anatolian fashion." Although the Uzbeks managed to turn the enemy flanks and plunder the Iranian camp, Tahmasp's center stood firm, and the artillery inflicted heavy losses on the Uzbek cavalry. Tahmasp then ordered his men to cease fire, rallied them around his royal standard, and launched a decisive counterattack that shattered the Uzbek cavalry.

The battle of Jam helped Tahmasp to consolidate his authority in northeastern Iran, but he was unable to fully exploit its consequences because the Ottomans threatened his domain from the west. The Uzbeks, despite suffering a heavy defeat at Jam, were not destroyed, quickly regrouped, and continued to invade Iran until the death of Ubayd Allah Khan in 1540.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Chaldiran, Battle of (1514); Ismail, Shah; Panipat, Battles of (1399, 1526, 1556, 1761); Tahmasp I.

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Janissaries

Turkish for "new soldier" (yenicari), members of the infantry units that formed the Ottoman sultan's household troops and bodyguards. Traditional accounts credit Orhan I (1324–1360) as the founder of the Janissary corps. Modern historians

attribute its creation to Orhan's son, Murad I (1360–1389) around 1365. The Janissaries became the first Ottoman standing army and the first standing army in Europe since the Roman Empire. The Jannissaries replaced the forces, comprising mostly tribal warriors (ghazis) whose loyalty and morale were sometimes suspect.

The first Janissaries were prisoners of war and slaves. After the 1380s, their ranks were filled under the devshirme system. The recruits were mostly Christian boys, preferably 14 to 18 years old; however, boys ranging from 8 to 20 years old could be taken. Initially, the recruiters favored Greeks and Albanians, but, as the Ottoman Empire expanded into southeastern Europe and north, the devshirme came to include Albanians, Bulgarians, Georgians, Armenians, Croats, Bosnians, and Serbs and later Romanians, Poles, Ukrainians, and southern Russians.

During the reign of Sultan Murad III (1546–1595), the Janissaries began enrolling outside the devshirme system. In 1683, Sultan Mehmed IV (1648–1687) abolished the devshirme as increasing of numbers Muslim Turkish families had enrolled their sons into the force. After this point, volunteers for the Janissary corps were mostly of Muslim origin.

Janissaries trained under strict discipline in monastic-like conditions in cadet schools, where they were expected to remain celibate and single until after they retired. The young recruits were also expected to convert to Islam. Unlike other Muslims, they could not have beards, only a moustache. Janissaries also learned to follow the beliefs of the dervish saint Hajji Bektash Wali, disciples of whom had blessed the first troops.

TABLE 1 Increase in the Size of the Janissary Corps

Year	Number of Janissaries
1389	~2,000
1514	10,156
1567–1568	12,798
1609	37,627
1661	54,222
1665	49,556
1670	49,868
1680	54,222

Source: Gábor Ágoston, "The Ottoman Warfare in Europe, 1453–1812," in *European Warfare, 1453–1815*, ed. Jeremy Black (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999), 135.

For all practical purposes, Janissaries belonged to the sultan, carrying the title "door slave," indicating their collective bond with the sultan. Janissaries were taught to consider the corps as their home and family and the sultan, their father. They lived in their own barracks and served as police and firefighters during peacetime. They could not participate in any outside economic activity or trade. Only those who proved strong enough earned the rank of true Janissary at the age of 24 or 25. The corps inherited the property of dead Janissaries, amassing wealth like some religious orders and foundations.

In return for their loyalty and their fervor in war, Janissaries gained special privileges and benefits. They received a quarterly cash salary during peacetime and wartime, a significant difference from the contemporary practice of paying troops only during wartime. They also received booty during war and enjoyed a high standard of living and a respected social status.

The Janissaries had a full complement of support units. There were units to prepare the roads the Janissaries would travel over, set up the tents, and bake bread. The Janissaries had a quartermaster corps that carried and distributed weapons and ammunition and its own internal medical auxiliaries, Muslim and Jewish surgeons who traveled with the corps during campaigns and had organized methods to move

Mounted Janissaries of the Ottoman Turkish army, from an early 18th-century manuscript. The Janissaries were an elite military guard of the Ottoman Empire, initially composed of war prisoners and Christian soldiers. (The Art Archive/Topkapi Museum Istanbul/Dagli Orti)

the wounded and the sick to mobile hospitals behind the lines. They were also good combat engineers, as demonstrated during the Siege of Vienna in 1529.

During the early centuries, in peacetime the Janissaries carried clubs or cutlasses unless they served as border troops. On campaign, they were expert archers and used axes and sabers for close-in fighting. In the 1440s, they began adopting firearms and, by the early 16th century, were equipped with muskets. Janissaries also made extensive use of early grenades and hand cannon and, after the late 1600s, used the pistol. The Janissaries fought in every major campaign of the Ottoman Empire, including the 1453 capture of Constantinople, the defeat of the Egyptian Mamluks, and the wars against Hungary and Austria. The sultan himself always led Janissary troops into battle.

Over time, the Janissaries became aware of their military prowess and importance. In 1449, they revolted for the first time, demanding and receiving higher wages. After 1451, every new sultan paid each Janissary an accession reward and raised his pay rank. In 1566, Selim II (1566–1574) gave Janissaries permission to marry. In 1618, the teenage Osman II became sultan, determined to curb their excesses. In 1622, hearing rumors that he was preparing to move against them, the Janissaries revolted, took the sultan captive, imprisoned him, and murdered him shortly thereafter.

Like the Praetorian Guard of the Roman Empire, the Janissaries were becoming a law unto themselves and a serious threat to the empire's stability. Yet, over the 1600s and into the 1700s, they became increasingly ineffective militarily at a time that the military strength of European armies was growing. The results were seen in lost wars with Austria and Russia with commensurate losses in Ottoman territory after 1683.

By the mid-18th century, many Janissaries had taken up trades and crafts outside of their military service, gained the right to marry and enroll their children in the corps, and lived away from the barracks. Many had become landholders, administrators, and scholars, and retired or discharged Janissaries received pensions. This evolution away from their original military vocation was the essence of the system's demise.

In 1807, when Selim II tried to modernize the army along Western European lines, the Janissaries revolted again and deposed him in favor of Mustafa IV. Mustafa had Selim III killed, and a second rebellion deposed Mustafa and made Mahmud II sultan in 1808. Mahmud II had the captured Mustafa executed and eventually came to a compromise with the Janissaries. Ever mindful of the Janissary threat, the sultan spent the next years discreetly securing his position.

The Janissaries' abuse of power, military ineffectiveness, and resistance to reform, as well as the cost of salaries to men, many of whom were not actually serving soldiers, became increasingly intolerable. In 1826, Mahmud II informed them

that he was forming a new army, organized and trained along modern European lines. The Janissaries mutinied and advanced on the sultan's palace. In the ensuing fight, artillery fire set their barracks on fire, killing 4,000 Janissaries. The sultan had the survivors exiled or executed and confiscated their possessions. This event is now called the "Auspicious Incident." The last of the janissaries were executed in Thessalonica.

The impressive war record of the Janissaries had made them into a subject of interest and study by foreigners in their own time. Although the concept of the modern army incorporated and surpassed most of the distinctions of the Janissary, their image has remained as one of the symbols of the Ottomans in Western minds.

Robert B. Kane

See also: Auspicious Incident (1826); Black Guard (Morocco); Devshirme System; Ghazi; Ghulams; Ikhwan; Kapikulu Corps; Mahmud II; Vienna, Siege of (1529); Vienna, Siege of (1683).

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Jassy, Treaty of (1792)

Peace treaty concluded between Russia and the Ottoman Empire on January 9, 1792 at Jassy (Iasi, Romania). The treaty ended the Russo-Ottoman War of 1787–1792 and established the Dniester River as the Russian-Ottoman border. Russia retained the territories it occupied east of the river (including the port of Ochakov) but ceded Moldavia and Bessarabia to the Porte. Sultan Selim III recognized the Russian presence in Crimea and the northern Black Sea coast, and Russian empress Catherine II acknowledged Ottoman authority in the Balkans.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Russo-Ottoman Wars; Selim III.

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Jawhar (d. 992)

One of the greatest Fatimid generals. Jawhar, whose full name was Abu al-Hasan Jawhar ibn Abd Allah, was a Christian from Dalmatia (not a Greek or Sicilian as previously suggested). He was kidnapped by Muslim pirates operating in the Adriatic and brought as a slave to Kairouan. After serving several masters, he was gifted to Caliph al-Mansur, whose son and successor granted him freedom. A capable man, Jawhar quickly advanced through the ranks, becoming a vizier and commander-in-chief of the Fatimid army. His first major campaign was directed to northwestern Africa in 958. He departed from al-Nasuriyya and, in two years of fighting, succeeded in extending Fatimid caliph al-Muizz's authority west to Tahart, Tlemcen, Sijilmasa Fez, Tangier, and Ceuta. Beginning in 966, Jawhar began preparing to accomplish the long-standing Fatimid ambition of conquering Egypt. He made a tax-collecting tour throughout the Fatimid realm, inspecting wells and frontier towns that could be used for invasion. In 967, the Fatimid caliph signed a peace with the Byzantine emperor, freeing additional resources for the Egyptian expedition. By the time Jawhar returned from his tour in late 968, the Fatimid army was assembled and, in February 969, he departed with some 100,000 men from Kairouan.

After two months of marching, Jawhar reached Alexandria in May 969, facing limited resistance as the reigning Ikhshidid regime had disintegrated from years of internecine warfare and famine; the power was in the hands of feuding factions. At Alexandria, he was met by the embassy of Egyptian notables offering him the submission of the country. Jawhar accepted the offer and granted the envoys a general letter of safety that remained the most important document of this era. The letter explained the reasons for the Fatimid campaign in Egypt and outlined the future political, economic, and religious policies of the new regime. More importantly, the letter provides a fascinating look into a wide range of issues affecting contemporary Egypt, such as internal security, illegal taxation, and quality of coinage. Nevertheless, Jawhar also faced isolated resistance from the Ikhshidi and Tuluni regiments, whom he decisively defeated in early July. In mid-July, Jawhar took possession of Fustat, where he began constructing a new city with a royal palace that came to be known as al-Qahira (Cairo) or the "Victorious." He subdued an uprising in Lower Egypt and dispatched part of his army under Jafar ibn Fallah to Syria, where the Fatimid troops captured Damascus. The Fatimid expansion into Syria, however, provoked a counterattack by the Qarmatians whose forces invaded Egypt in 971. Jawhar won a complete victory over them near Cairo on December 24, 971, and spent next two years pacifying the country. In 973, Jawhar invited Caliph al-Muizz into his new capital at Cairo, transferring the political center of the Fatimid state from Tunisia to Egypt. But the caliph's arrival proved to be unfortunate for the warrior. Suspicious of his popularity and authority, the caliph stripped him of all

honors, which, however, were restored to Jawhar by al-Muizz's successor in 976. Jawhar's last campaign was in Syria; he initially failed to capture Damascus and was besieged in Ascalon but Caliph al-Aziz arrived with a relief army enabling Jawhar to undertake a successful campaign. Jawhar spent the remainder of his life in retirement before dying at an advanced age in January 992.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Fatimids.

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Jerusalem, Fall of (1917)

Symbolic turning point in the Palestine campaign of World War I. Jerusalem was not only an important administrative center, transportation hub, and headquarters of the German-Turkish Yıldırım (Thunderbolt) Army Group, but it was also a city of enormous symbolic value. When Lieutenant General Sir Edmund Allenby assumed command of the British forces in Palestine in June 1917, he pledged to be in Jerusalem by Christmas.

After the British broke through the Gaza-Beersheba line in November 1917, General Erich von Falkenhayn's Yıldırım Army Group retired to a new defensive line from just beyond Jaffa to Bethlehem. In late November the British XXI Corps wheeled right into the Judean hills, directly threatening Jerusalem. Between November 27 and December 3, General Mustafa Fevzi Pasha's Ottoman Seventh Army conducted a vigorous counteroffensive just west of the Holy City but failed to make much headway against the Allied forces.

Both sides were determined to avoid making Jerusalem a battlefield. Falkenhayn had no desire to waste forces to defend the city in an operation that had every chance of becoming a siege and trapping large numbers of his forces. Allenby was anxious to avoid damage to a location sacred to Jews, Christians, and Muslims alike. Consequently, the plans for the final British assault on the Turkish Jerusalem position called for an encirclement operation: two divisions facing the Turkish earthworks west of Jerusalem would wheel north, leaving the city to their right, while one division would advance northward from Hebron, passing east of Jerusalem.

Direction of the operation fell to Lieutenant General Philip Chetwode, commander of the British XX Corps. Early on December 8, without benefit of preliminary bombardment, its 60th and 74th Divisions advanced on the Turkish positions

west of Jerusalem on a 4.5-mile-wide front from Nabi Samweil to Ain Karim. By 7:00 a.m. the first Turkish line had been captured, but then Turkish resistance stiffened.

Meanwhile, the advance of the southern flanking detachment led by Major General S. F. Mott and consisting of the 53rd Division and XX Corps cavalry had been delayed, as Mott was hesitant to engage Turkish artillery around Bethlehem without express orders for fear of damaging the city, something he had been told to avoid at all costs. Only when explicitly ordered forward by Chetwode did Mott resume his advance in the afternoon. This lack of progress by the flanking column caused the 60th Division to halt for the remainder of the day. That pause gave the defenders a chance to escape, and that night the battered Turkish XX Corps of the 26th and 53rd Divisions withdrew from Jerusalem. In the late morning of December 9, British patrols found the Turkish defensive works abandoned. Total casualties for the Yıldırım Army Group from October through December 1917 were 25,337 killed, wounded, captured, or missing, a rate well in excess of 50 percent, as opposed to 18,000 total casualties for Allenby's forces, which moreover enjoyed a two-to-one superiority in men and far better artillery.

Allenby entered Jerusalem at noon on December 11, 1917. He walked in through the Jaffa Gate in a well-considered gesture aimed at favorably setting him apart from the arrogance of German emperor Wilhelm II, who had entered the Holy City in 1898 on horseback by a gap made in the wall specifically for that occasion. The

British general Edmund Allenby enters the Old City of Jerusalem through the Jaffa Gate on December 11, 1917, after capturing the city. Following World War I, the British helped to establish a Jewish state in the region through their administration of the Palestinian Mandate. (Library of Congress)

gesture was part of a carefully prepared propaganda effort, capitalizing on the symbolic value of Jerusalem and aimed at catching the imagination of the world. The Allied capture of Jerusalem was a great blow to Ottoman prestige in the region, while for the Allies it helped offset the bad news from Russia and Italy.

Dierk Walter

See also: World War I (Palestine and Syria and).

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Jerusalem, Siege of (1099)

The Siege of Jerusalem took place during the First Crusade (1096–1099) and culminated in the capture of the Holy City on July 15, 1099. The liberation of the Holy Sepulchre from the hands of the Islamic enemy was the fundamental inspiration for the Crusade. When the Crusaders began the siege on June 7, it was not merely a military objective but the emotional mainspring of the whole expedition, although the army faced substantial problems in undertaking it.

Perhaps 60,000 Crusaders had gathered at Nicaea (mod. İznik, Turkey) in June 1097, but a member of the army estimated that when they got to Jerusalem there remained only 1,200–1,300 knights and 12,000 Crusaders on foot. They had suffered heavy losses, and many Crusaders had stayed behind with Bohemond of Taranto at Antioch (mod. Antakya, Turkey) and Baldwin of Boulogne at Edessa. This small army was very isolated; its nearest secure base was Laodikeia (Laodicia) in Syria, more than 480 kilometers (300 miles) to the north. Jaffa (mod. Tel Aviv-Yafo, Israel), the port for Jerusalem, had been largely demolished, so the sea power that had hitherto been so useful could now only be exercised precariously, for there was a powerful Fatimid fleet based at Ascalon (mod. Tel Ashqelon, Israel), while Jerusalem itself was held by a Fatimid garrison. The Fatimids of Egypt had been content to support the Crusaders against the Saljuk Turks, from whom they had seized the city of Jerusalem in July 1098, but the Crusaders broke this arrangement when they marched south to

the Holy City. Now they knew that a mighty Fatimid force would gather at Ascalon. The attack on Jerusalem was a race against time: this was why the Crusaders first assaulted the city on June 13, although they had only one siege ladder.

The Fatimid garrison had expelled the native Christian inhabitants and made the springs outside the walls unusable. There was little wood in the vicinity, and raiders from Ascalon harassed the army. Jerusalem, though a mighty city, was vulnerable on the north wall, which was somewhat overlooked by rising ground. The east wall crowned a steep slope down to the Valley of Jehoshaphat. The land did not fall away quite so steeply on the west, but here the wall was reinforced by a citadel (the Tower of David) and an outer wall and ditch that extended around to reinforce the north wall. To the south there was a small, level plateau outside Zion Gate, and here Raymond of Saint-Gilles, count of Toulouse, prepared his attack, while the rest of the army concentrated to the north. The crucial event was the arrival of a Crusader fleet at Jaffa on June 17. A Crusader force defeated Egyptian forces, opening the way to the coast on June 18, and escorted back food, timber, and sailors, who provided skilled labor for the manufacture of siege equipment, for their fleet was destroyed in the port by the Egyptians. Thus reinforced, the army began to erect two siege towers. The North French and Lotharingians built one, with a ram to breach the outer wall, at the northwest corner of the city, and the Provençals constructed theirs outside Zion Gate.

On the night of July 9–10, the northern tower and ram were moved from the west to the east end of the north wall, surprising the defenders. A two-pronged attack was launched on July 13. On July 15,the North French and Lotharingians broke into the city, causing the garrison of the citadel to surrender to the Provençals in the south. The Crusaders massacred most of the city's Muslim and Jewish inhabitants, but this was the fate of any medieval city that refused to surrender. The capture of Jerusalem was remarkable for the courage and skill of the attackers and for the fact that it was achieved before the Fatimids could gather their relief force at Ascalon.

John France

See also: Fatimids; First Crusade (1096–1099).

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Jidda, Siege of (1925)

The capture of Jidda after a year-long siege gave control of the entire Arabian Peninsula to Abdul Aziz Ibn Saud and contributed to the establishment of Saudi Arabia.

During World War I, Sharif Husayn ibn Ali proclaimed Arabian independence and claimed the title of the first king of the Hejaz. However, his actions provoked great resistance among the Wahhabis, who had long challenged his authority. In 1924, Ibn Saud, the Wahhabi leader who had consolidated his authority over the Nejd and the Asir and sought to unite the peninsula under his control, attacked the Hejaz, defeating Husayn, who abdicated his throne to his son Ali ibn Husayn. After occupying Mecca, Ibn Saud invested the last Hejaz stronghold of Jidda, which resisted for one year until December 23, 1925. With Ali ibn Husayn giving up the crown, the victorious Ibn Saud proclaimed himself king of the Hejaz and Nejd in January 1926.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Husayn ibn Ali; Ibn Saud; Saudi-Hashemite War (1919–1925); Wahhabism.

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Jihad

The word "jihad" comes from the Arabic root *jahada*, meaning "to exert an effort" or "to strive" toward a goal, and the term is used in the Muslim world in several different ways. Indeed, in the Middle East, "jihad" is often used in social or economic contexts, similar to the West where politicians or newspapers speak about waging a crusade against poverty, homelessness, or illiteracy. The Muslim use of the word "jihad," however, is often misunderstood in the West, and the common English translation of it as "holy war" is overly simplistic and emphasizes only one of several different aspects of this word.

In its most basic sense, there are two different kinds of jihad: *al-jihad al-akbar* (the greater struggle or effort) and *al-jihad al-asghar* (the lesser form of struggle). The greater jihad refers to the internal struggles that all people deal with on a daily basis to be good and honest and to obey the laws of God. The difficulties of living a morally upright life when faced with the world's constant temptations is the most common use of the term "jihad" in the Islamic world; such a struggle between doing good and avoiding evil is a concept common to all religious traditions and is not unique to Islam.

On the other hand, the lesser jihad refers to the outer, and at times military, struggle in defense of the true religion, Islam. Just as often, if not more so, the outer, or lesser, jihad can involve simply preaching the faith to unbelievers. But when jihad involves military action, not just anyone can declare what can also be referred to as a jihad of the sword, and there are strict rules for waging such military efforts. At

times, the term has been used freely by individuals in the Muslim world who have no authority to declare a jihad but attempt to use religious terminology as a rallying point in furtherance of their own secular political or military agendas, such as Saddam Hussein's declaration of a jihad against coalition forces invading Iraq in 1991. In addition, suicide bombers often describe themselves and are reported by the media as waging jihad; however, taking one's life is forbidden in Islam, just as in Christianity, and thus such incidents should not be considered within the context of struggle for the sake of the religion but rather as an expression of political, social, and/or economic disenfranchisement.

A jihad of the sword can only be declared or sanctioned on the basis of a religious authority, such as a widely recognized Muslim scholar or judge. Modern-day scholars in both the Sunni and Shia traditions agree that such a jihad is only permissible for the purposes of defense. In addition, the lesser jihad is never waged to force conversion to Islam, for Surah (Chapter) 2:256 of the Koran allows for freedom of religion and is translated as saying that "There is no compulsion in religion."

The religion of Islam spread throughout the Arabian Peninsula and far beyond in the seventh and eighth centuries, eventually extending from Spain and Morocco in the west to as far as northwest India in the east by roughly 750. These early centuries witnessed frequent warfare, and the rules established by the religion in governing the conduct of warfare became an effort to exercise some control over these ongoing conflicts. These same rules apply to the exercise of jihad and can be found not only in the Koran but also in the Hadith (the recorded sayings and actions of the Prophet Muhammad) and eventually were incorporated into the corpus of Islamic law. For example, warfare is to be limited to combatants only, and it is not permissible for Muslims involved in any kind of warfare to kill women (except when they take up arms against Muslim armies), children, the elderly, or the injured; to torture or otherwise humiliate prisoners of war (although they can be killed in certain circumstances); or to destroy places of worship, crops, trees, or livestock. In addition, there is a code of honor and behavior that all Muslims must follow that clearly outlines treatment and exchange of prisoners, avoidance of blind revenge or retaliation, and insistence on mandatory peace negotiations at the enemy's request. Moreover, the jihad must be openly declared, and the enemy must first be given the opportunity to convert to Islam before an attack can be launched.

An example from Islamic history when the lesser jihad, or jihad of the sword, was properly used for the defense of the religion and proclaimed openly through the appropriate channels can be seen in the wake of the First Crusade. Refugees from Jerusalem, which had been captured and sacked in 1099, fled to Damascus and appeared before the grand *qadi* (religious judge) of Damascus, Abu Saad al-Harawi, to relate what had happened to the third-holiest city in Islam. The grand *qadi* then traveled to Baghdad to inform the Abbasid caliph, al-Mustazhir Billah (r. 1094–1118), of these events, and the proclaiming of a jihad against the European

invaders soon followed. Although it would take approximately another 50 years for Muslim armies to begin to mount an effective counterattack against the European crusaders, this call for jihad is considered to be the first act of resistance in defense of Islam and its holy sites in Jerusalem during this period.

April L. Najjaj

See also: First Crusade (1096–1099; Hussein, Saddam; Sharia, War and; War and Violence in the Koran.

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K

Kabakchi Incident (1807)

Revolt in Constantinople that resulted in the deposition of Sultan Selim III. During his reign, Selim III sought rapid modernization of his armed forces, and among his reforms was the creation of the *nizam-i cedid* troops that received European training and weaponry. These reforms, however, threatened the power of traditional groups, particularly the ulama and Janissaries, who, together with conservative political circles, propagated the idea that military innovation modeled after Europe would eventually threaten Islamic values and engender an infidel state. When the sultan tried introducing his reformed *nizam-i cedid* troops in the Balkans in 1806, the opposing forces refused to admit the troops into Edirne in an episode known as the second Edirne Incident. The sultan's political opponents used this incident to breath life into a political conspiracy against him. On May 25, 1807, several newly recruited units in the fortresses along the Bosporus were incited to revolt against the government and refused to wear the European-style uniform of the *nizam-i cedid* army. Led by Sergeant Kabakchi Mustafa, these units marched to Istanbul and forced the demoralized sultan to accept their demands. The *nizam-i cedid* army was disbanded, and the reformist officials were handed over and murdered. Despite his concessions, Selim could not save his throne and was deposed in favor of Mustafa IV. Selim was assassinated the following year in an attempted countercoup orchestrated by his supporters.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Ottoman Army (Early 19th Century); Selim III.

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Kafur, Abu'l-Misk al-Ikhshidi (d. 968)

Black eunuch ruler of Egypt, the only black man from sub-Saharan Africa to rise from humble origins to one of the highest position in the Islamic world. Little is known about Kafur's early life; he was born in Nubia or Ethiopia sometime between 904 and 920. In his youth, he was captured and sold into slavery in Cairo. His presentation in literature is rather contradictory, mixing admiration for his superb talents with ridicule for his race and physical unsightliness. He was said to be deformed and clumsy, but his ugliness concealed brilliant intelligence and political acumen. As a slave he had the good fortune of being sold to Muhammad al-Ilkshid, the ruler of Egypt, who quickly appreciated his talents. Kafur must certainly have had great merits because al-Ilkshid entrusted him to tutor his sons and later gave him command of his household troops. When al-Ilkshid died in 946, Kafur became the guardian to Unujur (Anujir), who inherited his father's realm, and administered the state with great ability. Overshadowed by a powerful vizier, Unujur tried unsuccessfully to escape, prompting Kafur to recruit black soldiers (*al-kafuriyya*) to consolidate his authority.

Kafur ruled over Egypt for two decades and showed himself as a skillful statesman. He was ready to compromise and willing to abandon a peripheral province rather than seek to maintain the country on permanent war footing. In the 940s, Kafur capably protected al-Ikhshidid interests in Palestine, which Saif al-Dawla, the Hamdanid lord of Syria, sought to conquer. In 946, Kafur defeated Saif near Nasira and captured Damascus. After regrouping, Saif returned to Damascus in the spring of 947 but again suffered defeat at Marj Rahit. Kafur retained Palestine and southern Syria but allowed Saif to keep Aleppo, thus relieving the Ilkhshid state of the need to counter the Byzantine expansion into northern Syria. Exploiting the absence of the Ilkhshid army in Syria, Ghabun, governor of the Middle Egypt, revolted and tried to capture Fustat before Kafur routed him in 947. In 957, in response to Nubian incursions into southern Egypt, Kafur organized a major expedition to Nubia, briefly capturing Qasr Ibrim, but the conflict with the Nubians continued undeterred for years.

When Unujur died in 960, Kafur arranged the accession of his brother Abu'l-Hasan Ali but retained the real power in his hands. He avoided direct confrontation with the Byzantine Empire until the Byzantines attacked Cyprus in the 960s. Kafur dispatched the Egyptian fleet to Cyprus, but the Byzantines destroyed it between 960 and 963, which allowed them to raid the Egyptian and Syrian coasts. After Ali died in 966, Kafur sidelined his heir and assumed the supreme authority under the title of al-Ustadh (master), which was conferred upon him by a complaisant Abbasid caliph. Kafur ruled over Egypt, Palestine, and southern Syria until his death. Domestically, the last years of his life proved to be challenging as a series of low Nile floods in 963–969 brought on a devastating famine in Egypt. Internationally,

Kafur enjoyed such a high reputation that in 966, when the Bedouins raided the great pilgrim caravan from Damascus, about 200 camel loads of booty was handed over to Kafur as a goodwill gesture. He pursued scholarly endeavors and was a generous patron of scholars. In his famous *Muqaddimah*, the great Muslim historian Ibn Khaldun used Kafur as an example of the way in which the rulers could be eclipsed by more competent ministers. Kafur died in April 968 and was buried in Jerusalem.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Fatimids; Jawhar; Saif (Sayf) al-Dawla.

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Kandahar, Battle of (1880)

A battle fought on September 1, 1880, by the British against Afghan forces at the end of long march to relieve the British garrison of Kandahar; it was the last major conflict of the Second Anglo-Afghan War. After his victory over the British at Maiwand in July 1880, Ayub Khan, the governor of Heart, led his troops to besiege Kandahar, while General Frederick Roberts marched from Kabul to its relief. By the end of August, Roberts had reached the city as Ayub Khan had taken up a position on a spur to the northeast of Kandahar around the village of Mazra. On September 1, at around 9 a.m., Roberts ordered his artillery to open fire and sent his infantry brigades to attack the ridge. The first position to be attacked was around the village of Mulla Sahibdad, where Highlanders and Gurkhas fought hard to evict the Afghan defenders. The British then attacked the village of Gundigan. Once more the fighting was fierce and the Afghans held on among the buildings and orchards, until the British attack was reinforced by Gurkhas. With these two villages under his control, Roberts launched an attack on the main position of Ayub Khan around Mazra. The British advanced to close range so they could use bayonets, and Afghan resistance began to waver. By noon, Ayub Khan realized that his force was beaten and began to organize a withdrawal. The British entered the camp at Mazra at around 1 p.m. The British and Indian forces had 238 casualties, and the Afghans suffered around 2,500 casualties.

Ralph M. Baker

See also: Anglo-Afghan War (1878–1880).

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Kapikulu Corps

According to legend the Kapikulu Corps was set up by Kara Halil Candarli, brother-in-law of Sheikh Edebali, a Muslim mystic in western Anatolia in the early 14th century. Its infantry units, the *Yeni Ceri* (new troops, or Janissaries) were supposedly founded in 1326 when the recruits were also blessed by Hacci Bektas, from whose broad upraised sleeve the Janissaries adopted the flap that fell behind their traditional white felt caps. In reality this Muslim mystic had died many years before, and the first Janissaries actually seem to have been prisoners of war captured after the Ottoman invasion of eastern Thrace in the 1360s. Nevertheless, the *Bektasi* sect of dervishes, followers of Hacci Bektas, maintained close links with the Janissary Corps, some living in its barracks, serving as chaplains, and participating in parades.

Prisoners captured during raids provided the expanding Ottoman state with plenty of military manpower during the 14th century, so it was not until the early 15th century that the devshirme system was formalized. Thereafter this human levy, though strictly against Islamic law, provided the bulk of recruits for the various elements of the Kapikulu Corps. Those deemed the most intelligent were selected for training as *ic oglani*, pages in the sultan's Topkapi Palace, and the rest went to work on farms where they learned Turkish and the Muslim faith before becoming qualified Janissaries. Meanwhile the *ic oglani* were trained for up to seven years with the focus on character building, leadership, military and athletic prowess, languages, religion, science, and a creative art of the pupil's own choosing. Three further examinations selected men for the Kapikulu cavalry or to be Kapikulu officers, and the cream of the crop became military or administrative leaders. All remained bachelors until their training ended, whereupon most married women who had been through a parallel schooling system in the Palace harem. The Kapikulu Corps grew steadily from the 14th to 18th centuries, rulers regarding it as a counterbalance to turbulent provincial military forces. Sultan Mehmed II (r. 1451–1481) placed them under the command of men who had themselves risen through the *devshirme* system, by which time the Janissaries numbered about 12,000.

Sultan Suleiman I (r. 1520–1566) raised the Kapikulu to 48,000 men, including 20,000 Janissaries. However, the Kapikulu cavalry was militarily more important

and had higher prestige than the Janissary infantry. It consisted of six units, of which the *silahtar* (weapon bearers) formed an early bodyguard until this function was taken over by the elite *sipahi oglan* (*sipahi* youngsters) created by Sultan Mehmed I early in the 15th century. By the late 16th century the Kapikulu cavalry numbered some 6,000 and included the sons of *suvarileri* (troopers); Arab, Persian, and Kurdish Muslims; and ex-Janissaries who had distinguished themselves in battle. The Kapikulu Corps also included smaller artillery and engineer units. The Kapikulu cavalry have nevertheless sometimes been confused with feudal, provincial, fief-holding cavalry because both groups were broadly known as *sipahis.* The Kapikulu cavalry also gradually took over much of the provincial *timar* fief system, often as a reward for individual service, but also to balance the power of the feudal *sipahis.*

David Nicolle

See also: Devshirme System; Janissaries; Mehmed II; Suleiman the Magnificent.

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Karbala, Battle of (680)

A battle between the forces of the Umayyad caliph Yazid and Husayn ibn Ali, Prophet Muhammad's grandson, which had a profound impact on the Islamic community. Many Muslims were displeased with Yazid's succession to the caliphate, and a few prominent people openly defied the new caliph. Husayn, the son of Caliph Ali and grandson of the Prophet Muhammad, was among those who refused to swear allegiance to Yazid and fled to Mecca. After sending his cousin to assess the situation in Kufa and receiving word that the inhabitants of the city were ready to support him, Husayn set out to join them with his family and close supporters.

However, things changed when Yazid appointed Ubayd Allah ibn Ziyad as the new governor of Kufa and ordered him to restore order in the rebellious city. Despite warnings from friends, companions, and Bedouins he met along the way, Husayn refused to veer from his objective. At Karbala, Husayn and his 72 followers were intercepted and surrounded by much larger Umayyad troops from Kufa. After

a standoff in which the small party suffered greatly from thirst and heat Husayn and his male supporters were all killed in the ensuing battle on Muharram 10 (October 10, 680). Husayn's head was severed and sent to the caliph. Husayn was survived by his sickly son, Ali, whose line provided the future imams of the Shia. The events at Karbala were central to the development of Shiism as a religious sect. The battle is commemorated each year by Shia Muslims in the Remembrance of Muharram.

Adam Ali

See also: Ali ibn Abi Talib; Umayyad Caliphate.

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Karim Khan Zand (d. 1779)

Iranian military commander, first Zand ruler of Iran, who ended civil strife in the wake of the collapse of the Safavid dynasty. Born around 1705, Muhammad Karim Khan belonged the Lur tribe and rose from obscurity while serving under Nadir Shah. After the shah's assassination in 1747, he entered into an alliance with Ali Mardan Khan, the chief of the Bakhtyari tribe, who controlled central Iran. The two men seized Isfahan in 1757 and restored Shah Ismail III, the grandson of the last Safavid shah, to the throne but retained real power in their hands. However, after Ali Mardan broke the alliance, Karim Khan had him killed and took control over southern and central Iran. Karim Khan gradually came in control of western Iran, defeating the rival Azad Khan near Qazvin and extending his authority to Azerbaijan. In the early 1750s, he defeated the rival Qajar tribesmen and limited their authority to Mazanderan. By the early 1770s, Karim Khan controlled all of Iran (except Khurasan, where he tolerated the rule of the blind Shah Rukh, Nadir Shah's grandson) and switched his attention to Iraq, capturing Basra in 1775. He never claimed the title of shah, instead maintaining the powerless Shah Ismail III on the throne and ruling as a *vakil* (deputy or regent). His pragmatic and commonsense policies restored peace in his realm, reorganized the fiscal system, promoted agriculture and commerce, and generated a building boom, particularly in his capital of Shiraz. He pursued active cooperation with the British East India Company in the Persian Gulf. An illiterate man, he earned a reputation as a patron of arts, attracting scholars to his



One of the generals of Nadir Shah, Karim Khan Zand reunited Iran after decades-long civil strife, bringing a renewed sense of tranquility and prosperity. (Sean Gallup/Getty Images)

court. He died on March 13, 1779, and his passing marked the start of another period of anarchy in Iran, which ended only with the rise of the Qajar dynasty.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Agha Muhammad Khan Qajar; Iran, Wars of Succession in (18th Century); Nadir Shah.

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Karlowitz, Treaty of (1699)

Treaty signed on January 26, 1699, at Sremski Karlovci (German: Karlowitz), a town in modern-day northern Serbia, that ended the Austro-Ottoman War of 1683–1697.

In 1683, the Ottoman Sultan Mustafa II initiated a second Siege of Vienna. The siege failed, and the Ottoman Empire and the Holy League, consisting of the

Habsburg monarchy, the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, the Republic of Venice, and Russia, became embroiled in a series of conflicts that lasted 16 years. The war essentially ended after the Battle of Zenta at which Austria defeated the Ottoman army and captured the sultan's harem, 87 cannon, the royal treasure chest, and the Ottoman state seal. Austria lost 500 men, whereas the Ottoman army lost 30,000.

In early November 1698, the delegates of both sides began peace negotiations at Sremski Karlovci. They sat at a round table, the first time one was used, and met in a tent with four entrances so that none of the delegates had precedence when entering. According to the treaty signed on January 26, 1699, the Ottomans ceded most of Hungary, Transylvania, and Slavonia to Austria; returned Podolia to Poland; and ceded most of Dalmatia and the Peloponnesus peninsula to Venice. In 1715, the Ottomans reconquered the Peloponnesus and regained the region in the 1718 Treaty of Passarowitz. The Treaty of Karlowitz marked the beginning of the Ottoman decline and made the Austrian Empire the dominant power in Central Europe.

Robert B. Kane

See also: Austro-Ottoman Wars; Passarowitz, Treaty of (1718); Zenta, Battle of (1697).

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Karnal, Battle of (1739)

Decisive victory of Nadir Shah of Iran over the army of Mughal emperor Muhammad Shah that paved the way for the Iranian conquest of north India. In late 1738, Nadir Shah launched an invasion of India, passing through the Khyber Pass and descending into Peshawar in January 1739. To stop the invader, the Mughul emperor led his massive army out of Delhi in mid-December and took up positions near Karnal, 75 miles north of Delhi, where it built a large camp by mid-February. The Iranian army was around 100,000 strong, whereas the Mughul forces comprised about 200,000 fighters, although the real total of the Mughal army (including camp followers) exceeded half a million. The Mughals also had a number of war elephants. The Mughal camp was surrounded by a mud wall about 16 miles in circumferences, with large cannons installed on it. Unwilling to attack the enemy in such a strong position, Nadir carefully reconnoitered enemy defenses and then

divided his army into three groups under his trusted generals Tahmasp Khan Jalayer on the right, Mortaza in the center, and Fath Ali Khan and Lotf Ali Khan on the left. On February 24, the Mughal army received reinforcements under Saadat Khan, but as these troops made their way into the camp, Nadir's advance guard attacked the stragglers, forcing Sa'adat Khan to leave the camp to fight.

The battle began around noon as Sa'adat Khan counterattacked against the Iranians, who feigned flight and drew his men further away from the camp. The khan informed the Mughul emperor of the Iranian withdrawal and urged him to come out with his entire army and join in the pursuit. Muhammad Shah dispatched Khan Dowran with some 10,000 men, and then followed him with most of his army. Nadir, elated to see the enemy leave its fortified position, bided his time until the Mughals came out into the open while luring Sa'adat Khan and Khan Dowran away from the main army. The Iranian cavalry then drew aside exposing the Mughals to Nadir's soldiers armed with heavy jazayer muskets and a large number of zanburaks (small cannon) at almost point-blank range. Iranian gunfire routed the charging Mughal cavalry and elephants.

The defeat of Sa'adat Khan and Khan Dowran spread confusion in the main Mughal army and revealed divisions among its commanders. Mughal morale plummeted, and the army started to disintegrate. In the evening of February 24, Nadir Shah offered an armistice to Muhammad Shah, which the latter accepted. On February 26, the Mughal emperor surrendered his empire to Nadir, although much of his army remained starving in the camp. On March 8, Nadir allowed the Mughal troops to leave and then let his troops to ransack the camp, where the Iranians captured vast booty, including elephants, field treasury, guns, and baggage. On March 20, 1739, Nadir entered Delhi.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Nadir Shah.

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Kars, Battle of (1877)

Decisive Russian victory in the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877–1878. By October 15, the Russian advance in Armenia drove the Turks back to the well-provisioned

fortress of Kars, where they were besieged. The Russians brought up siege guns and commenced a bombardment on November 11. This proved largely ineffective, and with winter looming, the Russian commander, General Loris-Melikov, decided to storm the fortress rather than expose his men to a long siege. Given the strength of the fortress, Melikov decided to conduct the assault at night. The Russians mustered 30,000 infantry, 144 guns, and about 5,000 cavalry (mainly Cossacks). In defense the Turks had 23,000 men and 303 guns. The assault forces mustered in darkness, and the advance commenced at 9 p.m. Fort Souvari was quickly captured with the bayonet, and there was a great deal of bloody fighting through the night. By morning most of the outlying forts had been taken, which left two forts to the west of the town. However, the Turks were a demoralized force, and Hussein Pasha (the fortress's commandant) decided to break out. This turned into a rout, and pursued by the Cossacks, the Ottoman force fell apart. The Turks lost all of their men and equipment; the Russians suffered 2,200 casualties. The Ottoman forces never recovered from this defeat, and it was only the intervention of the armistice that saved them further losses.

Nicholas Murray

See also: Russo-Ottoman War (1877–1878).

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Kars, Treaty of (1921)

Agreement between Turkey, Soviet Russia, and representatives of the newly established Soviet authorities in Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan signed on October 13, 1921; Turkey was represented by the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi). The treaty was based on the earlier Treaty of Moscow (March 1921) and determined contemporary borders. The contracting states agreed not to recognize any peace treaty or other international act imposed on any one of them by foreign powers. Under the treaty, the northeastern border of Turkey was determined by a line that began at the village of Sarpi on the Black Sea, passed by the Mt. Khedis Mta, and followed the former northern administrative borders of the sanjaks of Ardahan and Kars. As a result, Turkey took control of territory that belonged to Georgia and Armenia. Turkey agreed to cede to Georgia suzerainty over Batumi and the territory to the north of the frontier, under special conditions. The local population was to enjoy administrative autonomy,

and Turkey was to be guaranteed free transit through Batumi for commodities and all materials destined for, or originating in, Turkey, without customs duties and charges. Turkey and Georgia also agreed to facilitate the crossing of the border by the inhabitants of the border zones on the condition that they observe the customs, police, and sanitary regulations. The treaty greatly affected the future of the neighboring Armenian republic, whose territory was also partitioned. Most of the Kars provinces of the Russian empire were given to Turkey, and Armenia gained parts of the former Elizavetpol governorate. Turkey, Azerbaijan, and Armenia also agreed that the region of Nakhichevan constituted an autonomous territory under the protection of Azerbaijan.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Alexandropol, Treaty of (1920).

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Kemal Reis (ca. 1451–1511)

Ottoman naval commander and admiral. Born around 1451 in Gallipoli, Kemal was given as a present to the sultan by Kapudan Pasha Sinan, served as a page at the sultan's palace, and later began his service as naval commander of the small fleet at Egriboz (Euboea) before embarking on a career of piracy. In 1487, Sultan Bayezid II dispatched him to the western Mediterranean to counter Portuguese attacks on North Africa and assist the Muslims of Granada in their struggle against Spain. From his base on the island of Jirba (Jerba), Kemal Reis conducted successful raids on Malaga, the Balearic Islands, Corsica, and Italy. In 1490–1492, he harassed the Andalucian coastlines and helped transport thousands of Muslims and Jews who were expelled from the Iberian Peninsula by King Ferdinand and Queen Isabella of Spain. In 1497–1498, Kemal was involved in piracy in the eastern Mediterranean and does not seem to have been serving the sultan. Yet by 1499, he was already one of the admirals of the Ottoman fleet; of the three newly constructed enormous battleships (kuke), one was given to Kemal Reis.

In 1499, with the start of the Venetian-Ottoman War, Kemal Reis assumed leadership of the Ottoman navy. In August 1499, he defeated the Venetian fleet of Antonio Grimani at the battle of Zonchio (Sapienza). After capturing Lepanto, Kemal Reis attacked the Venetian island of Corfu and scored a decisive victory at the Battle of Modon in August 1500. His victory allowed the Ottoman land forces to seize Venetian possessions in Greece. Defeating the Venetians off the coast of Coron,

he harassed Venetian shipping throughout the Ionian and Adriatic seas. He gained a fearsome reputation during the war against the Venetians, and people dreaded encountering him on open seas.

In 1501, a European merchant described Kemal's fleet as consisting of eight galliots of 20–22 banks of oars each and 13 fustas with 12–16 banks of oars each. The same year Kemal Reis sailed to the western Mediterranean, where he conducted raids along the Italian and Spanish coastlines, sacking coastal settlements and capturing prisoners. In one of these raids, his nephew Piri Reis came across a chart purportedly drawn by Christopher Columbus, which he used to create the famous Piri Reis map. After returning to Istanbul in 1502, Kemal Reis rested his fleet before sailing out to fight the Venetians once more. He conducted naval operations near the islands of Kos, Lesbos, and Lefkada before raiding Venetian territories in the Adriatic. Threatened by his success, Venice organized a major fleet under Benedetto Pesaro, who forced the Ottomans out of the northern Adriatic.

Struck by disease, Kemal Reis was unable to participate in naval operations until 1505. After returning to active service, Kemal Reis was the leading Ottoman naval commander until his death in 1511. He conducted wide-ranging operations throughout the Mediterranean, intercepting Christian shipping, stopping European corsairs, and raiding the coastlines of Spain, Sicily, and Italy. In 1507–1510, he brought the much-needed copper, timber, gunpowder and cannon to the Egyptian Mamluks, who had been fighting against the Portuguese in the Indian Ocean. Last seen in 1510, he perished in a storm while escorting a cargo fleet to Egypt in early 1511.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Barbarossa Hayreddin Pasha; Bayezid II; Cesayirli Ghazi Hasan Pasha; Piale (Piyale) Pasha; Turgut Reis; Venetian-Ottoman Wars; Zonchio (Sapienza), Battle of (1499).

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Kemal Atatürk, Mustafa (1881–1938)

Turkish army general and political leader; first president of the Turkish Republic. Born Mustafa Rizi (Riza) in Salonika, Greece, on March 12, 1881, he began military schooling at age 12. Mustafa proved so adept at mathematics that he earned

the nickname "Kemal," meaning "The Perfect One." The young man liked the name and made it part of his own, preferring to be known as Mustafa Kemal and later Kemal Atatürk. Commissioned a lieutenant in 1902, Kemal served ably in a number of staff posts and combat commands. During the turbulent years before the outbreak of World War I, he became active in the emerging reformist Young Turk movement. In 1909, he took part in the march on Constantinople to depose Sultan Abdul-Hamid II but soon after turned his attention away from politics to military matters. During 1911–1912 he saw action as a major during the Italo-Turkish war when the Italians invaded Libya. A year later, as a lieutenant colonel, he was chief of staff of a division based at Gallipoli during the Balkan Wars of 1912–1913.

Kemal was overshadowed during this period by the rise of his flamboyant contemporary Enver Pasha, a dashing, politically minded officer, leader of the Young Turks, and a remarkably inept general. Kemal and Enver disagreed violently about the encouragement of German influence in the Turkish government and armed forces. Unlike his rival, Kemal believed Turkey should remain neutral in World War I, doubted the chances of the Central Powers, and resented Enver's invitation to Berlin to send a military mission not only to advise but actually to command Turkish forces.

After a period of exile as military attaché in Sofia, Bulgaria, Kemal was recalled and, with the rank of colonel, appointed to command the 19th Division based at Rodosto on the Gallipoli Peninsula. Although in charge of the area reserves only and subordinated to German general Otto Liman von Sanders, Kemal took the initiative that established him as a great soldier during the Allied amphibious landings of April 1915. He immediately committed his troops and led them in a series of fierce counterattacks to combat the landings that pinned the Allied troops to the beaches.

When the Allies tried another landing at Suvla Bay on August 6, 1915, Kemal was given command of that area as well. By early 1916, when the Allies had evacuated their forces, Kemal was hailed as the "Savior of Constantinople." Subsequently promoted to general, he took command of XVI Corps and continued his success against the Allies in defending Anatolia in March 1916. He was the only Turkish general to win victories against the Russians. Kemal's accomplishments, as well as his annoyance at being subordinate to the Germans, so threatened and angered Enver Pasha that he relieved him of command in 1917, placing him on sick leave. A year later, with the German-Ottoman alliance facing defeat by the Allies, Enver recalled Kemal to command the Seventh Army in Palestine. Outnumbered by General Sir Edmund H. Allenby's better-equipped British forces, the best Kemal could achieve was to extricate the bulk of his command and withdraw first to Aleppo and then to the Anotolian frontier, an orderly retreat that saved his army.

With the Allied victory in the war and collapse of the Ottoman Empire, Kemal used his assignment as inspector general of the armies in eastern and northeastern

Kemal Mustafa Atatürk, who is credited with being the founder of the modern Turkish state, served as the first president of Turkey from 1923 to 1938. (Library of Congress)

Anatolia to strengthen those elements working for a free and independent Turkish nation. On May 19, 1919, ignoring the sultan's attempt to remove him, Kemal issued orders that all Turks fight for independence. In April 1920 Kemal established a provisional government in Ankara. He became president of the National Assembly in Ankara and successfully directed Turkish forces in the defeat of Greek forces in eastern Anatolia during 1921–1922.

With the external threat overcome, Kemal ended the sultanate on November 1, 1922. The Treaty of Lausanne granted almost all the concessions that Turkey demanded, and Kemal proclaimed the Republic of Turkey on October 29, 1923, with himself as president. He then set about implementing reforms that limited the influence of Islam and introduced Western laws, dress, and administrative functions.

Although an autocrat, Kemal, who took the title Atatürk in 1934, encouraged cooperation between the civil and military branches and based his rule on the concept of equality of all before the law. His achievements in every field of national life were extraordinary, and almost single-handedly, he inspired Turkey to take its place among the modern nations of the world. Atatürk died on November 10, 1938 in Istanbul.

James H. Willbanks

See also: Balkan Wars (1912–1913); Enver Pasha; Greco-Turkish War (1919–1922); Lausanne, Treaty of (1923); Sèvres, Treaty of (1920); Turkish-Armenian War (1920); World War I; Young Turks.

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Khadairi Bend, Battle of (1916–1917)

First battle in the British offensive that captured Baghdad. During this battle the British used their significant advantages in men and artillery to systematically root the Turks from their defenses covering Kut. For the Turks 1916 was their most successful year in Mesopotamia. On April 29, a British and Indian army force under Major General Charles Townshend had surrendered at Kut-al-Amara after a five-month siege. The defeat was a powerful blow to British prestige in the Middle East. Several efforts to break through and save Townshend's force had failed, resulting in heavy casualties.

In August General Sir Frederick Maude received command of British forces in Mesopotamia. Maude was determined to strengthen his logistical base before undertaking any offensive action. He improved Basra as a port and supply center, and he also built up a fleet of motor vehicles to transport supplies. Because the major lines of communication in Mesopotamia were the Tigris and Euphrates rivers, Maude also developed a river fleet, securing vessels to carry supplies as well as gunboats to support operations. Troop reinforcements also arrived, and by the end of the year Maude had more than 166,000 men in five divisions.

Maude disguised his intentions as to which river he planned to use, forcing the Turks to divide their numerically smaller force. Kazim Bey's Ottoman XVIII Corps manned the defenses along the Tigris River, but Kazim had fewer than half the soldiers that Maude would deploy against him. Maude's forward movement was hampered more by restrictions imposed by the British government in London than by the Turks. Until November, London insisted that he make no move toward Baghdad; after the restriction was lifted, Maude was still under pressure not to incur heavy casualties.

On December 13, 1916, Maude finally began his offensive. His immediate objective was to clear the formidable Turkish defenses from the Khadairi Bend of the Tigris River north of Kut, with the intention of recapturing Kut. To accomplish this he hoped to maneuver the Turks from their defenses. In a night march, Maude

advanced one corps along the right bank of the Tigris. The British and Indian formations outflanked the Turks by moving across the desert. They first moved north and then turned back east toward the Tigris, threatening to sever the Turkish communications north.

On December 20, the British forces reached the Tigris. They could have moved faster, but Maude continued to be wary of casualties. Having cut off the Khadairi Bend position, the British then began to systematically reduce it. On the night of December 22, British engineers began to dig saps forward from their own trenches. After a few yards, the saps were joined to form a new line of trenches. By January 7, 1917, the British had advanced their lines in such fashion some 2,000 yards. British artillery regularly shelled the Turks to prevent them from interfering with this forward process.

On January 9, the British and Indians launched a frontal assault following a heavy bombardment and quickly secured the first Turkish trench. Continuing the assault, by the evening of January 10 the British had nearly driven the Turks into the Tigris. A heavy Turkish counterattack the next day nearly broke through the British line, but reserves were able to contain it. After that, the battle dissolved into small mopping-up operations. The operation was completed on January 29, allowing Maude to begin his attack on Kut. The Turks lost about 3,000 men, while British losses were approximately 2,000.

Tim J. Watts

See also: World War I (Mesopotamian Theater).

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Khalid ibn al-Walid (d. 642)

Khalid ibn al-Walid Ibn al-Mughira al-Makhzumi has been described as one of the tactical geniuses of the early medieval period. Yet his Arabic nickname, "The Sword of God," implied that he was merely a weapon to be wielded by greater men. This in turn reflected the fact that military prestige counted for relatively little in the early Islamic world, at least when compared with religious or cultural status. Khalid headed an important clan in Mecca during the Prophet Muhammad's lifetime and

was, in fact, the tactician behind the only serious victory that the pagans of Mecca enjoyed over the Muslims during Muhammad's lifetime, this being at the Battle of Uhud. Khalid ibn al-Walid then converted to Islam around 627 and took part in the unsuccessful Muta campaign against the nominally Byzantine southern Jordan and the Muslim conquest of Mecca. The Prophet Muhammad sent him to destroy a particularly important pagan idol in the oasis of Nakhla and to negotiate with the powerful Banu Jadhima tribe, which, Khalid attacked without orders. Nevertheless, the Prophet continued to trust Khalid ibn al-Walid and soon sent him against the Arabian oasis town and power center of Dumat al-Jandal. This time Khalid captured the local ruler and sent him to Mecca, after which Khalid's next mission was to Yemen to invite the important Banu al-Harith tribe to accept Islam. After the death of the Prophet Muhammad in 632, Khalid ibn al-Walid became a leading Muslim military leader during the Ridda Wars, which saw the newly established Muslim caliphate extent its authority across the entire Arabian peninsula. Yet again he disgraced himself, killing fellow Muslims in error and then marrying the widow of one of those he had slain.

However, Khalid ibn al-Walid had proved himself a superb military leader and an honest if unsophisticated man, which was probably why he was sent to campaign against Sassanian and pro-Sassanian forces in Iraq. Khalid ibn al-Walid's epic desert march from Iraq to attack Byzantine forces in Syria from the rear caught the imagination of most chroniclers. He is similarly credited with keeping the still relatively new Muslim-Arab army intact during its long retreat in the face of a Byzantine counteroffensive. In 636, this was followed by Khalid's greatest victory at the Battle of Yarmouk, where he was probably the real military leader under the nominal command of others. Khalid ibn al-Walid's personality appears to have been impulsive, sometimes ignoring directives from the caliph, particularly when the latter was from an Arabian clan that possessed lower prestige in pre-Islamic times. This suggests that in some ways Khalid was still rooted in the pre-Islamic past, while he was certainly accused of an un-Islamic love of luxury. Khalid ibn al-Walid was buried at Homs in central Syria where, during the later 19th century, a large mosque was built by the Ottoman Turkish authorities in an attempt to retain the loyalty of their increasingly disaffected Syrian-Arab subjects. In subsequent decades Khalid was also adopted as a hero and symbol of Arab nationalism.

David Nicolle

See also: Ridda Wars (632–633); Yarmouk (Yarmuk), Battle of (636).

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Khanaqin, Battle of (1916)

Turkish military victory that halted a Russian drive into Mesopotamia. The offensive that ended at Khanaqin marked the only Russian attempt at a coordinated effort with its British ally.

Before World War I, the Russian and British governments had agreed to divide Persia into two spheres of influence, separated by a neutral zone. When war broke out the Persian government declared its neutrality. Although many Persians were sympathetic toward Turkey on religious grounds, the Persian government had neither the forces nor the will to fight. German agents took advantage of Persia's neutrality to wage a vigorous propaganda campaign, resulting in a number of public demonstrations.

The Turks took advantage of Persia's neutrality to occupy the city of Kotur in December 1914. The Russian government had sent troops to occupy Oiyadin in northern Persia in November 1914. These easily pushed the lightly armed Turks out of Kotur and back into Ottoman territory. In November 1915, Russian troops under General N.N. Baratov marched on and secured control of the Persian capital of Tehran in response to reports of a possible German coup.

The situation along the Persian border with Mesopotamia remained stable through much of 1915. In September 1915, British troops under Major General Charles Townshend moved up the Tigris River toward Baghdad. Defeated in November at Ctesiphon, only 20 miles south of Baghdad, Townshend retreated to Kut-al-Amara, where his force was promptly besieged by the Turks. British relief efforts in December 1915 and January 1916 failed, and in desperation the British appealed to their Russian allies in Persia for help.

In response, Baratov moved into western Persia to threaten Baghdad. On February 26, 1916, he secured Kermanshah. Continuing their progress, the Russians moved next to Kharind, only 125 miles from Baghdad. The British hoped that Baratov would then push on to Baghdad, forcing the Turks to raise the siege at Kut. The Turks had little to prevent his advance, but unfortunately Baratov remained at Kharind for three months. The Russians were at the end of a long supply line, and Baratov was anxious to resupply and consolidate before advancing farther.

After the fall of Kut in late April 1916, Turkish forces there were available for other assignments. Veteran Turkish divisions were also available thanks to the Allied evacuation of the Gallipoli Peninsula at the end of 1915, and these slowly made their way to Mesopotamia. Turkish Sixth Army commander Halil Pasha agreed

to send his XIII Corps to attack Baratov at Kharind. Ali Insan Pasha commanded XIII Corps of three fresh divisions and some other formations. Insan massed his forces near the border with Persia and then advanced toward Baratov's positions. When the Russians learned of the Turkish move, Baratov undertook a preemptive strike, crossing the border. On June 3, the Russians attacked the Turkish 6th Infantry Division of XIII Corps at the border town of Khanaqin. Baratov employed his infantry to pin the Turks in place, while his cavalry tried to encircle them. Insan's corps outnumbered the Russians, however, and the confident Insan fended off the infantry assault and used his reserves to crush the Russian cavalry. Turkish losses were only around 400 men. Russian casualties were much greater.

After his victory, Insan pushed into Persia. Baratov conducted a skillful fighting retreat, but Insan forces defeated the Russians in a series of small-scale actions and eventually reached Hamadan, while Baratov withdrew to the north and awaited reinforcements. Insan was disappointed that few Persians joined his army. As no Turkish reinforcements were forthcoming and his extended supply line left his force short of virtually everything, Insan had no choice but to withdraw back into Ottoman territory. Insan had succeeded, however, in preventing a major Russian invasion of Mesopotamia.

Tim J. Watts

See also: World War I.

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Khandaq, Battle of (627)

In 627, the Meccans, led by Abu Sufyan, launched their greatest and last offensive against Muhammad in Medina. They mobilized their Bedouin allies to form a coalition of 10,000 warriors. The Prophet had a ditch (khandaq) dug across the unprotected northern approach, while the other sides of the city were surrounded by lava rocks. These defenses enabled the 3,000 Muslims to neutralize the enemy's cavalry and superior numbers. The Meccans besieged Medina, but a combination of factors led to the lifting of the siege and their withdrawal after a few weeks. First,

the Muslims were able to defend their city in a series of skirmishes along the ditch, which lowered morale among the besiegers. Second, the Prophet's agents successfully sowed the seeds of mistrust between the different tribes of the coalition. Third, the attack occurred after the harvest, which resulted in a lack of the supplies needed to sustain large numbers of men and animals. The Muslim victory played a major role in the rise of Islam in Arabia. It dealt a major blow to the Meccan efforts to defeat Muhammad and his supports, who, following the victory, enjoyed a political ascendency that brought them a victory just three years later.

Adam Ali

See also: Badr, Battle of (623); Muhammad, Campaigns of the Prophet.

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Khanua, Battle of (1527)

Second of three great battles fought by Babur to found the Mughal Empire in India. Like the other battles, Khanua was fought against more numerous enemies. Babur, however, used the combination of mobile, heavily armored cavalry and firepower to defeat the Rajputs at Khanua and establish his small force as the dominant power in northern India. Babur began to raid into the Punjab region in 1519, but his early attempts were unsuccessful. In 1526, however, he defeated the sultan of Delhi at Panipat and destroyed his army. Babur swiftly occupied Delhi and took over the administration of the area. He convinced his men to stay in Delhi instead of returning home, despite their homesickness. Surrounded by enemies, Babur's next opponent was Rana Sanga of Mewar, who headed a confederacy of princes in Rajasthan. Sanga marched on Delhi to destroy Babur. The Mughal sought help from God by forbidding liquor to himself and his men, pouring out the wine he could find, and by invoking God's help in an inspiring speech to his men. While Sanga had an army of 100,000 horsemen and 500 elephants, Babur had about 12,000 men.

The two armies met at Khanua, 37 miles west of Agra, on March 16, 1527. Babur used his normal formation and tactics. His center consisted of his own clansmen with a barrier of wagons to provide a field fortification. Gaps were left between the wagons for cavalry sallies and for artillery to fire on the enemy. The wings were composed of allied bands, ready to maneuver against Sanga's flanks as necessary.

The Rajput army was arranged in its traditional manner, with each force under its own prince. The battle was hard fought. Babur's artillery concentrated on the elephants, who stampeded under the fire and trampled and disordered their own forces. Babur sent his allies against the Rajput flanks to drive them in and prevent them from maneuvering. The battle remained in doubt for 10 hours, until the Rajputs finally broke and fled from the field. They never again organized under a single leader. Babur was able to defeat his other enemies and establish his empire. He adopted many of the Indian ways and left in place much of the administrative machinery from those who preceded him. Babur died in 1530.

Tim J. Watts

See also: Babur; Panipat, Battles of (1399, 1526, 1556, 1761).

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Kharijites

The Kharijites were the "seceders" who "went out" from supporting Ali ibn Abi Talib as the fourth caliph. The term has been applied to a variety of Muslims. Immediately after the death of Muhammad a dispute arose over who should succeed him. One group supported Ali ibn Abi Talib, the cousin and son-in-law of Muhammsd, who was married to Muhammad's daughter Fatima. However, the community chose Abu Bakr the father of Aisha one of the wives of Muhammad. Omar Umar (Omar) ibn al-Khattab succeeded Abu Bakr when he died two years later (634). Omar was assassinated in 644 by a disgruntled slave. He was succeeded by Uthman (Osman) ibn Affan.

Uthman was a member of the same Quraish (Quraysh) tribe as Muhammad had been, but he was from the Umayyad family rather than the Beni Hassan (Hashemite) clan into which Muhammad had been born. As caliph he was accused of unfair distributions of the booty and nepotism in appointments. A group of disgruntled

Muslims from Egypt and the Arab garrison city of Kufa on the Euphrates assassinated him in 656. Their action began the First Civil War (656–661).

After Uthman's assassination in Medina, Ali ibn Abi Talib was elected the fourth caliph by the Medina community. Ali was the cousin and son-in-law of Muhammad by marriage to Fatima. His position as caliph was disputed by Muawiyah ibn Abi Sufyan who was an Umayyad kinsman of Uthman's and the governor of Damascus. He wanted Uthman's murderers to face trial, but he knew that some of Ali's supporters had been the conspirators, so he refused to follow Ali.

Armies in support of Muawiyah and Ali fought the Battle of Siffin on the banks of the upper Euphrates River in what is now Ar-Raqqah, Syria (July 26–28, 657). The battle was inconclusive, so the two sides agreed to arbitration. This, however, angered many of Ali's followers who withdrew their support to become the Kharijites. They argued that the issue should be fought out and that Allah would grant victory to those who were his true followers.

The arbitration did not go well for Ali because Muawiyah chose a pretended neutral, Amr al-Aas, who was really his strong supporter and Ali's advocate, Abu Musa al-Ashari, was not a supporter of Ali's. When the arbitrators called for both Ali and Muawiyah to resign both refused. There were now three groups with claims about the legitimacy of succession to Muhammad. Those in support of Ali argued that the caliph should be from the family (Hashemite) of Muhammad. Those in support of Muawiyah argued that the caliph should be someone from the Quraish tribe of Muhammad's. The Kharijites, however, argued any Muslim who was pure in heart could become the caliph by being elected by the whole Muslim community (*umma*). As Muslim purists their battle cry was "only God has the right to decide." They moved to a village at Harura and began attacking those who did not agree with them, declaring them infidels worthy of death.

Eventually, many Kharijites moved to Nahrawan on the Tigris River. Led by Abdullah ibn Wahab, they were defeated by Ali in the Battle of Nahrawan in 658. Those few that survived reorganized themselves. In 661, Kharijites in Mecca conspired to kill the governor of Egypt, Muawiyah the governor of Syria, and Caliph Ali in a simultaneous attack. Their plot, carried out on the 17th of Ramadan (January 20, 661) by three young Kharijites, met with limited success. The governor of Egypt was wounded in the attack by Amr ibn Bakr. Barq ibn Abdullah failed in his attempt on Muawiyah; however, the attack on Ali while he was praying in the mosque in Kufa was successful. He was mortally wounded by Abd-al-Rahman ibn Muljam al-Sarimi with a poison-coated sword.

Shortly after the death of Ali, his opponent Muawiyah, the son of Abu Sofian who had been a bitter opponent's of Muhammad's, was chosen as caliph. He was forced at times to suppress small groups of Kharijites. They soon splintered into about 20 small groups, a few of which, such as the Ibadis, still survive. Their doctrines inspired revolts throughout Islamic history. The Ibadis developed

a stronghold in Algeria among the Berbers at Tahert, which was destroyed by the Fatimid caliphs in the 10th century.

Andrew J. Waskey

See also: Ali ibn Abi Talib; Muawiyah; Siffin, Battle of (657).

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Khartoum, Siege of (1884–1885)

The Siege of Khartoum occurred when a garrison of 7,000 troops commanded by General Charles Gordon held off superior Sudanese forces led by the Mahdi for 10 months.

In 1884, General Charles Gordon was sent to face a revolt led by Mahdi Muhammed Ahmad in Sudan. He had been ordered to organize the withdrawal of Egyptian and Sudanese forces, but on his arrival in Khartoum on February 18, 1884, he began to reinforce the defenses of the city. He built nine gunboats to patrol the White and Blue Nile. On the southern side of the city he built a system of trenches with land mines and wire entanglements. In April 1884, the Mahdist forces cut off the city, and its population of 30,000 quickly began to run short of food. During August, Gordon ordered a number of successful sorties. However, in September a similar expedition was defeated, allowing Mahdist forces to capture more than 1,000 rifles. At the end of the month, Gordon sent all his large steamers up the Nile in an attempt to contact a British relief expedition.

On January 5, the outlying fort of Omdurman was captured, allowing Mahdist forces to place guns to enfilade Gordon's defenses. Fearful of the possible success of the British relief, late on January 25 the Mahdi ordered a wholesale attack on Khartoum. Advancing over the Nile, which was at a low level, 50,000 Mahdists attacked the city. With the defensive line pierced, the garrison fought a series of rearguard actions but were easily overcome. Gordon was killed. The relief expedition arrived two days later, but seeing that Khartoum was taken withdrew from the Sudan.

Ralph M. Baker

See also: Anglo-Sudan War (1883–1899).



Death of Charles George Gordon in Khartoum in January 1885. (Library of Congress)

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Khirokitia, Battle of (1426)

A hotly contested battle (July 7, 1426) fought near the village of Khirokitia (mod. Khoirokoitia, Cyprus) between Nicosia and Limassol, resulting in the crushing defeat of the 4,600 troops of King Janus of Cyprus by the 5,000 invading soldiers of the Mamluk sultan of Egypt, Barsbay. The cause of the Mamluk invasion was the raiding mounted from Cyprus by Cypriot, Genoese, and Catalan corsairs, as well as an attack on the Syrian coast by Janus himself. In retaliation, Barsbay had attacked Cyprus in 1424 and 1425. On July 1, 1426, he landed on Cyprus with a larger Mamluk force and proceeded to capture the town of Limassol. The Cypriot forces were defeated at Khirokitia, and Janus was taken prisoner; the Mamluks went on to capture and sack the capital, Nicosia (July 11), carrying off 6,000 captives. The king was ransomed for 200,000 ducats eight months later and returned

to the island in May 1427, having agreed to become the sultan's vassal, paying an annual tribute of 5,000 ducats.

Alexios G. C. Savvides

See also: Mamluk Sultanate.

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Khomeini, Ruhollah (1900–1989)

Iranian Muslim cleric, leader of the Iranian Revolution (1978–1979), founder of the first modern Islamic republic (1980), and leader of Iran (1980–1989). Born in Khomein, a village near Tehran, on May 17, 1900, Seyyed Ruhollah Musavi Khomeini, as did his father, pursued theological studies, attained the rank of ayatollah, and ultimately became an Islamic jurist.

For decades, Khomeini watched passively as Shah of Iran Mohammad Reza Pahlavi promoted secularization and restricted the influence of clerical powers. Khomeini also remained detached from the crisis of the early 1950s, as the shah turned to the United States for assistance. In 1953, the Central Intelligence Agency engineered a coup against a popularly elected government and brought the shah back to power.

A disciple of Iran's preeminent cleric, Ayatollah Mohammad Boroujerdi, who was a defender of the tradition of clerical deference to established power, Khomeini took over this role in 1962 following Boroujerdi's death and began a sharply antagonistic campaign against the shah. That same year, the shah passed a bill that permitted municipal officials to take oaths of office on whatever holy scripture they preferred. This move deeply offended Khomeini and other Islamic fundamentalists, who considered the Koran to be the only appropriate scripture for such occasions. In January 1963 Khomeini issued a strongly worded declaration denouncing the shah and his plans.

Condemning Iran's ties with Israel, Khomeini also called a proposal to permit American servicemen in Iran to be tried in U.S. military courts "a document for Iran's enslavement." After several arrests, in 1964 Khomeini was finally banished to Turkey. He was then allowed to relocate to the Shiite holy city of Najaf, Iraq. In exile, he became the recognized leader of the anti-shah fundamentalist opposition. While in exile, he shaped a revolutionary doctrine. Condemning the shah's dependence on the United States and his blatant secularism, Khomeini called for the creation of an Iranian clerical state.

Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini thronged by supporters after he delivered a speech at the Tehran airport, February 1, 1979, the day of his return from 14 years of exile. (AP/Wide World Photos)

In 1978, unrest began to spread throughout Iran. Islamic fundamentalists were joined by students and others disaffected with the shah's heavy-handed rule, state-sanctioned police brutality, and a corrupt bureaucracy. By the end of the year, a host of student-led protests shook the shah, who was then ailing with cancer. Members of the middle class also began to demand the shah's ouster. On January 3, 1979, Shapur Bakhtiyar of the National Front was appointed prime minister. Ten days later, the shah left Iran. In February 1979, Khomeini became Iran's unquestioned leader. He ended the brief parliamentary experiment and ordered an Assembly of Experts—a group of high-ranking Islamic clerics—to draft an Islamic constitution that would establish and enforce religious law. In November 1979, Khomeini's partisans, most of them young college students, seized the U.S. embassy in Tehran and held 52 Americans there hostage for 444 days. The affair led to extremely tense U.S.-Iranian relations and ultimately contributed to President Jimmy Carter's electoral loss in 1980.

In the remaining 10 years of his life, Khomeini consolidated his power, proving fully as ruthless as the shah. He instituted a strict regime of Islamic law and suspended the criminal justice system in favor of religious courts. He also tried to export his revolution by calling for Islamic revolutions throughout the Middle East.

In September 1980, Iraq's Saddam Hussein attacked Iran, hoping for a quick victory and access to Iran's rich oil fields. Hussein believed that the political chaos

in Iran would ease both the invasion and occupation, but he badly miscalculated. Khomeini and his followers saw the Iraqi invasion as a holy war and rallied the Iranian people in a fanatical defense of the country. Khomeini was disdainful of Hussein's secular regime. The war dragged on until 1988, bringing staggering casualties and great suffering to both sides.

Meanwhile, life in Khomeini's Iran was repressive, particularly for those who did not subscribe to its fundamentalist tenets. Khomeini encouraged a veritable personality cult by the late 1980s, while harsh punishments were meted out to those who did not adhere to the strict Islamic laws enforced by the state. Reports of wholesale human rights abuses, including torture, were attributed to the Islamic regime. In early 1989, Khomeini precipitated an international uproar when he publicly called for the murder of the writer and novelist Salman Rushdie, who, Khomeini charged, had committed blasphemy in his book *The Satanic Verses*. As the fatwa against Rushdie continued to create controversy, Khomeini became gravely ill and died on June 2, 1989 in Tehran.

Paul G. Pierpaoli and Luc Stenger

See also: Hussein, Saddam; Iran, Islamic Revolution in (1978–1979).

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Konya, Battle of (1832)

Egyptian forces under Ibrahim Pasha produced a 19th-century version of Blitzkrieg after the fall of Acre (Akko) during the First Egyptian-Ottoman War (1831–1833). Racing into Syria, the Egyptians smashed Ottoman armies at Homs (July 8, 1832) and the Syrian Gates (July 29). Although this rapid advance confounded Ottoman strategists, it also forced Ibrahim to leave behind artillery and garrison troops. He entered Anatolia in December with about 50,000 men.

The main Ottoman field force, more than 80,000 strong, was marching into eastern Anatolia when it collided with Ibrahim's screen outside the city of Konya (December 18–19, 1832). Commanded by the grand vizier, Rescid Mehmed Pasha (1780–1839), this army had several disadvantages. First, a significant portion of these men were irregulars, incapable of facing Egyptian regulars in a set-piece battle. Equally important, the Ottoman regulars were in the midst of a military reformation and were not as well trained or led as their Egyptian counterparts.

The battle started on the very foggy morning of December 21. Rescid ordered his army to advance, while the Egyptians held steady, both flanks covered by infantry squares to negate the Ottoman advantage in light cavalry. Poor training and weak leadership, compounded by the heavy fog, caused Ottoman units to separate, especially on their left flank. Ibrahim noted significant gaps, and ordered a counterattack. This quickly unhinged the Ottoman left, forcing Rescid to charge with his bodyguards in hope of restoring order. Instead, the grand vizier was captured, and his left wing collapsed. A half-hearted effort to continue the fight ended when an Egyptian grand battery blasted the center and right wings. Ottoman casualties were 10 times that of their Egyptian counterparts, and those who escaped the battle dispersed into Anatolia. Ibrahim's victory at Konya removed the last significant Ottoman force between his army and Istanbul, the imperial capital.

John P. Dunn

See also: Egyptian-Ottoman Wars; Ibrahim Pasha; Mehmed Ali.

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Koprulu, Fazil Ahmed Pasha (1635–1676)

One of a family of statesmen and warriors who served the Ottoman Empire during the 17th century and helped to restore its former glory and power. Following in the footsteps of his father, Mehmed Pasha Koprulu, who had founded the dynasty of viziers, the younger Koprulu not only continued his father's policies but also fought in many of the same arenas. He completed the conquest of Crete and helped break the power of Venice in the Mediterranean. He went on to conquer Transylvania and expanded the Ottoman borders into Polish territory. Koprulu also maintained the internal order of the empire, using ruthless means where necessary. When he died, he left the empire at the height of its power.

Koprulu was born at Vezir Kopru in northern Anatolia in 1635. His father was a remarkable statesman who had become grand vizier at an advanced age but had eliminated his rivals and dominated Sultan Mehmed IV. With such power, Koprulu's father had convinced the sultan that only another Koprulu could succeed him, and on his father's death in 1661, Sultan Mehmed called Koprulu to Istanbul and appointed him grand vizier. As he had with Koprulu's father, the sultan promised

not to interfere with the government of the empire and happily devoted himself to a life of pleasure and hunting.

Koprulu was only 26 years old when he became grand vizier on October 31, 1661. Unlike his father, who had had only the barest education, Koprulu was well educated. He had been trained in every kind of experience designed to enable him to rise to high office. As grand vizier, Koprulu was a patron of scholars and the founder of a library that still exists in Istanbul today. Initially, he was a member of the ulama, the Muslim learned men. Although Koprulu seemed to have the talent to advance on his own, his father continually intervened on his behalf, which caused so much jealousy that Koprulu had to leave the ulama and join the sultan's bureaucracy. He quickly rose to responsible positions, including that of provincial governor. Koprulu thus brought wide experience into the position of grand vizier and combined administrative acumen with great intelligence.

In the traditional way, Koprulu undertook to ensure his position as grand vizier by eliminating his rivals. He executed without trial anyone who disagreed with him or unfortunates whom he suspected of undermining his position. The death list included many who had been friends or colleagues of his father. Within a year, however, Koprulu felt secure enough that the repression ended, and his rule became more just and humane as he reformed the civil administration of the Ottoman Empire. He continued his father's struggle against corruption, pointedly refusing to accept favors. He encouraged free trade and other financial policies designed to stimulate the Ottoman economy. Following his father's advice, he was able to keep the treasury filled, despite a series of expensive wars.

Although Koprulu was a devout Muslim, he allowed greater religious freedom among the Christians and Jews of the empire. He reversed a long-standing law that had prevented non-Muslims from building new churches. When someone reminded him of the provision that they were to use only the materials from the old building, Koprulu declared those who followed that rule were fools. He cared only that non-Muslims continued to pay tribute and accept Ottoman rule.

Koprulu's domestic reforms were overshadowed by his military campaigns. Though he displayed greater military ability than his father and expanded the borders of the empire, he did suffer some defeats. In 1663, he began a campaign against the Austrian Habsburgs, renewing an older contest for control of Transylvania. Koprulu sent Tatar raiders into Moravia and Silesia, which raised fears throughout Europe of a Muslim invasion. Koprulu and a large Turkish army took the important Austrian fortress of Neuhausen before going into winter quarters in Belgrade. In the summer of 1664, he led his army toward Vienna. Although the Austrians indicated that they were ready for peace, Koprulu attempted to cross the Raab River. At the Convent of St. Gothard, his army was divided by a sudden rise in the river. A smaller Austrian army that included a French contingent defeated the Turks through superior weapons and tactics on August 1, 1664. The Treaty of

Vasvar quickly followed. Though Koprulu had not taken Vienna, the treaty recognized the authority of the Ottomans over Transylvania, accomplishing his original goals for this campaign.

Next, Koprulu turned to the island of Crete, stronghold of Venetian power in the eastern Mediterranean. In 1666, he led a large number of reinforcements to the island, where the Siege of Candia had long been under way. The fortress was the principal Venetian stronghold, and its survival depended on supplies and men brought in by sea. Using the navy that had been rebuilt by his father, Koprulu was able to impose a blockade on Candia. Toward the end of August 1669, the situation had become critical for the Venetians, who made the situation worse by arguing with the leaders of other European contingents sent to assist them. Finally, the other Europeans withdrew, and Candia surrendered on September 5, 1669. The Venetian garrison was allowed to leave, and the Venetians' right to trade within the Ottoman Empire was restored. Crete became an Ottoman stronghold, blocking access from the south to the Aegean Sea and Istanbul.

Koprulu's final campaigns were against the Poles. Conflict between Russia and Poland over the Ukraine during the 1660s had resulted in the occupation of most of the Ukraine by the Poles. In 1672, the hetman of the Zaporozhye Cossacks acknowledged Ottoman authority instead and appealed for help against the Polish forces. Koprulu marched with an army of 200,000 men in June 1672. They quickly occupied the province of Podolia, but this invasion inspired a united Polish opposition under Jan Sobieski. Although the Polish king accepted the Ottoman gains, his death allowed Sobieski to invade the Ukraine and defeat a larger Turkish army at Chocim in November 1673. The Turks withdrew only to return again in 1675. Again Sobieski defeated the Turks, this time at the Battle of Lvov. Yet another attempt to invade Poland was defeated at the Battle of Zuravno in 1676. When Sobieski became involved with a new war against Sweden, however, he was forced to sign the Treaty of Zuravno on October 27, 1676. This treaty confirmed direct Ottoman rule over Podolia and left the rest of the Ukraine under the sultan's suzerainty.

Koprulu died on November 3, 1676, near Adrianople. Though a lifetime of drinking and debauchery no doubt hastened his death by dropsy, it nevertheless seemed very sudden. He left the Ottoman Empire very strong and at its greatest expanse. Despite almost constant wars, Koprulu had maintained the financial health of the empire, and because the wars were fought on foreign soil, they had prevented the Janissaries from causing internal dissension and allowed for a great deal of domestic peace.

Tim J. Watts

See also: Austro-Ottoman Wars; Koprulu, Mehmed Pasha; Polish-Ottoman Wars; St. Gotthard Abbey, Battle of (1664); Vasvar, Treaty of (1664); Zuravno, Treaty of (1676).

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Koprulu, Mehmed Pasha (1575–1661)

Founder of a dynasty of viziers, warriors, and statesmen who dominated the administration of the Ottoman Empire during the last half of the 17th century. He helped rebuild the power of the empire by rooting out corruption and reorganizing the Ottoman army. As he introduced these changes, Koprulu also expanded the borders of the empire, defeating the Cossacks, the Hungarians, and most impressively, the Venetians. Koprulu's effectiveness was matched only by his reputation for ruthlessness.

Not much is known of the early life of Mehmed Pasha Koprulu. He was apparently born in the Albanian village of Rudnik, near Berat, in 1575, probably of an Albanian Christian father. He entered the sultan's service as a devshirme youth, one of the Christian children recruited for conversion to Islam and lifetime service to the sultan. Koprulu began as a kitchen boy in the imperial kitchen before transferring to the imperial treasury and then the offices of the palace chamberlain. His honesty and energy seem to have made it hard for other officials to work with Koprulu, and he was transferred to the *sipahi* (cavalry) corps in the provinces.

He was first stationed in the village of Kopru in central Anatolia. He quickly rose in rank, keeping the name Koprulu, meaning "man of Kopru." Koprulu's former mentor, Husrev Pasha, rose in the imperial service and promoted Koprulu to increasingly important offices. When Husrev was assassinated, however, Koprulu built up his own following. He eventually held important offices as head of the market police in Istanbul, supervisor of the imperial arsenal, chief of the *sipahi* corps, and head of the corps of armorers. Koprulu managed to attach himself to powerful men and somehow survived their falls without being destroyed himself. Koprulu continued to hold important offices, including governor of Trabzon.

Over the years, Koprulu had cultivated many friendships at the sultan's court, especially with the Queen Mother Kosem Sultan, grandmother of the minor sultan Mehmed IV. When the Venetian Navy threatened the Ottoman Empire in 1656, these friends, including Mehmed Efendi, the chief of scribes, and the chief architect, convinced the sultan that only Koprulu could avert disaster. He was called to Istanbul, where he accepted the position of grand vizier on September 14, 1656. As a condition of his acceptance, Koprulu demanded that the sultan decree only what Koprulu approved, allow him to make all appointments

and dismissals, and refuse to hear or accept any malicious stories that might be spread about him.

Koprulu had acquired the reputation of being an honest and able administrator, but he was 80 years old when he assumed office. Few observers expected him to serve long. His first actions, however, were designed to assert his power. Possible rivals and unfriendly religious leaders were banished or executed. The support of the Janissaries, the traditional elite shock troops of the Ottomans, was obtained by bribes to the rank and file, execution or removal of potentially unfaithful officers, and appointment of leaders loyal to Koprulu. Koprulu then used the Janissaries to punish those who refused to do his bidding.

Once secure in his office, Koprulu centralized power in the empire, reviving traditional Ottoman methods of governing. He ordered those who were suspected of abusing their positions or who proved to be corrupt to be removed and executed. Those who failed at their tasks were punished severely, and unsuccessful military commanders often paid the supreme price. When Grand Admiral Topal Mehmed Pasha failed to break the Venetian blockade of the Dardanelles on July 17, 1657, Koprulu executed him and his principal officers on the spot. When rivals complained to Mehmed IV about the grand vizier's methods, Koprulu resigned, complaining that the sultan had violated their agreement. Mehmed immediately asked Koprulu to return as grand vizier, because his methods showed such success at restoring Ottoman power.

Since the resurgence of the Republic of Venice was the immediate crisis that had prompted Koprulu's appointment as grand vizier, it was important that he demonstrate his effectiveness as a leader against the Venetians. Their navy had defeated the Turks and taken the islands of Tenedos and Lemnos in the Aegean Sea, blockading Istanbul and causing severe shortages. Recognizing that the Venetian Navy had far more modern equipment, Koprulu took the time to rebuild the Ottoman fleet before sending it against the Venetians. Despite heavy losses, the Ottomans regained the lost territory and captured several other islands from the Venetians.

The Venetians were able to retain their bases on the island of Crete, however, because new challenges to the Ottoman government arose in Transylvania and Anatolia. In Transylvania, a state to the southeast of Hungary, Prince George Rakoczy renounced his erstwhile allegiance to the sultan. He attempted to make his state into a major power, allying himself with other Protestant princes in an attempt to conquer Hungary and Poland. While Rakoczy invaded Poland in 1657, however, Koprulu sent the Crimean Tatars to attack Transylvania. They forced Rakoczy to retreat from Poland, but he refused to resume his obedience to the sultan. In response, in 1658, Koprulu himself led a large Ottoman army into Transylvania. This force defeated Rakoczy and forced him to flee to Habsburg lands. War with the Habsburgs continued, but Ottoman control over Transylvania was confirmed in a temporary peace.

Koprulu also had to deal with a serious revolt in Anatolia, led by an Ottoman official, Abaza Hasan Pasha. In mid-May 1658, Abaza brought together dissatisfied soldiers and officials to plot a revolt against Koprulu. On July 8, they openly declared a revolt, demanding Koprulu's head as the price for their obedience. Thousands joined the revolt, including soldiers sent to suppress it. Abaza marched on Istanbul. Koprulu led an army to meet them, first giving his soldiers six months' pay to ensure their loyalty. Abaza sent soldiers to join Koprulu's army in an effort to assassinate him. Koprulu learned of the plot and executed 6,000 soldiers on suspicion of sympathy to Abaza. Abaza retreated, losing many men to desertion. At last, Koprulu managed to lure Abaza and most of his officers into a trap by offering a truce. Koprulu slaughtered them all at a banquet. His agents then eliminated anyone in Anatolia who was deemed suspicious, including soldiers, teachers, judges, and religious leaders. At least 12,000 heads were sent back to Istanbul.

Despite Koprulu's advanced age, he continued to display amazing energy until the end of his life. He also continued to demonstrate his lack of education with his ruthless responses to any challenge. As he neared death, Koprulu became suspicious of everyone and began to execute even his friends on suspicion of disloyalty. When he fell mortally ill in 1661, the sultan came to his bedside. Koprulu convinced him to appoint his son, Koprulu Fazil Ahmed Pasha, as the next grand vizier. He is also reported to have advised the sultan to never take advice from a woman, never appoint a minister who is too wealthy, keep the Treasury filled, and keep the army on the move. Koprulu died on October 31, 1661. He left behind a well-tuned administrative machine, having restored to the Ottoman Empire its reputation for military aggressiveness.

Tim J. Watts

See also: Devshirme System; Janissaries; Koprulu, Fazil Ahmed Pasha; Venetian-Ottoman Wars.

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Kosovo, Battle of (1389)

This engagement, fought on June 28, 1389, effectively marked the end of Serbian independence for many years. The Serbian army of Prince Lazar was defeated by an Ottoman army led by Murad I.

In the spring of 1389, Murad I moved his army into Kosovo intending to threaten the Serbian lands of Prince Lazar. Lazar gathered his forces at Nis and then moved to intercept the Ottoman army on the field of Kosovo by June 28. Lazar's army numbered around 25,000 men, whereas the Ottoman was stronger, numbering up to 40,000 troops. The Serbian army deployed with its heavy cavalry in the center, flanked by light cavalry. The Serbian infantry was to the rear in support. The Ottoman forces were arrayed with the Janissaries and guard cavalry in the center under Murad's command. His two sons commanded the flanks, Bayezid on the right and Yakub on the left. The battle began with Ottoman archers goading the Serbian cavalry into making a charge. This attack was successful against the left wing of the Ottoman army. Serbian infantry pressed forward in the center, but the right wing of the Ottoman line held firm. This allowed Ottoman troops to counterattack in the center led by Bayezid. The Serbian attacks had now stalled, but their fate was sealed by the retreat of 12,000 troops commanded by Vuk Brankovic. Whether this was a betrayal of Lazar, or an attempt to salvage some Serbian troops from the debacle is open to debate. Lazar was killed during the fighting, and Murad I was killed by a Serbian nobleman, Milos Obilic. Accounts are conflicting about whether this took place during the battle or not. Bayezid declared himself sultan and had Yakub strangled. The results of the battle led to Serbia's becoming a vassal to the Ottoman Empire.

Ralph M. Baker

See also: Balkans, Ottoman Conquest of the; Janissaries.

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Kosovo, Battle of (1448)

This battle was fought on October 17–20, 1448, between the army of Murad II and a Christian army led by John Hunyadi, and led to an Ottoman victory. In 1448, Hunyadi, with a force of 24,000 Hungarian troops, attacked Murad II, who had around 50,000 men under his command. On October 17, Hunyadi reached Kosovo. His knights captured a series of hills from the Ottomans, which he then defended with war wagons. The following day Hunyadi tried to outflank Murad's position, using his light cavalry, however this attack was defeated by Rumelian and Anatolian troops. Hunyadi now ordered an assault on the center of the Ottoman army with his infantry. Initially, his troops pushed back the Janissaries facing them, until they reached the Ottoman camp. Here the Janissaries regrouped and, supported by their

own cavalry, forced the Hungarians back. This retreat turned into a rout, in which many Hungarian nobles fell. Hunyadi himself fled but was later captured. The remnants of the Hungarian force now withdrew to their fortified camp. Overnight the Ottoman forces maintained a constant rain of archery upon them. The Hungarians replied with desultory cannon fire. The following day Murad ordered a full-scale assault, and the Hungarian army was effectively annihilated.

Ralph M. Baker

See also: Hungarian-Ottoman Wars (1437–1526); Janissaries; Murad II.

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Krbava Field, Battle of (1493)

Major Ottoman victory over the Hungarian-Croatian army. After the conquest of the Byzantine Empire in 1453 and Bosnia in 1460s, the Ottomans quickly expanded into the northeastern Balkan peninsula, where they threatened the kingdom of Croatia, which was in personal union with the kingdom of Hungary. To put an end to Turkish raids, the Croats mobilized their forces (about 10,000 men) under Ban (prince) Mirko Derencin and intercepted the Ottoman army (some 8,000) of Hadim Yakup Pasha, returning from a plundering raid, near the town of Udbina in the Lika region (southern Croatia). The battle, fought on September 9. 1493, ended in a decisive defeat for the Croatian army, which lost most of its leaders, including Ban Mirko Derencin himself. The loss of thousands of Croats, among them the flower of the Croat nobility, had a profound effect on the Croatian popular memory, which christened the field of battle as the *Krbavsko Polje* (Field of Blood). This victory allowed the Ottomans to gradually extend their authority to southern Croatia.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Hungarian-Ottoman Wars (1437–1526).

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Kuchuk Kainardji, Treaty of (1774)

Peace treaty between Russia and the Ottoman Empire in the wake of the Russo-Ottoman War of 1768–1774. The treaty, signed at the village of Kuchuk Kainardji (Bulgaria) on July 21, 1774, proved to be rather consequential for the Ottoman Empire and had long-term effects on the history of the Middle East. The agreement consisted of 28 articles (plus two secret provisions). Under Russian pressure, Sultan Abdulhamid I recognized the independence of the Crimean khanate, which was annexed by Russia just nine years later, but maintained, as a caliph, his religious authority over it. This was the first time a separation of secular and spiritual authority was established in the Ottoman Empire and the first time an Ottoman ruler surrendered territory largely populated by Muslims.

According to other provisions, the Porte ceded the major fortresses of Kilburnu, Kerc, Yenikale, and Azak, and the territories of the Greater and Lesser Kabarda, allowing Russia to establish a strong presence in north Caucasus and the Black Sea. The Ottoman Empire retained Moldavia and Wallachia but recognized Russia's special position in the region. Russia agreed to withdraw from parts of north Caucasus and the islands in the Aegean Sea. In addition, the Ottoman authorities made concessions that gave Russian merchants commercial privileges throughout the empire, and the sultan agreed to pay a heavy war indemnity of 15,000 purses (4.5 million rubles).

The most consequential articles of the treaty dealt with Russia's role inside the Ottoman Empire. Russia received the right to open consulates anyplace within the Ottoman Empire. The sultan agreed to let Russia establish a Russian Orthodox Church for local Russians in the Galata district of Constantinople (Istanbul). Yet Article 7 granted Russia the right to represent (and protect) the church and its personnel. These provisions proved to be highly controversial as disagreements over their interpretation quickly emerged between Moscow and Istanbul. Russia interpreted them as granting it the status of the protector of Ottoman Orthodox Christians, which allowed active interference in Ottoman domestic affairs. The treaty was crucial in the development of the "Eastern Question" and contributed to the outbreak of the Crimean War in 1853.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Crimean War (1853–1856); Russo-Ottoman Wars.

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Kurdan, Treaty of (1746)

Concluded on September 4, 1746, the treaty ended more than a decade of hostilities between the Ottoman Empire and Iran. It reaffirmed the boundary arrangement set up in the 1639 Treaty of Zuhab.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Ottoman-Safavid Wars; Zuhab (Zohab), Treaty of (Treaty of Qasr-e Shirin) (1639).

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Kurdish Insurgency

From the 1960s to the end of the 1990s, many Kurdish organizations throughout the Middle East described themselves as "revolutionary movements." The concept *chorech*, which derives from Persian, has been widely used by these groups to define social and political "revolution" and national "liberation." Throughout these decades, the Kurdish movements projected themselves as a part of the Kurdish national struggle and as a component of Turkish, Iranian, Iraqi, and Syrian revolutionary movements. Many Kurds were members of the left-wing parties of these countries, and a certain fluidity was accepted by the Kurdish political organizations and by left-wing organizations (to a lesser extent, this is still the case in Turkey). These double affiliations oblige scholars to avoid a rigid typology and pay specific attention to the subjective aspects of these movements. In general, armed struggles for Kurdish independence were not successful, and the ideologies of Kurdish movements tended to shift from the 1960s to the present from relatively radical aspirations for independence and social revolution to more moderate goals. In the 1990s (and especially after 2003), the Iraqi Kurdish movements, with the assistance of the United States, established an autonomous self-governing region.

From the beginning of the 19th century, and particularly after the Tanzimat reforms (1839–1876) in the Ottoman Empire, the Kurdish regions entered a period of constant rebellions. The reforms were intended to improve and centralize administrative systems within the empire, following the French model. But they replaced the negotiations between the central government and the Kurds with massive state coercion and provoked widespread resistance. From 1808 to 1880, a series of revolts took place, aiming either at the preservation of autonomy or the establishment of an independent state. The last revolt of the 19th century, led by Ubeydullah, a

religious dignitary, developed a quasi-nationalist discourse, describing the Kurds as a different nation with the right to govern themselves. Ubeydullah's project was to liberate Persian Kurdistan first, before dealing with the issue of Ottoman Kurdistan.

State coercion was successful in suppressing these revolts and destroying the emirates from the 1840s to 1880. The destruction of the emirates produced two unintended consequences. First, a political vacuum, along with the enormous security problems linked to the presence of a massive, ill-paid, and starved imperial army, pushed the Kurds to seek protection through tribal networks. Instead of the dozens of autonomous emirates that governed Kurdistan earlier in the 19th century, almost 1,000 tribes now held de facto power. Second, unlike the former emirates, these tribes refused to identify themselves with an exclusive territory. Many of them were active in the border area between Russia, Persia, and the Ottoman Empire. They could challenge these states, yet change alliances when necessary.

The Ottoman state's answer to this unexpected evolution was to integrate the Kurdish tribes into the state's coercive policy. In 1890, Sultan Abdul Hamid II accepted the creation of the Hamidiye cavalries, in which some 50 tribes were transformed into Ottoman auxiliary forces. Largely autonomous in their actions, these tribes received salaries and weapons from the state. The Ottoman palace intended to use their military potential in a triple strategy: first, to prevent unification of the Kurdish tribes by favoring some over others; second, to prevent transborder affiliations and to deploy a cavalry force comparable to that of the Cossacks of the Russian Empire to protect the Ottoman-Russian border; and third, to Islamize the peripheral regions of the empire. The cavalries were used against the Christian Armenians during the massacres of 1894–1896.

The fall of Abdul Hamid II in 1909 and the ambition of the newly established Committee of Union and Progress to resolve the Armenian agrarian question pushed the Kurdish allies into rebellion. This new stage of revolts continued until 1914 and was marked by the slide of the tribes (and some religious dignitaries) toward nationalist aspirations, which included regional autonomy and use of Kurdish as an official language.

World War I radically changed the situation, namely in the Kurdish-inhabited areas of the Turkish Republic. The Union and Progress government decided during this war to exterminate the Armenian population (according to Ottoman figures dating from 1919, about 800,000 were killed; more recent estimates put the number killed at more than one million). It also sought a new alliance with the Kurdish tribes, mainly the former Hamidiye cavalries, which were renamed "Tribal Light Cavalries." The cavalries participated in the extermination, linking their fate (and that of the Kurds) to the alliance with the Ottoman state.

After the end of World War I, many parts of the Ottoman empire were occupied by Allied troops. Although small sections of the Kurdish-inhabited areas were

included in French-occupied Syria, southern Kurdistan was occupied by the British. The Sèvres Treaty of 1920 offered the other Kurds the possibility of having an autonomous state near an Armenian state. It also affirmed that this autonomy could lead to the formation of an independent Kurdish nation.

Some Kurdish nationalist movements, such as the Kurdish Clubs and the Society for Kurdish Elevation, were quite sympathetic to this project. However, most Kurdish leaders rejected this solution for four reasons: (1) they were reluctant to accept the creation of an Armenian state because some of them had participated in the extermination of Armenians, and they feared reprisals by the survivors; (2) Mustafa Kemal, the general leading the Turkish War of Independence after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire during the end of World War I, had promised the Kurdish leaders a new entity based on the equality and fraternity of the Turkish and Kurdish peoples and suggested the possibility of Kurdish autonomy within this new political framework; (3) according to the Turkish National Pact of March 1920, Mustafa Kemal affirmed his determination to liberate Iraqi Kurdistan and unify the Kurds; and (4) Kemal assured the Kurds that the Turkish Khalifa—the universal religious authority of Sunni Islam that was the main link between the Kurds and the Turks—would be protected.

Revolts of 1919–1946

By the end of the Turkish War of Independence in 1922, it was obvious that the division of the Kurdish populations among Iran, Iraq, Syria, and Turkey was a reality. In this situation, the Kurds faced some common circumstances but also different local situations. The first common feature was political. All four governments criminalized political, sectarian, and ethnic differences and aspirations. Turkey was the most radical case, as it was governed by an authoritarian single-party regime. Although less rigid, the other states also had nationalist programs that refused to accept the Kurds as a distinct group and Kurdish culture as a legitimate component of society. The second common factor was that compared with the former Ottoman-Persian border, the new borders were militarized. Crossing the borders meant, in the states' perspective, abandoning national allegiance and the national economy. Kurdish cross-border activities, including family gatherings, were militarily repressed, which provoked a spontaneous nonpolitical but armed resistance. The later Kurdish rebellions were either transborder conflicts or exerted heavy impacts on Kurdish populations across borders. Except for three periods—1927–1929, 1961–1974, and 1980–1998—cross-border movement was repressed by the states.

The 1920s and 1940s were decades of harshly repressed rebellions and uprisings, giving birth to both a traumatic collective memory and dreams of collective vengeance. Often, these revolts brought together two different, to some extent socially antagonistic, forces: the nationalist and widely Westernized intelligentsia, which

opposed the states because they were not Kurdish, and rural forces, mainly tribes and religious brotherhoods, which opposed the states because they were coercive entities that tried to impose taxes and intervene in what they viewed as nonstate domains. Kurdish nationalism became the dominant political response.

In Iran, the main rebellious force was that of Ismail Agha Simko, influential leader of the Shikak tribe. Simko's revolt, which mobilized mainly tribal forces at the end of the 1910s and the beginning of the 1920s, was suppressed in 1930 (Simko was killed by the state's representatives while he was attending negotiations). In Iraq, where the Kurds did not accept their attachment to the newly founded state, the alliance between the Westernized nationalist elite and the rural forces made possible a few revolts, dominated by the figure of Sheikh Mahmoud Berzendji (1919, 1922–1923, 1931) or members of the Barzani family (1943). Finally, in Turkey, where the Kurdish leaders believed the Kemalist regime had betrayed them (the new government declared Turkish nationalism as its official ideology, abolished the khalifa, adopted a forced policy of Westernization, and did not honor its promises to liberate Iraqi Kurdistan), no less than 16 revolts took place between 1924 and 1938. The most important, the 1925 Sheikh Said Rebellion, the 1927–1930 Ararat Rebellion, and the 1936–1938 Dersim Revolt, had clearly nationalist agendas. Repression killed tens of thousands of civilians.

The last in this series of rebellions was that of Qadi Muhammad in Iranian Kurdistan, who, in the aftermath of World War II, and while the Russian troops were still occupying Iran, proclaimed an autonomous republic (the Mahabad Republic). Although based on a massive mobilization of the Kurdish tribes and Iraqi Kurdish fighters, the republic's survival was contingent on the presence of Soviet troops. It was crushed after the Soviet withdrawal. Qadi Muhammad was executed in 1947. The fall of the Mahabad Republic marked the beginning of what is called the "period of silence" in the Kurdish nationalist struggle.

The 1961 Barzani Rebellion

By 1961, when the Barzani Rebellion started, the situation in the entire Middle East was radically different from that of the 1940s. First of all, the Cold War created an unprecedented polarization and the conditions for new social and political mobilizations. Second, urban intelligentsia adopted leftist views such as the dream of national independence and ideas of progress and social change. Third, the cities replaced the countryside as the centers of social and political activity. The new urban intelligentsia included military officers along with university students and, more and more, high school students. Though living outside the realities of the working class and the peasantry, the intelligentsia viewed itself the agent of the social revolution leading to their emancipation. Fourth, thanks to transistor radios, popular magazines, and harshly repressed left-wing literature, this intelligentsia

was aware of the realities of the outside world. The situation was similar in Kurdistan and, broadly speaking, among the Kurdish communities in the big cities of Tehran, Baghdad, and Istanbul. Leftist goals for Kurdish youth included social emancipation and national liberation.

The renewal of the Kurdish movement took place as an outcome of this process of radicalization. In the aftermath of the 1958 military coup in Iraq, Mustafa Barzani, who had participated in the formation of the autonomous Kurdish republic in Iran, returned to Iraq from the Soviet Union. He assumed leadership of the Kurdistan Democratic Party (PDK). Although he had spent almost 15 years in exile in the Soviet Union and was nicknamed the "red Mollah," Barzani remained a conservative figure. But for many party leaders and members, among them the well-known Kurdish writer Ibrahim Ahmad (1914–2000) and leftist Kurdish leader Jalal Talabani, *chorech* meant a revolutionary experience that included sacrifice, social and political change, and national liberation. Through the *chorech*, the fate of the Kurdish nation was linked to that of all exploited classes in Iraq and to that of humanity.

According to some Kurdish sources, when the negotiations between the Iraqi central government and the PDK failed, the revolutionary branch of the Kurdish party decided to start a new revolt. This rebellion was one of the most important guerrilla struggles of the 1960s and the early 1970s. It continued until March 11, 1970, partly thanks to Iranian, American, and Israeli aid. Then the newly established Iraqi Baath regime accepted the principle of regional autonomy and the organization of a general census in Kirkuk city to determine whether the Kurds constituted its majority. But following the policy of the forced Arabization of the city and the proclamation of a unilateral law of autonomy, which excluded Kirkuk, the uprising resumed. In March 1975, Iran and Iraq signed a treaty of reconciliation in Algiers, and, with the blessing of the United States, Iran stopped aiding (namely offering shelter for the fighters) the rebellion. Barzani then ended the Kurds' armed struggle.

Compared with past Kurdish movements, the Barzani uprising, which had important rural components, also enjoyed the support of urban populations, namely the youth, who participated massively in the rebellion. The urban intelligentsia accepted the leadership of Mustafa Barzani, but it was much more radical. The *peshmarga* (those who face death) were the Kurdish guerrilla soldiers of the revolt for an independent Kurdish nation and became world famous; but a new type of participant, called "militant," who shared many common features with other left-wing activists in the Middle East, also emerged in the armed struggle.

Thanks to its durability (almost 15 years) and the technical means at its disposal (including a radio station), the Barzani Rebellion became the main inspirational example of the Kurdish movement well beyond Iraqi Kurdistan. Its collapse in 1975 was a major trauma for the Kurds, resulting in three radicalizing effects. First, the



Kurdish tribesman, hoping to reach the Iran-Iraq border before the ceasefire ended on April 1, 1974, gather in a village near a pass leading to the border. During the 1970s, the United States backed the Kurdish Revolt in Iraq against Saddam Hussein in order to help protect Iran from Iraqi aggression. (HultonArchive/Getty Images)

loss of what seemed to be the Kurdish activists' most successful liberation movement created a vacuum that led to the formation of many new Kurdish groups, namely the PUK (Patriotic Union of Kurdistan) in Iraq and the PKK (Kurdistan Workers' Party) in Turkey. Second, what was perceived as America's betrayal in supporting Iran's 1975 withdrawal of support for the insurgent Iraqi Kurds, thereby undermining the Barzani revolt, pushed the entire Kurdish movement toward anti-Americanism and far-left positions. Some Kurdish organizations in Turkey, such as Kemal Burkay's PSK (Socialist Party of Kurdistan), chose the pro-Soviet camp, while the Iraqi PUK of Jalal Talabani, hostile to the Soviet Union because it supported the Baath regime in Iraq, became Maoists. Others, among them the PKK, adopted an independent revolutionary strategy. Third, Kurdish nationalists redefined Kurdistan as a colonized country. The new kind of colonialism of the states that divided Kurdistan, they argued, was not solely an economic one; it aimed also at the destruction of Kurdishness. The domination of the Kurds by the Turkish, Persian, and Iraqi states was part of a wider imperialist domination over the world,

in the sense that these states were either dependent on or supported by the United States. The liberation of Kurdistan was thus portrayed as a means for the emancipation of the colonized Iranian, Arab, and Turkish populations.

Kurdish Insurgency in 1975–1991

Other major events shook the Kurds: the Iranian Revolution (1978–1979), the Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988), and a military coup d'état in Turkey (1980) whose leaders openly aimed at destroying left-wing activities and viewed Kurdishness as a pathological illness to be cured. In Iraq, the Kurds had begun a new guerrilla war immediately after the end of the Barzani Rebellion in 1975. With the start of the Iran-Iraq War in 1980, it gained momentum, and with Iranian support, Kurds were able to gain control of wide sections of the Iraqi Kurdish countryside. Both the PDK and the PUK had strong support, mainly among the urban populations, but their political options were limited. They were dependent on the war. Moreover, although the war forced the Iraqi Baath regime to withdraw from sections of Kurdistan, it also provoked more coercive force, including the use of chemical weapons against the Kurds on March 16, 1988, at Halabja, a city of 50,000 people, causing the death of some 5,000 people. Also, the abandonment of Maoism in China and the crisis of the Soviet system obliged the Kurds to develop social-democratic or even purely nationalist programs.

In Iran, Kurdish cities had participated in the Iranian Revolution, which, in its initial stage, had a left-wing orientation. Although many Kurds were members of Iranian left-wing organizations, Kurdish political life passed rapidly under the control of two Kurdish parties: the radical leftist Komeleh of A. Ilkhanzade and the more social-democratic PDK-Iran, headed by Abdul Rahman Ghassemlou. Iran's new Islamic regime, however, was opposed to Kurdish national autonomy. After heavy fighting, which probably cost tens of thousands of lives, and many death sentences pronounced by Iranian revolutionary tribunals, the Iranian Kurdish organizations abandoned urban centers and turned to rural guerrilla warfare. During the Iran-Iraq War, they received military support from Iraq. After the war, the PDK-Iran accepted the central government's proposal to negotiate, but Ghassemlou and his delegation were assassinated in Vienna by Tehran's envoys.

In Turkey, after military repression that lead to the death of many of its members, the PKK decided to start a guerrilla war in 1984. The PKK won massive popular support among Kurdish youth. By the end of the 1980s, the guerrilla war had resulted in some 3,000 deaths.

Post 1991

By 1990, the Kurdish movement was once again facing an *ashbetal* (capitulation). The Iranian Kurdish movement had been beheaded, weakening possibilities for

further military resistance; in Iraq, the physical destruction of rural areas made a new phase of resistance impossible to envision.

This situation changed radically after the defeat of Iraq in the First Iraqi War of 1991. President George Bush's appeal to resist the Baath regime inspired a popular uprising. But when the United States refused to intervene, the Iraqi Republican Guards crushed the rebels. Fearing a renewal of chemical warfare, almost two millions Kurds decided to flee Iraq to Turkey and Iran. On the insistent demands of François Mitterrand and Turgut Özal, the French and Turkish presidents, respectively, the United Nations Security Council declared the northern part of Iraq a "safe haven," where the Iraqi army was not allowed to operate. But a civil war broke out among the Iraqi Kurds during 1994–1997, resulting in the division of Iraqi Kurdistan between Jalal Talabani's PUK and Mesud Barzani's PDK. Later the situation improved considerably, and a form of self-rule was established, mainly under the direction of the PDK. After the Second Iraq War of 2003, Kurdish forces entered into the largely Arabized city of Kirkuk, where tensions between the Turkoman, Kurdish, and Arab communities continued. Leaving aside the issue of the future status of Kirkuk, the Provisional Iraqi Constitution of 2004 accepted the principle of a federal solution to the Kurdish question in Iraq.

In Iran, the Komeleh lost popular support, and members of a new generation of PDK leaders, among them Dr. Sharafkandi, were assassinated by Iranian agents. Kurdish armed struggle has largely ended, replaced by civil forms of resistance within Iran itself. The demand of regional autonomy within the framework of a democratized Iran still constitutes the Kurdish nationalists' main political goal.

In Turkey, guerrilla warfare intensified in the 1990s. During these years, the PKK, led by Abdullah Öcalan, was simultaneously expressing its desire to be recognized by the United States and the European Union as the legitimate representative of the Kurds while pursuing its goal of leading a socialist revolution throughout the Middle East to "hunt out imperialist forces." When Öcalan was captured in Kenya and delivered to Turkey in 1999, many militants reacted with self-sacrificial forms of violence (suicide bombings, self-immolation). Only the appeals of Öcalan and other party leaders brought such actions to stop. After his arrest, Öcalan ordered the end of the armed struggle, which was generally accepted by his followers. But the organization did not disarm; it preserved its squadrons as the "people's defense forces." And after June 1, 2004, in reaction to what its leaders claimed were repeated Turkish attacks on their forces and the nonsatisfaction of the PKK's minimal demands, it started a new phase of limited guerrilla war.

The PKK of the 1990s was the last example of what could be called a revolutionary Kurdish organization. Its history illustrated how reaction to state coercion, as well as the practice and romanticism of its revolutionary armed struggle, can lead to extreme forms of violence, including self-sacrifice.

Currently, Kurdish political activity is generally linked to Kurdish nationalist goals dissociated from any kind of class struggle. Some forms of cross-ethnic revolutionary radicalism have emerged, particularly among poorer members of Kurdish society. Common religious beliefs have united members of different ethnic groups in the Hizbullahî organization in Turkey, which has been widely armed and used by Turkish security forces against PKK militants, or in Ansar al-Islam, which is seemingly a part of the Al Qaeda networks. These organizations were originally purely Kurdish but later became mixed Kurdish-Turkish and Kurdish-Arabic, respectively.

The decades-long Kurdish struggle for self-rule, which has repeatedly provoked brutal repression, has also been greatly affected by international conflicts and developments. Finally, partly as a result of Iraq's defeat in wars in 1991 and 2003, the Iraqi Kurds achieved the creation of an autonomous homeland, which likely will encourage the aspirations of Kurds in Turkey, Iran, and Syria.

Hamit Bozarslan

See also: al-Anfal Campaign (1987–1898).

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Kutahya Convention (1833)

When the last Ottoman field force was destroyed by Ibrahim Pasha (1789–1848) at Konya (December 21, 1832), during the first Turko-Egyptian War, very little remained to block an Egyptian march on Istanbul. The "Eastern Question" seemed

ready to obtain a definitive answer, until a Russian squadron landed troops to protect the city (February 20, 1833). Now the sultan's rebellious vassal, Mehmed Ali (1769–1849), stepped back and agreed to a truce brokered by the great powers.

The Kutahya Convention (May 4, 1833) ended hostilities between Egypt and the Ottomans. It required Ibrahim to pull back from Anatolia but recognized Egyptian control of greater Syria, Crete, and the Hejaz. It also guaranteed ratification of Hunkiar Iskelesi (July 8, 1833), a defensive treaty between Russia and the Ottoman Empire. As one Turkish diplomat explained this strange connection between two bitter foes, "a drowning man will clutch a serpent."

The combination of Kutahya and Hunkiar Iskelesi seriously upset the status quo in the Near East. They turned British, Austrian, Russian, and French attentions to this region, and the combination guaranteed a new round of fighting in 1839–1840, great power intervention, and the Treaty of London (July 15, 1840).

John P. Dunn

See also: Egyptian-Ottoman Wars; Hunkiar Iskelesi, Treaty of (1833); Ibrahim Pasha; London, Treaty of (1840); Mehmed Ali.

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Kutayba Ibn Muslim. *See* Qutayba (Kutayba) ibn Muslim

Kuwait, Iraqi Invasion of (1990)

At 2:00 a.m. on August 2, 1990, Iraqi forces invaded Kuwait. Two weeks before, on July 17, 1990, Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein had threatened military action against that small Gulf nation for its overproduction of Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) oil quotas, which had helped drive down the price of oil.

Relations between the two countries had heretofore been close. In 1979, a radical regime had come to power in Iran, and Kuwait subsequently proved a staunch ally during Iraq's protracted war (1980–1988) with Iran. Hundreds of thousands of people died on both sides in the war, and Iraq had accumulated a considerable war debt of some $80 billion. Hussein was thus anxious that oil prices be as high as possible, and Kuwaiti excess production worked against this. Kuwait was also the major creditor for the Iraqi war effort, to the tune of about

$35 billion. Hussein demanded that these loans be forgiven, reasoning that Iraq had borne the brunt of the fight in defense of Arab interests and deserved monetary concessions.

Hussein was also angry over Kuwaiti slant drilling into Iraqi oil fields along their common border. Finally, Iraq had long claimed Kuwait as a province dating back to the arbitrary administrative boundaries during the period of the Ottoman Empire. Iraq's desire to gobble up its small neighbor certainly did not begin with Hussein. When Britain granted Kuwait its independence in 1961, Iraqi strongman Abdul al-Karim Quassim had immediately asserted Iraq's claim to sovereignty. This was not only a matter of securing Kuwaiti oil but also that nation's long coastline. Iraq's sole access to the Gulf was the Shatt al-Arab waterway, the sovereignty over which was a matter of contention with its enemy Iran. Securing Kuwait would mean easy Iraqi access into the Persian Gulf.

The war with Iraq had left Iraq with one of the world's largest military establishments, and Hussein was determined to use it to advantage. For some time Washington had been concerned over Iraq's expanding nuclear industry and a chemical and biological capability that Hussein had used in the war against Iran as well as against some of his own people, the Kurds. Then, in mid-July 1990, American intelligence satellites detected Iraqi forces massing near the Kuwait border.

Yet U.S. policy was unclear. Fearful of radical Islam in Iran, both the Soviet Union and the United States had assisted Iraq in its war with Iran. Washington had provided valuable satellite intelligence. Up until the invasion of Kuwait, moreover, Washington assumed that Hussein was weary of war and would in any case need a protracted period of peace to rebuild. At the same time, U.S. Ambassador to Iraq April Glaspie had followed the George H.W. Bush administration policy and delivered mixed messages that seemed to allow Hussein operational freedom in the Persian Gulf. Hussein probably believed his moves against Kuwait would not be challenged by the United States. On its part, the State Department did not believe Saddam Hussein would actually mount a full-scale invasion. If military action occurred, Washington expected only a limited offensive to force the Kuwaitis to accede to Iraqi's demands to bring the cost of oil in line. Clearly, Washington underestimated Hussein's ambitions. The intelligence was there, but the administration had failed to act on a Pentagon call for a show of force to deter possible Iraqi aggression. Indeed, the Bush administration did not draw a firm line in the sand until Hussein had already crossed it.

Commander of the Republican Guards Lieutenant General Ayad Futahih al-Rawi, had charge of the invasion force. It consisted of the Iraqi Hammurabi Armored Division and Tawakalna Mechanized Division, supported by Iraqi special forces and the Medina Armored Division. The Hammurabi and Tawakalna divisions easily overcame the sole Kuwaiti brigade deployed along the common border, then headed south to Al Jahrad at the head of the Gulf of Kuwait before turning



east to Kuwait City. Kuwaiti armored cars had no chance of stopping the massed Iraqi T-72 tanks.

By 5:00 a.m., fighting had begun for Kuwait City. Heliborne elite Iraqi troops were airlifted into the city, preventing any Kuwaiti withdrawal back into it. At the same time, Iraqi seaborne commandos sealed off the Kuwaiti coast. Meanwhile,

Iraqi Army troops in Baghdad celebrate their country's successful invasion and occupation of Kuwait in August 1990. (David Turnley/Corbis)

the Medina Armored Division screened the Iraqi invasion force against the remote possibility of any intervention by the Gulf Cooperation Council's Peninsula Shield Brigade situated in northern Saudi Arabia. By evening it was all but over. Four Iraqi infantry divisions moved in behind the mobile forces to occupy the country and conduct mopping-up operations. The three Iraqi heavy divisions then took up defensive positions along the border with Saudi Arabia to the south. Kuwait was completely occupied in less than 48 hours. In all, the Iraqis lost in the battle two fighter aircraft, six helicopters, and several armored vehicles. Most Kuwaiti Air Force aircraft took refuge in Saudi Arabia.

Once the battle was won, the Iraqis settled in for an occupation that claimed the lives and property of many Kuwaitis. The Iraqis failed in their effort to seize the emir of Kuwait, Sheikh Jaber al-Ahmad al-Sabrah. He managed to escape, but Iraqi commandos killed his brother, Sheikh Fahd, who was in the palace. The Iraqis then proceeded to loot much of the public and private wealth of Kuwait. Saddam set up a brief puppet government under Alaa Hussein Ali, before annexing Kuwait outright and installing an Iraqi provincial government.

The U.S. reaction was surprisingly swift. President Bush was deeply concerned over the impact of the invasion on the supply of oil and oil prices, as well as on Saudi Arabia, which possessed the world's largest oil reserves and shared a common border with Kuwait. Bush and others of his generation styled Hussein's aggression

as a challenge akin to that of Adolf Hitler and made much of a supposed and quite inaccurate contrast between dictatorship (Iraq) and democracy (Kuwait).

On August 8, Bush ordered the deployment of forward forces to Saudi Arabia in Operation Desert Shield. The troops were to bolster the Saudis and demonstrate resolve in the midst of diplomatic maneuvering. Saddam Hussein proved intransigent, and war loomed between Iraq on the one side and a growing coalition headed by the United States that included Arab states.

Spencer C. Tucker

See also: Hussein, Saddam; Iran-Iraq War (1980–1988); Persian Gulf War (1991).

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Conflict and Conquest in the Islamic World

Conflict and Conquest in the Islamic World

A HISTORICAL ENCYCLOPEDIA

Volume 2

Alexander Mikaberidze, Editor

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L

Labor Battalions, Ottoman (World War I)

Labor battalions, as in other countries' armies, have always been an important part of the Ottoman Army. The first such labor battalions were used as auxiliary army work corps building roads and bridges ahead of the army during campaigns. They were then assigned the duty of building forts and castles in the conquered territories. They were also frequently assigned to provide similar labor function for the navy. The labor corps was recruited from Ottoman subjects, though mainly non-Muslims, and they were exempt from certain taxes. Prisoners of war and hired foreigners were also used in the labor battalions.

When the Ottoman Army was modernized in the 19th century, recruits were categorized as regular (*nizamiye*), active reserve (*ihtiyat-redif)*, and garrison guards (*mustahfız*). The latter were used in service works and laid the foundation of the labor battalions, which were used first in the Balkan Wars (1912–1913).

Before the Ottoman Empire entered the World War I, the Ottoman Army was divided into combat and noncombat forces. All Ottoman male subjects between the ages of 18 and 45 years were recruited for the army. The labor battalions (called *Amele Taburları*) were part of the noncombat forces on August 5, 1914, and placed under the authority of the Army Transportation Inspectorate (*Ordu Menzil Müfettişliği*). The labor battalions were organized into two main groups, and were tasked with providing logistical support, such as repairing and constructing the highways, railways, and ports for the war fronts and constructing fortified military posts. Group A, the Army and Transportation Labor Battalions (*Ordu ve Menzil Amele Taburları*), was under the command of the General Inspectorate of the Transportation. Group B was under the command of the General Directorate of Military Railways and Ports. The plan was to recruit 1,200 soldiers for each battalion, but this number increased to 1,500 when the work necessitated it. Labor battalions were formed generally from the reserves and garrison guards, so these soldiers were seen as not useful at the front or too old for active service (i.e., they were older than 40 years and had completed their regular military service). A high number of the recruits in these battalions were non-Muslims because the Ottoman government did not want to use them on battle fronts. The non-Muslim recruits were typically younger than the Muslim recruits. Prisoners of war were also used in

separately created labor battalions. Labor battalions distinguished between skilled soldiers (e.g., smiths, quarrymen, stonemasons, carpenters, lathe operators, fitters, and conductors who worked under the order of the engineers) and unskilled soldiers (i.e., those who performed general menial tasks, such as maintaining bridges and roads, digging graves, and loading and unloading goods).

Throughout World War I there were 90 labor battalions, each named after an army unit or the region it was assigned, and commanded by a retired reserve officer. In addition, many civilian laborers were mobilized for war fronts while labor battalions were used for constructing railroads and fortification, handling goods, and working factories and on agricultural farms. When the need for labor increased, the Ottoman authorities established a women's labor battalion on October 3, 1917. The women recruits were used as tailors and seamstresses, as well in offices and hospitals; some were even put to work building roads and digging graves. The labor battalions supported the Ottoman Army throughout World War I and were disbanded after the war ended.

Birten Çelik

See also: Ottoman Army (World War I); World War I.

Further Reading

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Lausanne, Treaty of (1912)

Treaty concluded in Lausanne, Switzerland, on October 18, 1912, between Italy and the Ottoman Empire (Turkey). The treaty, which ended the Italo-Ottoman War of 1911–1912, compelled the Porte to withdraw forces from Tripoli and to recognize Italy's control of Libya. Italy removed its forces from the Aegean Islands and agreed to the presence of a religious representative of the Turkish sultan in Tripoli.

The war had revealed the Ottoman weakness and contributed to the outbreak of the First Balkan War (1912–1913).

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Balkan Wars (1912–1913); Italo-Ottoman War (1911–1912).

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Lausanne, Treaty of (1923)

Peace treaty between the Allied Powers and Turkey. Unlike the Treaty of Sèvres, the terms of which the Allies dictated to the Ottoman government in 1920, the Treaty of Lausanne that was signed on July 24, 1923, was a negotiated peace. The Treaty of Sèvres had been a humiliation for Turkey. Under its terms Greece assumed control over Smyrna and the hinterland as well as all of Ottoman Europe outside of Constantinople. The treaty also removed the Arabic-speaking lands and Armenia from Ottoman control and established an autonomous Kurdistan under League of Nations guidance. It fixed the size of the Turkish army at 50,000 soldiers, and it also left in place the capitulations that gave foreigners the right of extraterritoriality and established foreign control over many aspects of the Turkish financial system.

The terms of the treaty set off a wave of nationalism in Turkey, personified in Mustafa Kemal, known as Atatürk. On August 19, 1920, the National Assembly, called into session by the sultan to approve the Treaty of Sèvres, instead rejected it and denounced as traitors those who had supported it. The sultan then dissolved Parliament, which led Kemal to establish a rival government in the interior of Anatolia. He soon concluded an agreement with Russia that proved beneficial to both nations. Turkey recognized Russian incorporation of Azerbaijan, Georgia, and half of Armenia. In return, Turkey received surplus Russian arms and Russia's diplomatic support, including its recognition of Turkish control over the other half of Armenia.

Kemal soon took advantage of the Russian arms to go to war against Greece in Smyrna. Although Greek prime minister Eleuthérios Venizélos sent forces into Anatolia, Kemal carried out a brilliant military campaign in the Greco-Turkish War of 1920–1922, during which he retook Smyrna and its hinterland and then turned north against Constantinople. Italy, which had come to see Greece as a more immediate rival than Turkey, agreed to withdraw its own occupation troops after a defeat at Kemal's hands in Central Anatolia. This led the British and French also to depart.

Turkish success on the battlefield produced gains at the bargaining table. In November 1922, a conference to consider revisions to the Treaty of Sèvres opened in the Swiss city of Lausanne. Plenipotentiaries from eight nations negotiated there for seven months. As evidence of their parity at the conference, Turkish diplomats successfully rejected a draft treaty presented in April 1923. The two sides resumed talks until a revision met with the approval of all parties in July.

The Treaty of Lausanne abrogated the terms of the Treaty of Sèvres. It included no provisions for the autonomy of Kurdistan, thus recognizing its reincorporation into Turkey. The capitulations continued in theory, but only a handful of Western legal and medical advisers remained in Turkey after 1923. Eastern Thrace and all of Anatolia returned to Turkish control, settling border disputes with both Greece and Bulgaria. The military terms of the treaty were also favorable to Turkey. Greece agreed not to fortify its Aegean islands and promised not to fly military aircraft over Turkish airspace.

The treaty also resolved the delicate issue of the Bosporus and the Dardanelles. The International Straits Committee established at Sèvres and composed of Great Britain, France, and Italy remained in place, but Turkey became a member. More importantly, the committee lost the right of intervention granted in the previous treaty. Thereafter, determinations about the security of the straits were the preserve of the League of Nations. In exchange for these concessions, Turkey recognized British control of Cyprus and Italian authority in the Dodecanese Islands.

The treaty also freed Turkey from the reparation payments that the Ottoman government had accepted in the Treaty of Sèvres. In return, Turkey agreed to pay outstanding prewar debts incurred by the Ottomans to the other signatories.

The treaty represented a major triumph for Kemal and the Turkish nationalists. Eleuthérios Venizélos, former prime minister, signed for Greece. He had been one of the most vocal supporters of Greek territorial aims in Turkey, and his signature symbolized the end of Greek designs across the Aegean Sea. The United States and Russia, although not signatories, lent support.

The treaty also led to one of the largest forced movements of populations in history. It took religion as a basis for defining ethnicity and implicitly argued that religious minorities could not exist within the newly created borders. As a result, more than 1.2 million Eastern Orthodox Christians moved from Turkey to Greece, 150,000 of them were from Constantinople (soon to be renamed Istanbul). Similarly, 380,000 Muslims moved from Greece to Turkey. The flood of refugees caused financial and social problems for both nations.

The Treaty of Lausanne must be understood as a monumental triumph for Turkey. It formally ended any chance of the return of the sultanate, and it established Turkey as a power in the Middle East, Eastern Europe, and Central Asia. The biggest losers under the treaty were the independence-minded Kurds and the Armenians who now had to live under Turkish and Soviet control. The treaty also

significantly reduced tensions in the region among Greece, Italy, and Turkey, thus calming the Balkans considerably.

Michael S. Neiberg

See also: Greco-Turkish War (1920–1922); Kemal Atatürk, Mustafa; Sèvres, Treaty of (1920); World War I.

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Lawrence, Thomas Edward (Lawrence of Arabia) (1888–1935)

Variously an intelligence officer, Arabist, historian of Crusader castles, and writer, T. E. Lawrence was born at Tremadoc, North Wales. Educated at the Oxford School and at Jesus College, Oxford, he spent the years between 1911 and 1914 on archaeological excavations in the Middle East, notably at the Hittite site of Carchemish, Syria. The Arabic he learned there he placed at the service of British army intelligence in 1913 and 1914, helping to survey Sinai and the Negev under cover of an archaeological expedition.

After the outbreak of World War I, he joined military intelligence, going to Cairo in December 1914. In 1916, he served in Mesopotamia (now Iraq). Then, in June 1916, Arabs in the Hejaz (western Arabia and home to Muslim's holiest site, Mecca) began a revolt from Turkey. Sharif Hussein, the emir of Hejaz, led forces made up primarily of Bedouin tribes with his sons, Sharif Feisal and Sharif Abdullah. Lawrence joined them in October 1916, as Britain provided naval support, gold, and weapons. Helping to organize attacks on the Medina-Damascus Railway, he also traveled north through the desert with Arab forces, putting pressure on the Germans and Turks nearer Britain's main advance from Egypt into Palestine and Syria. The forces took the Red Sea port of Aqaba in July 1917, reaching Damascus in October 1918.

Lawrence by then knew that Britain and France intended to keep some of the spoils from the Ottoman Empire for themselves. Sent to the Paris Peace Conference

in 1919, he was disappointed to see France given control of Syria. In his next post, he was the adviser on Arab affairs at the Colonial Office under Winston Churchill, and in that capacity, he accompanied Churchill to a vital Cairo conference in March 1921. This meeting secured the throne of Iraq for Feisal (who had been removed from Damascus by the French in mid-1920) and the emirate of Transjordan for Feisal's brother, Abdullah.

So Lawrence did see his Arab allies rewarded before turning his back on high posts and joining the ranks of the armed services. Briefly enlisting in the tank corps in 1923, he changed his name to T.E. Shaw. He served in the Royal Air Force (RAF) from 1922 to 1923 and again from 1925 to 1935, including a spell on India's northwest frontier.

Despite joining the ranks, Lawrence continued to mix with public figures, such as writer Thomas Hardy. His epic account of his desert exploits, *The Seven Pillars of Wisdom*, was printed privately in 1926. The same year, it appeared in abridged form as *The Revolt in the Desert*, the full version being published after his death. Retiring to his cottage in rural Dorset (in southwest England) in 1935, Lawrence died on May 19, 1935, as a result of a motorbike accident on a Dorset lane.

Karl A. Hack

See also: Arab-Revolt of 1916–1918; Husayn ibn Ali; World War I.

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Lebanon, Civil War in (1975–1990)

The Lebanese Civil War, which lasted from 1975 to 1990, had its origin in the conflicts and political compromises of Lebanon's colonial period. It was exacerbated by the nation's changing demographics, Christian and Muslim interreligious strife, and Lebanon's proximity to Syria and Israel. Indeed, the Lebanese Civil War was part and parcel of the wider Arab-Israeli conflict and was emblematic of the inherent volatility and instability of the Middle East after World War II.

Lebanon in its present-day borders dates to 1920, when the French administered a mandate over the region. The French added several districts to the historic mustashafiyya, Mount Lebanon, a separate administrative district that had called for Western protection in the 19th century, eventually establishing Greater Lebanon.

This meant the inclusion of areas whose populations had always been administered from Syria and did not necessarily support separation from that country. These heavily Sunni and Shia Muslim areas diluted the previous Maronite Christian and Druze majority of Mount Lebanon. When Lebanon won its independence from France in 1943, an unwritten power-sharing agreement was forged among the three major ethnic and religious groups. These included Maronite Christians (then in the majority), Sunni Muslims, and Shiite Muslims.

Lebanon's Muslim groups were discontented with the 1943 National Pact, which established a dominant political role for the Christians, especially the Maronites, in the central government. Druze, Muslims, and leftists joined forces as the National Movement in 1969. The movement called for the taking of a new census, as none had been conducted since 1932, and the subsequent drafting of a new governmental structure that would reflect the census results.

Muslim and Maronite leaders were unable to reconcile their conflicts of interest and instead formed militias, undermining the authority of the central government. The government's ability to maintain order was also handicapped by the nature of the Lebanese Army. It was composed on a fixed ratio of religions, and as members defected to militias of their own ethnicity, the army would eventually prove unable to check the power of the militias, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), or other splinter groups.

Maronite militias armed by West Germany and Belgium drew supporters from the larger and poorer Christian population in the north. The most powerful of these was al-Kata'ib, also known as the Phalange, led by Bashir Jumayyil (Gemayel). Others included the Lebanese Forces, led by Samir Jaja (Geagea), and the Guardians of the Cedars.

Shiite militias, such as the Amal militia, fought the Maronites and later fought certain Palestinian groups and occasionally even other Shiite organizations. Some Sunni factions received support from Libya and Iraq. The Soviet Union encouraged Arab socialist movements that spawned leftist Palestinian organizations, such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PLFP) and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine. Before the civil war, the rise of Baathism in Syria and Iraq was paralleled by a surge of Lebanese Baathists. Within the civil war, these were also reflected in groups such as al-Saiqa, a Syrian-aligned and largely anti-Fatah Palestinian fighting force, and the Arab Liberation Front, an Iraqi-aligned Baathist movement.

In 1970, Jordan's King Hussein expelled the PLO from Jordan after the events of Black September. PLO chairman Yasir Arafat thus regrouped his organization in the Palestinian refugee areas of Beirut and South Lebanon, where other refugees had survived since 1948. The National Movement attracted support from the PLO Rejection Front faction, prominently including the PFLP, although Arafat and Fatah initially sought to remain neutral in the inter-Lebanese conflict. The National

Movement supported the Palestinian resistance movement's struggle for national liberation and activities against Israel, and although Palestinians could not vote in Lebanon and, being outside of the political system, had no voice in its reformation, they nonetheless lent moral support to the movement's desire for political reformation. By the early 1970s, the Palestinian resistance groups, although disunited, were a large fighting force. Maronites viewed the resistance and the PLO as disruptive and a destabilizing ally of the Muslim factions.

On the morning of April 13, 1975, unidentified gunmen in a speeding car fired on a church in the Christian East Beirut suburb of Ayn ar Rummanah, killing four people, including two Maronite Phalangists. Later that day, Phalangists led by Jumayyil killed 27 Palestinians returning from a political rally on a bus in Ayn ar Rummanah. Four Christians were killed in East Beirut in December 1975, and in growing reprisals Phalangists and Muslim militias subsequently massacred at least 600 Muslims and Christians at checkpoints, igniting the 1975–1976 stage of the civil war.

The fighting eventually spread to most parts of the country, precipitating President Suleiman Franjieh's call for support from Syrian troops in June 1976, to which Syria responded by ending its prior affiliation with the Rejection Front and supporting the Maronites. This technically put Syria in the Israeli camp, as Israel had already begun to supply the Maronite forces with arms, tanks, and military advisers in May 1976. Meanwhile, Arafat's Fatah joined the war on the side of the National Movement.

Syrian troops subsequently entered Lebanon, occupying Tripoli and the Bekaa Valley, and imposed a cease-fire that ultimately failed to stop the conflict. After the arrival of Syrian troops, Christian forces massacred some 2,000 Palestinians in the Tal al-Za'atar camp in East Beirut. Anther massacre by Christian forces saw around 1,000 people killed at Muslim Qarantina.

Some reports charge al-Saiqa, the Syrian-backed Palestinian force, or a combination of al-Saiqa, Fatah, and the Palestine Liberation Army along with some Muslim forces with an attack on the Christian city of Damur, a stronghold of Camille Chamoun and his followers. When the city fell on January 20, the remaining inhabitants were subject to rape, mutilation, and brutal assassinations. The civilian dead numbered at least 300, with one estimate being as high as 582. Graves were desecrated, and a church was used as a garage. Also, former camp dwellers from Tal Zatar were resettled in Damur and then evicted again after 1982. As a result of the massacre, other Christians came to see the Palestinian presence as a threat to their survival.

The nation was now informally divided, with southern Lebanon and the western half of Beirut becoming bases for the PLO and other Muslim militias and with the Christians in control of East Beirut and the Christian section of Mount Lebanon. The dividing thoroughfare in Beirut between its primarily western Muslim

neighborhoods and eastern Christian neighborhoods was known as the Green Line.

In October 1976 an Arab League summit in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia, gave Syria a mandate to garrison 40,000 troops in Lebanon as the bulk of an Arab deterrent force charged with disentangling the combatants and restoring calm. However, in no part of the country had the war actually ended, nor was there a political solution offered by the government.

In the south, PLO combatants returned from central Lebanon under the terms of the Riyadh Accords. Then, on March 11, 1978, eight Fatah militants landed on a beach in northern Israel and proceeded to take control of a passenger bus and head toward Tel Aviv. In the ensuing confrontation with Israeli forces, 34 Israelis and 6 of the militants died. In retaliation, Israel invaded Lebanon four days later in Operation Litani in which the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) occupied most of the area south of the Litani River, resulting in approximately 2,000 deaths and the evacuation of at least 100,000 Lebanese. The United Nations (UN) Security Council passed Resolution 425, calling for an immediate Israeli withdrawal. It also created the UN Interim Force in Lebanon, charged with maintaining peace. Under international pressure to do so, Israeli forces withdrew later in 1978.

However, Israel retained de facto control of the border region by turning over positions inside Lebanon to the group later known as the South Lebanon Army (SLA), led by Major Saad Haddad. Israel, meanwhile, had been supplying Haddad's forces. The SLA occupied Shia villages in the south, informally setting up a 12-mile-wide security zone that protected Israeli territory from cross-border attacks. Violent exchanges quickly resumed among the PLO, Israel, and the SLA, with the PLO attacking SLA positions and firing rockets into northern Israel. Israel conducted air raids against PLO positions, and the SLA continued its efforts to consolidate its power in the border region.

Syria, meanwhile, clashed with the Phalange. Phalange leader Jumayyil's increasingly aggressive actions (such as his April 1981 attempt to capture the strategic city of Zahla in central Lebanon) were designed to thwart the Syrian goal of brushing him aside and installing Franjieh as president. Consequently, the de facto alliance between Israel and Jumayyil strengthened considerably. In fighting in Zahla in April 1981, for example, Jumayyil called for Israeli assistance, and Prime Minister Menachem Begin responded by sending Israeli fighter jets to the scene. These shot down two Syrian helicopters. This led Syrian president Hafez al-Assad to order surface-to-air missiles to the hilly perimeter of Zahla.

In July 1981 Israeli forces attacked Palestinian positions, provoking retaliatory shelling by the PLO. The Israeli response to this shelling culminated in the aerial bombardment of a West Beirut suburb where Fatah's headquarters were located, killing 200 people and wounding another 600, most of them civilians. The PLO rejoinder was a huge rocket attack on towns and villages in northern Israel, leaving

6 civilians dead and 59 wounded. These violent exchanges prompted diplomatic intervention by the United States. On July 24, 1981, U.S. special Middle East envoy Philip Habib brokered a cease-fire agreement with the PLO and Israel. The two sides now agreed to cease hostilities in Lebanon proper and along the Israeli border with Lebanon. The cease-fire was short-lived.

On June 3, 1982, the Abu Nidal organization attempted to assassinate Israeli ambassador Shlomo Argov in London. Although badly wounded, Argov survived. Israel retaliated with an aerial attack on PLO and PFLP targets in West Beirut that led to more than 100 casualties, a clear violation of the cease-fire. The PLO responded by launching a counterattack from Lebanon with rockets and artillery.

Then, on June 6, 1982, Israeli forces began Operation Peace for Galilee, an invasion of southern Lebanon to destroy PLO bases there. The Israeli plan was subsequently modified to move farther into Lebanon, and by June 15, Israeli units were entrenched outside Beirut. Israel laid siege to Beirut, which contained some 15,000 armed members of the PLO. Over a period of several weeks, the PLO and the IDF exchanged artillery fire. On a number of occasions, the Palestinians directed their fire into Christian East Beirut, causing an estimated 6,700 deaths, of which 80 percent were civilians. On August 12, 1982, Habib again negotiated a truce that called

A woman cries in shock minutes after a car bomb exploded in a crowded Muslim neighborhood in West Beirut, Lebanon on August 8, 1986, killing 13 people and injuring at least 92. The Lebanese civil war broke out in April 1975. (Khalil DeHaini/AFP/Getty Images)

for the withdrawal of both Israeli and PLO elements. Nearly 15,000 Palestinian militants had been evacuated to other countries by September 1. Within six months, Israel withdrew from most of Lebanon but maintained the security zone along the Israeli-Lebanese border.

Jumayyil was elected Lebanon's president on August 23, 1982, with acknowledged Israeli backing. But on September 14, 1982, he was assassinated. The next day, Israeli troops crossed into West Beirut to secure Muslim militia strongholds and stood back as Lebanese Christian militias massacred as many as 2,000 Palestinian civilians in the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps. This event was protested throughout the Arab world, especially because of the Israeli presence in Beirut.

With U.S. backing, the Lebanese parliament chose Amin Jumayyil to succeed his brother as president and focused anew on securing the withdrawal of Israeli and Syrian forces. On May 17, 1983, Lebanon, Israel, and the United States signed an agreement on Israeli withdrawal that was conditioned on the departure of Syrian troops. Syria opposed the agreement and declined to discuss the withdrawal of its troops. In August 1983, Israel withdrew from the Shuf (a district of Mount Lebanon to the southeast of Beirut), thus removing the buffer between the Druze and the Christian militias and triggering another round of brutal fighting.

By September the Druze had gained control over most of the Shuf, and Israeli forces had pulled out from all but the southern security zone. The collapse of the Lebanese Army in February 1984 following the defection of many Muslim and Druze units to militias was a major blow to the government. On March 5, 1984, the Lebanese government canceled the May 17 agreement.

This period of chaos had witnessed the beginning of retaliatory attacks launched against U.S. and Western interests, such as the April 18, 1983, suicide attack at the U.S. embassy in West Beirut that left 63 dead. Then, on October 23, 1983, a bombing in the Beirut barracks that hit the headquarters of U.S. military personnel left 241 U.S. marines dead. A total of 58 French servicemen also died in the attack. Months later, American University of Beirut president Malcolm Kerr was murdered inside the university on January 18, 1984. After U.S. forces withdrew in February 1984, anti-Western terrorism as well as that directed against Lebanese enemies continued, including a second bombing of the U.S. embassy annex in East Beirut on September 20, 1984, that left nine Americans dead, including two U.S. servicemen.

Between 1985 and 1989, factional conflict worsened as various efforts at national reconciliation failed. The economy collapsed, and the militias that had participated in crime, car theft, hijackings, and kidnappings for ransom expanded their activities. The larger militias were also involved in profiteering, land investment, and sales, and they, rather than the government, also collected tariffs and customs.

Heavy fighting took place in the War of the Camps in 1985 and 1986 as the Shia Muslim Amal militia sought to rout the Palestinians from Lebanese strongholds. Many thousands of Palestinians died in the war. Sabra, Shatila, and Burj al-Barajnah were reduced to ashes. Combat returned to Beirut in 1987 with

Palestinians, leftists, and Druze fighters allied against Amal, eventually drawing further Syrian intervention. Violent confrontation flared up again in Beirut in 1988 between Amal and Hezbullah.

Meanwhile, Lebanese prime minister Rashid Karameh, head of a government of national unity set up after the failed peace efforts of 1984, was assassinated on June 1, 1987. President Jumayyil's term of office expired in September 1988. Before stepping down, he appointed another Maronite Christian, Lebanese Armed Forces commanding general Michel Aoun, as acting prime minister, contravening the National Pact. Muslim groups rejected the violation of the National Pact and pledged support to Selim al-Hoss, a Sunni who had succeeded Karameh. Lebanon was thus divided between a Christian government in East Beirut and a Muslim government in West Beirut with two presidents.

In February 1989 Aoun attacked the rival Lebanese Forces militia. By March he turned his attention to other militias, launching what he termed a "War of Liberation" against the Syrians and their allied Lebanese militias. In the months that followed, Aoun rejected both the Taif Agreement that ultimately ended the civil war and the election of another Christian leader as president. A Lebanese-Syrian military operation in October 1990 forced him to take cover in the French embassy in Beirut. He later went into exile in Paris.

The Taif Agreement of 1989 marked the beginning of the end of the fighting. In January 1989 a committee appointed by the Arab League, chaired by a representative from Kuwait and including Saudi Arabia, Algeria, and Morocco, had begun to formulate solutions to the conflict. This led to a meeting of Lebanese parliamentarians in Taif, Saudi Arabia. There in October they agreed to the national reconciliation accord. Returning to Lebanon, they ratified the agreement on November 4 and elected Rene Mouawad as president the following day.

Muawad was assassinated 18 days later, on November 22, in a car bombing in Beirut as his motorcade returned from Lebanese Independence Day ceremonies. He was succeeded by Elias Hrawi, who remained in office until 1998. In August 1990 parliament and the new president agreed on constitutional amendments. The National Assembly expanded to 108 seats and was divided equally between Christians and Muslims. Because the Muslim sects together now outnumbered the Christians, this decision did not represent a one-vote-one-person solution but was nonetheless an improvement on the previous situation. In March 1991 parliament passed an amnesty law that pardoned all political crimes prior to its enactment. In May 1991 the militias were dissolved, and the Lebanese Armed Forces began to slowly rebuild as Lebanon's only major nonsectarian institution.

Moshe Terdiman

See also: Arafat, Yasir; Fatah, al-; Lebanon, Israeli Invasion of (1982); Palestine Liberation Organization.

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Lebanon, French Intervention in (1860)

In 1860, Lebanon witnessed a bloody conflict between the Druze and the Maronite Christians. The conflict stemmed from a long history of tensions between the Muslim and Christian populations of Mount Lebanon. Although this discord simmered under Ibrahim Pasha's rule in early 19th century, it intensified under the governorship of Umar Pasha, who was appointed to Mount Lebanon in 1842. Foreign powers played an important role in this process as they supported different groups: France wielded its influence among the Maronites and Britain supplied guns to the Druze. The events leading to the massacres began in 1858 when the Maronite peasants of the Kasrawan region rebelled against heavy taxes and demanded the abolition of feudal practices. As the violence spread, both sides established armed groups to protect themselves. On May 22, 1860, a minor incident near the entrance to Beirut provoked widespread clashes between the Druze and Maronites, claiming several dozen lives. Events escalated very quickly between both sides, and the bloody attacks continued to spread toward other areas of Mount Lebanon, and, by July, it had already reached Damascus in Syria. The conflict led to the death of between 7,000 and 12,000 people in Lebanon alone and the destruction of more than 300 villages, 40 monasteries, and 500 churches. In addition, thousands of Christians, including the American and Dutch consuls, were killed in Syria.

The Ottoman authorities dispatched Fuat Pasha, the foreign minister, to pacify the region, which he did quite effectively by the fall of 1860. Yet, despite the restoration of order, the foreign powers chose to use the situation to intervene in

Lebanon. The French intervened in favor of the Maronites against the Druze, and the British deployed their warships in the harbor of Beirut. The Maronites welcomed the arrival of the French expeditionary force under the leadership of General Beaufort d'Hautpoul. European powers soon realized that the Ottoman authorities had already settled the problems, and an international conference was assembled to confirm a new settlement. In June 1861, France agreed to withdraw its troops. The Beyoglu Protocol (June 9, 1861) turned the district of Mount Lebanon into autonomous region within the Ottoman Empire and granted the Christians more power over the Druze. Lebanon would be governed by a Christian governor general (mutassarif) who was to be a Catholic, appointed by the Porte, and assisted by the Administrative Council. This arrangement remained in effect until the end of World War I and the creation of Great Lebanon in September 1920.

Rami Siklawi

See also: French Mandates; Ibrahim Pasha.

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Lebanon, Israeli Invasion of (1982)

The Israeli invasion of Lebanon began on June 6, 1982, when Defense Minister Ariel Sharon, acting in full agreement with instructions from Prime Minister Menachem Begin, ordered Israel Defense Forces (IDF) troops into southern Lebanon to destroy the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) there.

In 1977, Begin had become the first Israeli prime minister from the right-wing Likud Party. He sought to maintain Israeli hold over the West Bank and Gaza but also had a deep commitment to Eretz Israel, the ancestral homeland of the Jews that embraced territory beyond Israel's borders into Lebanon and across the Jordan River.

Israeli defense minister Sharon, also a prominent member of the Likud Party, shared Begin's ideological commitment to Eretz Israel. Indeed, Sharon played an important role in expanding Jewish settlements in the West Bank and Gaza. He took a hard-line approach toward the Palestinians, endeavoring to undermine PLO influence in the West Bank and Gaza, and was also influential in the formation of Israeli foreign policy.

In June 1978, under heavy U.S. pressure, Begin withdrew Israeli forces that had been sent into southern Lebanon in the Litani River operation. The United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) then took over in southern Lebanon. UNIFIL was charged with confirming the Israeli withdrawal, restoring peace and security, and helping the Lebanese government reestablish its authority in the area. The Israeli failure to remove PLO bases in southern Lebanon was a major embarrassment for the Begin government.

UNIFIL proved incapable of preventing PLO forces from operating in southern Lebanon and striking Israel, which led to Israeli reprisals. Attacks back and forth across the Lebanese-Israeli border killed civilians on both sides as well as some UNIFIL troops. Israel, meanwhile, provided weapons to the force later known as the South Lebanon Army, a pro-Israeli Christian militia in southern Lebanon led by Major Saad Haddad, and the force used them against the PLO and local villagers.

In July 1981, U.S. president Ronald Reagan sent Lebanese-American diplomat Philip Habib to the area in an effort to broker a truce during the Lebanese Civil War. On July 24, Habib announced agreement on a cease-fire, but it was in name only. The PLO repeatedly violated the agreement, and major cross-border strikes resumed in April 1982 following the death of an Israeli officer from a land mine. Although Israel conducted air strikes and commando raids across the border, it was unable to prevent a growing number of PLO personnel from locating there. Their numbers increased to perhaps 6,000 men in a number of encampments, as PLO rocket and mortar attacks regularly forced thousands of Israeli civilians to flee their homes and fields in northern Galilee and seek protection in bomb shelters.

On June 3, 1982, three members of a Palestinian terrorist organization connected to Abu Nidal attempted to assassinate the Israeli ambassador to Britain, Shlomo Argov, in London. Although Argov survived the attack, he remained paralyzed until his death in 2003. Abu Nidal's organization had been linked to Yasir Arafat's Fatah faction within the PLO in the past, and the Israelis used this as the excuse to bomb Palestinian targets in West Beirut and other targets in southern Lebanon during June 4–5, 1982. The PLO responded by attacking Israeli settlements in Galilee with rockets and mortars. It was this PLO shelling of the settlements rather than the attempted assassination of Argov that provoked the Israeli decision to invade Lebanon.

The operation began on June 6, 1982. It took its name from the Israeli intention to protect its vulnerable northern region of Israel from the PLO rocket and mortar attacks launched from southern Lebanon. Ultimately, Israel committed to the operation some 76,000 men, 800 tanks, 1,500 armored personnel carriers (APCs), and 364 aircraft. Syria committed perhaps 22,000 men, 352 tanks, 300 APCs, and 96 aircraft, and the PLO had about 15,000 men, 300 tanks, and 150 APCs.

The Israeli mission had three principal objectives. First, Israeli forces sought to destroy the PLO in southern Lebanon. Second, Israel wanted to evict the Syrian Army from Lebanon and bring about the removal of its missiles from the Bekaa Valley. Although Sharon perceived Syrian forces in Lebanon as a major security

threat to Israel, he maintained that the IDF would not attack them unless it was first fired upon. Third, Israel hoped to influence Lebanese politics. Israel sought to ally itself with the Maronite Christians, led by Bashir (Gemayel), the leader of the Phalange (al-Kataib) and head of the unified command of the Lebanese Forces.

Although the Phalange was mainly a political association, the Lebanese Forces was an umbrella military organization comprising several Christian militias. Jumayyil had carried out a series of brutal operations to destroy the autonomy of the other Christian militias and had incorporated them into his Lebanese Forces. He was opposed to relinquishing the power held by the Maronites in traditionally Christian-dominated Lebanon to the Sunni and Shia Muslims of Lebanon. Many in the Phalange maintained that their heritage was Phoenician and not Arab, and they sought to maintain their historic linkages with France and the West. To this end, Jumayyil maintained a close relationship with Israel. As with the Israelis, he harbored intense opposition to a Syrian presence in Lebanon.

Palestinian militias were not only entrenched in the southern part of the country but were also well established in West Beirut. Understandably, the Israeli cabinet was loath to place its troops into an urban combat situation that was bound to bring heavy civilian casualties and incur opposition from Washington and Western Europe. Begin and Sharon informed the cabinet that the goal was merely to break up PLO bases in southern Lebanon and push back PLO and Syrian forces some 25 miles, beyond rocket range of Galilee.

Once the operation began, however, Sharon quickly changed the original plan by expanding the mission to incorporate Beirut, which was well beyond the 25-mile mark. Many in the cabinet now believed that Begin and Sharon had deliberately misled them. The IDF advanced to the outskirts of Beirut within days. Tyre and Sidon, two cities within the 25-mile limit, were both heavily damaged in the Israeli advance. The entire population was rounded up, and most of the men were taken into custody. Rather than standing their ground and being overwhelmed by the better-equipped Israelis, the Palestinian fighters and PLO leadership withdrew to West Beirut. Sharon now argued in favor of a broader operation that would force the PLO from Beirut, and for about 10 weeks Israeli guns shelled West Beirut, killing both PLO forces and civilians.

Fighting also occurred with Syrian forces in the Bekaa Valley. Unable to meet Israel on equal footing and bereft of allies, Syria did not engage in an all-out effort. Rather, much of the battle was waged in the air. By June 10, the Israeli Air Force had neutralized Syrian surface-to-air missiles and had shot down dozens of Syrian jets. (Some sources say the ultimate toll was as many as 80 Syrian jets.) The Israelis used AH-1 Cobra helicopter gunships to attack and destroy dozens of Syrian armored vehicles, including Soviet-built T-72 tanks. The Israelis also trapped Syrian forces in the Bekaa Valley. Israel was on the verge of severing the Beirut-Damascus highway on June 11 when Moscow and Washington brokered a cease-fire.

In Beirut, meanwhile, Sharon hoped to join up with Jumayyil's Lebanese Forces. Sharon hoped that the Lebanese Forces might bear the brunt of the fighting in West Beirut, but Jumayyil was reluctant to do this, fearing that such a move would harm his chances to become the president of Lebanon.

Begin's cabinet was unwilling to approve an Israeli assault on West Beirut because of the probability of high casualties. Meanwhile, the United States had been conveying ambiguous signals regarding its position in the conflict. This only encouraged Arafat to entrench himself and the PLO in West Beirut.

Sharon disregarded cabinet opposition and placed the western (predominantly Muslim) part of the city under a siege from air, land, and sea. He hoped that this might convince the citizens to turn against the PLO. The bombing and shelling resulted in mostly civilian casualties, however, provoking denunciations of Israel in the international press. The PLO believed that it could hold out longer under siege than the Israelis could under international pressure, leading Israel to intensify its attack on Beirut in early August. Believing that there was an impending full-scale assault, the PLO then consented to a UN-brokered arrangement whereby American, French, and Italian peacekeeping forces, known as the Multinational Force in Lebanon, would escort the PLO fighters out of Lebanon by the end of the month. (The PLO relocated to Tunis.) Habib assured the PLO that the many refugees in camps in Lebanon would not be harmed.

On August 23, 1982, Jumayyil was elected president of Lebanon. He was dead within two weeks, the victim of assassination on September 14, 1982, by a member of the pro-Damascus National Syrian Socialist Party. Jumayyil had indeed paid for his connection to the Israelis. Although the National Syrian Socialist Party took responsibility for the murder of Jumayyil, some suspected an Israeli conspiracy to kill him owing to his more recent attempts to disassociate himself from Israel.

After the assassination of Jumayyil, Israeli forces occupied West Beirut. This was in direct violation of the UN agreement calling for the evacuation of the PLO and protection of the Palestinian refugees who remained behind. With the PLO removed, the refugees had virtually no defense against the Israelis or their Christian allies.

Once Israel had control of the Palestinian refugee camps, in September 1982 Sharon invited members of the Phalange to enter the camps at Sabra and Shatila to "clean out the terrorists." The Phalange militia, led by Elie Hobeika, then slaughtered more than 1,000 refugees in what he claimed to be retaliation for Jumayyil's assassination. Estimates of casualties in the Israeli invasion and subsequent occupation vary widely, although the numbers may have been as high as 17,826 Lebanese killed and approximately 675 Israelis.

Israel had achieved a number of goals. It had accomplished its immediate aim of expelling the PLO from Lebanon and temporarily destroying its infrastructure. It had also weakened the Syrian military, especially as far as air assets were

concerned. The Israelis had also strengthened the South Lebanon Army, which would help control a buffer, or security zone, in the south.

However, the invasion had negative repercussions as well. Much of Beirut lay in ruins, with damage estimated as high as $2 billion, and the tourist industry was a long time in recovering. Operation also became an occupation. In May 1983, with assistance from the United States and France, Israel and Lebanon reached an agreement calling for the staged withdrawal of Israeli forces, although the instruments of this agreement were never officially exchanged. In March 1984 under Syrian pressure, the Lebanese government repudiated it. In January 1985, Israel began a unilateral withdrawal to a security zone in southern Lebanon, which was completed in June 1985. Not until June 2000 did Israel finally withdraw all its forces from southern Lebanon.

Rather than producing a stable, pro-Israeli government in Beirut, the occupation led to contentious new resistance groups that kept Lebanon in perpetual turmoil. There was also considerable unrest in Israel. A protest demonstration in Tel Aviv that followed the Sabra and Shatila massacre drew a reported 300,000 people. Responding to the furor within Israel over the war, the Israeli government appointed the Kahan Commission to investigate the massacres at Sabra and Shatila. The commission found that Israeli officials were indirectly responsible, and Sharon was forced to resign as minister of defense. Begin's political career also suffered greatly. Disillusioned by the invasion and the high Israeli casualties, he resigned as prime minister in 1983, withdrawing entirely from public life.

Brian Parkinson and Spencer C. Tucker

See also: Arafat, Yasir; Fatah, al-; Lebanon, Civil War in (1975–1990); Palestine Liberation Organization.

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Lebanon, Israeli Operations against (2006)

Fighting between the Israeli military and Hezbollah fighters carried out over a 32-day period in southern Lebanon and northern Israel. Known to the Israeli military as Operation Change of Direction, it began on July 13, 2006, and ended on August 14, 2006.

On July 12, 2006, Hezbollah fighters crossed the Israeli-Lebanese border into northern Israel and killed three Israel Defense Forces (IDF) soldiers and captured two others, evidently with the intent to use them for prisoner exchange purposes. This closely followed a similar operation mounted by Hamas in southern Israel in which one Israeli soldier was captured and two others were killed.

Holding the Lebanese government responsible for not enforcing security in the southern part of its country, Israel on July 13 began implementing an air, land, and sea blockade against Lebanon. The Beirut International Airport was also bombed. There were a number of Israeli objectives in Change of Direction. The Israelis sought the return of the two kidnapped IDF soldiers but also wanted to remove the Hezbollah threat against Israeli territory by destroying its armaments and outposts and to establish long-term stability along the northern border. They also hoped to strengthen the anti-Syrian and anti-Hezbollah forces within Lebanon.

Israel's operation consisted chiefly of air and naval strikes on Lebanon's infrastructure, which destroyed a total of 42 bridges and damaged 38 roads. This effort also caused extensive damage to telecommunications, electricity distribution, ports, airports, and even private-sector facilities, including a milk factory and food warehouses. Roughly 70 percent of Lebanese civilians living in southern Lebanon fled north during the conflict. For its part, Hezbollah responded by launching an average of more than 100 Katyusha rockets per day into northern Israel, targeting such cities as Haifa and hitting hospitals, chemical factories, military outposts, and residential areas. Although the Israeli Air Force tried to strike at the launchers, they were virtually impossible to find, and many of the rockets were fired from residential areas, even near mosques.

Israeli air strikes against Lebanon and Hezbollah Katyusha rocket launches into Israel continued until July 21, 2006, when a new dimension was added to the conflict. Israel now began massing troops on the border and called up five battalions of army reservists (3,000 troops) for a ground invasion. The ground offensive commenced on July 22, 2006, in the village of Marun al-Ras. IDF forces engaged Hezbollah fighters in Bint Jbayl, the largest Lebanese town near the border. One week later, Israel declared that it would occupy a strip inside southern Lebanon with ground troops. Meanwhile, four unarmed United Nations (UN) observers died when an errant Israeli air strike hit their observation post near the border.

U.S. secretary of state Condoleezza Rice visited the region during July 24–25 and again during July 29–31 in an effort to negotiate a cessation of hostilities. However, she opposed a cease-fire that would merely return the status quo. Meanwhile, discussions at the UN centered on how a negotiated solution to the conflict could prevent further violence and how an international—or Lebanese—force might control southern Lebanon and disarm Hezbollah. Talks were also undertaken in Rome among American, European, and Arab leaders in an attempt to reach a satisfactory end to the conflict, but to no avail.

On August 5, 2006, Lebanon rejected a draft UN resolution, proposed by the United States and France, that called for a full cessation of hostilities between Israel and Hezbollah. Lebanon claimed that the resolution did not adequately address Lebanese concerns. Nevertheless, the Lebanese government affirmed two days later that it would send 15,000 troops to the south as soon as Israeli troops withdrew from the area. Lebanon's prime minister, Fuad Siniura, repeatedly called for a quick and decisive cease-fire and for the immediate withdrawal of Israeli troops from southern Lebanon. His demands were echoed by thousands of demonstrators in cities around the world.

The IDF's ground offensive into Lebanon and its fierce clashes with Hezbollah fighters continued until August 11, 2006, when the UN Security Council unanimously approved UN Resolution 1701 in an effort to end hostilities. The resolution, which was approved by both the Lebanese and Israeli governments, also called for the disarming of Hezbollah, Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon, and the deployment of the Lebanese Army and an enlarged UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) in southern Lebanon. Nevertheless, the 72 hours that preceded the effective date of the cease-fire on August 14, 2006, witnessed the fiercest fighting of the month-long conflict.

The Lebanese Army began deploying into southern Lebanon on August 17, 2006. However, Israel's air and sea blockade was not lifted until September 8, 2006. On October 1, 2006, the Israeli Army reported that it had completed its withdrawal from southern Lebanon, although UNIFIL denied these assertions.

The conflict killed an estimated 1,187 Lebanese civilians and 44 Israeli civilians, severely damaged Lebanese infrastructure, displaced some 1 million Lebanese and 300,000 Israelis, and disrupted life across all of Lebanon and northern Israel. By September, 60 percent of the towns and villages in the south had no water or electricity. Even after the cease-fire, 256,000 Lebanese remained internally displaced, and much of southern Lebanon remained uninhabitable because of more than 350,000 unexploded cluster bombs in some 250 locations south of the Litani River. Moreover, the Lebanese coasts witnessed a tragic oil spill that resulted from Israel's bombing of fuel tanks. About 40 percent of the coastline was affected. Both Hezbollah and Israel were accused of violating international humanitarian law during the conflict.

Hezbullah launched an estimated 3,970 rockets into Israel during the conflict, and the Israeli Air Force carried out about 15,500 sorties, striking more than 7,000 targets in Lebanon. Between 250 and 600 Hezbollah fighters were killed. Thirteen Hezbullah fighters were captured by the IDF during the conflict. The IDF reported 119 Israeli soldiers killed, more than 400 wounded, and 2 taken prisoner. The Lebanese Army suffered casualties as well: 46 killed and more than 100 injured. Finally, 7 UN personnel were killed, and 12 others were injured.

The parties to the conflict were in fact tangled in asymmetric warfare. On one hand, Hezbollah's munitions included 14,000 short- to medium-range missiles and rockets in calibers ranging from less than 100 mm up to 302 mm, some of the

warheads of which were loaded with ball bearings to maximize their lethality. In addition, Hezbollah possessed four types of advanced ground-to-ground missiles: Fajr 4 and 5, Iran 130, and Shahin 335-mm rockets with ranges of 54 to 90 miles. Hezbollah also possessed Iranian-built Zilzal 2 and 3 launchers, wireless detonators, Ra'ad 1 liquid fuel missiles, radar-guided ship-to-shore missiles, and a large number of optical devices.

Israel, on the other hand, possessed an impressive diversity of munitions, including precision-guided munitions, made in Israel or imported from the United States. It also completely dominated the skies and, in addition to fixed-wing jet aircraft, employed AH-64 Apache and AH-1 Cobra attack helicopters inside Lebanon. At least two unmanned aerial vehicles provided 24-hour coverage over Lebanon, with the Israel Aircraft Industries' Searcher 2 and the Elbit Systems Hermes 450 transmitting real-time targeting data directly into F-15 and F-16 cockpits.

In addition, the Israelis used American GBU-28 bunker-buster bombs on Hezbullah's Beirut headquarters. Multiple Launch Rocket System platforms were heavily used, and phosphorus munitions, which are restricted under the third protocol of the Geneva Conventions, were used as well. Although Israel's operation at first focused mainly on aerial and naval offensives, ground incursions became increasingly necessary. This was because most of Hezbollah's forces were able to make use of an extensive network of underground tunnels. Israeli troops faced fierce resistance and an unexpectedly strong performance by Hezbollah fighters, who multiplied ambushes and surprise attacks. Indeed, Hezbollah fielded an impressively innovative military force well tailored to meet a specific foe on particular terrain. Israeli intelligence, on the other hand, proved inadequate in this operation. For example, during the war Israeli forces launched a commando raid on Baalbek, capturing the Imam Khomeini Hospital where they supposedly found Iranians and a Syrian. No Iranians had been there for years, but a number of civilians were kidnapped and not returned. One may have been the central target of this raid, a grocer named Hasan Dib Nasrallah, unfortunately not the leader of Hezbollah. In fact, none of the objectives that the IDF had set for Operation Change of Direction were realized. In a significant sense, the conflict was the result of both sides having misjudged the other. Hezbollah has stated that it would not have kidnapped IDF soldiers had it known the severity of Israel's response. Israel, meanwhile, was taken aback by the effectiveness of the Hezbollah defenses. There was sufficient anger in Israel over the results of the operation that the government was forced to appoint an investigating committee. In January 2007 IDF chief of staff Dan Halutz resigned in the face of increasing criticism of the IDF's performance in the war.

Rana Kobeissi

See also: Hezbollah; Lebanon, Israeli Invasion of (1982).

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Lebanon, U.S. Interventions in

The first U.S. intervention in Lebanon occurred in 1958 when President Dwight Eisenhower ordered U.S. Marines to the tiny nation to support a peaceful transition of power. This action was in direct response to Cold War concerns of instability that might benefit the Soviet Union in the Middle East as well as to the perceived threat from Arab nationalism, then being promoted by Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser. This intervention has generally been considered a success, and a peaceful transition of power was brokered by the United States. The second U.S. intervention in Lebanon took place during 1982–1984, when President Ronald Reagan similarly deployed U.S. Marines, first to act as a buffer between an invading Israeli military force and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), headquartered in Beirut, and later to serve as peacekeepers.

In January 1957, President Eisenhower requested a congressional resolution authorizing the use of force in the Middle East to prevent the spread of communism. This policy, which became known as the Eisenhower Doctrine, was formed in response to waning British influence in the region after the Suez Crisis of 1956. Before this, the Eisenhower administration had been willing to allow the British to take the lead in protecting the Middle East, particularly its vital oil fields. By 1957, however, the president had lost faith in British capabilities and declared his intention to take the lead in keeping the region out of Soviet control. The doctrine was therefore used as a guarantee to the noncommunist governments in the region and a threat to those who would support alliances with the Soviets.

Events in the region during 1957 and 1958 were seen by the United States as warning signs that communism and radical Arab nationalism were on the rise. In 1957, King Hussein of Jordan, considered a moderate, established diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. In February 1958, the most radical regimes in the region, Egypt and Syria (both supported by the Soviet Union), merged to form the United Arab Republic (UAR). In July 1958, the pro-Western Iraqi monarchy was overthrown by a radical military junta.

In the face of these developments, along with relentless propaganda by Arab nationalists against his more pro-Western regime and internal threats to his rule, Lebanese president Camille Chamoun asked for direct American intervention to defend his government. President Eisenhower, invoking his new doctrine, immediately ordered U.S. Marines to Lebanon.

The main issue at stake in Lebanon was Chamoun's effort to change the constitution to allow him to continue to rule the nation after his term of office expired. Eisenhower instructed his personal representative in Lebanon, noted diplomat Robert Murphy, to pressure Chamoun to give up power to circumvent an all-out civil war in Lebanon. Chamoun eventually conceded, and a popular favorite for the presidency replaced him, allowing American troops to withdraw peacefully.

The second American intervention in Lebanon, during 1982–1984, was similar in many ways to the first, at least in the beginning. On June 6, 1982, Israeli forces invaded Lebanon in an effort to crush the PLO, which had been using Lebanon as a base of operations for attacks against Israel. Although a staunch supporter of Israel, by 1982 President Reagan had begun to fear that Israeli actions in Lebanon (and elsewhere) would inflame anti-Western sentiments in Arab nations and provide an opportunity for increased Soviet influence in the region. Therefore, his administration attempted to broker an arrangement whereby the PLO would be evacuated from Lebanon in exchange for an Israeli promise to withdraw to its own borders.

When worldwide pressure intensified against Israel after its relentless attacks in Lebanon, especially in the PLO's West Beirut stronghold, and after direct threats by the Reagan administration, the PLO was allowed to leave Beirut in late summer 1982. As part of the agreement, a multinational force (MNF) of American, French, and Italian troops was sent to Beirut to ensure the safety of those departing from its harbor. More than 15,000 Palestinians were successfully evacuated by the end of the operation on September 1, 1982.

After the evacuation of the PLO, however, the ongoing civil war escalated among various Christian, Muslim, and Druze factions vying for control of Lebanon. Furthermore, Israeli and Syrian forces in Lebanon continued to clash, threatening an all-out war between the two nations. Reagan ordered the Marines back to Beirut (and convinced the other members of the MNF to do the same) to serve as peacekeepers. As time passed, the MNF was embroiled in the fighting and became viewed as supporting the Lebanese government.

When a bomb exploded outside the U.S. embassy in Beirut in April 1983, the justification for the MNF to stay in Lebanon changed. Secretary of State George Shultz argued that America would not give in to terrorists, and so the Marines stayed in place as the civil war raged on. Then, on October 24, 1983, an event occurred that forced the United States and the MNF from Lebanon for good. A suicide bomber, believed to be from a Shiite Muslim terrorist group, drove a vanload of explosives

into the Marine barracks at the Beirut airport, killing 241 troops. Across town at the French headquarters, another bomb killed 58 soldiers. Public pressure in the United States and the collapse of the Lebanese Army in February 1984 finally forced Reagan to withdraw the Marines from Lebanon, and the other MNF nations soon followed. The Lebanese Civil War raged for years afterward.

Brent Geary

See also: Cold War in the Middle East; Lebanon, Israeli Invasion of (1982).

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Lepanto, Battle of (1571)

Lepanto, located on the southern coast of central Greece opposite the Peloponnese, was the site of the last great galley battle between a united Christian fleet and the Ottoman navy on October 7, 1571. The battle of Lepanto was the culmination of an ongoing naval war between the Ottoman Turks and the Habsburgs of Spain that began with the Ottoman conquest of Egypt from the Mamluks in 1517. In succeeding years, Turkish and Christian ships vied for control of the sea lanes in the central Mediterranean. Some of the significant engagements before Lepanto were fought at Peñon of Algiers (1529), Tunis (1534, 1535), Algiers (1541), Tripoli (1551), Bejaïa (1555), Jerba (1560), and Malta (1565).

The immediate cause of the Lepanto campaign was the Ottoman conquest of Cyprus from the Venetians in 1570–1571. In retaliation Pope Pius V and Venice organized the Holy League against Sultan Selim II's fleet, and encouraged Philip II of Spain to join. In return for crusading tithes, Philip promised to pay half the total cost of the league, while Venice paid a third and Pius V a sixth. The duke of Savoy and the Knights of Malta also contributed galleys to the Christian fleet.

The fleet of the Holy League, led by Don Juan of Austria, Mark-Anthony Colonna, and Sebastian Venier, sailed in September after the Turks captured Famagusta on Cyprus. The Christians planned to retake Tunis (which the Ottomans had captured in 1569) while the Turks were fighting in Cyprus. They encountered a Turkish fleet, commanded by Pertev Pasha, general of the Ottoman land forces, and Muezzinzade Ali Pasha, commander of the fleet. The battle pitted 208 Christian

Painting of the Battle of Lepanto between the Ottoman Empire and an alliance of European states. The battle, which took place on October 7, 1571, was the largest naval engagement in early modern times and the last great naval battle fought by traditional oar-powered galleys. (National Maritime Museum, London/Jupiterimages)

ships against 275 Ottoman ships. Approximately 100,000 men fought in the battle. The Christians lost 15 or 20 ships and 8,000 men, and the Ottomans lost 210 ships and more than 30,000 men.

Contemporary Christians celebrated Lepanto as a major victory over the Muslim Turks, and the Ottomans considered it a major disaster. Modern scholars, however, question whether the battle decisively halted Ottoman expansion. The Ottoman Empire retained Cyprus, and its sea power recovered rapidly after Lepanto. The Holy League collapsed by 1573, and subsequent attempts to reconstitute it failed. The conflict between the Ottomans and the Spanish continued until both sides agreed to a truce in 1580.

Theresa M. Vann

See also: Austro-Ottoman Wars; Müezzinzade Ali Pasha.

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Libya, U.S. Bombing of (1986)

On April 14, 1986, in response to repeated Arab terrorist attacks against U.S. citizens, U.S. president Ronald Reagan ordered a strike aimed at destroying military barracks and the airport in Tripoli, Libya.

During the 1980s, terrorist attacks against Americans abroad increased substantially. Several Arab countries, including Libya, provided extremist groups with protection and a base of operations. In 1982, a suicide mission in Lebanon resulted in the deaths of 241 U.S. marines, and Reagan initiated a policy of retaliation against countries that assisted such militant organizations.

On April 5, 1986, a bomb exploded inside the La Belle disco in Germany; two U.S. soldiers and a Turkish woman died, and 230 other people, including 60 Americans, were wounded. Intelligence linked the attack to Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi and the Libyan government. Consequently, on April 14, Reagan ordered a surgical strike aimed at destroying military barracks and the airport in Tripoli as well as a seaport. The next morning, U.S. air and naval forces attacked. Eighteen fighter-bombers flew low over the city to avoid radar detection. Before locking on to their targets, the sky erupted with antiaircraft fire. Although most of the computer-guided missiles hit their targets, some did not: one struck the French Embassy, and another hit the home of Qaddafi and killed one of his daughters.

Two years later, Arab extremists retaliated for the Libyan bombing. On December 21, 1988, terrorists blew up a U.S. Boeing 747 over Lockerbie, Scotland. After a lengthy investigation, the evidence linked Qaddafi with the Lockerbie bombing. The United States asked the United Nations to impose sanctions against Libya in 1992. The entire country suffered for the attack until 1998, when the sanctions were suspended. Negotiations are currently under way to remove the sanctions permanently. Since the Libyan bombing and the imposition of sanctions, terrorist attacks against Americans have declined.

Cynthia Northrup

See also: Terrorism.

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Libyan-Egyptian War (1977)

Brief border war between Libya and Egypt in July 1977. In early summer, massive demonstrations were organized in Libya to protest rapprochement between

Egypt and Israel. The Libyan leader, Colonel Muammar Qaddafi, accused Egypt of provoking tensions inside his country so that it could seize the Libyan oil fields. Despite Egyptian's denial, Qaddafi ordered tens of thousands of Egyptians working and living in Libya to leave the country by July 1 or face arrest. As tensions between the two countries escalated, a brief skirmish between border guards on July 21, 1977, caused the start of the war. The four-day war (July 21–24) saw both sides using tanks, artillery, and airplanes. Libyan forces suffered greatly from Egyptian attacks, and part of the Libyan air force was destroyed on the ground by an Egyptian attack on the base at al-Adam. By July 24, mediation by President Houari Boumediène of Algeria and Yasir Arafat of the Palestine Liberation Organization led to a cease-fire and armistice. Overall, the war claimed some 100 Egyptian casualties; Libya lost about 400 men, 60 tanks, and more than 20 aircrafts. Although the sides returned to status quo after the war, Egypt was a clear winner as it maintained complete control of the theater of war and achieved air superiority, conducting raids deep into the enemy territory.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Arafat, Yasir; Palestine Liberation Organization.

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London, Treaty of (1840)

Treaty, formally known as the "Convention for the Pacification of the Levant," signed on July 15, 1840, between Britain, Austria, Prussia, and Russia on one hand, and the Ottoman Empire on the other to end the fighting between Muhammad Ali, the de facto ruler of Egypt, and the Ottoman Empire. The other goals of the treaty were to limit Mohammed's territorial gains from the Ottoman Empire and preserve the territorial integrity of the Ottoman Empire.

In 1831, Mehmed Ali invaded Syria in an attempt to establish an independent Egypt after Sultan Abdülmecid I refused to give Muhammad Syria and Morea (Peloponnesus) in return for his assistance against the Greeks in the late 1820s. On December 21, 1832, the Egyptian army, led by Ibrahim Pasha, soundly defeated the Ottoman army at the Battle of Konya. With nothing between the Egyptians and Istanbul, the European powers negotiated the Kutahya Convention in May 1833.

Dissatisfied with the convention's terms, Mehmed Ali launched another offensive against the Ottoman Empire and again destroyed the Ottoman army in the

Battle of Nizip (Nezib) on June 24, 1839. Adding to the disaster was the defection of the Ottomans fleet to Mehmed Ali. At this point, Sultan Mahmud II died and was succeeded by 16-year-old Abdul Mecid I. Britain preferred a weakened but intact Ottoman Empire that would grant Britain concessions to maintain its influence in the Middle East.

As a result, in July 1840, Britain, France, Austria, Russia, and Prussia intervened on the side of Abdülmecid to drive the Egyptian forces out of Syria. A British fleet bombarded Beirut on September 11, 1840, and an Anglo-Turkish force captured Acre on November . The arrival of these forces caused local uprisings against the Egyptian forces in Syria. Meanwhile, a British naval force anchored off Alexandria, and the Egyptian army retreated back to Egypt.

Mehmed Ali had to accede to British demands. According to the treaty of 1840, he surrendered all conquered territory except Sudan and the province of Acre (roughly present-day Israel), which would remain part of the Ottoman Empire, but received the hereditary governorship of Egypt for life, with succession going to the eldest male in the family. Mehmed Ali also had to return to Sultan Abdülmecid I the Ottoman fleet that had defected to Alexandria. Finally, Mehmed Ali reluctantly accepted the Anglo-Ottoman Convention of 1838, which established free trade in Egypt, forcing him to establish new tariffs that were favorable to imports. As a result, cheap manufactured imports flooded Egypt and decimated local industries.

Robert B. Kane

See also: Egyptian-Ottoman Wars; Konya, Battle of (1832); Kutahya Convention (1833); Mahmud II; Mehmed Ali; Nizip, Battle of (1839).

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London, Treaty of (1913)

Treaty resolving territorial adjustments after the end of the First Balkan War between the Balkan League (Bulgaria, Greece, Montenegro, and Serbia) and the Ottoman Empire. Austria-Hungary, Britain, Germany, Italy, and Russia were also present at the deliberations. After the end of hostilities on December 12, 1912, the

principal belligerents met in London along with the European Great Powers. The main points of contention at the conference were the status of Albania, which had declared its independence on November 28, 1912; the Sanjak of Novi Pazar, which had been under Austro-Hungarian protection since 1878; and the status of Kosovo, Macedonia, and Thrace. All the territorial settlements were at the expense of Ottoman territorial losses from the conflict.

The terms of the treaty declared Albania an independent state, obliging Greece, Montenegro, and Serbia to evacuate their troops. Austria-Hungary and Italy both supported an independent Albania. Most of the Balkan states had desired to divide Albanian territory amongst themselves. However, Austria-Hungary sought to create a buffer state in the Balkans as a check against Serbian expansion. Italy wanted to increase its influence in the Balkans through an Albanian state. Despite this limitation on their expected gains, the Balkan powers made some gains from acquired territory. Kosovo was divided among Albania, Montenegro, and Serbia. Greece received most of Thrace. However, no decision was made on Macedonian territory under dispute. The treaty was signed on May 30, 1913. Despite this treaty, the tenuous peace between the Balkan states did not last and led to the outbreak of the Second Balkan War in June 1913, when Bulgaria attacked Serbia and Greece.

Abraham O. Mendoza

See also: Balkan Wars (1912–1913).

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London Straits Convention (1841)

Agreement, one of several, concluded on July 13, 1841, between Russia, Britain, France, Austria, and Prussia that closed the straits—the Bosporus, the Sea of Marmara, and the Dardanelles, which link the Black Sea to the Mediterranean—to all warships during wartime. It benefited Britain by denying the Russian fleet in the Black Sea direct access to the Mediterranean.

In 1831, Mehmed Ali of Egypt revolted against the Ottoman Empire. The Egyptian army drove into Syria and Anatolia, threatening Istanbul. Believing an Ottoman defeat could lead to greater war among the European nations, Russian emperor Nicholas I supported the Ottomans. In 1833, Austria, Russia, and Prussia agreed to take all necessary steps to preserve the Ottoman Empire. The resulting Treaty of Hunkar Iskelesi between the Ottoman Empire and Russia promised mutual assistance should either be attacked by a foreign power. A secret provision closed

the straits to all warships except those of the Ottoman Empire and Russia in case of war.

In 1839, Egypt and the Ottoman Empire went to war again. Russia worked with Austria and Prussia to convince France, which had sided with Egypt, to accept a multilateral agreement. These new negotiations produced the London Straits Convention of 1841, with guarantees similar to those of the earlier treaty. Britain believed the convention would help preserve the European balance of power by preventing Russia's Black Sea fleet access to the Mediterranean. Russia, however, believed the treaty encouraged British aggressiveness in the region, and ultimately such British aggressiveness did lead to the Crimean War. These arrangements forced Nicholas I to abandon his plans to make the Ottoman Empire completely dependent on Russia and gain oversight of the Balkan Christians. The Montreux Convention Regarding the Regime of the Turkish Straits, negotiated in 1936 and technically still in force, closes the strategic straits to all warships during war times.

Robert B. Kane

See also: Crimean War (1853–1856); Egyptian-Ottoman Wars; Hunkar Iskelesi, Treaty of (1833); Mehmed Ali.

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Long Campaign in Hungary (1443–1444)

A multinational military effort on the part of multiple European states to engage the potentiality of a Turkish advance into Hungary. Led by prominent Hungarian general John Hunyadi and Polish king Ladislaus (Wladyslaw) III (crowned Ulászló I of Hungary in 1440) through the Balkans. Lasting from July 22, 1443, to January 25, 1444, the multinational Christian forces, which included Hungarian, Bohemian (Czech), Polish, and German cavalry and infantry, in tandem with Lithuanian auxiliaries, along with smaller Wallachian and Serbian contingents, fought Turkish forces in the Ottoman Balkan realms. The Turkish advance into the Balkans threatened Hungarian ambitions in the region.

From 1443 to 1444, both Ulászló and Hunyadi led the Long Campaign into the Ottoman-held territories. Although this campaign allowed for a series of victories for the European forces at the expense of the Turks, it failed to remove the Ottomans from the Balkans. Hunyadi was able to defeat the Turkish forces in three major engagements (Nis, Sofia, and Snaim) during the Long Campaign, but Turkish forces were nonetheless able to regroup and engage the allied forces. Moreover, European forces were unable to recapture lands lost to the Ottoman Turks, regardless of the swath of rebellions fostered by rampant warfare during this period.

As part of the greater series of engagements between Hungarian-led forces and Ottoman forces, which lasted for another two centuries, this was an unsuccessful attempt to remove Turkish advances into the Balkans. The ideological notion of removing the Muslims from the lands of Christendom was a factor as were Hungarian ambitions in the region. Moreover, it allowed Turkish forces to strengthen their positions in the Balkans, eventually sacking the last bastion of Byzantium, Constantinople, in 1453, and Belgrade in 1521, and eventually Hungary in the 17th century.

Abraham O. Mendoza

See also: Hungarian-Ottoman Wars (1437–1526).

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Long War in Hungary (1593–1606)

Conflict between the Habsburgs and the Ottomans lasted from 1593 to 1606 as part of a greater intra-European effort to drive the Turks from Ottoman-held Hungary. Although the war was fought using the rhetoric of crusade, it was essentially a geostrategic objective on the part of the Habsburgs to expand into Hungary.

In 1595, Pope Clement VIII arranged an alliance between Christian states to fight together against the Ottomans. The Ottomans ultimately sought to seize Vienna, but the Habsburgs and their allies merely sought to remove the Turks from Hungary. Habsburg-led forces included contingents from Austria, Hungary, and Bohemia as well as smaller forces from Wallachia, Moldavia, Transylvania, and Spain. Most of the engagements during this conflict took place in western Hungary and in Ottoman-held regions in the Balkans.

Habsburg forces successfully captured the strategic fortresses of Gyor, Visegrad, and Esztergom along the Danube but were hesitant to take the city of Buda.

Wallachian forces were able to capture a series of Ottoman strongholds along the Lower Danube. Moreover Moldavians defeated the Turks in Moldova. Wallachian forces were able to defeat the Turks at the Battle of Călugăreni in 1595 but were unable to secure territory from the Ottomans. Regardless of the advances made against Ottoman forces by European forces, the entrenched Turkish forces were able to sustain themselves and continue to fight in defense of their holdings.

Despite having superior weapons, the Habsburg forces and their Transylvanian allies were defeated by Ottoman forces at the Battle of Mezokeresztes in October 1596 in Hungary. The Habsburg-led forces were held in check by Ottoman forces for much of the remainder of the conflict. Moreover, Transylvanian uprisings against both the Ottomans and the Habsburgs hampered any sort of resolution of the conflict.

The Long War ultimately ended with the Peace of Zsitvatorok on November 11, 1606. While it stabilized the Habsburg-Ottoman borderlands, it also allowed the Ottomans to maintain their control over Hungary, which would become the strategic object of future conflict for the Habsburgs.

Abraham O. Mendoza

See also: Austro-Ottoman Wars; Călugăreni, Battle of (1595); Hungarian-Ottoman Wars (1437–1526); Mezokeresztes, Battle of (1596); Zsitvatorok, Peace of (1606).

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M

Mahdiyya Movement in Sudan

In Sudanese history, the Mahdiyya (from *Mahdi*, "guided one," in Arabic) refers to a revolutionary movement that overthrew the Ottoman-Egyptian regime in the early 1880s and established a government in Sudan that lasted until 1898. The Ottoman province of Egypt, which had gained increasing autonomy under the rule of Mehmed Ali (r. 1805–1848), had conquered Sudan in 1820–1822. Mehmed Ali and his successors sought the country's supposedly abundant mineral and human resources to finance Egyptian modernizing projects, help create a new army, and develop agricultural and industrial enterprises.

After six decades of foreign rule, large sections of the Sudanese population were restive for various reasons. First, they disliked the government's growing reliance on European Christians such as Samuel Baker, governor (1869–1873) of Equatoria (an Upper White Nile region that would henceforth become the most southern province of Sudan), and Charles George Gordon, governor (1874–1876) of Equatoria and governor-general (1877–1880) of Sudan. These British officers were appointed by the Egyptian khedive Ismail Pasha (r. 1863–1879) to spread Ottoman-Egyptian control over the upper reaches of the White Nile and fight against the slave trade. Second, heavy taxation resulted in famine, depopulation, and migration, whereas the growth of cities such as Khartoum and El Obeid posed an economic challenge to the older urban centers of Sennar, Wad Medani, and Shendi. Third, many Sudanese—above all merchants from the Danaqla and Jaliyyin tribes who had moved to the province of Kordofan because of fiscal pressure and riverain farmers of the Nile Valley relying on slave labor—opposed governmental efforts to suppress the lucrative slave trade. Finally, Sufi leaders resented the presence of Azharite ulamas (al-Azhar was and remains the world's leading center of Sunni Islamic learning) in Sudan's judicial and educational institutions, which challenged their own authority. Adhering to Sufi orders such as the Sammaniyya, the Khatmiyya, the Ismailiyya, and the Majdhubiyya, the Sudanese population felt alienated by the more doctrinaire Islam preached by Egyptian ulamas.

Hence, when Muhammad Ahmad bin Abdallah (born on August 12, 1844, in the Dongola district and died on June 22, 1885, in Omdurman) publicly proclaimed himself the Mahdi on June 29, 1881, at Aba Island (White Nile), large numbers of Sudanese joined his cause and prepared to fight against the Ottoman-Egyptian

government. According to Sunni doctrine, which largely prevails in Sudan, the Mahdi should appear at the end of times to restore true religion and spread social justice throughout the world. Muhammad Ahmad's reputation as a Sufi sheikh of the Sammaniyya order as well as widespread expectations of the Mahdi linked to the approaching Islamic year 1300 (1882–1883 CE) contributed to popularizing the Mahdiyya among the Sudanese. In less than four years the movement managed to take control of nearly the whole of Sudan, occupying the capital of Khartoum on January 25, 1885. In these same critical years, Ottoman Egypt was shaken by the Urabi protonationalist revolt (September 1881), subsequent British occupation (September 1882), and the loss of Sudan (January 1885).

The Mahdiyya's territorial expansion was accompanied by the establishment of various administrative, military, and judicial institutions. Several governors were selected by the Mahdi to manage the provinces of the emerging Mahdist state. The army was divided into three commands, a treasury was constituted, and a chief judge (*qadi al-Islam*) was appointed. After the fall of Khartoum (January 25, 1885), the Mahdist capital was founded at Omdurman, just across the White Nile. Muhammad Ahmad centralized all decision-making powers in his hands. He banned the existing Sufi orders, condemning them as divisive and useless once the encompassing rule of the Mahdiyya had been established. He also abolished the traditional Islamic



The Mahdi's tomb at Omdurman in the Sudan, after being damaged by British gunboats in the Battle of Omdurman on September 2, 1898. (Hulton Archive/Getty Images)

schools of thought (*madhahib*), recognizing three exclusive sources for Mahdist law: the Sunna, the Koran, and prophetical inspiration (*ilham*). Independent judgment (*ijtihad*) became his exclusive right. New laws prohibited pilgrimages to the tombs of saints; banned alcohol, tobacco, and music; and confined women to the private sphere.

The Mahdi died on June 22, 1885, only five months after the collapse of the Ottoman-Egyptian regime. His successor, Abdullahi al-Taaishi (1846–1899), completed the transformation of the Mahdiyya into a state structure. His 13-year rule (1885–1898) was characterized by mounting internal and external challenges. The Ashraf opposition (relatives and supporters of the Mahdi belonging mostly to Danaqla and Jaliyyin tribes), which did not recognize him as the legitimate successor of the Mahdi, organized two great rebellions against the regime (in 1885–1886 and 1891). Fearing for his personal and political survival, Abdullahi became increasingly autocratic. He forced fellow Taaishi nomads to emigrate from western Sudan and resettle in Omdurman so as to strengthen his power base. With regard to foreign affairs, he attempted to continue expanding the Mahdiyya east and north. Border warfare brought Sudan into conflict with Ethiopia for a few years (1885–1889), until the Ethiopian emperor Yohannes IV was killed at the Battle of al-Qallabat (March 9–10, 1889). Although Mahdist jihad primarily targeted British-occupied Egypt, physical and political obstacles prevented any attack until the summer of 1889. Sudanese forces were then overwhelmed by Anglo-Egyptian troops at the Battle of Tushki (August 3, 1889), which definitively crushed Mahdist territorial ambitions toward Egypt. In the 1890s, European progression into the Nile Valley, the Red Sea, and Central Africa significantly pressured Sudan. While the British fought the Mahdist forces from Egypt (mainly from Suakin), the Italians advanced westward from their Eritrean colony. In the south, Belgian expeditions sent from the Congo Free State threatened the Upper Nile and Bahr al-Ghazal Sudanese provinces. After two years of southward progression along the Nile, Anglo-Egyptian armies eventually overthrew the Mahdist state in the Battle of Karari (September 2, 1898). The Condominium Agreement (January 19, 1899) formally established joint Anglo-Egyptian rule over Sudan until the country gained independence on January 1, 1956.

Iris Seri-Hersch

See also: Anglo-Sudan War (1883–1899).

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Mahmud II (1785–1839)

Cautious reformer, unlucky general, and workaholic—all of these terms describe the Ottoman Empire's Mahmud II. Rising to power in 1808 after two years of coups and countercoups, he faced immediate challenges from external enemies and the Janissary Corps. The latter was a reactionary clique of soldiers, notorious for making and breaking previous sultans. Janissaries were also an obstacle to military reform at a time when predatory neighbors called Turkey "the sick man of Europe." Russia was a principal party in the latter group, attacking Mahmud's holdings during the Russo-Ottoman wars (1808–1812 and 1828–1829). These conflicts displayed the terrible state of the Ottoman army and encouraged regional uprisings in the Balkans, the Middle East, and Egypt. The uprisings ranged from genuine wars of independence to power grabs by local warlords, such as Mehmed Ali in Egypt. This combination of internal and external threats loomed over every year of the sultan's reign. June 1826 marked a major turning point and a considerable triumph for Mahmud: the destruction of the Janissary Corps. A Western-style army followed, along with civic, religious, and educational reforms. Indeed, Mahmud's principal accomplishment was his success in legitimizing reform, thus laying the groundwork for the Tanzimat era of reform of his successor, Abdul ul-Mejid.

John P. Dunn

See also: Auspicious Incident (1826); Egyptian-Ottoman Wars; Janissaries; Mehmed Ali; Ottoman Army (Early 19th century); Russo-Ottoman Wars.

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Mahmud of Ghazna (r. 998–1030)

The greatest of the Ghaznavid sultans, under whom the empire reached its zenith in power and size. He and his father, Sebuktegin, supported the Samanid emir Nuh ibn Mansur during the civil wars that plagued the dynasty in its last years. For his service, Mahmud was appointed commander of the army of Khurasan. Upon the death

of Sebuktegin, Mahmud was able to seize the emirate of Ghazna from his inexperienced brother with the backing of his powerful army. After securing his position in Ghazna and Khurasan he turned upon the Samanids, who were also being attacked by the Karakhanids from the north. Mahmud occupied the Samanid regions south of the Oxus River, and the Karakhanids occupied the north. The Karakhanids also attempted to seize Khurasan while Mahmud was campaigning in the east but were driven back in 1008 and did not attempt another attack during his reign.

During his long reign, Mahmud was occupied with a series of military campaigns that expanded his empire into India in the east and into Iran in the west. These raids were necessary to maintain the large standing army that he employed. Because of his frequent raids on India, he attained the title of ghazi. He first captured the strong fort of Bhatinda in 1004, which guarded the northwestern approach into the Ganges Valley. He then attacked Multan in 1006 and fully conquered it by 1010. Other Indian cities and strongholds fell to the sultan or suffered from his raids; he took Narayanpur in 1009, sacked Thanesar in1014, and on the Ganges Doab he led an army of 11,000 regulars and 20,000 volunteers in a lightning campaign that saw the capitulation of Muttra, Asai, Sharwa, and Kanauj and the collection of booty valued at three million dirhams, 55,000 slaves, and 350 elephants in 1018. In 1019 he forced Gwalior and Kalinjar to become his tributaries and led a major expedition in 1026, which ended in the taking and sacking of Somnath. He led his last foray into the east as a punitive expedition against the Jats, who had harassed his army as it returned to Ghazna after plundering Somnath; he defeated them in a battle on the Indus River in 1027.

In Iran, Mahmud focused his energies on fighting the Shiite Buyid princes and other regional dynasties. In 1002–1003, he first conquered Sistan, which was ruled by the descendents of Yaqub ibn Layth, the Saffarid. In 1011, he conquered eastern Ghur and fully subjugated the whole region by 1015. He then conquered Khwarezm in 1017, deposing the native dynasty of the region. After the weakening of the Buyids, Mahmud took Rayy, Hamadan, and Isfahan in 1029–1030. During this campaign several Daylamite and Kurdish dynasties, such as the Ziyarids, Kakuyids, and Musafirids, became his vassals. Mahmud had plans to expand into Iraq and face the Fatimids in Syria and Egypt, but he died in 1030 before they could be accomplished.

Adam Ali

See also: Muhammad of Ghur, Conquests of.

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Maiwand, Battle of (1880)

The fall of the Conservative government in England on April 28, 1880, during the Second Afghan War, resulted in a policy change to withdraw British forces from many locations, including Afghanistan. To fill the power vacuum upon their imminent departure and to maintain stability, the British selected Abdul Rahman to rule the country. He was proclaimed emir on July 22, 1880.

Ayub Khan, a brother of Yakub Khan, who was then governing Kabul, believed he should rule Afghanistan, and he had been marching with a large force toward Kandahar to gain the throne by force since early July 1880. Former Afghan Army soldiers and religious followers flocked to Ayub Khan's cause. On July 2, 1880, a British brigade, commanded by Brigadier General G. R. S. Burrows, began to advance from Kandahar to the Helmand River to prevent Ayub Khan's force from crossing it. Burrows's brigade consisted of the 66th Foot (minus two companies); 1st Bombay and 30th Bombay Native Infantry Regiments; 3rd Bombay Light Cavalry; 3rd Sind Horse; 2nd Company Bombay Miners and Sappers; and E Battery, B Brigade, Royal Horse Artillery. This unit totaled 2,599 soldiers, six 9-pounder guns, and about 3,000 support and transport personnel.

Some 6,000 British-equipped local Afghans, manning a blocking position at Girishk, mutinied and joined Ayub Khan's advancing army, abandoning six of their artillery pieces to the British. With the Helmand River then indefensible, Burrows withdrew to Khushk-i-Nakhud, 50 miles from Kandahar. British intelligence ascertained that Ayub Khan's advance force was in Maiwand on July 26, 1880, and the following morning Burrows marched his brigade to that location to engage the Afghan force on the march.

The British first spotted the Afghan force, estimated at more than 25,000 (with about 8,500 regular troops) with 30 guns, at about 10:00 a.m. on July 27, 1880. British artillery deployed forward and started firing on the Afghans. Burrows deployed his brigade in two lines, with the 1st Bombay Native Infantry to the left of the guns, four companies of 30th Bombay Native Infantry to the right of the guns, and the 66th Foot at the extreme right. The two cavalry regiments were positioned to the left rear of the line, and four companies of the 30th Bombay Native Infantry were in reserve.

The British, by deploying into a defensive combat position, forfeited the initiative. Ayub Khan's cavalry attacked the exposed British left flank and Afghan irregular infantry moved in a ravine to threaten the British right flank. The 66th, using their Martini-Henrys, repulsed the attacking ghazis on the right flank. Burrows ordered units on his left to advance and break up the impending Afghan attack, but heavy and accurate Afghan artillery fire limited their advance to about 500 yards.

The Afghans suffered considerably and then regrouped. At around 1:30 p.m. the British smoothbore artillery ran out of ammunition and withdrew. About an

hour later, the Afghans, led by irregular soldiers, conducted an all-out attack on the British. Companies of the 30th, having lost all their officers, broke and ran to the 1st Bombay Native Infantry, throwing the latter into confusion. A British cavalry charge was ineffective, and the horsemen retreated. Only the 66th maintained a semblance of order and discipline, and about 100 soldiers of the rear guard, surrounded by the Afghans, fought to the death. Realizing the situation was hopeless, Burrows ordered a withdrawal. The survivors straggled into Kandahar the following day.

The Battle of Maiwand was one of the worst British Army disasters of the Victorian era. About 962 British soldiers were killed and another 161 wounded. Afghan casualties are difficult to estimate, but some sources state that more than 5,500 killed and 1,500 wounded. Ayub Khan's force then marched on and besieged Kandahar.

Harold E. Raugh Jr.

See also: Abdul Rahman, Campaigns of; Anglo-Afghan War (1878–1880); Kandahar, Battle of (1880).

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Malik Shah (1055–1092)

Jalal al-Dawla Mu'izz al-Din Abu'l-Fat Malik Shah I was the third Great Saljuk sultan (1072–1092), under whom the power of the sultanate reached its greatest extent.

A son of Sultan Alp Arslan, Malik Shah was appointed as his father's heir in 1066. After his father's death (1072), he was accepted as sole ruler by defeating his paternal uncle Qawurd, who had challenged him for supreme authority. He also had to put down two rebellions by his brother Tekish in 1081 and 1084, but thereafter his rule was secure. Malik Shah's power was founded on two principal pillars: the central administration headed by his father's Persian vizier, Niam al-Mulk, and his

large standing army of Turkish slave soldiers. Many of the more far-flung parts of the empire were granted to members of the Saljuk family as princes or governors. In the east of the empire, Malik Shah carried on wars against the Ghaznawids and Qarakhanids, and in the west against Georgia, Byzantium, and the Fatimid caliphate. He appointed his brother Tutush (I) as ruler of southern Syria and Palestine (1078), but as the Turkish conquest of northern Syria proceeded, Malik Shah later installed governors of his own choosing in Aleppo, Antioch, and elsewhere.

The first signs of instability in Saljuk rule began to appear when Niam al-Mulk was assassinated (October 1092). Malik Shah's relationship with the Abbasid caliph in Baghdad, who had originally legitimized the rule of the Saljuks, deteriorated toward the end of the reign. It is possible that the sultan intended to depose the caliph, but he died while hunting in November 1092, in circumstances that are still disputed by historians.

Whether or not the sultan was murdered like his vizier, the deaths of its two most powerful men within such a short period plunged the Great Saljuk Empire into disarray. Malik Shah's widow, Terken Khatun, had her young son Mamud proclaimed sultan by the caliph, but this move was contested by another son, Barkyaruq, and by Tutush in Syria. The ensuing civil wars, which continued into the 12th century, greatly limited the ability of the Great Saljuks to respond effectively to the threat to Muslim Syria and Palestine that was presented by the First Crusade (1096–1099).

Alan V. Murray

See also: Alp Arslan; Byzantine-Saljuk Wars; Fatimids; First Crusade (1096–1099); Georgian-Saljuk Wars (11th–13th Centuries).

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Malta, Siege of (1565)

The siege of the island of Malta, the headquarters of the Order of the Hospital, by forces of the Ottoman Empire, lasting more than three months (May 28–Septem-

ber 8, 1565). The successful defense of Malta was hailed as a major triumph of Christendom against the Muslim Ottomans.

No sooner had the knights of the Order of the Hospital taken possession of Malta and Tripoli in 1530 than they embarked on an intensive program of harassing Muslims on land and sea as they had done from their previous Mediterranean base, the island of Rhodes: looting their towns and villages, raiding their ships, seizing their merchandise, and taking their men into slavery. These activities obstructed the Ottoman Empire's designs of westward expansion and interrupted its lines of communication with the Barbary corsairs. Sinan Pasha's raid on Malta, his sack of Gozo, and his capture of Tripoli, all in quick succession in 1551, was a foretaste of the Ottoman reaction to the program.

On May 18, 1565, an Ottoman armada of 180 vessels and 25,000 men reached Malta. The fleet was under the command of Piale Pasha, with Mustafa Pasha responsible for the land forces. Ten days later the Siege of Malta had begun. Defending the island's three strong centers of resistance (the forts of St. Elmo and St. Michael, and the heavily fortified St. Angelo, with its hinterland of Birgu and Bormla) were 500 knight brethren, 1,200 soldiers of various nations, 4,000 arquebusiers, and around 3,500 Maltese irregulars. The initial focus of the siege was Fort St. Elmo. On June 2, the besiegers were joined by Dragut with 45 vessels and 25,000 men. Fort St. Elmo fell on June 23; the siege of the fort had taken more than a month, and cost the Turks some 6,000 men. This also gave the Hospitallers time to strengthen their other defenses.

Fort St. Michael was the Ottomans' next target, and this formed the second major stage of the siege. Batteries were placed on St. Elmo promontory, Marsa, and Corradino Heights. On July 2, a Spanish relief force of 700 men (known as the *piccolo soccorso*) reached Malta, too late to save St. Elmo, but in time to save the island. This help was countered by the arrival on July 8 of Hasan Pasha with 28 ships from Algiers. Several savage assaults were made on the fort. Others were as fiercely directed at Birgu and St. Angelo all through July and August. On September 7, a second relief force of 12,000 troops sent by Philip II of Spain (the *gran soccorso*) reached the extreme north of Malta. The next day, a thanksgiving Mass was sung at the conventual church of St. Lawrence in Birgu. Even two centuries later, the French Enlightenment author Voltaire (1694–1778) claimed that few events were more widely known than the siege of Malta of 1565.

Victor Mallia-Milanes

See also: Piale (Piyale) Pasha; Suleiman the Magnificent.

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Mamluk Sultanate

A state ruled by slave soldiers of predominantly Turkish, and later Circassian, origin from 1250 to 1517. The Mamluk sultanate was originally established in Egypt but soon came to control Palestine and Syria. It was responsible for the attenuation of the Frankish presence in Outremer, and its final elimination with the taking of the city of Acre (mod. 'Akko, Israel) in 1291.

The Mamluk state emerged during the Seventh Crusade of Louis IX of France to the East (1248–1254). The Ayyubid sultan al-ali Najm al-Din Ayyub died in late 1249 while the Crusade army was holding a position opposite the town of Mansurah (mod. El-Mansûra, Egypt). An attack by the Crusaders on the Egyptian camp was defeated, largely owing to the Bariyya, a regiment within the Mamluk (slave soldier, literally "owned") formation known as the aliiyya. Turan Shah, the son and heir of al-Ali, quickly alienated his officers, including the Bariyya, and was assassinated on May 1, 1250.

In such cases in Muslim states at this time, the usual procedure was for the military grandees to gather and find a young prince who would be a puppet in the hands of the officers. On this occasion, however, the senior officers decided to dispense with a prince of the Ayyubid family and appointed Shajar al-Durr, the Turkish wife of the late sultan. This was a short-term arrangement: Muslim political culture was not yet ready to have a woman ruler. She was replaced by Aybak, a former mamluk of al-ali (but not a member of the Bariyya), who in turn married her.

Egypt had become a Mamluk state, ruled by a Turkish military caste composed mainly of warriors of slave origin. The convoluted events of the 1250s were characterized by infighting among the various Mamluk factions, along with conflict with the Syrian Ayyubids, who did not accept that the rich country of Egypt had been wrested from the control of their family. This led to Ayyubid attacks on Syria as well as Mamluk campaigns in Palestine and its environs. The Bariyya, which had played a prominent role at Mansurah and in the establishment of the new regime, was relegated to a secondary role: its leader, Aqtay, was murdered, and his second in command, Baybars, fled to Syria with 700 Bari (Bariyya) Mamluks. In the next few years these refugees earned their keep as mercenaries and contributed not insignificantly to the political confusion in the region. The fledgling Mamluk state was little concerned with the Franks on the coast at this time.

The arrival of the Mongols in northern Syria at the beginning of 1260 put an end to the infighting. Early in the year, Baybars had returned to Cairo with his followers and reconciled with the new Mamluk ruler, Quuz. In the late winter, Ayyubid rule collapsed in Damascus, and many soldiers and other refugees (including the odd Ayyubid prince) fled to Egypt. Mongol raiders, meanwhile, were harrying the countryside as far south as Gaza and Hebron. With the withdrawal from Syria of the Ilkhan Hulegu with most of his army in the late winter, the sultan, supported by Baybars, decided to capture the initiative and attack the remaining Mongol troops in the country.

This campaign led to the complete Mamluk victory at Ayn Jalut in northern Palestine on September 3, 1260. The battle was significant for three reasons: it showed that with determination (and luck) the Mongols could be beaten; it provided legitimacy for the nascent Mamluk state; and finally, it gave the Mamluks control over most of Muslim Syria up to the Euphrates and the foothills of the Taurus Mountains. At the same time, the Mamluks understood that they had defeated only part of Hulegu's army and that the real test of strength was yet to come. Quuz, however, was unable to savor his victory for long. Within several weeks he had been assassinated by a team organized by Baybars, who replaced him as sultan.

Sultan Baybars I (r. 1260–1277) was the real architect of Mamluk power and in many ways can be seen as the institutionalizer of the sultanate. He first had to strengthen his power internally, which he did by consolidating his support among the military (mostly Turkish) Mamluk elite, particularly among his comrades in the aliiyya/Bariyya. Realizing that the greatest danger to the sultanate was an attack by the Mongols, now itching to revenge their defeat at Ayn Jalut, Baybars launched a massive expansion of the army (perhaps even as high as fourfold) and increased its readiness and training. A communication system, based on postal-horse relays (the famous barid), smoke and fire signals, and pigeon post, was established to bring quick word of trouble in Syria to the government center at the citadel in Cairo. A widespread external intelligence service was set up that included both sympathizers in the enemy camp and secret couriers; this system was active among the Mongols, the Armenians of Cilicia, and the Franks of the coast of Syria and Palestine.

Fortifications along the frontiers and inland were strengthened and refurbished, although it should be noted that fortifications along the coast were usually destroyed to some degree after these cities were taken from the Franks. The Mamluks were never particularly adept seamen and made only a halfhearted attempt to keep a navy, as a sorry performance at Cyprus in 1271 shows. It was this awareness of Mamluk weakness at sea that convinced Baybars to adopt a scorched-earth policy on the coast, which was followed by his successors: conquered cities were razed (although actual destruction was surely less than the sources would lead us to believe), the logic being that the Franks, who enjoyed freedom of movement on the

sea, would not be able to gain a significant and fortified beachhead on the coast before the mobile Mamluks could gather and drive them off.

Baybars I also strengthened his hand politically, both internally and externally. He brought to Cairo a scion of the Abbasid family who had been found wandering around the Syrian desert; after ascertaining his genealogy, this claimant was declared caliph and given the title al-Mustanir. The latter's first act of government was to promptly hand over all aspects of power to the sultan, who was to act in his name. Baybars also received a mandate to expand the borders of his state. This caliph was soon sent across the border into Iraq with a small force, with which he was massacred by the local Mongol garrison. Either Baybars had wanted to get rid of him, because the new caliph may have been too independently minded, or there may have been a belief that the Mongols had indeed withdrawn from this area and that it could be easily recaptured.

Baybars's most important diplomatic démarche was the establishment of relations with the Mongols of the Golden Horde in the steppe area north of the Black Sea. Word reached him around 1262 that Berke, khan of the Golden Horde, was now engaged in a conflict with his cousin, the Ilkhan Hulegu. Baybars encouraged Berke (a Muslim) and his successor, Mongke Temur (a pagan) in this struggle, buoyed by the knowledge that his main adversary was engaged on another front. Perhaps the most important matter established with the distant Golden Horde was permission for merchants from the sultanate to continue exporting young Mamluks (mostly Turkish, but with a sprinkling of Mongols) from its territory. The main emporium for young slaves was the Crimea; from there they were transported by Genoese ships via the Bosporus to the slave markets of Syria and Egypt. Needless to say, this trade required the agreement of Genoa and the Byzantine Empire, which was acquired to the advantage of all sides.

Baybars I's initial attitude toward the Franks was not obviously more aggressive than that of his Ayyubid predecessors. By the mid-1260s, however, matters had clearly changed. In 1265, the Mamluks took Caesarea (mod. Har Qesari, Israel) and Arsuf, and the following year Saphet (mod. Zefat, Israel) was conquered. Two years later they took Jaffa (mod. Tel Aviv-Yafo, Israel), and the following year they stormed Antioch (mod. Antakya, Turkey). In 1271 they captured the important Hospitaller fortress of Krak des Chevaliers. They also took numerous smaller forts and minor places.

It would be difficult to suggest that there was anything inherently Mamluk behind this change in policy vis-à-vis the Franks in Syria, beyond noting the general atmosphere of jihad (holy war) that pervaded their early regime, largely as a result of the ongoing fight against the still pagan Mongols. It can be suggested, however, that concrete circumstances may have led the Mamluk sultan to adopt a more truculent attitude toward the Franks: this was the growing awareness that the Mongol Ilkhans in Persia, from Hulegu onward, were engaged in efforts to arrange an

alliance with the Christians of the Levant and Europe itself, including the pope and the kings of France, England, and Aragon, against their common Mamluk enemy.

The perceived threat of fighting on two fronts at one time or the possibility of a joint Mongol-Frankish force may well have convinced the Mamluk elite that the Frankish bridgehead in Syria and Palestine should be systematically reduced and eventually eliminated. Even after the conquest of Acre in 1291 by the sultan al-Ashraf Khalil, and the subsequent abandonment of the coast by the remaining Franks, there remained a fear among the Mamluk leadership of a possible alliance between the European powers and the Mongols of Persia. These Mamluk fears, however, were never realized: apparently the closest the Franks ever came to some type of military cooperation with the Mongols was during the campaign of Prince Edward of England in 1271, which resulted in some halfhearted and not very effective Mongol raids in Syria. It should be mentioned that long after the peace with the Ilkhans (ca. 1320) and the breakup of their state (1335), the threat of both a renewed crusade and Frankish raids was taken seriously by the Mamluk leadership. This fear was not unjustified, as seen by the temporary capture of the port of Alexandria by Peter I, king of Cyprus, in 1365.

Throughout the reign of Baybars I there was an ongoing border war with the Mongols along the northern Euphrates and the frontier region north of Aleppo. The Ilkhans launched serious attacks against the border fortresses of Bira and al-Raba and several deep raids into the north of the country, but during this period they did not attempt a determined campaign into Syria. In any event, none of these Mongol efforts were particularly successful, and all were met by a forceful Mamluk response. The sultan and his lieutenants, always suspecting the Mongol raids and attacks as harbingers of a larger offensive, immediately reacted by dispatching reinforcements from the main cities of Syria and Cairo; often the sultan would set out himself at the head of the main Egyptian army. In their war in the frontier region, the Mamluks were assisted by the Bedouins of the Syrian Desert, who had been integrated into the Mamluk state by subsidies, land grants, and titles. The Mamluks themselves frequently carried the border war into Mongol territory, often using the border fortresses as staging areas, as well as dispatching Bedouin or Turkoman raiders.

The kingdom of Lesser Armenia in Cilicia also suffered Mamluk depredations. In the early 1260s, the Armenians, sure of the support of their Mongol overlords, had launched several raids into Syria, which were all repulsed. The Mamluks responded by carrying out a series of devastating raids, thus gaining revenge, weakening an important local ally of the Mongols, and issuing a warning to the Armenian kings and barons about attempting ill-advised forays into Mamluk territory. Subsequent sultans continued this tradition of raiding Cilicia until the Armenian kingdom was finally eliminated in 1375, and most of its lands incorporated into the sultanate.

Baybars I's greatest success against the Mongols was his campaign into Mongol-controlled Anatolia in 1276–1277 because he was able to take advantage of dissatisfaction among much of the local Saljuk elite. The culmination of this campaign was the total defeat of a smaller Mongol, Saljuk, and Georgian army at Abulustayn (Elbistan) in the southeast of the country. Baybars was, however, aware of his precarious position—he was far away from his bases, with a large Mongol army approaching—and soon withdrew. He died soon afterward in Damascus and was succeeded by his son, Baraka Khan, whose disastrous reign was ended in 1279 by a coterie of senior officers led by Qalawun, Baybars's close associate. For appearance's sake, another son of the late sultan, al-Adil Sulemish, was named ruler, but after a reign of only 100 days, he was removed, and Qalawun gained the throne (1279–1290), taking the royal title al-Malik al-Manur.

This series of events repeats a pattern that was common within the Mamluk governing system. The ruling sultan would attempt to have his son succeed him, and even secure the consent of his senior officers, but with his demise the most powerful officers would jockey among themselves until one was strong enough to gain power. At this point the usually hapless sultan, often only a youth, was typically removed. Alternatively, if the former sultan's son was old enough to attempt to assert his power vis-à-vis the officers, he might even bring his own Mamluks into positions of power and influence. The old guard, however, fearing for their power, livelihood, and perhaps more, would eliminate him, and again, the most powerful of them would seize the throne. In the case of Baraka Khan and the final seizure of power by Qalawun, a combination of both models was at work.

Qalawun, an old and trusted comrade of Baybars I, can be seen as a continuator of his policies. During his reign, the institutions of the sultanate developed and crystallized. Early on in his reign, he was faced with a large-scale invasion of Syria by the Mongols. This was the first serious attempt that the Mongols, now led by Abagha, had launched to conquer Syria since the campaign of 1260, and it was, in a sense, a test of all of the military preparations that Baybars had made to meet a Mongol challenge. The armies met on the plain to the north of Homs in October 1281. The battle hung in the balance throughout the day, but in the end the Mamluks were victorious. The military machine that Baybars had built had proven itself in spite of the vicissitudes it had undergone since his death in the years of political confusion.

Through the remainder of Qalawun's reign, the frontier with the Mongols was to remain relatively quiet, and during the reign of the Ilkhan Teguder Ahmad (1282–1284), envoys were even exchanged to discuss ending the war. After the battle of Homs, Qalawun concluded a treaty with the Franks of Syria, but by the mid-1280s he was prepared to renew the Mamluk offensive against them: the castle of Margat was taken in 1285 and, more importantly, Tripoli (mod. Trâblous, Syria) in 1289.

At his death in 1290, Qalawun was preparing a campaign to conquer Acre. The realization of this plan was left to his son and successor, al-Ashraf Khalil, in 1291. This sultan was evidently planning a campaign to Iraq when he was assassinated by a group of senior officers. His death initiated several years of political instability, which lasted until the reign of al-Nair Muammad ibn Qalawun (1310–1340). This time of political confusion came too late, however, to help the Franks, whose presence in the Levant was now just a memory.

At the heart of the Mamluk sultanate was the institution of military slavery that had developed in the Islamic world over several centuries. A number of principles can be discerned for this institution. The Mamluks were brought as young slaves (generally 8 to 12 years old) from wild pagan areas in the north (the steppe region north of the Black Sea, and later the Caucasus). They were then converted to Islam and put through several years of religious and military training in the barracks. Around the age of 18, they completed their training, were officially manumitted, and then enrolled in the army or unit of their patron, either the sultan or an officer. In theory, and generally in practice, they were loyal to both their patron (Arab. *ustadh*) and their comrades, Mamluks of the same patron (these were known as khushdashiyya). Finally, Mamluk society was a continually replicating, single generational military caste; the sons of Mamluks could not be enrolled as Mamluks, although many, known as awlad al-nas ("sons of the people [who matter]"), served in inferior units. The Mamluk army was therefore replenished by the constant import of young slave recruits. Contemporary Muslim observers appear to have been aware of these principles in a general way, although they were never actually written up as such.

The Royal Mamluks (Arab. *al-mamalik al-sulaniyya*) were the mainstay of the army. The core of this group consisted of those Mamluks who had been bought and raised by the ruling sultan. To these were added Mamluks of previous rulers, as well as some Mamluks who had been attached to various officers who were deceased or no longer serving. An officer or emir (Arab. *amir*) had a personal entourage of Mamluks, although in the early sultanate, some of this complement was composed of horsemen of nonslave origin.

Non-Mamluk horsemen, as well as some déclassé Mamluks, were enrolled in the alqa formations. The word *alqa* means literally a "ring" or "circle" in Arabic, perhaps denoting either a ring around the sultan or an encircling maneuver. Alqa units were of some importance in the early sultanate, when there was a ready supply of first-class horsemen, such as Kurds, Turkomans, Ayyubid soldiers of various provenance, and military refugees (known as wafidiyya or musta'minun) from across the frontier with the Mongols: these might be Mamluks and other troopers from subjected states (for example, Iraq and Saljuk Anatolia) or even Mongol deserters themselves. With time, however, these sources dried up, and the alqa declined in

Mosque and madrassa of Sultan Hasan bin Mohammad bin Qalawon in Cairo, Egypt. The structure was built in 1256 during the Mamluk sultanate. (Shutterstock)

quality and became units of decidedly secondary importance. Generally, Bedouins and Turkomans served as auxiliaries in time of war, and also patrolled the northern frontier, occasionally raiding into enemy territory. Foot soldiers and militiamen are infrequently encountered in the time of the early sultanate, mainly on the frontier with the Mongols or as garrison troops; sappers and other technical support troops are mentioned during sieges, especially against the Franks.

The officers were divided into ranks, as follows: an officer (Arab. *amir*) of 100, commander (Arab. *muqaddam*) of 1,000, which meant the officer had a personal entourage of some 100 Mamluks and commanded a regiment of (theoretically) 1,000 alqa troops in time of war; an officer of 40, known also as an officer of an ablkhana (drum orchestra), who enjoyed an entourage of 40 mamluks and the right to maintain a private band of musicians; and an officer of 10, who had a small entourage of 10 personal Mamluks. These ranks were somewhat flexible: there were, for example, officers of 40 who actually had 70 personal Mamluks.

The basis for the purchase of young Mamluks, their training, the maintenance of a unit, and an officer's household in general was an *iqa'* (pl. *iqa'at*), an allocation of agricultural land. The officer in question (called a muqa') had a right to collect the taxes from this allocation for the aforementioned uses; the state treasury was thus circumvented in this process. The *iqa'* did not, however, entail administrative

Mamluk Sultanate in the Reign of Baybars I



authority and was not passed on as an inheritance. The muqa‘ also lived in the city: the Mamluk regime was an urban-based military society. There are thus several differences between the *iqa‘* system and feudalism, including the variant of the latter in the Levant. The senior Mamluk emirs amassed great wealth, not only from agricultural taxes but also from land and grain speculation and commerce. The sultan himself held large tracts of land in Syria, Palestine, and Egypt as his royal *iqa‘*. Occasionally, as in the aftermath of the conquest of Arsuf and Caesarea, state land was alienated and given as private property to various emirs. In short, the *iqa‘* system was an efficient mechanism for transferring the agricultural surplus of the state to the sultan and the Mamluk elite.

Compared to its Ayyubid predecessor, the Mamluk sultanate was a relatively centralized regime. Under normal circumstances the sultan's authority reigned supreme throughout Syria, Palestine, and Egypt (at least as much as premodern conditions permitted). The center of the government was the Citadel of the Mountain (Qal‘at al-Jabal) in Cairo; the bulk of the Royal Mamluks were stationed there and in its environs; the senior officers (theoretically numbering some 24 in Egypt) and their contingents also resided in the city. The governors in Syria, which was divided into a number of provinces, were directly appointed by the sultan. The governors and officers in Syria also had their private contingents of mamluks, and there were other horsemen in their forces. Provinces in the early sultanate included Damascus (which was responsible for Jerusalem, a subprovince until 1376 when it became a province, albeit of secondary rank), Homs, Hama (actually an Ayyubid puppet regime until the early 1330s), Aleppo, and Kerak. After their conquests, Saphet and Tripoli also became centers of provinces, as did Gaza later on. In some of the larger cities (most prominently Damascus and Aleppo), there was a separate commander of the local citadel who answered directly to the sultan, and who thus could help check any overly ambitious governors. The sultan resided in Cairo, but in the case of Baybars, much of his time was spent campaigning in Syria and Palestine.

The Mamluk sultans and senior officers were great patrons of Islamic architecture. This patronage resulted from the Mamluk elite's religiosity and spiritual needs, and perhaps also from their need to prove their attachment to their new religion and from the tremendous wealth that they amassed. The fact that these establishments were usually waqfs (endowments), which provided income for descendants in a volatile economic milieu (as well as circumvention of Muslim inheritance laws), was an added incentive. Finally, although this may not have been the original intention, the cultivation of religion won the Mamluk sultans and officers legitimacy in religious circles and among the population at large. Foremost among the institutions supported were madrasas (religious colleges focusing on legal studies), but mosques, khanqahs (Sufi lodges), and khans (hospices or caravansarys) also received extensive patronage. The Mamluk elite saw itself as the defender of Sunni Islamic orthodoxy, which included moderate Sufism (mysticism), although

individual Sufis of a more extreme variety could also enjoy the benefits of support from the military-political elite. Among various intellectual currents that flourished under the Mamluks, mention can be made of historiography, the extent and richness of which may be unsurpassed in pre-modern Muslim societies.

It is often thought that the height of the sultanate was the third reign of al-Nair Muammad ibn Qalawun (1310–1341), during which peace was concluded with the Mongols. It was certainly a time of massive urban and rural construction, encouraged by the sultan, as well as general luxurious living among the elite. Recent research has suggested that many of the subsequent political and economic problems may be attributed to the irresponsible fiscal policy of these years and to changes in the educational system of the young Mamluks. In any event, after this ruler's death, the sultanate entered a 41-year period of political and economic instability, exacerbated by the arrival of the Black Death in 1348. In 1382, Barquq ascended the throne, providing a modicum of stability. He also inaugurated the succession of Circassian sultans known (incorrectly) as Burjis.

The 15th century was one of successive economic crises that made for smaller and less disciplined armies. Novice Mamluks (now mostly imported from Circassia in the northern Caucasus) were bought at an older age and thus received less training. This period is often seen as one of decline, although if so, it was certainly a process that took a long time. With the demise of Frankish and Mongol power, the Mamluks had no serious external enemies (Tamerlane's excursion to Syria was short-lived); nor did they have any substantial internal opponents. The appearance of the Ottoman Empire in the northern frontier region in the second half of the 15th century brought about a change for the Mamluks, who put up a spirited fight in the area until their final defeat, which was aided by their unwillingness or inability to adopt gunpowder weapons, in 1517.

Reuven Amitai

See also: Ayyubids; Ayn Jalut, Battle of (1260); Baybars I; Hulegu; Homs, Battles of (1260, 1281, 1299); Mamluk-Ilkhanid War; Mansurah, Battle of (1221, 1249); Middle East, Mongol Invasion of the (1256–1280); Qalawun; Seventh Crusade (1248–1254).

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Mamluk-Ilkhanid War

Prolonged conflict between the Mamluk sultanate of Egypt and the Mongol Ilkhanate. The conflict began in 1260 when, two years after sacking Baghdad, the Mongol Hulegu Khan invaded Syria, which the Mamluks claimed, and captured Aleppo. Hulegu left a part of his army, about 12,000 troops, under one of his most trusted generals, Ketbugha, in Syria while he himself marched to northwestern Iran. Historians have traditionally explained Hulegu's sudden departure as a response to the news of the death of the Great Khan Mongke and subsequent power struggle over succession. In leaving Ketbugha in Syria, Hulegu certainly underestimated his opponents in Egypt. On September 3,1260, the Mamluks led by Sultan Qutuz defeated Ketbugha's Mongol force at Ayn Jalut (Goliath's Well), marking the first important defeat the Mongols suffered. The Mamluks then reclaimed Aleppo and Damascus.

Upset by this unprecedented setback, Hulegu organized a punitive expedition under Baydar (some sources refer to Ilge Noyan or Koke-Ilge), who had been one of Ketbugha's officers and had escaped death at Ayn Jalut. The Mongols recaptured Aleppo and advanced into southern Syria. On December 11, 1260, they encountered the Muslim coalition of lords of Aleppo, Hama and Homs, under the overall command of Al-Ashraf, near the tomb of the famous Arab commander Khalid ibn al-Walid at Homs. The battle, which pitted about 6,000 Mongols against about 1,400 Muslims, took place on the outskirts of Homs and resulted in a decisive Muslim victory, which some Mamluk chronicles consider greater than Ayn Jalut because the Muslims had numerical superiority at the latter.

For a variety of political and military reasons neither Hulegu nor his successor made any serious attempts to exact revenge on the Mamluks and their allies and to reconquer Syria for the next 21 years. The Mamluks used this period to reform their forces and establish political alliances (e.g., with the Crusader States and the Golden Horde) to be better prepared for the future wars against the Ilkhan Mongols. Between 1261 and 1277, the Mamluks and the Mongols were engaged in prolonged border skirmishing, with neither side willing or able to undertake a major attack. In 1277 the Mamluk sultan Baybars became concerned by the Mongol expansion into the Sultanate of Rum and launched a preemptive invasion into Asia Minor, where he defeated the Mongols at Abulustayn. Informed of this setback, Abaka (Abagha) marched at the head of a large army to Rum, where he executed the perfidious Pervane Muin al-Din Sulayman, the ruler of the Rum, and sacked several cities, where large numbers of civilians were killed. Abaka initially wanted to pursue

after Baybars but logistical difficulties prevented him from launching the invasion of Syria. He was, however, pleased to learn that Baybars did not live long to enjoy the glory of his victory at Abulustayn and died suddenly on July 1, 1277.

The new mamluk sultan, Baraka Khan (al-Malik al-Said Berke Khan), proved to be incapable of living up to his father's legacy, and his reign was cut short in 1279 by a group of senior officers led by Qalawun, Baybars's close associate. Although Qalawun became sultan, he faced domestic challenges to his rule. Informed of developments in Egypt and Syria, Abaka Khan was keenly interested in exploiting the infighting among the Mamluks, and in the summer of 1280, he dispatched a large army into Syria. The Mongol force was divided into three groups: the first marched from Asia Minor under Samaghar, Tanji, and Taranji; the second proceeded from the east under Abaka's nephew Baidu; and the third group, which included the greater share of the army, was led by Mengu Temir. The Mongol army also included an Armenian contingent. The Mongols invaded Syria in late 1280, capturing a series of fortresses, including Aleppo, and looting the entire region. Learning about the Mongol invasion, Sultan Qalaqun left Cairo at the head of the Mamluk forces on November 2, 1280 but, upon reaching Gaza, learned that the Mongols had returned home for the winter.

As the winter passed, Qalawun mobilized his army once more and left Cairo for Syria on March 23, 1281. He reclaimed the cities Mongols took the previous fall and entered Damascus on May 10. Informed by the spies of the Mongol preparations for another invasion, Qalawun remained in Syria until August when he learned about the Mongol army of some 40,000–50,000 men under Mengu Temur, Abaka's brother (the actual command was, however, in the hands of experienced commanders Tukna and Dolabai), marching through Rum towards Syria. The Mongol army included large contingents from Georgia (led by King Demetre), Armenia (led by King Leon), and Rum. The Mongols avoided fortresses in north Syria and advanced directly to Homs where the Mamluks, and their Arab allies, had already carefully selected their positions. In the decisive battle on October 29, 1281, the Mamluks scored another decisive victory against the Mongols.

Almost 20 years passed before another Ilkhan attempted to invade Syria. By then, the mighty Mamluk army that Baybars forged had become but a shadow of its former glory. Lack of unity, lack of command, and overconfidence plagued the army. In 1299, Abaka's grandson, Ilkhan Ghazan, organized a third invasion of Syria, crossing the Euphrates and capturing Aleppo before proceeding south; as on previous occasions, the Mongol army featured contingents from Armenia and Georgia. The young sultan al-Malik al-Nasir Muhammad mobilized the Mamluk forces in southern Palestine, where floods swept away their supply trains, depriving men of food and causing a decline in morale. In early December, the sultan marched north of Damascus to the plains north of Homs. During this three-day march, the Mamluks wore full battle gear, exhausting themselves and their mounts. The two

sides met at Wadi al-Khaznadar at dawn of December 22, 1299, and this time the Mongols prevailed. The Mamluks retreated to Egypt, abandoning Syria and Palestine. After the battle, Ghazan pushed south to Damascus and, after sending raiding parties as far south as Gaza, withdrew back home in 1300. Three years later, Ghazan dispatched Qutlugh-shah to reassert his authority in Syria. The Mamluks, led by Baybars al-Jashnakir and Sultan Al-Nasir Muhammad, encountered the enemy near Marj al-Saffar, south of Damascus on April 20 and gained an upper hand in a bloody combat. This defeat marked the end of Mongol incursions into Syria.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Abaka; Abulustayn (Elbistan), Battle of (1277); Ayn Jalut, Battle of (1260); Baybars I; Golden Horde—Ilkhanid Wars; Homs, Battles of (1260, 1281, 1299); Hulegu; Ilkhan; Middle East, Mongol Invasion of the (1256–1280); Qalawun; Rum, Sultanate of.

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Mamluk-Ottoman War

Relations between the Ottoman Empire and the Mamluk sultanate of Egypt and Syria worsened in the mid-15th century as the Ottomans gradually expanded their sphere of influence throughout Asia Minor. During the Ottoman War of Succession in 1481–1482, Mamluks provided assistance to Jem against his older brother, Sultan Bayezid II, who later sought retribution against them. In 1485, the Ottomans and Mamluks became involved in a major war after a conflict over territory ruled by the Mamluk-backed Dulkadir dynasty in Cappadocia. The war continued for six years and saw intermittent success on both sides. In the end, the two sides agreed on a peace treaty that gained the Mamluks territorial concessions.

After his victorious campaign against the rising Safavids, Sultan Selim I (1470–1520) turned his attention to the Mamluk sultanate, ruled by the aged Sultan Kansu (Qansuh) al-Gauri (d.1516). While conducting diplomatic negotiations with Selim, Kansur moved most of his army up to the north Syrian city of Aleppo. Hearing

about the Mamluk duplicity, Selim broke off negotiations, shaved the head and beard of the Mamluk negotiator before sending him home on a lame mule, and marched into Syria. On August 24, 1516, the two sides met at Marj-Dabik (Dolbek). Taking advantage of his superior firearms and artillery Selim placed his Janissaries in the center, flanked by batteries of artillery, while cavalry formed the wings. The Mamluks, lacking any firearms, were divided into three wings, with Kansu commanding the center, Emir Sibay on the left wing and Kha'irbay Mulbai, the governor of Aleppo who had secretly gone over to the Turks, on the right. The battle began with a Mamluk charge that almost routed the Ottoman left flank. However, Ottoman superiority in firearms played a decisive role in the center, and the Mamluks suffered heavy losses. Many of their commander perished, including Kansu, who died of a stroke while trying to rally his men. The Mamluks retreated to Egypt, giving up on Syria.

In the fall of 1516, Selim seized Damascus. This was followed by the conquests of Beirut, Jerusalem, and Gaza, where Ottoman governors were installed. A Mamluk force under the renegade Janbardi al-Ghazali tried but failed to stop Ottoman advance in Gaza. Selim offered peace to the new Mamluk sultan Tuman Bey (d. 1517), on condition that he accept Ottoman suzerainty, but it was rejected. The Ottoman army then rapidly advanced to Cairo, routed Tuman Bey's army at the Battle of Reydaniyya on January 22, 1517 and captured the Egyptian capital. Tuman Bey tried to organize guerrilla warfare (briefly reclaiming Cairo) but was defeated in a battle near the Pyramids in Giza, captured, and executed.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Bayezid II; Mamluk Sultanate; Marj-Dabik, Battle of (1516); Selim I.

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Mansurah, Battles of (1221, 1249)

The town of Mansurah (mod. El-Mansûra, Egypt) was founded by the Ayyubid sultan al-Kamil (1218–1238) as a forward military base against the Fifth Crusade (1217–1221), which in November 1219 had seized the vital port of Damietta at the mouth of the eastern branch of the Nile following a prolonged siege. Mansurah was, in fact, a large fortified encampment of a type typical in Middle Eastern Islamic warfare. Its location also dominated the eastern Nile and the Bahr al-Saghir, a strategic waterway linking the Nile and Lake Manzala. After a long pause, largely

caused by the divided leadership of King John of Jerusalem and Cardinal Pelagius, the Crusader army advanced along the eastern bank of the Nile in July and August 1221, heading for Cairo. It was, however, halted by the Ayyubid forces at Mansurah, and al-Kamil ordered that the irrigation dikes be broken, and the surrounding land flooded. The Crusader army found itself caught on a small island between the eastern Nile and the Bahr al-Saghir and was obliged to negotiate a humiliating peace. However, in return for the surrender of Damietta, still held by a Crusader garrison, the trapped army was permitted to retreat in safety at the end of August 1221.

In 1249, Damietta again fell to a Crusader army, led by King Louis IX of France. Although he was dying, the sultan al-Salih (1240–1249) assembled an army at Mansurah, supported by a river fleet. In November–December 1249, the Crusaders advanced up the Nile toward Mansurah. The death of al-Salih on November 23 was kept a secret from his army, which skirmished with the Crusaders outside the town during December and January. Eventually, the Crusaders crossed the Bahr al-Saghir to attack the town, but on February 11, 1250, the king's brother Robert, count of Artois, disobeyed orders and entered Mansurah, where he was defeated in street fighting. The Egyptians then counterattacked, and the Crusaders were besieged in their camp, while the Egyptian river fleet won control of the Nile. In March and April the Crusaders retreated toward Damietta before being forced to surrender near Fariskur, where King Louis was taken prisoner. In May 1250 some senior crusader leaders were released after paying large ransoms, but much of their army was enslaved.

This second battle of Mansurah was one of the most important during the entire Crusades, confirming three strategic points: that Egypt was the center of Islamic power in the Middle East, that Frankish power in the Holy Land could only be preserved by dominating Egypt, and that the conquest of Egypt by a seaborne assault was probably impossible, given the military technology of this period. The Ayyubid sultanate collapsed during this campaign, to be replaced by a military regime, which evolved into the Mamluk sultanate. Victory at Mansurah gave the Mamluks great prestige, helping them to inflict a major defeat upon the invading Mongols a decade later.

David Nicolle

See also: Ayyubids; Fifth Crusade (1217–1221); Mamluk Sultanate.

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Manzikert, Battle of (1071)

A battle in which Byzantine forces under Emperor Romanos IV Diogenes were defeated by a Saljuk army under the sultan Alp Arslan, fought near the fortress of Manzikert (mod. Malazgirt, Turkey) on August 26, 1071. Byzantine historians of the event were partisan: Michael Attaleiates (an eyewitness) and John Zonaras supported Emperor Romanos; Michael Psellos and Nikephoros Bryennios (whose grandfather fought in the battle) were critical of his actions. Muslim historiography, none of it contemporary, emphasized the heroic Islamic credentials of the Saljuks. Armenian historians saw the defeat as divine punishment for Byzantium's persecution of non-Chalcedonian Christians.

In the summer of 1071, Emperor Romanos led a large force (possibly 100,000 men) to secure fortresses near Lake Van (mod. Van Gölü) in Armenia against the threat of the Saljuks. A considerable number, under Joseph Tarchaneiotes, was dispatched to besiege Khliat (mod. Ahlat). Romanos approached from Theodousiopolis (mod. Erzurum) with around 60,000 men. They included provincial troops, contingents of Oghuz Turks, Rus mercenaries, and Armenian foot soldiers. The fortress of Manzikert had been successfully recaptured when Romanos learned of the proximity of a large Saljuk force commanded by Alp Arslan. Outnumbered, the sultan made an offer of peace, which was rejected. Tarchaneiotes, however, hearing of the Saljuk advance, fled toward Mesopotamia.

The battle began on the evening of August 26. After inconclusive skirmishing during the day, and not wishing to remain outside the undefended camp at nightfall, the emperor gave the order to withdraw. According to Attaleiates, the general Andronikos Doukas, hostile to Romanos, then betrayed him by spreading panic in the army. Bryennios, in contrast, relates that by this time the Turks had encircled the Byzantine army, putting the right wing (under Alytes) and then the left wing (under Nikephoros Bryennios the Elder) to flight. Both Doukas and Bryennios escaped capture, but Romanos, with the imperial bodyguard and the troops from Asia Minor commanded by Alytes, was left to face the Turks. Although many escaped, Romanos was captured and held prisoner for eight days. After his release, he took refuge in Cilicia, where he was defeated by forces loyal to Doukas. He was then blinded and forced to become a monk.

Byzantine losses at Manzikert were low: Attaleiates names only three high-ranking officers who were killed. Half the Byzantine army did not fight in the battle, and most of those who were captured were later released. The battle did not change

the balance of power between Byzantines and Turks in Asia Minor; far more damaging were the 10 years of civil war that followed the deposition of Romanos IV.

Rosemary Morris

See also: Alp Arslan; Saljuks.

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Marj Dabik, Battle of (1516)

Battle between the Ottomans and the Mamluks that led to the Ottoman conquest of Syria. After his victory at Chaldiran against the Safavids in 1514, Sultan Selim I had to divert his forces to deal with the Mamluks after hearing reports of potential attack from the Mamluk sultan Qansuh al-Ghawri. As the Ottoman forces marched south, the two armies met on the plain of Marj Dabik in northern Syria. The Ottoman infantry, armed with firearms and supported by artillery, deployed behind the protection of a wagenburg formed of 300 armored wagons chained together that the Mamluk cavalry could not breach. Furthermore, there was dissension within the ranks of the Mamluk army, some units refused to fight, and Khayir Bey, the governor of Aleppo, defected to the Ottomans. Sultan Qansuh died in the battle, and the Mamluks permanently lost Syria to the Ottomans.

Adam Ali

See also: Chaldiran, Battle of (1514); Mamluk-Ottoman War; Mamluk Sultanate; Selim I.

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Massacre at the Citadel (1811)

Mamluk influence had been drastically curtailed by the French invasion of Egypt (1798–1801). Despite centuries of power, their numbers, and more important, their prestige, were dramatically reduced. This was evident in the appointment of a new *wali* (governor) in 1805—Mehmed Ali.

An Albanian adventurer who had charisma, political savvy, and a pinch of luck, Mehmed Ali spent much of 1805–1810 battling Mamluk grandees to further reduce their control. Although capable of dominating Egypt's major urban centers, the governor faced a considerable challenge in his desire to extinguish Mamluk opposition. His opponents were mounted warriors par excellence, quite capable of speeding away from the wali's infantry based army.

Mehmed Ali's solution was treachery. On the eve of his campaign to Arabia, he offered Mamluk emirs (leaders) safe conduct to attend a lavish ceremony in honor of his son, Tusun, to be held at Cairo's Citadel on March 1, 1811. Citadel parties were important social/political events in contemporary Cairo, and attendance was de rigueur for political hopefuls. Lured by offers of rich gifts, a sumptuous meal, and tradition, more than 400 emirs and their chief officers advanced up the narrow street leading to the Bab Al-Azab—a main gate to the Citadel. As they milled about, Mehmed Ali's Albanian mercenaries launched a near-perfect ambush, killing almost all the key leaders and many of their retainers. The Massacre at the Citadel did not wipe out the Mamluks, but it did remove them as contenders for influence in Mehmed Ali's Egypt.

John P. Dunn

See also: Egyptian-Arab Wars (1811–1840); Mamluk Sultanate; Mehmed Ali.

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Mauritania-Senegal Border War (1989–1991)

The Mauritania-Senegal Border War was an ethnic conflict fought between the West African nations of Mauritania and Senegal from 1989 to 1991. A conflict over grazing rights in the Senegal River valley, the border between southern Mauritania

and northern Senegal, ignited the conflict. The underlying cause of the war, however, was ethnic conflict exacerbated by the migration of Mauritanian Moors to the fertile lands along the river. Whereas the overwhelming majority of the people in Mauritania and Senegal are Muslim, the Mauritanian government is dominated by white Moors, whereas the Senegalese government is dominated by black Africans, especially the Wolof. Black Mauritanians, members of the Wolof, Soninké, Fula, and Bambara ethnic groups, represent about 30 percent of the population and reside primarily in southern Mauritania. The Mauritanian Moors, who reside primarily in northern Mauritania, however, control political power and have engaged in racial discrimination since independence in 1960.

On April 9, 1989, Mauritanian border guards shot and killed three Senegalese farmers near the village of Diawara on a Senegalese island in the Senegal River and took 15 farmers hostage. The conflict intensified on April 22, 1989, when Senegalese mobs looted shops owned by Mauritanians in Dakar, the Senegalese capital, and killed 61 Mauritanians. Meanwhile, Mauritanian troops clubbed and killed more than 200 Senegalese living in southern Mauritania. To avoid further bloodshed, the governments of Spain, France, Algeria, and Morocco provided planes to repatriate 100,000 Mauritanians and 85,000 Senegalese. More than 65,000 Senegalese and black Mauritanians fled south across the river to safety. Ethnic violence against Mauritanian blacks, however, continued, and 275 border villages in southern Mauritania were burned. A peace treaty was eventually signed on July 18, 1991 and diplomatic relations were restored in 1992.

Michael R. Hall

See also: Western Sahara War (1971–1991).

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Medina, Siege of (1916–1919)

Significant event during the Arab Revolt. One of the three holy cities of Islam and terminus of the Hejaz railroad, Medina was a natural target for the Arab insurgents in the Hejaz from the outset of the revolt. In fact, the standard of revolt was first raised on June 5, 1916, near the city, and a first attempt at capturing it failed the next day. Although the forces of the grand sharif of Mecca, Husayn ibn Ali, aided by Egyptian field artillery and British warships, were able to capture most important

cities and ports in the Hejaz, among them Jidda, Mecca, Taif, and Yanbo, the Turks reinforced Medina and held it for almost three years.

In spite of a warning by their German allies that trying to defend both the Hejaz and Palestine in the face of the British buildup could result in losing both, the Ottoman leadership, fearing for its legitimacy when giving up the holy places, decided to hold the Hejaz. To this end, they turned Medina into an impregnable stronghold and reinforced its garrison. The Turkish VIII Corps was tasked with defending the Hejaz railroad on its entire length of some 430 miles from Syria to the Hejaz. The principal component of this force, the Medina garrison called the Hejaz Expeditionary Force, numbered 14,000 men by the fall of 1916. The Turkish commander at Medina, Khairy Bey, felt strong enough to stage repeated successful sorties against the weakly organized Arab forces that were more blockading than actually besieging the town, and he even planned a counteroffensive aimed at recapturing Mecca, though it never materialized.

In the summer of 1917, Prince Faisal's Arab Army, backed by British warships, moved north from al-Wejh, taking Aqaba and conducting raids on the Hejaz railroad, the sole supply artery for the Medina garrison. When the British Egypt Expeditionary Force and its Arab allies continued their advance into Palestine and Syria in late 1917 and 1918, the task of protecting the railroad increasingly imposed a heavy strain on the Turkish forces. Including the Medina garrison, the Ottoman Empire needed 22,000 troops in 1918 to keep the Hejaz railroad open. The men were distributed among major garrisons and numerous small blockhouses along the track from which they usually dared not venture.

In April 1918, Arab forces finally cut the Hejaz railroad around Ma'an. Evacuation of the 12,000-man Turkish garrison still in Medina, something long advocated by Ottoman officers but always refused by the government, was now out of the question. Fakhri Pasha refused to surrender well into January 1919, when his officers finally revolted and turned the influenza-plagued garrison over to the Arabs. Some 8,000 Turkish troops were evacuated to Egypt, and many Arabs joined the victors' cause. Holding on to Medina may have been a political necessity for the Ottoman government, but the fall of the empire made it a vain sacrifice.

Dierk Walter

See also: Arab Revolt of 1916–1918; Hejaz Railroad, Attacks on (1916–1918); Husayn ibn Ali; World War I.

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Medina Ridge, Battle of (1991)

The Battle of Medina Ridge on February 27, 1991, was the largest tank battle of the First Gulf War. Fought between the U.S. 2nd Brigade, 1st Armored Division and the B Brigade of the Medina Division, Republican Guards Forces Command, it is named for the low rise along which the Iraqi B Brigade had established a defense. The U.S. 2nd Brigade, part of the VII Corps sweep intended to bypass Iraqi divisions to engage the Republican Guard, considered the Iraqi elite. Commanded by Colonel Montgomery C. Meigs, the brigade was one of the largest in the U.S. Army, consisting of four maneuver battalions. The Iron Brigade consisted of one infantry battalion (6th Battalion, 6th Infantry) and three armor battalions (1st Battalion, 35th Armor, 2nd Battalion, 70th Armor, and 4th Battalion, 70th Armor) equipped with M1A1 tanks. The Iraqi B Brigade had two battalions of T-72 tanks and an infantry battalion of BMP-1 IFVs; a few T-55 tanks from other Iraqi units were integrated into the defense.

The Iron Brigade refueled and boresighted their tanks' main guns early on February 27 and began moving east at 11:40 a.m. The weather was overcast and misty, limiting visibility to less than 1,000 meters but not limiting the American thermal sights. Near 11:50 a.m., the first American elements reported contact with tanks at a distance of 3,500 meters. The Iraqis' fighting positions did not prevent American observation. The sudden American fire surprised the Iraqi crews during lunch, and the surviving Iraqis returned fire, but because of the weather they could only aim at American muzzle flashes; their rounds consistently landed short of the American vehicles. An Iraqi counterattack was abortive. The BMPs were destroyed within a few hundred yards of their positions, and Iraqi artillery fire was ineffective.

Within 40 minutes, tank gunfire, Apache helicopters, and artillery destroyed the Iraqi brigade. The Americans suffered a single casualty and destroyed 59 tanks, 33 personnel carriers, six antiaircraft launchers, and 17 other armored vehicles. The Americans also captured more than 100 prisoners. American sabot rounds caused catastrophic explosions, blowing T-72 turrets into the air. Lasting just 40 minutes, the lopsided results showed the decisive influence of American technology and superior training.

Mark T. Gerges

See also: Persian Gulf War (1991).

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Mehmed Ali (1769–1849)

Was he "that Albanian tyrant," or the "father of modern of Egypt"? Although historians still argue these questions, most agree that Mehmed Ali, or Muhammad Ali if one is using the Arabic form of his name, played an important role in Egyptian history. He dominated the nation from 1805 to 1848, set off a military revolution in the Middle East, and established a dynasty that survived until 1952. Although a self-described "Ottoman gentleman," Mehmed Ali was born Albanian. He worked as a sailor and merchant before entering the more lucrative field of soldiering. Joining a battalion of Arnaut (Bashi-Bazouk) mercenaries, he arrived in Egypt, took advantage of turmoil after the 1798 French invasion, and rapidly rose through the ranks. Mehmed Ali was in his element here. Blessed with charisma, significant tactical skills, political savvy, and luck, he soon dominated the Arnauts and was favorably connected with local notables. By 1805, a reluctant Ottoman government appointed him *wali* (viceroy), recognizing his de facto control of Egypt.

Mehmed Ali viewed centralized government, plus a powerful military machine, as twin pillars of the state. He strove to dramatically improve both, and he proved adroit as copyist and innovator. Promising fiscal and military programs already proposed by Ali Bey al-Kebir, who dominated Egypt from 1768 to 1772, plus Mehmed Ali's nominal overlord, Sultan Selim III (1761–1808), were embraced with vigor. In addition, the new wali tweaked the Sultan's *nizam i-cedid* military reforms to incorporate conscription of the fellahin—Egyptian peasant farmers, the vast majority of the population, but previously excluded from military service. Military innovation was the wali's strong suit. Hiring a motley array of Ottoman, European, and even American mercenaries helped him create a European-style army and navy. By 1811, these were potent enough to initiate a seven-year campaign against the first Saudi state, one that ended with an Egyptian victory. A decade later, Mehmed Ali's soldiers advanced south, capturing significant portions of the modern Sudan. Next, Egyptian soldiers and sailors projected power into the Greek isles and the Morea. Their 1825–1827 efforts nearly changed the course of the Greek Revolution.

Falling out with Sultan Mahmud II (1785–1839) over terms of compensation for his Greek effort, Mehmed Ali started his largest war, a nine-year conflict with the Ottoman Empire (1831–1840). At first, all seemed possible. Egyptians captured Acre (Akko), defeated several Ottoman armies, and were marching on a poorly

Mehmed Ali was a professional soldier of the Ottoman Empire who seized control of Egypt in 1805 and ruled the country for more than four decades. He sought to consolidate his hold on power and his influence throughout the region by reforming the nation's military and economic structures. In so doing, he established a dynasty that would rule Egypt until 1952. (Library of Congress)

defended Istanbul (Constantinople) when Russia intervened. Forced to back down, Mehmed Ali agreed to sign the Kutahya Convention (1833), which spared the Ottoman Empire from destruction but allowed for the largest Egyptian Empire in history. Between 1833 and 1840, Mehmed Ali dominated greater Syria, Arabia, Crete, Cyprus, and much of the Sudan. Kutahya was more of a truce than a peace treaty; fighting resumed in 1839 and featured a resounding Egyptian victory at Nezib. At this point, Britain and Austria stepped in, forcing the Egyptians to disgorge all Middle Eastern territories gained at the expense of the Ottomans. Northeast Africa remained part of Mehmed Ali's Egyptian Empire. Here he directed forays into regions as far apart as central Sudan and Eritrea. Although originally looking for gold, Egyptian conquistadors mainly generated revenues from the trade in slaves and ivory.

Mehmed Ali significantly altered the Middle Eastern status quo. Indeed, it can be argued that he started the "Eastern Question" and forced neighboring states to embrace his military reforms. Under his direction, the Egyptian army evolved from a small antiquated collection of irregulars into a 100,000-man combined arms force that smashed every local opponent. Islamic leaders as far away as Morocco attempted to copy this Egyptian model of excellence, and although the original rapidly atrophied after Mehmed Ali's death, it secured his family's hold on Egypt for the next century.

John P. Dunn

See also: Egyptian-Arab Wars (1811–1840); Egyptian-Ottoman Wars; Greek War of Independence (1821–1832); Ibrahim Pasha; Kutahya Convention (1833); London, Treaty of (1840); Mahmud II.

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Mehmed II (d. 1481)

Sultan of the Ottoman Empire (1444–1446 and 1451–1481). Mehmed II first came to the throne at the age of 12 on the abdication of his father Murad II in 1444. He was immediately faced by a severe military challenge from John Hunyadi, the voivod of Transylvania, and King Vladislav I of Hungary. His father returned from retirement to lead the Ottoman troops who defeated Hunyadi and Vladislav at the Battle of Varna in 1444. Mehmed continued to rule, with considerable difficulty, until he was eventually deposed as the result of a Janissary revolt in 1446 and Murad was restored.

On the death of Murad II in 1451, Mehmed returned once more to the throne. In 1453, he took the city of Constantinople (mod. İstanbul, Turkey), a conquest of great symbolic value, which firmly established the Ottoman state as an empire to be reckoned with. The fall of the Byzantine Empire caused deep consternation in Europe, many fearing that the Ottomans would appear in Rome itself and that the whole of Christendom was in the deadliest danger. The contemporary Nicola Sagundino declared that Mehmed's every thought and action were directed toward the extermination of the Christians. There were many calls for a crusade, in particular by the Hospitallers, who urged the pope to coordinate action against the Ottomans, and called for Christian unity in the face of this great danger.

During Mehmed's reign the frontiers of the Ottoman state were further extended, both in the east and the west. He took Athens in 1458, the Morea in 1460, and Negroponte (Euboia) in 1470, and he laid siege to Rhodes in 1480. Serbia fell in 1459 and Bosnia in 1464. In Anatolia, Mehmed disposed of both Uzun Hasan, the Akkoyunlu ruler, defeated in 1473, and the Turkish state of Karaman, which had for so long been a rival to Ottoman power in central Anatolia and which was conquered in 1474. Mehmed extended Ottoman control northward across the Black Sea. The Crimea became a vassal state, and the Genoese trading colony in Caffa (mod. Feodosiya, Ukraine) fell to the Ottomans in 1475. The extent of Ottoman advance was made very explicit for the European powers when Ottoman troops landed in Italy and took Otranto in 1480. Mehmed encouraged commercial activity and paid great attention to cultivating his relations with the Western trading states. Often regarded

as cruel (Niccolò Tignosi described him as a new Caligula), Mehmed was also described by contemporaries as a shrewd administrator, temperate and austere by nature, and a man of learning with a particular interest in ancient history.

Kate Fleet

See also: Byzantine-Ottoman Wars; Hungarian-Ottoman Wars (1437–1526); Uzun Hasan; Varna Crusade (1444).

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Messolonghi, Sieges of (1822–1826)

Greek port city on the Gulf of Patras, Messolonghi (Missolonghi) was besieged by Ottoman forces several times during the Greek War of Independence. Possibly these are best remembered today by the well-known painting by Eugène Delacroix, *La Grèce sur les ruins de Missolonghi*.

Geography favored the city's defense, which was enhanced by Konstantinios "Lagoumitzis" redoubts. Equally important were a string of islands that dominate a lagoon separating Messolonghi from the gulf. Many contained batteries that dominated this waterway, making it very difficult for hostile ships to conduct a close blockade.

An uprising on May 20, 1821, delivered the city to the Greek rebels. Several Ottoman efforts to retake Messolonghi failed between 1822 and 1824. Finally, as Egyptian forces were gaining an upper hand in the Morea, and Turkish troops cleared a route from Epirus, Resid Mehmed Pasha (1780–1839) was directed to take the city. He arrived in April 1825 and set his engineers to diggings saps. Although outnumbered by Greek artillery, the Turks pushed forward, using mines to blast holes in the defenses. Their capture of the Franklin Redoubt on July 16 marked the high point of this effort.

Spirited Greek counterattacks drove the Ottomans back to their lines, forcing Resid Mehmed to call for help from his rival, Ibrahim Pasha, the Egyptian commander. The latter arrived with better artillery and a disciplined infantry more suited for siege operations. Despite these advantages, Ibrahim's attacks were no more successful. Shifting focus, he directed his forces to construct gunboats for

operations in the lagoon, and then he ordered attacks against Vasiladhi, Kleisova, and Anatolika. The fall of the latter on March 15, 1826, turned the lagoon into an Ottoman lake, and sealed the fate of Messolonghi.

Cut off from reinforcements and supplies, the defenders opted for a massive sortie. Either betrayed, or simply botched because of to the tactical complexity of escorting noncombatants from the city, this effort failed on April 10. No more than 1,000 broke through the Ottoman lines. The remaining fighters and civilians retreated back into the city. Two more days of intense fighting ensued, which included Greek defenders in powder magazines blowing themselves up rather than surrendering.

Ottoman forces took control of the city on April 13; Greek losses amounted to 7,000, both military and civil. Ottoman-Egyptian losses were higher, but even more important, the impact of Messolonghi's fall redirected European opinion. The already powerful Philhellene movement converted the city's heroic defense into a propaganda victory for Greece. Britain, France, Russia, and the Germanies witnessed a dramatic increase in public support. This fueled the intervention of Britain, France, and Russia, which resulted in the naval battle of Navarino Bay (October 27, 1827) and the end of Ottoman efforts to keep Greece.

John P. Dunn

See also: Greek War of Independence (1821–1832); Navarino Bay, Battle of (1827).

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Mezokeresztes, Battle of (1596)

Major Ottoman victory over a coalition of Habsburg-Transylvania. By 1595, when Sultan Mehmed III ascended the throne, the Ottoman Empire had already been at war with the Habsburgs, supported by Wallachian and Transylvanian rulers, for three years. To resolve the conflict, the new sultan launched a major campaign that captured the fortress of Erlau (Eger) in September 1595. With the Habsburg-Transylvanian army advancing to reclaim the fortress, the sultan initially wanted to retreat to Istanbul to regroup but Grand Vizier Damad Ibrahim Pasha convinced him to attack the enemy. The Ottoman army (about 100,000 men) marched to the village of Haçova (Mezokeresztes) where the Austrian-Transylvanian army (about

95,000 men) of Archduke Maximillian III of Austria and King Sigismund Báthory of Transylvania had already assumed defensive positions surrounded by their own wagon laager; the Imperial forces had an advantage in firearms and Hasan Kafi al-Akhisari, who fought on the Ottoman side, noted that the Habsburg troops used the most modern types of cannon and arquebus that were clearly superior to the Ottoman. The battle began on October 25 and continued for two days. Initially, the fighting was limited to skirmishing, but a major Ottoman attack was repulsed by the guns of the Habsburg wagon laager, and the counterattacking Austrians routed the leading Ottoman units—some of sekban and tüfenkendaz troops abandoned the field. As panic spread among the Turks, the Habsburg troops busied themselves with plundering the Turkish camp, allowing Mehmed to rally his men under the sacred standard of the Prophet Muhammad (which had been purposefully brought from Damascus) and to counterattack with his cavalry. The attack proved decisive and put the Austro-Transylvanian troops to flight, leaving the Ottomans in possession of the field.

The battle was one of only two major field battles between the Ottomans and Europeans in Hungary between 1526 and 1683. The Ottoman victory was consequential as it allowed the Turks to preserve their authority in Hungary and Bulgaria for another 80 years.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Austro-Ottoman Wars; Hungarian-Ottoman Wars (1437–1526).

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Middle East, Mongol Invasion of the (1256–1280)

By 1227, the Mongols under Chinggis (Genghis) had emerged from the steppes of Mongolia to spread their influence to Central Asia and parts of Iran and Afghanistan. The once-mighty Khwarezm lay in ruins, as did various polities that lay in the path of the Mongol host. Chinggis Khan's death in 1227 briefly halted the westward expansion of the Mongol Empire as the Mongols diverted their attention to consolidating their authority in China and the steppes. In the 1230s, the Mongols extended their control to Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan as well as to the

Russian states and parts of Iran. The Mongol expansion into the Middle East was slow but steady until 1251, when the Great Khan Mongke resolved to extend his authority to the Abbasid caliphate. His brother, Hulegu was given the title of Ilkhan (subordinate khan) and tasked with extending Mongol power into western Asia. Hulegu left Mongolia in 1253 and began his campaign in earnest in the spring of 1256. He had a considerable army at his disposal. Persian historian Alaiddin Ata-Malik Juwayni's chronicle states that Hulegu's army was composed of 2 of every 10 soldiers in the Mongol army, but scholars question whether this statement can be taken literally. Most studies suggest that Hulegu probably had an army of 15–17 tumens (each tumer equal to 10,000 men) of Mongol troops and additional forces of local auxiliaries (e.g., Georgians, Armenians, Chinese) who were ordered to provide contingents. In January 1256, Hulegu crossed the Oxus River and entered Iran. As he advanced his formidable war machine, a succession of emirs, atabaks, and various rulers came to pay homage to him. Hulegu initially directed his attention to the Elburz Mountains from where the infamous sect of Ismaili Assassins had terrorized much of the Middle East since the 11th century. The Assassins' Grand Master Rukn ad-Din sought to negotiate with Hulegu but balked at the Mongol's steep demands. In the fall of 1256, the Ismaili domain was destroyed, its castles, including the impregnable Alamut, destroyed and its grand master captured and later executed.

Hulegu spent the year of 1257 receiving submissions from the remaining princes in Iran and then turned his army southwest and advanced on Baghdad, the seat of the Abbasid caliph, who had yet to submit to the Mongol authority. The Abbasid caliphate was but a shadow of its former glory, and the political authority of Abbasid caliph al-Mustasim (1242–1258) scarcely went beyond Baghdad and its immediate territory. But the caliph still commanded religious and moral prestige and claimed universal sovereignty in the Islamic world. Hulegu was upset by the caliph's refusal to acknowledge Mongol authority (even though the caliph's envoys had performed some expression of submission to the great khan in 1246) or send troops to fight the Ismailis. As Hulegu advanced to Baghdad, he and al-Mustasim exchanged a number of letters in which the caliph castigated and insulted the Mongol leader. Yet the caliph also failed to recognize the grave danger of confronting the Mongols and made no preparation to repel the invasion. He ignored his generals' warnings to strengthen the city's weakened walls and military.

In January 1258, the Mongols reached the Tigris River and approached Baghdad. Al-Mustasim tried to engage them, but his attack failed abysmally near Baghdad when the Mongols broke the dikes and flooded the Muslim camp, drowning many of the Muslim troops and killing those who survived. By late January, the Mongols took positions on both sides of the river, placing the city under a siege. The Chinese engineers constructed siege engines and began bombarding the city in early February. By February 10, Baghdad's walls were breached and the Mongol army

launched the final assault. What followed remains one of the most tragic examples of wanton destruction of human lives and property. Likely 100,000 people died (although some exaggerated accounts claim 800,000 to 1 million), and Baghdad's famous libraries, hospitals, palaces, and mosques were destroyed. Never again would the city serve as the intellectual center of Islam. The sack of Baghdad played an important role in deteriorating relations between the offspring of Chinggis Khan. Thus, Chinggis's grandson Berke Khan of the Golden Horde had converted to Islam and was so infuriated by Hulegu's destruction of Baghdad that he began negotiating an alliance with the Mamluks of Egypt against Hulegu.

After spending a few days at Baghdad, Hulegu pushed northeast to Tabriz and then made preparations for a campaign into Mediterreanean littoral. Some scholars suggest that King Hetum of Cilicia or Lesser Armenia, who had recognized Mongol rule in 1243, may have played a role in provoking this invasion. During his stay at the great khan's camp in 1253–1256, Hetum probably brought the Mediterranean littoral to Mongke's attention. The Armenian chronicler even claims that Hetum wanted to use the Mongols to liberate the Holy Land, which would then be given to the Christians. It is certain, however, that Hetum had a major influence on his son-in-law, Bohemond VI of Antioch, to enter into alliance with Hulegu.

On the eve of his campaign, Hulegu ordered the Saljuk sultans of Rum to participate in his invasion of Syria and Egypt and sent letters to al-Nasir Yusuf, the ruler of Syria, and Sultan Qutuz of Egypt requesting their submission. By the end of the summer of 1259, Hulegu finally departed from Tabriz, and after occupying the Jazira region in Upper Mesopotamia, the Mongol troops, accompanied by Georgian, Armenian, and Rum Saljuk contingents, entered Syria in early 1260.

Since 1250, Syria and Egypt had been under control of the Mamluks, the slave-soldiers, mostly of Turkic origins, who had deposed the Ayyubid dynasty and consolidate their rule in the region. Al-Nasir Yusuf, the lord of Syria, initially sought to compromise with the Mongols and sent Hulegu gifts, hoping to prevent the invasion. But Hulegu demanded that al-Nasir come in person and submit to the "sultan of the world, supreme king of the face of the earth" (sultan al-ard shahinshah-i ruy-i zamin) or be prepared to be destroyed. Al-Nasir then changed his position and adopted a defiant attitude toward the Mongols, sending a belligerent letter to Hulegu, requesting military help from Egypt and mobilizing his forces at a camp at Barza (near Damascus).

In January 1260, Hulegu besieged Aleppo, which surrendered on January 25 and was subjected to looting and slaughter. The Mongols marched west, and Hama and Homs submitted to them. Hulegu dispatched part of his army—about 12,000 troops under Ketbugha, one of his most trusted generals—on a raid into south Syria while he left Syria and returned to Tabriz. Historians have traditionally explained Hulegu's sudden departure as a response to the news of the death of the Great Khan Mongke and subsequent power struggle over succession. Some scholars also note that Hulegu



In this page from a 14th-century illuminated manuscript, Mongols under Hulegu (grandson of Genghis Khan) cross the Tigris River and conquer Baghdad in 1258. The ruling Abbasid caliphate was effectively destroyed, and as many as 800,000 residents were killed. (Bildarchiv Preussischer Kulturbesitz/ Art Resource, NY)

left Syria because of the lack of adequate pastures for his army, which consisted predominantly of cavalry. In leaving Ketbugha in Syria, Hulegu certainly underestimated the numbers and quality of troops available to his opponents in Egypt.

On early February 1260, Ketbugha arrived in Damascus, which submitted to the Mongol authority. The Mongols then turned south and camped at Marj Barghuth on the road from Damascus to Jisr Yaqub. Ketbugha dispatched a reconnaissance force into Palestine while he prepared for the campaign. The scouts raided Hebron, Ascalon, Nablus, and Jerusalem and reached as far as Gaza before returning to Damascus in April 1260. By then Ketbugha was busy suppressing uprisings in Damascus and Baalbek, both of which he accomplished with ruthless efficiency, and conquering the fortresses of al-Subayba and Ajlun in the Golan.

In Egypt, the new Mamluk sultan, Qutuz, and his brilliant general Baybars had been also preparing for battle. In late July 1260, taking advantage of Hulegu's withdrawal, Qutuz left Cairo for Salihiyya, where the Mamluks mobilized their forces and were joined by the refugee Syrian troops and assorted Turkomans, Bedouins (al-urbani), and Shahrazuriyya Kurds. Although many of his emirs urged him to wait for the Mongols in Egypt, Qutuz decided to attack the Mongols in Syria. Advancing into Palestine, Baybars, at the head of the Mamluk advance guard, routed a Mongol forward force (talia) near Gaza. The surviving Crusader polities faced a difficult choice between siding with Mongols or the Mamluks but eventually chose to remain neutral, even though they sent supplies to the Muslim camp. Ketbugha was in the Bekaa Valley when he received the news of the Mamluk invasion of

Palestine. He quickly gathered his forces, which included contingents from Georgia and Lesser Armenia, and marched to face the Mamluks. The two forces converged on the Plains of Esdraelon at the Battle of Ayn Jalut (Goliath's Well) on September 3,1260. The outnumbered Mongols began the battle with a ferocious charge that drove the Mamluks back, but the tide of the battle turned after the defection of Syrian troops under al-Ashraf Musa. The Mamluk counterattack shattered the Mongol ranks and killed Ketbugha. Qutuz dispatched Baybars after the routed Mongols, and the Mamluks chased them up through northern Syria.

Ayn Jalut was the first important defeat the Mongols suffered, and it played a crucial role in the history of the Middle East. Ketbugha's defeat at Ayn Jalut, though a relatively small battle in itself, proved to be the Muslim version of the Christian victory at the Battle of Tours in 732. Just as Christian Europe had held back the forces of Islam, so Muslim Egypt turned away the forces that could have had a devastating effect on the heart of the Islamic world. Instead, Egypt endured as one of the centers of Islam, and Syria became an integral part of the centralized Mamluk sultanate. The myth of Mongol invincibility was weakened, and the glory earned at Ayn Jalut allowed Baybars to assassinate Qutuz and assume the supreme leadership of the Mamluk sultanate. Hulegu was infuriated by this unprecedented Mongol defeat and prepared a major punitive expedition. However, continued power struggles in the heart of the Mongol Empire prevented this plan from being carried through. Faced with attacks from the Golden Horde, Hulegu campaigned against Berke Khan in the Caucasus in 1261–1263, but neither was able to gain the upper hand. Hulegu was still hoping to revive his alliance with the Crusaders and invade the Mamluk realm when he died in 1264.

Hulegu's son Abaka continued his father's struggle against the Mamluks of Egypt and their allies. In 1266, he built a fortified line in eastern Georgia to protect his territory from the attacks of the Golden Horde, and in the 1270s he campaigned against north Caucasian tribes. Abaka sought to establish diplomatic alliances with European nations against Egypt and sent embassies to France and the Papal States in 1274 and 1277. Although Abaka had negotiated join operations with England, France, and the Papal States, European states failed to organize any combined action, leaving Abaka alone to face the Mamluks, who attacked his territories throughout the 1270s and routed the Ilkhan force near Albistan in 1277. Abaka responded with an invasion of Syria in 1280, but although he sacked Aleppo, his army suffered a major defeat at the Battle of Homs.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Abaka; Abbasids; Assassins; Ayn Jalut, Battle of (1260); Berke Khan; Golden Horde—Ilkhanid Wars; Hulegu; Homs, Battles of (1260, 1281, 1299); Ismailis; Mamluk-Ilkhanid War; Mamluk Sultanate; Tours, Battle of (732).

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Military Education, Ottoman

The origin of the professional military education in the Ottoman Empire can be traced to the 18th century. The first institution dedicated to military education was the Ulufeli Humbarachi Ocağı (Bombardier Corps), which was established in Constantinople (Istanbul) in 1735. The institution, directed by French engineer Claude Alexandre, Comte de Bonneval (known as Humbaracı Ahmed Pasha), trained students in military engineering, mathematics, ballistics, and technical drawing. Another Frenchman, Baron Francois de Tott, created the Topçu Mektebi (Artillery School) in 1772 and Topçculari Ocağı (Rapid-Fire Artillery Corps) in 1774. In 1773, Sultan Mustafa III established Tersane Hendesehanesi (Naval Engineering School of the Naval Shipyard), which trained civilian merchant marines. Two years later Baron de Tott and Hasan Pasha, admiral of the navy, convinced Sultan Mustafa III to establish the Hendesehane (Mathematical School) at the Imperial Shipyard, later designated as Mühendishanesi (Engineering School) in 1781. The first Ottoman school to offer professional engineering education, the Mühendishanesi employed European and Ottoman experts who taught courses on shipbuilding, navigation, cartography, geography, and military engineering. The school greatly benefited from the close diplomatic relations between France and the Ottoman Empire—textbooks at Mühendishanesi were largely French, and many instructors were French engineers. However, after the Franco-Ottoman alliance ended in 1778, French instructors left and were replaced by local madrassa teachers.

In 1793, during Sultan Selim III's military reforms, a new military engineering school, Mühendishane-i Cedide (New Engineering School) was established to train bombardiers, sappers, and artillerymen. In 1797, the sultan built new facilities for the school. Here the best soldiers of the Lağimci Ocağı (Miners Corps) and Humbarachi Ocağı (Bombardier Corps) received engineering education. By 1802, Selim III combined the Mühendishane-i Cedide and Mimaran-I Hassa Ocağı (State Architecture Corps), and the resulting new institution now produced both civil and

military engineers (except for naval engineers) and offered courses in drawing, geometry, algebra, astronomy, languages, and history. In 1806, the sultan introduced further changes in military education. Modern technical education was introduced, and the engineering schools were divided into Mühendishane-i Berri-i Hümayun (Imperial Military Engineering School), which trained army engineers, and Mühendishane-i Bahri-i Hümayun (Imperial School of Naval Engineering), which provided a four-year education in naval engineering.

After destroying the Janissary Corps in 1826, Sultan Mahmud II embarked on a series of military reforms aimed at establishing a modernized Ottoman army. The key problem facing reform was the traditional system of education, which was dominated by the conservative ulama (religious scholars). Therefore, the sultan and the army leaders embarked on creating a separate and secular educational system that would meet the demands of the reformed military. The graduates of mekteps (elementary schools), which were controlled by ulama, were selected for special Rüşdiye schools that Mahmud established at the Suleymaniye and Sultan Ahmed mosques in Istanbul. These schools offered courses in history, mathematics, and grammar and prepared pupils for government and military service. The sultan also began to send students to Europe for training and revived Mühendishane-i Bahri-i Hümayun (Imperial Military Engineering School), which had fallen into disrepair and obscurity since the reign of Selim III. In 1828, this school was placed under able leadership of Hoca Ishak Efendi, who developed new curriculum and hired new instructors. Destroyed by a fire in 1821, Mühendishane-i Bahri-i Hümayun was moved to Parmakkapı in 1822, but the new building proved to be inadequate. This prompted Sultan Mahmud II to construct a new school building at Heybeliada, an island in the Sea of Marmara, though the school did not relocate there until 1850, when the facilities were completed. The new location featured a vast main building for about 150 cadets, a hospital, a printing house, and a library. The sultan next created Mekteb-i Harbiye-i Şahane (the Imperial Military Academy) in 1831. Directed by Ahmed Fevzi Pasha and Mehmed Namık Pasha, the academy was modeled after European military academies and sought to provide modern military education to Ottoman officers. Because of the political and military challenges facing the Ottoman Empire in 1830s, however, the academy did not graduate its first class of officers until 1841. In 1850s, displeased with the graduates of regular (secondary) schools, the army leadership developed its own system of schools—rüşdiye (elementary) and idadi (middle)—that prepared pupils for Mekteb-i Ulum-u Harbiye's (the School of Military Sciences) advanced training in military sciences, engineering, mathematics, and geometry.

The French military mission to Istanbul played an important role in development of the Ottoman military schools. Until 1870, instructors and textbooks were oftentimes of French origin, and the French language was the second language in schools. Yet, France's defeat in the Franco-Prussia war, and its refusal to extend the

military mission in 1877, led to major changes. Sultan Abdulhamid II's reign saw a gradual shift to the German model of education in which the German military mission to Istanbul, established in 1882, played a major role. Thus, German military adviser Colmar von der Goltz drastically changed the education and training system for officers of Erkân-ı Harb (the Ottoman General Staff), introducing rigorous selection of cadets for the Erkân-ı Harb, where he created an academically challenging environment. German textbooks and military manuals replaced French and British versions. Yet, von der Goltz was unable to convince Osman Pasha, the head of the Ottoman Military Academy, to make thorough changes to the curriculum that would have stressed military application and regimental tours. Sultan Abdulhamid II also opened military secondary schools throughout the empire, including Baghdad (1876, 1886), Beirut and Damascus (1877), Edirne (1879), Erzurum and Trabzon (1881), Aleppo (1882), Salonika (1884), and Mosul (1893). By the early 1900s, the Ottoman Empire possessed a network of military schools in every province that trained new officer cadres and played a key role in integrating various Muslim ethnic groups; the network even included a special military school (Aşiret Mekteb-i Hümayun) for children of nomadic tribes that was founded in 1892.

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See also: Mahmud II; Ottoman Army (Early 19th Century); Selim III.

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Military Equipment, Islamic

The popular notion that Islamic arms and armor were especially decorated is untrue. Yet there was greater variation of decorative schemes and of material used than that seen in medieval Europe. The history of Islamic arms and armor also reflects the migration of conquering peoples, the rise and decline of dynasties, and even changing degrees of iconoclasm. The decoration of military artifacts, as well as the forms of such objects, also differed geographically as a result of cultural diversity within Islam, differing influences from beyond the Islamic World, and even climatic variations.

It is generally assumed that, apart from Yemen, pre-Islamic Arabia had little artistic culture and that its arms and armor merely reflected those of neighboring Romano-Byzantine and Iranian civilizations. Certainly, written sources and surviving artifacts confirm the survival of a short Roman-style stabbing sword well into the early Islamic world. Similarly, archaeological evidence from Oman points to Sassanian influence upon military equipment in regions neighboring Iran. The lands from Syria to Spain that the Muslim Arabs conquered were essentially Romano-Byzantine in their military traditions, though the Visigothic presence in Iberia set that area slightly apart. Not surprisingly, such a background had its influence on the subsequent development of arms and armor, as did a relative lack of Turkish influence west of Egypt. On the other hand, the decoration of medieval western Islamic arms betrays virtually no Romano-Byzantine heritage and remains strictly Arab with a small Iranian and virtually no Turkish input. In contrast, Egypt, Syria, and Anatolia show strong though varying degrees of a Central Asia military-technological influence. In Iran a late Sassanian and already slightly Turkified form of Iranian tradition initially dominated Islamic weaponry and its decoration. Yet at a very early stage Turkish influence strengthened as a result of a virtual Turkish takeover of the eastern Islamic military elites. This can even be seen in India, though there was also an as yet barely understood Buddhist and Hindu influence upon some aspects of early Islamic arms and armor.

In Transoxania and much of Afghanistan, Central Asian stylistic influence was, of course, paramount, behind which was that of China. Until the 12th century most Islamic swords were straight and generally double-edged. Hilts were correspondingly symmetrical, though their designs varied from those lacking crossguards to those with curved quillons. Surviving examples are often highly decorated, which may reflect a willingness to preserve beautiful objects, plus the fact that many are made of easily decorated bronze. Very few helmets survive from the early Islamic period, but probably include a much corroded, copper- or bronze-covered iron helmet from northern Iraq whose segmented structure and very pointed shape are in a Central Asian rather than a Mediterranean tradition. A second surviving helmet is perhaps an early eighth-century specimen from near Bukhara, whose low rounded shape, remnants of a mail aventail, and one-piece iron construction demonstrate the advanced metallurgical capabilities of this region. The mixing of iron and bronze or copper lamellar in a fragmented seventh- or eighth-century cuirass from southern Iran may be the reality behind the rows of blue and gold lamellae shown in medieval eastern Islamic art. A recent find of 13th- or 14th-century iron lamellae from the Citadel of Damascus also show remnants of gilding. The use of bronze links in mail armor had been known in the Middle East since pre-Islamic times. It then appears in some fragments of medieval Syrian mail, is clearly shown in late 11th-century Spanish manuscripts, and continued to be used in Islamic mail armor until the 19th century. The curved saber was known in pre-Turkish Iran,

and perhaps further west, though it did not achieve widespread popularity until the 13th century. The mace was, however, a more popular weapon that spread from Iran during the early Islamic centuries and resulted in an abundance of different forms, from the elongated and flanged to animal-headed; the latter being particularly popular among Turks. Few war axes survive from the early period, though they became widespread in later centuries, perhaps reflecting developments in armor.

Little archery equipment survives from the early period other than arrowheads. Though difficult to date, their forms clearly reflect a spread of Turkish and other Central Asian influences. The decoration of a silver archer's thumb ring from Egypt also appears more Turkish than Islamic. In recent years an abundance of other medieval Islamic archery equipment has been found in Syria. Although the findings remain largely unpublished, it confirms the sophistication of composite bows, confirms that they were manufactured in an almost mass-produced manner, and shows that crossbows were more important than had previously been thought. The coming of the Mongols reinforced the existing spread of Central Asian styles of warfare with their accompanying forms of arms, armor, and horse harness. On the other hand, early Ottoman Turkish military equipment drew inspiration primarily from that of the Mamluks, western Iran, and, to a minor degree, Byzantine or southeast European traditions. One feature that soon became apparent was the use of more naturalistic plant motifs in surface decoration, as was similarly seen in other forms of Ottoman art. Meanwhile, a separate evolution took place in the westernmost provinces of the Islamic world during the later medieval period. Here, in Andalusia and North Africa, arabesque and geometric designs plus calligraphic inscriptions became virtually the sole form of decoration. A distinctive series of weapons also developed here, with the few curved swords owing little to Central Asian influence while the earlier straight swords evolved into the abundantly decorated Grenadine swords of the 15th century. An even more distinctive form of kidney-shaped leather shield, known in Spanish as the *adarga* (from the Arabic *daraqa*), became characteristic of Morocco and Granada, having probably evolved from larger rawhide-shields used in early medieval North Africa and the Sahara.

David Nicolle

See also: Military Medicine, Medieval Islamic; Muslim Armies of the Crusades.

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Military Medicine, Medieval Islamic

Islamic military medicine is a combination of classical Greek science with practices of India and China. When Bishop Nestorius was expelled from Constantinople for heresy in 431, the history of military medicine took a fortunate turn. The bishop and his followers relocated to the Mesopotamian city of Edessa and set about translating the existing body of Greek and Latin medical literature into Syriac. When the Nestorians were expelled from Edessa in 489 and resettled in the Persian town of Jundi-Shapur, they took their entire library of translated texts and founded a university with an adjacent hospital, creating the clinical-research-educational model of medical training that persists to the present. Benefiting from its geography, the school at Jundi-Shapur was able to merge Greek and Roman knowledge with that from Persia, India, and China.

In just 80 years, the new religion of the Prophet Muhammad (570–632) spread from the Arabian Peninsula across the Middle East and west to Iberia. Persia fell to the Arabs in 642, and the Muslim conquerors not only preserved the university and hospital but also reproduced its model throughout their empire, spreading medical knowledge from the Indus to the Pyrenees. Under the direction of Abbasid caliph Al-Mansur, who founded the city of Baghdad and the Eastern caliphate, translation of the Jundi-Shapur library from Syriac to Arabic was begun in 765. Following Koranic mandates to care for the sick and weak, the Baghdad caliphs undertook an ambitious program of hospital construction; by 1160, there were 60 hospitals in the capital alone. The hospital at Damascus continued to furnish charity care for more than 300 years.

The Koran, however, prohibited dissection. Consequently, little innovation took place in Arabic medicine or surgery, and Galen's anatomic errors were perpetuated virtually in their entirety. Surgery was denigrated and separated from medicine under the caliphate. Even medicine held a low status, and practitioners were frequently Christians, Jews, or Persians rather than Arabs. In fact, the three greatest Islamic physicians (Rhazes, Avicenna, and Abul Kassem) were all Persian. Islamic medicine emphasized drug treatment with extensive pharmacopoeias that included such medicines as cannabis, opium, and bhang (hemp or hyoscyamus). Ibn Batar's text included 1,400 substances, more than 300 of which, having come from India, Persia, or China, were unknown to Western medicine.

A formal program of physician training and licensure was instituted in Baghdad in 931, in which candidates were trained at universities and their attached hospitals

and then served apprenticeships with established practitioners. The model was later copied by the Italian school at Salerno and persists in modern medical education.

The Eastern caliphate developed camel-borne tent hospitals for its armies. Each had its own instruments and a full staff and could follow the troops, but surgical techniques remained crude. Amputation was done with a mallet and cleaver, followed by cauterization with hot oil to stop the bleeding. Splinting of fractures was inexpert and regularly resulted in limbs that ranged from crooked to grotesque. Muslim military physicians did follow Roman sanitary advice and insisted on proper camp location and field hygiene, and the best of their physicians honed their craft while serving in the military.

Rhazes (Abu Bakr Muhammad ibn Zakariyya) (ca. 860–932) was the most influential of the medieval Arab-Islamic physicians. Born in Iran, he did not take up medicine until he was almost 30 years old after being inspired by a visit to a Baghdad hospital. As a junior physician, he helped choose the site for Baghdad's new hospital by hanging bits of raw meat around the city and seeing in which location it lasted the longest without rotting, reasoning that this would be the site least prone to corruption and disease. Rhazes subsequently became chief physician at that hospital and divided his time between the capital, a second institution in his home village, and travels in Syria, Egypt, and Spain.

Rhazes joined Avicenna and Albucasis of Cordova as the great triumvirate of medieval Muslim physicians. Like the other two, he was principally a medical encyclopedist and organizer of Greek and Eastern science. Although Persian was his first language, he wrote in Arabic and adopted Arab culture. His *Almansour* dealt with many of the problems of military medicine. Rhazes recommended placing tents in summer camps at the top of hills facing north with wide spaces between them. In the winter, he recommended camping at the base of hills facing south and joining tents in groups of two to preserve heat. He also recommended keeping animals, especially those with diseases, well away from the camps. The book contained a chapter on extraction of arrows that mirrored the recommendations of Aulus Cornelius Celsus and Paul of Aegina. The *Almansour* also discussed fractures, various operations, alchemy, astrology, snakes, and angels. A second Rhazes book, the *Mansoury*, contained sections on surgery, poisons, hygiene, and travel, all subjects appropriate to military medicine. The *Mansoury*'s ninth book was frequently reprinted in Latin translation and remained a standard in therapeutics well into the European Renaissance.

Rhazes wrote the encyclopedic *El Hawi*, or *Continens*, in which he attempted to coalesce all known medical knowledge from Greek, Islamic, and Hindu sources and combine it with descriptions from his personal experience. The *Continens* included the first detailed, accurate descriptions of smallpox and measles and was first translated into Latin in 1279 by Jewish scholar Farj ibn Salim for Charles of Anjou, the king of Sicily. During a remarkably productive career, Rhazes wrote as

many as 230 books and articles, 61 of which dealt with medicine. The rest were dedicated to a wide range of subjects, including mathematics, music, and chess. Rhazes served as court physician to Prince Abu Salih al-Mansur and continued to practice in Baghdad until his sight failed. He is said to have died in his home village in around 932.

Albucasis (936–1013 or 1013–1106), also known as Abulkasim or Al-Zahrawi Abul-Oasim, was the most frequently cited surgical authority of the Middle Ages. He was born in the Spanish village of Medinat al-Zahra near Cordova, where he spent his professional life. He was an active practitioner who was said to have left his doors open day and night and whose courtyard was reputed to have been perennially overflowing with the poor patients for whom he cared as a charitable obligation.

His *Altaserif* (variously translated as *Praxis*, *The Method*, or *The Collection*) comprised 30 volumes and was a virtually encyclopedic treatment of 11th-century medical knowledge. It was completed in 1000 and reflected Albucasis's nearly 50 years of study and practice. Although Albucasis was even more respected in the Orient than in Europe, French physician Guy de Chauliac referred to him more than 200 times in his own surgical treatise, and, through the 12th century, he was considered part of a classical triumvirate with Hippocrates and Galen. The last volume of the *Altaserif* was dedicated to surgery and was divided into three parts. The first part dealt in detail with use of the cautery; the second with lithotomy, wound care, and amputation for gangrene; and the third with fractures and dislocations, including an excellent description of paralysis from spinal trauma. Albucasis's surgical treatise is notable for its pictures of surgical instruments beside the text describing their use, and it contains a section dedicated to military medicine.

Albucasis based his surgical works on the sixth book of Paul of Aegina's compendium but emphasized that great care should be used in deciding to perform an operation and that good results could only be achieved by surgeons with a detailed knowledge of anatomy. His descriptions of removing arrows, based on details of actual cases, were particularly useful. Albucasis described ligating severed arteries well before famous European surgeon Ambroise Paré (16th century) wrote about the procedure, although the latter is widely credited with the technique. It is fair to consider Albucasis the first to treat surgery as a science based on anatomy rather than merely as a craft.

Avicenna (Ibn Sena) (980–1037) was court physician and vizier to the caliph of Baghdad. Born in Central Asia, he was a child prodigy who mastered the Koran at age 10, began studying medicine at 16, and was treating the royal family by 18. He remained a successful court physician and served the caliph as vizier, or adviser. He was chief physician to the largest and most important hospital at Baghdad and wrote more than 100 books. Avicenna was a polymath who, in addition to his medical works, authored the world's first comprehensive text on geology. By preserving

the Greek medical tradition housed in Baghdad's libraries and augmenting it with learning from Persia and India, he joined the other two great Islamic physicians, Rhazes and Albucasis, in making Islamic medicine the most advanced of its time.

Avicenna's *Canon* was an encyclopedic work that attempted to collect and arrange the entire corpus of existing medical knowledge and relate that knowledge to the writings of Galen and Aristotle. The Canon remained a primary reference for European physicians through the Middle Ages. Avicenna described reduction of spinal fractures. He recommended irrigation with wine to sterilize wounds and knew that diabetic urine tasted sweet. He described anthrax, which he called Persian fire, and he generally considered surgery to be inferior to other, less invasive, forms of treatment. In common with other Islamic physicians, Avicenna preferred, when he was forced to operate, to use the cautery rather than the knife. That technique actually hampered wound healing and its general acceptance set surgery back for centuries. The *Canon*'s section on military surgery has little that is original and is mostly derived from Book Six of Paul of Aegina's compendium.

Jack E. McCallum

See also: Military Education, Ottoman.

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Military Raid in Islam

Within pre-Islamic Arabia most warfare involved conflict between rival tribes over grazing and access to water, or to impose alliances. Such tribes might also threaten merchant caravans to extort protection money. When nomadic tribes clashed with settled tribes the former tended to threaten the latter's life-supporting groves of palm trees, again with minimal casualties. This razzia or ghazw warfare was essentially a form of economic pressure designed to weaken an enemy's ability to survive in harsh ecological conditions. Though such campaigns tended to be prolonged, they resulted in few casualties, being governed by customary rules based on mutual self-interest. Thus, the Arab tradition of warfare was based on raiding rather

than the seizure of territory, and the first Muslim campaigns against the neighboring Byzantine and Sassanian empires were again preceded by extensive raids that avoided the main local garrisons or fortified places. After the Byzantines retreated into Anatolia, caliphal forces advanced into Cilicia, which became a major springboard for raids into Anatolia. These were undertaken almost every summer, either from Cilicia in the west or Maras in the east. Occasionally a large raiding force would spend the winter within Byzantine territory, having seized a fortification and planted crops to harvest in spring.

Meanwhile, Islamic advances on more distant frontiers halted, largely because they were no longer economically worthwhile and because Muslim manpower was overstretched. During the eighth and ninth centuries, caliphal armies proved particularly effective in long-distance raiding and the bringing together of separate columns deep within enemy territory. Smaller raids against the Byzantine Empire would then strike through one of the three main passes, sometimes entering by one and leaving by another to avoid being trapped by defending forces. Their objectives were to capture horse herds, take prisoners for ransom, and seize grain stores or the valuables kept in fortresses. In fact, they struck at the Byzantine Empire's economic foundations and were thus in the same tradition as pre-Islamic Arabian warfare. Such warfare tended to decline in importance during the 11th to 13th centuries, when the Islamic world was largely on the defensive.

Raiding strategies revived in a modified form during the early centuries of Ottoman history when Muslim forces advanced deep into Europe. Here Ottoman raids were not spontaneous but formed part of a broad strategic plan, being followed up by operations designed to seize and consolidate territory already weakened by raiding. By the late 14th century, the Ottoman army had, in fact, evolved its own patterns of campaigning, which normally ran from August to October. Horse-tail banners guarded by elite troops would march one day ahead of the main army within friendly territory but would pull back once the frontier had been passed. Next came an advance screen of raiders and reconnaissance troops, usually drawn from auxiliary horsemen, followed by the main forces. Light cavalry raiders now consisted of akinjis and delis who attempted to spread fear and confusion far ahead of this main force, while also gathering information and securing roads, bridges and mountain passes.

David Nicolle

See also: Sharia, War and.

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Mohács, Battle of (1526)

A major defeat of the royal army of Hungary by the forces of the Ottoman sultan Suleiman I (the Magnificent), fought on August 29, 1526. After a relatively peaceful period of Hungarian-Turkish relations between 1483 and 1520, the Turks took Belgrade, the key to the defense system on the southern Hungarian frontier (1521). The young Louis II, king of Hungary and Bohemia (1516–1526), was unable to organize the defense of the country, which had fallen into political crisis after 1490. In 1526, the Ottoman army, personally led by Sultan Suleiman, departed from Constantinople on April 23, 1526; marching via Belgrade (June 30), it crossed the river Drava on August 14. The Hungarian royal army, commanded by Paul Tomori, archbishop of Kalocsa, and George Count Szapolyai, lacked any strategic concept to stop the invaders, and before completing its mobilization, left Buda on July 20, 1526. The Hungarians were inferior in numbers, amounting to 25,000–50,000 men (including some 10,000 foreign mercenaries, mostly infantry) compared to the Turks' 75,000–120,000. Hungarian scholars still debate whether the Hungarian army had any realistic chance of defeating or halting the Turks.

Ottoman miniature showing the First Battle of Mohacs on August 29, 1526. Ottoman sultan Suleiman the Magnificent defeated Hungarian forces under King Louis II. After massacring the prisoners, Suleiman laid waste to much of Hungary. (Fotosearch/Getty Images)

The Hungarians launched a surprise attack on the Ottoman army while it was still drawing up in battle formation on the plain of Mohács, a small town on the west bank of the Danube to the east of the city of Pécs. The initially promising attack of the first wave of Hungarian cavalry soon collapsed in the fire of the hidden Ottoman artillery and the disciplined Janissary troops, and the whole army turned to panic. Within a few hours, not only the royal army but also the medieval Hungarian kingdom itself was defeated; the king and most of the country's prelates and dignitaries were dead. The Turks reached the abandoned royal castle of Buda unhindered (September 12), but then withdrew, occupying only a small strip of land. However, the defeat at Mohács paved the way for the subsequent occupation of most of the kingdom by the Turks (1541), leaving only a northern and western rump under Christian rule.

László Veszprémy

See also: Hungarian-Ottoman Wars (1437–1526); Janissaries; Mohács, Battle of (1687); Suleiman the Magnificent.

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Mohács, Battles of (1687)

Decisive Habsburg victory over the Ottoman forces. The second battle of Mohács took placed during the Austro-Ottoman War of 1683–1699. The Ottoman invasion of Austria in 1683 almost succeeded in capturing Vienna before the Austrian-Polish forces scored a major victory at Vienna in September 1683 and drove them out of northwestern Hungary. The Holy League, organized by Pope Innocent XI and consisting of the Holy Roman Empire, Venice, Poland, and Russia, conducted a series of successful counterattacks against the Ottoman interests in Moldavia, Crimea, Dalmatia, Greece, and the eastern Mediterranean. The Ottomans successfully dealt with Venetian, Polish, and Russian threats throughout 1680s and 1690s but the fate of the war was decided on the field of Hungary, where the Ottomans suffered a devastating defeat at Mohács on August 12, 1687.

In 1687 the Habsburg launched a new offensive, with two armies under the leadership of Duke Charles of Lorraine (some 40,000 troops) and Elector Maximilian II Emanuel of Bavaria (about 20,000) threatening the Ottoman territories.

Opposing them was the Ottoman army (about 60,000 troops) under Grand Vizier Sari Suleiman Pasha, who maintained central position near Osijek on the Drava River. By July 1687 the Imperial and Ottoman armies stood on the opposing riverbanks, waiting for an opportune moment to strike. The Ottomans moved first, forcing the Habsburg forces downriver to the vicinity of Mohács, where the Turks had fortified positions. As the Habsburg forces stretched along the river, Sari Suleyman Pasha thought he was in an advantageous position to attack the enemy early on August 12. The Imperial left wing under Elector Maximilian, however, held its ground, which promoted the surprised Ottoman commander to halt his further attacks. This respite in fighting allowed Duke of Lorraine to arrive with reinforcements and launch a major counterattack in the afternoon. The Habsburg firepower, skillfully managed by generals Rabutin and Eugene of Savoy, shattered the Ottoman ranks and caused them to flee in disorder. The Ottoman suffered grave losses, with up to 10,000 killed, and almost all artillery and dozens of flags were captured.

This defeat precipitated a deep political crisis in the Ottoman Empire. The army suffered from demoralization while the Grand Vizier was executed for the loss. Sultan Mehmed IV was deposed by the soldiery and succeeded by Suleiman II, who was compelled to recognize the loss of most of Hungary, Slavonia, and Transylvania to the Habsburgs. The Ottoman power, which had seen a brief military renaissance during this war against Austria, struggled to recover from this defeat, suffering further defeats from the Austrians in 1690s.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Austro-Ottoman Wars; Mohács, Battle of (1526); Vienna, Siege of (1683).

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Mongols

A nomadic people of Altaic stock who first appear in Chinese texts of the 11th century and who in the 13th came to rule an empire embracing most of Asia. For several decades after the 1230s, they were Latin Christendom's most formidable eastern neighbor.

At a tribal assembly around the year 1206, the Mongol leader Temüjin, who had reduced the neighboring tribes of the eastern Asian steppe, was proclaimed ruler of all the tent-dwelling peoples under the title of Chinggis (Genghis) Khan (probably Mong. "hard ruler" or "stern ruler"). Chinggis Khan (d. 1227) began the conquest of North China (1211), then ruled by the Chin dynasty; reduced the seminomadic Qara-Khitan Empire in Central Asia (1215–1218); and in the course of a seven-year campaign (1218–1224) to the west accomplished the destruction of the Muslim Empire of Khwarezm in what is now Iran and Turkmenistan. Why the Mongols came to be known as Tatars (the name of an enemy tribe crushed by Chinggis Khan in 1202) is unclear; in Latin Europe the term was corrupted to Tartars, reinforcing the West's association of the Mongols with the hell (Lat. *Tartarus*) of classical mythology. In any case, by the time they reached Europe most of the Mongols' nomadic troops were of Turkic stock.

At both the administrative and the ideological level, the Mongol Empire represented a significant advance on earlier steppe confederacies. Their early conquests had brought the Mongols into contact with other tribes, such as the Naiman and the Kereyid, which had been in the process of attaining statehood, and with the semisedentary Turkic Uighurs, who had possessed literate traditions of government for some centuries and whose script Chinggis Khan adopted for the written Mongolian of his chancery. It was probably also through the Uighurs, and other Turks whom they incorporated in their war machine, that the Mongols had access to long-established notions of imperial rule. At what stage they developed the idea that Heaven (Mong. *Tenggeri*) had conferred on them rulership of the entire world, we cannot be sure. It may postdate the flight of certain of their nomadic enemies into sedentary territories; conceivably, it belongs to the era of Chinggis Khan's successor. The notion is articulated in the ultimatums that the Mongols sent out to rulers who had not yet submitted: formulaic documents that demanded from those rulers acknowledgment of their place in the Mongol world empire and threatened them with attack should they refuse. The earliest of such documents to survive dates from 1237.

Various reasons have been put forward to explain the phenomenal pace of the Mongol conquests. Like those of other steppe nomadic peoples, their forces were highly mobile and maneuverable, which gave them an advantage over the armies of their sedentary opponents: each Mongol warrior, whose main weapon was the composite bow, traveled with several spare horses. However, their decimal chain of command was not an innovation, and their proverbial discipline is unlikely to have exceeded that of the Chinese troops they encountered. What particularly distinguished them from their enemies was their cohesiveness. Chinggis Khan had eliminated the ruling elites of those peoples who resisted him, and divided them up into new military units under trusted officers; even tribes that cooperated, and were therefore permitted to remain intact, were entrusted to new commanders

from different tribal backgrounds. The imperial guard, his own creation, numbering 10,000 men and drawn from a wide range of peoples, served as the nursery of an officer class that owed allegiance to Chinggis Khan and his dynasty alone. In this fashion the conqueror surmounted the centrifugal effects of the old clan and tribal affiliations, forging a more homogeneous structure than had been available to the Mongols' precursors. This cohesiveness contrasted sharply with the disunity of many of their opponents. During the early stages of the war in northern China, the conquerors benefited from the assistance of several elements that resented Chin rule and saw the Mongols as a means of deliverance. In Central Asia, Chinggis Khan's generals won the support of the Muslims, who had been persecuted by the last Qara-Khitan sovereign, and thereby incidentally undermined the ability of the shah of Khwarezm to portray his own struggle with them as a holy war.

Territorial expansion continued under Chinggis Khan's immediate successors who, with the title of qaghan (great khan), reigned from their principal base at Qaraqorum in Mongolia. Chinggis Khan's son Ogodei (Ogedei) (1229–1241) presided over the final destruction of the Chin Empire (1234), inaugurated the long-drawn-out war against the Sung in South China (from 1235), and dispatched fresh forces to eliminate the vestiges of Khwarezmian resistance in Iran (1229); these troops reduced Georgia and Greater Armenia to tributary status (1236–1239) and shattered the Saljuk sultanate of Rum at Kösedagh (1243).

From 1236 the great khan's senior nephew Batu commanded a major expedition that completed the subjugation of the steppe and forest peoples of western Asia, notably the Volga Bulgars (1237) and the Cumans or Qipchaq (1237–1239), and overwhelmed the fragmented principalities of Russia (1237–1240). Batu's campaigns mark the foundation of the Mongol power known as the Golden Horde in the southern Russian steppe. After the enthronement of another of Chinggis Khan's grandsons, Mongke (1251–1259), the conflict with the Sung was resumed in earnest, and the new sovereign's brother Hulegu headed a campaign to southwest Asia, overthrowing in turn the Ismacili Assassins of northern Persia (1256) and the Abbasid caliphate at Baghdad (1258).

By 1260, the Mongol Empire extended from the Siberian forests to the western Punjab and from the Yellow Sea to the eastern Mediterranean coast. But Mongke's death was followed by a civil war in Mongolia between his brothers Qubilai (Kublai) and Arigh Böke, in which members of the imperial dynasty took opposing sides. In the west, Hulegu favored Qubilai, while the ruler of the Golden Horde, Batu's brother Berke, supported Arigh Böke. With the outbreak of conflict among Chinggis Khan's descendants, the unitary empire dissolved into a number of independent, and usually hostile, khanates: the Golden Horde, with its center at Sarai on the lower Volga; a polity in Central Asia ruled by the descendants of Chinggis Khan's second son Chaghadai; the Ilkhanate in Persia and Iraq, governed by Hulegu and his line; and the great khan's own territory in the Far East. The

Mongol dominions continued to expand only in the Far East, where the conquest of the Sung was completed in 1279, though seaborne invasions of Japan and Java failed. Qubilai reigned as a Chinese emperor rather than simply as a Mongol great khan: he abandoned Qaraqorum for Ta-tu (Mong. *Khanbaligh*, "the khan's city") close to modern Beijing, and adopted for his dynasty the Chinese name of Yuan (1271). The Yüan were expelled from China in 1368, and the Ilkhanate collapsed after 1335, but the other two Mongol states survived for significantly longer: the Golden Horde until 1502 (and its successor state in the Crimea until 1783) and the Chaghadayid khanate until 1678.

The Mongols menaced Latin Christendom on two fronts: in Eastern Europe and in Outremer. The first reports of the attack on the Khwarezmian Empire, reaching Egypt in 1221, prompted the commanders of the Fifth Crusade (1217–1221) to identify the newcomers with the long-awaited forces of the great Eastern king Prester John, though news of the defeat of the Cumans and their Russian allies on the Kalka River (1223) was less encouraging. The Mongols attacked the Latin world only after the sack of Kiev (December 1240). While Batu and three separate armies entered Hungary, two divisions protected his flank by ravaging Poland, where they crushed Duke Henry II of Silesia and his allies near Liegnitz (mod. Legnica, Poland) on April 9, 1241; ravaging the borders of Saxony and Bohemia, they then passed through Moravia into Hungary. Here King Béla IV was overwhelmed at Mohi near the Sajó River on April 11 and fled toward the Adriatic coast while the Mongols devastated his kingdom east of the Danube. In January 1242 they crossed the frozen river and harassed the western provinces before retiring into the steppes north of the Black Sea. In the Near East, the general Baiju sent a division into northern Syria in the summer of 1244: various Ayyubid Muslim rulers promised tribute, but Prince Bohemond V of Antioch defiantly rejected an ultimatum. One important consequence of this advance was that several thousand Khwarezmian horsemen, displaced from northern Iraq, moved south and sacked Jerusalem in August 1244 before joining forces with the Egyptian sultan and crushing the Franks and their Muslim allies at La Forbie in October.

The Mongol attacks of the 1240s threw into relief the disharmony and unpreparedness of the West, where the Mongol menace had perhaps not been taken sufficiently seriously. Pope Gregory IX and the Emperor Frederick II were unwilling to resolve their differences to cooperate against the Mongols, and a crusade mustered in Germany in 1241 dissolved before it could make contact with the invaders. Not until the pontificate of Innocent IV (1243–1254) did the Curia endeavor to negotiate with the enemy. Innocent dispatched three separate embassies—two, comprising Dominican friars, to the Near East and a third, composed of Franciscans, through the Russian steppes—with letters protesting the attacks on Christian nations and urging the Mongols to accept the Christian faith. The reports submitted by these friars in 1247 furnished the papacy with its first full dossier of information on the

enemy, and they are among our most important Western sources, particularly that of the Franciscan John of Piano Carpini, who visited the court of the Great Khan Guyug. But this aside, they achieved little more than espionage, merely bringing back ultimatums that required the pope's submission. When in 1248 the general Eljigidei, who had superseded Baiju in northwestern Persia, sent a cordial message to the French king Louis IX in Cyprus, its moderate tone occasioned great excitement in the West; but most probably its aim was merely to deflect Louis's crusading army from territories on which the Mongols had immediate designs. At this time, the Mongols had no allies, only subjects—or enemies awaiting annihilation.

Following the cataclysm of 1241–1242, King Béla IV of Hungary made efforts to prepare for the next assault, instigating the construction of stone castles on his eastern frontiers and entering into marriage alliances with several of his neighbors, including a Cuman chief whose daughter married his son and heir Stephen (later Stephen V); he also recruited Cumans as auxiliaries. In 1259 Berke's forces attacked Poland, sacking Sandomir and Kraków, but the splintering of the empire in 1261–1262 prevented the Mongols from following up this campaign. The Golden Horde remained content with exacting tribute and military assistance from the Russian princes and adjudicating their succession disputes. The khans were in any event probably more interested in operations south of the Caucasus at the expense of the Ilkhans than in Russia or, by extension, Hungary and Poland.

Nevertheless, the Golden Horde remained a hostile power on the frontiers of Latin Christendom. In the Baltic region, the Mongols tended to act through their Russian satellites and the pagan Lithuanians, who paid them tribute intermittently, against external enemies such as the Teutonic Order. Further south the Golden Horde threatened for a time to draw into its orbit further non-Latin polities that might otherwise have succumbed to Latin pressure, such as Bulgaria and the Byzantine Empire. During the heyday of Noghai (d. 1299), a member of the dynasty who was virtually co\ruler in the western regions of the Pontic steppe, Mongol influence extended deep into the Balkans. However, Noghai's amicable relations with Byzantium did not outlast him, and in the early 14th century the khans launched a series of invasions of Thrace. As late as 1341, when the Emperor Andronikos III bought off a Mongol attack, the Golden Horde may still have constituted a greater menace than did the nascent Ottoman polity.

The Mongols dealt with Hungary and Poland more directly. Although there were no further campaigns on the scale of 1241–1242 or 1259, there were frequent raids and substantial attacks on both countries in the 1280s. The extinction of the client Russian princes of Galicia and Volhynia in 1323 provoked fresh tensions, which were resolved when the new ruler, the Polish prince Bołeslaw of Mazovia, maintained payment of tribute. But after his death (1340), the Mongols reacted sharply to the occupation of Galicia by Kazimierz III of Poland with a series of attacks, and during the middle decades of the 14th century, the khan appears to have recruited

Lithuanian assistance against him. If Polish appeals to successive popes elicited little or no military aid, they did at least secure the grant of crusading tenths and twentieths (taxes in support of crusading enterprises) rather more readily than did the simultaneous pleas of the Hungarian crown. Around 1360, however, the Golden Horde, already badly hit by the Black Death, succumbed to a prolonged phase of internecine conflict, and the attacks of the conqueror Timur (Tamerlane) in the 1390s dealt its commercial centers a severe blow. The khans were powerless to impede the rise of Lithuania and its appropriation of Russian territory, and by the early 15th century they had sunk to being merely auxiliaries in the conflicts of their western neighbors: a Mongol contingent fought at the battle of Tannenberg (1410) alongside the Poles and Lithuanians against the Teutonic Order.

When Hulegu entered Syria early in 1260, King Hetoum I of Cilicia, who had been subject to the Mongols since 1246, joined forces with him and induced his son-in-law, Bohemond VI of Antioch, to become tributary to the conquerors and accept a Mongol resident in Antioch, for which the prince was excommunicated by the papal legate at Acre. Hulegu left in March for Azerbaijan with the bulk of his army, leaving his general Kitbugha, at the head of a rump force, to receive the surrender of Damascus and to confront the kingdom of Jerusalem. The government at Acre (mod. ʻAkko, Israel) rejected demands for submission, and the Mongols sacked Sidon in August 1260 in reprisal for a Frankish raid on the interior. When the Mamluk sultan Qutuz advanced against the Mongols, the Franks gave the Egyptian army safe-conduct and furnished it with provisions. The Egyptian defeat of Kitbugha at Ayn Jalut on September 3 relieved the kingdom of the Mongol threat, although Qutuz was murdered soon after and the new Mamluk sultan, Baybars, who was not bound by any agreement with the Franks, embarked on the piecemeal reduction of the Latin states of Outremer.

Like the sudden retreat from Hungary in 1242, which has usually been linked with the death of the Great Khan Ögödei, Hulegu's withdrawal from Syria in 1260 has been ascribed to the fortuitous demise of Mongke in the Far East, as both events would have required the Mongol princes and generals to assemble and elect a successor. It is at least as likely, however, that both the Hungarian and the Syrian campaigns were abandoned on logistical grounds, given the inadequacy of the available pasturage for the Mongols' vast numbers of horses and livestock. The same circumstance perhaps underlay the Ilkhans' efforts, from 1262 onward, to secure Western military collaboration against the Mamluks. In part this was a response to the internecine conflicts following Mongke's death: menaced by the Golden Horde and other hostile kinsmen to their rear, and without access to the resources of the unitary Mongol Empire, the Ilkhans were compelled to seek external allies if they were to pursue the dynasty's traditional mission of expansion. But just as in China, where ecological problems obliged the nomadic Mongols to rely on Chinese infantry in large numbers, so in Palestine they proposed to recruit the assistance of Frankish troops who were more accustomed to the terrain and the summer heat.

The Mongol World



The Ilkhans corresponded with successive popes and the kings of France and England, sometimes also with those of Aragon and Sicily. The Mongol ambassadors, who stressed their masters' favor toward Christians and Christianity, were frequently expatriate Italians who had entered the Ilkhans' service; on occasion, the ambassadors were Nestorian Christians, like the monk Rabban Sawma, who in 1287–1288 visited Naples, Rome, and Paris, and met King Edward I of England at Bordeaux. In any event, these exchanges, which persisted until 1307 (or possibly later), bore no fruit, despite the fact that the Mamluks posed a growing threat to the Latin states and eliminated them in 1291. In his crusading treatise, written in 1307 at the behest of Pope Clement V, the Armenian prince Hetoum (a nephew of King Hetoum I), strongly advocated Latin-Mongol collaboration, which he saw as offering his native country the best hope of avoiding a Mamluk conquest. Their past record, however, rendered the Mongols an object of widespread distrust, and the papacy was reluctant to enter into firm commitments until the Ilkhan had accepted baptism. On crusade in 1271, before his accession, Edward of England tried unsuccessfully to coordinate his activities with the forces of the Ilkhan Abaka; but otherwise the few instances of military cooperation involved the Franks of Outremer and Cyprus. Some Hospitallers from Margat may have reinforced Abaka's army when it invaded northern Syria in 1281; and after Abaka's grandson, the Ilkhan Ghazan (1295–1304), launched his first attack on the Mamluks in 1299–1300, defeating the sultan and overrunning the whole of Syria and Palestine, King Henry II of Cyprus and the Templars tried to anticipate his return by occupying the island of Ruad (mod. Arwad, Syria), off the coast near Tortosa. Ghazan's later, and less impressive, Syrian campaigns, in 1301 and 1303, did without Frankish assistance altogether. Ghazan and his brother and successor, Oljeitu (1304–1316), the last Ilkhan to invade Syria, were both Muslim converts. Yet it was seemingly the obstacles to a successful war with Egypt, rather than religious considerations, that led Öljeitü's young son Abu Said (1316–1335) to make peace with the Mamluk regime (1323).

The union of much of Asia under a single government (until 1261) facilitated long-distance commerce; the Mongol sovereigns, moreover, far from passively presiding over the growth of trade, actively fostered it. Western merchants who were already active in the eastern Mediterranean traveled east in quest of high-value, low-bulk commodities such as silk, spices, pepper, and precious stones. There was a Venetian presence in the Persian city of Tabriz by 1263, and within a few years the Genoese had bases at Caffa (mod. Feodosiya, Ukraine) in the Crimea and Tana on the Sea of Azov. The Italians did not always enjoy friendly relations with the Golden Horde khans, who resented Genoese attempts to assert their own sovereignty within Caffa: the Mongols attacked the town in 1298, in 1308, and in 1345–1346, when Pope Clement VI sought to launch a crusade in its defense. At what point Western traders penetrated as far as China is uncertain. Although Marco Polo

and his father and uncle were in China starting around 1275, Polo's book suggests that all three were in Qubilai's service; we do not know to what extent they engaged in commerce on their own account. The heyday of the Western mercantile presence in the Far East, for which physical evidence has survived in the form of two Latin tombstones in the city of Yang-chou (dated 1342 and 1344), was relatively short lived, from 1300 to 1350. The Black Death probably dealt a severe blow to Latin residents in China and Central Asia, while further west the Mamluks seized Ayas (mod. Yumurtalık, Turkey) in Cilicia (1337), one of the termini of the trans-Asiatic routes, and in Persia the turbulence that followed the collapse of the Ilkhanate made conditions for trade less propitious.

Latin missionaries frequently accompanied Latin traders. The Mongol Empire and the khanates that superseded it were characterized by religious pluralism; and although certain taboos in Mongol customary law fell particularly heavily on the adherents of one or another faith (e.g., the prohibition of the Islamic method of slaughtering animals for food), generally speaking each of the various confessional groups was permitted to practice its faith in its accustomed fashion. In return for praying for the imperial family, Christian and Buddhist monks and priests and Muslim scholars enjoyed exemption from certain taxes, military service, and forced labor. For Christians in lands that had formerly been subject to Islamic rule, the new regime represented a marked amelioration in their condition; Western missionaries too were now able to preach uninhibitedly. The earliest known Latin missionary in Mongol Asia was the Franciscan William of Rubruck (1253–1255), though the lack of an adequate interpreter and the fact that he was mistaken for an envoy of King Louis IX of France caused him considerable difficulty. By the 1280s, however, Franciscans and Dominicans were established in the territories of the Golden Horde and the Ilkhanate. The Franciscan John of Montecorvino was the first Western missionary to enter China, in about 1294. Pope Clement V subsequently placed him at the head of a new archdiocese of Khanbaligh (1307), with jurisdiction over all the Mongol dominions, and sent out a group of friars to act as his suffragans. In 1318, Pope John XXII withdrew Persia and India from Khanbaligh's authority, creating a second archiepiscopal see at Sulaniyya, one of the Ilkhan's residences. The Latin missionary effort flourished for a few decades, though in China the friars seem to have made no impact on the indigenous Han population; conversions for the most part involved Nestorians and other eastern Christians, like the Orthodox Alans, transported from their home in the Caucasus to form a corps of the imperial guard. Reports of high-ranking conversions, designed in part to secure reinforcements, were often also grounded in misapprehensions about the Mongol rulers' attitude toward religious matters. With the definitive conversion to Islam of the Ilkhans (1295), the khans of the Golden Horde (1313), and the Chaghadayid khans (c. 1338), Christian proselytism grew increasingly hazardous, and several friars were martyred in the 1320s–1340s. The route to China seems to have been

abandoned, and when the Jesuits entered China in 1583, the earlier missions had fallen completely into oblivion.

Peter Jackson

See also: Abaka; Ayn Jalut, Battle of (1260); Baybars I; Berke Khan; Golden Horde—Ilkhanid Wars; Homs, Battles of (1260, 1281, 1299); Hulegu; Mamluk-Ilkhanid War; Middle East, Mongol Invasion of the (1256–1280); Rum, Sultanate of; Russo-Mongol Wars (13th–14th Centuries).

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Mont Gisard, Battle of (1177)

A victory of the army of the kingdom of Jerusalem under King Baldwin IV and Reynald of Châtillon over an invasion of the kingdom by Saladin, who had launched a diversionary attack from Egypt soon after Raymond III of Tripoli and Philip of Flanders marched to besiege Hama in Syria in November 1177.

A large proportion of the armed forces of Jerusalem and the military orders had gone north to besiege Hama, and so Baldwin summoned all remaining able-bodied men to muster at Ascalon (mod. Tel Ashqelon, Israel); Saladin bypassed the city and moved inland toward Jerusalem, sending detachments to raid Ramla and Lydda and ambush Franks who were still arriving for the muster. On the afternoon of November 25, the feast of St. Catherine of Alexandria, the Franks surprised and routed Saladin's main force at a hill known as Mont Gisard (mod. Tell Jazar) 8 kilometers (5 miles) southeast of Ramla, before it was able to form up in battle order. With most of his army dispersed and his base at El'-Arish overrun by Bedouin, Saladin retreated to Egypt. A Benedictine priory dedicated to St. Catherine was built on the battle site as an act of gratitude and commemoration.

Alan V. Murray

See also: Saladin.

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Moroccan War of Succession (17th Century)

The Saadi dynasty of Morocco reached its height during the reign of Sultan Ahmed al-Mansur, who turned his realm into a powerhouse of West Africa. The sultan died on August 20, 1603, and his passing prompted a long power struggle among his descendants. Al-Mansur had three sons: Muhammed al-Shaikh (the eldest), Abu Faris, and Zidan (Zaidan). In his old age, the sultan showed favor to Zidan, which caused great resentment from Muhammed al-Shaikh, who rebelled in Fez but was defeated by his father and imprisoned in the capital city of Marrakech. Upon the sultan's death, both Zidan (in Fez) and Abu Faris (in Marrakech) were proclaimed sultans by their supporters and refused to accept the claims of the other. The ulama sided with Zidan, issuing a fatwa that argued that Abu Faris, as a son of a freed slave woman, had lesser claims to the throne than Zidan, whose mother was a free woman. In response, Abu Faris freed his brother Muhammed al-Shaikh, who was highly popular among the troops, on the condition that he would lead the struggle against Zidan and, upon completion, would return back to confinement. The two armies met on the Umm al-Rablta where Zidan's army was routed and he fled to Fez.

Yet, the success proved bittersweet for Abu Faris because Muhammed al-Shaikh refused to give himself up. In 1605–1606, Abu Faris and Muhammad al-Sheikh clashed at Mars al-Ramad, where the former suffered a heavy defeat and fled to Sus. Muhammed al-Shaikh became the master of Morocco, but his troops committed such acts of violence that they provoked great discontent among the people, who then turned to Zidan for leadership. Receiving Ottoman help, Zidan rallied his forces and drove Muhammed al-Shaikh (who had quickly reconciled with Abu Faris) out of Fez and Kars al-Kabir in 1607–1608. Hard-pressed, Muhammed al-Shaikh went to Spain to solicit military aid, leaving his son Abd Allah and his brother Abu Faris to continue the struggle against Zidan. In late 1608, Abd Allah and Abu Faris attacked Marrakech, defeated Zidan's forces, and sacked the town in July 1609.

But a month later Abu Faris was implicated in a plot to proclaim himself sultan, and Abd Allah killed him. In 1609–1610, Muhammed al-Shaikh played on the Spanish fears of the Ottoman annexation of Morocco in the wake of the victory of Zidan, whom the Ottomans supported. Al-Shaikh offered the port of Larache to the Spanish king Philip III in exchange for 200,000 ducats and a loan of 6,000 soldiers, which allowed him to return to Morocco; in 1610, the Spaniards occupied Larache. In the subsequent fighting between Muhammed al-Shaikh and Zidan, the Moroccan kingdom split into two, with Marrakech and Fez as rival capitals, in alliance

with Morocco's traditional enemies, the Ottomans and the Spaniards. Continuous warfare introduced a period of anarchy that became one of the darkest in Moroccan history. Central authority declined and outlying regions gradually broke away. The country remained divided until the rise of the Alaouites dynasty in the mid-17th century.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Al-Mansur, Ahmad ibn Muhammad.

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Moroccan-Algerian War. *See* Sand War (Morocco-Algeria) (1963).

Moroccan-Songhai War (1591–1593)

Conflict between Morocco and the Songhai Empire. The Songhai, settled on both banks of the middle Niger River in Western Africa, established a major state in the 15th century, which unified a large part of the western Sudan and allowed for the development of a brilliant civilization. It was ruled by the dynasty or royal family of Sonni from the 13th century to the late 15th century. In the last half of the 16th century, the Songhai Empire, which had enjoyed prosperity across much of the Western portion of the Sahel region in Africa for the previous few centuries, began to falter. Songhai slid into civil war.

Echoing the fates of Ghana, Mali, and Kanem, the wealth and power of Songhai deteriorated rapidly, not only because of civil war but also because of droughts and diseases caused by environmental change; however, Songhai might have survived all this, if not for the decisive factor of the Moroccans wanting to control the sub-Saharan gold trade. To accomplish this feat, the Moroccan army had to take down a weakened Songhai Empire, which had neither the resources nor the ability to stop a superior Moroccan force.

In October 1590, Moroccan sultan Ahmad al-Mansur dispatched Moroccan troops under a renegade Spaniard, Judar Pasha, to Songhai. After crossing the Sahara Desert, the Moroccans seized the important salt mines of Taghaza and marched toward the Songhai capital of Gao. The Songhai ruler, Askia Ishaq II, mobilized his army and met the invaders at Tondibi (March 1591), where the Moroccans exploited their superiority in firearms to defeat the enemy. Judar Pasha sacked Gao,

Timbuktu, and Djenné before returning home. Morocco won the war but lost the peace as it struggled to maintain firm control over this remote territory. The sultans of Morocco eventually lost interest. The Moroccan garrison stayed but took to freelance looting and pillaging. The old empire split up by 1593, and the Bambara kingdom of Segu emerged as an important new force. Mostly forgotten by students of history, the Moroccan-Songhai War proved to be a monumental shift in the power of Western Africa, because some scholars believe the era of modern Africa began when the Songhai fell.

Trey Bernard

See also: al-Mansur, Ahmad ibn Muhammad; Tondibi, Battle of (1591).

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Morocco, French Conquest of (1907–1934)

Nineteenth-century Morocco failed to transform from a jihadi state, regularly in conflict with European powers, into a more modern power like the Ottoman Empire. Political, fiscal, and military reforms created more trouble than benefit, making this large piece of northwest Africa a target for British, Spanish, German, and French imperialists. Internal unrest and dynastic squabbles increased during the reign of Sultan Abd al-Aziz (r. 1894–1908), so that by 1907 there was a three-way civil war between the Sultan, his brother, Abd al-Hafiz (r. 1908–1912), and a pretender, Bou Hmara.

France took advantage of its already close relations with Abd al-Aziz, to dispatch a peace-keeping mission. Under such cover, their entry went unopposed, allowing French garrisons into most major port cities, plus Fez. When Abd al-Hafiz finally triumphed over his brother in 1908, the French presence created a conundrum. The new sultan was a member of the Alaouite dynasty, which had a proud tradition of defending Morocco and Islam from Christian invaders. Indeed, the victory of Abd al-Hafiz was partially due to popular conception that his brother was owned by Europe, and thus unfit to rule. Although this had played well in fueling the rebellion, Abd al-Hafiz proved incapable of halting attacks against French soldiers, for to do so would cast him in a similar light.

Yosef ibn Hassan, sultan of Morocco from 1912 to 1927, photographed in Fez in 1913. (Apic/Getty Images)

Between 1907 and 1911, the French used Morocco's internal problems as cover to expand their control. Despite a First and Second Moroccan Crisis (1905, 1911), France kept European rivals out of the conflict, agreeing only to cooperate with Spain, a second-rate power unlikely to digest more than a few slivers of Morocco. Simultaneously, continual fighting between French troops and Moroccan irregulars provided justification for reinforcements. These struggles reached a crescendo in 1911, when units of the French-trained national army mutinied. Having secured British, German, and Spanish support, France removed all pretext, forced Abd al-Hafiz to abdicate, and replaced him with Yusef ibn Hassan (r. 1912–1927). The new sultan was made to sign the Treaty of Fez (March 20, 1912), which declared Morocco a protectorate of France.

The treaty also ushered in the era of General Hubert Lyautey (1854–1934), who as resident-general for Morocco, established his *tache d'huile* (oil slick) strategy for colonial conquest. The concept used the analogy of oil spreading slowly over water, implying gradual extension of French administration hand-in-hand with military occupation. Military actions were followed by economic and administrative reconstruction of the state that sought to win over the hearts and minds of

the local populace. Although Lyautey was successful, and even raised a considerable force of Moroccan mercenaries, armed resistance to the French continued until 1934.

John P. Dunn

See also: Algeria, French Conquest of (1830–1857); West Africa, French Wars of Conquest in.

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Moudros, Armistice of (1918)

Armistice signed by the Ottoman Empire and the Allies on October 30, 1918, that ended fighting in the Middle Eastern theater at the end of World War I. In September 1918, the Bulgarian Army in Macedonia collapsed, opening the way for an Allied advance on Constantinople, the Dardanelles, and the Bosporus. In Palestine, British forces broke through Ottoman lines and quickly advanced toward Aleppo. With impending military disaster, poor morale in the army, and rising domestic discontent, the Ottoman government surrendered. An Ottoman delegation, led by Minister of Marine Affairs Rauf Bey, traveled to Moudros on the Greek island of Lemnos to meet the Allied delegation, headed by Admiral Somerset Arthur Gough-Calthorpe, aboard the HMS *Agamemnon.*

According to the armistice, the remaining Ottoman garrisons outside Anatolia would surrender, and the Allies could occupy the forts controlling the straits and any territory in case of a security threat. The Ottoman Army also had to demobilize, and Allied forces could use ports, railways, and other strategic points as needed. Ottoman forces in the Caucasus had to withdraw to the empire's prewar borders.

On August 10, 1920, Allied and Ottoman delegates signed the Treaty of Sèvres, which partitioned the Ottoman Empire among Greece, Italy, Britain, France, and Armenia and established an international zone around Constantinople and the straits. Turkish nationalists, led by former Ottoman Army colonel Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk), rejected the treaty and, after more than two years of fighting, established the Republic of Turkey, consisting of Turkish Anatolia and territory around Constantinople, now called Istanbul. On July 24, 1923, after eight months

of negotiations, Turkey and the former Allies signed the Treaty of Lausanne, the only successful revision of the post World War I treaties.

Robert B. Kane

See also: Kemal Atatürk, Mustafa; Sevres, Treaty of (1920). World War I.

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Muawiyah (602–680)

Abu Abd al-Rahman Muawiyah ibn Abi Sufyan was a senior member of the Umayyad clan, long the rival of the Hashemite clan to which the fourth and final Rashidun "Rightly Guided" Caliph Ali belonged. Rivalry between this Banu Umayyah and the Banu Hashim had existed long before the coming of Islam, despite the fact that both formed part of the Prophet Muhammad's own tribe of the Quraish. Muawiyah also commanded the Muslim army in Syria, the most prosperous of the Arab or Semitic provinces of the caliphal empire. Though Ali, the Prophet Muhammad's cousin, had been proclaimed caliph in the hope that he could heal rifts that were threatening the unity of the Muslim community, these problems got worse. Many provincial governors had been promoted by his predecessor, the Caliph Uthman, and Ali now demanded that several step down. These included several members of the Banu Umayyah, such as Muawiyah. After political and military clashes that highlighted Ali's ineffectiveness as a ruler, Muawiyah led his Syrian-based forces in open rebellion. After the inconclusive Battle of Siffin in 657, a compromise enabled Ali to remain caliph, and he remained in that role until his assassination by a puritanical zealot in 661. This crime united most of the Muslims for the first time in years, and Muawiyah was declared the new caliph, ruling until 680. He pardoned those who had previously fought against him and tried where possible to rule by consensus. In fact, Muawiyah become one of the most effective rulers in the early medieval period. The Umayyad caliphal dynasty that he founded endured for more than a century and consolidated Islamic power from the Atlantic Ocean to India.

Muawiyah also changed the caliphate from an almost republican or patriarchal state into an almost constitutional monarchy—the "constitution" being the Koran

and Islamic law. He similarly set about imposing the military discipline that had characterized his governorship of Syria; for example, field armies were now commanded by members of the ruling Umayyad family. Muawiyah made no special claim to religious insight and became renowned for his *hilm*, that is, self-control and careful thought before any important action, reputedly writing a now lost book on the subject. Furthermore, Muawiyah sometimes placed men of remarkably humble origin in the highest positions of civil and military responsibility if they had proved themselves suited to the task.

Umayyad power rested on the army, in which Syrian units formed elite known as the *ahl al-sham* (People of Syria). They were recruited not only from the Muslim tribes that had conquered Syria a generation earlier but also from Syrian Arab tribes descended from Byzantine frontier forces and even local Christian Arab tribes. Furthermore Muawiyah had a retinue of 3,000 non-Arab *mawali* (clients) attached to an Arab tribe. By moving the capital of the now vast caliphal empire from Arabia to Damascus in Syria, he also shifted its center to one of the most ancient, prosperous, and sophisticated cities in the Middle East—a decision that would have a profound cultural and military impact upon the Islamic world for centuries.

David Nicolle

See also: Ali ibn Abi Talib; Siffin, Battle of (657); Umayyad Caliphate.

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Müezzinzade Ali Pasha (d. 1571)

Ottoman military official and grand admiral (*kapudan-i deryâ*) between 1567 and 1571. As his nickname, Müezzinzade, reveals, he was the son of a prayer caller (muezzin). Ali Pasha eventually became a favorite of Sultan Selim II, married one of his daughters, and enjoyed a successful career at the court. In September 1568, he made a reconnaissance raid on Cyprus. In 1570, he supervised the Ottoman expedition to Cyprus, where, despite his lack of experience in naval affairs, he commanded the fleet of 208 to 360 vessels and blocked Christian relief fleets from reinforcing the besieged defenders of Cyprus. When the Holy League alliance of European states was proclaimed in 1571, Ali Pasha served as the grand admiral of the Ottoman naval forces. He raided Crete in June, and though he failed to capture

the cities of Irakleio and Turluru, he pillaged the islands of Kythira, Zakynthos, and Kefallonia before reaching Corfu. He attacked the Venetian garrison at Sopot, which was captured with heavy losses.

As the opposing navies gathered near southern Greece, the Ottomans held a war council on October 4 to discuss the strategy. Knowing that the Ottoman navy was undermanned and fatigued from the Cyprus campaign, Pertev Pasha, commander in chief (*serdar*) of the 1571 campaign, and Uluç Ali Pasha, governor general (*beylerbeyi*) of Algiers, wanted to remain on defensive inside the Gulf of Lepanto. However, Müezzinzade Ali Pasha overruled them and ordered his fleet of 205 galleys and up to 68 galliots (small galleys) to attack the Christian fleet of some 219 galleys and six galleases commanded by Don Juan of Austria, the half-brother of King Philip II of Spain. During the battle, a fierce melee developed in the center, where the two flagships, Don Juan's *Real* and Ali Pasha's *Sultana* clashed; although Ali Pasha's men managed to board the *Real*, they were unable to overcome stiff resistance, and Ali Pasha was killed in action. Reportedly, he died at the hands of a Macedonian in the Venetian service who shot him in the head with a musket ball. As the admiral fell to the deck, he was beheaded by a zealous Spanish soldier, and his head was then displayed on a pike, which demoralized the Ottoman crews and contributed to the Ottoman defeat.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Barbarossa Hayreddin Pasha; Cezayirli Ghazi Hasan Pasha; Kemal Reis; Piale (Piyale) Pasha; Turgut Reis; Venetian-Ottoman Wars.

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Mughal-Maratha Wars

A series of wars fought by the Maratha kingdom against the Mughal Empire in India in the 17th and 18th centuries, the Maratha Wars culminated in the defeat of the Mughals, who had ruled India for centuries.

During the 18th century, the Mughal Empire ruled India, but it faced outside pressure from the steady growth in power of the Maratha kingdom, which began to encroach into northern India in the mid-1600s. The Marathas were mounted Hindu mercenaries living in the arid mountain region southeast of modern Bombay. They were the descendants of the former Yavada kingdom of Devagiri. As soldiers for hire, they engaged in guerrilla-style campaigns for neighboring rulers.

In the mid-1600s, the Marathas formed a confederacy behind the charismatic Yavada ruler Shivaji (Sivaji). Shivaji opposed the Muslim oppression of the Hindus and led the Marathas in an uprising against the Muslim kingdom of Bijapur in 1655–1659. That victory enabled the Marathas to establish an independent state in the western Ghat Mountains. Alarmed by Sivaji's success, the Mughal emperor Aurangzeb sent an army against him but Shivaji's daring midnight attack defeated it. In 1664, Shivaji's forces sacked Surat, one of the largest Mughal port, taking immense booty. In response, Aurangzeb dispatched one of his ablest generals, Mirza Raja Jai Singh, with some 100,000 men. Jai Singh pursued Shivaji to Bijapur, where he defeated him and forced him to sue for peace at Purandhar in 1665. The Maratha leader agreed to surrender most of his fortresses and pay compensation. He then traveled to Agra to pledge his allegiance to the Mughal ruler but was placed under house arrest inside the palace. Nevertheless, he escaped in August 1666 and rallied his supporters against the Mughals. Over the next two years he not only had won back all the lost territory but also significantly expanded his realm, reorganized his army, and began collecting taxes from Mughal regions. He sacked Surat a second time in 1670 and invaded Khandesh and Berar. Although the arrival of Mughal reinforcements under Bahadur Khan checked the Maratha's expansion by 1672, Shivaji turned his attention to Bijapur, Golconda, Jinji, and neighboring territories. He was the first Indian ruler to establish a naval force, which he used for defense and trade. In 1674, Shivaji proclaimed himself an independent sovereign (chatrapati), but his rule proved to be short lived; in April 1680, he died of illness in his mountain stronghold of Rajgarh.

After Shivaji's death, his son Sambhaji ascended the Maratha throne. He provided shelter to the rebellious Crown Prince Muhammad Akbar, the son of Aurangzeb, which provoked hostilities with the Mughal emperor. In 1681, Aurangzeb and his enormous courts (said to number half a million people) came to the Deccan, where it stayed for the next quarter of century. Aurangzeb conquered the Deccan kingdoms of Bijapur and Golconda in 1686–1687, and then turned his attention to the Marathas. In early 1689, Sambhaji was betrayed by one of his companions, who helped the Mughal forces to locate and capture him at Sangameshwar. After Sambhaji's execution in March 1689, Aurangzeb tried to absorb his kingdom but was unable to suppress the Marathas' resistance, which soon turned into guerrilla warfare (led by Sambhaji's brother Raja Ram) that consumed the rest of Aurangzeb's life.

After Aurangzeb's death in 1707, Maratha power was reconstituted under a confederacy, and throughout the early 18th century, the Marathas remained the dominant power in Maharashtra. Sahu, a Maratha leader who had been imprisoned by Aurangzeb but released by Bahadur in 1708, enjoyed a long period of rule lasting to 1748. By the mid-18th century, the Maratha Confederacy, through continued guerrilla warfare, had eclipsed the decaying Mughal Empire as the most powerful

regime in India. Over the next half century, it fought three wars against the British (1775–1782, 1803–1805, and 1817–1818) to prevent economic domination by the British East India Company.

Jason Newman

See also: Aurangzeb.

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Mughal-Safavid Wars

A series of conflicts between the Safavid and Mughal empires over the strategic city-fortress of Kandahar in Afghanistan. In 1595, two Safavid princes defected to the Mughal court, surrendering the fortress to Emperor Akbar (1542–1605). In 1622, after consolidating his authority at home, the Safavid shah Abbas organized a major expedition to reclaim Kandahar. After a month-long siege, the Mughal garrison surrendered. The Mughal emperor Jahangir (1569–1627) initially planned to send a punitive expedition and tasked his son Khurram (the future Shah Jahan) to lead it, but the expedition never materialized because Jahangir soon fell seriously ill and died. The Mughal court became embroiled in a bitter power struggle for the next few years..

Once Shah Jahan secured his authority, he turned his attention to Kandahar. The moment seemed opportune as the death of Shah Abbas in 1629 caused domestic instability in Iran. In 1638, as the Mughals prepared for the campaign against Kandahar, Ali Mardan Khan, a Safavid commander of Kandahar who had quarreled with Shah Safi (1629–1642), defected to the Mughal side and surrendered the fortress to Shah Jahan.

A decade passed before the Safavids were able to turn their attention to Kandahar. Shah Abbas II (r. 1642–1666) launched an expedition in 1648 and, after a two-month siege, captured the fortress. The following year the Mughals counterattacked under the leadership of young Aurangzeb, who laid siege to the fortress but could not take it before the onset of winter. The Mughals returned in late 1652 and once more in 1653 but failed to take the fortress on both occasions due to bad weather, logistical difficulties and the tenacious defense of the Safavid garrison.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Abbas the Great; Akbar; Aurangzeb.

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Muhammad, Campaigns of the Prophet

The Prophet Muhammad's military career began shortly after his emigration to Medina with his followers in 622. Once settled, the Prophet started to organize raids, an age-old Arab custom, against his Meccan enemies. The purpose behind these expeditions was to strategically and economically weaken Mecca and to secure much needed provisions and booty for Medina.

The first clash occurred at Nakhla, during the sacred month of Rajab in 624. A band of Muslims attacked a small Meccan caravan in which one pagan was killed. There was outrage in Mecca at this attack during the holy month. However, the unease of the Muslims in Medina was alleviated when a revelation affirmed that breaking the truce of the holy months was a grave matter, but even graver was the opposition of the true faith. That same year Muhammad set out with a force of 317 men to attack a large Meccan caravan returning from Syria. However, the caravan, under the skilled leadership of Abu Sufyan, managed to escape. The Muslims then found an army of 1,000 Meccans blocking their path at the wells of Badr. In the ensuing battle, the discipline and high morale of the Muslims and their control of the water won the day. Seventy Meccans lost their lives and about the same number were taken prisoner. The following year Abu Sufyan led a punitive expedition against Medina. A Muslim force of 700 men met the Meccans and their allies, 3,000 soldiers total, at the hill of Uhud. Initially, the Muslims had the upper hand in the fight; however, the battle was lost when the Meccan cavalry, led by Khalid ibn al-Walid, attacked the Muslims in the rear. The Prophet and his companions were driven onto the hill, but the Meccans did not follow up their attack and retired from the field.

In 627, Mecca launched its last offensive against Muhammad. A force of 10,000 Meccans and allied Bedouin attacked Medina. Muhammad ordered a trench to be dug along the undefended northern section of the city. The Meccans set up an ineffective blockade of the city for several weeks. They abandoned the siege after few half-hearted skirmishes along the trench failed to breach the defenses. In 628, the prophet concluded a truce with Mecca at Hudaybiya. This treaty freed him up to conquer the fertile oasis of Khaybar. This conquest was carried out by a force of

1,600 men who managed to destroy the defenders piecemeal by isolating them in their fortresses and preventing them from helping one another. In 630, Muhammad conquered Mecca after the truce of Hudaybiya was broken by tribes allied to Mecca. Muhammad's army of 10,000 men entered the city from four directions. Muhammad granted the populace of Mecca general amnesty, which resulted in a peaceful and bloodless conquest. Shortly after conquering Mecca, Muhammad met and defeated a coalition of Bedouin tribes at the Battle of Hunayn. He also led 30,000 men to the borders of Syria in a show of force to the Bedouin tribes of the region. The prophet died in 632, while preparing another expedition against the Byzantine frontier.

Adam Ali

See also: Badr, Battle of (623); Khalid ibn al-Walid; Khandaq, Battle of (627); Ridda Wars (632–633).

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Muhammad al-Kanemi (ca. 1779–1837)

Political and religious leader in the northern African state of Kanem-Bornu (in present-day northeastern Nigeria). His leadership and diplomacy protected the kingdom from the Fulani attacks of the early 19th century.

Al-Hajj Muhammad al-Kanemi was born around 1779 in Bornu. The geographical belt known as the Sudan (a region stretching across west and central Africa from the Atlantic Ocean to the Red Sea) was settled during this period by a variety of peoples, some of whom practiced their traditional animist forms of worship, some of whom had converted to Islam, and some of whom practiced a combination of the two systems. The state of Kanem-Bornu, in the region around Lake Chad, had long been ruled by a Muslim family, the Sefawa dynasty.

Al-Kanemi was the son of a sheikh and received a religious education. He went on to become a scholar of Islam and, as a young man, distinguished himself by taking the pilgrimage, or hajj, to Mecca. By the time of his return to Kanem, he had gained a reputation as a devout scholar and a charismatic leader. Al-Kanemi assumed a leadership role among the Kanembu people.

Earlier in the 18th century, Fulani pastoralists (animal herders) had begun a series of jihads—religious struggles to militarily defeat and then convert not only the peoples of animist traditions but also to purify those who had converted to Islam but did not adhere strictly to its laws. Over time, the jihads led by the Fulani cleric Usuman dan Fodio conquered most of Hausaland, establishing a theocratic state known as the Sokoto caliphate. Kanem-Bornu lay directly east of the new state, and the Sefawa dynasty soon found itself threatened by the Fulani jihad.

Usuman's forces attacked Bornu in 1808. Ahmad Alimi, the elderly mai, or ruler of Bornu, sent emissaries to Usuman insisting that he had no right to attack fellow Muslims. The Fulani leader ignored this plea, and his forces conquered the city of Bornu. The mai then abdicated in favor of his son Dunama.

At the time of the Fulani attack, al-Kanemi had just returned from his pilgrimage and was working as a teacher. Dunama asked him to help rally resistance to the Fulani, and al-Kanemi was able to halt and eventually rout the Fulani forces. To show his appreciation, Dunama rewarded al-Kanemi with gifts and honors. When the Fulani returned the following year, al-Kanemi again helped to save the kingdom. After this victory, Dunama gave al-Kanemi the title of sheikh and bestowed a large land grant upon him. Thereafter, al-Kanemi became an important and influential adviser to Dunama.

Yet al-Kanemi's growing power inspired jealousy among the nobles of the Bornu court. In 1809, they deposed Dunama and invited his uncle, Muhammad

Sheikh al-Hajj Muhammad al-Kanemi was a political and religious leader in the northern African state of Kanem-Bornu (in present-day northeastern Nigeria). (Bovill, E.W. (ed.), *Narrative of Travels and Discoveries in Northern and Central Africa in the Years 1822, 1823, 1824*.)

Ngileruma, to become the new mai. Through skillful political maneuvering, however, al-Kanemi managed to reinstate Dunama four years later. Al-Kanemi now became the power behind the Bornu throne and the most powerful man in the kingdom. Dunama came to resent al-Kanemi's growing authority and plotted against him. He planned to stage a war with neighboring Bagirmi and murder al-Kanemi during one of the battles. Al-Kanemi discovered the plot in time and was able to trick the opposing forces into fighting among themselves. It turned out to be Dunama who lost his life in the conflict, which left al-Kanemi free to install Dunama's pliant younger brother on the throne, thereby making himself the de facto ruler of the Kanem-Bornu state.

Al-Kanemi was a man of great religious piety. He claimed to despise the responsibility of ruling over Kanem-Bornu but remained in power because he believed it was a divine commission. He is reputed to have said that if he could, he would be "out of here as fast as a runaway slave." As a devout Muslim, he tried to avoid conflict with the Fulani warriors and corresponded with Usuman and his successor, Muhammad Bello, in an unsuccessful effort to make peace between the two kingdoms. Finally, in 1825, he determined that the Sokoto rulers were unwilling to make peace and attacked Hausaland, where they had established their caliphate. Though he did not conquer the Fulani, he was able to establish a boundary between the two states, which prevented future conflict.

Gradually al-Kanemi built up an administration in Kanem-Bornu that rivaled that of the mai. He began administering the affairs of the kingdom directly and accepting tribute from the provinces. He died in 1837 and was succeeded by his son Umar.

James Burns

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Muhammad Bello (1781–1837)

The son of the great Muslim reformer Usuman dan Fodio who took up his work as the Fulani leader of the Islamic jihad in Hausaland, a vast territory stretching across West Africa in what is today northern Nigeria, Cameroon, and Niger. Building on the victories of his father's armies, Muhammad Bello took control of the empire and founded the Sokoto caliphate.

Muhammad Bello was born in 1781 into a Fulani family in Hausaland. His father, Usuman, was a Muslim scholar and preacher who was traveling throughout Hausaland preaching for the purification of Islam at the time of Muhammad Bello's birth. At that time, Hausaland encompassed a number of city-states ruled by families of the Hausa aristocracy. Though many of the leaders claimed to be Muslims, Usuman believed their religious convictions to be halfhearted because they continued to follow many practices linked to traditional animist worship. He preached in the Fulani language, and his message resonated with the members of Fulani communities, many of whom were nomadic pastoralists living among the Hausa.

In 1804, Usuman's teachings brought him into conflict with Yunfa, the ruler of Gobir. After an attempt on his life, Usuman retreated from Gobir and declared a jihad against Yunfa. His call was taken up by many of the Fulani living in Hausaland, who resented their treatment at the hands of the Hausa. After four years of fighting, Usuman's forces triumphed over Yunfa, and a new Muslim state was created in Hausaland.

Muhammad Bello was 23 years old when his father went to war with Yunfa. He was put in charge of one of his father's armies and proved to be a skilled military leader. By 1812, with the assistance of Muhammad Bello and other talented generals, the armies of Usuman were victorious throughout Hausaland. Usuman decided to retire from politics to devote himself to a life of quiet contemplation. He placed Muhammad Bello and Muhammad Bello's uncle Abdullah in charge of his newly built kingdom and appointed several emirs to administer its provinces.

One of the goals of the jihadists was to elevate Islam from a matter of personal faith to the organizing principle of new states. Muhammad Bello built a new capital for the empire at Sokoto and thus provided the name for his caliphate. Usuman died in 1817 without making arrangements for a successor. Abdullah was away from Sokoto when his brother died, and Muhammad Bello seized power in a bloodless coup. As heir to his father's empire, he declared himself sultan of Sokoto. Abdullah resented his nephew's action at the time, but the two were reconciled years later. In the meantime, Muhammad Bello proceeded to unify his newly conquered kingdom by working to extend effective rule outside of the cities and into the vast rural areas.

As sultan, Muhammad Bello faced many challenges, not the least of which came from neighboring peoples who resisted the expansion of his empire. On his border to the east, the neighboring Islamic state of Kanem-Bornu resisted the imperialism of Sokoto both ideologically and militarily. Muhammad Bello led more than 40 military campaigns against those he considered to be his enemies. He built a series of forts, or ribats, on the borders of the empire to protect it from invasion. He also established control over western Bornu and thus eliminated that kingdom's threat to his sultanate.

Within the empire, many of the newly conquered peoples resented the domination of their new Fulani overlords. As sultan, Muhammad Bello tried to ease the tensions between the Fulani and Hausa. He promoted impartial justice and equal education for the peoples of his empire as he sought to change the entire society from one based on the mystical powers of hereditary kings to one united under a single state structure under the authority of Allah. Muhammad Bello worked to integrate the pastoral Fulani into settled communities throughout his empire.

At the center of his empire, administration took place in courts that were also centers of Islamic scholarship. Muhammad Bello was an accomplished scholar, and like his father, he was greatly preoccupied with the study of Islam. Jis skills as a historian and poet were also prodigious. His commitment to education extended to women, a rarity in Islam, and they were allowed to become teachers as well. After his death, the education system he founded would continue to grow, and Sokoto became a center for Islamic scholarship. When Muhammad Bello died on October 25, 1837, his brother Abubakr Atiku took control of the empire.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Usuman dan Fodio.

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Muhammad of Ghur, Conquests of

Muhammad of Ghur was a Muslim conqueror of northern India in the late 12th century, whose conquests initiated several centuries of rule by Muslims in the region. His lieutenants became the first sultans of the Mamluk dynasty in Delhi.

Muhammad's birth date is unknown. He came from an Islamic family of probably Turkic origins that ruled the region of Ghur, in what is now Afghanistan. Muhammad's older brother, Ghiyas-ud-din Muhammad bin Sam, acquired power in the region east of Herat in approximately 1162. From that point until Ghiyas-ud-din's death in 1202, Muhammad always acknowledged his older brother's leadership and never presented himself as anything but his brother's general. He reportedly sent the best spoils of war to his brother after all of his victories. The brothers may be seen as partners in the extraordinary expansion of the Ghurid state in the late

12th century, although Muhammad was clearly the dominant force behind the conquest of northern India.

The presence of Islam was felt in India as early as the seventh century, as Muslim sailors and merchants traveled throughout the Indian Ocean. The first serious Muslim invasion of India occurred in the eighth century when Muhammad ibn Qasim conquered the Hindu state of Sindh. In the 11th century, the Turkic warlord Mahmud of Ghazna established an Islamic state in Punjab, in northern India. Mahmud's successors in his western territories came into conflict with the neighboring Ghurid sultanate in the 12th century. In 1173, Ghiyas-ud-din, with Muhammad's assistance, defeated the Ghaznavid leaders of Ghazni (in what is now Afghanistan). While Ghiyas-ud-din focused on expanding his control over the region of Khurasan, Muhammad assumed control of Ghazni and began to use it as a base for an invasion of the Indian subcontinent.

In 1175, Muhammad made his first foray into India, leading his troops through the Gomal pass and occupying Multan and Uch. On this campaign, he attempted to conquer Gujarat but failed. In a series of campaigns over the following years, he took control of Peshawar in 1179, Sialkot in 1185, and Lahore in 1186. By this point, the Ghurids ruled all of the territory in India previously controlled by the Ghaznavids. Muhammad decided to continue his conquests against the Hindu Rajputs of the north Indian plain. In 1191, he seized the fort of Bhatinda. Muhammad initially began to return home with the spoils of his campaign but received word that the Hindu leader Prithvi Raj was marching to reclaim Bhatinda. Muhammad turned back to fight, and the two armies met at Taraori. Muhammad reportedly fainted during the battle, and his army was routed. Muhammad returned to Ghazni and spent the next year preparing for a rematch with the Rajputs. In 1192, the two armies fought the second of the Battles of Taraori. This time, Prithvi Raj was killed in the battle, and Muhammad won a decisive victory.

Muhammad followed the victory at Taraori by invading a series of Rajput states. He seized Badaun and Oudh in 1193, Kanauj and Benares in 1194, and Bayana and Gawalior in 1195. The most significant Ghurid victory came in 1196, when Muhammad's lieutenant Qutb-ud-din Aibak captured Delhi. Muhammad returned to Ghazni at this point, but he left Qutb-ud-din as governor of Delhi. Muhammad left another of his lieutenants, Muhammad bin Bakhtiyar Khilij, in charge of the state of Oudh. Khilij used the resources of this territory to create an army of horsemen with which he conquered Bengal and parts of Assam for Muhammad's rapidly expanding empire. As a reward, Muhammad appointed Khilij governor of Bengal.

Qutb-ud-din and Khilij both began their careers as Muhammad's slaves. Muhammad owned thousands of Turkic slaves whom he relied on for both military and administrative services. Perhaps because he had no heirs, Muhammad devoted

considerable resources to the training and education of his most able slaves, like Qutb-ud-din and Khilij. It is reported that when a courtier lamented that Muhammad had no sons, he replied, "Other monarchs may have one son, or two sons; I have thousands of sons." Muhammad's policy of promoting his ablest slaves would have important consequences; after Muhammad's death in 1206, his lieutenants took over the empire and established the Mamluk ("slave") dynasty.

Muhammad was assassinated in 1206. After putting down a revolt in Lahore, he traveled through the Indian town of Damyak on his way back to Ghazni. An assailant, who may have been an Ismaili or a member of the Ghakkar tribe, murdered him there, reportedly while he was saying his evening prayers. He was buried on the spot, and a tomb was erected in his honor. After Muhammad's death, Qutb-ud-din declared himself sultan of Delhi. He was succeeded by Iltutmush, who ruled during 1210–1235 and substantially increased the sultanate's territory. The Mamluk dynasty eventually fell from power in 1290, but Muslims continued to control much of northern India for several centuries afterward. Muhammad's conquests are considered some of the most significant events in medieval Indian history.

Ryan Hackney

See also: Ala al-Din Khalji (Alauddin Khilji); Delhi Sultanate; India, Muslim Conquest (to 16th Century); Mahmud of Ghazna; Taraori (Tarain), Battles of (1191–1192).

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Muhammed Omar, Mullah (1959–)

Radical Islamic fundamentalist cleric and leader of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan from 1996 to 2001. Muhammed Omar was born near Kandahar, either in Singesar or Naduh, in Afghanistan some time in 1959. His father died when he was young, leaving Omar as the primary breadwinner for his family. With the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, Muhammed Omar joined the mujahideen, the guerilla fighters opposing the Soviet forces. The mujahideen received the support of much of the Islamic world and even the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. Muhammed Omar was wounded a number of times in actions against the Soviets, most famously from shrapnel that damaged his eye and required its

surgical removal by Red Cross doctors. After recovering from his wound, Muhammed Omar became a mullah (Islamic clergyman), either by attending a madrassa or by his own personal study.

With the withdrawal of the Soviets from Afghanistan, the various tribes and factions there continued to be united in their opposition to the Afghan communist government in Kabul. With the collapse of that government in 1992, the country entered a state of civil war. Muhammed Omar led a faction called the Taliban, which means "students." Most recruits to the Taliban came from Islamic religious schools and refugees in neighboring Pakistan. Omar and his followers considered themselves humanitarians trying to rid Afghanistan of the evils and corruption of the warlords. In part owing to support from Pakistan, Omar was able to capture Kandahar in 1994. In 1996, Muhammed Omar took the title of "commander of the faithful." That same year the Taliban captured the Afghan capital city of Kabul, fashioning the nation as an Islamic emirate. Muhammed Omar, however, remained in Kandahar living as a virtual reclusive. The Taliban strenuously enforced the Sharia, the portion of Islamic law that attempts to promote moral behavior by heavily restricting individual rights, particularly those of women. World human rights groups were very critical of the new regime.

Muhammed Omar had become acquainted with and befriended Osama bin Laden in the mujahideen. Bin Laden was instrumental in financing the Taliban and thus made a significant contribution to its eventual takeover of Afghanistan. In turn, Muhammed Omar allowed Al Qaeda terrorist training camps to operate within his nation. After the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, Muhammed Omar defended the Taliban as a moderate regime and argued that bin Laden had played no role in the attacks. There is some evidence that a number of Taliban leaders resented the presence of Al Qaeda and were dissatisfied with Muhammed Omar's decision to allow the group to be located there in the first place. These individuals urged cooperation with the United States, but Muhammed Omar remained firmly in control and refused to comply with U.S. demands. His refusal to hand bin Laden over to the U.S. government led to the American military intervention that drove the Taliban from power in the late fall of 2001.

Since the Taliban's fall from power in Afghanistan in late 2001, Omar has eluded capture, although it is widely assumed that he is hiding in the Pashtun regions of Afghanistan or Pakistan. The U.S. government has offered a $10 million bounty for his capture, but Muhammed Omar retains the loyalty of many Taliban factions within Afghanistan, and they are unlikely to turn him in.

Michael K. Beauchamp

See also: Afghanistan, U.S. War in (2001–); Osama bin Laden; Taliban.

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Murad II (d. 1451)

Ottoman sultan (1421–1444 and 1446–1451). On his accession to the throne following the death of his father, Mehmed I (1421), Murad II faced two challenges to his leadership: one from his uncle Düzme Mustafa, and the other from his own brother Mustafa. Having successfully defeated both rivals, Murad set about securing his position, campaigning against the rival Turkish state of Karaman, based round Konya, and dealing with his enemies in Europe, in particular the very able John Hunyadi, voivod of Transylvania. After an unsuccessful siege of Constantinople (mod. İstanbul, Turkey), Murad concluded a treaty in 1424 with the Byzantines.

By the 1440s, Murad, a gentle, humane, and liberal man according to the Genoese merchant Jacopo di Promontorio, appears to have tired of ruling, and, possibly due to the death of his son Alaeddin, abdicated in 1444, leaving the throne to his son Mehmed II. Before doing so, he arranged the Treaty of Adrianople (mod. Edirne, Turkey) with Hungary and Serbia in 1444 and a treaty with Karaman, also in 1444, in an attempt to ensure peaceful relations with his neighbors. Peace was, however, not achieved; on the accession of the young and inexperienced Mehmed II, John Hunyadi and King Vladislav I of Hungary promptly attacked. Murad returned from retirement to lead the Ottoman army. At the Battle of Varna (1444), the Ottomans defeated the Hungarians; Vladislav was killed, and Hunyadi fled. For the next two years, Mehmed continued to retain a precarious hold on the throne, but was brought down by a Janissary revolt in 1446. Brought back to the throne, Murad II reestablished Ottoman control firmly over the European territories, defeating Hunyadi at the Second Battle of Kosovo in 1448. He was less successful against George Kastrioti, known as Skanderbeg, who battled against the Ottomans in Albania. Murad II died in 1451 and was succeeded for the second time by his son Mehmed II.

Kate Fleet

See also: Adrianople, Treaty of (1444); Kosovo, Battle of (1448); Mehmed II; Varna Crusade (1444).

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Musa ibn Nusayr (d. ca. 716)

Little is known about the origins of Musa ibn Nusayr, and some of this is probably legendary. Like several other leaders of the Muslim conquest of the Iberian peninsula between 711 and 714, Musa was Berber rather than Arab and may have been a captive or slave. Umayyad armies were already unlike those of the initial wave of Islamic conquest and included significant numbers of non-Arab recruits. Many were enlisted individually, some were ex-prisoners loosely attached to their captors' tribe, and others joined pseudo-tribal regiments as mawalis or "clients". In fact Musa ibn Nusayr, himself a mawla (pl. mawali) had many mawali of his own, including Berbers and Greeks or Byzantines probably captured during the Islamic conquest of North Africa. Here Umayyad governors had, from an early date, encouraged the recruitment of Berbers and their conversion to Islam; a policy continued by Musa when he became governor. Though a North African Islamic fleet had emerged under Musa's predecessor, it was he who made this fleet into a major force and developed Tunis as a significant naval base. However, Musa ibn Nusayr's most famous campaign was the conquest of the Iberian peninsula, which had been initiated by his subordinate, Tariq ibn Ziyad. Yet only two years later Musa and Tariq were recalled to Damascus to explain their barely authorized invasion. After some delay they set out, making a leisurely way east, accompanied by a triumphant procession and an immense convoy of booty. Reaching Damascus shortly before Caliph al-Walid died, Musa ibn Nusayr found that the new caliph, Sulayman, was unsympathetic to him as a wealthy and worryingly popular governor of Islam's westernmost provinces. Both Musa and Tariq were accused of misappropriation of funds, and Musa ibn Nusayr was thrown into prison, where he died about a year later; Tariq was dismissed from his post but not imprisoned and, according to some sources, spent the remainder of his life as a religious ascetic.

David Nicolle

See also: North Africa, Muslim Conquest of; Spain, Arab Conquest of (711–718); Tariq ibn Ziyad.

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Muslim Armies of the Crusades

The Crusades to the Near East, Egypt, and the Balkans encountered a variety of Muslim armies between the late 11th and the 15th centuries. The earliest Crusades were confronted by the Great Saljuk Empire and its dependencies (covering Persia, Iraq, and Syria), the Saljuk sultanate of Rum in Anatolia, and the Fatimid caliphate in Egypt. Later the main enemies were the Ayyubids in Syria and Egypt (the later 12th and earlier 13th centuries), the Mamluk sultanate in Egypt, Palestine, and Syria (13th century and later), and the Ottoman Empire (14th–16th centuries).

Recruitment

Military recruitment in the Islamic world during the period of the Crusades reflected established traditions until the coming of the Mongols in the 13th century. Most eastern Muslim states recruited multiethnic armies, which included local volunteers and large numbers of soldiers of slave origin called *Mamluks* or *ghulams.* Even the Saljuk Turks turned to such traditional methods as their authority spread across most of the Middle and Near East. Paradoxically, however, it seems that many of the first so-called Turks who erupted into Byzantine Anatolia around 1025 were actually Persians, Daylamis, or Kurds. Non-Turks, including Armenians and Arabs, also played an important role in the armies of several Saljuk successor states in 11th-century Syria and Iraq. Meanwhile, by the end of the 11th century, some of the Christian Greek and Armenian military elites of Anatolia had also been Turkified through intermarriage. The Khwarezm shahs, who took over Transoxania and eastern Persia following the decline of the Saljuks, recruited numerous troops of slave origin, though their garrisons also included freeborn Turkish and Persian professional soldiers. Traditional Islamic military recruitment reappeared in Mongol Persia and Iraq during the 14th century, but was more characteristic of the post-Mongol successor states.

The most significant military development in the heartlands of Islamic civilization was a continuing professionalization of most armies, because the skills demanded of a soldier were now so high that the old militias and tribal forces could not compete. This trend prevailed despite the fact that, after the fragmentation of the Great Saljuk sultanate, many of the states involved were remarkably small and could only maintain small armies. Most rulers could only afford a small *'askar* (bodyguard of slave-recruited Mamluks), which formed the core of a larger force

of provincial soldiers, mostly Turks or Kurds plus a few Arabs. *Ahdath* (urban militias) played a minor role in some cities, while, further south, Bedouin Arab tribes continued to dominate the semidesert and desert regions.

Saladin and his Ayyubid successors built a large and powerful military system in Egypt, Syria, and northern Iraq, making use of existing Zangid-Turkish and Fatimid-Egyptian structures. Though Saladin was of Kurdish origin, the role of Kurds in Ayyubid armies has been greatly exaggerated, and the *alqa* (elite) of Saladin's army were slave-recruited Turks. Thereafter Mamluks continued to form the elites of subsequent Ayyubid forces. Among the more exotic troops in Saladin's army were ex-Fatimid infantry of black African slave origin, but these proved unreliable and were soon disbanded. The same applied to most of the ex-Fatimid Armenian soldiers. Many North Africans were recruited by the Ayyubid navy, while large numbers of renegade European warriors served Saladin and his successors after Saladin's reconquest of most of Outremer.

The army of Mamluk Egypt was essentially the same as that of the preceding Ayyubid dynasty, except that Mamluks now formed the ruling caste as well as forming the military elite. Under the Bari, or first "dynasty" of Mamluk sultans, the majority were of Turkish origin, but in the late 14th century larger numbers of Circassians, Russians, Greeks, and western Europeans were enlisted. Meanwhile, freeborn troops had a far lower status in the Mamluk army.

The Saljuks of Rum who ruled central Anatolia attempted to model their army on that of the Great Saljuks of Iraq and Persia. At first their military forces consisted of Turkoman tribesmen around an elite of slave-recruited ghulams that included many Greek prisoners of war, but by the later 12th and early 13th centuries, the bulk of the professional cavalry were probably freeborn Turks. Other characteristics of the army of the Saljuks of Rum were its assimilation of existing Byzantine, Armenian, and Georgian military elites and the use of professional mercenaries (at the height of the sultanate's prosperity). Rum and the subsequent Turkish principalities (beyliks) also encouraged urban Islamic brotherhoods as a source of religiously motivated volunteers.

Like the other western beyliks, the Ottomans attracted military and civil refugees from the Mongol occupation of central Anatolia. Nevertheless, the earliest Ottoman armies were entirely traditional, consisting of a majority of Turkoman tribal cavalry, perhaps a tiny elite recruited from slaves or prisoners, and a few ill-trained infantry. By 1338, the Ottoman ruler already had a small force of ex-prisoner or slave-recruited soldiers, and although these were not as yet known as such, the famous Janissary (Turk. *yeni çeri*) infantry may have developed out of this earlier formation. The Janissaries also differed from previous slave-recruited formations because they eventually came to be drawn from enslaved members of the Ottoman sultan's own non-Muslim population.



The Arab army on the march, from a manuscript made under the direction of Alfonso X "The Wise," *King of Castile and Leon* (vellum), 13th century. (Biblioteca Monasterio del Escorial, Madrid, Spain/Bildarchiv Steffens/The Bridgeman Art Library)

Organization

Traditional systems of military organization characterized the Islamic world until the Mongol invasions. Military ranks remained much the same as they had been for centuries. The Great Saljuk sultanate was theoretically divided into 24 military zones, each commanded by an officer whose Turkish or Persian title reflected the culture of his district. Each had to raise, train, equip, and lead a specified number of local troops. However, this idealized system proved inadequate, and the sultan soon created a palace-based army loyal to himself. The inadequacy of traditional structures also led to a great extension of the *iqa'* system of allocations of revenue. Although this system was largely destroyed by the invading Mongols, it was partially recreated by the Ilkhans (the Muslim Mongol rulers of Persia) and their successors.

The success of the Ayyubids, Mamluks, and Ottomans in expelling the Franks of Outremer and defeating later crusading expeditions was not a result of superior numbers but reflected superior organization, logistical support, discipline, and

tactics. Such sophistication could even be seen in the small forces of some city-states, such as that of 12th-century Damascus. This force was divided into five sections, according to the origins of the soldiers or their specific role. The militia, though primarily defensive, sometimes took part in offensive campaigns. The *mutaawwi'a* (religious volunteers) also formed a permanent though part-time force. There were three senior military ranks: the *isfahsalar* (commander), who was often the ruler himself; the *ra'is* (head of the militia); and the *shina* (head of internal security forces). Many grants of *iqa'* appear to have become hereditary and were largely reserved for the ruler's *'askar* of regular cavalry. This force was in turn divided into *ulb* (platoons), whose weapons were normally held in the ruler's own *zardkhanah* (arsenal).

Cavalry was now the dominant arm, but Egypt, the primary center of Ayyubid power, was seriously short of pasture. Consequently, the Egyptian army relied on small numbers of exceptionally well-trained and equipped horsemen, with larger mounted forces being stationed in Syria. In Egypt the Ayyubids also inherited the sophisticated Fatimid *Diwan al-Jaysh* (ministry of war).

The elite of the Ayyubid army was the *jandariyah*, which largely consisted of regiments of Mamluks, while the bulk of the army consisted of the professional but nonelite *alqa.* Infantry remained essential for siege warfare but mostly consisted of mercenaries and volunteer auxiliaries. On campaign, Ayyubid tactical units were not necessarily the same as the administrative formations, and they varied considerably, often overlapping or being created in response to circumstances. These included a *yazak* (advance guard) selected from the best cavalry and the *jalish*, which appears to have been a cavalry vanguard carrying banners. The term *qufl* (literally "fortress") may have referred to soldiers sent to secure the main routes; the term *arafisha* (rabble) seems to have referred to guerrillas operating inside enemy territory, and the *liu* were light cavalry sent to attack enemy supplies or caravans. Ayyubid logistical organization was even more sophisticated and was based upon an *atlab al-mira* (supply train) commanded by a senior officer. There was also a recognized military market (Arab. *suq al-'askar*) of civilian, specialized merchants.

The army of the Mamluk sultanate was a development of that of the preceding Ayyubid dynasty and consisted of three main elements. The most important were the Royal Mamluks (Arab. *mustakhdamun*), while the *khaakiya* formed an elite bodyguard within the Royal Mamluks. Lower in status were the Mamluks of senior officers, and third there was the *alqa,* the freeborn cavalry. However, the status of the *alqa* steadily declined and, within Egypt, had little military value by the end of the 14th century.

The Mamluk army's ranking structure was equally elaborate. Until the late 13th century, the most senior officer was the *na'ib al-salana* (viceroy of Egypt), but later the *atabak al-'asakir* (father-leader of soldiers) was considered senior. The *amir silah* (master of arms) was in overall charge of government arsenals,

the *ra'is nawbat al-nawab* commanded the Royal Mamluks, the *ustadar* was in charge of Mamluk pay, and the *dawadar al-kabir* selected which members of the *alqa* went on campaign. Other officers were in charge of government stables, arsenals, garrisons, and so on. Ordinary officer ranks were based on the number of soldiers the man maintained as his own retinue rather than the number he commanded on campaign. Provincial forces remained vital for the Mamluk state, each *qira* (military district) theoretically supplying 1,000 soldiers. Syria was by far the most important region outside Egypt. Its army commander was called the *'atabak 'amir kabir* and was directly responsible to the sultan in Cairo. Syria itself was divided into small *mamlaka* (districts), each with a local administration with an officer called *na'ib al-salana* in charge of local military forces.

The army of the Saljuks of Rum was divided into two parts: an "old," or traditional, force and a "new" army. The Old Army mainly consisted of Turkoman tribesmen and the ruler's Mamluks, plus the *havashvi* (armed retainers) of *iqa'* holders and urban governors. The New Army was essentially a mercenary force under the ruler's immediate control. Following the Mongol conquest of Anatolia, these elite forces were replaced by Turkoman tribesmen whose loyalty was gained by giving them grants of freehold land rather than grants of revenue, while urban militias known as *igdish* were responsible for maintaining security under their own *igdishbashis.* The little beyliks that then emerged had small military forces under the command of the local ruler. Many of the ghazis (fighters for the Faith) who typified this period formed religious brotherhoods (Arab. *futuwa*) characterized by a very egalitarian spirit.

The Ottoman Turks absorbed a variety of military traditions, of which that of the Mamluks was most important. At the start of the 14th century, the Ottomans' Turkoman tribal forces were led by their own chiefs, whose loyalty was based on traditional Turko-Mongol rather than Islamic concepts. But by the late 14th century the Ottoman army consisted of two parts. The freeborne *timarli* (holders of estates) were mostly Sipahi (cavalry), while the *maasli* (troops recruited from slaves or prisoners-of-war) received salaries from the government. Irregulars and auxiliaries formed an unrecognized third part of the Ottoman army. At the very heart of the later 14th-century Ottoman army were the elite *silahdar* (guardians of the ruler's weapons) who formed one of six Palace cavalry regiments. Quite when the two Janissary cavalry regiments were established is unclear, though another elite Janissary unit, the *solak* (infantry bodyguard), certainly existed from an early date. The Janissary infantry were part of the Ottoman sultan's *birun* (outer service) and consisted of a single *ocak* (hearth), a corps commanded by the *Yeniçeri Agasi.* This *ocak* was divided into *orta* (companies), each commanded by a *Çorbaci basi* (soup chief). Ottoman provincial forces were divided into European and Asian armies, those in the Balkans consisting of three *uc* (frontier marches), which had, in fact, existed even before the Ottomans crossed into Europe. By the late 14th century,

the fast-expanding Ottoman Empire was divided into *sanjaq* (provinces), each of which fielded a specified number of cavalrymen. The *timarli* of these provinces were grouped into *alay* (regiments) under *alay bey* (officers), who were in turn led by the *sanjaq bey* (provincial governor). Several *sanjaq beys* were commanded by the *beylerbeyi* of the wider *eyalet* (military province).

David Nicolle

See also: Ayyubids; Fatimids; Fortifications, Islamic; Ilkhans; Mamluk Sultanate; Military Equipment, Islamic; Rum, Sultanate of; Saladin; Saljuks; Tarsusi, Ali ibn Murdi al-.

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Muslim Civil War (First)

The Muslim civil war or *fitna* lasted from the murder of the third caliph Uthman (Osman) in 656 to the assassination of the last of the Rashidun caliphs, Ali, in 661. Ali was chosen as caliph after Uthman's murder. Zubair and Talha, two prominent companions of the Prophet, advised him to keep Uthman's governors in place for the time being and to unify the Muslims by punishing the mutineers who had taken part in the siege of Uthman's house and his murder. However, Ali did not heed their council and took no action because of indecisiveness, inability, or refusal. In fact, he alienated himself from many by trying to replace the governors of the provinces with his own candidates.

Because of his inactivity over Uthman's murder, Ali lost his standing and support among many Muslims in the empire. As a result, Zubair, Talha, and Aisha

raised the banners of rebellion and marched to Basra. In the ensuing Battle of the Camel, Ali crushed the rebels and turned his attention next to Syria where Muawiyah, Uthman's cousin, was governor and had refused to acknowledge Ali's caliphate or the governor he appointed to replace him. An inconclusive battle was fought at Siffin, and both sides agreed to resolve their differences through arbitration. This decision divided Ali's forces, and some of them abandoned his cause and became the Kharijites.

Ali lost the arbitration, which determined that Uthman's death was unjust. Ali refused to acknowledge the outcome of the arbitration and withdrew to Kufa while Muawiyah was proclaimed caliph by his followers in Damascus. Before Ali could march against Syria again he had to deal with the dissidents who left his army at Siffin. He met this group, the Kharijites, near Nahrawan and tried to convince them to rejoin his army. A compromise could not be reached, however, and more than 3,000 Kharijites were massacred. The two caliphs ruled their domains from Damascus and Kufa until 661 when Ali was assassinated by a Kharijite. Muawiyah was able to consolidate his caliphate and establish the Umayyad dynasty.

Adam Ali

See also: Ali ibn Abi Talib; Bassorah, Battle of (Battle of the Camel) (656); Kharijites; Muawiyah; Siffin, Battle of (657); Umayyad Caliphate.

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Muslim Civil War (Second)

The second Muslim civil war, or *fitna*, started in 680 when Yazid succeeded his father Muawiyah as caliph. Many people were opposed to this succession because they thought the Umayyads were establishing an Arab dynastic monarchy, which was viewed as despotic and un-Islamic. The 12-year civil war lasted into the reigns of Marwan and his son Abd al-Malik.

Several sides were involved in this conflict. Husayn ibn Ali gathered his supporters in Mecca and marched towards Kufa in an attempt to raise an army there. His small party of 72 men was cut off and massacred at Karbala by the Umayyad army. The Kufans attempted to avenge Husayn's death, but they were also defeated by the

Umayyads. Another Alid revolt in Kufa, led by Mukhtar ibn Abi Ubayd, tried to raise another son of Ali, Ibn al-Hanafiyya, to the caliphate, but their uprising was put down by the Zubayrid governor of Basra in 687.

The other major opponent of the Umayyads was Abd Allah ibn al-Zubair. He managed to assert his control over most of the Islamic Empire, with the exception of Syria, between 681 and 692. The new Umayyad caliph, Marwan, and the Kalb, his tribal supporters, defeated the Zubayrids and the tribes of Qays at the Battle of Marj Rahit in 684. With this victory Syria was secured by the Umayyads, and Egypt also fell to them soon after. In Iraq, Musab ibn al-Zubair, the governor of Basra, had to contend with Kharijite rebels and Mukhtar's revolt in Kufa. These struggles wore down the Zubayrids and the Syrians were able to take Iraq in 691. Abd Allah ibn al-Zubayr was thus confined to Mecca where he was killed in 692 while fighting a Syrian army led by Hajjaj. The Kharijites also rebelled in Najd, Iraq, and Iran, but they were not a unified group and were not major contenders for the caliphate as their revolts were localized.

Adam Ali

See also: Abd Allah ibn al-Zubair; Hajjaj ibn Yusuf ath-Thaqafi, al-; Husayn ibn Ali; Kharijites; Muawiyah; Umayyad Caliphate.

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Myriokephalon, Battle of (1176)

A defeat of a Byzantine army under Emperor Manuel I Komnenos by the Saljuk sultanate of Rum on September 17, 1176. Although the battle has generally been named after the fortress of Myriokephalon, it actually took place in the pass of Tzivritze, north of Lake Eğirdir (mod. Eğirdir Gölü, Turkey) in western Asia Minor. In 1176, Manuel Komnenos marched east from Byzantine territory, intending to capture the city of Ikonion (mod. Konya) from the Saljuks of Rum and reopen the land route to Jerusalem. The Saljuk sultan, Qilij Arslan II, offered peace. However, Manuel rejected this offer and pressed on with an army of around 35,000 men and a large, slow-moving baggage train, by this time suffering from shortages of food and water. Passing the deserted fortress of Myriokephalon, they entered the pass of

Tzivritze. Inadequate scouting had failed to report that the Turks already controlled it. The vanguard successfully broke through and set up camp.

The most serious Turkish attack fell upon the right wing, commanded by Baldwin of Antioch, Manuel's brother-in-law. The Byzantine right turned and fled, and Baldwin was killed. The emperor and his bodyguard, trapped behind the baggage train, could neither get information from the vanguard nor send orders forward. A violent sandstorm further confused the situation. Kilij Arslan circled around behind the rear of the army, blocking any retreat. The historian Niketas Choniates reported that Manuel contemplated flight but instead, abandoning the baggage train, fought his way through to the vanguard. He was eventually joined by elements of the rear guard.

According to Choniates, half the Byzantine army was lost, and he criticized the "foreigners" on the right wing for cowardice. The Byzantine defeat was caused by poor discipline and communication. Many divisions were allowed to march into the pass in open order without waiting for following groups and were thus defeated piecemeal. Having escaped the battle, Manuel made peace with the Saljuks, promising to dismantle the fortifications of Soublaion and Dorylaion, an agreement that he subsequently broke. Manuel compared the defeat to that of Manzikert (1071); in reality, matters in Asia Minor were little changed.

Rosemary Morris

See also: Manzikert, Battle of (1071); Sultanate of Rum; Saljuks.

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N

Nadir Shah (1688–1747)

Ruler of Iran and a brilliant military commander, whose campaigns created a large Iranian empire that collapsed upon his death. Nadir was born into a pastoral family in Darra Gaz (northeast Iran) in late 1688. His family belonged to the Afshar Turkomans, whom the Safavids had settled in northern Khurasan to defend it against Uzbek incursions. Little is known about Nadir's early life, and most of what is known comes as legends and tales. He began his career in the service of Baba 'Ali Beg Ahmadlu, the governor of Abivard (a town north of Mashad) who appointed him as his muster-master (*ishik aqasi bashi*) and eventually gave him two of his daughters in marriage. In 1722, the invasion of the Afghan tribes resulted in the collapse of the Safavid dynasty; Shah Sultan Husain abdicated and was later executed by the Afghans. This event had a decisive role in Nadir's career as he chose to side with Tahmasp Mirza, the surviving heir to the Safavid throne. Tahmasp chose him as his principal military commander and gave him the title Tahmasp Quli Khan (servant of Tahmasp). Throughout the 1720s, Nadir gained a series of major victories, first crushing Malek Mahmud Sistani, who claimed the crown, in 1725–1726 and then defeating the Abdali Afghans near Herat in May 1729 and the Gilzi (Ghilzais) Afghans at Mihmandust and Murchakhur in the fall of 1729. He expelled the Afghans from the former Safavid capital of Isfahan, where Tahmasp was installed as a shah but with actual authority in the hands of Nadir. In 1730, Nadir announced the Safavid restoration to the Ottomans and demanded their withdrawal from the Iranian territory they had occupied since 1722. Receiving no response, Nadir waged a successful campaign against the Turks in the spring and summer of 1730 and recaptured most of the territory the Ottomans had taken in the previous decade. He then campaigned against the Abdali Afghans in Herat while Shah Tahmasp was left to secure the western province. The shah, however, pursued a disastrous campaign resulting in his defeat at Kurijan in 1731, and he agreed to sign a peace treaty that surrendered substantial territory to the Porte. Nadir was infuriated by the shah's decision and used the peace treaty as an excuse to replace him with his eight-month-old son Abbas III. He then resumed war against the Ottomans and, after a series of victories, negotiated a new treaty that reinstated Iran's borders as of 1639; the Ottoman sultan, however, refused to ratify it. After quelling uprisings in Fars and Baluchistan, Nadir resumed his campaign against the Ottomans, scored

a major victory at Baghavard, and captured Ganja, where, in 1735, he signed a defensive alliance with Russia, reclaiming provinces Russia occupied in early 1720s. By now, Nadir thought he had gained enough political and military prestige to assume the throne of Iran himself. In early 1736, he organized an assembly of tribal leaders and asked it to choose him or one of the Safavids to rule the country. After several days of deliberation, the assembly proclaimed Nadir as the new shah, and he was officially crowned on March 8. One of his first acts as shah was to negotiate peace with the Ottomans. Although no formal peace treaty was signed, both sides agreed on a truce that lasted several years.

Nadir used this brief respite to pursue a series of major economic and military reforms. He issued coinage in his name and ordered a special cadastral survey of the land. He abolished traditional revenues derived from land tenure and established fixed salaries for officials and troops. He used the revenue to modernize the army and greatly increased the size of the army directly under his command. Like the Safavids before him, Nadir used forced resettlement of tribes to secure his frontiers and control rebellious provinces.

In 1738, Nadir resumed his campaign against the remaining Afghan forces, destroying their last stronghold, Qandahar, and forcibly removing the Afghans to other provinces. In the wake of this defeat, many Afghan soldiers joined Nadir's army and proved helpful in subsequent campaigns. In 1739, he invaded Mughal India, delivering a crushing blow to the Mughal emperor Mohammad Shah at the battle of Karnal in February 1739 and plundering Delhi. The Mughul emperor agreed to recognize Nadir's suzerainty and paid a heavy indemnity, which included the famed Peacock Throne and the Koh-i-Noor diamond. To highlight his new status, Nadir assumed the title of shahanshah (king of the kings).

In 1740, Nadir returned from India to campaign in central Asia, where he quickly defeated the khans of Khwarezm and Bukhara. After these triumphant campaigns, he laid the foundation for the Iranian navy, which launched expeditions throughout the Persian Gulf. His 1741–1743 campaigns against the Daghestan tribes in the Caucasus proved to be unsuccessful, but he managed to reclaim Iranian sovereignty over the eastern Georgian principalities of Kartli and Kakheti. Nadir's peace overtures to the Ottomans were rejected once more by 1743, leading to the resumption of hostilities. Nadir besieged several cities in Iraq but failed to gain any decisive results and agreed to a cease-fire. By then, he faced several revolts at Shiraz and Fars, but he quelled them by 1744. The following year, he returned to the western provinces to fight the Ottomans, whom he decisively defeated at Baghavard in August 1745. The Iranian victory compelled the sultan to accept the peace treaty, which was signed in September 1746 in Kurdan (Kordan), northwest of Tehran. The sultan recognized Nadir as shah and agreed to the proposed frontiers, exchange of ambassadors, and protection of pilgrims.

Despite his successes, Nadir had come to be regarded as a cruel and capricious tyrant and faced a number of internal revolts in 1746. A group of Afshar and Qajar officers conspired against Nadir and assassinated him in June 1747. His death, however, plunged Iran into a civil war and opened the way for the rise of the Afghan Ahmad Shah Durrani, former deputy of Nadir, who became first ruler of an independent Afghan state.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Abdali, Ahmad Shah; Baghavard, Battle of (1735); Baghavard, Battle of (1745); Karnal, Battle of (1739); Kurdan, Treaty of (1746); Iran, Wars of Succession in (18th Century).

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Nagorno-Karabakh War

Nagorno-Karabakh is a mountainous region covering 1,700 square miles that was once part of the Azerbaijan Soviet Socialist Republic but acquired de facto independence as the result of a war that began in 1991. In 1918, the enclave had a population of about 330,000 people. In 1921, the Soviet regime handed over Nagorno-Karabakh to Azerbaijan, despite the fact that its population was predominantly Armenian and that it was separated from Armenia proper by only a few miles. Joseph Stalin, who was in charge of nationality policies in the Soviet Union at the time, deliberately placed different ethnic groups in the same administrative unit to dilute national and ethnic cohesiveness and to pit people against people.

Azerbaijanis and the Muslim-dominated Azeri local government did not respect the autonomous status of Nagorno-Karabakh, and the Armenians (who are

Christian) in the enclave experienced discrimination and the suppression of their cultural traditions. As Armenians left the region, their majority gradually declined from 96 percent in 1926 to 76 percent in 1979, or by approximately 123,000 people. On February 20, 1988, a group of Armenian nationalists responded to growing uncertainty in the Soviet Union by publicly calling for the transfer of Nagorno-Karabakh to Armenia. The Azeri government responded with an attack on Armenian residents in Sumgait, a town outside the Azerbaijani capital of Baku. When Armenians demonstrated their solidarity with the victims by organizing protests in Yerevan and in Stepanakert (now Xankändi), the principal town of Nagorno-Karabakh, the Azeris responded with more anti-Armenian violence. On July 12, 1988, an assembly in Nagorno-Karabakh voted to secede and join Armenia. The Armenians feared that if the Soviet Union disintegrated, they would have no political or economic future in a nationalist Azerbaijan.

In January 1989, Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev attempted to deal with the crisis by replacing Azeri control over the enclave with direct control from Moscow. When the Azeris responded with a rail and road blockade of the region and Armenia, however, he backed down. Gorbachev's vacillation served only to provoke the Armenians of the enclave. After Armenia declared its independence in September 1991, a referendum on independence was held in Nagorno-Karabakh. On December 10, 1991, 82 percent of the enclave's eligible voters went to the polls, and of those, 99 percent voted for independence. For the Armenian residents of Nagorno-Karabakh, the January 2, 1992 declaration of independence was meant to be a step toward eventual amalgamation with Armenia.

The response of Azeri president Ayaz Mutalibov was to proclaim direct control of the enclave and send in a military force, which surrounded and bombarded Stepanakert. Karabakh Armenians, claiming that they had no assistance from Armenia proper, formed self-defense forces and drove the Azeri army back. In the process the Armenians took control of the Lachin Strip, which gave them road contact with Armenia proper. When the Azeri Army recovered and again bombarded Stepanakert, the Karabakh Armenians established close contact with the Armenian government headed by Levon Ter-Petrossian. With aid from Armenia and the Armenian diaspora, the Armenians went on the offensive. During October 1992–September 1993, the Armenians drove the Azeri Army out of the enclave and went on to occupy an additional 3,400 square miles of Azeri territory. Hundreds of thousands of Azeris fled the advancing Armenians, and Azerbaijan was thrown into political turmoil.

In September 1993, Turkey and Iran sponsored a successful United Nations resolution demanding that the Armenians withdraw from Azeri territory. The Armenians ignored the resolution and temporarily pushed almost to the Iranian frontier. An Azeri offensive in December 1993 succeeded in regaining some of the lost territory, but the Armenians remained in control of Nagorno-Karabakh. Finally, in

May 1994, through the mediation of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), a fragile cease-fire was signed by representatives of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Nagorno-Karabakh. It is estimated that during 1988–1994, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict cost as many as 18,000 lives. Another 25,000 people were wounded, and approximately one million Azeris were displaced from their homes.

Despite efforts on the part of the OSCE to mediate, a tense standoff continued. When Ter-Petrossian, attempting to end the crisis, announced that Nagorno-Karabakh could expect neither to join Armenia nor to become independent, he was removed from office in February 1998 and was replaced by Robert Kocharian, the Armenian prime minister and a native of Nagorno-Karabakh. The president of Azerbaijan, Heydar Aliyev, and Kocharian met more than 20 times during 2000–2003, but a permanent settlement of the crisis proved elusive. Despite the protests of Russia, Azerbaijan, and the European Union, Arkady Gukasyan, a staunch proponent of Nagorno-Karabakh independence, was reelected president of the enclave in August 2002 by 90 percent of the Karabakh voters.

Bernard Cook

See also: Alexandropol, Treaty of (1920); Kars, Treaty of (1921); Turkish Armenian War (1920).

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Nasser, Gamal Abdel (1918–1970)

Egyptian nationalist politician, vice president (1953–1954), premier (1954–1956), and president (1956–1970). Born in Beni Mor, Egypt, on January 16, 1918, the son of a civil servant, Gamal Abdel Nasser at an early age developed great antipathy toward Britain's rule over Egypt, setting the stage for his later championing of Egyptian nationalism and Pan-Arabism. Settling on a military career, he graduated from the Egyptian Royal Military Academy in 1936 and was commissioned as a second lieutenant. While stationed at a post in the Sudan, he met and became friends with

future Egyptian president Anwar Sadat. Based on their mutual dislike of the British, they eventually laid the groundwork for a secret anti-British organization that came to be called the Free Officers.

The Free Officers recruited Egyptian military officers who wished to bring about an end to British colonial rule and to oust King Farouk I. After months of painstaking planning, the organization fomented a revolt against Farouk's government on July 23, 1952. Three days later, the king abdicated and fled Egypt. Upon Farouk's abdication, a Revolutionary Command Council was established under the leadership of Major General Mohammad Naguib, with Nasser working behind the scenes. When the council declared Egypt a republic in June 1953, Naguib became its first president and Nasser its vice president. Beginning in the winter of 1954, a political power struggle ensued between Nasser and Naguib. Within months, Nasser took de facto control as president of the Revolutionary Command Council. Naguib was allowed to continue as president of Egypt, although this was in reality little more than a figurehead position.

Nasser and his faction consolidated their hold on power, and after the October 1954 attempt on his life, which he blamed on Naguib, Nasser ordered Naguib arrested. Using the assassination attempt to solidify his power base, Nasser became premier of Egypt on February 25, 1955. Seven months later he also took the title of provisional president.

Nasser quickly moved to centralize his authority, creating a tightly controlled police state in which political opponents were imprisoned, intellectuals and elites disenfranchised, and industries nationalized. In June 1956, a national election occurred in which Nasser was the sole candidate for the presidency, and thus he officially became Egypt's second president.

In addition to seeking land reform and following quasi-socialist economic policies, Nasser sought to modernize Egyptian infrastructure. His public works projects included the building of a massive dam at Aswan, for which he received promises of financial support from the United States and Great Britain. He also approached the United States about purchasing arms. When the United States refused this request, fearful that the arms would be used against Israel, Nasser turned to the Soviet Union.

The Soviets saw a chance to increase their influence in the region and began negotiating an arms deal with Nasser, whereupon the United States and Britain withdrew their support for the Aswan Dam project in early July 1956. Seeing an additional opportunity to gain more influence with the Egyptians and to establish a foothold in the Middle East, the Soviet Union quickly offered to help Nasser with the dam.

Nasser used the loss of Western financial support as a pretext to nationalize the Suez Canal on July 26, 1956. This action provoked joint French, British, and Israeli military action against Egypt, beginning the Suez Crisis. On October 29, 1956, Israeli forces attacked Egypt, and two days later French and British forces attacked

Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser shakes hands with Japanese chief delegate Tatsunosuke Takasaki at the Afro-Asian Conference of 1960. Nasser was an influential and controversial figure in the Arab world, twice waging war with Israel but also acting as a mediator during the Jordanian Civil War. (Library of Congress)

by air. On November 5, French and British forces landed at Port Said, further escalating the conflict. The United States, not privy to the attack, applied great pressure on the Israelis as well as on the French and British to withdraw, which they did on November 7. Far from being defeated, Nasser was vindicated by the Suez Crisis, and he shrewdly used this victory to further consolidate his rule at home and to promote Pan-Arabism throughout the Middle East. The Suez Crisis turned him into a hero of Middle East nationalism.

In pursuit of his Pan-Arab vision, Nasser established the United Arab Republic (UAR) on February 22, 1958. Consisting of only Egypt and Syria, however, the UAR fell apart when Syria withdrew on September 28, 1961. Nevertheless, Nasser continued to promote Arab nationalism and his vision of a Pan-Arab union.

Nasser's strong-arm rule began to work against him as the years progressed. Losing some of his popular appeal at home, he attempted to reform the government, which was corrupt and riddled with cronyism. Instead, he was forced to crack down on his opponents who tried to expand their power during the attempted reorganization. In foreign affairs, in an effort to play up Arab resentment toward Israel, he signed a defense pact with Syria in November 1966. In early 1967, he began

provoking the Israelis through a number of different actions, including insisting on the departure of United Nations (UN) peacekeepers from the Egyptian-Israeli border, blockading the Gulf of Aqaba, and moving troops into the Sinai.

In retaliation, on June 5, 1967, the Israelis attacked Egypt, Syria, and Jordan. The war lasted only until June 9 and proved to be a humiliating defeat for Nasser. His miscalculation further eroded his support in Egypt and blemished his reputation throughout the Middle East. In March 1969, he launched the War of Attrition against Israel, which resulted in many more Egyptian than Israeli casualties. In July 1970, he agreed to a cease-fire arrangement put forward by U.S. secretary of state William Rogers, ending the war. By then in deteriorating health, Nasser died on September 28, 1970, in Cairo.

Dallace W. Unger

See also: Arab-Israeli War (1948); Arab-Israeli War (1956); Arab-Israeli War (1967); Sadat, Anwar.

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Navarino Bay, Battle of (1827)

Key engagement of the Greek War for Independence (1822–1832). Britain, France, and Russia all sent squadrons to Greece. These arrived at Navarino Bay on October 14, 1827. British vice admiral Sir Edward Codrington flew his flag in the *Asia* (84 guns). He also had two 74-gun ships of the line, four frigates, and four brigs. French admiral Henry Gauthier de Rigny had four 74-gun ships of the line, a frigate, and two schooners. Admiral Count Heidin's Russian squadron consisted of four 74-gun ships of the line and four frigates. In all, the Allies had 11 ships of the line and 15 other vessels. Codrington, the senior officer present, who also commanded the most ships, took charge.

In Navarino Harbor the Egyptians and Turks had 65 or 66 warships: 3 Turkish ships of the line (2 of 84 guns each and 1 of 76); 4 Egyptian frigates of 64 guns each; 15 Turkish frigates of 48 guns each; 18 Turkish and 8 Egyptian corvettes of 14–18 guns each; 4 Turkish and 8 Egyptian brigs of 19 guns each; and 5 to 6 Egyptian fire brigs. There were also transports and smaller craft.

On September 25, Codrington and de Rigny met with Turkish commander Ibrahim Pasha to discuss a mediation arrangement already accepted by the Greeks. London had instructed Codrington to avoid battle if possible, and Ibrahim Pasha agreed to an armistice while awaiting instructions from the sultan. Then news was received

that the Greek squadron under British admiral Lord Cochrane, commander of the Greek navy, had arrived at nearby Patmos. Soon afterward the Turko-Egyptian fleet tried to leave Navarino harbor for Patmos, but Codrington's force turned them back. The situation was complicated by reports of civilian suffering as a consequence of actions by Turkish land forces in the Navarino area.

About noon on October 20, after consultation with the other allied commanders, Codrington sailed the joint force in two lines into Navarino Bay. The British and French formed one line, the Russians the other. The Turks demanded that Codrington withdraw, but the British admiral replied that he was there to give orders, not receive them. He said that if any shots were fired at the allied ships, he would destroy the Turko-Egyptian fleet.

The Turko-Egyptian vessels lay at anchor in a long horseshoe-shape formation with their flanks protected by shore batteries. The allied ships dropped anchor in the midst of this formation. Codrington dispatched the frigate *Dartmouth* to a Turkish ship in position to command the entrance of the bay with an order that she move. The captain of the Dartmouth sent a dispatch boat to the Turkish vessel, which opened musket fire on it, killing an officer and several seamen. Firing then immediately became general, and the shore batteries also fired on the Allied ships.

The resulting four-hour engagement was more a slaughter than a battle; it was essentially a series of individual gun duels by floating batteries at close range, without an overall plan. Three-quarters of the vessels in the Turko-Egyptian fleet were either destroyed by Allied fire or set alight by their own crews to prevent their capture. Only one, the *Sultane,* surrendered. Allied personnel losses were 177 killed and 469 wounded; the Allies estimated Turkish and Egyptian killed and wounded in excess of 4,000 men. Recalled to Britain, Codrington was acquitted on a charge of disobeying orders.

The Battle of Navarino Bay removed any impediment to the Russian Black Sea Fleet, and in April 1828, Russia declared war on Turkey. That August Egypt withdrew from hostilities, virtually ending the war. In the May 1832 Treaty of London, Greece secured its independence. The Battle of Navarino Bay, which had made this possible, is noteworthy as the last major engagement by ships of the line in the age of fighting sail.

Spencer C. Tucker

See also: Egyptian-Ottoman Wars; Greek War for Independence (1821–1832); Ibrahim Pasha.

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Navas De Tolosa, Battle of Las (1212)

A great victory in southern central Spain by a combined Christian army led by the kings of Castile, Aragon, and Navarre over the Muslim Almohads and their Andalusian allies.

The Christian defeat at Alarcos (1195) was followed in 1197 by a truce with the Almohads, which was renewed until the year 1210, when it expired. Before that date, King Alfonso VIII of Castile had nevertheless resumed hostilities against the Muslims, an aggressive attitude that was shared by Peter II of Aragon, whose kingdoms had recently suffered an Almohad naval attack. In 1210, Peter led an expedition to the Rincón de Ademuz, a region in northwestern Valencia, which he incorporated into his domains. The Muslims of al-Andalus asked the Almohad caliph for help. Muammad al-Nair agreed to intervene after some hesitation. In February 1211, he and his forces left Marrakech; they reached Tarifa in mid-May and finally Seville at the end of that month. The caliph's aim was to conquer an important Christian fortress and thus show the strength of the Muslims. His choice was Salvatierra, an isolated Christian strongpoint south of Ciudad Real, which had been boldly taken by the Order of Calatrava in 1198. The fortress fell in the summer of 1211.

A major confrontation was now inevitable, because the Christian kings feared the projects of the caliph, who in turn wished to check Castilian and Aragonese expansionism. In the early autumn, Alfonso VIII began preparations for an important campaign, although there are doubts whether he was seeking God's judgment in battle. He instructed his subjects to concentrate efforts on this project, received Peter II's promise of full Aragonese participation, and sent ambassadors to Pope Innocent III to ask for crusade bulls. The pope clearly supported the project by stimulating foreign participation in the war against the infidel and by threatening other Iberian kings with spiritual sanctions in case they attacked Castile while it was at war with the Muslims (Alfonso IX of León was not impressed and attacked Castilian positions while Alfonso VIII was on campaign). Papal propaganda for the crusade in Spain was so effective that, well before the fixed assembly date of May 20, 1212, numbers of *ultramontanos* (people from beyond the Pyrenees) reached Toledo. Among them was Arnold Amalric, archbishop of Narbonne, who while on his way persuaded King Sancho VII of Navarre to drop his traditional opposition to Castile and join the common effort.

The expedition left Toledo in mid-June 1212. A few days later it reached Muslim territory and conquered the fortress of Malagón. Calatrava la Vieja, the central headquarters of the Order of Calatrava, which had been lost after Alarcos, surrendered after a short siege. Then most of the *ultramontane* crusaders left the army, perhaps disappointed at the peaceful way Calatrava had been taken. By mid-July the Christian army had reached Sierra Morena. The Almohads and their Andalusian allies were positioned on the other side of the hills. According to a legend, a shepherd showed the crusaders a way down into a plain, where the battle took place on

July 6, 1212. The complete disarray of Muslim forces after a few hours of fighting has been a source of debate since. In spite of their superior numbers (around 20,000 against 12,000 Christians), the Muslims were unable to put up a strong resistance, probably due to lack of internal coherence; for various reasons, sections of the Andalusians defected during the battle. The crusaders exploited the caliph's swift return to Africa and conquered various sites (Vilches and Baeza) before besieging the strong fortress of Úbeda, where most of the population of the district had sought refuge. On August 3, 1212, it surrendered, and soon the Christian army disbanded due to illness. The campaign had finished.

The modern name of the major battle in the campaign, wrongly regarded as a turning point in the Reconquista (reconquest of the Iberian Peninsula from the Muslims) is misleading. It was known in the Middle Ages as the Battle of Úbeda or simply as "the Battle," as in contemporary chronicles. Even Jerónimo Zurita in the late 16th century spoke of the "gran batalla de Úbeda" (great battle of Úbeda), because the relevant aspect was not so much an open confrontation, but the loss of an important fortified city. The modern name is also misleading because Tolosa was probably a deliberate corruption invented by the archbishop of Narbonne in his report to the Cistercian general chapter. He altered the local toponym Losa to match that of Toulouse in France (Sp. Tolosa) where other infidels, namely, the Albigensian heretics, were under attack by crusaders and might expect the same fate as the Muslims in Spain.

Luis García-Guijarro Ramos

See also: Almohads; Reconquista.

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Nikopolis, Crusade of (1396)

A large crusade recruited from much of western Europe and Hungary, defeated by the Ottoman Turks near the frontier fortress of Nikopolis (mod. Nikopol, Bulgaria) in 1396.

The Turks had penetrated the Balkan peninsula during the 1360s and demonstrated that they were a major military power when they vanquished the Serbs at Kosovo Polje in 1389. A struggle followed between Hungary and the Ottomans for the domination of the principalities on both sides of the Danube. The Turks had suzerainty over Serbia and the Bulgarian kingdom of Vidin, having annexed the other Bulgarian kingdom of Turnovo (including the stronghold of Nikopolis) in 1393. Vlad, voivod of Wallachia, sought Ottoman help against his rival, Mircea the Great, who turned to King Sigismund of Hungary. Sigismund (of Luxembourg), a German, had acceded to the Hungarian throne on his marriage to Maria, queen of Hungary, in 1387.

The Turks launched raids north of the Danube from 1391 onward. The Hungarians mounted a retaliatory expedition in 1393, recapturing Nikopolis Minor on the north side of the river. King Sigismund was able to gauge the extent of the Ottoman menace, and called on the leaders of western Europe for assistance, sending an embassy the same year. Louis, duke of Orléans, Philip the Bold, duke of Burgundy, and John of Gaunt, duke of Lancaster, all pledged their support, while King Charles VI of France dispatched a small force under the constable of France, Count Philip of Eu. The following year, the three dukes sent their own ambassadors to the king of Hungary. Further east, the new Byzantine emperor, Manuel II Palaiologos, cast off his status as a vassal of the Ottoman sultan Bayezid I, leading to the siege of his capital, Constantinople (mod. Istanbul, Turkey), by the Turks.

The Ottoman advance constituted a menace to Italian navigation in the Black Sea, and Venice joined the Christian coalition that was taking shape. In the spring of 1395, ambassadors of Sigismund of Hungary and Manuel II Palaiologos came to Venice and Paris to plan the expedition, to which Charles VI promised to add a French corps. However, at the end of the year, the dukes of Lancaster and Orléans withdrew from the project, believing they could not leave France, even though a truce had been signed between England and France in 1392. Philip the Bold also decided he could not leave France; his place was taken by his eldest son, John, count of Nevers. Venice, Genoa, and the Hospitallers agreed to participate in the expedition, while the rival popes at Rome and Avignon issued crusade bulls.

During the spring of 1396, men took the cross throughout much of western Europe: the areas that participated included England, Germany, Savoy, and Italy, but France is the best documented. Poems by Eustache Deschamps and pamphlets by Philippe de Mézières were written in favor of the crusade. The unrealistic plan developed at the court of France was to expel the Ottoman Turks from Europe, restore the Latin Empire of Constantinople, and go on to recover the Holy Land from the Mamluk sultanate. The nominal head of the French army was John of Nevers, but Philip of Eu, Marshal Boucicaut, and Enguerrand of Coucy led their own troops, leaving France at different times and taking different routes. In July, the different Western forces assembled at Buda, where they joined the Hungarian army. The

total Christian forces numbered between 15,000 and 20,000 men, according to modern estimates.

The plan of campaign elaborated with the Hungarians was to march down the Danube accompanied by a supply fleet as far as Nikopolis, where the Christian land forces were to meet a Genoese, Venetian, and Hospitaller naval force sailing upriver from the Black Sea. They would then go on to Constantinople to raise the Turkish siege. A small corps was diverted to Wallachia to restore Mircea to the throne.

In early September the crusaders reached Ottoman territory at Vidin, held by the Bulgarian prince Ivan Stratsimir, who surrendered the town; the Ottoman garrison was massacred. This was followed by an attack on Oryakhovo (Rahova), when the French knights raced to be first to reach the walls. The Turkish commander offered to surrender, but the French insisted on taking the place by storm. They massacred not only the Turks but also the Orthodox population, except for the richest citizens, who had to pay a ransom, and then burned the town.

The crusaders arrived at Nikopolis, a near-impregnable site protected by strong fortifications, around September 10 and immediately laid siege to it by land and from the river. The Genoese and Venetians (the Hospitaller fleet not having arrived) cut off communications by water. The French constructed ladders to be used in assaults, while the Hungarians dug two large mines up to the walls. However, siege machinery was in short supply, and the sources give no indication that the crusaders had artillery with them. Deluded by their early victories and the absence of any news of the sultan, the crusaders turned the siege into a blockade, spending their time in debauchery, with little thought of security.

When the crusaders entered Ottoman territory, Sultan Bayezid I was occupied with the siege of Constantinople. After receiving news of their arrival, he began to summon troops from his Asian and European dominions, and assembled these together with his Christian allies at Philippopolis (mod. Plovdiv, Bulgaria). He marched toward Nikopolis and established his camp not far from the Danube on September 24. The same day, Mircea of Wallachia and Enguerrand of Coucy made a raid to reconnoiter the positions of their enemies and had a victorious encounter against a small Turkish corps.

The battle took place the next day. Bayezid had chosen the place: he disposed his light cavalry and foot archers on the slopes of a hill beyond a wooded ravine, while the Serbs and Sipahi cavalry remained hidden behind the hill. As had been decided in Paris, the French formed the vanguard. They foolishly rushed ahead of the Hungarian and allied troops against the Ottoman light cavalry; many impaled their horses on prepared stakes and were forced to dismount, which began to spread panic in the Hungarian ranks. Nevertheless, this force of mounted and unmounted men was able to defeat the enemy infantry and attacked the cavalry. They thought they had gained victory, but when they reached the top of the hill,

exhausted, they discovered the fresh forces of Bayezid. Then, according to the Chronicle of Saint-Denis, "the lion in them turned into a timid hare" (Chronique du religieux de Saint-Denis, 2:510). The battle became a rout: Mircea and his Wallachians had already fled, and the French were either killed or taken prisoner as they tried to save themselves. The Hungarians had been attacked by the Serbs; Sigismund's fall in a desperate melée was the signal for a general flight. Sigismund



The victory of the Ottomans at the Siege of Nikopolis in 1396 marked the end of the Crusades. Copy after a miniature conserved in the Topkapi Museum in Istanbul. (Froissart, Jean, *Chronique de Flandre*, Bibliothèque Nationale de France, FR 2646, fol. 220)

was able to escape on a boat, and eventually made his way back to Hungary via Constantinople and Ragusa (mod. Dubrovnik, Croatia).

The next day Bayezid took vengeance on his Christian prisoners for killing the Ottoman garrisons. Jacques de Heilly, who had fought for the Turks before, saved the lives of John of Nevers, Marshal Boucicaut, and some others. Eventually. the Turks tired of cutting off heads, and the survivors were enslaved. With the support of King Charles VI, Philip the Bold entered negotiations with Bayezid for the release of his son. He raised a huge ransom with the help of Italian financiers, the Hospitallers, and the king of Cyprus, and sent it to Bayezid, along with tapestries of the story of Alexander.

The Crusade of Nikopolis was a total failure, and the Ottomans were able to pursue their expansion in the Balkans. Military commanders failed to learn lessons from the battle for a long time. With the notable exception of John Hunyadi in the 15th century, they did not learn how to fight the Turks, while Boucicaut, who drew up the French plan of attack against the English at Agincourt in 1415, fell into the same trap there as at Nikopolis.

Jacques Paviot

See also: Balkans, the Ottoman Conquest of the; Bayezid I; Kosovo, Battle of (1389); Varna Crusade (1444).

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Ninth Crusade (1271–1272)

The final significant Christian crusade to Palestine, which occurred from 1271 to 1272. Prince Edward, the future King Edward I, led this Crusade from England in 1270. His forces consisted of nearly 1,000 English soldiers and two small units from Brittany and the Netherlands. Additional troops led by Edward's brother Edmund followed in his wake. Edward first landed at Tunis in North Africa, intending to join King Louis IX of France in a Crusade to Palestine. Upon arrival, he discovered that Louis was dead and his French troops were returning to France. After wintering in Sicily, Edward pressed on, landing at Acre in May 1271. Desperately short of manpower and facing the formidable Mamluk sultan Baybars I of Egypt and the Levant, Edward obtained military assistance from the Mongols. Despite initial successes, the Mongols withdrew rather than face the full Mamluk army. After a failed attack on the small Mamluk fortress of Qaqun, Edward reluctantly acquiesced to a nearly 11-year truce between Baybars and the remnant of the Frankish Crusader kingdom. Edward then survived a Muslim assassin's poisoned knife attack before embarking for England in September 1272.

Glenn E. Helm

See also: Baybars I; Mamluk Sultanate.

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Nissa, Treaty of (1739)

Peace treaty signed on October 3, 1739, at Nissa (Serbia) between Russia and the Ottoman Empire to conclude the Russo-Ottoman War of 1736–1739. During this conflict Russia was supported by Austria, which, however, suffered defeats and was forced to accept disadvantageous Treaty of Belgrade in September 1739. Although Russia continued the war for a couple more weeks, the Austrian pullout forced it to accept Ottoman conditions. Russia restored portions of Moldavia and Bessarabia, including the city of Khotin, to the Turks, and promised to dismantle the fortifications at Azov, which, however, Russians retained as a port. Russia also agreed not to maintain war ships in the Black Sea. The Ottomans agreed to grant Russia certain trading privileges.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Austro-Ottoman Wars; Belgrade, Treaty of (1739); Russo-Ottoman Wars.

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Nizip, Battle of (1839)

A decisive battle, fought on June 24, 1839, between forces of the Ottoman Empire and those of Mehmed Ali, viceroy of Egypt, at Nizip (now in southeastern Turkey). In early 1820s, facing the Greek Revolt, the Ottoman sultan Mahmud II asked Mehmed Ali for assistance in subduing the Greeks, promising to give additional provinces to the Egyptian ruler. An expedition commanded by Ibrahim Pasha (the son of Mehmed Ali) landed in Greece in 1824 and subdued the Morea (Peloponnese) but was eventually compelled to withdraw by combined forces of Britain, France, and Russia. After the war Mehmed Ali and the Ottoman sultan disagreed over compensation promised for the Egyptian help. During the Egyptian-Ottoman War of 1831–1832, Ibrahim Pasha led an Egyptian army through Palestine and Syria, defeating the Ottomans at Homs and Konya. The sultan was spared only by the intervention of Great Britain, Austria, Russia, and Prussia, who forced Mehmed Ali to accept the Kutahya Convention (May 4, 1833), which granted Syria and Adana to Egypt.

However, these territorial concessions were not satisfactory to either party, and a new war developed in 1839. The Ottoman army, led by Hafiz Pasha and advised by Prussian officers, among them Graf Helmuth Karl von Moltke, invaded Syria but was decisively defeated by Ibrahim Pasha at Nizip (Nezib). The battle was short but decisive. The initial Ottoman attack was checked and turned back, spreading confusion among the Ottoman ranks. The Egyptian artillery performed admirably, inflicting heavy casualties on the Ottomans. As the news of the defeat spread, the Ottoman admiral Derya Ahmad Fewzi Pasha, who was sent to support the Ottoman army in Syria, led his fleet to Alexander where he handed it over to the Mehmed Ali. The Egyptians, however, were unable to take advantage of these successes. The Great Powers again intervened on behalf of the Ottomans, forcing the Egyptians to evacuate Syria in 1840. Still, the Ottomans were compelled to compromise and Sultan Abdülmecid I, who replaced Mahmud II in July 1839, recognized Mehmed Ali as hereditary governor of Egypt in 1841.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Egyptian-Ottoman Wars; Ibrahim Pasha; Konya, Battle of (1832); Kutahya Convention (1833); Mahmud II; Mehmed Ali.

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Non-Aligned Movement

A loose association of nations opposed to Cold War entanglements that sought to create a third force between the communist bloc and the Western Bloc. The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) originally comprised 24 Afro-Asian countries plus Yugoslavia. It held its first summit in Belgrade, Yugoslavia, in September 1961. From the outset, NAM embraced issues theoretically unrelated to the Cold War, including anticolonialism, antiracism, economic development, and, under the Arab states' influence, anti-Zionism. To date there have been 13 summits at approximately three-year intervals. After Belgrade, NAM held 17 summits, including in Kuala Lumpur (Malaysia, 2003), Havana (Cuba, 2006), and Sharm El Sheikh (Egypt, 2009), while Belgrade (Serbia) and Jakarta (Indonesia) are scheduled to host it in fall 2011. As of 2011, the movement had 118 members and over a dozen observer countries. Mutual

interests in protecting state sovereignty and promoting development account for its expanding membership and durability.

Before NAM's foundation, Indonesian leader Sukarno's Asian-African Conference at Bandung in April 1955 demonstrated the value of small-state collaboration. Indian prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru's vaguely worded Panch Sheel (five principles of peace), which formed the basis for Sino-Indian relations and was popularized at Bandung, anticipated NAM principles by stressing mutual respect, preservation of state sovereignty, and peaceful coexistence. In the five years before the Belgrade conference, the founding countries—India, Yugoslavia, and Egypt—took exception to Great Power interference in weaker countries' affairs and to the superpowers' unwillingness to reduce nuclear tensions.

The simultaneous Suez Crisis and Hungarian Revolution of 1956 drew together Nehru, Yugoslavian marshal Josip Broz Tito, and Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser. Although their politics were dissimilar, they shared concerns about the Cold War, decolonization, and national independence. The emergence of 16 African states in 1960, the intensification of South African apartheid, the worsening U.S.-Soviet relations, the Congo Intervention, the U.S.-sponsored Bay of Pigs incursion, and the Second Berlin Crisis furnished the first summit's historical context.

The Belgrade meeting established enduring precedents for NAM. First, the organizational meeting, which took place in Cairo in June 1961, confined membership to countries that rejected participation in what were termed "Great Power conflicts" or signaled their intention of eventually departing from them. Countries that did not fully meet these criteria could nevertheless be invited as observers. Second, the Algerian provisional government's invitation as a full member, one year before that country's independence, underscored NAM's commitment to anticolonialism. Subsequent summits conferred diplomatic recognition upon the Angolan provisional government, the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), the Zimbabwe African National Union/Zimbabwe African People's Union, the African National Congress in South Africa, and the Southwest African People's Organization in Namibia. Third, the members reached agreement by consensus rather than by ballot, a procedure that led to criticism from the United States at later summits. Finally, Belgrade concluded with a communiqué outlining joint concerns. Although Nehru wished to make the first meeting a forum on global peace, the foremost issues were decolonization, noninterference in sovereign countries' internal affairs, and combating racism. Although the People's Republic of China (PRC) was not invited to Belgrade, NAM—as China's exclusive representative—called for its admission to the United Nations (UN).

Cairo illustrated the host country's influence over the NAM agenda. Forty-seven countries attended the 1964 summit. NAM invited all members of the new Organization of African Unity because its 1963 charter adopted nonalignment. Under Nasser, NAM called for a Palestinian homeland three years before the PLO's

foundation. Cairo was also significant for what was ignored: in October and November 1962, the PRC invaded India. At Cairo, the Chinese invasion was not mentioned because many members wished to cultivate good relations with the PRC. The selective treatment of security issues where members' national interests were at stake typified this and subsequent meetings. The departure of many NAM founders partially accounted for the six-year hiatus between Cairo and Lusaka. Nehru died just before the Cairo summit. In the intervening years, Sukarno, Kwame Nkrumah, and Burma's U Nu were deposed.

The conference at Lusaka established the movement's minimal institutional base. The host country's leader served as NAM spokesperson between triennial meetings, and its foreign ministry and permanent UN delegation dedicated offices to NAM affairs. At Lusaka, members agreed to hold annual foreign ministers' conferences and to work as a caucus in the UN. Occasionally, NAM has established emergency funds to support anticolonialist causes, such as the Africa Fund, which assisted the anti-apartheid frontline states of Mozambique, Angola, and Zimbabwe in the 1980s.

Unlike the Afro-Asian People's Solidarity Organization, NAM was not an adjunct of Soviet foreign policy. Certain members, such as Saudi Arabia, had close U.S. ties, while others, such as Yugoslavia, feared Soviet interference. The movement nevertheless supported certain Soviet initiatives, such as the call for two special UN disarmament sessions and the establishment of nuclear-free zones. Quick to condemn by name Western countries deemed responsible for violating developing-world countries' sovereignty, such as the continuing U.S. naval presence at Guantánamo Bay, Cuba, NAM did not apply this standard to Soviet interventions in Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan.

Although U.S. policy makers in the 1950s decried neutralism as aiding the Soviets, successive U.S. administrations, even President Dwight Eisenhower's, retained strong relations with many uncommitted countries. Presidents Lyndon Johnson and Ronald Reagan issued reminders to the Cairo and New Delhi summits that Soviet expansion constituted another form of imperialism. The Soviets anticipated that NAM would facilitate their goal of frustrating Western–developing world alliances and of becoming eventual adherents to the Soviet bloc. A split over North-South issues in the 1970s demonstrated that Soviet and NAM interests were not identical, however.

The NAM has repeatedly lobbied for economic aid to the developing world. A special NAM meeting in Cairo in 1962 called upon the UN to facilitate development, which led in early 1964 to the first UN Conference on Trade and Development in Geneva, at which the Group of 77, then the world's poorest countries and including many NAM members, was formed. At the Algiers conference and afterward, NAM called for a special UN General Assembly session on development. In 1974, the UN passed the New International Economic Order, an agenda that sought increased technical, financial, and agricultural aid for nations in the

developing world, to which the Soviets, partly for ideological reasons, showed little sympathy.

Joseph Robert White

See also: Baghdad Pact (1955); Bandung Conference (1955); Nasser, Gamal Abdel.

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North Africa, Muslim Conquest of

After completing the conquest of Egypt in 642, the Arabs started to raid the territory to its west inhabited by the Berbers, a land they called Bilad al-Maghreb (Lands of Sunset), or simply the Maghreb. In 705 this region became a province of the Muslim empire, then ruled from Damascus by the Umayyad caliphs.

The Byzantine (East Roman) empire ruled the Maghreb as an exarchate (viceroyalty, or subkingdom) in much of the seventh century. Because of a disagreement over religious policy with Byzantine emperor Constans II (r. 641–668), Gregory, exarch (viceroy or governor-general) of the Byzantine exarchate of Carthage, rebelled (647) and ruled as an independent sovereign. The dominions of Gregory extended from the borders of Egypt to Morocco.

Arab raids to the west of Egypt concentrated at first on the area of Cyrenaica in present-day Libya, which they conquered in 642. They raided Ifryqia (Tunisia) several times. Gregory attempted to halt the Muslim advance but met defeat and death at the Battle of Sufetula in 647. After Gregory's death, the Byzantines reasserted their rule, appointing a new exarch, Gennadius. Gennadius sought to avoid a Muslim takeover by offering tribute to the Muslim authorities at Damascus while simultaneously paying taxes to Constantinople. The burden was too great, and the population, particularly the Berbers, rebelled.

However, no attempt was made to establish Arab rule in the exarchate before 670. Conflicts among the Muslim leaders, especially after the assassination of the

third caliph Uthman (Osman) in 656, hindered Muslim territorial expansion. Only after the Umayyads had consolidated their authority in the 660s and had come to view the conquest of the Maghreb in the context of their confrontation with the Byzantine empire was the systematic conquest of the Maghreb undertaken. Uqbah ibn Nafi commanded the Arab army that occupied Ifryqia (the Arab term for the exarchate) in 670. Before his recall in 674, Uqbah founded the town of al-Qayrawan (Kairouan), which became the base for further military operations and the first center of Arab administration in the Maghreb.

When Uqbah's successor, Abu al-Muhajir Dinar al-Ansari, began the conquest of the Maghreb west of Ifryqia, he had to fight seminomadic Berber communities that had developed some tradition of centralized political authority. In the course of his campaign, Abu al-Muhajir Dinar prevailed upon the Berber king Kusaylah to become Muslim. From his base in Tlemecen, Kusaylah dominated a confederation of the Awraba tribes living between the western Aures Mountains and the area of present-day Fez. Since Kusaylah's profession of Islam implied his recognition of caliphal authority, it served as a basis for coexistence between him and the Arabs. However, when Uqbah was reinstated as commander of the Arab army in the Maghreb in 681, he insisted on imposing direct Arab rule over the whole region. In 682 he led his troops across Algeria and northern Morocco, reaching the Atlantic Ocean and penetrating south to the area of Sous in southern Morocco. On his way back to al-Qayrawan, when he was near Biskara in present-day Algeria, Uqbah was attacked, on orders from Qusaylah, by Berbers supported by Byzantine contingents. Through his death in this battle and his extended campaign, Uqbah became the legendary hero of the Muslim conquest of the Maghreb.

By the 680s the Arabs had gone too far in the conquest of the Maghreb to be willing to accept defeat at the hands of a Berber leader, albeit one professing Islam. Two large armies had to be sent from Egypt, however, before organized Berber resistance could be suppressed. The first, commanded by Zuhayr ibn Qays al-Balawi, reoccupied al-Qayrawan and then pursued Qusaylah west to Mams, where Qusaylah was defeated and killed. The dates of these operations are uncertain, but they must have occurred before 688 when Zuhayr ibn Qays was killed in an attack on Byzantine positions in Cyrenaica.

The second Arab army, commanded by Hassan ibn al-Numan, was dispatched from Egypt in 693. In the eastern Aures Mountains, it faced stiff resistance from the Jawara Berbers, who were commanded by a woman whom the Arabs referred to as Kahinah (al-Kahinah, or the Priestess). After Kahinah was defeated in 698, Ibn al-Numan occupied Carthage, the center of Byzantine administration in Tunisia, and began constructing the town of Tunis nearby.

These successes and Arab naval supremacy in the Mediterranean forced the Byzantines to evacuate their remaining positions on the Maghrebi coast. Consequently, under Ibn an-Numan's successor, Musa ibn Nusayr, the Maghreb was made into

a province of the Umayyad caliphate in 705, known as Ifriqiya, thus separating it from Egypt to which it had been administratively attached until that time.

Moshe Terdiman

See also: Hassan ibn al-Numan; Musa ibn Nusayr; Umayyad Caliphate.

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North Africa, Role in World War II

In 1939 all the countries of the Maghreb—the Mediterranean coastal region of North Africa stretching from the Atlantic shoreline of Morocco to Libya's border with Egypt—were under administration by one or more of the European colonial powers of France, Spain, and Italy. This was a relatively recent development: although Spain had possessed tiny island enclaves along the Barbary coast since the late Reconquista period, the first serious encroachment did not begin until 1830, when the French began their conquest in Algeria. Morocco and Libya had not been incorporated into the European orbit until the eve of World War I. Although the Maghreb had a long history of previous colonial suzerainty from Ottoman Turkey, the problems of administering such a vast and forbidding region—1.8 million square miles spread over 38 degrees of longitude—meant that Constantinople's hold had been traditionally weak, and the indigenous peoples were very conscious of their autonomous heritage. World War II was to provoke an even greater desire among the inhabitants for national independence, establishing the conditions for the tumultuous decolonization saga of the 1950s.

Each North African state was organized under unique constitutional arrangements, and the states' wartime experiences were a product of peculiar local circumstances and events; but several general conditions applied to some degree throughout the whole of the Maghreb. Geographically, the region was composed of a fertile coastal strip running along the Mediterranean shoreline that contained most of the farms and larger settlements and a barren desert hinterland broken by the Atlas mountain chain. The population was predominantly Arabic and Berber, the Berbers tending to live in semiautonomous nomadic tribes away from the coast.

About 10 to 15 percent of the inhabitants were colonists, a heterogeneous mixture of southern European stock—Spanish, French, Italian, and Maltese. This elite community owned most of the best land, controlled the local political and legal administrations, and was vociferously opposed to any attempt by their metropolitan governments to make concessions to the local population.

Resistance to the imperial regime usually came in three forms, either singly or in combination. If the Europeans had maintained a traditional client ruler, that ruler might—however complacent his manner—become the focus of patriotic opposition. Religious revivalists and unconquered tribal chieftains sometimes provided a premodern call to arms. Most significantly of all, the small class of local European-educated residents that had been nurtured to serve in each colony's petty bureaucracy became politicized during the 1920s and 1930s, spawning nationalist parties that demanded civic rights and representative assemblies. These parties were typically banned and their leaders incarcerated in periodic bouts of colonialist repression.

The outbreak of European war did not immediately disturb the Maghreb. The territories of French Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia sent regiments of indigenous and settler troops to man the Franco-German border, but their neighbors in Spanish Morocco and Italian Libya remained neutral. Italy's entry into the war on June 10, 1940, and the swift French collapse a few weeks later transformed the situation. For the next two years, Libya was a fiercely contested battleground in the war between the British Western Desert forces and the Italians, later reinforced to spectacular effect by German general Erwin Rommel's Afrika Korps. The French North African colonies spurned General Charles de Gaulle's entreaties to continue the war against the Axis powers, and Vichy administrators remained loyal to the Henri Pétain government—a decision made all the easier by the Royal Navy's preemptive strike on units of the French fleet at Mers-el-Kébir in northwest Algeria on July 3, 1940.

In November 1942, the combined Anglo-American forces of Operation Torch landed on the Atlantic coast of Morocco, with subsidiary operations around Oran and Algiers. These met scattered and indifferent resistance, and after a few days the local Vichy authorities—who had already seen their home government overrun by the Germans as a retaliatory measure—capitulated to the Allies. The subsequent inheritance of French North Africa was a matter of intrigue, with claimants including the former Vichy commander in chief Admiral Jean Darlan (assassinated a month after the landings) and the feuding Free French commanders Charles de Gaulle and General Henri Giraud.

Despite American opposition, de Gaulle proved more politically adept than his rivals, and it was ultimately the Gaullist-dominated Comité Français de la Libération Nationale that secured power. During this period, the Axis forces had been defeated in Egypt, and with Libya secured for the Allies, the final military encounter

took place in Tunisia. In May 1943, the Germans and Italians were finally expelled from the African continent. France's triumphant reconquest of the Maghreb was at best a partial victory, however: its humiliation in 1940 had not gone unnoticed by the indigenous population, and the heady Allied rhetoric of liberation was seized on by local nationalists who saw little victory in a mere transition between imperial occupiers.

Each of the North African colonies was affected differently by the war. Algeria was the keystone of French North Africa, and uniquely among the Maghreb territories, it was administered as a metropolitan département with a governor-general answering to the Ministry of the Interior in Paris. Its 6.6 million Arab and 1 million European settler (colon) population lived mostly along the Mediterranean shore; the massive Saharan hinterland was given over to army patrols and scarcely governed Berber nomads. Moderate assimilationist reformers like the Young Algerians had given way by the 1920s to more radical nationalist campaigners, such as Ahmed Messali Hadj, who were subsequently persecuted by the colon-led authorities. An attempt by the Popular Front government in 1936 and 1937 to grant full French citizenship to certain Algerians without stripping them of their Islamic property and marriage rights—a traditional bar to naturalization—met with such tenacious resistance from the settlers that it was abandoned. After the armistice in 1940, the colons accepted the new Vichy regime with little outward dissent, the appointment of the highly esteemed General Maxime Weygand as the new delegate general for North Africa helping to smooth the transition. Their focus of attention remained on crushing nationalist activism. In March 1941, Hadj's Parti Populaire Algérien was broken up and its leaders sentenced to long prison terms.

Following the Torch landings and Algeria's reversion to the Allied cause, there were new nationalist initiatives, predominant among them the "Manifesto of the Algerian People" presented to the authorities in February 1943 by its author Ferhat Abbas (later first president of the Algerian Republic). Governor General Marcel Peyrouton provisionally accepted Abbas's manifesto, which called for wholesale reforms of the colony's legal and political structure and the end to the hegemony of the colon elite. As French sympathies proved ever more lukewarm, however, Abbas's lobbying group, Amis du Manifeste et de la Liberté, was suppressed on charges of sedition. The Free French government did make some effort to address the changing realities of imperial politics: in 1943, de Gaulle spoke of a new compact with the indigenous peoples as a reward for their loyalty during the war, and the following year the Brazaville Conference on colonial reconstruction expounded a new model of autonomous self-government, if not outright independence. But Algeria's wartime story ended disastrously on V-E Day when a celebratory crowd in Sétif turned into a pro-nationalist demonstration and was fired on by troops; a cycle of reprisals and even greater counterreprisals ensued in which tens of thousands of

View of the pyramids of Egypt from an Air Transport Command C-47 in 1943. Loaded with urgent war supplies and materials, this plane was one of a fleet flying shipments from the United States across the Atlantic and the continent of Africa to strategic battle zones during World War II. (National Archives)

people, mostly Algerians, were killed. This souring of the hopes for a postwar rapprochement prefigured the brutal civil war of a decade later.

Unlike its larger neighbor, Tunisia was a protectorate (established in 1881) with a ruling indigenous monarch, the bey of Tunis, who theoretically maintained absolute rule with only the "guidance" of the French resident general. Relations between the 200,000 settlers and 2.6 million indigenous people were somewhat less abrasive than in Algeria, but the colony had nonetheless gone through several political disturbances during the 1920s and 1930s. The most important nationalist force was the Destour, or Constitution, Party, which lobbied without success for a greater Arab role in Tunisian affairs. In 1934, lawyer Habib Bourguiba created a radical breakaway party, the Neo-Destour; four years later, this splinter group was broken up in a repressive purge, and Bourguiba was transported to a French metropolitan prison.

Politics under the Vichy regime were complicated by the evident Italian desire to include Tunisia in its regional sphere of influence. In June 1942, a new bey, Sidi Mohammed el Moncef, took the throne: his obvious sympathy for the nationalists alienated the French authorities from him, but when Vichy fell in November 1942 he was feted by the Italians in the hope that they could win him over to their cause. Bourguiba and the other Neo-Destour leaders were also transferred to Italian custody as potential puppet rulers, but neither the monarch nor the attorney were persuaded by this line of reasoning. When Axis forces evacuated Tunisia in the spring of 1943, the bey was promptly deposed and Bourguiba, who had returned to Tunis that March, fled into exile.

On the western edge of the Maghreb, Morocco was also under a protectorate established after the 1912 Agadir crisis by the Treaty of Fez. Nominally a united country under a single sultan, Morocco was in reality partitioned between French and Spanish zones, with the town of Tangier (the traditional diplomatic center) having international status. The French, who controlled 90 percent of the country, spent the interwar years developing the cities of the Atlantic coastline, building a new administrative capital at Rabat, and expanding the port of Casablanca. By 1939, the population stood at 6.25 million, including about 190,000 European settlers. As with the other Maghreb colonies, Morocco had its persecuted nationalist parties such as the Comité d'Action Marocaine: there were also more traditional forms of interwar dissent, such as the Third Rif War (1920–1927) and the Berber tribes' resistance to the "pacification" of the interior.

But it was Sultan Mohammed Ben Youssef who was at the heart of anti-French loyalties, especially after the Vichy takeover. He objected to the repeal of the 1872 Crémieux decree that had given North African Jews rights of citizenship and refused to accede to resident general Auguste Noguès's demand that he retire from the capital after the Torch landings. Youssef's greatest coup was his private meeting with U.S. president Franklin D. Roosevelt during the 1943 Casablanca Conference, in which the American leader expressed his sympathy for eventual Moroccan independence. The following year, an Independence Party formally petitioned the occupying Allied administration for the right to self-government: the French responded with some unconvincing accusations of collaboration between nationalists and the Axis forces, and in accompanying riots in Fès, several demonstrators were killed.

Libya, the second largest but most sparsely populated of the Maghreb states, was occupied by Italy in 1911 during its war with Ottoman Turkey. The coastal provinces of Tripolitania and Cyrenaica fell relatively quickly, but pacification of the Berber hinterland continued for the next two decades and was accelerated with great brutality in the 1930s by generals such as Rodolfo Graziani and Pietro Badoglio. By the outbreak of war, Italian settlers made up about 10 percent of Libya's 900,000 people. The country's poverty and scattered population centers precluded

the development of a strong nationalist movement before 1939, but the unpopularity of the Italian regime was made evident by the enthusiasm with which Libyans greeted their British conquerors during the war. After Italy's final ejection from its North African territory, few traces of colonial culture survived long.

Alan Allport

See also: Iran during World War II; Iraq during World War II.

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Northern Alliance

Coalition of ethnic and religiously disparate rebel groups in Afghanistan united after 1996 only by their desire to oust the Taliban, composed of mainly ethnic Pashtu tribesmen. In October 2001, the various Northern Alliance groups served as the ground forces for Operation Enduring Freedom to oust the Taliban, which had given sanctuary to Osama bin Laden and the Al Qaeda terrorist group, from power in Afghanistan.

After Soviet forces departed Afghanistan in 1989, the United States and its allies lost interest in Afghanistan. The country experienced continued fighting among the various anti-Soviet mujahideen factions. The Northern Alliance, composed of ethnic Takijks, led by Burhanuddin Rabbani and Ahmad Shah Masood, and ethnic Uzbeks, led by Abdul Rashid Dostum, briefly held power in 1991 but could not unite the country.

In 1996, the Taliban took advantage of these internal conflicts to seize Kabul, the capital, and establish the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan. The non-Pashtu forces allied again but could not prevent the Taliban from gaining control of 95 percent of Afghanistan by the end of 2000. As a result, the alliance controlled only the Panjshir valley and a small enclave in northeast Afghanistan. Because the alliance lacked manpower, training, and equipment, its forces only conducted guerrilla raids against the Taliban. Until late 2001, most of the alliance's support came from Iran, Russia, and Tajikistan.

After the Al Qaeda terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, the president of the United States, George W. Bush, decided to destroy the Al Qaeda training camps in Afghanistan and capture Osama bin Laden and other Al Qaeda, protected by the Taliban. Because of political, military, and geographical conditions, the United States decided to use the fighters of the Northern Alliance as the main ground force. Small teams of paramilitary officers from the Central Intelligence Agency's Special Activities Division, U.S. Army Special Forces, and U.S. Air Force Special Operations controllers operated with the Northern Alliance forces. By spring 2002, the Northern Alliance had captured Kabul and most of Afghanistan's large cities and had overthrown the Taliban. Many local warlords now switched allegiance from the Taliban to the Northern Alliance.

In December 2001, leaders of the former Afghan mujahideen signed an agreement in Bonn, Germany, for a new democratic government in Afghanistan. In 2002, a nationwide Council of Elders selected Hamid Karzai, an ethnic Pashtu from the southern city of Kandahar, as chairman of the Afghan Interim Authority. Since then, Karzai has worked to establish a viable national government for Afghanistan, despite continued poverty, poor infrastructure, large numbers of land mines and other unexploded ordnance, a huge illegal poppy cultivation and opium trade, occasional violent political jockeying, and a continuing Taliban insurgency.

Robert B. Kane

See also: Afghanistan, U.S. War in (2001–); Taliban.

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Nubia, Relations with Egypt

Relations between the medieval Christian Nubian kingdoms and Muslim Egypt were unique. Unlike the situation between Dar al Islam (the Muslim world) and its non-Muslim neighbors in other parts of the medieval world, where jihad and crusade were often the rule, interaction between these Muslim and Christian neighbors was comparatively peaceful for about six centuries.

The Nubian kingdoms emerged in the late fourth to early sixth centuries CE. They were located just south of Egypt in the valley of the Middle Nile, in the

modern republic of Sudan. Muslim Arab armies, fresh from their great victory over Emperor Heraclius's Byzantine army at the Battle of Yarmouk, invaded Egypt in 639. By 641 they had driven the Byzantines from Egypt, ending six centuries of Roman occupation. From that time to the present, Muslims would dominate Egypt. The northern Nubian kingdom, Makuria, had been a Byzantine ally, but because of the swiftness of the Muslim campaign the Nubians failed to come to the aid of their ally. Nevertheless, the Arab emir (governor) of Egypt Amr ibn al-As sent an army, reputed to have numbered 20,000, to invade Makuria. The Muslim army rampaged through the land pillaging and killing, but a Nubian defense force, which the Muslims claimed was 100,000 strong, drove the invaders back into Egypt.

Amr ibn al-As sent a second army into Makuria in 652. According to Muslim sources, this was in retaliation for a Nubian raid on Aswan, which the Egyptians had taken from Makuria in the previous combat. The Egyptian army, with 5,000 horsemen, drove the Nubian defenders more than 300 miles south and laid siege to Dongola, the capital of Makuria. Although the Muslims used catapults, which they had brought up the Nile River on ships, the Makurian archers created such havoc among the besieging Muslims that they withdrew.

The strength of the Makurian army was its bowmen. These well-trained troops had the ability to shoot armor-penetrating iron and copper alloy–tipped arrows very rapidly from very powerful compound bows. The Muslim attackers were astounded at the accuracy with which the Nubian archers could shoot their arrows. They complained that they could never get close enough to the Makurian soldiers to be able to use their swords.

As a result of this defeat, the Muslim commander agreed to a treaty, or *baqt*, with the Makurian king Qalidurut. This was an agreement that was to govern the relations between Egypt and Makuria for the next six centuries. It was a rare agreement for the Muslim caliphate at this time because it was an agreement among equals. It was more usual for early Muslim treaties for the non-Muslim party to be put in an inferior position. There was nothing in the terms of the *baqt* to imply a status of inferiority on the part of Makuria, however.

The *baqt* was a nonaggression treaty that acknowledged Makuria's independence and fixed the border just south of Aswan. It regulated commerce between the two powers, allowing traders from each country to operate in the territory of the other, but prohibited settlement. In addition, the *baqt* instituted a regular exchange of gifts between the two parties: Nubian slaves for the Muslims, and Egyptian grain, wine, horses, and cloth for the Makurians.

Until the 13th century, the *baqt* guaranteed peace of a sort between Egypt and Makuria. There were times when the Egyptians attacked Makuria, claiming that the Nubians were not fulfilling their agreement. At other times the Makurians raided into Egypt, pillaging Egyptian oases. In 748 the Makurian king Cyriacus went so far as to send an army deep into Egypt, even camping on the outskirts of Fustat, then

the Muslim capital of Egypt. The provocation for Cyriacus's action was religious: the Muslim governor of Egypt had imprisoned the Coptic patriarch, who was revered by Nubian Christians. The Muslim governor then released the patriarch, and the Makurians went back to their homeland.

In the ninth century Muslim raiders, not controlled by the Egyptian government, began raiding the Beja, camel nomads who dwelt between the Nile and the Red Sea. One of these raiders, el-Omari, after capturing some of the Beja as slaves and converting the rest to Islam and developing a gold mine, attacked and occupied Makurian settlements. Eventually el-Omari was driven out of Makurian territory, but not until after he triggered a civil war between the Makurian king's sons.

This Muslim incursion was the most serious until 1173, when the Makurian king took advantage of what he thought was a time of weakness and attacked the Muslim fortress of Aswan. The Muslim ruler, Salah ed-Din (Saladin), sent a punitive force south but had to withdraw it to face attacks by European Crusaders in the north.

The *baqt* ceased to have much importance after the Muslim invasion of Makuria in 1265. The Muslims occupied Dongola, the Makurian capital, and forced Makuria to pay tribute. From then on Makuria existed as a tributary vassal of Muslim Egypt. Muslims began to buy land and settle on Makuria, and the Egyptian authorities frequently interfered with succession to the Makurian throne. By 1315 the kings of Makuria were Muslim, and the Islamification and Arabization of Nubia proceeded without hindrance. Within a few centuries the population had converted to Islam and adopted the Arabic language.

The life span of the Christian Nubian kingdoms was roughly contemporaneous with that of the Muslim Spanish states. Both the Muslim Spanish states and the Christian Nubian kingdoms existed for roughly 800 years. Both experienced periods of intensive warfare with neighbors of a different religion. The Muslims in Spain were finally defeated at the end of the 15th century, while Alwa, the southernmost Christian Nubian kingdom (about which little is known), might have persisted until the early 16th century. But for about six centuries there was relative peace between the Christian kingdoms and Muslim Egypt.

Wilfred Bisson

See also: Amr ibn al-As; Egypt, Arab Conquest of; Saladin.

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Nur Al-Din (1118–1174)

Turkish ruler of Aleppo and Damascus, best known for uniting most of the Muslim Near East against the Crusaders. Nur al-Din was the second son of Zangi (d. 1146), the ruler of Mosul and Aleppo, who captured the city of Edessa (mod. şanliurfa, Turkey) from the Franks in 1144. After the death of Zangi, Mosul and the territories of upper Mesopotamia were inherited by his eldest son, Sayf al-Din Ghazi (d. 1149), while Nur al-Din received the western half of Zangi's territories, including Edessa and Aleppo. Inheriting only part of his father's lands reduced the resources Nur al-Din could draw on for his campaigns, and relations between him and Sayf al-Din became temporarily strained until Nur al-Din paid formal homage to his brother, who confirmed the eastern extent of his territories and charged him with the jihad (holy war) against the Franks. Thereafter, the generally cordial relations Nur al-Din maintained with his brother enabled him to devote his attention entirely to his Syrian interests without having to worry about his eastern borders.

When the Armenian populace of Edessa heard of Zangi's death, they neutralized the city's Muslim garrison and appealed to their former Frankish ruler, Count Joscelin II. Nur al-Din arrived at the city first, defeated the Franks, and crushed the Armenians.

In May 1147 Nur al-Din and Mu'in al-Din of Damascus repelled the Franks from the Hauran. Then, in July 1148, Damascus was attacked by the combined armies of the Second Crusade (1147–1149) and the kingdom of Jerusalem. Responding to appeals from Mu'in al-Din, Nur al-Din advanced on the city. In the face of this threat the Franks withdrew. In June 1149 Nur al-Din attacked the region of Apamea in northern Syria and defeated the Franks near Inab. He then besieged Antioch (mod. Antakya, Turkey), where a treaty was made after he had taken Apamea (mod. Afamiyah, Syria) and Harenc (mod. arim, Syria). In August Mu'in al-Din died. Nur al-Din attempted to intervene in Damascus, appealing to the city's inhabitants for support against the Franks, but instead they sought Frankish aid against him. Nur al-Din encamped near Damascus, but on hearing that Joscelin II of Edessa had been captured he returned to Aleppo. In the summer of 1150, in cooperation with the Saljuk sultan of Rum, Mas'ud (d. 1155), Nur al-Din attacked territories around Antioch, and by autumn he held the region downstream of Bira (mod. Birecik, Turkey), thus shifting the western border of Muslim lands from the Euphrates to the Orontes.

In 1151 Nur al-Din advanced on Damascus again but could not prevent its inhabitants from making terms with the Franks. However, he did secure their nominal recognition of his sovereignty. In 1152 he took Tortosa (mod. Tartus, Syria)

temporarily, severing communications between the county of Tripoli and the principality of Antioch. To win Damascus to his side, Nur al-Din cut off its supplies, while his agents engaged in propaganda. The city's ruler, Mujir al-Din Uvak, appealed to the Franks, but Nur al-Din acted first, entering Damascus in April 1154. There was some rioting, but he restored order and distributed provisions, and the city's leadership capitulated. Muslim Syria was now united under Nur al-Din.

The following year Nur al-Din subdued Baalbek, made treaties with the Franks of Jerusalem and Antioch, and intervened in the inheritance struggle that broke out after the death of Mas'ud of Rum. As a result he gained territories on the right bank of the Euphrates, including Bira. In the spring of 1156 he supported an attack made by troops from Damascus on Harenc. Eventually a treaty was concluded: Harenc remained in Frankish hands, but its revenues were split between them and Nur al-Din. Then, in February 1157, King Baldwin III of Jerusalem raided the Golan (Jawlan). In April Nur al-Din retaliated, sending troops to attack the town of Banyas. Its walls were breached, but hearing that Baldwin was marching to the rescue, Nur al-Din ordered a withdrawal. Baldwin followed the Muslims to Galilee, where they ambushed him: the Frankish troops were captured, but Baldwin escaped. In July earthquakes struck the region, forcing Nur al-Din to return to Damascus to repair its damaged defenses. Then, in October, he fell seriously ill. He was transferred to Aleppo, where he recovered, returning to Damascus in April 1158. There he mustered an army to take revenge for recent Frankish raids. An inconclusive engagement was fought near the Jordan in July; then, in December or January, Nur al-Din fell ill a second time. Again he recovered, and learning of a proposed Frankish-Byzantine coalition, he fortified Aleppo and set out to meet the allies. Long negotiations followed, and in May 1159 Nur al-Din concluded an alliance with Emperor Manuel I Komnenos, which included an agreement to cooperate against the Saljuk sultan of Rum, Qilij-Arslan II (d. 1192). While the Byzantines attacked Eskiflehir, Nur al-Din occupied a number of Saljuk territories and cities. In 1160 Qilij-Arslan negotiated a truce.

While Nur al-Din was in the north, Baldwin III of Jerusalem invaded Damascene territory. Najm al-Din Ayyub, Nur al-Din's lieutenant there (and the father of Saladin), negotiated a three-month truce. When it expired, the Franks invaded again. In the autumn of 1161 Nur al-Din returned and made a truce with Baldwin, before performing the hajj (pilgrimage to Mecca). Upon his return in 1162 he again fought the Franks near Harenc, but bad weather cut the battle short. In the spring of 1163 Nur al-Din suffered a second setback when he was surprised by the Franks at the foot of Krak des Chevaliers and his army routed.

In early 1164 Nur al-Din received an appeal for aid from Shawar, the deposed vizier of Fatimid Egypt. In exchange for promises of a third of the revenues of Egypt and other inducements, Nur al-Din sent troops under Asad al-Din Shirkuh, the brother of Ayyub, to restore Shawar to power. The new Egyptian vizier, Dirgham,

appealed to the Franks, but, harassed by Nur al-Din further north, they were unable to prevent Shirkuh and his army from entering the Nile delta. Shawar was restored but refused to fulfill his promises, although he eventually paid the costs of the expedition. Meanwhile, in August, Nur al-Din had defeated the Franks near Harenc and taken the city. Banyas followed in October.

In January 1167 Shirkuh set out for Egypt again. Meanwhile Nur al-Din occupied Hunin, near Banyas. Shirkuh returned in September, having fought and then come to terms with both Franks and Egyptians, and obtained a large payment from Cairo. Nur al-Din then took a number of fortresses on the coastal plain. He planned to take Beirut but was unable to because of dissensions in his army.

In 1168 the Franks attacked Egypt. The Fatimid caliph, al-'Aid (d. 1171), appealed to Nur al-Din for aid, and in December Shirkuh set out with an army. The Franks withdrew, and Shirkuh entered Cairo in January 1169. Shawar was executed, with Shirkuh becoming the new vizier. He died shortly after and was succeeded by his nephew Saladin.

In April 1170 Nur al-Din, apparently concerned about Saladin's ambitions, sent Ayyub to remind his son of his loyalties. In June another earthquake shook Syria. Nur al-Din spent time overseeing repairs, and then, in September, following the death of his brother Qub al-Din, who had succeeded Sayf al-Din at Mosul, he intervened in the succession, confirming the authority of Qub al-Din's son Sayf al-Din Ghazi II (d. 1180).

In September 1171 Saladin suppressed the Fatimid caliphate of Egypt. Then he attacked Kerak in Frankish Transjordan, while Nur al-Din attacked the county of Tripoli. However, when Kerak offered to surrender, Saladin withdrew, citing unrest in Cairo as an excuse, although it seems more likely that he was reluctant to remove obstacles between his territory and that of Nur al-Din. The angry Nur al-Din announced his intention of deposing his subordinate, but he relented when Saladin reaffirmed his loyalty.

In the autumn of 1172 Nur al-Din again repelled Frankish raids in the Hauran and intervened in northern Syria, where Qilij Arslan, obeying a warning from Manuel Komnenos, had refused Nur al-Din aid. Nur al-Din took several Saljuk territories on the right bank of the Euphrates, including Marash (mod. Karamanmarafl, Turkey) in July 1173. Soon afterward Qilij Arslan sued for peace, and Nur al-Din instructed him to participate in the jihad. Meanwhile, Nur al-Din had instructed Saladin to attack Kerak again. Saladin obeyed in May 1173, but upon hearing at the end of July that Nur al-Din had come south and was two days' march away, he retired, claiming that his father was ill and that he was thus needed to keep order in Cairo. This time Nur al-Din accepted his excuse, but he began to prepare an expedition to bring Saladin to heel. He set out for Egypt in early May 1174 but fell ill again. He died on May 15, 1174.

Like those of his father, Zangi, Nur al-Din's military forces consisted of a personally maintained core regiment (Arab. 'askar), consisting of cavalry made up of Turkish Mamluks (slave soldiers) and free Kurdish troops, supplemented by Turkomans and Arab tribal auxiliaries. All of these troops were usually skilled with both bows and close-combat weapons. Nur al-Din's armies were then usually augmented by the 'askars of his subordinates and locally recruited cavalry armed for close combat. In siege operations infantry would also be employed.

It is not clear how far Nur al-Din's jihad against the Franks was motivated by genuine piety and zeal, and how far it was a political tool for him. After his first two bouts of illness and his defeat at Krak des Chevaliers in 1163, he is said to have adopted a pious, ascetic lifestyle. However, he still spent much of his time campaigning against other Muslims as well as against the Franks. Whatever the truth of this, he was viewed by many of his contemporaries as a great mujahid (holy warrior), and his tomb in Damascus remains a site of popular veneration.

Niall Christie

See also: Fatimids; Rum, Sultanate of; Saladin; Second Crusade (1147–1149); Zangi.

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Ogaden War (1977–1978)

Territorial conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia fought during 1977–1978. The Ogaden War was a localized dispute between Ethiopia and Somalia, but the dynamics of Cold War geopolitics endowed this conflict with global implications. With communist bloc nations providing support to the Ethiopians and with the Somalis seeking accommodation with the Americans, the possibility existed that the Cold War would be fought out in the Horn of Africa through proxies. The United States, however, remained neutral, and in March 1978 Ethiopia triumphed in the war, a victory directly resulting from Soviet and Cuban aid. For many in the West, this provided yet another example of communist expansion, and American neutrality was seen as weakness that would only spur further Soviet aggression.

The Ogaden region, although inhabited mainly by ethnic Somalis, was territorially part of Ethiopia and had long been a source of contention between the two nations. In August 1977, border skirmishes erupted into full-scale war, with some 30,000 troops fighting on each side. Initially, the Somali incursion into Ethiopia met with success, and by October the Somali insurgents controlled all of the Ogaden except for the strategic towns of Harar and Diredawa. As the year progressed, however, the situation began to improve for the Ethiopians, mostly because of increasing aid from the communist bloc.

During the first few months of the war, the Soviet Union had also provided military aid to Somalia. However, Ethiopia was considered the greater prize in the African Horn region, and Somali leader Mohammed Siyad Barre feared Soviet abandonment. In October 1977, his fears were realized when the Soviet Union halted all military support to Somalia while greatly increasing supplies and troops to Ethiopia. In the Cold War context, Barre took the logical step. He officially broke ties with the Soviets and Cubans in November and expelled all their military personnel. He then approached the United States for help.

Although the American president, Jimmy Carter, was anxious to improve relations with Somalia, his reorientation of American foreign policy in January 1977 had led to a de-emphasis of traditional Cold War concerns in favor of such issues as regionalism and human rights. Instead of responding to the perceived Soviet threat, Carter insisted that the United States remain neutral and applied a policy that was based on these new principles rather than on traditional Cold War considerations.

Carter cited Barre's violations of human rights and pointed out that by invading Ethiopia he had violated both international law and the Cairo Resolution of 1964, which stated that the borders of African nations would be honored and maintained. Carter therefore refused to provide Barre with military aid, called for a peaceful resolution of the conflict, and, following his policy that "African problems should have African solutions," suggested that the Organization of African Unity (OAU) should host peace talks.

Although the OAU attempted to negotiate a peace agreement, it met with little success. Indeed, all the warring parties seemed dedicated to a military solution to the Ogaden conflict, but the extent of communist bloc support for Ethiopia combined with the lack of support for Somalia meant that Barre's territorial ambitions were doomed to failure. On March 9, 1978, he announced that all Somali forces were being withdrawn from Ethiopia.

Even though the war ended with Ethiopia maintaining its territory, the implications of the conflict for the Cold War were far reaching. Zbigniew Brzezinski, the U.S. national security advisor, would later claim that American reluctance to actively oppose communist-bloc involvement in the war demonstrated American weakness and encouraged Soviet aggression. Such a perception, he believed, led to the collapse of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) II Treaty, the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and ultimately the failure of détente.

Donna R. Jackson

See also: Cold War in the Middle East.

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Omdurman, Battle of (1898)

Decisive battle between the Anglo-Egyptian forces and the Sudanese army of Muhammad Ahmad during the Mahdist War of 1881–1899. Seeking to end a prolonged war with Muhammad Ahmad and halt the French expansion into eastern Africa, the British government authorized a major invasion of Sudan. On September 1, 1898, Egyptian Army commander-in-chief Major General Sir Horatio Kitchener and his 20,000 troops arrived at Omdurman on the west bank of the Nile across the river

from Khartoum to face the main Mahdist army. After some preliminary skirmishing on September 1, the next morning at dawn 35,000–50,000 Sudanese tribesmen under Abdullah attacked the British lines. The Mahdists had perhaps 15,000 rifles; the remainder of their men were armed only with spears and swords. There was no real sense of how the troops should be deployed; riflemen were merely mixed in with the spearmen and swordsmen to provide cover and fight hand-to-hand, in true warrior fashion.

In a series of charges against the British position, the Mahdists were simply annihilated. Disaster was narrowly averted that afternoon when Kitchener, who believed the battle was over and was anxious to avoid a street battle for Omdurman, tried to place his forces between the Mahdists and the capital. As the British troops shifted position, Kitchener's infantry encountered a fresh Mahdist force that had not participated in the earlier fighting. This attack was not coordinated either though and came in separate waves. Brigadier General Hector MacDonald's Sudanese brigade managed to hold off the Mahdists, and the 21st Lancers charged and defeated another Mahdist force that suddenly appeared on the British right flank. After the battle, the men of the Sudanese brigade had remaining, on average, two rounds apiece.

During the Battle of Omdurman, the British employed their magazine rifles and Maxim guns to kill perhaps 10,000 Dervishes and wound as many more; 5,000 were taken prisoner. The cost to the British side was 48 dead and 434 wounded. The Battle of Omdurman, for all practical purposes, gave Britain control of the Sudan and made Kitchener a British national hero. After a brief ceremony at the palace in Khartoum where General Charles Gordon had been slain 11 years before, Kitchener received orders from London to proceed up the Nile and dislodge a French force at Fashoda.

Spencer C. Tucker

See also: Anglo-Sudan War (1883–1899); Mahdiyya Movement in Sudan.

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Osama Bin Laden (1957–2011)

An Islamic militant and exponent of terror as a means of political communication, Osama bin Laden was born into a wealthy Saudi family that had made its fortune in

the construction business. At the time of the Soviet war with Afghanistan, he underwent a religious awakening to militant Islamic fundamentalism, specifically Saudi Arabia's Wahhabi sect. After a period devoted to raising funds for the struggle against the Soviet Union, he traveled to Afghanistan and used his family's wealth and equipment in support of the resistance. In particular, he became associated with two 1987 battles against the Russians at Jaji and Ali Khel. After the war he became a regular speaker in mosques throughout Saudi Arabia. Recordings of his powerful speeches were widely circulated. He argued that the victory over the Russians showed that a jihad (holy war) could not be stopped and that Islam was the wave of the future. The Saudi regime initially supported bin Laden but subsequently distanced itself following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990. Bin Laden called for the liberation of Kuwait by means of a religious jihad, but the Saudi government preferred to join the United States and accomplish the task through a more conventional campaign. Now a persona non grata, bin Laden relocated to the Sudan in East Africa. The presence of U.S. troops on the holy soil of Saudi Arabia was an outrage to bin Laden and led him to consider the United States the epicenter of evil.

Sudan was the base for a number of Islamic militant organizations with which bin Laden became associated, including the International Muslim Brotherhood and Al Qaeda (the Base), which began as a financial network; its activities originally included aid to Muslim fighters in Bosnia. Propaganda emanating from the Sudan included an Iranian-sponsored radio station. In 1992, the United States committed troops to nearby Somalia. Bin Laden was active in mobilizing an Islamic opposition in support of Somali warlord Muhammad Farah Aydid (1936–1996). In a 1997 CNN interview, bin Laden claimed that his followers had been behind the killing of 18 American soldiers in Somalia in 1993. These deaths proved a humiliation for the United States and further increased bin Laden's reputation.

Bin Laden made use of the fax and the Internet to extend his reach. He moved frequently but spent part of 1994 as a resident in London. Although his campaign included religious-based arguments against the United States, Israel, and the pro-Western governments of Egypt and Saudi Arabia, he increasingly looked to dramatic acts of terrorism to publicize his message and humiliate his enemies. Early incidents associated with bin Laden include a 1995 car bombing in Riyadh. Bin Laden then issued a declaration of war against the United States. The first major blow in this war fell in August 1998 when bombs exploded at the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania, killing 224 mostly local people. This simultaneity, which multiplied the psychological impact of the attacks, became a trademark of bin Laden's activities. Foiled plans included plots to hijack and destroy 2 planes in Hong Kong and 11 planes in U.S. airports. He also sought out prestige targets and had plans to attack a World Cup Soccer match in France in 1998. Successful operations ascribed to bin Laden included a suicide attack on the USS *Cole* in the Gulf of Aden. In 1996, bin Laden returned to Afghanistan, where the ultrareligious Taliban regime offered a safe haven to Al Qaeda to construct and operate terrorist

training camps. Bin Laden's political activities within Afghanistan included one of the most potent acts in the region: intermarriage with the family of Taliban leader Mullah Mohammad Omar (1962–). In the wider Middle Eastern region, bin Laden became a folk hero to the poor and disenfranchised: his picture appeared in bazaars in Pakistan and was placed in the hands of demonstrators in the Gaza strip. No Arab leader had commanded such popular appeal since Gamal Abdel Nasser (1918–1970) in the 1950s.

On September 11, 2001, Islamic terrorists crashed hijacked planes into prestige targets in the United States: the World Trade Center in New York City and the Pentagon in Washington, D.C. Bin Laden denied direct responsibility but endorsed the action. As a U.S.-led coalition mounted a War on Terrorism against his Afghan strongholds, bin Laden issued statements to the outside world in the form of video messages, broadcast on the Qatar-based satellite TV channel Al Jazeera. As the war progressed, bin Laden lost this link with the outside world. Despite the military success of Allied air power and the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance on the ground, it was clear that the threat of Islamic terrorism was bigger than one man, and that, dead or alive, bin Laden would remain a rallying point for dissent and anti-Western feeling. Nevertheless, after ten years of hunting for bin Laden, American military forces and the Central Intelligence Agency conducted a carefully planned and executed operation that resulted in bin Laden's death on May 2, 2011, in Abbottabad, Pakistan; his body was buried at sea according to Islamic practice and tradition. While his death is a significant blow for al Qaeda, bin Laden would probably remain a rallying point for dissent and anti-Western feeling among Muslim radicals.

Nicholas J. Cull

See also: Afghanistan, U.S. War in (2001–); Al Qaeda; Al Qaeda in Iraq; Kuwait, Iraqi Invasion of (1990); Taliban; Terrorism; Wahhabism.

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Oslo Accords (1993)

The agreement commonly called the Oslo Accords and formally known as the Declaration of Principles on Interim Self-Government Arrangements was signed

on September 13, 1993, in Washington, D.C., by Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Rabin, Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) chairman Yasir Arafat, and U.S. president Bill Clinton. In the Oslo Accords, the PLO, the Palestinians' major representative party and de facto government-in-exile, formally recognized Israel's right to exist, recognized Israel's sovereignty over 78 percent of historic Palestine, and pledged to end military actions against Israel. Israel, although failing to recognize Palestinian statehood, did recognize Palestinian nationhood, including the right of self-determination, and the PLO's role as the Palestinians' legitimate representative body.

The document spelled out ways in which the Palestinians could achieve a degree of autonomy in parts of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, which had been occupied by Israeli forces since the June 1967 Six-Day War. The hope was that by the PLO's demonstration of competent self-governance and control over anti-Israel violence, the Israelis would gain the confidence needed to make a phased withdrawal from the occupied territories and grant the Palestinians an independent state alongside Israel. Similarly, it was hoped that the removal of foreign occupation forces from certain areas, increasing levels of self-government, and the prospects of a viable independent state would give the Palestinian population the incentive to end the violence against Israelis. The interim peace period was to be completed by 1998, at which time a permanent peace agreement would be signed.

Although the U.S. government became the guarantor of the Oslo Accords, Washington had little to do with the agreement itself. Soon after the election of a more moderate Israeli government in 1992, direct talks began in secret between representatives of Israel and the PLO. They were first facilitated by Norwegian nongovernmental organizations and later with the assistance of Norway's foreign ministry. This apparently took place without the knowledge of U.S. officials, who still took the position that the PLO should not be allowed to take part in the peace process, excluding it from the stalled peace talks then going on in Washington. As the secret negotiations in Norway progressed during the summer of 1993, the Clinton administration put forward what it called a compromise proposal for Palestinian autonomy. This compromise was actually less favorable to the Palestinians than what was then being put forward by the Israelis.

The U.S. role in the Oslo process began with a historic signing ceremony on the White House lawn on September 13, 1993. The agreement had been finalized in Oslo on August 20. Given the ambiguities in the agreement, both parties agreed that the United States should be its guarantor. Indeed, the Israelis saw the U.S. government as the entity most likely to support its positions on outstanding issues, and the Palestinians saw the U.S. government as the only entity capable of forcing Israel to live up to its commitments and able to move the occupying power to compromise.

Peace talks resumed in Washington in the fall of 1993 within the Oslo framework. Over the next seven years, the United States brokered a series of Israeli-

United States president Bill Clinton (center) watches as Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Rabin (left) and Palestine Liberation Organization leader Yasir Arafat (right) shake hands at the ceremony for the signing of the historic Israeli-Palestinian Declaration of Principles (also known as the Oslo Accords) on September 13, 1993. (William J. Clinton Presidential Library)

Palestinian agreements that led to the withdrawal of Israeli forces from most of the Gaza Strip and parts of the West Bank. By the end of the decade, about 40 percent of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, including most of its towns and cities, had been placed under the rule of the new Palestinian Authority (PA), headed by Arafat, and divided into dozens of noncontiguous zones wherein the Palestinians could for the first time exercise some limited autonomy within their sphere of control.

During this period, the Israeli government severely limited the mobility of Palestinians within and between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, dramatically expanded its expropriation of land in the occupied territories for colonization by Jewish settlers, and refused to withdraw from as much territory as promised in the U.S.-brokered disengagement agreements. In addition, the United States tended to side with the Israelis on most issues during talks regarding the disengagement process, even after a right-wing coalition that had opposed the Oslo Accords came to power in Israel in 1996. This served to alienate many Palestinians who had been initially hopeful about the peace process and hardened anti-Israeli attitudes.

Meanwhile, much of the PA proved itself to be rather inept, corrupt, and autocratic in its governance of those parts of the occupied territories under its control. The corruption alienated much of the Palestinian population, and the PA's lack of control made it difficult to suppress the growth of radical Islamic groups. On more than two dozen occasions between 1994 and 2000, Islamic extremists from the occupied Palestinian territories engaged in terrorist attacks inside Israel, killing scores of Israeli civilians and thereby hardening anti-Palestinian attitudes.

The Palestinians had hoped that the United States would broker the negotiations based on international law that forbids the expansion of any country's territory by military force and prohibits occupying powers from transferring their civilian population into occupied land. The Palestinians also hoped that U.S. officials would support a series of specific United Nations (UN) Security Council resolutions demanding that Israel honor these principles. From the Palestinians' perspective—as well as that of the UN, most U.S. allies, and most international legal experts—the onus of the burden was on Israel, as the occupying power, to make most of the compromises for peace. The Clinton administration, however, argued that the UN resolutions were no longer relevant and saw the West Bank and the Gaza Strip simply as disputed territories, thereby requiring both sides to compromise. This gave the Israelis a clear advantage in the peace process.

In signing the Oslo Accords, the Palestinians operated on the assumption that the agreement would result in concrete improvements in the lives of those in the occupied territories. They hoped that the interim period would be no more than five years and that the permanent settlement would be based on UN Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338, which called on Israel to withdraw from the territories seized in the 1967 war. For their part, the Israelis had hoped that the Oslo Accords would lead to the emergence of a responsible Palestinian leadership and greater security. None of these wishes, however, came to pass.

Stephen Zunes

See also: Arab-Israeli War (1948); Arab-Israeli War (1956); Arab-Israeli War (1967); Arab-Israeli War (1973); Palestine Liberation Organization.

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Osman Nuri Pasha (1832–1900)

Prominent Ottoman military commander. Osman Nuri was born in Tokat in Asia Minor. His family moved to Istanbul, where he attended military high school. He matriculated into the Istanbul Military Academy in 1850, and graduated top of his class. Shortly afterward he fought in the Crimean War (1853–1856) as a lieutenant in the cavalry. There he particularly distinguished himself at the Battle of Eupadoria (February 17. 1855). Rapid promotion followed: he became a general by 1870. During the 1876 insurrection in Serbia he earned the rank of mushir (field marshal) for a string of victories over the rebels. However, it was the fighting at Plevna, during the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877–1878, that made him famous. Advancing to engage the Russian forces at Nikopol, his army arrived at Plevna on July 19, 1877, and started to dig in. Over the next 11 days, his forces twice bloodily repulsed the Russians. A lull ensued, during which both sides built up their forces: the Russians and Romanians eventually numbered 100,000 men against Osman's 30,000. On September 10–11, after a four-day bombardment with more than 400 guns, the Russians launched a failed assault that resulted in 20,000 Russian and Romanian losses. Osman Pasha's skillful defense earned him the title ghazi (victor for islam). This third defeat forced a change in Russian strategy, and they chose instead to invest the fortress of Plevna. Osman Pasha had wanted to retreat to preserve his army, but was denied permission to do so until it was too late. Wounded and captured during a desperate final attempt to break out, he was treated with great respect by the Russian grand duke. He returned to Constantinople a hero—a military march was named after him. He later served as minister of war, reformed the army, and was made a marshal of the palace by the sultan.

Nicholas Murray

See also: Crimean War (1853–1856); Ghazi; Russo-Ottoman Wars.

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Otlukbeli, Battle of (1473)

Major battle, also known as the Battle of Bashkent, between the Ottoman Empire and the Ak Koyunlu Confederation. By the mid-15th century, the rising Ottoman

state had successfully expanded into the former Byzantine territory but faced a major threat in the east where a powerful Ak Koyunlu Confederation, led by the maverick Uzun Hasan, challenged the Turkish authority over Anatolia. In his struggle against Sultan Mehmed II, Uzun Hasan formed an alliance with Venice but was unable to prevent the Ottoman invasion. The two armies met near the village of Bashkent on the Otlukbeli River on August 11, 1473. Uzun Hasan's army was divided into five corps and occupied the high ground above the Ottoman camp that was partially surrounded by a wagon laager. Unlike the traditional cavalry-dominated army of Uzun Hasan, Mehmed's troops incorporated firearms and artillery. Deployed behind a barrier of wagons, the Ottomans exploited their superiority in firearms to repel the enemy cavalry. As the Ak Koyunluunits began to fall back in panic, the Ottoman cavalry charged from the camp, pursuing the confused enemy and inflicting heavy losses on it. The battle lasted about eight hours and ended with a complete rout of the Ak Koyunluarmy. This victory opened eastern Anatolia to the Ottoman expansion as Uzun Hasan had to accept the Euphrates River as the western frontier of his realm.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Mehmed II; Uzun Hasan.

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Ottoman Army (Early 19th Century)

By the late 18th century, the Ottomans controlled one of the largest dominions in the world, which provided them with enormous military potential. However, two factors combined to prevent the sultan from successfully exploiting his resources: a cumbersome administrative and financial organization and the political division of the empire into virtually autonomous provinces led by pashas. The Ottoman Army was composed of regulars on pay (Kapikulu, including Janissaries) and irregular troops, with the latter branch also including regional irregulars (*toprakli*), short-term levies (*miri-askeris*), troops raised by provincial governors (*siratkulu*), local militias (*yerli neferats*) used for town defense, and tribal irregulars (*gönüllüyan*). The irregular troops had no training, and anyone able to wield a weapon was considered a soldier and could enlist. Renowned for their courage and weapon

handling, the Ottoman troops nevertheless lacked discipline and tactical maneuverability. The Ottoman ranking system also represented a complex hierarchy, with ranks varying depending on the branch.

The regular infantry, or Kapikulu, was established under the premise of the sultan's right to a fifth of the war booty, which he interpreted to include captives taken in battle. The captive slaves were converted to Islam and trained in the sultan's personal service. The most famous branch of the Kapikulu was the Janissary corps, but there were also several other troop types such as *baltaçis* (halberdier corps); *bostancis*, who were deployed as elite reserves around Constantinople and Edirne; and *solaks*, who defended the royal palace. A series of garrisons along the Straits of the Bosporus were each commanded by a *dizdar* (warden) under the general supervision of a *bogaz naziri* (superintendent). Since the 14th century, a system of conscription had been in place in the Ottoman military requiring every town and village to present a quota of fully equipped conscripts at the recruiting depot. A newer force of irregular infantrymen, called Azaps, were organized into garrison Azaps and naval Azaps; they transported the supplies to the front line, dug roads, and built bridges. One branch of the Azaps, the *başiboziik*, specialized in close combat, sometimes on mounts.

The Janissary corps constituted a major force in the empire and was organized through a devshirme system, which conscripted Christian youths from the Balkan and Caucasian provinces, converted them to Islam, and rigorously trained them in martial arts. Janissaries were organized into *ortas* (regiments) and *odas* (barracks) and enjoyed certain privileges and duties, such as policing the harbor, acting as members of fire brigades, or guarding foreign embassies. By the late 16th century, the Janissaries had become a powerful force within the empire, as the sultan grew dependent on them to counter other internal factions. As a result, Janissaries were frequently involved in palace coups and stubbornly resisted any reforms that might undermine their status. The opposition between the sultan and the Janissaries was particularly evident under Selim III, who attempted to modernize the army by launching a series of reforms called *nizam-i cedid* (new system). This reform agenda led to a rebellion of the Janissaries and the deposition of Selim in 1807. Such resistance prevented the introduction of much-needed reforms at a crucial time when the Ottoman Empire was struggling to fend off the attacks of the European powers, especially the Russian Empire. The Janissary corps lasted until well after the end of the Napoleonic Wars, when Sultan Mahmud II disbanded the corps in the Auspicious Incident in 1826.

The Ottomans also had a well-developed system of raising troops from the subject nations. Local militias (*serhat kulis*) served throughout the Balkans, and their composition and strength varied from province to province. Provincial governors often raised their own cavalry (*deli*), infantry (*segğban*), and light infantry (*panduks*). Christian nations of the Balkan peninsula also had their own forces, among them Serbian *hayduk* units, Wallachian *dorobanti*, Moldavian *slujitori*, Albanian

light infantry (*arnauts*), and Bosnian troops (*pandurs* and *eflaks*). In the eastern provinces, the local forces included Kurds, mainly recruited as *tüfenkçis* (musketeers), as well as irregular tribal troops. Ottoman provinces in Syria and Palestine had diverse forces that included *tüfenkçis*, *deli* (mostly Arabic cavalry), *levent* (mounted infantry, mostly Kurdish), *segğbans* (mostly Turkish cavalry), and others. In Egypt, Mameluk slave warriors from the Caucasus had ruled the country since 1250 but had been nominally under Ottoman rule since 1517.

An important part of the Ottoman Army was the six cavalry branches (*alti bölük*), a mounted elite force. The most important of them were Sipahis, who served as an escort and mounted bodyguard to the sultan and, in times of peace, were responsible for collecting taxes. They gradually became the mounted counterpart to the Janissaries, and the two factions often clashed over influence at court. Sipahis later played an important role in the destruction of the Janissary corps in 1826. Sipahis are often confused with timariots, an irregular cavalry that provided military service in return for land (*timar*), much like the system of fiefs in medieval Europe. The timariots usually assembled after a call for troops but then returned to their land in times of peace. They were organized into regiments (*alays*) commanded by *alay* beys. Above them, *sançak* beys commanded districts and were elected by the landowners. A special Tatar courier corps (*posta tatar*) was in charge of communications.

Although the Ottomans understood early on the power of artillery, they failed to keep up with Western modernization. The Ottoman *topçu ocagği* (field artillery corps) and *humbaraci ocagği* (siege artillery corps) lacked professional officers and modern artillery pieces. In the late 18th century, European officers were regularly invited to train this branch. A special artillery corps (*süratçi ocagği*), armed with modern artillery pieces, was established in the 1770s, and after reorganization this corps consisted of several 10-gun batteries, which included old guns (*balyemez* and *şahi*), new light caliber guns (*abus*), and heavy pieces (*sürat*). Each gun was manned by a *bölük* of ten men led by *top ustasi*. The artillery had an auxiliary corps (*top arabaci ocagği*) of five regiments to provide ammunition and technical support. Other auxiliary corps included military bands (*mehterhane*), which used doubled kettle-drums (*nekkare*), cymbals (*zil*), two-sided drums (*davul*), bass drums (*kös*), trumpets (*kurenay*, *boru*), and two kinds of seven-hole clarinets (the low-pitched *kaba zurna* and the higher-pitched *zurna*).

In the 1790s, Selim III launched a series of reforms to modernize the army and train new units in the European manner. To secure new sources of revenue, Selim established the *irad-i cedid* (new revenue) system financed from taxes imposed on previously untaxed sources and the confiscation of *timars* whose holders were not fulfilling their duties to the state. Technical and military books were translated into Turkish from Western languages, recruits were trained based on French military manuals, soldiers were armed with modern weapons, and graduates from new military schools were assigned to these units. The regiments were divided

into battalions (*taburs*, led by *agías*), companies (*bölük*, led by *bölükbasi*), and platoons under *onbasi*. Regimental officers included a *binbaşi* (colonel) and two *agías—agía-i yemin* and *agía-i yesar*—who commanded flank battalions. Finally, an attempt was made to introduce discipline into the decadent Janissary corps. However, the creation of new regular army units and growing French influence led to open rebellion of the Janissaries and conservative elements in society. In 1807, the Janissaries organized a coup d'état against Selim, who was imprisoned and then assassinated. By this action the modernization of the Ottoman Army was considerably delayed.

The 18th century saw the Ottoman Army engaged in a series of wars against Russia and Austria. The Ottomans fought with varying degrees of success, achieving certain tactical victories but often losing campaigns. The Janissaries refused to adopt any Western tactics or weaponry and objected to serving with the *nizam-i cedid* troops. These forces thus took virtually no part in the fighting against the Russians, leaving it to the relatively ineffective Janissaries and irregular troops. The conflicts of the late 18th century demonstrated that long periods of neglect and decay had left the Ottoman forces far inferior to their European rivals.

The Russo-Ottoman War of 1768–1774 ended the undisputed Ottoman control of the Black Sea and gave Russia the right to navigate freely through the straits. In 1783–1784, the Ottomans failed to defend their interests in the Crimea and Georgia, where the Russians then effectively established their authority. Selim engaged Austria and Russia in 1787–1792, but following Ottoman defeats at the hands of the legendary Russian general Alexander Suvorov he was forced to accept the Treaty of Jassy (1792), which extended the Russian frontier to the Dniester River. In 1798, the Ottoman Army faced a new enemy: the French expeditionary force under Bonaparte in Egypt and Syria. Although the sultan organized two large armies of almost 60,000 men, both were decisively defeated by smaller and more effective French forces at Nazareth, Mount Tabor, and Lake Tiberias in April 1799, and later at Aboukir in July 1799. After Bonaparte's departure Ottoman forces failed to defeat the isolated French troops in Egypt and ultimately succeeded only with British help in 1801.

The early 19th century saw the rise of nationalism among Ottoman subject peoples in the Balkans, where a Serbian uprising began in 1803, soon followed by revolts in Bosnia, Wallachia, and Bulgaria. Ottoman forces were effective in suppressing local rebellions but failed to subdue the Serbs, who appealed for help from Russia. A new Russo-Ottoman War began in 1806 and continued for the next six years. The Ottoman Army itself was in disarray after Selim's attempts to modernize it led to conflict with the Janissaries and others adversely affected by the reforms.

The new sultan, Mahmud II, faced a desperate situation both internally and externally. His authority was greatly diminished within the empire because of the opposition of the Janissaries and conservative elements. Muhammad Ali, viceroy

of Egypt, became virtually independent; Ali Pasha of Janina led an open revolt in southern Albania; and various local governors in Syria and Arabia also disregarded the central authorities. In early 1807, the British attempted to seize the Dardanelles with a naval squadron but were repulsed by Turkish defenses directed by French officers. Still, the Ottomans suffered a series of reverses against Russian forces in the Danubian Principalities (now Romania). By late 1809, the Ottomans were driven across the river Danube and lost all of Serbia and Greater and Lesser Wallachia. Two years later an Ottoman army under Ahmed Pasha was surrounded near Ruse on the Danube and starved into submission. Unable to continue the war, Mahmud finally signed a peace treaty at Bucharest on May 28, 1812, relinquishing his claims to Bessarabia and Georgia but restoring his authority in Moldavia, Wallachia, and Serbia. For the next 15 years, the Ottoman Army avoided wars with major powers and made continuous attempts to modernize.

Like Selim, Mahmud was convinced of the need for military reform, but after the Janissary rebellions of 1807 and 1808, he bided his time, gaining allies and purging conservative officials in preparation for a strike against the Janissaries. This came in 1826, when the Janissaries rebelled after Mahmud announced plans to reorganize the corps. With the support of loyal Janissary officers, elements of the regular army, and some Islamic leaders, Mahmud quickly suppressed the rebels during this *Vaka-i Hayriyye* (Auspicious Event) on June 15, 1826. Two days later Mahmud disbanded the Janissary corps and its allied and affiliated corps.

Mahmud then decreed the establishment of the new military, the Asakir-i Mansure-i Muhammediye (Victorious Soldiers of the Prophet Muhammad), which, in effect, represented a modernized version of Selim III's *nizam* troops, although it did not combine all the standing army corps but simply replaced the Janissary corps. Furthermore, the sultan did not pursue comprehensive reforms of the existing Kapikulu corps because this group played a crucial role in suppressing the Janissary rebellion. Yet, the *bostancı ocağı* (palace guard regiment) was replaced by a new regiment *bostancıyan-ı hassa,* which recruited the best members of the traditional corps. Although three Mansure regiments were created, lack of professional officers and staff soon stalled the reform. In the spring of 1827, the new commander of the Mansure troops, Mehmed Husrev Pasha, established a private staff of foreign experts, translators, and other personnel, which gradually became the model for the *Seraskeriye* (literally the office of the commander in chief) military staff for the commander in chief. He also introduced a new structural division into a regiment (*alay*), battalion (*tabur*), and company (*bölük*). At the same time, Mahmud also reorganized Ottoman cavalry and laid the foundation for the regular cavalry corps.

The Russo-Ottoman War of 1828–1829 caught the Ottoman army in the midst of modernization, when many regiments were still poorly trained and unprepared. This explains their poor performance during the war in which the Russian forces scored a series of major victories and forced the sultan to sue for peace. Furthermore, the

Ottoman weakness was revealed during the Egyptian-Ottomans conflict in 1830s when the newly reformed Egyptian troops overran Palestine and Syria and reached Anatolia itself. After this fiasco, Sultan Mahmud initiated a new round of military reform. Modern infantry regiments were established in the spring of 1829, and the rest of the army was transformed by 1832. The independence of individual corps was significantly curbed and subordinated to a single army leadership by mid-1830s. In 1834, Mahmud created the Turkish Military Academy (the Mekteb-i Ulum-u Harbiye) to create a cadre of well-educated and well-trained officers who would then supervise the creation of modern-style Ottoman army. He also established military councils at all command levels, the highest one, Dar-i Şurası Askeri (Council for Military Affairs) supervising the activities of the commander-in-chief.

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See also: Auspicious Incident (1826); Bucharest, Treaty of (1812); Devshirme System; Egyptian-Ottoman Wars; Janissaries; Jassy, Treaty of (1792); Kapikulu Corps; Mahmud II; Russo-Ottoman Wars; Selim III.

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Ottoman Army (World War I)

In terms of troop strength, the Ottoman Empire did not rank among the major belligerents of World War I. It mobilized about 2.8 million men, even fewer than the United States. In relation to its prewar population of 22 million, however, Turkey raised more men than Russia, and its recruitment ratio of about 13 percent ranked sixth among the major participating nations of the war. The sheer size of the Ottoman Empire, extending as it did from Thrace to the Persian Gulf and from Caucasia to the Suez Canal, ensured it an important role in the war. Turkey fought on five fronts and sent troops to three more to aid its allies.

The Ottoman Empire entered the war with an army that had been badly mauled in the Balkan Wars of 1912–1913. Of its 36 peacetime divisions, 8 were undergoing major reorganization in 1914, and 14 were being rebuilt from scratch after having been largely destroyed. Moreover, a 1913–1914 purge rid the army of 1,300 older officers who were considered a liability.

After decades of German military assistance, Turkey's army in 1914 was closely modeled after that of Germany, with a General Staff as the core organization and pool for highly trained general officers. The recruitment system, mobilization procedures, and order of battle also copied the German model. On the other hand, Turkey was largely lacking the material prerequisites for fighting a modern war. As the least industrialized European power, Turkey could not provide its army with modern armaments in sizable quantities and entered the war desperately short of field guns, machine guns, and ammunition. Turkish supply and medical services were woefully inadequate, and motorcars and aircraft were almost completely absent. The Ottoman road and railroad network was pitiful, and moving a division from Thrace to the East could take months.

Considering these shortcomings, the fighting performance of the Turkish soldier was truly astonishing. Poorly clad and ill-fed, Turkish soldiers for the most part endured terrible hardships, marched enormous distances, and fought in the most hostile environments. Turning the Turkish soldier from his defensive positions required massive material and manpower superiority. Significantly, even in defeat the Ottoman army never experienced large-scale mutinies among the rank and file. Desertion, however, became an increasing problem late in the war.

In 1914, Turkey mobilized 40 regular army divisions that initially formed 13 corps, grouped into four field armies. Corps were composed of three infantry divisions, one artillery regiment, and one cavalry regiment; divisions had three infantry regiments and one artillery regiment. In addition, there were regular and irregular cavalry regiments partially formed into (reserve) cavalry divisions. There was also the 40,000-strong Jandarma, a paramilitary police force that formed mobile regiments. Designated for rear-area duties, it occasionally served in the front line.

The authorized Turkish army organization increasingly came apart during the war when new field armies were added, fought-out divisions were replaced, depleted formations were consolidated, and ad hoc detachments were created. In November 1918, eight field armies commanded a force of only 25 divisions, almost none of which had been active in 1914.

Although the only war plan available in 1914 called for a cordon-style defense of the empire and deployed more than half of the army around Constantinople, in fact, Turkey began offensive operations almost from the outset. This was in part to fulfill its obligations to its allies and in part to regain territory lost in recent wars. Minister of War Enver Pasha, however, frequently implemented ever more fantastic offensive schemes that were beyond the operational capabilities of the army and necessitated permanent redeployments, which further wore down the troops.

To underpin Turkey's standing as a major European power, Enver even sent sizable reinforcements to its European allies, and these fought with distinction in Romania, Galicia, and Macedonia.

Although the potentially most dangerous front for Turkey in any war was Thrace, where the frontier was less than 180 miles from the national capital, its major military effort was in Caucasia. Here, the ill-equipped Third Army engaged in a winter offensive in late 1914. After some initial success, it was badly mauled by a Russian counteroffensive. Rebuilt in the spring of 1915, it was almost destroyed in the Russian Erzurum offensive early in 1916. Later in the same year, the Second Army, composed almost entirely of Gallipoli veterans, was nearly destroyed in an offensive farther south in the Caucasus. After that, the war in the east ground to a halt. In 1918, however, after the Russian revolution had resulted in a withdrawal from Caucasia, the Third Army went over to the offensive and penetrated deep into Armenia and Azerbaijan in an effort to incite a Pan-Turanic nationalist movement in central Asia.

In European Turkey, the First and Fifth Armies, under the able leadership of German general Otto Liman von Sanders, turned back the Entente Gallipoli landing with heavy losses in 1915. Thereafter, however, these two veteran armies were abused as a readily available manpower reserve for other fronts. When the Allies broke out from Salonika in 1918, there was nothing left to prevent them from entering Constantinople.

In Palestine, a coup de main aimed at seizing the Suez Canal in 1914 proved abortive. Afterward, the Sinai-Palestinian Front evolved into a state of protracted, indecisive warfare, aggravated by the rising Arab Revolt. During 1916–1917, a British buildup in this theater progressed, and in 1918 the German-Turkish Yıldırım (Thunderbolt) army group finally collapsed under repeated attacks, and British forces seized Jerusalem and Damascus.

In Mesopotamia (Iraq), an Anglo-Indian invasion resulted in Turkish triumph in April 1916 when Major General Charles Townshend surrendered an entire division to the Ottoman Sixth Army at Kut. Thereafter, this theater of war remained more or less quiet until the British renewed their advance in 1918. Several Turkish invasions of Persia secured a temporary foothold in this virtual strategic vacuum but on the whole proved insignificant.

On October 30, 1918, the Ottoman Empire signed an armistice with the Entente on board the British battleship *Agamemnon* off the island of Mudros, ending Turkey's participation in the war. According to recent estimates, Turkey lost 770,000 dead and 760,000 wounded in the war, each an astonishing 27 percent of the mobilized total, and about 145,000 captured.

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See also: Arab Revolt of 1916–1918; Balkan Wars (1912–1913); Enver Pasha; World War I.

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Ottoman Empire. *See* Albanian-Ottoman Wars (1444–1468); Anglo-Ottoman War (The Dardanelles Expedition) (1807); Austro-Ottoman Wars; Balkan Wars (1912–1913); Balkans, Ottoman Conquest of the; Byzantine-Ottoman Wars; Druze-Ottoman Wars; Egyptian-Ottoman Wars; Hungarian-Ottoman Wars (1437–1526); Italo-Ottoman War (1911–1912); Mamluk-Ottoman War; Military Education, Ottoman; Ottoman-Iranian Wars (18th–19th Centuries); Ottoman-Montenegrin Wars; Ottoman-Safavid Wars; Polish-Ottoman Wars; Russo-Ottoman War (1877–1878); Russo-Ottoman Wars; Saudi-Ottoman War (1911–1913); Serbian-Ottoman War (1876); Venetian-Ottoman Wars; World War I.

Ottoman Empire, Entry into World War I

In one of the major turning points of the war, in November 1914 the Ottoman Empire entered the war on the German side. When war began in Europe in early August 1914, Turkish leaders were torn over the appropriate response for their country: continued neutrality or entering the war on the side of Germany or the Entente. Both the German and British governments had worked hard to win Turkish goodwill in the years before the war. The British had long sought to uphold Turkey's territorial integrity against Russian encroachments and desire for a Mediterranean port, but efforts by the Turkish government in the years immediately before World War I to secure an alliance with Britain had been rebuffed, largely because London feared alienating its new ally, Russia. The British had, however, sent a naval mission to help train the Turkish navy, and the Turks had ordered warships from Britain. On the other side, Kaiser Wilhelm II had traveled to Turkey and pushed development of a railroad there to exploit Turkish resources (the Berlin-to-Baghdad Railway project). In 1913, Berlin had sent an advisory group under Generalleutnant (major general) Otto Liman von Sanders to Turkey to train its army.

A decision by the British government may have tipped the balance in favor of joining the war on the German side. On August 1, the eve of British entry into the war, First Lord of the Admiralty Winston Churchill ordered sequestered two powerful battleships being built in British yards that had already been paid for by popular subscription in Turkey. These were the *Sultan Osman I* (renamed *Agincourt*) and the *Reshadieh* (renamed *Erin*). This decision greatly angered public opinion in Turkey against the Entente. The Germans also sought to capitalize on the traditional animosity between Turkey and Russia.

Still, the Turkish leadership was undecided and on August 3 declared its neutrality in the war. While the government in Constantinople vacillated, Vice Admiral Wilhelm Souchon's German Mediterranean Squadron of the battle cruiser *Goeben* (the most formidable warship in the entire Mediterranean) and light cruiser *Breslau* changed the course of the war. Although British and French naval units heavily outnumbered his own squadron, Souchon succeeded in getting them to the Dardanelles and then to Constantinople on August 11. The presence of these two warships off the Turkish capital was of immense benefit to the pro-German faction. Without Berlin's concurrence, on August 16 Souchon arranged to turn over both warships to Turkey as replacements for the Turkish dreadnoughts sequestered by Britain. Renamed, the two warships nonetheless retained their German crews, and Souchon became commander of the Turkish navy while retaining his position in the German navy. The Turkish public was elated over the news of the acquisition of the two ships.

With the secret support of Turkish minister of war Enver Pasha, the leading supporter of the German alliance, Souchon used his warships to provoke war between Russia and Turkey. On October 27, he set sail from Constantinople under the guise of a training exercise in the Black Sea. Early on October 29 he bombarded Russian bases at Odessa and Novorossiysk and laid mines. The Turkish cabinet was not informed in advance, and Souchon falsely reported that the Russians had attacked him first.

On November 4, 1914, Russia formally declared war on Turkey. Despite the resignation of four members of the Turkish cabinet in protest against what Enver and Souchon had engineered, Turkey remained in the war on the side of the Central Powers. This decision resulted in a new theater of war in the Middle East and caused the Western Allies to divert important resources to the Turkish theaters of war, perhaps enabling Germany to prolong the war. Having Turkey as an active military opponent also cut off Russia from easy access to the West and imposed heavy economic burdens on that country, forcing it to divert military resources from the fight against Germany and Austria-Hungary. This added immensely to Russia's internal difficulties, helping to bring about revolutions three years later.

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See also: Enver Pasha; World War I.

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Ottoman Empire, Post–World War I Revolution

In October 1918, the Ottoman Empire lay in ruins. Allied troops controlled the Middle East and much of the Balkans, and even threatened Constantinople itself. Under these pressures, Turkish sultan Mehmed VI signed an armistice to end the fighting on October 31, 1918. The armistice terms opened the straits, demobilized Turkish armies, and placed all remaining Ottoman territory at the disposal of the Allies.

In the chaos following the armistice, Allied forces moved into Turkish territory on a large scale, beginning with a naval force steaming into Constantinople harbor and British troops pushing into the Caucasus. Over the next six months the British, French, and Italian governments established a three-power administration of Constantinople, garrisoned the Alexandretta-Smyrna-Constantinople railway, and encouraged the creation of independent Georgian and Armenian armies. By the summer of 1919, more troops had entered the country, with Italian troops in southwest Anatolia, French troops in the southeast, and a large Greek army at Smyrna.

Turkish nationalist resistance to these maneuvers developed in eastern Anatolia, particularly under General Mustafa Kemal in Samsun and General Kazim Karabekir at Erzurum. In September 1919, the nationalists issued the Declaration of Sivas, affirming the unity of Turkish territory and denying the Allies occupation rights. The nationalists—Karabekir in particular—also turned to the Bolsheviks of Russia for military aid, concluding an agreement the following spring. Contacts with Bolshevik officials served two purposes: they tapped a possible source of funds and provided a bargaining chip to use against the anticommunist British. Over the winter, Turkish nationalist troops skirmished with Allied detachments along the railroad and near Constantinople.

On March 16, 1920, British troops seized government buildings in Constantinople and set up a pro-Allied cabinet, preparatory to forcing the Ottoman government to sign the Treaty of Sèvres. Agreed upon by the British, French, and Italians in April, the treaty made the kingdom of Hejaz independent, gave Smyrna and many Aegean islands to Greece, ceded the Dodecanese Islands to Italy, internationalized the straits, and made Armenia an independent state. In addition, Syria, Palestine,

and Mesopotamia were established as independent states under French and British mandates. The latter two powers also signed the San Remo oil agreement, delimiting their oil interests in Persia, Mesopotamia, and the Caucasus. These demands were presented to the sultan and the pro-Allied cabinet on June 10. Twelve days later, about 60,000 Greek troops advanced from Smyrna to help enforce these terms. Fighting also began in the Caucasus.

Turkish forces were unprepared for this advance, and Greek military columns soon seized the major cities in western Anatolia and took Adrianople in Thrace. In the east an Armenian attack collapsed near Erzurum, and the Turkish counterattack forced the Armenians to sue for peace. The ensuing peace treaty reduced Armenia to the province of Erivan. On March 16, 1921, Turkish nationalists signed a treaty with Soviet Russia, delimiting the border in the east and securing more military aid.

On March 23, the Greeks opened a new offensive toward Ankara. Although initially stalled, the Greeks regrouped and advanced again in July. The Turks withdrew across the Sakarya River and stood on the defensive. Between August 23 and September 16, they fought a successful series of meeting engagements over a 120-mile front, known as the Battle of the Sakarya. At this point the French (as with the Italians earlier in the summer) agreed to withdraw from Anatolia in return for economic concessions.

Over the winter the British attempted to negotiate an end to the war through a partial revision of the Treaty of Sèvres. The nationalists in Ankara refused, and

Turkish troops of the Iron Division march across the Galata Bridge into Constantinople, Turkey in October 1923. With the end of Constantinople's occupation by foreign allies, a new Turkish republic was formed with Mustafa Kemal Atatürk as its president. (AP/Wide World Photos)

the Turks moved over to the offensive on August 18, 1922. In the ensuing war of maneuver, superior Turkish cavalry forced the Greeks back, the retreat then turned into a rout, and the Greeks fled in confusion to the coast.

In response to the Turkish advance toward Constantinople, a British force landed to protect the straits. Armistice negotiations began shortly thereafter. Given Turkish military successes, the opposing sides opened negotiations in November and agreed to the Treaty of Lausanne on July 24, 1923. Although Turkey agreed to relinquish all prewar non-Turkish territory in the Middle East and lost almost all the offshore islands in the Aegean and Mediterranean, the Greeks departed Anatolia, no reparations were paid, and no legal restrictions remained on the Turkish government. During this same period, the sultanate was abolished. The last British troops evacuated Istanbul on October 2, and the Turkish Republic was formerly established on October 29, 1923.

Timothy L. Francis

See also: Franco-Turkish War (Cilicia War) (1920); Greco-Turkish War (1919–1922); Kemal Atatürk, Mustafa; Lausanne, Treaty of (1923); Sèvres, Treaty of (1920); World War I.

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Ottoman Navy (World War I)

The once powerful Turkish navy was largely gutted by Sultan Abdul Hamid II (1876–1909). The navy had helped oust his predecessor, and Abdul Hamid II feared that it might be involved in a new revolution. After the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877–1878, he cut naval personnel in half and canceled ironclads on order in Britain and Constantinople. In the late 1880s, two small cruisers and a few torpedo boats and auxiliary vessels were built in Turkish yards, two submarines were acquired from Britain, and some torpedo craft were acquired from Germany. In 1890 a large program was announced that would include rebuilding a number of ships

and acquiring two new French Hoche-class battleships, as well as cruisers and other ships, but these plans were never realized. About all that was done was to modernize some older ironclads for a coast-defense role and acquire some new gunboats. At the beginning of the 20th century the navy did acquire two new cruisers, some destroyers, and smaller ships.

The 1908 Young Turk Revolution brought about a spirit of reform. That same year the new government announced a program to acquire 6 battleships, 12 destroyers, 12 torpedo boats, and 6 submarines as well as a number of smaller craft, but this program was not complete by the time of the Italo-Ottoman War of 1911–1912. In the meantime the government secured two old small battleships and four destroyers from Germany. A British naval mission arrived in 1908 to help implement change, but it was not able to accomplish much before the war with Italy, in which the many smaller Turkish navy warships were sunk. Further losses followed at the hands of the Greek navy, the empire's chief naval opponent in the First Balkan War of 1912–1913.

The Ottoman navy had proved utterly incapable of preventing the Italians and Greeks from taking Turkey's Aegean islands, and the Young Turk leaders were determined to build up the empire's naval strength. By 1914, the Turks had two dreadnoughts under construction in British yards and had contracted with the British companies of Armstrong and Vickers to update the government shipyard in Smyrna (Izmir). In August 1914, the British government's seizure of the dreadnoughts *Reshadieh* (renamed the *Erin*) and the *Sultan Osman I* (renamed the *Agincourt*), both of which had been paid for by public subscription in Turkey, was a major factor in the Turkish government's decision to enter the war against the Entente.

The Ottoman Empire began the war with a small force indeed. In November 1914 it numbered but two predreadnought battleships, one coastal defense ship, two light cruisers, nine destroyers, three torpedo gunboats, and several torpedo boats, gunboats, and auxiliary vessels. The navy did enjoy a quantum leap in strength on the arrival of the new German battle cruiser *Goeben* at Constantinople on August 11, 1914. It and its consort, the light cruiser *Breslau*, had escaped British and French ships in the Mediterranean. The German Mediterranean Squadron commander, Vice Admiral Wilhelm Souchon, promptly turned the two ships over to the Turkish navy. The *Goeben* was renamed the *Sultan Yavuz Selim*, and the *Breslau* became the *Midilli*. Both vessels kept their German crews; only a nominal number of Turks were added. On September 24, Souchon took command of the entire Ottoman navy. Souchon and Turkish war minister Enver Pasha conspired to use the two former German ships to shell Russian shore installations in the Black Sea on October 29 and bring Turkey into the war.

The empire lacked submarines, and one French submarine captured in the war did not see active service. Before it entered the war, Turkey requested and received from Germany a mission headed by Admiral Guido von Usedom of several hundred

officers and men who helped maintain Turkish warships and make improvements to torpedo, mine, and shore batteries at the Dardanelles and Bosporus. During the war the Germans also transferred some small warships to the Turks via Bulgaria.

Souchon ably directed Turkish naval operations during the war, most notably in the Black Sea. On the Dardanelles Front, German-supplied mines, shore batteries, and mobile howitzers, rather than ships, were the key factors in the defeat in early 1915 of a large Allied naval contingent sent to force the straits and steam to Constantinople. With German assistance, the Turks maintained active small flotillas on the Tigris and Euphrates rivers and on Palestinian lakes. During the war the Turks also utilized German submarines to run some supplies, and key personnel to the Senussi engaged in fighting Italy in Libya.

The greatest Turkish wartime success came when the minelayer *Nusret* laid mines in the Dardanelles that led to the sinking of two Allied battleships and damage to several others on March 18, the greatest success of the war by a single Central Powers warship. Not only was this a great tactical success, but it also had wide-ranging strategic implications. The Allies now abandoned their effort to force the Dardanelles by naval power alone. Had this gone forward and been successful, it might have driven Turkey from the war and saved imperial Russia from revolution. The other great Turkish naval success was the sinking off the Dardanelles of the British pre-dreadnought *Goliath* on the night of May 12–13, 1915, by the gunboat *Muavenet-i-Millet*, commanded by German Lieutenant Frie.

Most Turkish warships sunk during the war fell to Allied submarines that managed to transit the Dardanelles and enter the Sea of Marmora. During the war the Ottoman navy lost one battleship, one coastal defense ship, one light cruiser, and three destroyers.

After the October 31, 1918, armistice, on November 2, Souchon handed over control of the *Sultan Yavuz Selim* to a Turkish crew under Admiral Arir Pasha's control. The Turkish navy was then interned in the Gulf of Ismit on the Asiatic shore.

Jack Greene and Spencer C. Tucker

See also: Balkan Wars (1912–1913); Italo-Ottoman War (1911–1912); Russo Ottoman War (1877–1878); Senussi and Sultan of Darfur Rebellions (1914–1916); World War I; Young Turks.

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Ottoman-Iranian Wars (18th–19th Centuries)

The Ottoman Empire and Iran have shared a long history of rivalry and conflict that escalated in the 17th century with the rise of a powerful Safavid state in Iran. In 1722, the Safavid dynasty was overthrown as a result of the Afghan invasion, and the Ottomans exploited Iranian weakness to claim considerable territories in Iraq and Caucasus in a series of wars over the 18th and 19th centuries.

Ottoman-Iranian War of 1730–1736

Iran remained in a state of internal anarchy for almost a decade as various claimants vied for power. By the early 1730s, a maverick Iranian commander, Nadir Shah, defeated his opponents, announced the Safavid restoration and demanded the Ottoman withdrawal from the Iranian territory they had occupied since 1722. The Ottomans agreed to restore Kimanshah, Tabriz, Hamadan, Ardalan, and all of Luristan in exchange for Iranian recognition of Ottoman authority in eastern Georgia and Shirvan. While accepting such agreement, Shah Tahmasp and Nadir Shah desired greater territorial concession from the Porte and were encouraged by the news of popular turmoil in Istanbul. In the spring of 1730, Nadir Shah captured Farahan and Yazdikhwast and crushed the Ottoman army of Kopruluzadeh Abdallah near Tabriz, which he seized in July. Sultan Ahmed III (r. 1703–1730) imprisoned the Iranian ambassador and ordered Ottoman troops in the Caucasus and eastern Anatolia to move into western Iran to face the Nadir's attack. Yet the Patrona Revolt soon shook the Ottoman capital causing the downfall of Ahmed III and the rise of Sultan Mahmud I (r. 1730–1754).

This turmoil delayed the Ottoman response to Iranian invasion and allowed Iranians to invade Ottoman-controlled Armenia. However, the revolt of the Abdali tribesmen in Afghanistan forced Nadir to march against them, leaving the inexperienced Shah Tahmasp to deal with the Ottomans. In Nadir's absence, the Ottomans, led by Hakimoglu Ali Pasha, recaptured Urmiya (November) and Tabriz (December), after which Mahmud I granted the title of ghazi to Hakimoglu. At the same time, the Ottoman forces in Iraq, led by Ahmad Pasha, the governor of Baghdad, reclaimed Kirmanshah and Hamadan, where they routed Shah Tahmasp at Kurijan on September 15, 1731. The shah agreed to sign a peace treaty with Ahmad Pasha that surrendered substantial territory (Erivan, Ganja, eastern

Georgia, Daghestan, and Shirvan) to the Porte while retaining Hamadan, Tabriz, Kirmanshah, Luristan, and Ardalan. The sultan, however, was upset by Ahmad's concession of Tabriz, and Nadir Shah was infuriated by the shah's decision to give up such vast territories and used the peace treaty as an excuse to replace him with his eight-month-old son Abbas III while keeping the real power in his hands. He then resumed war against the Ottomans in western Iran and Iraq. He repelled Ottoman attacks in Shahrazur and Derne and laid siege to Baghdad. However, the Ottoman army under Topal Osman Pasha scored a major victory against Nadir near Baghdad on July 20, 1733, thereby protecting the Anatolian heartland, relieving Baghdad, and reclaiming Kirkuk and Derne.

Despite the defeat, Nadir quickly regrouped his forces and counterattacked later the same year. On November 30, he routed Topal Osman Pasha at Lailan, capturing the entire Ottoman camp and killing the Ottoman commander-in-chief. Following up on this success, Nadir reclaimed Kirkuk, Derne, and Shahrazur and besieged Baghdad in January 1734, but again failed to capture it. After his peace proposals were twice rejected, Nadir resumed his campaign by attacking Ottoman interests in the Caucasus. He captured Shirvan (August 1734) before Kopruluzadeh Abdallah stopped him at Kars and pushed back beyond the Arpa Chay River (January–May 1735). The Iranian counterattack, however, proved to be decisive. On June 14, 1735, Nadir crushed the Ottomans in a battle at Baghavard that claimed the life of Kopruluzadeh Abdallah. This decisive victory allowed the Iranians to capture Ganja (July 9), Tiflis (Tbilisi, August 12), and Erivan (October 3), extending Iranian authority to much of Armenia and eastern Georgia. The succession of defeats also prompted internal power struggles in Istanbul, where two grand vizier were dismissed within six months. The Porte agreed to an armistice and opened diplomatic negotiations on a peace that was signed in Constantinople (Istanbul) in late 1736. Preoccupied with his wars against Austria and Russia, Mahmud I was compelled to recognize Nadir as the shah of Iran and accept Iranian occupation of the disputed territories in the Caucasus and Iraq.

Ottoman-Iranian War of 1742–1743

The Treaty of Constantinople proved to be contentious because Iran insisted that a small Shiite sect, the Ja'fari, be declared orthodox. Disagreements over this religious issue led to the Ottoman proclamation of war on April 30, 1742. Mahmud made preparations to invade the Caucasus and western Iran while Nadir Shah raided Baghdad and unsuccessfully besieged Mosul (September 1743). The Iranian offensive resumed in early 1744 as Nadir Shah marched west from Hamadan, besieging Kars (July 1744) and then quelling a revolt in Daghestan that was incited by the Turks. He returned in time to rout the Ottoman army, led by Yegen Muhammad Pasha, at Baghavard in August 1745. The Iranian victory compelled the sultan to

accept the peace treaty, which was signed in September 1746 in Kordan, northwest of Tehran. The sultan again recognized Nadir as shah and agreed to the restoration of Iran's frontiers as determined in the 1639 Treaty of Zuhab (Qasr-e-Shirin). The treaty recognized Iraq (including Baghdad and the Shatt al-Arab), western Caucasia, and Kurdish territories as part of the Ottoman Empire but granted southwestern Caucasia to Iran.

Ottoman-Iranian War of 1776–1779

The death of Nadir Shah in 1747 plunged Iran into a period of civil anarchy and provided the Porte with a long period of peace. Sultans Mahmud, Osman (r. 1754–1757), and Mustafa (r. 1757–1774) were preoccupied with the struggles against European powers and resisted the temptation to exploit Iranian weakness to expand their territory. Furthermore, the Ottoman authorities imprisoned any fugitive Iranian princes and politicians who threatened to upset the 1746 peace accords. By the 1770s, however, the Iranian civil war ended with the victory of Karim Khan who pursued an aggressive policy toward the Ottomans, intervening into Ottoman affairs in Iraq. In 1775, Karim Khan attacked and captured the Ottoman town of Basra (south Iraq) prompting Sultan Abdul al-Hamid's (r. 1774–1789) declaration of war on Iran in June 1776. Ottoman armies raided Iranian territory from Baghdad and Mosul but internal power struggles between Ottoman commanders and local governors allowed Karim Khan to successfully repel these attacks and retain Basra. He made plans for a joint Iranian-Russian attack on the Ottoman Empire, but his death in March 1779 put an end to this undertaking and restored an uneasy peace between the two empires.

Ottoman-Iranian War of 1820–1823

After the tumultuous period of the 1770s, relations between Iran and the Ottoman Empire entered a more peaceful stage that lasted almost five decades. Following defeats in the Russo-Ottoman Wars of 1787–1791 and 1806–1812, Ottoman authorities wanted to compensate their territorial losses in Europe with new lands in the east. This was particularly enticing in light of poor Iranian performance during the Russo-Iranian War of 1804–1813. At the same time, territorial losses to Russia in the Caucasus encouraged Iran's ruling Qajar dynasty to seek compensation at the Ottoman cost. The Russian victories also compelled Fath Ali Shah (r. 1797–1834) to embark on military reforms supervised by his son Crown Prince Abbas, Mirza who used European officers and military techniques to train Iranian troops.

Exploiting Sultan Mahmud II's preoccupation with European affairs, Fath Ali Shah interfered in Iraq, where he supported local Mamluk rulers and launched Iranian raids into the vicinity of Baghdad and Shahrazur in early 1812. By 1817–1818,

Iranian forces conducted raids all the way to Van, inciting local Kurdish tribes to rebel against the Turks. In October 1820, Sultan Mahmud II, tired of continued border incidents, declared war on Iran and dispatched Khusrau Pasha, the governor of Erzerum, to command the Ottoman army in north Iraq; however, the Ottoman war effort was half-hearted as their best forces were tied down in Greece. In late 1821, the Iranian army, under Muhammad Ali Mirza, attacked in the direction of Baghdad but soon suffered from a cholera epidemic (which claimed its commander's life) and turned back. More successful was the invasion of Abbas Mirza. He advanced through Armenia and captured Bayazid, Toprak Qala, Diyarbak, and Bitlis in the fall of 1821. However, he was soon forced to retreat to his winter quarters, which allowed the Ottomans, under new commander Muhammad Amin Rauf Pasha, to regroup. Fighting occurred in the Lake Urmiya area and culminated in Iranian victory at Khuy (May 1822), where Abbas Mirza routed a superior Turkish force. But the Iranian army could not exploit its success because of a cholera epidemic that devastated its ranks and forced a retreat. On July 28, 1823, Iran and the Porte signed an agreement at Erzerum that restored the border as determined by the Treaties of Zuhab (Qasr-e Shirin) in 1639 and of Kurdan in 1746. The treaty recognized Iraq (including Baghdad and the Shatt al-Arab), western Caucasia, and Kurdish territories as part of the Ottoman Empire but granted southeastern Caucasia to Iran.

This was the last major war between the Ottoman Empire and Iran. Facing unrelenting Russian expansion in the Caucasus, neither power was willing or strong enough to continue its rivalry in Iraq and eastern Anatolia, although minor cross-border skirmishes continued.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Abbas Mirza; Baghavard, Battle of (1735); Baghavard, Battle of (1745); Nadir Shah; Karim Khan Zand; Kurdan, Treaty of (1746); Ottoman-Safavid Wars; Tahmasp I, Shah; Zuhab (Zohab), Treaty of (Treaty of Qasr-e Shirin) (1639).

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Ottoman-Montenegrin Wars

Nineteenth-century conflicts between Montenegro, a small Balkan tributary state, and the Ottoman Empire. Montenegro came under the Ottoman control in the 15th century but had been ruled by a prince-bishop (vladika) of Cetinje, who had jurisdiction over the entire region. In the early 1800s, the Ottoman power in the Balkans was gravely undermined by successful revolts in Greece and Serbia, which resulted in their independence. Montenegro, neighboring Serbia, also moved toward independence under the reign of its prince-bishop Danilo I (1851–60), who ended the existing system of government and sought closer ties with Russia, whose Emperor Nicholas I recognized Danilo's claim as the prince of Montenegro. Danilo's proclamation of his princely power (supported by Russia and Austria), however, posed a direct challenge to the Ottoman sovereignty in the region. The Turks, refusing to recognize Montenegro's new status, began to meddle in Montenegrin affairs, while Danilo responded by seizing control of Žabljak Crnojević, which gave the Turks a definitive pretext to invade. The Ottomans reasserted their authority by dispatching troops under Omar Pasha Latas, governor of the neighboring Bosnia, to Montenegro in 1852. A smaller Montenegrin army was unable to halt the Ottoman advance, but Austrian intervention persuaded the sultan to keep Danilo in power in 1853; Danilo's efforts to have the conference of Paris, in the wake of the Crimean War, recognize Montenegran independence, led nowhere.

After the first Ottoman-Montenegrin War, the region experienced rising nationalism, and tensions between Montenegrins and the Ottomans rapidly increased. Prince Danilo actively supported uprisings in Herzegovina, which, he believed, would erode Ottoman control in the entire region and lead to Montenegrin independence. Danilo's policies led to the Herzegovinian uprising of 1857 (supported and directed by the Montenegrins), which caused the Sublime Porte to the Ottoman army, under Hussein Pasha to rein in the Montenegrin prince. In the spring of 1858, Hussein Pasha invaded Montenegro, but after occupying several settlements, he suffered a major defeat at the hands of Grand Duke Mirko Petrović-Njegoš, "the Sword of Montenegro," at Grahovac between May 12 and 13, 1858. The battle had a major political and cultural influence. Proclaimed as the "Marathon of Montenegro," it quickly became a part of the national folklore and mythology. More importantly, the Great Powers forced the Ottomans to accept a Conference of Ambassadors at Constantinople, where border rectification of Montenegro took place.

Thus, the border between Montenegro and the Porte was officially established, a significant step toward formal independence.

Prince Danilo was assassinated in August 1860, but Montenegrin success in the second war encouraged nationalistic sentiments in the neighboring Herzegovina, where a major revolt against the Ottoman rule began in 1861. Montenegro did not directly intervene in this revolt because of pressure from the Great Powers, but the Ottoman authorities accused Danilo's successor, Prince Nikolas, of clandestine involvement and failing to contain Montenegrin groups that crossed into Herzegovina. In late November 1861, Omar Pasha, governor of Bosnia, suppressed the revolt in Herzegovina after routing the rebel forces (which included Montenegrins) at Piva. When Montenegro mobilized its own forces and threatened to intervene under the pretext of protecting fellow Slavs, Omar Pasha invaded during the winter of 1861. The campaign led to a rapid and decisive defeat for the Montenegrins, and the Great Powers had to intervene once more to stop Ottoman troops from capturing the Montenegrin capital of Cetinje. The subsequent Convention of Scutari (Shkodër, August 1862) left affairs in status quo ante, except that Montenegro agreed to cease helping the Herzegovinian revels, not to build forts on its borders or to import arms.

The Montenegrins had to wait 14 years before exacting revenge. In 1876, Prince Nikola forged an alliance with Serbia and supported the start of a revolt in Herzegovina. He declared war on the Ottoman Empire and dispatched some 11,000 troops to Herzegovina, where the Montenegrins scored early successes at Vučji Do (July) and Fundina (August). However, later the same year, the Ottoman offensive drove the Montenegrins deep into their own territory. Only the start of the Russo-Ottoman War in 1877 saved Montenegro from another defeat. The Ottoman focus on the Danubian front against Russia allowed Montenegro to seize territories around Nikšić, Bar, and Ulcinj, which gave it leverage in the subsequent Congress of Berlin in 1878. The congress granted Montenegro formal recognition as an independent state and recognized its territorial enlargement, although the congress rejected Treaty of San Stefano's territorial arrangement that doubled Montenegro's size.

Montenegro enjoyed a period of relative peace after 1878 but fought another war against the Ottoman Empire in 1912, when it joined an alliance of Greece, Serbia, and Bulgaria during the First Balkan War. During that war, the Montenegrin army seized considerable territory, including the Sandžak and Metohija (including the towns of Djakovica and Peć), and gained the towns of Bijelo Polje, Mojkovac, Berane, and Pljevlja, among others.

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See also: Balkan Wars (1912–1913); Herzegovinian Revolt (1875); Russo-Ottoman Wars; San Stefano, Treaty of (1878).

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Ottoman-Safavid Wars

A series of conflicts between the Ottoman Empire and Safavid Persia in the 16th and 17th centuries. In early 16th century, Ismail, a Safavid leader who claimed descent from the Prophet Muhammad and Ali, succeeded in establishing a theocratic state in western Iran. In 1501–1503, Shah Ismail gained control of central and southern Iran and, by 1508, was campaigning in southwest Iran and Iraq. The growing Safavid power soon threatened Ottoman interests in the region. In 1509–1512, Ismail played an active role in a civil war fought between the sons of Sultan Bayezid II, supporting Prince Ahmed against Selim. After seizing the Ottoman throne in 1512, Sultan Selim I prepared for a campaign against the Safavids. Aside from political considerations, religious differences (Sunni Ottomans versus Shii Safavids) played an important role in provoking this conflict. In 1514, Selim began the long march from Adrianople to Azerbaijan. Ismail initially practiced a scorched-earth policy but then engaged the Ottomans in a decisive battle. Lacking artillery and a trained infantry, the Safavid army suffered a decisive defeat in the Battle of Chaldiran in August 1514. Selim then plundered the Safavid capital of Tabriz and returned to Anatolia. In the next year's campaign, the Ottomans captured the fortress of Kamakh and established control over Kurdistan and parts of Syria (Albistan). However, Ottoman inroads into Syria led to the Mamluk-Ottoman War in 1516–1517, which diverted Ottoman attention from the Safavids and allowed Ismail to regroup, although he never seriously threatened the Turkish domain.

Ottoman-Safavid War of 1526–1555

After the death of Shah Ismail in 1524, the Safavid crown went to Shah Tahmasp, who exploited the Ottoman preoccupation in Europe, where Suleiman I "the Magnificent" conducted major campaigns in Serbia and Hungary to stir up rebellion in eastern provinces of the Ottoman Empire. Tahmasp also opened diplomatic negotiations with the Habsburgs on the creation of a Habsburg-Safavid alliance against the Ottomans. In response, Suleiman provoked the Uzbeks in Transoxania to attack Iran from the east. The war between Suleiman and Tahmasp began in earnest in 1526. The Ottomans, led by the Grand Vizier Ibrahim Pasha, who was later joined by Suleiman, invaded Iraq and, over the next eight years, captured Baghdad, Bitlis, and Tabriz. Tahmasp avoided pitched battles and waged a scorched-earth strategy.

Tabriz, recaptured by Tahmasp in early 1535, was sacked later that year by Suleiman. Minor skirmishes and border fighting persisted for almost a decade. The Safavid capture of Tabriz and Van provoked a second campaign by Suleiman in 1548. Yet again, Tahmasp adopted a scorched-earth policy, laying waste to the Armenian highlands. The Ottomans reclaimed Tabriz and Van as well as additional fortresses in Armenia and Georgia.

After a three-year hiatus, the war resumed in earnest. A Safavid attack on Erzurum in 1552 led to a counterattack by Suleiman, who reclaimed Erzurum and invaded western Iran in 1553–1554. Unable to defeat the Ottomans, Tahmasp chose to negotiate, signing the Treaty of Amasya in 1555. Under the treaty, the two powers determined their spheres of influence. Iran received Azerbaijan, eastern Armenia, eastern Kurdistan, and eastern Georgian kingdoms, and the Ottomans claimed all of western Georgia, Arabia, Iraq, and western Armenia and Kurdistan. Kars was declared neutral, and its fortress was destroyed.

Ottoman-Safavid War of 1578–1590

The Peace of Amasya lasted until an Ottoman offensive in 1578 sought to take advantage of a period of Iran's weakness under Shah Muhammad Khudabanda (1578–1587). The death of Shah Tahmasp I in 1576 resulted in a two-year civil war over succession, which weakened the Safavid state and led the Ottoman Turks to believe Iran could at last be conquered. In 1578, Mustafa Pasha, known as Lala Pasha, defeated the Iranian forces on Lake Childir, and invaded Georgia and Shirvan. The Ottoman expansion into eastern Caucasia forced Shah Muhammad to release King Simon I of Kartli (eastern Georgia) to fight the common enemy. Simon achieved considerable success in eastern Georgia, where he reclaimed the key fortresses of Lori and Gori before besieging Tbilisi in 1579. In 1580, he repulsed the Ottoman expeditions in Kartli, and in 1582, he routed a major Ottoman army on the Mukhrani Field. The Ottomans, meantime, conducted operations in Daghestan and Azerbaijan and gained considerable success at Ganna and Karabagh in 1588. With Uzbeks attacks intensifying in eastern Iran and the Ottomans capturing Tabriz in 1590, Shah Abbas Shah, who succeeded Shah Muhammad two years earlier, chose to enter into peace talks. The Treaty of Constantinople (also known as Treaty of Ferhat Pasha, after the commander of the Ottoman forces), signed in May 1590, ended the war. It gave the Ottomans control of Azerbaijan, Georgia, Armenia, most of Qarabagh (except for Ardabil), most of Iranian Kurdistan, Luristan, and Daghestan.

Ottoman-Safavid War of 1603–1612

The Safavids refused to accept the loss of vast territories in the Caucasus. After subduing the Uzbeks, Abbas exploited Ottoman problems in Hungary to launch an

offensive from the east. A surprise attack by the Safavid army led to the capture of Tabriz in late 1603. While Abbas commanded the main offensive in the northwest against the Ottomans led by Chighalah Pasha, smaller Safavid forces raided Iraq and southern Caucasia. Ottoman sultan Ahmed I led a large army against Abbas but was defeated near Lake Urmia in 1606. Following up on his success, Abbas captured Baghdad, Mosul, and Diarbekh by 1608, thus reclaiming almost all of the areas the Safavids had lost in the preceding decade. In 1612, the new Treaty of Constantinople confirmed the Ottoman-Safavid frontier on the line established by Selim I and Ismail almost 100 years earlier; in return, the shah pledged to deliver 200 pack-loads of fine silk annually to the Sublime Porte.

Ottoman-Safavid War of 1616–1618

The Safavid failure to deliver the silk served as a pretext to the resumption of hostilities in 1616. An Ottoman army besieged Erivan (Yerevan) in 1616, but was repulsed and forced to withdraw. In 1618, the Turks attacked in the direction of Tabriz, but they were defeated at Soltaniyeh. Afterward peace negotiations began, resulting in the Treaty of Sarab (1618), which confirmed the terms of the previous peace treaty.

Ottoman-Safavid War of 1623–1639

The war of 1623–1639 was the last major war between the Safavids and Ottomans. It began as a result of a power struggle between local officials in eastern Ottoman provinces. Abaza Mehmed Pasha, the governor of Erzurum, rose in rebellion, against Janissary Subashi Bakr and his followers, who had controlled Baghdad since 1621. Bakr futilely appealed to Sultan Murad IV for recognition as the new pasha, and when the sultan ordered Hafız Ahmed Pasha, the governor of Diyarbakir, to restore order in Baghdad, Bakr turned to Abbas, who sent troops to assist him. To prevent the Safavids from capturing Baghdad, Hafız Ahmed chose to negotiate with Bakr and convinced him to recognize the sultan's authority. In response, the Safavid forces besieged Baghdad and captured it in January 1624. In the wake of this major victory, Abbas's troops took control of most of Iraq, including Kirkuk, Mosul, Najaf, and Karbala, the last two cities being holy to the Shiites. To recover these territories, the sultan dispatched Hafiz Ahmed Pasha, who was appointed the grand vizier.

The Ottomans organized several campaigns in 1625–1639: in the first campaign, the Ottomans captured Mosul in northern Iraq but unsuccessfully besieged Baghdad in 1625–1626; three years later, after Shah Abbas died in January 1629, Grand Vizier Gazi Ekrem Khusrev Pasha led another campaign into Iraq. Although he was victorious at Mihriban (near Kermanshah) in May and sacked Hamadan in June,

he failed to capture Baghdad in November and was forced to return because of bad weather. The Safavids reclaimed parts of Iraq, their efforts facilitated by the Janissary revolt and the murder of the grand vizier in February 1632.

Sultan Murad spent almost five years subduing internal revolts before he was able to turn his attention to Iraq again. In March 1635, the sultan opened his campaign against Erivan, which was captured in August 1635. One month later, the Ottomans occupied Tabriz, but their campaign then stalled. Shah Sefi organized a Safavid counterattack that reclaimed Erivan in April 1636 and defeated the Ottomans at Ardalan (central Iran) in October. Sultan Murad delayed the start of a new campaign until 1638, when his army marched to Baghdad. Led personally by Murad, the Ottomans captured Baghdad in December 1638 and effectively restored their authority in Iraq. Peace negotiations soon began, resulting in the Treaty of Zuhab (or Treaty of Qasr-e Shirin), in May 1639, which established a boundary between the two empires that remained virtually unchanged into modern times. The treaty recognized Iraq (including Baghdad and the Shatt al-Arab), western Caucasia, and Kurdish territories as part of the Ottoman Empire but granted southwestern Caucasia to Iran.

In 1722, the Safavid dynasty collapsed after the Afghan invasion. As Iran descended into political chaos, the Ottomans regarded it as an opportunity to expand their territory in Azerbaijan and western Iran, but their efforts failed because of local resistance and the rise of Nadir Shah (1730–1747) of the Afshar dynasty.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Abbas the Great; Amasya (Amassia), Treaty of (1555); Chaldiran, Battle of (1514); Ismail, Shah (Safavid); Nadir Shah; Selim I; Suleiman the Magnificent; Tahmasp I, Shah; Zuhab (Zohab), Treaty of (Treaty of Qasr-e Shirin) (1639).

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P

Pakistan, War in Northwest (2004–)

A prolonged high-level insurgency in Pakistan's Waziristan area. Pakistan's northwestern provinces are part of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) where local tribes exercise considerable autonomy from central government. Fiercely independent and traditional, these tribes developed ties with the Taliban movement in Afghanistan in the 1990s and, by 2001, had contacts with Al Qaeda as well. After the start of the War on Terror and the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, the tribes sheltered many Taliban and Al Qaeda operatives who were forced to escape from Afghanistan.

By 2002, Pakistan came under increasing pressure from the United States to deal with these militants. In July 2002, Pakistan troops moved into Waziristan, where they tried unsuccessful to force local tribes to hand over militants. Tensions quickly escalated and led to open clashes between the government forces and tribes people. In December 2003, Pakistan president Pervez Musharraf escaped two assassination attacks that were traced to the militants in Waziristan. In response, Pakistan military escalated conflict by attacking Azam Warsak (near Wana) in South Waziristan, which was defended by several hundred militants. After heavy fighting on March 16–23, 2004, the Pakistani army seized the settlement and drove the militants into the mountains. In April, the militants agreed to an armistice, but Pakistani and American attacks on the militant leadership continued; Nek Muhammad Wazir, the Taliban commander, was killed in an unmanned drone attack in June 2004.

The tenuous armistice endured throughout 2005–2007 but was occasionally interrupted by militant attacks on Pakistani military installations and punitive counterstrikes by Pakistani and American forces. The Waziristan Peace Accord, signed on September 5, 2006, called for tribes to expel the foreign jihadists and for the Pakistani government to launch reconstruction projects and compensate tribes for loss of life and property. Despite the peace accord, clashes between militants and Pakistani forces continued. In October 2006, a Pakistani airstrike killed up to 80 people in a madrassa in the Bajaur region, and the retaliatory attack by the militants claimed the lives of more than 40 Pakistani soldiers. In June 2007, the militants seized the Lal Masjid mosque in Islamabad, the capital of Pakistan, and the Pakistani military's attack on the mosque on July 10–11 left about 170 dead and hundreds more wounded. This assault broke down the existing truce between Pakistan's

army and tribal areas and led to quick escalation in hostilities. Just three days later, on July 14, a suicide bomber killed 25 and wounded 54 Pakistani soldiers. Several more suicide attacks took places over the next several weeks. By mid-September, more than 220 people had been killed in bombings throughout Pakistan.

The Pakistani government responded by declaring a state of emergency and launching a new invasion into Waziristan, where fierce clashes continued throughout the fall. Hundreds of militants and dozens of Pakistani soldiers were killed over next two months of fighting. By mid-September, the Taliban militants had organized a major counterattack but were repelled with heavy losses, particularly in the battle at Mir Ali on October 7–10. The Pakistani army also faced resolute Taliban resistance in the Swat district, which ended in the government's victory only after a two-month fight that left around 400 militants and dozens of Pakistani soldiers dead. But Pakistani cities continued to live under the threat of continued terrorist attacks. On September 3, the militants launched a suicide attack on the headquarters of the Pakistani military in Rawalpindi that resulted in more that 85 casualties. On October 18, an attack on a motorcade of former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto left 139 dead and 450 wounded. Although Bhutto survived this attack, she did not survive a second attack on December 27, which also killed two dozen bystanders. The assassination of Bhutto, who was enjoying considerable popular support against Musharraf in the upcoming election, produced a wave of political violence across the country that left dozens dead and undermined the Pakistani government, which was accused of having a role in the assassination.

The year 2008 began with militant attacks on Pakistani military installations in South Waziristan, including assassination of a Pakistani general on February 25. In January, the Pakistani army launched Operation Zalzala, which expelled militants from South Waziristan but also displaced 200,000 local residents. The success of the Pakistani offensive compelled Baitulah Mehsud, the Taliban leader, to start negotiations with the government. A formal truce was signed on May 21, 2008, but broke down in June. In response to continued attacks the Pakistani army launched Operation Sirat-e-Mustaqeem, which secured government control in Khyber in June-July, and Operation Sherdil directed government forces into the Bajaur region, which was secured by February 2009. At the same time, after five years of hostilities and vast loss of life and property, many Pakistani tribes people in FATA turned against the militants and supported the Pakistani military. Yet, these pro-government tribes people soon came under intensive attacks from the Taliban militants.

The militants also continued asymmetrical warfare against the government, organizing a massive bombing of the Marriott Hotel in Islamabad that killed at least 54 and wounded more than 260 people. Pakistan's new president, Asif Ali Zardari, publicly vowed revenge in response to this bombing, and in late September, Pakistani troops, supported by American unmanned drones, launched a major offensive

Pakistani paramilitary soldiers stand at the ready beside a barbed wire barricade near the Red Mosque in Islamabad following a military assault, July 10, 2007. Around 50 suspected militants surrendered to government forces during a break in fighting at a mosque in the Pakistani capital, a military official said. (Asif Hassan/AFP/Getty Images)

in the Bajaur and Tang Khata regions of the FATA, killing over 1,000 militants over several weeks. By early 2009, the military secured these regions, but the Taliban militants then targeted military installations in Islamabad and Lahore, where an assault on a local police academy killed at least 95 policemen. Baitullah Mehsud threatened to launch two suicide attacks per week until the Pakistani army withdrew from the border region.

In April 2009, the Pakistani government chose to negotiate with the Tehreek-e-Nafaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi, a Taliban-aligned militant group that held authority in the Swat region. The government agreed to suspend military operations and allowed the introduction of the Sharia law in exchange for militant ceasefire. Yet, after reports of militants' mistreatment of local population in Swat, the Pakistani army launched Operation Toar Tander-I (April 26), which cleared Lower Dir and Buner districts by early May. The fighting proved to be particularly fierce in the Swat region, but the battle for Mingora, Swat's administrative center, ended with a government victory on May 30. The Pakistani army then turned its attention to the South Waziristan province, where it began concentrating its forces while Americans conducted drone attacks, one of which killed the Taliban leader Baitullah Mehsud in early August. Under their new leader, Hakimullah Mehsud, the Taliban

militants launched a new wave of attacks on military and civilian infrastructure in cities across Pakistan in October 2009. A month-long campaign claimed hundreds of lives and helped turn popular opinion in Pakistan against the militants.

On October 17, 2009, the Pakistani army launched a large-scale offensive into South Waziristan, which routed the Taliban forces and established the government's authority in the region by December. In early 2010, the government forces continued their offensives, this time targeting the Bajaur, Orakzai, and Kurram regions of the FATA. As of 2011, the Pakistani military had secured these regions, but the conflict is far from over and insurgent attacks on civilian and military installations continue to occur.

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See also: Afghanistan, U.S. War in (2001–); Taliban; Terrorism.

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Palestine Liberation Organization

The Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) was founded in 1964 by Palestinian representatives from the West Bank, Gaza, and the Palestinian Diaspora with the support of the Arab League. The idea of a Palestinian national body was Egyptian leader Gamal Abdel Nasser's. Nasser, constantly concerned with Israeli military power and his own peoples' unfulfilled political-economic desires, championed the new organization that would demonstrate to the Arab world, and to Nasser's domestic constituency, that he was doing something constructive for the Palestinians while effectively shifting the burden of representation to the new body. The existence of the PLO would place even greater military pressure on Israel, Egypt's most powerful and feared enemy.

Initially, the PLO, which was headed by Ahmad al-Shuqayri, was a weak organization that was under the military control of the countries in which it operated (Egypt, Syria, and Jordan). Following Israel's lightning victories over Egypt, Syria, and Jordan in 1967 and its subsequent military occupation of Gaza and the West Bank, which brought the majority of Palestinians under Israeli control, Yasir Arafat was able to take control of the PLO. Arafat, an Egyptian-educated Palestinian who had fought in the 1948 war, aimed to liberate all of the Palestine mandate, including

the 78 percent that had become the State of Israel, to create a secular Palestinian state. He had previously founded al-Fatah, a secular group that was nevertheless influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood, to conduct raids against Israeli targets and to help build a Palestinian military force. His fellow al-Fatah commanders also came to dominate the PLO's leadership after the 1967 war.

By the early 1970s, the PLO had established a state within a state in Jordan, which was home to a sizable Palestinian minority. Worried that Palestinian military activities were undermining his nation's sovereignty, Jordan's King Hussein attacked the PLO in September 1970. Although the conflict threatened to escalate into a regional war, Jordan was eventually successful and drove the PLO leadership out of Jordan and into Beirut. Following this event, however, the PLO leadership soon rebounded, and by the mid-1970s, the PLO had established itself as the global representative of the Palestinian people.

During their stay in Lebanon the PLO leadership again established a state within a state and continued to launch raids against Israel. In 1982 Israel invaded Lebanon in an attempt to drive the PLO out of Beirut. Although this invasion had disastrous public relations and political ramifications for Israel, by late 1982 the PLO leadership had agreed to leave Lebanon, and the United States guaranteed their safe passage. The PLO leadership soon relocated to Tunisia.

In the late 1980s two key events helped transform the PLO: the first Palestinian Intifada (uprising) and the U.S.-PLO dialogue. The intifada against Israel's 20-year occupation began in Gaza and soon spread to the West Bank, bringing international attention to the Palestinian cause. At the same time the PLO leadership announced its intention to honor previous United Nations resolutions that called for a two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Following this announcement, U.S. president Ronald Reagan's administration entered into its first official dialogue with the PLO. Although short-lived because of Arafat's subsequent support of Saddam Hussein in the 1991 Gulf War, this marked the beginning of the U.S.-PLO dialogue.

By the early 1990s the Israeli government and the PLO had entered into secret negotiations in Oslo, Norway, regarding a future peace settlement. In 1993 Arafat and Israeli prime minister Yitzhak Rabin signed the Oslo Accords at the White House, thus ushering in a new era of Israeli-Palestinian relations. Unfortunately, Rabin came under significant attack by right-wing politicians in Israel, such as Ariel Sharon and Benjamin Netanyahu, and Arafat was challenged by a new Palestinian Islamist movement, Hamas, that rejected the idea of a two-state solution and aimed to establish an Islamic government in all of the Palestine mandate. The situation continued to deteriorate. In 1995 Rabin was assassinated by a Jewish militant, and during the mid to late 1990s Hamas unleashed a series of suicide bombings inside Israel. Meanwhile, Israel continued to build settlements in the West Bank and Gaza, and the PLO leadership was accused of large-scale corruption by

Palestinians and foreigners. By 2000 the Oslo Accords had proven to be a failure, as Arafat and then Israeli prime minister Ehud Barak could not come to a final agreement over a future peace.

In 2000 a new, more violent intifada broke out in the West Bank and Gaza that included suicide attacks against Israeli civilians. Israel responded by using collective punishment against Palestinian militants and civilians. In 2005 Arafat died, and the Palestinians held a new election, voting Hamas into office and thus ending al-Fatah's (in reality the PLO's) 38-year rule. In 2007 a civil war erupted in Gaza in which Hamas drove al-Fatah supporters from the area. Al-Fatah responded by taking control of the West Bank with international support. The factional struggle continued throughout 2008 and 2009 but the two sides also began reconciliation talks which, as of 2011, produced no results. Thus, not only are the Palestinians without their own state, but they also lack any semblance of national unity.

Jonathan Sciarcon

See also: Arab-Israeli War (1967); Arab-Israeli War (1973); Arafat, Yasir; Fatah, al-; Hamas; Intifada, First (1987–1993); Intifada, Second (2000–2004); Lebanon, Israeli Invasion of (1982–; Oslo Accords (1993); Persian Gulf War (1991).

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Panipat, Battles of (1398, 1526, 1556, 1761)

The small northern Indian town of Panipat lies about 80 miles north of Delhi and is located along the main invasion route from central Asia. Over the centuries, it has been the scene of decisive battles between Muslim invaders and Indian defenders.

The earliest battle recorded at Panipat between Muslim invaders and Hindu defenders took place on December 17, 1398. The invader was the Mongol conqueror Timur, who was drawn by the wealth of Delhi, the seat of Mahmud Shah of the North Indian Delhi sultanate. Timur crossed the Indus River in October 1398, and met the sultan's army near Panipat. Like other Indian rulers, Mahmud's army used war elephants, about 120 of them, to intimidate and try to break the opposition. In response, Timur dug a trench in front of his army to keep the elephants away and ordered his mounted archers to seek to wound the beasts and kill the mahouts

(elephant handlers). He then had wood and hay placed on camels' backs—the wood was set on fire and the camels driven toward the elephants, who panicked and trampled Mahmud's army in their fright. At the same time, Timur executed flanking attacks that routed the enemy. After his victory, Timur sacked Delhi before withdrawing with a massive booty to Central Asia.

The next battle took place 127 years later, and is generally referred to as the First Battle of Panipat. Babur, the great-great-grandson of Timur, ruled over Kabul, but was determined to expand southward into India. With a well-disciplined army of some 12,000 men, Babur crossed the Indus River in December 1525. Many of his soldiers were armed with firearms, and 15 to 20 cannons further increased Babur's firepower. He reached Panipat around April 21, 1526, and waited on his opponent, Ibrahim Lodhi, sultan of the Delhi sultanate, who led an army of 30,000–40,000 fighting men, along with 60,000 camp followers (both Hindus and Muslims) and around 100 war elephants. The battle took place on April 21. When Lodhi's elephants attacked, Babur used his cannons and firearms against them. The noise and smoke helped frighten the elephants, causing them to panic and run away, trampling sultan's troops. Babur then enveloped Lodhi's flanks, while many of Lodhi's units failed to get into action and withdrew as the battle turned against them. Ibrahim Lodhi was killed in the battle, which marked the founding of the Mughal Empire in India.

The Second Battle of Panipat took place only 30 years later. In 1556, the Mughal ruler Humayun died and was succeeded by his 13-year-old son Akbar. Mughal power had greatly declined since the days of Babur, and local Hindu rulers in India tried to take advantage of the perceived weakness to overthrow the Mughals. Hemu (Samrat Hem Chandra Vikramaditya), a successful and popular Hindu general, led an army through northern India and captured Delhi. Hemu established a kingdom and prepared to meet the Muslim Mughal counterattack. Akbar's guardian and mentor was Bairam Khan, an aggressive general who was determined to restore Mughal authority. The two sides met at Panipat on November 5, 1556. Hemu's army included dozens of elephants (Akbar claimed that the enemy army had as many as 1,500 elephants), and Hemu himself directed the battle from atop an elephants named Hawai. The battle began with an elephant charge. Bairam Khan withdrew his troops behind a deep ravine, which was impassable for elephants, and he used mounted archers to harass the enemy from the flanks. As the elephant charge slackened, the Mughals counterattacked, forcing Hemu to hasten to the threatened spot. The *Akbarnama*, an official biographical account of Akbar, described Hemu "showing every stratagem which his powerful capacity could conceive" to stop the enemy attack, but as he led a charge to break the Mughal line, a chance arrow hit him in the eye. The badly wounded Hemu fell, disheartening his soldiers while the Mughals attacked and scattered his army; Hemu was captured and later executed. The Mughals followed up their victory by capturing Delhi and eventually extending their rule over most of India.

The final Battle of Panipat took place on January 14, 1761, between Afghan and Maratha armies. By the mid-18th century, Mughal power had been declining, and their subject peoples had gained greater autonomy. The Marathas in particular had expanded their control into northern India, where they came into conflict with Ahmad Shah Abdali, ruler of Afghanistan. Abdali had sacked Delhi in 1757 but allowed the Mughals to remain as titular rulers. When the Mughals called upon the Marathas for assistance, Abdali gathered an army of some 100,000 (with 80–90 guns and about 1,500 camel swivels) and marched on Delhi. The Maratha army, commanded by Sadashiv Rao Bhau, had about 70,000 men (including European-trained infantry and 200 artillery) but was followed by tens of thousands of camp followers who limited its operations.

The first two months of confrontation were a series of feints and skirmishes by the opposing forces, with varying degrees of success for both sides. The Marathas established a fortified camp near Panipat but soon suffered from dwindling supplies and stores. Abdali gradually managed to cut the Marathas' supply lines and forced them to accept the battle near Panipat, where the armies met on January 14, 1761. The battle began with the Marathas successfully attacking Abdali's right flank and center, where some Afghan troops began to buckle. But the Afghan left flank, led by Najib Khan, held ground, allowing Abdali to counterattack with his elite reserve cavalry, which turned the Marathas' flanks and then their line. The Maratha army was routed and suffered devastating losses. After the Marathas' defeat, Abdali allowed his troops to massacre the fleeing Marathas and their camp followers, resulting in the death of up to 80,000 soldiers and civilians. The Afghans lost about 30,000 soldiers in the battle. Despite his victory, Abdali soon withdrew from India, which descended into long civil strife as various political factions fought for power. The Battle of Panipat cleared the way for later British supremacy as the British East India Company was able to take advantage of internal turmoil to establish itself as the major power in India by early 19th century.

Tim J. Watts

See also: Abdali, Ahmad Shah; Akbar; Babur; Timur.

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Passarowitz, Treaty of (1718)

Peace treaty, also known as the Treaty of Požarevac, signed between the Ottoman Empire, Habsburg Austria, and the Republic of Venice. The treaty came in the wake of the Austro-Ottoman War, which saw the Ottomans score important victories over the Venetians but suffer defeats at the hands of the Austrian troops of Prince Eugene of Savoy. Under the treaty, the Porte agreed to relinquish the Banat of Temeswar, most of Serbia, and parts of northern Bosnia and Lesser Walachia (Oltenia) to Austria. Venice lost its possessions on the Peloponnesus peninsula and Crete, but retained the Ionian Islands and Dalmatia.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Austro-Ottoman Wars; Venetian-Ottoman Wars.

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Patrona Khalil Revolt (1730)

An armed uprising that occurred in the Ottoman Empire in 1730 and brought an end to the reign of Sultan Ahmed III and to the Tulip Period (1718–1730) more generally. The revolt marked a realignment of forces within the Ottoman government and was the only Turkish uprising of the 18th century not instigated by the army.

Though support for the centralized government of the Ottoman sultan had traditionally come from the military elite and the ulama (learned Muslim leaders), the reforms Ahmed had tried to introduce had a French-influenced secular trend that was disturbing to these two groups. Neither did the reforms succeed at improving the economy, and inflation, taxation, and banditry made life difficult for the common people. When the Ottoman military was defeated in Iran by the forces of

Nadir Shah in 1729, all of these strands of discontent came together in opposition to Ahmed III.

Patrona Khalil was the lowly employee of a Turkish bathhouse in Constantinople who led a mob uprising in that city in 1730. In the midst of this popular disorder, the ulama provided the movement with legitimacy by defining a religious basis for the opposition. Ahmed was deposed and died in captivity in 1736. The new sultan, Mahmud I, was forced to spend the first months of his rule trying to suppress the rebellion and an uprising among the Janissaries that followed in 1731. The Patrona Khalil Revolt marked the beginning of an anti-Western, religiously oriented current of opinion in the Ottoman Empire that existed throughout the 18th and 19th centuries alongside the desire for reform based on Western models.

Karen Mead

See also: Nadir Shah; Ottoman-Iranian Wars (18th–19th Centuries).

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Persian Gulf War (1991)

The Persian Gulf War resulted from the Iraqi invasion of neighboring Kuwait. In July 1990, U.S. intelligence detected an Iraqi military buildup along the Kuwaiti border. On July 17, Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein threatened military action against Kuwait for its violation of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) oil caps. Overproduction had driven down the price of oil. Because of Iraq's recently completed eight-year war with Iran (1980–1988), it had accumulated a war debt of $80 billion, and Baghdad was anxious to keep oil prices high. There was also an ongoing Iraqi border dispute with Kuwait over charges of Kuwaiti slant-drilling into Iraqi-controlled oil fields. Finally, Iraq had long claimed Kuwait as a province.

Washington had been increasingly concerned over Iraq's expanding nuclear industry and its chemical and biological weapons, some of which Hussein had used in the war against Iran and even against his own people, the Kurds. But U.S. policy was ambiguous, and Iraqis knew that Washington had tacitly supported them in the war with Iran, providing satellite intelligence information on Iran. U.S. Ambassador to Baghdad April Glaspie delivered mixed messages on behalf of the George H. W. Bush administration that seemed to allow Hussein free rein

in the Persian Gulf. Hussein thus believed Washington would probably not challenge a move against Kuwait. On its part, the State Department did not believe Hussein would actually mount a full-scale invasion. If military action occurred, Washington expected only a limited offensive to force the Kuwaitis to accede to Iraqi oil production demands. Clearly, Washington underestimated Hussein's ambitions.

On August 2, 1990, Iraqi forces invaded Kuwait and speedily overran the country. The United States demanded that Hussein recall his troops from Kuwait. When he refused, the Bush administration took action. Washington feared that an unchecked Iraq would threaten Saudi Arabia, which possessed the world's largest oil reserves, and thus would be able to control the price and flow of oil to the West. Bush also saw Hussein as a new Adolf Hitler and was determined that there would be no Munich-like appeasement of aggression.

On paper Iraq appeared formidable. Its army numbered more than 950,000 men, and it had some 5,500 main battle tanks, of which 1,000 were modern T-72s; 6,000 armored personnel carriers; and about 3,500 artillery weapons. Hussein ultimately deployed 43 divisions to Kuwait, positioning most of them along the border with Saudi Arabia.

In Operation Desert Shield, designed to protect Saudi Arabia and prepare for the liberation of Kuwait, the United States put together an impressive coalition that included Syria, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia as well as Britain, France, and many other states. Altogether, coalition assets grew to 665,000 men, 3,600 tanks, and substantial air and naval assets.

Hussein remained intransigent but also quiescent, allowing the buildup of coalition forces in Saudi Arabia to proceed unimpeded. When the deadline for Hussein to withdraw from Kuwait passed on 15 January 1991, coalition commander U.S. Army general H. Norman Schwarzkopf unleashed Operation Desert Storm on January 16. It began with a massive air offensive, striking targets in Kuwait and throughout Iraq, including Baghdad. In only a few days the coalition had established absolute air supremacy over the battlefield. Iraq possessed nearly 800 combat aircraft and an integrated air defense system controlling 3,000 antiaircraft missiles, but it was unable to win a single air-to-air engagement, and coalition aircraft soon destroyed the bulk of the Iraqi Air Force. Air superiority ensured success on the ground.

The air campaign destroyed important Iraqi targets along the Saudi border. Night after night B-52s dropped massive bomb loads in classic attrition warfare, and many Iraqi defenders were simply buried alive. Schwarzkopf also mounted an elaborate deception to convince the Iraqis that the coalition was planning an amphibious assault against Kuwait. This feint pinned down a number of Iraqi divisions. In reality, Schwarzkopf had planned a return to large-scale maneuver warfare, which tested the U.S. Army's new AirLand Battle concept.

On February 24, Allied forces executed simultaneous drives along the coast, while the 101st Airborne Division established a position 50 miles behind the border. As the Marines moved up the coast toward Kuwait City, they were hit in the flank by Iraqi armor. In the largest tank battle in the history of the U.S. Marine Corps, the Marines, supported by coalition airpower, easily defeated the Iraqis. The

Kuwaiti soldiers sit beside an Iraqi BMP-2 infantry fighting vehicle captured during Operation Desert Storm in 1991. (U.S. Department of Defense)

battle was fought in a surrealist day-into-night atmosphere caused by the smoke of oil wells set afire by the retreating Iraqis.

In the next four days, Allied forces had liberated Kuwait, and on February 28, President Bush stopped the war. He feared the cost of an assault on Baghdad and was also concerned that Iraq might then break up into a Kurdish north, a Sunni Muslim center, and a Shiite Muslim south. Bush wanted to keep Iraq intact to counter a resurgent Iran.

The war was among the most lopsided in history. Iraq lost 3,700 tanks, more than 1,000 other armored vehicles, and 3,000 artillery pieces. In contrast, the coalition lost four tanks, nine other combat vehicles, and one artillery piece. In human terms, the Allies sustained 500 casualties (150 dead), many of these from accidents and friendly fire. Iraqi casualties totaled between 25,000 and 100,000 dead, with the best estimates being around 60,000. The coalition also took 80,000 Iraqis prisoner. Perhaps an equal number simply deserted.

Following the cease-fire, Hussein reestablished his authority. He put down, at great cost to the civilian population, revolts by the Shiites and Kurds. He also defied United Nations inspection teams by failing to account for all of his biological and chemical weapons, the so-called weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Ultimately, President George W. Bush would use the alleged presence of WMD

as an excuse to send U.S. and allied forces to invade and occupy Iraq in another war in 2003.

Spencer C. Tucker

See also: Hussein, Saddam; Medina Ridge, Battle of (1991).

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Peterwardein, Battle of (1716)

Major Austrian victory over the Ottoman forces during the Austro-Ottoman War of 1716–1718. In 1699, the Treaty of Karlowitz established a peace between Austria and the Ottoman Empire that continued for 15 years. During this time, both empires waged wars on other fronts, and Sultan Ahmed III concentrated his efforts on reclaiming lands in Greece, which resulted in the start of the Venetian-Ottoman War in 1714. Austria accused the Turks of breaking the Treaty of Karlowitz by endangering Venetian interests and made a defensive alliance with Venice in 1716.

In 1716, Grand Vizier Damal Ali gathered about 120,000 men around Belgrade and, crossing the Sava River, marched north. At the town of Peterwardein (Petrovaradin), he encountered the Austrian army (about 85,000 men) led by the brilliant commander Prince Eugene of Savoy, who built a fortified camp near the town. After skirmishes on August 2–4, the decisive battle began with an Austrian attack at dawn on August 5. The Austrians captured the Ottoman artillery but were repelled in the center. The Ottoman counterattack failed to break into the Austrian fortified camp, while Eugene of Savoy launched flanking attacks that encircled the Turks and bombarded them with his flotilla guns from the Danube River. The battle ended by afternoon with a decisive Austrian victory. On the sultan's orders, the grand vizier was executed after the battle. The victory at Peterwardein allowed the Austrians to seize the Banat of Temesvar, the only remaining Ottoman region in Hungary. The following year, the Austrians invaded Serbia, capturing Belgrade in August 1717. With the Austrians controlling much of Serbia and western Wallachia, the

Ottomans sued for peace. In 1718, the Treaty of Passarowitz confirmed Austrian gains in Hungary, Serbia, and Wallachia.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Austro-Ottoman Wars; Karlowitz, Treaty of (1699); Venetian-Ottoman Wars.

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Piale (Piyale) Pasha (d. 1578)

Ottoman naval commander. Born in Hungary of Croat origin, Piale was brought to Istanbul in early youth and served as a page at the Ottoman court, although details of his early years are lacking. He came to prominence in 1554 when he was appointed as kapudan pasha (grand admiral) of the Ottoman navy and conducted successful attacks on the islands of Elba and Corsica. In 1555, Sultan Suleiman dispatched him to assist France against Spain, and he spent two years successfully operating off the Spanish coastline in the western Mediterranean. In 1558, he sailed, together with Turgut Reis, off the coastline of Italy, capturing Reggio Calabria, the Aeolian Islands, Massa Lubrense, Cantone, and other towns. Later the same year they raided and captured Minorca, causing great consternation in Spain, whose King Philip II negotiated a Holy League to counter the Ottoman attacks.

In early spring 1650, the Holy League fleet, which included vessels from Spain, Venice, Genoa, Savoy, and the Papal States, captured Djerba, a strategically located island that controlled sea lanes along the North African coastline. Piale Pasha quickly sailed to face the Christians, and on May 11, 1560, he surprised the Christian navy as it lay at anchor near the island. In a matter of hours, the Ottoman fleet destroyed or captured most of the Holy League's navy, gaining one of the greatest Ottoman naval victories. Piale Pasha's victory at Djerba marked the zenith of the Ottoman naval dominance in the Mediterranean, which lasted until 1571. After destroying the enemy fleet, Piale Pasha captured the fort on the island and returned with about 5,000 Christian captives to Constantinople, where he was greeted with joyous celebrations. As a reward, Sultan Suleiman allowed him to marry one of his granddaughters.

Piale Pasha returned to the sea in 1563 when he raided and captured Naples. Two years later, he participated in the failed Ottoman expedition to Malta. In 1566, Piale Pasha conducted successful attacks on Chios and the Apulian coast and, after Sultan

Suleiman departed for a campaign in Hungary, Piale Pasha was left in charge of the harbor and arsenal of Constantinople. In 1568, he was promoted to vizier, and two years later he commanded the Ottoman navy during the Ottoman conquest of Cyprus. His failure to prevent Venetian relief from reaching Famagusta, however, resulted in his disgrace. After the Ottoman defeat at Lepanto, Piale Pasha was called back and given command of the Ottoman navy. He successfully rebuilt the fleet and continued to conduct vigorous naval campaigns. He died in Constantinople on January 21, 1578, and was buried at the Piale Pasha Mosque, which he had built under the direction of the famous Ottoman architect Sinan.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Barbarossa Hayreddin Pasha; Kemal Reis; Lepanto, Battle of (1571); Suleiman the Magnificent; Turgut Reis.

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Plassey, Battle of (1757)

The battle that gave control of Bengal (and eventually much of India) to the British. In the 18th century, India saw a struggle for colonial supremacy between France and Britain. The British East India Company had the delegated power of a sovereign state and its own private army, which it used to expand its influence over Indian rulers. In April 1756, Siraj-ud-daula (Suraha Dowla) inherited the crown of Bengal and cast covetous eyes on the trading post of British East India Company at Calcutta, where he believed massive wealth was to be had. He sent his army against Calcutta, which quickly fell to his overwhelming force. For reasons that have never been fully explained, he caused 146 British prisoners to be locked in a tiny cell overnight on one of the hottest nights of the year. Only 23 survived. The other 123 suffocated, and this created the legend of the "Black Hole of Calcutta."

The East India Company rallied its forces, and several months later a force under Colonel Robert Clive, mixed regular British troops and East India Company troops, recaptured Calcutta and sought to punish Siraj-ud-daula, whose army they encountered near Plassey on June 23, 1757. The British then began a process of negotiations, not so much with Siraj-ud-daula, but with his lieutenants, who had grown weary of his violence and arrogance. Clive marched against Siraj-ud-daula with a force of 613 European infantry, 100 Eurasian soldiers, 171 artillery, and

2,100 Sepoys facing 50,000 Bengalese troops and more than 40 cannon manned by French gunners. The British won the battle by standing fast, while treachery and treason in the Bengalese ranks, provoked by British negotiations and bribes, which fed the anger of Siraj-ud-daula's generals, caused them to desert him. In addition, the weather proved to be a decisive factor: a sudden monsoon rainstorm wet the Bengalese powder while the British covered their artillery and used it to inflict casualties on the enemy. Unable to continue the battle when his generals refused to act or outright betrayed him, Siraj-ud-daula fled, abandoning his army, but was captured and executed by one his generals on July 2, 1757. As the result of the Battle at Plassey, Bengal fell totally under British domination, soon to be followed by the rest of India, laying the very foundation for the British Indian Empire.

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Plevna (Pleven), Siege of (1877)

Russian siege of the Ottoman fortress of Plevna, in present-day Bulgaria, July 20 to December 10, 1877, during the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877–1878. The Ottoman defense slowed the main Russian advance south into Bulgaria.

In July 1877, Grand Duke Nicholas led the Russian Army into present-day Bulgaria and occupied the city of Nikopol on July 16. Osman Pasha, leading an army to reinforce the city, then occupied Plevna about 20 miles south of Nikopol and began reinforcing the city for an expected Russian siege.

Russian forces, reinforced with Romanians, began the Siege of Plevna on July 19. For the next two weeks, the besieging forces tried to break through the defenses, but the Ottoman defenders repulsed their attacks. By early September, the Russian-Romanian army numbered 100,000 men, and Osman Pasha had about 30,000 men.

A large-scale Russian-Romanian assault on Plevna on September 11 gave the besieging force a section of the fortifications. By October 24, the Russians and Romanians completely encircled the fortress. Osman wanted to abandon the fortress, but the Ottoman high command refused. With supplies running low, Osman's forces, outnumbered almost 5 to 1, unsuccessfully tried to break out during the night of

December 9. Osman Pasha surrendered after being wounded. Although Osman was treated honorably, thousands of Ottoman soldiers perished in the winter snows on their way into captivity, and the Bulgarians massacred the wounded Ottoman soldiers left behind in military hospitals.

The siege had held up the main Russian advance into Bulgaria and captured the world's admiration, gaining the Ottomans sympathy at the Congress of Berlin. The fall of Plevna provided reinforcements to the Russian army, which decisively defeated the Ottoman army at the fourth battle of Shipka Pass, January 5–9, 1878, opening the way to Constantinople.

Robert B. Kane

See also: Osman Nuri Pasha; Russo-Ottoman Wars.

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Polish-Ottoman Wars

By the 16th century, after consolidating their Balkan victories, Ottoman armies pushed closer to Central Europe. Genoese Black Sea trading posts, like Kaffa (Caffa), fell under Ottoman control in the 1470s–1480s, and Moldavia submitted to Ottoman domination in 1495. These efforts drew attention from Austria, Hungary, and the Commonwealth of Poland and Lithuania. Diplomacy and royal marriages often connected these Christian nations in efforts to halt Muslim Ottoman aggression. The Nikopolis (1396) and Varna (1444) campaigns are early examples, albeit disastrous defeats for the allies. These actions strained the already poor relations between the Ottomans and the Commonwealth. Despite a 1533 treaty that pledged "perpetual friendship and alliance," every Ottoman advance pushed the Sultan's armies closer to Poland-Lithuania, while regional politics drew both countries toward war.

Moldavia, desired for its resources and trade routes by both the Commonwealth and the Ottomans, played a part in this contention. When not directly battling each other, as in 1620–1621, both nations sponsored outside forces to conduct proxy wars—the Crimean Tatars for the Ottomans and the Ukranian Cossacks for the

Commonwealth. The latter, headquartered in the "Wild Lands," a sparsely settled frontier zone of the southern Ukraine and Moldavia, were a collection of adventurers, bandits, pirates, and mercenaries. Seldom unified under one leader, Cossack factions maintained fortified outposts, like the Zaparozhskaya Sich, located on an island in the Dnieper River.

Fearless and contemptuous of authority, Cossacks prized their independence above all else. Although a problem for all their neighbors, Cossacks were most often at odds with the Ottomans or Tatars. Both Moscow and Poland-Lithuania used Cossacks as border guards, mainly to protect the Wild Lands and beyond from Tatar raiders. These Muslim descendants of the Mongols maintained a predatory state based in the Crimea. Every year, *Tchambouls*, large parties of Tatar horsemen, which could total up to 20,000 men, moved north looking for loot and slaves.

These raids were but one part of a complex series of rebellions, invasions, and general chaos that racked the Moldavia and the Ukraine between 1648 and 1667. Cossacks aligned for, and then against, both the Commonwealth and Moscow. Finally, the new leader of the Tatars, Khan Adil Ghiray, forged an alliance with Piotr Doroszenko, a Cossack faction leader, for a grand raid into Polish territories. Late summer of 1667 saw a combined Tatar-Cossack army of nearly 30,000 men crossing the frontier. Noted for their horsemanship and raiding skills, Tatars and Cossacks were excellent light cavalry but lacked artillery, and they were easily disrupted by massed musket fire. Warsaw knew this, and refusing to believe that Orthodox Christian Cossacks would make common cause with Muslim Tatars, refused funds for building a counterforce.

Poland-Lithuania's local commander, Jan Sobieski, combining his personal retinue with local troops, had but 8,000 soldiers. Moving into the Polish sector of the Wild Lands placed the invaders in Podolia, a land of plains, hills, swamps, and sparse forests dominated by the Dniester and Southern Bug rivers. The former is navigable for its entire length, and the latter is interrupted by swamps and rapids. Podolia also featured Kamieniec Podolski (Kamianets-Podilskyi), a powerful fortress and arms depot. Brilliant tactics allowed Sobieski to defeat the Tatar-Cossack alliance. Using Kamieniec Podolski, strategically placed earthworks, and mobile wagon forts, he divided his army into small mutually supporting units. Each had the task of holding river crossings, smashing enemy raiders, or falling back onto fortified positions when faced by superior numbers. Taking 3,000 of his best soldiers, Sobieski constructed a fortified camp at Podhajce, which allowed him to cut the invader's main supply line. A large Tatar-Cossack force moved to besiege his position, but it was routed when the Poles launched a night assault on October 4, 1667. Sobieski next secured a truce but also asked for reinforcements. Parsimonious magnates who dominated Poland-Lithuania's parliament (*Sejm*) refused to fund this request, arguing that Sobieski was capable of dealing with any contingency.

Their focus was not on military affairs, but rather the election of a new monarch to succeed Jan Kazimierz, who had died on August 16, 1668.

After considerable politicking, Michal Wisniowiecki, leader of a Ruthenian magnate family greatly disliked by the Cossacks, became king on September 29, 1669. A pious fool who "could speak eight languages but had nothing intelligent to say in any of them," he would only make enemies and encourage dissension within his semi-anarchic government. Doroszenko positioned himself to benefit from this by aligning his Cossacks with the Ottomans. Thus encouraged, Sultan Mehmed IV declared himself "the protector of the Cossacks," sending an Ottoman army north, while calling up his Tatar vassals. Poland-Lithuania now faced a severe challenge, as the combined enemy forces had a significant advantage in numbers, and the Ottomans possessed a first-rate army. Comprising cavalry, artillery and elite Janissary infantry, the army numbered 80,000 men who moved into Podolia during the hot August 1672. On August 29, after a siege of only seven days, Kamieniec Podolski surrendered. This powerful fortress was symbolic of the weakened state of Polish-Lithuanian armies, for despite having more than 200 cannon, it had a garrison of only 250 men—all but four incapable of serving as artillerymen.

Sobieski responded with a 150-mile raid into Tatar/Cossack-controlled Ukraine, destroying forts, arms depots, and enemy villages. From October 5 to 14, he smashed smaller Tatar forces, killing, capturing, or dispersing nearly 22,000 enemy riders. Although a brilliant raid that showed Sobieski could "out-Tatar the Tatars," this did not stop Polish diplomats from recognizing Podolia as an Ottoman fief administered by Doroszenko, plus agreeing to pay a yearly tribute of 22,500 gold ducats to the sultan. Unwilling to ratify this humiliating document, the *Sejm* instead voted to raise a 40,000-man army for a war of revenge. Sobieski started this campaign with additional defeats of Tatar raiders at Niemirów and Komarno. Dispersed by Sobieski's superior tactics, the Tatars were hunted down by enraged peasants, and in the words of Polish nobleman Jan Chryzostom Pasek, "died like dogs."

These setbacks sent Tatars reeling back to the Crimea, and deprived the Ottoman army of valuable scouts. The Ottoman army was split into three parts, 30,000 were entrenched at Chocim, on the Dniester, under the command of Hussein, the grand vizier. Sobieski, now reinforced with a similar-sized force, managed to sneak up and launch a surprise attack on November 11, 1673. Routed, the Ottomans attempted to flee over a single bridge, which quickly collapsed under their combined weight. The Ottoman force was annihilated, and the Poles captured 120 guns, hundreds of standards, and plenty of loot.

Sobieski followed up his victory with an offensive into Ottoman-dominated Moldavia, forcing the Turkish garrison at Jassam to abandon the town and flee south. In addition, he detached a force to regain Kamieniec Podolski. Neither action was completed before the news arrived that King Michal had died on November 10. In the Commonwealth, kings did not inherit the throne, but were instead elected. Voting was the prerogative of all aristocrats, and a chance to enrich themselves at

the expense of candidates. Combined with Poland-Lithuania's perennial lack of funds for military salaries, there was little chance to keep the army in Moldavia—instead, it disintegrated.

Sobieski returned to Warsaw, where his victories over Cossacks, Tatars, and Turks made him a candidate for the throne. After some debate, the hero of Chocim became the king of Poland-Lithuania on May 19, 1674. In addition, the *Sejm* authorized funding for a new army to fight the Ottomans. It was organized just in time, as a new force of more than 100,000 Turkish soldiers crossed the Dniester, and advanced on Lwow.

Sobieski again used his hit-and-run tactics backed by mobile wagon-forts and earthworks. On August 24, 1675, at the Battle of Lwow, he demolished a Tatar army of 20,000. Reconcentrating his forces, Sobieski drove the Ottomans back into Moldavia. The final battle of the war took place at Zurawno, from September 25 to October 14, 1676. Again Sobieski used earthworks and his wagon-forts to protect his 20,000 troops from the 100,000 Turks and Tatars under Ibrahim Pasha. Spirited assaults only produced heavy Ottoman losses, while Sobieski advanced his redoubts to within musket range of the Turkish main camp. At this point Ibrahim suggested negotiations, and a final conclusion to the Polish-Ottoman Wars came with the Treaty of Zuravno, which required the commonwealth to surrender part of Podolia but eliminated tribute.

John P. Dunn

See also: Austro-Ottoman Wars; Hungarian-Ottoman Wars (1437–1526); Russo-Ottoman Wars; Zuravno, Treaty of (1676).

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Portuguese Colonial Wars in Arabia

Moorish control over Portugal, beginning in the eighth century and lasting through the Reconquista, fostered a strong anti-Islamic and anti-Arabic element to Portuguese nationalism. As Portuguese exploration and trade increased,

entrepots on the Arabian Peninsula grew in importance because they were midway points between Africa and the Indies and because Arab traders controlled much of the trade in East Africa and engaged in trade with the Indies, as did Persians.

The Portuguese crown charged Afonso de Albuquerque with attacking Aden, but given limited resources he instead engaged in raids on the Arabian Peninsula and then an attack on the Persian sultanate of Hormuz in 1507. He took the city and made it a tributary state, garrisoned by the construction of a fort, but the following year the sultanate rose in revolt and regained its independence. After 1510, as governor of the Estado da Índia, Albuquerque attempted to control key geographic points to secure shipping routes and the spice and gold trades. In 1513, Albuquerque assaulted Aden to control the Red Sea and to strike against Egypt, which competed with the Portuguese as intermediaries in the spice trade between the Indies and Europe, but the fortress proved too difficult to take. Albuquerque returned in 1515, however, and retook Hormuz. Though on the Persian side of the gulf, Hormuz controlled key ports on the Arabic side, and when Hormuz became a tributary of the Portuguese crown those ports went over to the Portuguese as well. Hormuz became a captaincy with a captain appointed for three years who headed a local garrison that provided military protection and ensured local control.

In 1521, Hormuz revolted, but in 1523, the Portuguese restored order and replaced the shah with a new ruler. Subsequent rebellions against Portuguese authority occurred in Hormuz and cities on the Arabian side of the gulf, but they were put down throughout the 16th century. From Hormuz the Portuguese engaged in raids in the Red Sea and Arabia.

The Ottoman Empire seized Egypt in 1517, expanded into the Arabian Peninsula, and took control of trade in the Red Sea. In 1551, the Portuguese captured Al Qatif in Arabia from the Ottoman Turks. The Ottomans in turn attacked Muscat and Bahrain, which they failed to take. By 1554, the Portuguese had eliminated Ottoman sea power in the Persian Gulf and had fortified Muscat and Bahrain, ensuring that the Portuguese would control trade in the area. In 1581, Ottomans again destroyed Muscat, and in 1602, Shah Abbas drove the Portuguese from Bahrain. More troubling than the Ottoman threat, however, was increased competition from the British and Dutch in Africa, the Indies, and Arabia. The British East India Company allied with the Persians to seize Ormuz; the British provided naval support to blockade the port, while the Persians besieged the city, a move that resulted in Ormuz's fall in 1622. Even so, a series of fortresses in the Gulf and on the Arabian Peninsula provided Portugal with influence in the Persian Gulf, though they no longer held a monopoly on gulf trade. As in India, northern European powers played on indigenous people's animus against Portuguese abuses and trading practices. Oman, aided by the Dutch and the British, developed as a sea power and seized

the main Portuguese stronghold on the Arabian Peninsula at Muscat in 1650. From there, Oman challenged Portuguese trade in Africa and attacked Portuguese commerce in the Indian Ocean.

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See also: Abbas the Great; Mamluk-Ottoman War.

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Portuguese-Moroccan Wars

In the 15th century, the Portuguese expanded in North Africa as part of the continuation of the Reconquista of Portugal, rather than as an extension of Portuguese expansion into the Atlantic or down the coast of Africa. Over the history of the Portuguese empire, the Catholic church and religious orders advocated Portuguese expansion in Islamic North Africa. At times, however, this expansion came up against political opposition from other elements within Portugal who wanted to devote more resources to the Atlantic, Brazil, India or other areas of the east, and Africa. In 1415, Portugal seized control of Ceuta, the Mediterranean port opposite Gibraltar, from the Moors. Ceuta played a large role in the African gold trade, so its seizure expanded both Christianity and the Portuguese commercial empire. Soon after, however, Portuguese trading posts in West Africa reoriented toward the African gold trade, making Ceuta an expense that failed to justify itself commercially. The Portuguese encouraged Islamic leaders and communities near the Atlantic and in Mediterranean coastal cities to cooperate with them in opposing the emir of Marrakech. In 1437, the Portuguese mounted a failed attack on a second North African port, Tangier. In 1458, the Portuguese captured a second major Moroccan port at Alcazer and then gained control of Tangier and Arzila in 1471.

The Portuguese captured Mediterranean cities but failed to make inroads into the Moroccan interior. The Portuguese presence relied largely on seapower; the cities required substantial garrisons, and the expense and greater commercial opportunities elsewhere impeded further expansion into Morocco. Even so, with this control over key ports and much of coastal Morocco, many Moors acceded to Portuguese authority if not direct control within Morocco. Portuguese expansion into Morocco brought Portugal up against Spanish conquests in the same area. In 1501, the Portuguese mounted a failed expedition into Algeria but captured the coastal city of

Mazagan in 1502. Over the course of the 16th century the Portuguese undertook greater control of the Atlantic Coast of Morocco by seizing ports, demanding direct tribute to the crown and constructing fortresses. In 1508, Portugal took the Moroccan weaving center Safi on the Atlantic coast in 1507 and Azemour in 1513. Portuguese soldiers along the frontier began to engage in raids into the interior, and Portuguese settlers, both Jews and Christians, settled in Morocco.

In 1542, the Moroccans captured the Portuguese fort of Santa Cruz. John III of Portugal, under increasing pressure from the Moors and the Ottoman Empire, pursued a policy that abandoned fortresses in Morocco, including Safi, Alcazer, and Arzila, leaving the crown with three coastal forts at Ceuta, Tangiers, and Mazagan, and all three were subject to attacks by the Moors. In 1576, the Moroccans captured Fez with Ottoman aid. In 1578, under King Sebastião, the Portuguese led a large force to Tangier that was destroyed at Alcazarquivir (Alcazar el Kebir) by a Moroccan force under King Abd al-Malik, who died at the battle. Portuguese king Sebastião also died in the battle, and his death led to the eventual union of the Portuguese and Spanish crowns. These Portuguese defeats in the 16th century can be attributed to conflicting methods of establishing armed forces. Portugal relied on a feudal system of retainers, supplemented by mercenary and local auxiliaries, whereas other European powers and Moroccan leaders had centralized professional armies. When Portugal regained its independence from Spain in 1640, it received Mazagan and Tangiers back, but Ceuta remained under Spanish control. Portugal transferred control of Tangiers to the English in 1661 as part of Princess Catarina's dowry upon her marriage to Charles II. Mazagan remained in Portuguese hand until 1769 when the government chose to abandon the city to a large Moroccan force given the large expense of defending the post.

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See also: Alcazarquivir, Battle of (1578); al-Mansur, Ahmad ibn Muhammad.

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Preveza, Battle of (1538)

Decisive Ottoman naval victory over a coalition of European states. By the early 1530s, the Ottomans conducted wide-ranging operations in the Mediterranean Sea that resulted in the capture of numerous islands in the Ionian and Aegean seas and

threatened territories controlled by the Republic of Venice, the Knights of Malta, and other European states. To counter this threat, Pope Paul III organized a Holy League of Spain, Genoa, Venice, Malta, and the Papal States, which gathered a massive fleet of 112 galleys, 50 galleons, and about 140 barques; Marco Grimani led the Papal fleet, Vincenzo Capello commanded the Venetian fleet, and Andrea Doria, who arrived with the Spanish-Genoese navy, provided overall command for the European fleet. The Ottoman navy, commanded by Barbarossa Hayreddin Pasha, mustered 122 galleys and galliots.

The two navies met near Preveza (a town in the Epirus, northwestern Greece) in late September. At first Barbarossa skillfully avoided a general battle, keeping his fleet's back defended and his crews replenished, while Doria's larger fleet remained exposed on the open seas. When Doria ordered a retreat, Barbarossa sailed out with his fleet. The decisive battle took place on September 28 with the Ottoman fleet holding the commanding position and the Christians fleet failing to coordinate its galleys and sailings ships (barques). The European fleet was arranged in four long lines, but the Ottoman fleet approached in a Y formation, with Seydi Ali Reis commanding the left wing, Barbarossa Hayreddin Pasha in the center, Salih Reis on the right wing, and Turgut Reis in the back. Taking advantage of the lack of the wind, which affected the European barques, the Turks attacked with their more maneuverable ships and inflicted heavy losses on the coalition. During the battle Andrea Doria, concerned about his fleet, ordered his ships to disengage, leaving the Venetians outnumbered and exposed.

The Europeans lost 13 ships and another 36 were captured. Doria's own fleet, although it escaped battle unscathed, was caught in a storm two days later. Up to 70 galleys were lost. The Turks, on the other hand, lost not a single ship, although a few were seriously damaged. Probably the greatest Ottoman naval victory over Europeans, the battle established Ottoman naval supremacy in eastern Mediterranean and compelled Venice to surrender fortresses along the Dalmatian coast and the Aegean islands.

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See also: Barbarossa Hayreddin Pasha; Turgut Reis.

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Pruth, Treaty of (1711)

Peace accord signed between Russia and the Ottoman Empire to end the Russo-Ottoman War of 1710–1711. The treaty was signed on July 23, 1711, near the Pruth River, where Czar Peter I of Russia conducted an unsuccessful campaign against the Turks. The Russian ruler was compelled to return the fortress of Azov, which he had captured in 1697, to the Turks and to destroy the fortresses of Taganrog, Bogoroditsk and Kamennyi zaton. The Ottomans pledged to expel the Swedish king Charles XII (who had fled to the Porte after a defeat in Russia in 1709) and agreed to maintain peaceful relations with Poland and the Cossacks. The treaty was an important political victory for the Ottoman Empire in its struggle against the rising Russian state.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Russo-Ottoman Wars.

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Q

Qadisiyya, Battle of (637)

Decisive battle between the Muslim Arabs commanded by Saad ibn Abi Waqqas and the Sassanid army commanded by Rustem. The two sides had met in several engagements before Qadisiyya: The Muslim Arabs had won most of them, with the exception of the Battle of the Bridge in 634. Qadisiyya was the final clash that decided the fate of Iraq. Saad's army numbered 9,000–12,000 men, in addition to 1,500–6,000 reinforcements arriving from the Syrian front during the course of the battle. The Sassanids greatly outnumbered the Arabs; Rustem probably commanded 30,000–80,000 men, supported by a small number of elephants.

The battle lasted for three full days and one night. The Arabs took up a defensive position with a canal in front of them and marshes guarding their flanks. Initially, the Sassanids had the upper hand because of their numbers and armament, but the Arabs neutralized the elephants by blinding them, which caused a stampede that disrupted the Sassanid lines. The Arabs were also heartened by the arrival of the Syrian reinforcements. After three days of heavy fighting the Sassanids were disheartened and finally dispersed when the Muslims broke through their center in a night attack on the last day of the battle and killed Rustem. After the battle, Iraq lay open to the Arabs, most of the Aramean farmers who welcomed them as liberators. The remnants of the Sassanid army was besieged in Ctesiphon a few months later.

Adam Ali

See also: Iran, Arab Conquest of (636–671); Iraq, Arab Conquest of (632–636).

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Qalawun (1222–1290)

Mamluk sultan of Egypt (1279–1290) and founder of a dynasty that lasted for 100 years. Qalawun's reign saw the Mamluk victory in the Second Battle of Homs (1282), which ended the immediate Mongol threat to the eastern Mediterranean region and enabled the Mamluks to concentrate their military efforts on the final destruction of the Frankish states of Outremer. He died while mounting an expedition against Acre (mod. 'Akko, Israel), which under his son and successor Khalil ended the Frankish occupation of the Near East.

Qalawun was a Kipchak Turk by origin. When he was in his twenties, he was purchased by a member of the household of al-Kamil, Ayyubid sultan of Egypt, for the price of 1,000 dinars, and hence came to be called al-Alfi, after the Arabic word for thousand. Later he served al-ali Ayyub as one of the Bariyya corps of soldiers, and became an emir under Sultan Baybars I. After Baybars's death, Qalawun succeeded to the throne following a brief power struggle, and set about consolidating his position. This consolidation involved setting aside the Mamluks (slave soldiers) of Baybars in favor of his own, as well as some of the aliis who had not previously held important positions. He also successfully confronted a revolt in Syria by Sunqur al-Ashqar with the support of the Bedouin leader Isa ibn Muhanna.

In 1281, Qalawun faced a long-expected invasion of Syria by the Ilkhan Abaka, who had sought to break Mamluk power in the region. Qalawun's victory in the Second Battle of Homs, followed by Abaka's death shortly thereafter, left him free to continue the Mamluk military campaign against Outremer, which was politically weak and divided. The sultanate had concluded a number of truces with individual Frankish powers; now, Qalawun simply found pretexts for declaring them void and eliminating his enemies one at a time.

In 1285, the sultan accused the Hospitallers of Margat of attacking Muslims, and after a brief campaign he took the stronghold in late May. He then moved against the castle of Maraclea, which Prince Bohemond VII of Tripoli ordered to be surrendered so as to preserve his own truce with the Mamluks. In 1287, after an earthquake destroyed some of the fortifications at Laodikeia in Syria, Qalawun took the city, claiming that it was not covered by his truce with Bohemond, as the city lay outside the boundaries of the county of Tripoli. In 1289, Qalawun attacked Tripoli (mod. Trâblous, Lebanon), eventually storming the town and massacring much of the population. He then razed the city and ordered it rebuilt on a new site. In an attempt to save Acre, the last Christian possession in the area, Pope Nicholas IV called a crusade in February 1290, though many Western monarchs simply used the crisis to strengthen their economic interests in Egypt. During the preparations for his campaign against Acre, however, Qala-

wun died. The city's capture was left to his son Khalil, whom he had successfully installed as heir.

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See also: Abaka; Baybars I; Homs, Battles of (1260, 1281, 1299); Ilkhans; Mamluk Sultanate; Mamluk-Ilkhanid War.

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Qarmatians

A dissident faction of the early Ismailis named after Hamdan Qarmat, the first chief missionary or *da'i* of the Ismailis in Iraq. The early Ismaili movement appeared in Iraq and many other regions of the Islamic world around 870. As Shia Muslims, the Ismailis aimed to replace the Sunni-Abbasid established order with a new Shia caliphate ruled by the Ismaili imam. Most of the early Ismailis recognized a line of seven such imams, starting with the Prophet Muhammad's cousin and son-in-law Ali (d. 661) and ending with Muhammad ibn Ismail, a grandson of Imam Ja'far al-Sadiq (d. 765), who was also acknowledged as the Mahdi or the restorer of true Islam and justice in the world. Meanwhile, Muhammad ibn Ismail remained in hiding, and the Ismailis awaited his reappearance. The central leaders of the early Ismaili movement, who traced their ancestry to Ali, did not initially claim the imamate openly. Instead, they acted as the *hujja*s or full representatives of the hidden seventh imam-Mahdi, Muhammad ibn Ismail.

In 899, soon after his own accession to the central leadership of the Ismaili movement, Abd Allah al-Mahdi, the future founder of the Fatimid caliphate, claimed the imamate for himself and his predecessors. The doctrinal reform of Abd Allah split the Ismaili movement into two rival factions. On one side, there were those loyal Ismailis who accepted Abd Allah's reform and maintained continuity in the Ismaili imamate; they also recognized Abd Allah's successors to the Fatimid caliphate as

their imams. By contrast, a dissident Ismaili faction, initially led by Hamdan Qarmat and his chief assistant Abdan, retained its original doctrine and continued to expect the return of Muhammad ibn Ismail as the Mahdi and final imam. Henceforth, the term Qarmatian was more specifically applied to those dissident Ismailis who did not acknowledge Abd Allah al-Mahdi (d. 934) and the later Fatimid caliphs as their imams.

Qarmatian communities existed in different parts of Arabia, Yemen, Iraq, Iran, and Central Asia. But the Qarmatians found their main stronghold in eastern Arabia, then known as Bahrayn. There, in the year 899, Abu Sa'id al-Jannabi (d. 913) founded the Qarmatian state. He was succeeded by several of his sons, including Abu Tahir al-Jannabi (d. 944). The Qarmatians of Bahrayn indulged in continuous pillaging raids into the surrounding regions, remaining hostile to both the Sunni Abbasids and the Ismaili Shia Fatimids. Several Qarmatian missionaries, especially Abu Hatim al-Razi (d. 934) and Muhammad al-Nasafi (d. 943), attained prominence in Iran and Central Asia, where they converted a Samanid emir and other rulers.

By the time the Qarmatian state of Bahrayn was finally uprooted by local tribespeople in 1077, the Qarmatian groups of other regions, who had continued to await the return of their hidden Mahdi, had either disintegrated or joined the loyal Ismaili camp led by the Fatimids. The Qarmatians were generally condemned and refuted by the Muslim majority as "heretics," though the Qarmatians of Bahrayn also received occasional praise for the communal and egalitarian principles that informed the sociopolitical organization of their state.

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See also: Fatimids; Ismailis; Kharijites.

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Qutayba (Kutayba) ibn Muslim (Eighth Century)

Arab commander and governor under the Umayyads, famed for his conquests in Central Asia and Afghanistan. At a time of Arab tribal unrest, Qutayba was appointed

governor of Khurasan, in subordination to al-Hajjaj ibn Yusuf, the governor of the East, because of the relative neutrality of his Bahila tribe, his distinguished military career against rebels in Iraq, and his service as the governor of Rayy.

Unlike earlier Arab raids beyond the Oxus River, Qutayba's expeditions led to a significant eastward expansion of the Umayyad domains during Khalid ibn al-Walid's reign. During his 10-year governorship Qutayba recovered Lower Tukharistan in 705, conquered Bukhara by 709, established Arab sovereignty in the Oxus valley and conquered Sughd between 710 and 712, and led expeditions against the principalities on the Jaxartes from 713 to 715. He managed to divide and conquer the rival principalities and used strategy, guile, and even treachery to achieve victory.

Qutayba's Khurasani army was composed of 47,000 Arab warriors and 7,000 Mawali registered in the Diwan. However, after 709 he imposed the obligation upon all conquered cities to provide an auxiliary force to supplement his armies. This system not only provided much needed manpower to the Arab armies but also prevented rebellions in Qutayba's rear during expeditions. Qutayba wanted to create a Persian army similar in quality to that of the Arabs, but more devoted to him. Qutayba's patron, al-Hajjaj, and al-Walid died in 714 and 715, respectively. Qutayba's position was confirmed by the new Caliph Sulayman. However, Qutayba feared that the favor he had previously enjoyed was coming to an end. He raised the flag of revolt, but only his tribe and his private bodyguard of Iranian archers supported him. The bulk of the Arab and Persian soldiery mutinied and killed Qutayba and several of his family members. After his death Arab expansion eastward halted for several decades.

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See also: Hajjaj ibn Yusuf ath-Thaqafi, al-; Khalid ibn al-Walid; Umayyad Caliphate.

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Radical Islam in the 20th Century

Radical Islam may be defined as a militant form of Islamic thought that claims religious validation for a variety of political, military, and paramilitary activities, frequently directed against Israel and the West. A common view in the West, supported to some extent by the popular media, suggests that contemporary terrorism and insurgency proceed from the Islamic notion of jihad, or holy war, articulated in the Koran.

It is certainly true that contemporary Muslim extremists tie their attacks explicitly to jihad and its basis in Islamic tradition. However, such ideas do not represent a continuous, dominant strain in Islamic or Arab thought over the past 1,400 years. Although the idea of holy war clearly played a role in the initial Arab conquests of the early Middle Ages, in later medieval conflicts, and in some anticolonial movements of the late 19th century, it does not act as the dominant ideological justification for modern Arab unity or for political and military conflict in the period after World War II.

On the contrary, in the 20th century Arab nationalism in the guise of Baathism or Nasserist Arab socialism served as the primary ideological basis for conflict in the Middle East. Arab political leaders of the mid-20th century did not employ the idea of jihad to a great extent, even in their opposition to Israel. The notion of holy war, as it is currently embraced by extremist groups, grew largely in response to a number of late 20th-century factors: the failure of secular Arab political and military initiatives, the 1979 revolution in Iran, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, the end of Soviet support for Arab regimes in the Middle East, the Palestinian Intifada, and the Persian Gulf War.

Radical Islam is sometimes referred to as Islamic fundamentalism or Islamic extremism. Some Muslim writers refer to it as a variant of Islamic revivalism. Radical Islamic beliefs combine an anti-Western political agenda with a set of theological principles. In the mid-20th century, radical Islam grew in the Middle East in response to Western imperialism and the spread of Western values in the region. In 1929, Hassan al-Banna, an Egyptian opposed to the growing secularism in the Muslim world, founded the Ikhwan Islamiyya (Muslim Brotherhood). His goal was to transform Egypt into an Islamic state modeled after the ideal days of the Prophet Muhammad and the companions. The organization began as an Islamic

charity but evolved into a more radical group, and in the 1940s it assassinated several prominent Egyptian officials. However, in 1949 al-Banna was killed by one of the Egyptian intelligence services.

At the time of al-Banna's death another Egyptian, Sayyid Qutb, was working toward an education degree at the University of Northern Colorado. He had been sent to the United States in 1948 by the Egyptian government to study the U.S. educational system. However, the more he saw of Western society, the more alienated he became. He returned to Egypt in 1950 and joined the Muslim Brotherhood. Qutb wrote several influential works, including *Social Justice in Islam*, a lengthy commentary on the Koran, and a shorter book, *Ma'alim fi-l-Tariq* (*Milestones, or Signposts on the Road*). In these he argued that before the coming of the Prophet Muhammad, the world was in *jahiliyah* (spiritual darkness), a condition dominated by opposition to Allah. For a brief time the Prophet Muhammad and the companions lived in a pure Islamic society ruled by submission (Islam) to the will of Allah.

According to Qutb, modernity was a time of great danger, as Islam faced a new kind of *jahiliyah*. The new *jahili* societies included the atheistic communists, the corrupted Christian and Jewish societies, Arab nationalist states, and Muslim states that cooperated with the West. All these opponents had to be defeated through jihad for Islam to prevail. Qutb was hanged by Gamal Abdel Nasser's government in

Hamas supporters burn a poster of Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas and other Fatah officials in January 2011. (AP/Wide World Photos)

1966, and his fate illustrates the opposition of secular Arab authorities toward Islamic radicalism for much of the 20th century.

The Muslim Brotherhood and the views of Qutb influenced many radical organizations: the Egyptian Islamic Liberation Movement, the Islamic Group Movement, and, ultimately, the Palestinian group Hamas. It is important to point out that Arab governments largely opposed the growth of Islamic radicalism during the period from World War II to the 1980s. Arab regimes in the mid-20th century based their identity and their warfare with Israel primarily in terms of Arab nationalism rather than Islamic unity. Indeed, such regimes, supported by the Soviet Union, often viewed activist Islam as a threat. Even the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) framed its foundational documents in terms of nationalism, Arab socialism, and anti-Zionism. However, this pattern changed in the closing decades of the 20th century.

In 1979, a theocratic Shiite regime headed by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini took power in Iran and confronted the United States by seizing the U.S. embassy in Tehran and holding its staff hostage. That same year, the Soviet Union invaded the nation of Afghanistan and installed a puppet regime there. Both events would fuel the growth of radical Islamic political activity. The Iranian regime sponsored Islamic fundamentalist political and paramilitary activity against Israel and the West, most particularly the Shiite group Hezbollah, active in Lebanon and Israel.

In Afghanistan, Soviet occupation produced native opposition, creating a generation of mujahideen motivated primarily by radical Islamic ideas and encouraged and supplied by the United States as a counter to Soviet influence. Although the Afghani resistance resulted in the withdrawal of the Soviets from the country after nine years of warfare, it also resulted in the establishment of Afghanistan as a haven for radical Islamic activity. Indeed, during the 1980s, thousands of recruits from Arab nations went to Afghanistan to fight the Soviets. Already immersed in Wahhabism, the strict version of Islam prominent in Saudi Arabia, they developed an anti-Western agenda based on the writings of Qutb, among others. One of the Saudi Arabian citizens fighting in Afghanistan, Osama bin Laden, ultimately went on to found the Al Qaeda organization in 1989.

In the closing decades of the 20th century, as conventional warfare against Israel fueled by Arab nationalism failed, as receding Soviet power freed former Middle Eastern client states of communist influence and deprived them of military and financial aid, and as the Iranian and Afghani crises produced a generation of anti-Western fighters motivated largely by radical Islam, anti-Israeli and anti-Western activity in the Muslim world adopted a religious character. Such feeling inspired the first Palestinian uprising against Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza, the Intifada, in 1987. Groups such as Hamas played a leading role in the Intifada, as radical Islam came to rival Arab nationalism as the defining ideology behind the struggle against Israel. Such ideas appealed particularly to the powerless and the disenfranchised in Palestinian society. The rhetoric of the PLO is indicative of this change. Whereas

once its agenda centered on secular Arab socialism and nationalism, the PLO adopted language of martyrdom and holy war and gave rise to its own radical group, the al-Aqsa Martyr's Brigade. Fundamentalist Islam has remained a potent force in Middle Eastern politics to the present day.

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See also: Al Qaeda; Hamas; Hezbollah; Suicide Bombings; Terrorism; Wahhabism.

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Rawalpindi, Treaty of (1919–1921)

Peace treaty between Emir Amanullah of Afghanistan and Britain in the wake of the Third Anglo-Afghan War. Signed by Ali Ahmad Khan, Afghan commissary for home affairs, and A. H. Grant, foreign secretary of the British India, on August 8, 1919, it was later amended on November 22, 1921. Under the treaty, Britain recognized Afghanistan's independence, stopped subsidies to Afghan rulers, and pledged that the authority of British India would never extend past the Khyber Pass.

In 1921, the treaty was revised after 11 months of negotiations between Henry Dobbs, the British envoy, and Mahmud Tarzi, head of the Afghan delegation. The revised treaty, sometimes referred to as the Treaty of Kabul, restored friendly and commercial relations between the two states and opened legations in London and Kabul. Afghanistan confirmed its recognition of the boundary west of the Khyber Pass and was allowed to import arms and munitions through India. Both sides agreed to inform each other of any major military operations undertaken along the frontiers.

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See also: Anglo-Afghan War (1919).

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Războieni, Battle of (1476)

Major battle between the forces of Stephen III of Moldavia and Sultan Mehmed II, which resulted in a decisive Ottoman victory. After Stephen's victory over the Ottomans at Vaslui-Podul, Mehmed II organized and personally led a punitive expedition against the Moldavian prince. Stephen accepted the battle on July 26, 1476, near Războieni in Valea Albă (the White Valley). Stephen attacked and gained some success against the Ottoman vanguard, but the arrival of the main Ottoman army led by Mehmed turned the tide of battle. The Ottoman numerical superiority and solid leadership determined the battle's outcome as the Moldavian army suffered heavy losses and was forced to retreat. However, Mehmed II could not fully exploit his success because two major Moldavian fortresses, Neamt and Hotin, successfully resisted the siege. Stephen, meantime, received support from the infamous Vlad III Dracula of Transylvania and waged a successful guerilla campaign, which, in combination with disease and bad weather, ultimately forced Mehmed to leave Moldavia.

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See also: Mehmed II; Vaslui, Battle of (1475).

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Reconquista

Only since the 19th century has the Christian conquest of the Iberian Peninsula from Muslim control been referred to as the *Reconquista*, that is, "reconquest." This has led some scholars to consider the term to be a modern attempt to justify colonization and subjugation by conferring supposedly higher values on the Christian expansion of the Middle Ages. Contemporary evidence does, however, show that the notion of regaining lost political and religious unity was indeed present among some Iberian Christians during the early Middle Ages: at the end of the ninth century, the memory of the vanished Visigothic kingdom was kept alive and its reestablishment propagated through a series of chronicles written during the reign of King Alfonso III of Asturias (866–910) by churchmen probably associated with his court. This Asturian "neo-Gothicism" was an important basis for the Christian expansion of the 10th and 11th centuries. It caused the borders to Islam to be regarded as only provisional and areas of future expansion to be repeatedly marked out by way of contracts between Christian powers.

The concept of neo-Gothicism (of which the Muslims were aware, as Arab chronicles show) was only rarely linked to the notion of spiritually meritorious warfare. However, some early sources do exist in which the Reconquista was justified on a religious basis. In certain Asturian and Leonese chronicles of the 10th and 11th centuries, the conflict is presented as projected, and thereby sanctified, by God as a fight to restore an incomplete ecclesiastical order, because the areas to be conquered had been Christian territories with a fully developed church structure before the Muslim conquest. According to these works, victories were attributable to God's care for his people, and Iberian Christians were associated with the Chosen People of the Old Testament. Until the end of the 11th century, this opinion does not seem to have been common enough to have strongly influenced actions in the religious borderlands, nor did it attract foreign arms bearers to the Iberian Peninsula. The fronts were not as clearly laid out as often depicted: local rulers, whether Muslims or Christians, formed alliances in changing coalitions, and religion often played a secondary role. Christian rulers frequently preferred Muslim tribute payments (Sp. *parias*) to warfare, as Muslim chronicles clearly demonstrate. Only toward the end of the 11th century did the notion of a sanctified, meritorious war on behalf of Christ against the Lord's foes, combined with the concept of the restoration of the Visigothic kingdom, begin to exert a strong influence on Christian actions. It was not until the beginning of the 12th century that the Reconquista became a crusade, although even then cases of interreligious alliances and coexistence persisted.

The Reconquista should thus not be understood as an incessant religious war, but rather as a sequence of long periods of peace interrupted by shorter periods of crisis that were marked in varying degrees by religious ideals. Only the border zones were marked by frequent raids and devastation. Nor were Spain and Portugal formed out of the crucible of interreligious strife, although that strife did set the Iberian realms apart from most of Latin Europe.

The year 711 represents a turning point in the history of the Iberian Peninsula. In the early summer a Muslim army under Tariq ibn Ziyad crossed the Strait of Gibraltar and defeated the Visigoths in the Battle of Guadalete on July 23, 711. The invaders, mostly Arabs and Islamized North Africans, rapidly succeeded in conquering nearly the entire Iberian Peninsula. The Muslims called the area they controlled al-Andalus (Land of the Vandals) and raised the ancient bishopric of Córdoba to be the capital of their own emirate. With time, the distance between this realm and the caliphate of Baghdad grew, and in the year 929, Emir Abd al-Raman III (912–961) proclaimed the independent caliphate of Córdoba. The realm was far from homogenous: there were areas with a predominantly Berber population and others with a mainly Arab Muslim population, and even within these communities there were separate groups. Many Jews also lived in the peninsula, and the majority of the population, the subjected Christians (Mozarabs), were divided into descendants of the Visigoths and descendants of the Hispano-Romans.

Only the mountainous, inaccessible border zones in the extreme north of the peninsula remained under Christian rule. Here, five Christian realms developed between the 8th and 11th centuries: (1) In the area of Asturias and Cantabria, the kings of Asturias led the exiled Visigothic nobility. Toward the middle of the eighth century they expanded their rule to the west (Galicia) and east (Álava), and by the end of the following century they had crossed the river Duero (Port. Douro) in the south and conquered the town of León, to which the center of the realm, afterward known as the kingdom of León, shifted. (2) At its southeastern flank, the county of Castile gradually slipped from the control of the Leonese kings. By the beginning of the 11th century, it had become fully established as an independent kingdom. (3) Further east, Navarre also developed into a principality of its own, which was ruled by kings from the beginning of the 10th century onward. (4) Aragon, once a county dependent on Navarre, escaped its control, rising to the status of kingdom after 1035. (5) The last of the five Christian realms was the county of Barcelona. It had been part of the Carolingian Empire, whose southern border it formed, together with a number of other Catalonian counties. In the course of the 11th century, the count of Barcelona succeeded in becoming the dominant power of the southeastern Pyrenees.

These five realms—León, Castile, Navarre, Aragon, and Barcelona—experienced transformations during the High Middle Ages. On the one hand, the dynastic union between the rulers of Barcelona and Aragon (1137) brought forth the crown of Aragon (or the Aragonese-Catalan crown). On the other hand, the county of Portugal became independent of León and achieved the rank of a kingdom in 1143. And finally, after a short-lived union (1038–1157), Castile and León were united once and for all in 1230. The existence of four independent kingdoms (Portugal, Castile-León, Navarre, and Aragon) impedes any general account of the Spanish history of the Middle Ages. Only with this complicated situation in mind can one attempt to describe the complex process known as Reconquista.

Until the second half of the 11th century, the Christians' disputes with the Muslims were still a largely Iberian affair marked by the neo-Gothic concept of reconquest, by limited religious zeal, and by border skirmishes of uncertain outcome. At the turn of the first millennium, the vizier and general al-Mansur billah (Sp. *Almanzor*) achieved important military successes, but after his death (1002), the caliphate of Córdoba collapsed and disintegrated (1009–1031) into a number of petty Muslim realms (the Taifa kingdoms). Some of these polities fought the Christians, but others preferred to sign treaties or make payments of tribute (*parias*) in return for peace. By so doing, these latter may have ultimately helped finance their own destruction, but the parias also show the synchronicity of coexistence and conflict typical for this period. In general, the Christian frontier continued to expand south, and on May 6, 1085, King Alfonso VI of Castile-León succeeded in taking the old Visigothic capital, Toledo, without bloodshed by guaranteeing wide-ranging rights

(which were soon abrogated) to the Muslim population. The historical figure who best represents the complexities of the Iberian 11th century is Rodrigo Díaz de Vivar (d. 1099), better known to the modern world as El Cid. A vassal of Sancho II and Alfonso VI of Castile, Rodrigo fought against the Christians, became involved in disputes between the Muslim rulers of Seville and Granada, and supported the Muslims of Zaragoza against the Christian king of Aragon. In 1094 he gained power over the Muslim town of Valencia, where he established an independent principality, which he successfully defended against attacks by Muslim opponents. The story of the Cid Campeador (from Arab. *sayyid*, "lord," and Lat. *campi doctor*, "victorious fighter") is only one example of the possibilities that the frontiers of the Iberian Peninsula offered to militarily and politically capable figures.

At this time, however, the struggle also began to draw Christians from beyond the Pyrenees. This change occurred for several reasons: increasing dynastic and feudal ties between the ruling Iberian lineages and nobles from beyond the Pyrenees; the rising significance of Santiago de Compostela in Galicia as a center of pilgrimage that attracted a constantly growing stream of people, particularly from the 11th century onward; and the papacy's mounting interest in the Iberian Peninsula. For a long time, the Roman church's influence was limited to the Carolingian-dominated eastern Pyrenees, but in the second half of the 11th century, the zone widened: in 1064, for the first time, a notable contingent of French knights took part in the siege and conquest of an Aragonese town, Barbastro. Pope Alexander II supported this action by promising indulgences and depicting the siege as a war intended and justified by God. In 1068, the kingdom of Aragon placed itself under the protection of the Holy See and accepted the Roman liturgy. Soon Castile, León, and Navarre also followed the Roman rite, and prelates close to Rome took over important ecclesiastical functions after the conquest of Toledo. But the victory of 1085 also had unexpected military consequences: the hard-pressed Muslims called in coreligionists from the North African mainland to assist them: the Almoravids (Arab. *al-Murabiun*), zealous Berbers particularly committed to the idea of religious warfare. On October 23, 1086, they gained a sweeping victory over Alfonso VI's forces at Sagrajas and soon thereafter began taking possession of al-Andalus. By 1095, they had conquered practically all the Taifa kingdoms in the peninsula; El Cid's Valencia also fell victim to their expansion (1102). An era in the history of the Iberian Peninsula had come to an end. That period had been marked by the predominantly secular and political character of the Reconquista. Now the logic of warfare became more dominated by religious issues on both sides, and the fronts hardened.

With the expansion of the Almoravids in Iberia (1085–1095), the second phase of the Reconquista began. It brought a religiously loaded form of warfare to al-Andalus that also affected Christian concepts and actions. The popes' commitment increased, and growing numbers of foreign arms bearers crossed the Pyrenees to fight against the Muslims. Some of them later took part in the First Crusade

(1096–1099). Various factors caused the strangers to participate in the struggle, such as hope for booty or land, political considerations, and feudal ties to Iberian rulers. But the fights were also an expression of growing tensions between Islam and Christianity, which were being particularly aggravated on the Iberian Peninsula and which began to transcend the Pyrenees.

During this period at the end of the 11th century, at least some elements of the crusade movement become recognizable in the Iberian Peninsula: the religious nature of the struggle was stressed, the papacy's participation increased, indulgences were conferred, and foreign armed forces participated in the fighting. The situation in the Iberian Peninsula seems to have had a particularly strong effect on the papacy's attitude toward the use of force against Islam. The Iberian experience, however, neither led directly to the proclamation of the First Crusade, nor was it a crusade in its own right. Some of the latter's constitutive elements were still absent, such as the crusading vow, the taking of the cross, or the plenary indulgence (Lat. *remissio peccatorum*). At least regarding the indulgence, however, an important step was taken even before the conquest of Jerusalem: between 1096 and 1099, Pope Urban II specifically promised the Christians who contributed to the reestablishment of the Catalan town of Tarragona the *remissio peccatorum.* The conjunction between the fight against the Muslims and the plenary indulgence was thus first established in Iberia. In contrast, other features of the crusades entered the Iberian Peninsula as a result of the events in the Middle East. In the year 1101, for example, King Peter I of Aragon rallied his forces under the banner of the cross (Lat. *vexillum crucis*) when he fought against the Muslims before Zaragoza, where he named a locality after the war cry of the First Crusaders (*Júslibol*, after Lat. *Deus vult*, "God wills it").

In 1114, the Christians who participated in the conquest of the Balearic Islands were promised indulgences, a papal legate accompanied the expedition, and the participants marked themselves with the sign of the cross. During the conquest of Zaragoza under Alfonso I (the Battler) in the year 1118, foreign combatants were also called upon to assist their coreligionists and were promised indulgences. By this time at the latest, the Iberian wars had taken on the quality of a crusade, at least in the eyes of the papacy and the foreign combatants. It was only logical that in 1121 the arms bearers in Spain were explicitly assured that they would receive indulgences identical to those of the crusaders in the Holy Land, and at the First Lateran Council of 1123, regulations were applied to those who took the cross to go to either Jerusalem or to Spain. In the Iberian Peninsula, too, the first crusade bull was issued to recruit new contingents. Almost at the same time as the establishment of the military orders in Outremer, military confraternities were founded in Aragon (Belchite, Monreal), which combined a form of life under monastic rules with warfare against the Muslims. Thus, one can observe mutual influences between the Levant and the Iberian Peninsula. Both were seen as crusading areas.

Literary texts also contributed to fashioning and promoting the idea of Reconquista as crusade. Twelfth-century works like the *Chanson de Roland*, the *Rolandslied des Pfaffen Konrad*, and the Pseudo-Turpin (*Historia Karoli Magni et Rotolandi*) represented the eighth-century Iberian campaign of the Emperor Charlemagne as a crusade, and a series of chansons de geste (epic poems) praised the feats of the Christians *in Hispania*. Only a few Hispanic sources, however, point to an authentic crusading ideal within the Iberian Christian population. This is hardly surprising: the same also applies to the inhabitants of Outremer after the establishment of the Crusader kingdoms. For the local Christians, the struggle acquired the character of border warfare, marked by short incursions and raids. The Reconquista's domestic dimension was also the reason why Iberian Christian rulers apparently felt few reservations about concluding alliances with Muslims against coreligionists or treating the Muslim inhabitants of conquered towns honorably. Christian mercenaries fought for Muslim rulers, and the Iberian frontier was in many senses more permeable than many later historians would assert. The inconsistencies between crusading ideologies, political interests, and economic considerations are recurring elements of the Reconquista, which often antagonized foreign crusaders. Nevertheless, during important campaigns in particular, crusade propaganda and crusading enthusiasm can even be detected in the Iberian sources.

Particularly substantial participation of foreign crusaders occurred in the years 1147–1148 as a result of the diverse elements that made up the Second Crusade (1145–1149). At the same time as an attack on the Muslim state of Damascus launched from the kingdom of Jerusalem and a campaign against the pagan Slavs (Wends) beyond the river Elbe, the Iberian kings undertook a series of offensives against the weakened Almoravid Empire. In Portugal, Lisbon was taken in October 1147; in the same month the Castilian king conquered the important port of Almería; and shortly afterward (December 1148 and October 1149), the Taifas of Tortosa and Lleida (Lérida) capitulated to the Aragonese-Catalan ruler Count Raymond Berengar IV (1131–1162). For these campaigns, the monarchs sought and received the assistance of foreign contingents: the conquest of Lisbon was achieved thanks to the aid Afonso Henriques I of Portugal (1128–1185) received from crusaders from England and the Rhineland on their way to the Holy Land. Some of the English crusaders participated in the conquest of Tortosa several months later; they were further supported by a Genoese fleet, which was crucial for the success of the enterprise. Certainly, the campaigns of 1147–1148 represented the high point of foreign participation in the Reconquista.

During the following decades, the Iberian monarchs ensured that the influence of external forces diminished. This policy represents a substantial difference between the crusades in the Levant and those of the Iberian Peninsula: while the Franks of the East, few in number relative to the native population, actively sought and urgently required the assistance of their western coreligionists, the Iberian Christians



did not depend on external support to a comparable degree. Foreign rulers did undertake crusading initiatives to Spain, including King Louis VII of France and King Henry II of England, who planned a joint expedition to the Iberian Peninsula in 1159. Nonnative crusaders also took part in several later campaigns (for example, in 1189 in Silves in Portugal, in 1212 leading to Las Navas de Tolosa, in 1217 in Alcácer do Sal in Portugal, and in 1309 at Gibraltar). But it is telling that the initiative of 1159 did not prosper because it was not coordinated with the native monarchs, who closely monitored later foreign activities. The many military orders founded during this period in the Iberian Peninsula (e.g., Calatrava, Alcántara, Santiago) helped keep alive the crusading ideal and undoubtedly included international elements; but they soon became strongly nationalized institutions and

decidedly Iberian in scope. Thus, the Reconquista's international resonance cannot be likened to that of the Eastern crusades, although this in no way contradicts the fact that the Iberian Peninsula was a crusading theater.

By the late 12th century, a new change of power had occurred in al-Andalus: the Almoravids were displaced by the Almohads (Arab. *al-Muwaidun*). These were Sunnî reformers like the Almoravids, but belonged to a different Berber tribe. They were particularly critical of the Almoravids, whom they accused of religious laxity and error. By 1148, Morocco was subjugated with extreme violence, and by 1172, al-Andalus had also been conquered. The Almohads achieved their most important military success against the Christians on July 9, 1195, on the battlefield of Alarcos against the troops of Alfonso VIII of Castile (d. 1214). This defeat led the Christians to bury their internal disputes and take common action against the Muslims. They received strong support from Pope Innocent III, who promulgated crusade bulls in favor of the campaign and ordered processions and prayers to be held far and wide. As a result, a substantial contingent of foreign (above all French) warriors enlarged the united armies led by the kings of Castile, Aragon, and Navarre. Although most of these crusaders withdrew their support when they were kept from plundering the castles that had capitulated, the local Christians triumphed over the Almohad army at Las Navas de Tolosa on July 16, 1212.

After this battle, the Muslims of al-Andalus were never again to achieve a major military success. For this reason Las Navas de Tolosa has been seen as a final turning point in the history of the Reconquista, even if this was hardly apparent to contemporaries. In fact, the expansion slowed down for a short period because of the untimely death of several of the chief political players. Also, Pope Innocent III attempted in 1213 to detach the Reconquista from the crusades to the East by breaking with the tradition of equating both struggles. But after a series of smaller campaigns of lesser importance, the expansion (once again fostered by papal indulgences) gathered momentum in the 1230s. Under King Ferdinand III, the Castilians conquered the most important Andalusian cities, among them Córdoba (1236) and Seville (1248). In the Aragonese-Catalan crown, King James I the Conqueror (d. 1276) reaped similar successes: in 1228, the island of Mallorca was occupied; in 1238, the town of Valencia fell; and by 1235 and 1246, respectively, the Balearic Islands and the kingdom of Valencia had been subjugated. In Portugal the advance reached the coast of the Algarve by the year 1248. In barely 20 years, therefore, the realms of Portugal, Castile, and Aragon-Catalonia had nearly completed the conquest of al-Andalus. Only in the mountainous area around the Sierra Nevada in the extreme south could a Muslim lordship, the kingdom of Granada governed by the Narid dynasty, remain intact, albeit as a vassal state to the kingdom of Castile. For more than two centuries it maintained its position between the Muslim Marînids in the south and the Christians in the north.

In the first half of the 14th century, the Reconquista flared up once more: an Aragonese-Castilian army wrested Gibraltar from the Marînids in 1309, and on October 30, 1340, a Portuguese-Castilian force achieved an important victory at the river Salado. Foreign crusaders participated in both campaigns, thus acquiring crusading indulgences, and even in later decades, Christians repeatedly crossed the Pyrenees to fight the Muslims. But in the meantime these expeditions were strongly (though never exclusively) marked by chivalrous and courtly ideals. To many knights of the 14th and 15th centuries, honor and adventure counted just as much as the welfare of their souls. After the kingdoms of Aragon and Castile united under the joint rule of the Catholic Kings (Ferdinand II and Isabella I) in 1469, the kingdom of Granada, the last Muslim realm on Iberian soil, was subjugated in a 10-year war. With its fall on January 2, 1492, the Reconquista was ended.

Nikolas Jaspert

See also: Almohads; Almoravids; Covadonga, Battle of (ca. 718 or 722); Granada, Siege of (1491); Navas de Tolosa, Battle of las (1212); Spain, Arab Conquest of (711–718); Umayyad Caliphate.

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Resht, Treaty of (1732)

Treaty between Russia and Iran signed on February 1, 1732, at Resht (Rasht). In 1720s, the two powers were involved in a brief war that left parts of Iran under Russian control. The Russian involvement in Iranian affairs, however, withered away after Russian Emperor Peter's death in 1725. At the same time, Iran's domestic situation had improved after the rise of the maverick Nadir Khan, who consolidated power and sought to reverse Iranian losses of the earlier years. In the Treaty of Resht, Nadir Khan negotiated for the restoration of Astrabad, Mazandaran, and Gilan to Iran while the territory north of the Kura River remained temporarily under Russian control. Three years later, Russia accepted the Treaty of Ganja, by which it gave up all of its previous conquests, including Baku, Derbent, and Tarqu.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Nadir Shah; Russo-Iranian Wars.

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Reza Shah Pahlavi (1878–1944)

An army officer who seized power in a 1921 coup and declared himself the founder of a new Persian dynasty in 1925, Reza Shah Pahlavi overthrew the disintegrating Qajar dynasty, began Iran's modernization, and reduced foreign influence—most notably from Britain and the Soviet Union—in his country.

Born Reza Khan, the son of a chief of the Pahlavan clan, he enlisted in the military, quickly rising through the ranks on the basis of his intelligence and physical stamina. A strong nationalist, Khan witnessed an Iran—ruled by the failing Qajar dynasty—that was economically destitute and powerless to ward off foreign control of its resources. With the Russians and British taking de facto control over Iran in the early 20h century, Khan led a coup in February 1921 and was appointed minister of war under the new republican regime.



Reza Shah Pahlavi, Shah of Iran, shown here during a visit to the United States on November 15, 1977. (AP/Wide World Photos)

After securing his authority, Reza Khan reorganized the Iranian military, merging various paramilitary groups, the famous Iranian Cossack Brigade, the South Persia Rifles (established by the British), and the Gendarmeria (formed by the Swedes) into a single Iranian army. He then launched a campaign—stunning in its scale and success—to crush various rebel and separatist groups. In the spring of 1921, he subdued a local revolt in Khurasan, then in the fall he marched to the Caspian province of Gilan, where he crushed the Bolshevik-supported Soviet Republic of Gilan. In 1922, he moved further to the west, defeating a Kurdish nationalist movement before turning north to subdue a revolt in Azerbaijan. In 1924, he marched south to assert control in Khuzestan (southwest Iran), where the British incited a revolt among local tribes. Reza Khan had barely accomplished this when he had to hustle to Luristan (west Iran) to deal with another local revolt. Having subdued it, he then proceeded to put down a Turkoman revolt along the Caspian before returning to Tehran. As a result of these remarkable campaigns, Reza Khan was able to restore central government's authority throughout Iran.

Reza Khan, however, quickly became disenchanted with the government, which he saw as too idealistic and inexperienced to get the Russians and British out of the country. Although viewed as unsophisticated by the civilian members of the regime, he was actually quite skilled, having built an independent power base within the military that was loyal to him alone. He soon became the real power in the country. In 1925, Ahmad Shah, the ailing Qajar monarch, left Iran for treatment in Europe. While he was gone, the Majles, Iran's parliament, elected Reza Khan as the shah of Iran, creating a new dynasty for the country. Moving rapidly to consolidate

his power and put into force his nationalist ideals, Khan disarmed many of the country's warring tribes, emancipated women, embarked on a major building program, and ended all special privileges for foreigners.

To protect a relatively weak Iran, he tried to play off the Soviets against the British, a policy that no longer worked after the two powers joined forces in an anti-Nazi alliance following Germany's invasion of Russia in June 1941. Claiming the shah was potentially pro-Nazi, Russia and Britain jointly occupied Iran in August to ensure a supply route into the Soviet Union. To protect his dynasty, the shah abdicated in favor of his son, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi, who would rule the country until his own overthrow by Islamist forces in 1979. The elder shah, meanwhile, went into exile in Johannesburg, South Africa, where he died in 1944.

James Ciment and Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Iran during World War II; Iranian Cossack Brigade.

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Rhodes, Siege of (1522–1523)

Ottoman Sultan Suleiman I (Suleiman the Magnificent) was determined to remove the Christian outposts on the eastern Mediterranean islands, especially Rhodes. Rhodes is the largest of the Dodecanese islands in the eastern Mediterranean and lies only about 10 miles from Anatolia. The Knights of St. John (Hospitallers) controlled the island, the last Christian holding in the eastern Mediterranean.

The Knights of St. John had been in possession of Rhodes since 1310, and over the years they had fortified both its harbor and its high ground. The knights used the island, which lies astride major Ottoman shipping lanes, to send out ships to raid Muslim shipping throughout the eastern Mediterranean. This activity had led Sultan Mehmed II (the Conqueror) to mount an unsuccessful 3-month siege of the island in 1480. Continued Christian commerce raiding from Rhodes induced Suleiman to plan a major effort against the island. In 1522, he assembled some 400 ships, 100,000 men, and supporting siege artillery. On Rhodes Grand Master of the Knights of St. John Auguste de Villiers de L'Isle-Adam commanded only about 5,500 men: 700 knights drawn from all over Christendom, 500 mercenaries from Crete, 500 Genoese, 50 Venetians, and 4,000 men-at-arms from other places. The knights did what they could to prepare for the attack, closing off the entrance to the port with great chains, laying in supplies, and even demolishing some buildings to

secure better fields of fire. Each of the principal defensive positions on the island was held by a particular language group.

The Ottoman host arrived off Rhodes on June 26. It then sailed north and anchored off Parambolino, where the Ottoman troops landed uncontested. Among guns brought ashore were 40 bombards and 12 large basilisks. The Ottoman engineers took about a month to position their ordnance, opening fire on July 28. The Turks fired explosive shell, their first recorded use in battle in history. When this shelling failed to have the desired effect, at the end of August the Turks commenced mining operations. The defenders were well aware of this and dug their own countermines, setting off explosions against the Turkish tunnels and venting them to disperse the blasts.

Beginning in early September, repeated attempts by the attackers to take the principal Christian stronghold, commanded by the grand master in person, were unsuccessful. The knights also launched a number of effective counterattacks. Had the Christian powers provided assistance, the Turks might have been forced to lift the siege, but the two chief Christian rulers, Holy Roman Emperor Charles V and the French king Francis I, were at war with one another.

Suleiman's forces had suffered heavily and morale among them was low; in the course of the fighting Suleiman was said to have lost upwards of half his force. To terminate the costly siege and in recognition of the heroic Christian defense, on December 10 he offered to discuss a Christian surrender on honorable terms. The onset of winter, their own precarious position, dwindling numbers and supplies, and unrest among the civilian population, all prompted the knights to negotiate. On December 21 agreement was reached. The knights were allowed to depart the island with the full honors of war, their arms, their religious relics, and their treasury. Such civilians who wished to leave could also depart and take with them portable possessions. The siege had lasted 145 days. Suleiman had removed the last serious threat to Turkish naval power in the eastern Mediterranean and Aegean. The knights departed the island on January 1, 1523. For five years they were homeless, but they eventually took up residence in Malta, from which location they continued to harry Turkish shipping, inducing Suleiman in 1565 to order military operations against that island, which, however, were unsuccessful.

Spencer C. Tucker

See also: Mehmed II; Suleiman the Magnificent.

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Ridda Wars (632–633)

Prophet Muhammad's death on June 8, 632 in Medina sparked a struggle over power that developed into the Ridda Wars, or Wars of Apostasy (*ridda, riddah*), which lasted until June 633. The Quraish leadership at Medina, under Abu Bakr, ultimately triumphed, and the stage was set for the vast Islamic conquests that followed.

As the Muslims considered who should succeed Prophet Muhammed, Abu Bakr, the Prophet's father-in-law, and two close companions discretely solicited the support of major political leaders within the *ummah* (Muslim community). In a hastily assembled tribal election (*shura*), they secured the vote (*bay'ah*) for Abu Bakr. Yet, recognizing Abu Bakr as the Prophet's successor (caliph) did not resolve the problems facing the nascent Islamic polity which was confronted by strong tribal insurrections. The Islamic chroniclers claim that Muslim armies were forced to take the field against Arab converts who abandoned Islam. But it would appear the campaigns were initiated by Muhammad's successor to strengthen the very tenuous hold the Muslims had over areas in Arabia. Many tribes were upset by the rapid rise of the Muslim faction in Medina and Mecca; some of them joined Muhammad to get a share of the Muslim booty and their act may have been simply political. Other tribes appear to have reacted against the Prophet's teachings and proclaimed their own prophets as well. Musailima, a self-proclaimed prophet, was supported by the Banu Hanifa in the Yamamah region (central Arabia) while another self-proclaimed prophet, Tulaiha, led a tribal alliance in north central Arabia.

The *Ridda* campaigns involved a combination of diplomacy and force. In July 632, Abu Bakr sent envoys to the apostate tribes, calling upon them to remain loyal and continue paying *zakat* (alm-giving tax). However, many tribes refused the demand and mobilized their forces at Dhu al Qassa (about 30 miles east of Medina) in preparation for an attack on the Muslim capital city. However, on August 1, Abu Bakr led his Muslim forces in a dawn attack that drove the Bedouins into the desert. In September, as the Muslim troops campaigning in Palestine returned home, Abu Bakr divided his army into 11 corps, entrusting them to experienced commanders, including Amr ibn al-As (the future conqueror of Egypt) and Khalid ibn al-Walid, who was given command of the largest contingent. Each commander was given a specific objective and required to offer the apostates to return to Islam or face consequences. The Muslim corps soon fanned out throughout the Arabian peninsula, attacking tribesmen as far as Bahrain, Oman, and Yemen.

In September-October, Khalid ibn al-Walid conducted a victorious campaign in central Arabia, defeating the Tulaiha-led alliance at Buzakha and Ghamra, and scoring victories over rebellious tribes at Naqra, Zafar, and Butah, forcing local tribes to recognize the caliph's authority. Khalid's campaign, however, also caused

a major political scandal following his violent attack on Banu Tamim (Temeem), whose leader, Malik ibn Nuwayrah, was a Muslim and appointed by the Prophet himself to collect taxes in northeastern Arabia. Suspecting these tribesmen of apostasy, Khalid had Malik and his supporters killed in cold blood, despite their professions of being Muslims. His decision to marry Malik's wife Layla (Leila), renowned for her beauty throughout Arabia, within just24 hours of her husband's death and plundering of the tribal property, gave rise to the suspicion that Khalid acted out of personal interests rather than religious or political considerations. Outraged Muslims complained about Khalid's actions to Abu Bakr but the he chose to ignore them, well aware of the military prowess of the man some called "the Sword of Allah."

At first, the Muslim campaign was less successful in eastern Arabia, where Musailima scored a victory over the Muslim commander Ikrimah ibn Abi-Jahl, who ignored his orders to wait for Khalid and rushed to battle. In late December 632, however, the Muslims concentrated their forces, including the victorious Khalid ibn al-Walid, and scored a decisive victory over Musailima's army in the battle of Yemama (Yamama). This victory proved to be enormous consequences as the destruction of a major rebel forces sapped resistance in the region.

In the meantime, Muslims scored important successes elsewhere. In November, Hudaifa ibn Mihsan, later supported by Ikrimah, defeated the Omani chief Dhul Taj at Daba and subdued most of Oman by early 633. By the spring of 633, the Muslims also expanded their control to Yemen, where a series of self-proclaimed prophets incited anti-Muslim rebellions. Ula bin al Hadhrami also successfully campaigned in Bahrain, which accepted Islam and the caliph's authority. In the Handhramaut region (south Arabia), the Muslims overcame the resistance of the powerful Kinda tribe, scoring an important victory at Nujair. Thus, by April 633, the Ridda Wars gave Abu Bakr control of the Arabian Peninsula and its warring tribes. Emphasizing unity of all Muslims, the caliphs prohibited tribes from raiding for sport or conducting warfare to offset economic hardship. Yet with limited grazing and agricultural lands, and no longer able to target enemies to relieve distress, Arabia came to resemble a boiling pot about to spill its contents. Had nothing changed, there is the possibility, indeed the probability, that the ummah would have imploded. The solution, however, was to direct this energy outwards, initiating the Islamic conquests.

Andrew J. Waskey

See also: Khalid al-Walid; Muhammad, Campaigns of the Prophet.

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Rif War (1893–1894)

First of three significant conflicts between the Spanish Army and local Moroccan populations in northeast Morocco in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. This struggle arose in September 1893 on the border between Melilla (a Spanish fort/settlement in northeast Morocco since 1497) and Morocco proper when the Spanish started to build additional border fortifications. The Moroccans considered this to be an encroachment into their territoryand a violation of a nearby Muslim shrine. They reacted by killing a number of Spanish laborers to put a stop to the work. Spanish troops, under the command of the military governor of Melilla, General Juan García y Margallo, engaged the tribesmen, who though they numbered in the thousands and were armed with modern rifles, were repelled with losses. Although the Spaniards were outnumbered by the Riffians, they had the advantage of artillery and fire support from Spanish gunboats. Before reinforcements could be brought into the fight, the tribesmen attacked in late October, inflicting losses on the Spanish. General Margallo was shot in the head and killed by a Riffian sniper while on a reconnaissance mission. A young Spanish lieutenant, Miguel Primo de Rivera, who distinguished himself during these battles was promoted to captain and awarded Spain's highest decoration for valor. He would later serve as Spain's dictator from 1923 to 1930.

To end the conflict, the War Minister, General José López Domínguez, ordered up thousands of reserves. In fact, Margallo's successor, General Arsenio Martínez de Campos, required 15,000 men to restore order. On March 5, 1894, Martínez de Campos met with the sultan of Morocco in Marrakech and concluded an agreement that ended the hostilities and gave Spain a 20 million peseta indemnity. Spanish casualties included 44 dead and 206 wounded.

José E. Alvarez

See also: Rif War (1909–1910); Rif War (1920–1927).

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Rif War (1909–1910)

Second of three wars fought between Spain and Morocco during the late 19th century and the early 20th century. After the First Rif War (1893–1894), the situation in Morocco heated up again on July 9, 1909, when a force of Riffian tribesmen attacked a military outpost protecting the Spanish workers building a railway to serve the iron ore mines outside Melilla. Four workers and one sentry were killed. This was the chance Spanish colonialists had been anticipating to launch a new round of colonial expansion. However, on July 13, 6,000 Riffians attacked a force of 2,000 Spaniards and 10 days later, the tribesmen engaged Spanish forces for a third time. The campaign began disastrously for the Spaniards when the 1st Madrid Chasseurs, under the command of the reckless General Guillermo Pintos Ledesma, were ambushed in the Barranco del Lobo (Wolf's Ravine). In Melilla at the time, only 15,000 soldiers could be called upon for combat, so the government decided to reinforce its meager colonial forces with 40,000 reserves, as it had done during the 1893–1894 campaign.

This mobilization for a colonial conflict led to antiwar and eventually antigovernment and anticlerical protests, which were particularly strong in Barcelona. The authorities suppressed these protests harshly, and the period from July 25 through August 2, 1909, came to be called the "Tragic Week." By reinforcing the number of troops posted in Melilla, the government demonstrated its commitment not only to remain in Morocco but also to expand from its Melilla presidio toward the interior. Moreover, this episode brought to light the deep divisions in Spain between those who advocated overseas colonization and those who opposed it.

With the arrival of thousands of fresh troops in Melilla during 1909–1910, Spanish forces continued to move out from Melilla and occupy an enclave that stretched from Cape Tres Forcas to the southern shore of Mar Chica and ranging about 10 kilometers into the Moroccan interior.

José E. Alvarez

See also: Rif War (1893–1894); Rif War (1920–1927).

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Rif War (1920–1927)

The final and longest of the three Rif Wars (1920–1927), the Rif Rebellion started in 1920 when Spanish military columns began moving into the interior of the

Moroccan Protectorate. General Dámaso Berenguer Fusté's columns advanced successfully into the Yebala and Gomara regions in the western zone, capturing the city of Xauen. Another Spanish column, led by General Manuel Fernández Silvestre, moved west from Melilla toward Alhucemas Bay in the eastern zone. Silvestre pushed deeper into the Rif but failed to disarm the tribesmen and secure his flanks in his mad dash to get to Alhucemas Bay. By the summer of 1921, his army had occupied Monte Arruit and proceeded to cross the Amekran River, the demarcation line for Abd el-Krim's Riffian tribal lands. At the outpost of Abarrán, in June 1921, Silvestre's advance began to unravel when Riffian tribesmen attacked this outpost. In quick succession, one outpost after the other was overrun by the Riffians, or abandoned. The Spanish retreat culminated with the attack on Annual, the major base in the zone, in late July. Surrounded by Abd el-Krim's army of roughly 3,000 men, Silvestre ordered his army of about 14,000 men to retreat toward Melilla. The retreat turned into a major rout as panic-stricken soldiers fled for their lives only to be cut down by the Riffians. Silvestre committed suicide and more than 8,000 Spaniards were killed. The Riffians chased the Spanish all the way to the outskirts of Melilla and only the arrival of the newly created Foreign Legion from Ceuta prevented its fall.

The collapse of the eastern zone of the Protectorate led to a reconquest that would take the next five years to accomplish. In September 1923, General Miguel Primo de Rivera became Spain's dictator after a bloodless coup d'état. He introduced his plan for the "semi-abandonment" of the interior of the western zone of the Protectorate and withdrew the Spanish military forces to the coastal enclaves

Rif leader Abd el-Krim (left) and an attendant are guarded by a French officer in Fez, Morocco in 1926. The Rif War in Spanish Morocco, which lasted from 1920 through 1927, pitted the Berber rebels of the Rif Mountains against Spanish military forces, who, in the final phase of the war, received crucial assistance from the French. (Library of Congress)

behind a defensive line. Emboldened by his successes against the Spanish, in April 1925, Abd el-Krim made the fatal mistake of attacking the French in their zone of Morocco, along the Uarga River. This event brought the Spanish and the French together in a mutual war against the Riffians. The turning point of the war against Abd el-Krim occurred with the amphibious landing by the Spanish Army at Alhucemas Bay and the French offensive from their Protectorate in September 1925. The Riffian capital of Ajdir was captured in October, and Abd el-Krim fled into the interior. Pursued by Spanish and French forces, Abd el-Krim surrendered to French forces in May 1926. The peace of Bab Taza, signed on July 10, 1927, ended the Rif Rebellion.

José E. Alvarez

See also: Abd el-Krim; Annual, Battle of (1921); Rif War (1893–1894); Rif War (1909–1910).

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Rum, Sultanate of

A sultanate in Anatolia (Asia Minor), with its capital first at Nicaea (mod. İznik, Turkey) and then at Ikonion (mod. Konya), ruled by a branch of the Saljuk family from 1080/1081 to 1307/1308. The name Rum, deriving from the term *Bilad al-Rum* used by Muslim authors, relates to the formerly "Rhomaic" (i.e., Byzantine) territories of Anatolia.

The sultanate's foundation and consolidation period is intertwined with the careers of the able Sulayman I ibn Qutlumush, who perished fighting against a large Great Saljuk coalition in 1085 or 1086, and Qilij Arslan I, who lost his capital of Nicaea to the Byzantines in 1097 during the First Crusade (1096–1099). Qilij Arslan I faced the Crusade of 1101 in coalition with the Danishmendids, winning two important victories at Mersivan and Herakleia, but he met his death in Syria against the Saljuk ruler Riwan of Aleppo in 1107. By the early 12th century, the Saljuks of Rum had moved their capital to the Cappadocian town of Ikonion, from which comes the alternative appellation of their state as the sultanate of Konya.

For most of the 12th century, the sultans of Rum had to wage wars against their Anatolian rivals, the Turkophone Danishmendids of Caesarea in Cappadocia (mod. Kayseri) and Sebasteia (mod. Sivas), as well as against the Byzantines. They also faced attacks by the armies of the Second Crusade (1147–1149) and the Third Crusade (1189–1192). Under the Komnenian emperors Alexios I and

John II (ca. 1112–1140), the Byzantines succeeded in wresting from the Saljuks a significant section of their former western and northwestern Anatolian possessions. However, it was in the following period that Saljuk-Byzantine relations went through fluctuating phases, especially in the reigns of Qilij Arslan II of Rum and Manuel I Komnenos of Byzantium. In 1161–1162 the sultan was magnificently received in Constantinople, but the treaty concluded was soon proven a dead letter, for in 1173/1174 Qilij Arslan II made a pact with Byzantium's bitter enemy, the Holy Roman Emperor Frederick I Barbarossa. Shortly afterward the sultan thwarted Manuel I's invasion of Rum (1174–1175) by defeating him at the battle of Myriokephalon in September 1176.

Qilij Arslan II crowned his successes by annexing the two Danishmendid emirates in 1174–1177/1178, though his final years were spent in agonizing strife, as his sons bickered over the succession. In the course of the Third Crusade, Qilij Arslan II lost his capital to the armies of Frederick I and soon afterward died a broken man, naming as his successor one of his younger sons, Kay-Khusraw I. It was during that period that Byzantium failed to exploit its contacts with the Zangids; a firm alliance with Nur al-Dīn (d. 1174) might have prevented its defeat at Myriokephalon, while a more effective collaboration with Saladin (with whom the last Komnenos, Andronikos I, and the first Angelos, Isaac II, signed treaties between 1184/1185 and 1192) might have led to a gradual reconquest of Asia Minor, most of which had been lost to the Rum Saljuks by the late 12th century.

The sultanate's history from the late 12th to the late 13th century is treated in detail by the Saljuk-nama of Ibn Bībī, a Persian court chronicler at Ikonion, whose work is complemented by the work of Ibn al-Athīr and the major Byzantine chroniclers of the period. From this period dates another important aspect of Byzantine-Saljuk relations: the frequently attested social, institutional, cultural, and artistic contact and interplay between Rum Saljuks and Anatolian Christians, mostly evidenced by the phenomenon of mixed marriages, prove that both were not only opponents in battlefields but also partakers of a common cultural heritage.

In his first reign Kay-Khusraw I attempted to expand his territories at the expense of Byzantium, but he was temporarily toppled by his brother Rukn al-Dīn Sulayman Shah II, who continued his brother's policy, and also attacked Cilician Armenia and Georgia, but died suddenly while preparing a major expedition in the Caucasus. Meanwhile the exiled Kay-Khusraw I, who had found refuge in Byzantium in 1197–1203/1204, was reinstated at Ikonion. Since his Byzantine benefactors, the Angeloi, had been toppled in 1204, he became hostile toward their successors at Nicaea, the Laskarids, as well as to the latter's allies, the Cilician Armenians. He succeeded in capturing the important southern Anatolian port of Attaleia (mod. Antalya) in 1207, but in 1211 the Saljuks were defeated at Antioch on the Maeander by the Laskarids and their Italian mercenaries, and Kay-Khusraw I was killed in action.

The operations of Kay-Khusraw's successors were directed mainly against the Grand Komnenoi of the empire of Trebizond, from whom Kay-Kawus I (1211–1220) took Sinope in 1214, but the Saljuk army of Kay-Qubadh I (1220–1237) failed to capture Trebizond in 1222–1223 (a previous unsuccessful attempt having taken place in 1205–1206). Kay-Qubadh also faced attacks from John III Doukas Vatatzes of Nicaea between 1222/1225 and 1231, while he also led an expedition against Crimea (1227/1228) and participated in an eastern alliance that defeated the Khwarezm shah Jalal al-Dīn Mangubirtī in 1231. The brunt of the imminent Mongol invasion of Anatolia, however, was reserved for Kay-Qubadh's successor, Kay-Khusraw II, shortly after an internal religious insurrection led by Baba Isaq (1240/1241) had threatened the Rum throne. On June 26, 1243, the Mongol Ilkhans under Baidju crushed the forces of the Rum Saljuks and their Latin and Trapezuntine allies at Satala (mod. Köse Dagh). It was now too late for the Nicaean-Saljuk alliance (August 1243) to be effective, and from then onward the Rum sultanate declined to the status of a protectorate of the Mongol Ilkhanid Empire, in which most of the sultans were mere puppets in the hands of Ilkhanid governors. The period from the mid-13th century, with a long list of ineffectual Saljuk nominal sultans, witnessed a gradual spread of Turkoman emirates (beyliks) in Anatolia. The most powerful of these developed into the Ottoman Empire.

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See also: Basian, Battle of (1203); Mongols; Nur al-Din; Saladin; Saljuks.

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Russo-Afghan Conflict (1885)

A brief conflict, also known as the Afghan Crisis of 1885 or the Penjdeh Incident, between Afghanistan and the Russian Empire over territory in Central Asia. The war unfolded in the environment of the Anglo-Russian imperial rivalry as Russia sought to expand southward in Central Asia and Britain tried to protect India by establishing a buffer zone around it. Concerned about Russian expansion, Britain invaded Afghanistan in 1878 but evacuated the country three years later. At the same time, Russia quickly expanded into southern Central Asia, capturing Merv, a Turkoman town on the ill-defined Afghan border, in 1884. Alarmed by the Russian expansion, the Afghan emir Abdur Rahman deployed a garrison at Penjdeh, a desert oasis not far from Merv. The British government was very apprehensive about Russian operations in Turkmenistan, the last independent Muslim state in Central Asia, and was convinced Russia would then turn to Afghanistan.

In February 1885, the Anglo-Russian Boundary Commission was established to officially demarcate the northern Afghan border, but neither Russia nor Britain participated in it wholeheartedly, suspecting each other of subterfuge. During the border demarcation, Russia insisted on including Penjdeh in the Russian-controlled Merv area and deployed troops not far from the oasis on the banks of the Kushk River. In March, Russian and Afghan troops clashed in a series of skirmishes, the most important of them taking place March 25–27. On March 29, Russian authorities demanded that the Afghans withdraw from Penjdeh or risk being driven out by force. The Russian attack began the following morning. The Russians routed the Afghans and occupied the oasis. Alarmed by the Russian progress, Britain turned to diplomacy to resolve the conflict. The Anglo-Russian Boundary Commission handed Penjdeh to Russia in exchange for Afghan control of the strategic Zulfikar Pass. The border between Afghanistan and Russia was fully delineated in 1887. The Russo-Afghan War revealed British vulnerabilities in the region and prompted Britain to increase its military presence in India and improve the transportation infrastructure to ensure the rapid mobilization and deployment of forces.

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See also: Anglo-Afghan War (1839–1842); Anglo-Afghan War (1878–1880); Central Asia, Russian Conquest of; Great Game.

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Russo-Chechen Conflict (1994–1996)

This conflict began in December 1994, when Russian troops launched an attack to prevent Chechnya from breaking away from the Russian Federation. After two years of heavy fighting, primarily around Grozny, the capital, a peace agreement was reached. During the conflict thousands of civilians were killed and more than 600,000 lost their homes.

The origins of the conflict began in 1993 when the leader of Chechnya, Dzhokar Dudayev, announced the region's full independence from the Russian Federation. This action led to a civil war pitting Russian military against Chechen nationalists during November 1994. Dudayev maintained his stance, and on December 11 a large-scale Russian attack began. The initial assault involved three Russian armored divisions supported by pro-Russian Chechen infantry, though there was some dissension in the federal forces about attacking an area within the Russian Federation. Three columns attempted to surround Grozny, but by late December the Russian advance had been held up by strong resistance from irregular Muslim Chechen forces. Russian tactics now changed to an aerial and artillery bombardment of the city, which resulted in the deaths of many civilians and the destruction of most of the public buildings. Russian forces then began a systematic assault on Grozny in late December and by early 1995, had effectively occupied the city.

After the fall of Grozny, Russian forces extended their control over the lowland areas and then advanced into the foothills of the Caucasus in a widespread offensive on April 15, 1995. The Chechen fighters now adopted a different approach to engaging the Russian forces, carrying out attacks in Russian territory. On June 14, 1995, a group of fighters led by Shamil Basayev seized hundreds of hostages at a hospital in Budyonnovsk. More than 100 people were killed, and a Russian commando operation failed to rescue of the hostages.

By the middle of 1995, as Russian military losses mounted, President Yeltsin began to criticize his minister of defense, Pavel Grachev about the conduct of the campaign and dismissed a number of generals. On July 30, a cease-fire agreement was signed, which called for the Chechen fighters to disarm in return for the withdrawal of federal forces. An exchange of prisoners was also authorized. However, both sides reacted slowly to the protocol, and the agreement collapsed after a Chechen assassination attempt on General Romanov on 6 October.

There now followed a protracted period of guerrilla warfare in which Russian troops used excessive force to try and maintain control of Chechnya. The federal forces used small armored columns to drive into hostile areas and take men away for interrogation. This led to the abuse of force and mistreatment and torture of prisoners. The Chechens would respond by attacking and capturing isolated Russian patrols. These prisoners were often killed and their bodies dumped near Russian outposts. The Chechens also made widespread use of roadside bombs. On April 21, 1996, Dudayev was killed by a missile fired from a Russian aircraft, using his

Chechens, loyal to President Dzhokar Dudayev, ride on an armored personnel carrier around the center of Grozny in front of the presidential palace, on December 8, 1994. For the next 17 years, Chechnya would be mired in a disastrous war. (AP/Wide World Photos)

satellite phone signal as a target beacon. Another truce was signed on May 28, 1996, by President Yeltsin and acting Chechen president Zemlikhan Yandarbiyev. Yeltsin publicly claimed victory in Chechnya after this truce; but its terms only lasted until July.

Having spent the early part of 1996 husbanding their resources, Chechen fighters launched a major attack on Grozny on August 6. Although Russian forces in the city amounted to almost 12,000, within a few hours the key districts of the city had been taken. Russian troops in the towns of Argun and Gudermes were also surrounded. Federal forces responded by sending a number of armored columns against Grozny, but these were repelled with heavy losses. In five days of fighting 200 Russian soldiers were killed and 800 wounded. On August 19, Russian general Konstantin Pulikovsky ordered all Chechen fighters to withdraw within 48 hours or he would authorize the use of strategic bombers and ballistic missiles to flatten the city. The threat generated mass panic within the city, but before the heavy bombardment could take place General Alexander Lebed and Chechen leader Aslan Maskhadov signed the Khasavyurt Accords on August 22, ending the conflict that became known as the First Chechnya War. The accords postponed the decision on Chechen independence until December 2001. Estimates of the number of Russian

soldiers killed in the conflict vary considerably, but are probably around 7,000. Among the Chechens, it is estimated that around 10,000 fighters and more than 100,000 civilians died.

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Russo-Iranian Wars

A series of conflicts between the Russian Empire and Iran in the 18th and 19th centuries. Before the 18th century the two powers had sporadic contact, although commercial activity between Iran and Muscovite Russia increased after Czar Ivan IV's conquest of Kazan and Astrakhan in late 16th century and the Russian expansion into north Caucasus in the 17th century. The reign of the Russian czar Peter the Great saw a major transformation in the nature of Russo-Iranian relations. Despite Russia's exhaustion after the Great Northern War (1700–1721), Peter turned his attention to the Caspian Sea but lacked a legitimate excuse to declare war on Iran. He did not have long to wait. In August 1721, Shah Sultan Husein freed Daud Khan of Daghestan, hoping he would support the shah against the Afghans, who had rebelled in 1709. Instead, Daud Khan attacked and sacked Shemaka, an important Iranian trade center in eastern Caucasia. The attack claimed the lives of several thousand residents, including a few Russian merchants. Daud Khan then appealed to the Ottoman Empire for protection. Upon receiving this news, Czar Peter seized it as a casus belli by claiming that he was reclaiming Iranian land against a common enemy; if Iran protested, Russia could then demand an indemnity. At the same time, King Vakhtang VI of Kartli (eastern Georgia), who had been long mistreated by the Iranians, appealed to Russia for help and offered to a join campaign against Iran.

Russo-Iranian War of 1722–1723

As the Afghan tribesmen attacked Iran from the east, Russian troops advanced to Astrakhan, where Czar Peter arrived on June 29, 1722. The Russian ruler sent an envoy to the shah offering help in defeating the Afghans in exchange for certain provinces along the Caspian Sea. If Iran refused, Russia still planned to occupy

the Caspian provinces to prevent an Ottoman presence there. While the Russian envoy was delivering the message, Russian forces seized the Iranian city of Derbent (Darband), but progress then stalled because of the loss of a large number of ships in a storm at sea and an epidemic that killed off most of the horses in the Russian cavalry. Compelled to retreat to Astrakhan, Peter left garrisons at Tarqu, Derbent, and Baku. The Georgian-Armenian army, which gathered under the leadership of Vakhtang VI at Ganja, was abandoned to face the Iranian retribution. Although Czar Peter soon lost interest in the Caspian region, but his forces continued the campaign and captured Rasht (Resht) in late 1722. When the local Iranian governor demanded that the Russians withdraw, a minor battle took place between Russian and Iranian forces near Resht (March 28, 1723), which ended with a Russian victory and claimed about 1,000 Iranian lives. At the same time, the Ottomans, threatened by Russian penetration into the Caspian region, responded by invading eastern Georgia and seizing Tiflis (Tbilisi). Alarmed by the Ottoman attack, Shah Tahmasp, who had replaced Sultan Husein in 1722, agreed to negotiate with the Russians. By the Treaty of St. Petersburg, signed on September 23, 1723, Russia gained control of Derbent, Baku, and the coastal areas in between as well as the provinces of Gilan, Mazandaran, and Astrabad. The shah also received Russian troops for domestic peacekeeping.

When the treaty reached Isfahan in April 1724, Shah Tahmasp refused to ratify it; by then it was clear that the Russian forces in the region were too small to pose a major threat to Iran. Still, the news of the Russo-Iranian accord precipitated a crisis between Russia and the Ottoman Empire, which openly declared that it would not permit any other power to establish itself on the Caspian Sea. The war was avoided through French mediation, which resulted in the Treaty of Constantinople (June 24, 1724), in which the Ottomans received Azerbaijan and most of southern Caucasia (Georgia and Armenia), and the Russians retained the three Caspian provinces of Iran and captured territories. The treaty specified that if Iran refused to accept the treaty, both Russia and the Porte would take common action against Iran to enforce the treaty and install a puppet ruler. Russian involvement in Iranian affairs, however, withered away after Czar Peter's death in 1725. In February 1732, Nadir Khan negotiated the Treaty of Rasht, which restored Astrabad, Mazandaran, and Gilan to Iran though the territory north of the Kura River remained temporarily under Russian control. Three years later, Russia accepted the Treaty of Ganja and gave up all of its previous conquests, including Baku, Derbent, and Tarqu.

Russo-Iranian War of 1796

After the death of Nadir Shah in 1747, Iran descended into political chaos. Russia remained preoccupied with the Ottoman Empire, but by the 1780s, Russia showed

growing interest in Georgia, where King Erekle of Kartli-Kakheti (eastern Georgia) appealed for Russian help against the Turks and Iranians. Anarchy in Iran created favorable conditions for Russian to move into the Caucasus and the Caspian region. In 1781, a Russian expedition led by Count Voinovich landed near Astrabad with the goal of establishing a fortified base to facilitate subsequent conquest of the northern provinces of Iran. However, Agha Muhammad Khan, the new leading contender in Iran's power struggle, quickly realized the threat and had the members of the expedition arrested and deported. Although Agha Muhammad Khan tried to smooth over relations with Russia, Russian Empress Catherine II felt slighted by the incident and refused to accept the envoy. Relations between the two powers gradually deteriorated, with Russia supporting Agha Muhammad Khan's opponents and Agha Muhammad imposing tariffs on Russian products. In 1783, eastern Georgia and Russia signed the Treaty of Georgievsk, which placed Georgia under Russian protection. The arrival of Russian troops in Georgia greatly alarmed Iran, which still considered Georgia its vassal state. In 1784, Russia became embroiled in another conflict with the Turks and recalled its troops from Georgia; for the next 10 years, Empress Catherine's attention turned away from the Caucasus to European affairs. This allowed Agha Muhammad to attempt to restore Iranian authority in the defiant Georgia. In 1795, he led a major invasion of Georgia, unleashing the full force of his wrath on its capital, Tbilisi, where thousands of residents were massacred and some 15,000 residents taken into captivity.

Russia provided no military help to stop the Iranian invasion, but after Agha Muhammad left Georgia, the Russian authorities proposed a plan for the invasion of Iran. Led by Count Valerian Zubov, the Russian expedition wanted to overthrow Agha Muhammad and replace him with a pro-Russian candidate. The Russian troops set out from Kizlyar in April 1796 and captured Derbent on May 10. By mid-June, they were in control of most of Azerbaijan, including Baku, Shemakha, and Ganja, and by early November, Zubov was poised to invade Iran. However, Catherine's death put an end to this plan. Her successor, Paul, had other plans and ordered the troops back to Russia.

Russo-Iranian War of 1804–1813

Eight years passed before a new conflict erupted between Russia and Iran. Agha Muhammad's successor, Fath Ali Shah Qajar, sought to consolidate his authority by securing land near the Caspian Sea's southwestern coast and in southern Caucasus. At the same time, the new Russian emperor Alexander I was also determined to extend Russian sovereignty to the disputed territories across the Caucasus mountain range. In 1801, Russia annexed the Georgian kingdom of Kartli-Kakheti, and the appointment of Prince Paul Tsitsianov (Tsitsishvili) as

Russian commander-in-chief in the Caucasus greatly accelerated Russian expansion in the region. Despite his Georgian origins, Tsitsianov was a die-hard Russian imperialist who believed in Russia's mission in Asia. Between 1802 and 1804, he proceeded to impose Russian rule on the western Georgian kingdom of Imereti, the principalities of Mingrelia and Guria, and the khanates located around Georgia. Some submitted without a fight but Ganja resisted, prompting attack. Ganja was ruthlessly sacked: 3,000 people were killed and thousands more expelled to Iran. Russian attacks on the khanates, which Iran considered its vassal territories, served as a casus belli for Fath Ali Khan. On May 23, Iran demanded that Russia withdraw from southern Caucasia. After Russia refused, Iran declared war. In spring 1804, Tsitsianov's army of 3,000 troops marched to the Erivan khanate after its ruler Muhammad Khan refused to accept Russian sovereignty. In June, the Russians besieged Erivan and engaged the Iranian forces in the region. On 22 June, the Russians defeated the Iranian detachments at Gumry (Leninakan), while Tsitsianov scored a victory over Iran's Crown Prince Abbas Mirza not far from the Echmiadzin Monastery (near Erivan) on July 2–3. After these defeats, Iranian forces retreated to regroup while Tsitsianov continued to exert pressure on local khanates.

In 1805, Karabagh, Shakki, and Shirvan recognized Russian authority while Russians conducted raids against Baku and Resht. Although Tsitsianov was assassinated near Baku in February 1806, the Russians repelled an Iranian attack in Karabagh in the summer of 1806 and occupied Derbent and Baku. Inconclusive warfare persisted until 1812 because Russia, preoccupied with events in Europe, was unable to devote considerable resources to the Caucasian theater and Iran was unable to deal with the Russian threat. The Iranian forces suffered defeats at the Aras (Araxes) and Zagam rivers in 1805; Karakapet in 1806; Karababa in 1808; Ganja in 1809; and Meghri, the Aras River, and Akhalkalaki in 1810. In 1812, as Napoleon launched his invasion of Russia, Abbas Mirza led 20,000 men into the khanate of Talysh (southern Azerbaijan) and captured the fortress of Lenkoran on August 21. By October, the Iranian army reached the Aras river and attacked a small Russian detachment (2,000 men) under the charismatic General Petr Kotlyarovskii but suffered an unexpected defeat on October 31. On January 13, 1813, the Russians stormed Lenkoran, forcing Iran to sue for peace. Negotiated with British mediation and signed at the village of Gulistan on October 14, 1813, the treaty confirmed the Russian victory and forced Fath Ali Shah to relinquish Iran's claims to south Caucasia. Iran lost all its territories north of the Aras River, including Daghestan, all of Georgia, and parts of Armenia and Azerbaijan (e.g., Karabagh, Ganja, Shirvan, Baku). The shah also surrendered Iranian rights to navigate the Caspian Sea and granted Russia exclusive rights to maintain a military fleet in the Caspian Sea and capitulatory rights to trade within Iran. In return, Russia

promised to support Crown Prince Abbas Mirza as heir to the Iranian throne after the death of Fath Ali Shah.

Russo-Persian War of 1825–1828

Iranian leadership did not regard the Treaty of Gulistan as definitive and considered it more as a truce that allowed Iran to regroup. Peace reigned in the Caucasus for 13 years as Fath Ali Shah sought to secure foreign support and modernize his forces. Abbas Mirza played an important role in Iranian military reforms as he believed the introduction of European-style regiments would enable Iran to gain the upper hand over Russia and reclaim lost territory. He began sending Iranian students to Europe to learn Western tactics and employed British and French officers (and a few renegade Russian officers) to raise and drill troops. He also tried to introduce a new recruitment system to create a more predictable supply of manpower and to make himself independent of the local elite. Abbas Mirza had to overcome public resistance to reforms as the population and the ulama disliked changes, the European appearance of the new regiments, and the presence of "infidel" instructors. Although he received British subsidies to defray the cost of military reforms, training and equipping new regiments proved very expensive, and affected the Qajar finances. The reformed army had some success in campaigns against the Ottomans in 1821–1823, but it proved to be ill-prepared for the second Russo-Iranian war that broke out in 1826.

The continued Russian encroachment into the southern Caucasian territories as well as mistreatment of Muslim population seriously strained Russo-Iranian relations. General Alexei Yermolov, the new Russian commander-in-chief in the Caucasus, shared his predecessor Tsitsianov's worldview towards "Asiatics" and was firmly committed to war as a means of achieving Russia's political goals. In May 1826, Russian troops occupied Mirak in the Erivan khanate in violation of the Treaty of Gulistan. In response, Iranian forces invaded the Karabagh and Talysh khanates, where local elites switched sides and surrendered the major cities of Lenkoran, Kuba, and Baku to the Iranians. Although Abbas Mirza was able to seize the initiative and regain considerable territory in first months of the war, the Iranian offensive soon stalled. The Russian garrison at Shusha heroically defended the fortress for 48 days, which allowed Yermolov to rush reinforcements to the theater of war. The Russian counterattack soon shattered the Iranian forces, first crushing Muhammad Mirza (future Muhammad Shah of Iran) on the banks of the Shamkhor River (15 September) and then defeating Abbas Mirza at Ganja (September 26).

In October, the Russian troops under General I. Paskevizh stormed Erivan. In 1827, the Russians drove Abbas Mirza back into Iran, capturing Nakhichevan, Abbasabad, Meren, Urmiya, Ardabil, and Tabriz. By 1828, Iran had lost all of its

southeast Caucasian territories and was forced to sue for peace. Signed at Turkmanchai on February 22, 1828, the treaty was the definitive acknowledgment of the Persian loss of the Caucasus region to Russia and of the permanent division of Azerbaijan. The treaty required Iran to cede sovereignty over the khanates of Yerevan, Nakhichevan, Talysh, Ordubad, and Mughan in addition to regions Russia had annexed under the Treaty of Gulistan. The Aras River was declared the new border between Iran and Russia. Iran agreed to pay vast reparations of 20 million rubles in silver and transferred to Russia the exclusive right to maintain a Caspian Sea fleet. In addition, the capitulatory rights guaranteed Russia preferential treatment for its exports, which generally were not competitive in European markets, and exempted Russian subjects from Iranian jurisdiction.

Russo-Iranian Conflict of 1911

After the Iranian Revolution of 1906–1909, Muzaffar al-Din Shah was forced to accept a constitution (January 7, 1907) but died just a week later. His successor, Muhammad Ali Shah came to, and stayed in, power with the help of the Russian-controlled Iranian Cossack Brigade. The first National Consultative Assembly (the Majles), which opened in October 1907, was suppressed in 1908 by the officers of the Persian Cossack Brigade. However, the following year the second Majles came to power, forcing Muhammad Ali to flee to Russia and installing the young Ahmad Shah (r. 1909–1925). In 1911, the Majles hired American financial adviser William Morgan Shuster to modernize Iran's economy, but his intrepid moves to collect revenue throughout the country soon angered both Russia and Britain, who had divided Iran into spheres of influence since 1907. Russia issued an ultimatum demanding Shuster's dismissal, and when the Majles refused, the Russian army seized Tabriz and advanced to Tehran. The shah's regents hastily dismissed Shuster and dissolved the Majles in December 1911. For the next three years Russia effectively ruled Iran, but with the outbreak of the World War I, Russian troops withdrew from the north of the country.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Abbas Mirza; Agha Muhammad Khan Qajar; Gulistan, Treaty of (1813); Nadir Shah; Resht, Treaty of (1732); Tahmasp; Turkmanchai, Treaty of (1828).

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Russo-Mongol Wars (13th–14th Centuries)

During the 13th century, the declining Kievan Rus suffered devastating invasions by the Mongols. The Mongols' initial foray into Russia occurred in May 1223, when a small contingent advanced through the Caucasus Mountains to the Kalka River, where they, though outnumbered three or four to one, annihilated a Russian force made up of men from several Russian principalities and slaughtered their captives, including Prince Mstislav of Kiev, before heading back to the Mongolian steppes. Fourteen years later, the Mongols returned, en masse and intent on conquest. Striking Ryazan, easternmost of the Russian principalities, an invasion force of 150,000 to 200,000 men, led by Batu, grandson of the deceased Chinggis (Genghis) Khan, found the Russians disunited and unprepared. Consequently, in a whirlwind, three-year campaign, Batu's horsemen defeated every Russian army encountered, laid waste to the territories, inflicted mass death, and captured nearly every major city, an exception being Novgorod, spared when the annual spring thaw in 1239 created conditions Mongol cavalry could not overcome. The culmination came in November 1240, when Kiev, Russia's "mother city" since the ninth century, fell to Batu, whose men proceeded to pillage it and ravage the population.

In the decades following their conquest, the Mongols conducted at least 14 military campaigns within the Russian lands, many initiated by Russian princes who called upon the khan for assistance in suppressing rebellion. Mongol military intervention in Russia continued throughout the 14th century, frequently in consequence of the struggle between the princes of Moscow and Tver for the grand princely throne. For much of the century, the Mongols maintained military superiority. However, the balance ultimately shifted as the Kipchak khanate experienced internal strife and fragmentation and as Moscow's princes, having achieved the position of grand prince, fashioned an army whose organization, strategy and tactics,

and weaponry were modeled on those of the Mongols and gained the support of many of their fellow Russian princes.

In September 1380, Muscovite Grand Prince Dmitrii Ivanovich (r. 1359–1389)—subsequently know as Dmitrii Donskoi—routed a Mongol army at the Battle of Kulikovo Field, near the Don River. Although the Mongols captured and burned Moscow two years later, the victory at Kulikovo Field destroyed the aura of invincibility that had surrounded the Mongols and set the stage for Russia's liberation from the "Mongol yoke," a development symbolized by Grand Prince Ivan III's (r. 1462–1505) refusal to pay tribute, with no ramifications, in 1480.

Bruce DeHart

See also: Mongols.

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Russo-Ottoman War (1877–1878)

The last of a series of conflicts between the Russian and Ottoman empires resulting from Russian expansionism and Turkish decline. These conflicts were part of a continuing crisis in which Balkan instability growing out of Turkey's decline threatened the peace of Europe. The conflicts grew out of Russia's drive to secure her southern borders and dominate the Balkans. In addition, the Russians sought to regain losses they had sustained in the Crimean War of 1853–1856. The Porte's decline and ethnic tensions in the Balkan provinces fueled Russian ambitions.

The immediate cause of the 1877–1878 war was the Russian desire to aid the Balkan rebellions of 1875 and 1876 against Turkish rule. The crisis erupted in 1875 with scattered peasant rebellions in Bulgaria—the poorest and most exploited of Turkey's Balkan possessions—and was fanned with an ill-considered attack by Serbia against the Turks in Bosnia in the summer and early fall of 1876, which the Turks swiftly crushed. Despite Serbia's defeat, the revolts in Bulgaria intensified throughout the rest of 1876 and into 1877. Turkish forces carried out wholesale massacres, which inflamed public opinion throughout Europe and Great Britain and led to growing demands in Russian Slavophil and Nationalist circles for Emperor Alexander II and his advisers to act.

On April 24, 1877, after several months of diplomatic maneuvering in which the Russians gained the acquiescence of Germany and Austria-Hungary and the active support of Romania, Russia formally declared war on Turkey. The Russian plan called for a force of 250,000 men to push through Romania, cross the

Danube upstream of the main Turkish forces, pass through the Balkan Mountains, and seize Adrianople before advancing on the Ottoman capital at Constantinople. A diversionary offensive would be launched in the Caucuses to prevent the Turks from reinforcing their Balkan armies with troops from Asia Minor. A quick victory was vital. A prolonged war meant intervention by the other European powers and a strain on Russia's economy.

The Russian campaign was unexpectedly held up by the stubborn Turkish defense of Plevna (Pleven) in west central Bulgaria. Plevna's strategic importance lay in its location at the crossroads linking Bulgaria's vital roadways. Continuing Turk possession of the city constituted a grave threat to Russian supply and communication lines. Three times—twice in July and once in September 1877—the Russians assaulted Plevna only to be repulsed with heavy losses until they were forced to lay siege. At the same time, the Russian army crossed the Ottoman border in eastern Anatolia and captured Ardahan, Bayazid, Kars, and Erzurum.

In late November 1877, after a five-month siege, Plevna surrendered to the Russian army, which crossed the Balkan Mountains and occupied Sogia on January 4, 1878, and Adrianople (Edirne) on January 20. The Russian army was now in a position to directly threaten Constantinople, but the Russian advance to the Ottoman capital provoked a response from the British. Britain intervened and pressured the Russians to negotiate a truce with the Turks. The Russians accepted a cease-fire on January 31 but continued to advance toward Constantinople. The British responded by sending a naval task force to the Sea of Marmara. Although incensed by Britain's action, Russia was alarmed by the British presence around Constantinople and, to avoid a pan-European conflict, chose to seek armistice with the Turks. The Russian army halted at San Stefano, just a few miles from Constantinople.

Over the next few weeks, Russian and Turkish diplomats conducted negotiations that resulted in the Treaty of San Stefano of March 3, 1878. The treaty established an independent "Greater Bulgaria," which Russia envisioned as a satellite state through which they could control the Balkans. Bosnia-Herzegovina was granted autonomy. Romania, Serbia, and Montenegro received independence and were enlarged at the expense of Ottoman territorial losses.

Alarmed by the expansion of Russian power implicit in the San Stefano pact, the European powers, led by Britain and Germany, convened the Congress of Berlin and forced Russia to accept modifications in the treaty. The resulting Treaty of Berlin gave Russia southern Bessarabia, Batumi, Ardahan, and Kars as well as a vast war indemnity (about 800 million French francs) that the Porte was required to pay in the ensuing years. It also broke up Greater Bulgaria into smaller independent states, placed Bosnia-Herzegovina under an Austrian protectorate, and recognized the independence of Serbia, Romania, and Montenegro. Russian ambitions were thwarted but the Berlin agreement left many issues unresolved, particularly Slavic nationalism and Austrian and Russian ambitions in the region. The war had

a profound impact on the Ottoman Empire, which lost 8 percent of its most productive territory and 20 percent of its total population. The war also significantly altered the demographics of the Ottoman state as most of the Orthodox Christian population was lost. The Ottoman economy was saddled with heavy reparations.

Walter F. Bell

See also: Balkan Wars (1912–1913); Crimean War (1853–1856); Plevna (Pleven), Siege of (1877); Russo-Ottoman Wars; San Stefano, Treaty of (1878); World War I.

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Russo-Ottoman Wars

The Russian Empire and the Ottoman Empire shared a long border and were rivals for centuries. They competed for territory and influence in the Balkans, the Crimea, the Caucasus, and Central Asia. Although the two empires were often brought into conflict with each other because of their alliances with other great powers in Europe, the early Russo-Ottoman Wars were caused mainly by Russia's desire to establish a warm-water port on the Black Sea, which lay under Ottoman control.

Early History

The Ottomans initially used the term *Moskov* or *Moskovlu* to refer to the Russian state that emerged around the principality of Moscow (the so-called Muscovy or the Muscovy Rus). The first formal diplomatic contact between the two states took place in 1492, when the Muscovite embassy arrived at Constantinople to discuss long-distance trade. The Porte began to use the term "Rusiya" at the end of the 17th century, when the Muscovy Rus came to include parts of Ukraine, and it was only in 1741 that the sultan recognized the Russian rulers as the "Emperors of All the Russias" (*tamamen Rusiya*). Early Russo-Ottoman relations were marked by a clear distinction in status between the powerful Ottoman state and

the rising Russian principality. The sultans refused Russian offers of alliance and oftentimes relegated Russian affairs to their vassal khans of the Crimea, who conducted periodic raiding expeditions to the southern provinces of Muscovy. By the mid-16th century, however, Muscovite Rus became strong enough to resist the Crimean khanate, and Czar Ivan IV (r. 1533–1584) destroyed the Kazan and Astrakhan khanates, important allies of the Crimean Tatars, in 1552–1556.

Because the Black Sea was bordered by the Ukraine to the north, the Ukraine was an area of constant struggle between Russia, Poland, the Ottoman Empire, and the Don Cossacks for most of the 17th century. In 1637–1642, the Don Cossacks captured Azov, an important Ottoman fortress, which they offered to Czar Mikhail of Russia; the first Romanov ruler, however, declined it to avoid a direct conflict with the Porte.

Russo-Ottoman War of 1676–1681

In 1654, after a powerful Cossack uprising against Poland, Russia signed the Treaty of Pereyaslavl with the Cossacks, which granted Russia control over parts of eastern Ukraine. The Russian expansion, however, provoked a war with Poland and the Crimean khanate, supported by the Ottoman Empire. In 1672, the Ottoman army occupied parts of southern Ukraine, and a preliminary contest between Russia and the Ottoman Turks began in 1676 after the Cossacks, under Ivan Samoilovich, hetman of the Left-Bank Ukraine, asked for Russian assistance against the Turks, who supported his rival Hetman Petro Doroshenko. The Russian army, supported by Ukranian allies, captured the Cossack capital of Chyhyryn in 1676. The following year, a large Ottoman army, under Ibrahim Pasha, invaded Ukraine and besieged Chyhyryn, although a Russian attack soon forced the Ottoman army to retreat. In 1678, the Ottomans besieged Chyhyryn once again, capturing it in August. Over the next two years, the two sides limited their actions to raids and border attacks before the Treaty of Bakhchisarai, signed in 1681, established a buffer zone between the Ottoman and Russian-controlled regions of Ukraine.

Russo-Ottoman War of 1686–1700

In 1686, in the wake of the Ottoman defeats against the Holy League (Austria, Venice, Poland, and the Papal States), Russia, under regent Sofia Alekseyevna, joined the war and organized two invasions, led by Prince Vasily Golitsyn, of the Crimean khanate in 1687 and 1689, but both efforts ended disastrously for the Russian army, contributing to a discontent that resulted in the ouster of Sofia by her brother Peter. In 1695, Peter I took personal command of a force that sought to capture Azov, an Ottoman fortress on the northern shore of the Sea of Azov, an inlet of the Black Sea. Most of the Russian troops approached the area by traveling down the Don and

Volga rivers. Because the Russians had no navy, however, they were unable to cut off the Ottoman's access by water to the fortress at Azov. The Ottoman defenders turned back the Russians, who sustained heavy losses. Subsequently, Peter took a year to build a navy at the Don River city of Voronezh. In the spring of 1696, the Russians again approached Azov with an enlarged force of about 75,000. This time half the force traveled on the new warships down the river, and half came over land. As the land force engaged the fortress' defenders, the naval force was able to defeat the Turkish warships and blockade the fortress from the sea. The Russians were able to capture the city on July 28, 1696. Four years later, the Treaty of Constantinople compelled the Porte to acknowledge Russia's control of the fortresses of Azov, Taganrog, Pavlovsk, and Mius.

Russo-Ottoman War of 1711 (The Pruth Campaign)

Excited by his military success against the Swedes, whom he crushed at Poltava in 1709, Peter decided to force the Ottomans to open Constantinople and the straits to Russian commerce and gain free passage to the Mediterranean Sea. Hoping to incite anti-Ottoman rebellion among the Orthodox Christian population of the Danubian principalities (Wallachia, Moldavia, Bessarabia), Peter launched an ill-prepared campaign in the basin of the Pruth River, where he was defeated at Stanilesti (July 1711) and surrounded by the Ottoman (and Crimean) forces under Grand Vizier Baltaci Mehmet Pasha. On July 21, 1711, Peter accepted Treaty of Pruth, which required him only to restore Azov and its surrounding territory to the Turks. Considering Peter's desperate situation, the Turks certainly could have made greater demands but missed that opportunity.

Russo-Ottoman War of 1735–1739

In 1735, after a long period of occupation with European rather than Ottoman affairs, Russia, in league with Austria and Iran, declared a new war on the Ottomans. The new Russo-Ottoman War came in the wake of the War of the Polish Succession, which pitted their interests against each other and resulted in continued raids by the Crimean Tatars. The Russian troops, led by Field Marshal Burkhard Christoph von Münnich and General Peter Lacy, invaded Crimea (twice) and captured Perekop, Azov, and Ochakov, but they were later forced to retreat because of logistical difficulties and a plague epidemic. In 1739, the Russians advanced into southern Ukraine, defeating the Turks at Stavuchany and capturing Khotin and Yassy. Meanwhile, Austria, whose troops had been less successful than Russia's, was forced to sign a peace agreement that led to the Treaty of Belgrade in 1739. With its ally gone and war with Sweden looming, Russia chose to sign the Treaty of Nissa in October 1739. Russia restored portions of Moldavia and Bessarabia,

including the city of Khotin, to the Turks, and promised to dismantle the fortifications at Azov, which, however, Russians retained as a port. The Turks, however, opened the Black Sea to Russian commercial activity.

Russo-Ottoman War of 1768–1774

During the reign of Catherine II, the Russo-Ottoman conflict entered a new stage determined by Russia's role in the partition of Poland. In 1768, the Russian troops pressed Polish confederates toward the Ottoman frontier. Having promised help to Poland six years earlier, Sultan Mustafa III declared war on Russia in late 1768. This time, Catherine made sure Russia was well prepared. Russian troops led by Field Marshal P. A. Rumyantsev advanced into Moldavia and defeated the Turks under Kaplan Girey and Ivazzade Halil Pasha at Larga (1770) and Kagul (1770); the defeat at Kagul, one of worst in the Ottoman history, was so decisive that it spurred the Ottomans into introducing a series of Western-influenced reforms into the Ottoman army. By the summer of 1770, Moldavia was occupied by the Russians. Meanwhile, the Russian fleet, under the command of Count Alexis Orlov, reached the coast of Greece, where it won the naval battle of Chios on July 5, 1770. Two days later, he completely destroyed the Turkish fleet at Chesma Bay. In 1772, the Russian fleet bombarded Beirut to assist local rebels against the Porte and conducted diplomatic negotiations with the Mamluk leader Ali Bey of Egypt. A Russian expeditionary force was also sent to eastern Georgia, where King Erekle II scored a major victory over the Turks at Aspindza (1770).

After a failed attempt to negotiate in 1772, the hostilities resumed in earnest. The Russian troops, under General Alexander Suvorov, also advanced to the Danubian principalities, crossing the Danube in 1773 and 1774 and scoring a decisive victory at Kozluca (1774, now Suvorovo), which forced the Ottoman commander Muhsinzade Mehmed Pasha to sue for peace. The Treaty of Kuchuk-Kainardji was signed in July 1774. It granted Russia additional territory on the shores of the Black Sea along with the right of navigation on the sea and free passage for Russian merchant ships through the straits. The Crimean khanate gained independence from the Porte. Encouraged by such unprecedented success, Empress Catherine invaded and annexed the Crimean khanate in 1783 and ended Ukrainian autonomy in 1786. At the same time, Russia extended its authority to southern Caucasia, where it established a protectorate over the eastern Georgian kingdom.

Russo-Ottoman Wars of 1787–1791

The Ottomans spent the next decade reorganizing their army and fleet and preparing for revenge. Both sides complained of infringements of the Treaty of Kuchuk-Kainarji, and in 1786, Empress Catherine II's triumphal procession through the

annexed Crimea only further infuriated the Porte. On August 19, 1787, Sultan Abdul Hamid I, influenced by the vociferous pro-war ulama, refugee Crimean Tatar nobles, and Grand Vizier Koca Yusuf Pasha, declared war on Russia in an effort to reclaim territories lost in preceding conflicts. Russia welcomed a new conflict as it provided an opportunity to expand influence in the Black Sea littoral and to realize Empress Catherine II's long standing Greek Project, the reestablishment of a Byzantine state on Ottoman territory with Constantinople as its capital. Once the war began, Austria joined on the side of Russia.

The Turks were caught ill-prepared for the war and failed in their attempt to prevent further Russian expansion. Although they successfully dealt with the Austrians in the Banat (parts of present-day Romania, Serbia and Hungary), the Turks could not stop the Russian advance. The Russian Black Sea fleet defeated the Turks at Kinburn (1787) and Fidonisi (1788), Field Marshal Pyotr Rumyantsev captured Yassy and Khotin (1788), while Prince Gregory Potemkin seized Ochakov (1788) in the Crimea. In 1789, the Russian army, under Potemkin, Suvorov, and Rumyantsev, invaded the Danubian principalities, defeating Hasan Pasha's army at Focşani (July 1789) and Rymnik (September 1789). After these two defeats, the Ottoman army retreated in complete confusion, abandoning Bessarabia and Wallachia to the Russian forces. In 1790, Gazi Hasan Pasha replaced Hasan Pasha as commander of the Ottoman forces in the Balkans. But with his army in disarray and lacking supplies and quality recruits, the new commander could not rectify the situation. In December 1790, in one of the bloodiest battles of the 18th century, Suvorov's army stormed the powerful fortress of Ismail on the Danube and gained control of the lower Dniester and Danube rivers. Continued Russian successes in the Caucasus and on the Black Sea compelled the Turks to sign the Treaty of Jassy on January 9, 1792, whereby the Ottoman Empire ceded the entire western Ukrainian Black Sea coast to Russia.

Russo-Ottoman War of 1806–1812

The new Russo-Ottoman conflict must be understood within the context of the Napoleonic Wars in Europe. As Emperor Napoleon scored decisive victories over the Russo-Austrian coalition in 1805, Sultan Selim III adopted pro-French policies, which alarmed Russia. The immediate cause for hostilities was the sultan's dismissal of two pro-Russian rulers of the Danubian principalities, which violated the provisions of earlier agreements. In late 1806, two Russian armies crossed the Dniester River and occupied the Danubian principalities. The Porte declared war on Russia but could not dislodge the Russian force. Over the next three years, Russian armies gradually expanded their theater of operation, reaching the Danube River in 1809 and defeating the Ottomans at Frasin, Rassevat, and Tataritsa. In 1810, the Russians crossed the Danube, capturing Hirsovo, Razgrad, Silistra, Ruse, and

Shumla and advancing into Bulgaria. At the same time, Russia provided considerable support to the Serbs to sustain First Serbian Uprising (1804–1813) and conducted successful operations in western Georgia and eastern Anatolia, where the Ottoman army of Yusuf Ziya Pasha was routed at Arpa Su (1808). The Russian navy defeated the Turks in the Aegean Sea in 1807 and blockaded the Dardanelles Straits.

The Ottoman conduct of the war was greatly constrained by domestic difficulties as a series of internal political crises shook Istanbul in 1807–1808. Sultan Selim's effort to modernize the army provoked a violent response from the ulama and the Janissaries, who overthrew the sultan in the spring of 1807. The new Sultan Mustafa IV's reign proved to be brief as he was overthrown in 1808. These power struggles occupied the attention of the Ottoman high command and provincial notables, forcing them to adopt a defensive posture against the Russians. In 1811, Sultan Mahmud launched a counterattack, led by Ahmet Pasha, but the Russians, under Mikhail Kutuzov, surrounded and starved the Ottoman army into submission at Ruse in November 1811. Nevertheless, as the chances of a full-scale Franco-Russian war increased, Russia sought a quick end to its current war with the Ottoman Empire. In May 1812, Russia agreed to the rather disadvantageous Treaty of Bucharest, which restored all of the Danubian principalities, except Bessarabia, to the Ottoman Empire.

Russo-Ottoman War of 1828–1829

During the reign of Nicholas I, the question of the independence of Greece became central to Russo-Ottoman relations. In 1827, Russia, France, and the United Kingdom took joint action against the Porte, and their combined fleet destroyed the Egyptian fleet at Navarino Bay on October 20. Later, after Russo-British cooperation had come to an end, Russia continued to support the Greeks and declared war on the Ottoman empire on April 26, 1828; in declaring the war at this time, Russia also sought to engage the Ottoman army before the extensive military reforms launched by Sultan Mahmud II could take effect. A Russian army quickly advanced into the Danubian principalities, reaching the Danube River. Once again, the Ottoman military was ill-prepared, with the Janissaries destroyed by Mahmud in 1826 and the Ottoman fleet shattered at Navarino Bay in 1827. Russia exploited its naval supremacy to establish reliable supply lines for its land forces. Crossing the Danube, the Russian army captured Silistra and Vidin as the Ottomans, under Husrev Pasha, fell back to the defensive line in the Balkan mountains. In 1829, Russia opened a second front in the war in southern Caucasia, where Russian troops captured Poti, Ardahan, Kars, and Erzurum and besieged Trabzon. The Russian advance into the Balkan Mountains resulted in a decisive victory at Adrianople (Edirne), which opened the route to Istanbul. To prevent a catastrophe, the

Ottomans signed the Treaty of Adrianople (Edirne), the terms of which were highly favorable to Russia.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Adrianople, Treaty of (1839); Bakhchisarai, Treaty of (1681); Belgrade, Treaty of (1739); Bucharest, Treaty of (1812); Constantinople, Treaty of (1700); Jassy, Treaty of (1792); Kuchuk Kainarji, Treaty of (1774); Mahmud II; Navarino Bay, Battle of (1827); Pruth, Treaty of (1711).; Selim III.

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Russo-Ottoman War of 1853–1856. *See* Crimean War (1853–1856).

S

Saadabad Pact (1937)

Treaty of nonaggression signed by Afghanistan, Iraq, Iran, and Turkey on July 8, 1937, at the Saadabad Palace in Teheran. Italy's invasion of Ethiopia and the increasing Italian threat in the Near East exacerbated the security concerns of the countries in the region. Under these circumstances, on October 2, 1935, in Geneva, Switzerland, Turkey, Iran, and Iraq reached an agreement on consultation and nonaggression. Afghanistan readily declared its intention to sign, but the treaty was concluded until 1937, when Iran's outstanding border disputes with Afghanistan and Iraq were finally resolved.

Having reiterated their commitment to the General Treaty for Renunciation of War of 1928 (the Kellogg–Briand Pact), the parties pledged not to engage in acts of aggression against each other, ranging from declaration of war to assisting an aggressor; to consult in case an international dispute arises that might affect parties' interests; to respect the inviolability of common borders; to prevent the establishment of organizations on their territory threaten the security of other parties; and to not intervene in others' domestic affairs. Despite the fact that no party has officially denounced the Saadabad Pact, it became obsolete after the World War II.

Tuba Ünlü Bilgiç

See also: Baghdad Pact (1955); Non-Aligned Movement.

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Sadat, Anwar (1918–1981)

Egyptian nationalist leader, vice president (1966–1970), and president (1970–1981) of Egypt. Born on December 25, 1918, in Mit Abu al-Kum, Egypt, one of 13 children, Anwar Sadat attended the Royal Egyptian Military Academy, from

which he graduated in 1938 as a second lieutenant. His first posting was in the Sudan, where he met Gamal Abdel Nasser, fellow nationalist and future Egyptian president. Stemming from their mutual disdain of British colonial rule, Sadat and Nasser helped form the secret organization that would eventually be called the Free Officers Group, comprising young Egyptian military officers dedicated to ending British rule and ousting King Farouk II. During World War II, Sadat was jailed for conspiring with the Axis powers to expel British forces from Egypt.

Sadat was an active participant in the July 23, 1952 coup against King Farouk engineered by the Free Officers Group. Farouk abdicated and left Egypt on July 26, 1952. When Egypt was declared a republic in June 1953, Major General Mohammad Naguib became its president, and Nasser became vice president. In October 1954, after an attempt on Nasser's life, Naguib was removed from office, while Nasser consolidated his power. In February 1955, Nasser became prime minister and seven months later became president. Sadat, meanwhile, served loyally under Nasser, acting as his chief spokesman and one of his closest personal confidants and advisers.

In 1964, Sadat became vice president of Egypt and then president upon Nasser's death in September 1970. When Sadat became president, Egypt's relationship with the Soviet Union, once robust, was showing signs of serious strain. At the time of his death, in fact, Nasser had been moving away from the Soviet Union. Part of the reason for this had been the reduction in equipment that the Soviets were willing to sell to Egypt. On July 18, 1972, Sadat ordered all Soviet advisers to leave the country, to be followed by pilots and other army technicians.

On October 6, 1973, Sadat led Egypt, along with Syria, into a war with Israel with the goal of reclaiming the Sinai Peninsula lost in the 1967 Six-Day War. Although Egypt was defeated in the war, initial military successes and Sadat's determination earned him great respect among his people and lifted the morale of the nation, which had been badly shaken by Nasser's heavy-handed rule and economic difficulties. At war's end, the United States and the Soviet Union both were concerned about the balance of power in the Middle East and thus negotiated a cease-fire agreement that was generally favorable to Egypt, allowing Sadat to claim a victory of sorts.

Realizing that only the United States could elicit any substantive concessions from Israel, Sadat completely severed relations with the Soviet Union in March 1976 and began working with the Americans toward a peace settlement with the Israelis. In a courageous move, Sadat became the first Arab leader to officially visit Israel in November 1977, meeting with Prime Minister Menachem Begin and even addressing the Israeli Knesset. In September 1978, Sadat signed the Camp David Accords, ushering in a comprehensive peace agreement with Israel. The accords were highly unpopular in the Arab world, however, especially among fundamentalist Muslims.

Anwar Sadat was president of Egypt from 1970 until his assassination in 1981. Sadat is remembered for his part in concluding the 1979 Camp David Peace Treaty between Egypt and Israel. (U.S. Department of Defense)

Although the Camp David Accords were, in the long run, beneficial for Egypt, many in the Arab world saw them as a great betrayal and viewed Sadat as a traitor. In September 1981, Sadat's government cracked down on extremist Muslim organizations and radical student groups, in the process arresting more than 1,600 people. Sadat's strong-arm tactics angered many in the Arab community and only exacerbated his problems, which included economic stagnation and charges that he had quashed dissident voices through force.

On October 6, 1981, Sadat was assassinated in Cairo while reviewing a military parade commemorating the Yom Kippur War. His assassins were radical fundamentalist army officers who belonged to the Islamic Jihad organization, which had bitterly denounced Sadat's peace overtures with Israel and his suppression of dissidents the month before. Sadat was succeeded in office by Hosni Mubarak.

Dallace W. Unger

See also: Arab-Israeli War (1956); Arab-Israeli War (1967); Arab-Israeli War (1973); Camp David Accords (1978); Nasser, Gamal Abdel.

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Saif (Sayf) al-Dawla (d. 967)

The founder of the Hamadanid dynasty in Syria, famous for his prolonged struggle against the Byzantine Empire. Saif al-Dawla was born Abu al-Hasan Ali Ibn Hamdan around 916 into a prominent family; his grandfather Ibn Hamdan, the lord of Mardin, rebelled against the Abbasid caliph in 894/895, while his father, Abu al-Haija, perished in the power struggle in Baghdad in early 930s. The young Abu al-Hassan initially ruled at Wasit in modern Iraq and, with his brother Nasir al-Dawla, actively participated in the political struggles in Baghdad. He helped Caliph al-Muttaki to consolidate his authority in 940s, for which the caliph granted him the surname of *Saif al-Dawla* (sword of the state). However, Saif al-Dawla also exploited the weakness of the Abbasid caliphate to expand his realm. In 944, with the support of the local Banu Kilab tribe, he invaded Syria and captured Aleppo from the Ilkhshidid dynasty of Egypt in October. In 945, he besieged Damascus but could not capture it. Muhammad ibn Tughj al-Ikhshid then took field against Saif and, winning a victory at Qinnasrin, compelled the Hamdanid prince to sign a peace treaty. The accord established a mutually recognized frontier in Syria, Saif gained Qinnasrin and Aleppo, and the rest of Syria, including Damascus, stayed under the Ilkhshidid control. In addition, to keep Saif away from their realm, al-Ilkhshid pledged to send annual gifts in compensation for Saif's abandoning his claims to Damascus. In July 946, after al-Ilkhshid died in Damascus, Saif al-Dawla broke the treaty and marched on the city, which he captured. He then advanced into Palestine, hoping to exploit the moment to extend his authority. However, he was defeated by the Ilkhshidid army, led by the black eunuch Abu al-Misk Kafur, near Nasira in December 946. He retreated to north Syria, and Kafur reoccupied Damascus. After regrouping, Saif returned to Damascus in the spring of 947 but again suffered defeat, this time at Marj Rahit. After these reversals, Saif agreed to accept a new peace treaty with the Ilkhshidids, who allowed him to retain north Syria to create a buffer from the Byzantines but would no longer pay any tribute to the Hamdanids. The newly established frontiers in Syria, with the Hamdanid-controlled north and the Egyptian-ruled south, remained intact until the rise of the Egyptian Mamluks in the mid-13th century.

Unable to defeat the Ilkhshidids, Saif turned his attention to the Byzantine Empire. He had targeted the Byzantine realm as early as 936–938, but his early raids into Byzantine territory produced enormous booty. In December 944, Saif scored a decisive victory over the Byzantine army, led by a certain Pantherios, near Aleppo. Starting in 949, he embarked on a series of raids (*razzias*) that turned him into a

leader of the holy war against the Byzantines for the next 20 years. In 949, he raided the theme (Byzantine province) of Lycandus, but the Byzantines drove him out and sacked the border towns of Germanicea and Theodosiopolis. In 950, encouraged by Byzantine defeats on the island of Crete, Saif set out on an ambitious raid deep into the Byzantine territory, plundering the themes of Lycandus and Charsianum. He defeated Domestic of the Schools (commander-in-chief) Bardas Phocas in the valley of Lycus and returned carrying a vast booty. But the Byzantines under Leo Phocas ambushed him on a mountain pass between Lycandus and Germanicea, inflicting heavy losses. Spurning the Byzantine offer of peace, Saif raided the regions of Melitene and Lycandus in 951 and 952, and a year later he won a great victory near Germanicea, killing the patrikios Leo Maleinos, severely wounding Bardas Phocas and capturing his son Constantine. This was followed by more victories during the next three years, during which Saif rebuilt the ruined border fortresses of Germanicea, Adata, and Samosata. In 953–954, he burned down the Melitene region, and two years later he invaded the Byzantine Empire again, going inland as far as Harsan in Armenia, capturing several fortress, and devastating the entire region.

Saif's continued success prompted the Byzantines to focus their efforts against him. Emperor Constantine made treaties with neighboring rulers, sought military aid from them against Saif, and then launched a series of expeditions to break Saif's power. In 956, the brilliant young Byzantine commander John Tzimiskes raided the Hamdanid territory. A year later, the domestic Nicephorus Phocas destroyed Saif's major fortress of Adata, and in 958, Tzimiskes sacked Dara and Samosata on the Euphrates and defeated Saif near Aleppo, taking thousands of captives back to Constantinople. The next spring the Byzantines raided Qurus, just 40 miles from Aleppo. Three years later, Nicephoros Phocas led an even greater invasion of Cilicia and Syria, defeating Saif near Aleppo and capturing the town on 23 December 962. As Phocas continued his campaign, the Byzantines plundered much of northern Syria, including Saif's palace, which was destroyed. By then Saif was suffering from a serious illness that left him partially paralyzed. Nevertheless, he continued his struggle against the Byzantines, scoring an important victory near Aleppo during a new Byzantine invasion in 964. But in 965–966 Nicephorus Phocas reduced the numerous Muslim fortresses in the Taurus range, Cilicia, and northern Syria. In 967, broken in body but not spirit, Saif died at Aleppo. Although his struggle against the Byzantines ultimately proved unsuccessful, he brilliantly interpreted the role of ghazi leader, engaging the best Arabic poets of the time to sing praises to his rule.

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See also: Abbasids; Byzantine-Muslim Wars (to 1035); Kafur; Abu'l-Misk.

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Sakarya, Battle of (1921)

Major battle of the Greco-Turkish War of 1919–1922, known as "National Struggle" in the Turkish historiography and "Asia Minor Catastrophe" in the Greek historiography. It was one of the longest battles in the Near East and lasted for about 22 days (August 23–September 13). The Greek offensive came to a halt, and Turkish forces took the offensive initiative after this battle. In summer 1921, Greek forces commenced their attack with a great deal of encouragement by the British upon the Ankara government to have the latter recognize the Sèvres Treaty of August 1920. Greeks took their offensive positions on the west bank of the Sakarya River against the Turks, who were expecting them in the east bank. Both sides fought fiercely, and during one of the bloodiest moments of the battle, Mustafa Kemal Pasha uttered his famous phrase: "No defense of line, but defense of ground, and that ground is the entire homeland!" The battle came to end on September 13 with the retreat of Greek forces. The Greeks lost the offensive initiative and both sides prepared for a final showdown. Eventually, in August to September 1922, Turkish forces drove the Greek armies out of Anatolia.

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See also: Kemal Atatürk, Mustafa; Greco-Turkish War (1919–1922); Sèvres, Treaty of (1920).

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Saladin (1138–1193)

The vizier (1169–1171) and sultan of Egypt (1174–1193) and the main Muslim opponent of the Franks of Outremer in the last quarter of the 12th century. His

original name was Yusuf ibn Ayyub; the name Saladin is a European corruption of his honorific Arabic title ala al-Din (goodness of the faith).

Saladin was a Kurd who was born at Tikrit (in mod. Iraq) in 1138. His family originated in Dvin in the Caucasus (near mod. Yerevan, Armenia), but employment opportunities brought members of the family to Iraq. Saladin's father, Najm al-Din Ayyub, and uncle, Asad al-Din Shirkuh, served as governors of Tikrit on behalf of the Saljuk sultan Muhammad ibn Malik Shah. However, in 1138 they had to flee Tikrit after Shirkuh committed a murder. They both found employment at the court of Imad al-Din Zangi, emir of Mosul. For some years the careers of the two brothers took separate courses, but beginning in 1154 they were both in Damascus in the service of Zangi's son Nur al-Din, ruler of Muslim Syria. Saladin spent his formative years in Damascus: for a short period he served as chief of police, but he was mostly known as Nur al-Din's highly skilled polo-playing companion.

Between 1164 and 1169, Nur al-Din found himself obliged to intervene militarily in Egypt to counter invasions of the country mounted by the Franks of Jerusalem in alliance with the Byzantines. Saladin accompanied the expeditionary force commanded by Shirkuh, gaining his first military experience at the Battle of Babayn and the defense of Alexandria (1167). On the death of Shirkuh (March 26, 1169), Saladin became commander of Nur al-Din's forces in Egypt and was also appointed vizier, governing in the name of the Fatimid caliph. The period from this point to the death of the caliph al-Adil (September 1171) saw the consolidation of Saladin's power, the undermining of the Fatimid state, and the growth of tension with Nur al-Din. Saladin bought the loyalty of the officers of the Syrian army in Egypt by rewarding them with rural and urban property. His personal standing was much strengthened with the arrival of his father and older brothers from Damascus. His brother, Turan Shah, fought and destroyed the Fatimid infantry regiments in Cairo, thus curtailing the Fatimid regime's ability to oppose Saladin. Saladin's father, Najm al-Din Ayyub, governed provinces of Egypt, and his nephew, Taqi al-Din, emulated Saladin by establishing educational and religious institutions that emphasized the new Sunni character of Egypt. In the struggle against the Fatimid state Saladin was assisted by Sunni Muslims within the Fatimid administration, who had a deep dislike for the incompetent and religiously abhorrent Shiite regime. Among these, the cooperation of Qadi al-Fadil, head of the Fatimid chancery, proved invaluable.

The death of al-Aid in 1171 brought the tension between Saladin and Nur al-Din into the open: Nur al-Din now realized that Saladin and his Ayyubid kinspeople had developed a taste for power in Egypt, but he found himself unable to enjoy the fruits of the military investment he had made in sending his armies there. This tension, although it did not burst into open conflict, continued until the death of Nur al-Din in 1174. After the death of his former overlord, Saladin set out to conquer Syria from the hands of Nur al-Din's young heirs. This intra-Muslim war was presented

in Qadi al-Fadil's propaganda as having a different motive: the desire to wage holy war on the Franks. Damascus, Homs, and Hama came under Saladin's rule in 1174. However, it was only after two battles against Zangid forces, in 1175 and 1176, that Saladin was able to conquer Aleppo in 1183. Mosul remained a Zangid possession, while recognizing Saladin's sovereignty and contributing forces to his campaigns (1186). Other victories by Saladin included the conquest of the Artuqid towns of Mayyafariqin, Mardin, and the fortress of Amida (mod. Diyarbakir, Turkey) in 1183. Saladin's expansion at the cost of other Muslim dynasties took place intermittently, interspersed with wars against the Franks of Outremer and clashes with the Assassins, who were regarded as Muslim heretics.

In 1177, Saladin suffered a disastrous defeat at the hands of the Franks in the Battle of Mont Gisard in southern Palestine. However, he was able to recover from this and successfully fought the Battle of Marj Uyun (1179). Special animosity developed between Saladin and the lord of Transjordan, Reynald of Châtillon, who intercepted pilgrim caravans to Arabia and launched a naval raid in the Red Sea aimed at the holy city of Mecca, which was defeated by Saladin's forces in Egypt. Saladin's invasions of the Kingdom of Jerusalem in 1182 and 1183 were quite futile; in 1183, for example, the refusal of the Franks to be dragged into an all-out battle led to a stalemate and forced him to withdraw from the kingdom.

The campaign of 1187 was marked by Saladin's numerical superiority and tactical mistakes committed by the Franks. On June 27, Saladin rounded the southern tip of Lake Tiberias and, on June 30, took up a position to the northwest at Kfar Sabt. This well-watered place controlled one of the roads from Saforie, where the Franks had concentrated, to Tiberias. On July 2, Saladin left most of his army at Kfar Sabt and attacked Tiberias with his personal guard. The town was quickly taken, but Eschiva of Galilee, the wife of Raymond III of Tripoli, held out in the strongly fortified citadel. On July 3, the Franks left Saforie in an attempt to relieve Tiberias. Saladin's army seized the springs of Turan as they left, cutting the Franks off from water supplies; the nearest springs were at the Horns of Hattin, but these had also been seized by Saladin's troops. Saladin made effective use of his numerical superiority, attacking the rear of the Frankish army, held by the Templars, from the high ground of Turan. At this point King Guy de Lusignan of Jerusalem decided to establish a camp, and the Franks endured a night of thirst on the arid plateau (July 3–4). In the ensuing Battle of Hattin, Raymond of Tripoli and some of his troops were able to escape the Muslim encirclement, but the Frankish army, although it fought gallantly, finally collapsed, and most of the Franks were killed or taken prisoner. Saladin spared King Guy, but executed Reynald of Châtillon along with the Templar and Hospitaller captives. Vast numbers of prisoners were sent to Damascus. Saladin took full advantage of this victory and went on to capture the city of Jerusalem (October 20, 1187) and numerous other territories held by the Franks in Palestine and Syria in intense campaigns during 1187–1189, which occasionally

continued into the winter months as well. Only Tyre and Tripoli remained in Christian hands, but this was enough for the Franks, aided by Crusader forces, to begin their attempt at reconquest.

Saladin's great achievements in fighting the holy war had already become a myth during his lifetime, obliterating almost every feature of his personality and deeds that did not tally with the myth. Only rarely, if at all, is the nonmythical Saladin discernible from what is recorded about him. The myth of Saladin was created and propagated by a group of three historian-admirers: Qadi al-Fadil, Imad al-Din al-Ifahani, and Baha al-Din ibn Shaddad, who also served Saladin in various capacities and accompanied him on campaigns. Saladin's critics were few, and even they could not deny his real achievements. Scholars are left with Saladin's depiction by his historian-admirers, and these accounts must be examined on their own merits. Saladin is portrayed as a religious person who scrupulously performed the rites of Islam, and there is nothing unbelievable in this description. Medieval people, both humble and high-born, were deeply religious, and for many the strict observance of religious rites was a way of life. Far more problematic is the description of Saladin's religious beliefs and inclinations, as these are presented as conforming to the Sunni orthodoxy of his time. It can certainly be asked whether Saladin was indeed much concerned with theological problems such as God's attributes, or whether the views attributed to him by his historian-admirers were the reflections of their own inner religious world rather than his.

No less questionable are the descriptions crediting him with great interest in religious learning and the sessions of transmission of prophetic traditions. It is true that Saladin and his extended family were linguistically and culturally fully Arabicized—Saladin was fluent in both Kurdish and Arabic. The religious education of his many sons was important to him, and he tried to provide them with the best available. Attendance at sessions of the transmission of traditions, however, was not only a personal religious act. It had public implications and was politically useful in forging ties with the religious class, which was a group that rendered intermediary services between the ruling military elite (mostly Kurdish and Turkish) of Egypt and Syria and the subject populations. Participation in public sessions was only one minor aspect of Saladin's manifold relations with the religious class. The establishment of law colleges supported by vast pious endowments was a far more significant aspect of these relations. In this respect, Saladin's religious policy lacked originality, as it was the continuation of a pattern that had evolved in the 11th and 12th centuries in the Iranian world and the Near East. The main problem is, however, the depiction of Saladin as an unselfish warrior of the holy war. This image was propagated long before there were any real achievements and was used to justify wars against Muslims. By his time, the manipulation of the holy war for political purposes was common, and the fact that it was used in Saladin's propaganda should not necessarily automatically discredit him. Judging from the tenacity

with which he fought the Third Crusade, Saladin's commitment to the ideology of the holy war was deep and real.

Saladin's financial and material generosity toward members of the ruling elite is widely reported and must have been a very basic trait of his character. He is also characterized as humanely generous and attentive to the plight of captured and suffering enemies. This characterization prevailed in spite of the well-known executions of prisoners of war carried out on his orders and his quite callous attitude toward his own men in captivity. His failure to ransom the captured garrison of Acre, eventually executed by the Crusaders, subsequently affected his relations with his emirs.

During the Third Crusade (1187–1192), one of Saladin's major problems, the lack of adequate naval power, came to the fore. Saladin built a fleet, but it was much smaller than the European fleets operating in the eastern Mediterranean and performed poorly in combat, notably at Tyre in 1187. This naval shortcoming contributed greatly to Saladin's failure in the battle for Acre from September 1189 to July 1191. Although the Third Crusade failed to reconquer Jerusalem, Saladin suffered further military setbacks, losing the port of Jaffa and being defeated at the Battle of Arsuf (September 7, 1191). Fearing for the safety of Egypt, he decided to dismantle the fortifications of Ascalon. The truce of September 2, 1192, known as the Treaty of Jaffa, confirmed what the Franks held and gave the two sides a much needed respite, but events had taken a heavy toll on Saladin's health: he died on March 3, 1193, after an illness lasting only a few days.

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See also: Ayyubids; Al-Adil; Arsuf, Battle of (1191); Fatimids; Hattin, Battle of (1187); Nur al-Din; Third Crusade (1187–1192); Zangi.

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Saljuk War of Succession (1092–1105)

The Great Saljuk Empire reached its height under Sultan Malik Shah (1073–1092), but his death launched a struggle for the succession from which the empire never

fully recovered. The first signs of weakness in the Saljuk Empire came in the wake of the assassination of the great Saljuk vizier Nizam al-Mulk in October 1092. A month later, Malik Shah died while hunting in circumstances that are still disputed by historians. The deaths of the two most powerful men plunged the empire into disarray. Malik Shah's eldest son Barkyaruq was still a youth when his father died, and he faced a prolonged power struggle against his uncles and half-brothers. He first had to deal with Terken Khatun, Malik Shah's ambitious wife, who suppressed the news of Malik Shah's passing and had her son Mahmud recognized as the sultan's successor. Once the sultan's death became known, Barkyaruq rallied his supporters and advanced against Mahmud in Isfahan. Barkyaruq scored a victory at Burudjird in January 1093 and besieged Isfahan, which surrendered after a long siege. Barkyaruq let Mahmud retain Isfahan and Fars but claimed the rest of the Saljuk Empire. Hardly had he resolved this problem before he faced new challenges. In 1093, Barkyaruq defeated his maternal uncle, who rebelled in Azerbaijan. Later the same year, his paternal uncle, Tutush, disputed his claim to the sultanate, secured the support of all the Turkish leaders of Syria, and invaded Iraq, capturing Mosul. In the summer of 1093, Tutush confronted his nephew in battle at al-Rayy, where some of his allies changed sides and joined Barkyaruq, forcing Tutush to retire to Damascus. Barkyaruq consolidated his authority in Iraq (his name was mentioned in the mosque prayers in February 1094), but his uncle remained a potent threat. Tutush soon collected a new army and occupied Anatolia, Iraq, and much of western Iran, winning recognition as sultan from the Abbasid caliph in Baghdad. However, on February 26, 1095, his forces were defeated by Barkyaruq in a battle at the village of Dashlu, south of the Caspian Sea, where Tutush was killed.

This victory, however, had devastating consequences for Saljuk unity in Syria. Tutush left five sons who became embroiled in a power struggle and fought a bitter civil war in Syria that weakened the Muslim states on the eve of the First Crusade (1096–1099). Meanwhile, Barkyaruq was preoccupied with his other uncle, Arslan Arghun, who launched a rebellion in Khurasan in 1096–1097. After the revolt was crushed, Barkyaruq faced a challenge from his younger brother, Muhammad Tapar, who rebelled in Azerbaijan in 1098. Barkyaruq advanced against him, but many of his troops went over to the enemy and he had to take flight to Iran. He returned with a new army in 1100, reclaiming part of Iraq before suffering a major defeat at the hands of Muhammad at Hamadhan in April 1101. Barkyaruq and Muhammad negotiated a peace in 1101 that recognized the Barkyaruq as the sultan and granted Muhammad domains in Iraq and Azerbaijan. But the truce was quickly broken and the war continued with changing success throughout next three years, exhausting Saljuk military power and crippling the empire's economy. By early 1105, when Barkyaruq died, Muhammad controlled most of Anatolia, Iraq, and much of Iran and restored the unity of the Saljuk empire. The prolonged civil war greatly limited

the ability of the Great Saljuks to respond effectively to the threat of the First Crusade, which reached Syria and Palestine in 1096–1099.

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See also: Abbasids; First Crusade (1096–1099); Malik Shah; Saljuks.

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Saljuks

Turkic dynasty of Central Asiatic origin that conquered and ruled Persia, Iraq, and much of the Near East in the late 11th and earlier 12th centuries.

By the middle of the 11th century, the Muslim world consisted of a patchwork of peoples and states in the lands of the former Arab Empire, united, and divided, by the religion of Islam. That world had been founded by the Arab conquests 400 years earlier, when the last of the barbarians to assault the Roman Empire, and the last of the heretics to challenge its faith, had invaded and unified a Near and Middle East previously partitioned between the empires of Rome and Persia. In the middle of the 11th century, this world was in turn invaded by fresh barbarians: Berbers from the Sahara and Turkomans from Central Asia. Even more than the Arabs, these barbarians were nomads of the arid zone from the Atlantic to Mongolia; and, as in the case of the Arabs, their invasions were testimony to the attraction of the civilized world for the peoples on its periphery, who were drawn into its affairs by its wealth on the one hand, by its religion and its politics on the other.

At the end of the 10th century the emirate of the Samanid dynasty in Central Asia, an offshoot of the Abbasid Empire, collapsed. Its territories were divided between the Turkoman Qarakhanids in Transoxania and the Ghaznavids in Khurasan and Afghanistan. Unlike the immigrant Qarakhanids, the Turkoman Oghuz (also known as Ghuzz), occupying the steppes beyond the Aral Sea, remained largely pagan. In the first half of the 11th century, however, a Muslim fraction of the Oghuz, nomadic warriors in search of pasture and military service, moved south into Qarakhanid and then Ghaznavid territory. These were the Saljuk (Turk. Selçük) clan, named after their ancestor; and they came into conflict with both the Qarakhanids and the Ghaznavids, a dynasty founded by a Turkish ghulam (slave soldier, pl. ghilman) in the service of the Samanids.

To justify his usurpation of power, Mahmud of Ghazna (998–1030) had turned to war upon the internal and external enemies of Islam, that is the Shiites in Iraq and Persia and the Hindus of the Indian subcontinent. The Shiite Buyid dynasty in western Persia held power over the Sunni Abbasid caliphate at Baghdad; the Shiite Fatimids in Egypt claimed the caliphate for themselves. As recognized champions of the Abbasids, Mahmud and his son Mas'ud not only persecuted the Ismailis, the followers of the Fatimids within their dominions, but also set out to overthrow the Buyids and ultimately the Fatimids. But their ambitions were cut short at the battle of Dandanqan in 1040, when Mas'ud's ponderous army was routed by the Saljuks, who had overrun the province of Khurasan. From the battlefield, the Saljuk leader Tughril Beg sent the news of his victory to Baghdad, thereby taking upon himself the championship of the Abbasid caliphate and Sunni Islam.

With the Ghaznavids confined to Afghanistan and northwestern India, their dominions in northeastern Persia were divided between Tughril and his brothers Chagri and Musa Yabghu in a family dominion like that of the Qarakhanids in Transoxania. What might in consequence have remained yet another regional power, without pretensions or prospects, was transformed into a great new empire by this active championship. Leaving Chagri to establish a local dynasty in Kirman in southeastern Persia, Tughril resumed the drive of the Ghaznavids to the west. Between 1040 and 1055 he took over the Buyid dominions in western Persia and Iraq, and between 1055 and 1060 secured Baghdad against the attempt of the Fatimids to win it for themselves. By the time of his death in 1063, Tughril had married the daughter of the Abbasid caliph and received from him a plethora of titles: King of the East and the West, Pillar of the Faith, and so on. These confirmed him as the sultan, the hereditary ruler of the world on behalf of the caliph.

Tughril's nephew Alp Arslan (d. 1073) and Alp Arslan's son Malik Shah I (d. 1092) ensured that this role did not die with him, but was justified by further conquest. In 1071 Alp Arslan routed the Byzantines at the Battle of Manzikert in Armenia, adding Anatolia not only to the Saljuk realm but also to the Islamic world. Between 1078 and 1086 Malik Shah I and his brother Tutush I took the bulk of Syria, while in the northeast, the Qarakhanids of Transoxania were forced into submission. The ambition to conquer Egypt was never pursued, but at the death of Malik Shah I, Islam in Asia was predominantly under Saljuk rule.

The Saljuk Empire was a family affair, divided among brothers and their sons in accordance with Turkoman custom, and exposed to their rivalry. But at the same time it was not a Turkoman empire in the sense of nomadic tribespeople ruling over settled populations. The princes were khans, or chieftains, to the nomads who followed them, but as heirs to the Ghaznavids and the Buyids, they were patriarchs and rulers who relied less upon the folk than the household for their forces, and from the outset they depended upon the secretarial class of the Muslim world for their administration.

The Turkoman tribespeople who accompanied the Saljuks into the Muslim world and migrated in search of pasture for their sheep through the highlands of Persia into Anatolia largely escaped, and indeed resisted, their control. The twin threats of devolution and dissidence were only overcome with the creation of a centralized regime by two great viziers (Arab. wazir) brought up in the service of the Ghaznavids, al-Kunduri and Nizam al-Mulk. They did so as politicians as well as administrators, whose powers of appointment and patronage created networks of clients around their own extensive households, and enabled them to command obedience from the Saljuks themselves, from their colleagues, and from their subordinates. As politicians they lived dangerously between the confidence of the sultan and the royal ladies on the one hand, and the intrigues of their rivals on the other: Nizam al-Mulk had al-Kunduri put to death, and before his own murder in 1092 was protesting his loyalty against the calumnies of his enemies. But for more than 30 years they reined back the centrifugal forces underlying the supremacy of the "King of the East and the West."

The *Siyasat-nama* (Book of Government) by Nizam al-Mulk is a prescription for government that relies heavily upon Ghaznavid practice and example, not least for the acculturation of the Turks, who were to be trained up as ghilman, loyal and disciplined warriors in the household of the prince. What has been called the despotic and monolithic Ghaznavid state could not be recreated; the household of the sultan was only the greatest of many such retinues, which gave each prince a greater or lesser degree of independence. Devolution was nevertheless kept in check by the size of his household, coupled with that of Nizam al-Mulk himself, and by the appointment of its members as provincial governors and atabegs (father dukes), senior commanders who acted as tutors of junior princes, whose mothers they often married. It was more formally controlled by the use of the *iqa'*, a grant of revenue in payment for military service, which under the Saljuks became a grant of local or provincial government. At the same time Nizam al-Mulk set out to ground the pretensions of the sultan to the role of defender of the faith in more than titles and occasional warfare. In the name of Sunni Islam, he founded the Nizamiyya at Baghdad, the most famous of a series of colleges of religious education designed to inculcate the true faith as well as to bring it under the patronage and control of the state. The foundation of such a madrassa (religious college) became a hallmark of the pious prince, concerned with his image in the public eye.

On their entry into the Islamic world, the Saljuks were Turkoman nomads, fighting on horseback with composite bows and curved swords, but without armor, opposing their mobility to the more static formations of the armies they encountered. Over the next hundred years of warfare, the Turkomans acquired helmets and a certain amount of body armor, while the Saljuks themselves adopted the style of the ghulam, the so-called slave soldier, recruited as a boy from the Turkish populations of Central Asia and trained up to be a fully armored cavalryman in the armies

of the Islamic world from the ninth century onward. Their principal innovation was to provide him with the Turkoman bow in addition to sword and spear. Saljuk armies thus came to consist of squadrons of heavy household cavalry supported by Turkoman and other ethnic auxiliaries, with all the advantages of armor, archery, and mobility. Such squadrons under their individual commanders were nevertheless limited in size, and large armies were the exception. By the end of the Saljuk period, the term *ghulam* had been generally replaced by Mamluk (pl. mamalik), most obviously in Egypt, where the Saljuk warrior was introduced by Saladin.

The image of piety supplemented that of defender of the faith, employed by Tughril to create his empire, and to justify the power of a rank outsider over the Islamic world. That justification, however, at the expense of Shiite Islam, provoked a radical new challenge and a radical new threat. The *Siyasat-nama* barely mentions the Fatimids, nominal enemies who had evidently ceased to serve the Saljuk purpose of empire building. But it vehemently attacks the Ismailis, followers of the Fatimids under their leader Hassan-i Sabbah who in 1090 seized the castle of Alamut in northwestern Persia as a base for revolution. Directed against the Saljuks as the



champions of Sunni Islam, the threat of insurrection not only forced the regime to go to war in the mountains, but also, in 1092, Hassan's alarming campaign of assassination may have claimed the life of Nizam al-Mulk himself. Whoever arranged it, the murder of the great vizier was the beginning of the end for the empire he had striven to consolidate. The death of Malik Shah I a few weeks later curtailed the sultan's plan to depose the reigning caliph, and thus bring the Abbasid caliphate completely under his control. Instead, it opened the way to a struggle for the succession from which the empire never fully recovered.

Malik Shah I's sons Mahmud and Barkyaruq were minors, fought over by the factions at court, and challenged by their uncle Tutush I in Syria. Barkyaruq succeeded to the throne in 1094, and Tutush was killed in 1095, but from 1097 to his death in 1105, the new sultan was challenged by his half-brothers Muhammad Tapar (d. 1118) and Sanjar (d. 1157). The ensuing warfare divided the empire between Barkyaruq in Iraq and western Persia and his rivals in the northeast, and placed the contestants in the hands of the military. As the shifting loyalties of the atabegs came to dominate the conflict, Syria was abandoned to the sons of Tutush at Damascus and Aleppo, while the Saljuks of Rum (Anatolia) were left to fight off the Byzantines and Crusaders at Ikonion (mod. Konya, Turkey). The unsuccessful attempt of the atabeg of Mosul, Karbugha, to relieve Antioch (mod. Antakya, Turkey) in 1098 was the most that was done to halt the progress of the First Crusade (1096–1099). In Persia itself, Hassan-i Sabbah extended his mountain kingdom, while his assassins claimed their victims, and Shahdiz outside Isfahan fell into Ismaili hands.

The conflict ended with the death of Barkyaruq in 1105 and the accession of Muhammad Tapar, under whom the unity of the empire was restored. Shahdiz was recovered in 1110, and the expansion of Alamut halted. Between 1110 and 1115 two attempts were made by the atabegs of Mosul on behalf of the sultan to organize a joint campaign in Syria against the Frankish states of Outremer. Both, however, failed in the face of Syrian hostility to any attempt to recover the country for the empire. Mosul itself, under successive atabegs, was semi-independent, while Diyar Bakr and Mayyafariqin on the upper Euphrates were taken over by the Turcoman Artuqid dynasty.

Great Saljuk Sultans

Tughril Beg	1055–1063
Alp Arslan	1063–1072
Malik Shah I	1072–1092
Mahmud I	1092–1094
Barkyaruq	1094–1105
Malik Shah II	1105
Muhammad Tapar	1105–1118
Sanjar	1118–1157

The Saljuk sultan Malik-Shah ibn Alp Arslan. Miniature from the *Jami' al-Tawarikh* of Rashid al-Din, about 1307. (With kind permission of the University of Edinburgh/The Bridgeman Art Library)

This shrinkage of the empire back toward the east was confirmed by the death of Muhammad Tapar in 1118. The sultanate then passed to Sanjar, the fourth son of Malik Shah I, who had governed Khurasan since 1097, and remained identified with this first conquest of the dynasty. Left to rule over western Persia and Iraq, the sons and grandsons of Muhammad steadily lost control of their territory to their atabegs, whose principalities came to stretch from the Caspian Sea and the Caucasus through Mosul in northern Iraq to Luristan and Fars in western and southern Persia. By 1152 they had even lost Baghdad to the Abbasids, who had taken advantage of Saljuk weakness to create their own state. In Khurasan itself, Sanjar's position was seriously weakened by defeat at the hands of the Qara Khitay in Transoxania in 1141, and collapsed in 1157, when he was defeated by Oghuz Turkish tribesmen, and died.

Like the Ghaznavids before them, the Great Saljuks thus met their fate in the same region and at the hands of the same people whom they had led to the original victory at Dandanqan. Just as in 1040, their dominions in eastern Persia, including Kirman under the descendants of Tughril's brother Chagri, were overrun by the victors, while an empty title passed to the line of Muhammad in what was left of their empire in the west. From 1161 to 1191 their sultanate was under the control of the atabeg Eldigüz and his successors, whose power extended from Azerbaijan as far

as Isfahan. It ended in heroic suicide, when Tughril III ousted the Eldiguzids, only to go to war with the formidable Khwarezm shah, and died in battle in 1194.

The great difference between the victory of the Oghuz in 1157 and the victory of the Saljuks in 1040 was the absence of either a great religious or a great political cause. After the death of Sanjar, the Turks behaved as the Saljuks might have done without the championship of the caliphate and Islam, and remained as a horde in eastern Persia; there was no mantle for their leader Malik Dinar to inherit. This failure on the part of the Great Saljuks to maintain the ideal as well as the reality of universal empire is symptomatic of the growing conviction that might is right, in other words, that the ruler who had the power to govern had the authority to do so. It anticipated the coming of the pagan Mongols, and their ready acceptance by the counterparts of Nizam al-Mulk in the 13th century. It was left to the Zangids, the dynasty of the Saljuk atabeg at Mosul, gradually to rediscover the principle of religion for empire, and to their henchman Saladin to put it once again into practice.

Michael Brett

See also: Abbasids; Alp Arslan; Byzantine-Saljuk Wars; Fatimids; Georgian-Saljuk Wars (11th to 13th Centuries); Mahmud of Ghazna; Malik Shah; Manzikert, Battle of (1071).

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Samos, Battle of (1824)

An important battle between the Greeks and the Ottomans near the rebellious island of Samos during the Greek War of Independence. The Ottoman failure helped preserve the Greek revolution. By the summer of 1824, the failure of Ottoman arms to put down the Greek revolt, which began in 1821, forced Sultan Mahmud II to call on Muhammed Ali, the viceroy of Egypt, for help. A combined Ottoman-Egyptian fleet, commanded by Kapudan Pasha Mehmed Husrev, devastated Psara, one of the major Greek naval bases in Asia Minor waters. Greek admiral Andreas Miaoulis sent a squadron of 22 converted merchant ships under Georgios Sachtouris to defend Samos from a similar fate, while he gathered additional ships. On August 5, Sachtouris engaged an Ottoman squadron moving to bombard Samos. Although the Ottoman warships were larger and better armed, the Greek vessels were more maneuverable and able to avoid a set-piece battle. Instead, Sachtouris sent six fireships toward the Ottoman squadrons, covered by fire from his remaining vessels. The fireships were able to ram three Ottoman warships before their crews set them on fire. The fires spread to the warships, severely damaging or destroying several of them. The Ottoman squadron withdrew in disorder, and its angry commander, Kapudan Pasha Mehmed Husrev, executed his second-in-command.

Tim J. Watts

See also: Greek War of Independence (1821–1832).

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San Stefano, Treaty of (1878)

Treaty ending the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877–1878. Signed on March 3, 1878, the treaty was highly favorable to Russia. It called for the creation of the autonomous principality of Bulgaria, whose territory would extend from the Danube River to the Aegean Sea. Under article 7, a prince elected by the people but approved by the sultan would rule over Bulgaria, while article 8 called for the Ottoman evacuation of Bulgaria and deployment of Russian forces for two years. Russia also compelled the Turks to cede territory to Montenegro and recognize its independence. Serbia received the cities of Nis and Leskovac and was granted independence as

well. The Porte was also forced grant autonomy to Bosnia-Herzegovina under Austrian and Russian supervision and to recognize the independence of Romania. In the Caucasus, the Ottoman Empire lost Ardahan, Artvin, Batum, Kars, Olti, and Beyazit to Russia. The straits of the Bosporus and the Dardanelles were declared open to all neutral ships in war and peacetime (article 24).

The treaty, so advantageous to Russia, was rejected by the Great Powers, notably Austria and Britain, who were concerned about the spread of Russian authority into the Balkan Peninsula. As tensions between the Great Powers escalated, the German chancellor Otto von Bismarck negotiated a new agreement at the Congress of Berlin in June 1878 that was far less generous to the Russians.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Russo-Ottoman Wars.

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Sand War (Moroccan-Algerian War) (1963)

Like so many other conflicts in Africa, the 1963 "Sand War" between Algeria and Morocco must be seen in the context of decolonization in Africa, struggle for power and resources, and differing ideologies. No clear border existed between Algeria and Morocco when both states gained independence from France in July 1962 and the spring of 1956, respectively. Even before colonization by the French, southern and western Algeria had been under Moroccan influence, and Morocco pursued a policy of "Greater Morocco," including claims in the border territory between the two states France had earlier integrated into its Algerian colony. Revolutionary Socialist Algeria saw this as an attack on its newly won independence and territorial integrity by the monarchy of Morocco. The discovery of iron ore and other valuable minerals in the disputed area helped to fan the conflict.

Algeria had just formed its army from the guerilla FLN (Front de Libération Nationale) and did not yet have the means to fight a regular war. Algerian soldiers were battle ready and well trained but had hardly any heavy weaponry and relied on asymmetrical warfare. Morocco's professional army, on the other hand, was well equipped, mostly with Western (French) arms, but inexperienced. After regular small skirmishes, the capture of Bechar by Moroccan troops in July 1962, and an uprising in Algeria started in September 1963, open warfare erupted in early October 1963. Most of the fighting took place in the Tindouf province in the extreme west of Algeria and northeast of that near Bechar/Figuig, but Morocco failed to gain much ground. Instead, the Moroccan army built sand walls to counter the Algerian

Moroccan soldiers sit in the shade cleaning their weapons and preparing food during a lull in border fighting against Algerian troops, near Tindouf in southwestern Algeria, November 4, 1963. (AP/Wide World Photos)

hit-and-run tactics, which were well defended by mines and guarded by motion sensors. Within weeks the war ended in stalemate. According to French sources, Algeria suffered 60 dead and 250 wounded. Moroccan casualties were probably lower than that but unconfirmed.

The Organization of African Unity and the Arab League intervened. Fighting stopped in early November 1963, and a formal cease-fire was agreed upon on February 20, 1964, establishing a demilitarized zone. Tensions between the countries exist today.

Thomas J. Weiler

See also: Western Sahara War (1971–1991).

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Sarikamiş, Battle of (1914–1915)

First major battle of the war on the Caucasian Front. Turkish minister of war Enver Pasha sought to take advantage of Russian preoccupation with Germany and Austria-Hungary to launch an offensive through Armenia to recover territory in Caucasia lost to the Russians in the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877–1878. For Turkey the oil fields of Baku were the ultimate prize, but Enver had even more ambitious plans. While both sides faced daunting logistical problems in this first Turkish strategic initiative of the war, Turkey needed to come to grips with the fact that Caucasia was 500 miles from the nearest Turkish railhead at Konia.

Following the declaration of war, Enver took personal command of the Turkish "Eastern Army," consisting of the Third and Second Armies. He hoped to surprise the Russians, but his offensive was slow to develop because of both logistical problems and harassment by Armenian and Kurdish tribesmen. It also occurred in the dead of winter in the worst possible weather conditions. Kars guarded the route from the Turkish advance base of Erzurum to the middle of Caucasia. A railroad led from the Black Sea to the Caspian Sea with branch lines on both sides. One of these ran through Kars to Sarikamiş. Enver hoped to capitalize on his superior numbers of 150,000 men against 100,000 Russians under General Viktor Myshlaevsky. Russian forces were also split between their headquarters at Tbilisi and the frontier bases of Kars and Ardahan.

Enver divided his forces to move against the two Russian frontier bases, hoping to entrap the Russians. The Turkish offensive from Erzurum began on November 18, but both axes of the Turkish advance made slow progress, in part because of deteriorating weather conditions. The Russians soon halted the smaller Turkish Second Army's drive on Ardahan, allowing Myshlaevsky time to concentrate 60,000 men under his chief of staff, Major General Nikolay Yudenich, at Kars. Although ordered to retreat, Yudenich instead advanced to meet the Turkish Third Army east of the town of Sarikamiş, located 30 miles inside Russian territory between Kars and Erzurum. The Battle at Sarikamiş opened on December 26 and lasted until January 4. Both sides had only a few artillery pieces. On December 27, the Turks were repulsed from Sarikamiş. The Turkish 28th Division reached the Kars Road but was driven back. On December 29, the Turkish 30th Division took Alisofu south of the road and railway line, isolating the Russians.

The decisive day of the battle came on December 29, when some 18,000 Turks supported by about 20 guns faced 14,000 Russians with 34 guns. The Russians

managed to repulse the Turkish 30th and 31st Divisions, and the Turks were also forced to withdraw from Alisofu. Although the Turkish 17th Division managed to penetrate Sarikamiş proper, it was annihilated there, with about 800 men taken prisoner. Reinforced on December 31 from Kars, Yudenich saw a chance to surround the Turks. On January 1, Enver ordered a retreat, evading pursuit by January 4. The Battle of Sarikamiş had effectively destroyed the Turkish IX Corps. Exact casualty figures for both sides are unknown. The Turkish attack on Ardahan was also beaten back on January 4, and two weeks later both Turkish armies were back in their base of Erzurum, their strength reduced to only some 18,000 men. Perhaps 30,000 may have died of the bitter cold weather. Unfortunately for the Russians, this winter victory over the Turks was not decisive. Although Yudenich was promoted to lieutenant general and received command of the Russian Caucasus Army, he was seriously short of supplies and equipment and was unable to capitalize on the situation beyond mounting a number of probing attacks. Enver, meanwhile, was forced to shelve plans for a new spring offensive following the Allied naval assault on the Dardanelles and resulting Gallipoli campaign.

Spencer C. Tucker

See also: Russo-Ottoman War (1877–1878); World War I.

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Saudi-Hashemite War (1919–1925)

Conflict between the Hashemite dynasty of Hejaz and Ibn Saud of the Najd over supremacy in Arabia. As descendants of the Prophet Muhammad, the Hashemites (taking their dynastic name from the great-grandfather of Muhammad, Hashim ibn Abd al-Manaf), were entitled to use the title of sharif. For centuries they ruled over Mecca but were subordinate to greater powers, be it the Mamluks of Egypt or the Ottoman Empire. When World War I (1914–1918) began, Ibn Saud, the powerful emir of the Najd, offered Sharif Husayn ibn Ali of Mecca and the rulers of Hail and Kuwait the chance to adopt a neutral stance, avoid involvement in European hostilities, and seek self-determination for the Arab peoples. But Arab rulers' interests did not coincide and no agreement was reached. For the next two years Ibn Saud refrained from providing any real support to any side, biding his time to see which way the wind would blow.

Meantime, Sharif Husayn, with British encouragement, declared the Arab Revolt against the Ottomans and proclaimed himself as the "King of the Arabs," even though he lacked forces to exert authority outside Hejaz. Ibn Saud was infuriated by Husayn's claim of power over all of Arabia and demanded negotiations concerning the Najd-Hejaz border and extent of suzerainty over frontier tribes. Husayn rejected Ibn Saud's demands and insulted him in his response, calling him "either mad or drunk" for making such claims. In response Ibn Saud became involved in a political crisis that was unfolding in the Hashemite states between King Husayn and Khalid ibn Mansur ibn Luwai, the emir of the al-Khurma oasis. Khurma, the crucial strategic gateway between Hejaz and Najd, was under the Hashemite control but, insulted by the king, its emir Khalid defected to Ibn Saud's side. When, in July 1918, Husayn dispatched a detachment to seize al-Khurma, Ibn Saud clandestinely sent his Ikhwan troops to protect Khalid, who defeated the Meccan force.

Yet, Britain could not ignore Ibn Saud, the strongest of the Arab leaders, and gave him a generous financial subsidy in the hopes of inciting him to attack pro-Ottoman polities in Arabia. In December 1917, a British deputation, led by Colonel Hamilton, sought to spur Ibn Saud to action against Jabal Shammar. The Saudi leader promised energetic action if given modern arms. But, in early 1918, the British forces achieved a breakthrough in Palestine and occupied Jerusalem, making Ibn Saud's support irrelevant. Furthermore, Sharif Husayn concluded a peace treaty with Jabal Shammar, while the British became concerned that Ibn Saud's campaign might be detrimental to their chief ally, Sharif Husayn. Thus, in the fall of 1918, as Ibn Saud gathered some 5,000 men against Shammar, the British ordered him to end the campaign. The Saudi leader was furious at this duplicity and understood well that Britain was not interested his success.

With the Ottoman Empire defeated and his army free after capturing Medina, King Husayn thought the time ripe to deal with Ibn Saud, so he began to revive the issue of al-Khurma. The conflict soon transcended political dimensions and gained religious overtones as a struggle between the Wahhabis of the Najd against the Orthodox Sunni Hashemites. Ibn Saud's official passivity over the al-Khurma dispute placed Husayn in an awkward position because the king's claim that Ibn Saud was challenging his sovereignty appeared to many as unreasonable and overly aggressive. Yet, Husayn was in a difficult position. Avoiding military action would make him weak and would allow the spread of the Wahhabi ideas. But acting aggressively would undermine his religious legitimacy in the eyes of the many because he would be fighting against the Islamic revival movement. He finally decided to organize a new expedition against al-Khurma. The British understood that the new campaign would provoke a direct clash between the rulers of Hejaz and Najd, but, largely ignorant of the strength of Ibn Saud, they believed his forces would be quickly routed. In May 1919, Husayn's son Abdallah led the Hashemite army to Turaba, an oasis about 80 miles from al-Khurma, which was seized and plundered

on May 21. Ibn Saud warned Abdallah that a continued Hashemite presence at Turaba or an advance on al-Khurma would provoke a war, but neither side was willing to compromise. The Ikhwan force under Sultan ibn Bijad, Hamud ibn Umar, and Khalid advanced stealthily to Turaba and surprised the slumbering enemy at its camp on May 25–26. In just a few hours, the entire Hashemite army was annihilated; hundreds were killed and thousands fled in various directions; Abdallah barely escaped with his life.

The Battle of Turaba proved to be the turning point in the Saudi-Hashemite conflict. The loss of the army, the sole independent means of defending his sovereignty, placed Husayn in a very weak position vis-à-vis Ibn Saud. In early July 1919, Ibn Saud arrived in Turaba with about 10,000 men, ready to invade Hejaz. But on July 4, he received an ultimatum from the British to stop his campaign and return to Najd, or face a war. Unwilling to fight Britain, Ibn Saud submitted to their demands but his first, and rather easy, victory over the Hashemites had convinced him that he would ultimately triumph over Hejaz. He ordered his troops to evacuate the region but also called upon local tribesmen to join his struggle. Many of them responded to his call.

Over the next four years, Ibn Saud was preoccupied with consolidating his authority and expanding into new regions of Arabia. He annexed Jabal Shammar in 1920–1921. In 1922, he defeated Kuwait and defined the border with Iraq and Transjordan, while simultaneously conquering the Asir emirate in southern Arabia. King Husayn, understanding that a military conflict with Ibn Saud was inevitable, tried to prepare for it by increasing taxes to strengthen the army. Yet, government corruption and increased taxes caused resentment among many tribespeople, and they fled to Ibn Saud's court. By early 1923, Ibn Saud decided to conquer Hejaz but was unsure about Britain's position. He welcomed the worsening of relations between London and King Husayn, who refused to ratify the Treaty of Versailles in protest of the Anglo-French partition of the Ottoman lands. In March 1924, Husayn proclaimed himself a caliph, hoping to consolidate his authority among the Arabs. Yet, his decision proved to be highly unpopular and turned many away from him. In July 1924, Husayn recognized the Soviet Union, causing alarm among the British, who were worried they might lose control over Hejaz.

At the same time, Ibn Saud decided to start the conquest of Hejaz, which was enthusiastically supported by the Ikhwan who hoped to purify the holy sites of Islam. To test Britain's position, Ibn Saud launched a preliminary attack on al-Taif in early September 1924; the city was captured and viciously sacked by the Ikhwans for three days, prompting the Saudi leader to issue a strict order against any such atrocities. When no British response was forthcoming, Ibn Saud then advanced towards Mecca. King Husayn's son Ali tried to stop the Ikhwans at al-Hada but was routed in late September. The nobility of Mecca and Jidda, believing the main reason for the war was a quarrel between Ibn Saud and Husayn, pressured the king to abdicate,

which he did in favor of his son Ali on October 6, 1924. But his exile did not placate Ibn Saud whose troops entered Mecca without a fight in mid-October 1924. With Britain's tacit blessing, Ibn Saud entered Mecca on December 5 and demanded that King Ali abdicate and leave Hejaz at once. Upon his refusal, Ibn Saud advanced against the Hashemite king, besieging Jidda (where Ali was) on January 5, 1925, and Medina in early February.

As the year-long siege of Jidda unfolded, Ibn Saud busied himself with diplomacy to consolidate his conquests. Neither King Abdallah of Transjordan nor King Faisal of Iraq were willing jeopardize their authority to assist their brother Ali in his struggle against the Saudi emir. Demonstrating his political acumen, Ibn Saud agreed to concede some land in northern Arabia in exchange for Britain's recognition of his annexation of Hejaz, which was formalized in the al-Hada agreement of November 2, 1925. Learning about the al-Hada agreement and the surrender of Medina on December 6, King Ali realized that he was abandoned and capitulated in Jidda on December 22, 1925. The nobility and ulama of Mecca and Jidda swore allegiance to Ibn Saud as "the King of Hejaz and the Sultan of Najd and her dependencies." The first state to recognize Ibn Saud's authority was the Soviet Union on February 16, 1926.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Husayn ibn Ali; Ibn Saud; Ikhwan; Saudi-Kuwaiti War (1921–1922); Saudi-Ottoman War (1911–1912); Saudi-Rashidi War (1887–1921); Saudi-Yemeni War (1934).

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Saudi-Kuwaiti War (1921–1922)

In the late 18th century, a small sheikhdom of Kuwait found itself in the center of power struggle between Britain, Iran, and the Ottoman Empire. Although

nominally under the Ottoman authority, Kuwait cut its ties with the empire in 1896 and sought support from Britain. In 1899, Kuwait and Britain signed a treaty of cooperation that guaranteed Kuwait's integrity and domestic self-rule but granted Britain control over its foreign policy. After World War I, during which Britain sought to incite Arab rebellion against the Ottomans, Kuwait faced a serious threat from the rising power of Ibn Saud, who sought to unite Arabia under his control. Kuwait's southern and western borders were undefined and served as a source of friction between the two states.

In 1920, a dispute over a small border oasis led to the start of hostilities. Faisal Al-Duwaish, the leader of the Saudi Mutair Ikhwan warriors, defeated the Kuwaiti army led by Sheikh Duaij Al-Sabah. Sheikh Salem ordered a defensive wall to be built around Kuwait, which was completed in two months. Facing continued Saudi attacks, Kuwait invoked the 1899 agreement with Britain and asked for British intervention. In late 1920, Ibn Saud resumed hostilities as his commander Faisal Al-Duwaish attacked the Kuwaiti village of Al-Jahra on October 10. The Saudi troops captured the village but failed to dislodge Kuwaiti troops from a small fort. The arrival of Kuwaiti reinforcements drove the Saudis out into the desert where they were attacked by the British planes. Although a Kuwaiti victory, the battle of Al-Jahra led to the Saudi blockade of Kuwait, which lasted for several years. The death of Sheikh Salem and accession of the new sheikh, Ahmed Al-Jaber, played an important role because the Kuwaiti ruler established friendly relations with Ibn Saud.

The British intervention eventually led to a conference at Uqayr (eastern Arabia) where subsequent negotiations produced the Protocol of Uqayr (December 2). Ibn Saud preferred a tribal frontier, that is, a nondemarcated, flexible border allowing the sphere of influence of the state to be determined by the movements and grazing of its tribes. But the British delegation insisted on the Western concept of territorial demarcation, so the final agreement specified the territory belonging to each side and created the Saudi-Kuwaiti neutral zone where both sides held equal rights. The zone survived until 1960s when, after the discovery of oil, the two states agreed to divide the territory.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Ibn Saud; Saudi-Hashemite War (1919–1925); Saudi-Ottoman War (1911–1913); Saudi-Rashidi War (1887–1921); Saudi-Yemeni War (1934).

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Saudi-Ottoman War (1911–1913)

Ottoman military power was stretched to the breaking point in the decade before World War I. Soldiers not only had to defend the empire from external threats from places like Russia or Italy, but they were also needed as a police force in far-away Arabia. This dual role created headaches for military planners and, as the Balkans were so much closer to Istanbul, often made it possible for internal unrest to dramatically increase.

Nowhere was this stress more obvious than in the Arabian Peninsula. Although not yet valuable for its resources, "Arabistan" contained the holy cities of Mecca and Medina. As Sunni Islam's caliphs, all sultans obtained prestige and political authority by helping pilgrims visit these cities. Abdulhamid II (1876–1909) argued that the empire's survival rested on four points: supporting Islam, maintaining the dynasty, keeping the holy cities Ottoman, and holding Istanbul. But by 1911–1913, Ottoman forces faced simultaneous threats in the Balkans, Africa, and Arabia. In Africa, religious leaders like Imam Muhammad (1891–1904) of Yemen or Imam Muhammad ibn Ali al-Idrisi (1876–1923) of Asir led major uprisings against Ottoman authority. These conflicts were dangerously close to the holy cities, and required considerable Ottoman resources. Even today, folk songs such as *Yemen Türküsü* remind listeners of the high cost of subduing Yemen.

Nor was Yemen the Ottoman's only Arabian problem. On the other coast, after three decades of relative peace, Ottoman client tribes were facing a powerful enemy. The House of Saud, Ottoman enemies from a century earlier, had come back in force. Under their dynamic leader Ibn Saud, the ancestral capital, Riyadh, was recaptured in 1902. Two years later, he grabbed Unaizah, and despite facing eight Ottoman battalions, Ibn Saud defeated the sultan's client tribes, conquering most of al-Hasa by 1913. When Ibn Saud took Hufuf on May 4, it was with the knowledge that Ottoman disasters in Thrace were pulling potential reinforcements away from Arabia and precluding an Ottoman counteroffensive. Part of the Iraqi garrison was already deployed to Istanbul as a result of disasters in the First Balkan War in 1912. Ibn Saud had reestablished the Saudi state and, using power and prestige achieved from defeating the Ottomans, would go on to create Saudi Arabia in the next decade.

John P. Dunn

See also: Ibn Saud; Saudi-Hashemite War (1919–1925); Saudi-Kuwaiti War (1921–1922); Saudi-Rashidi War (1887–1921).

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Saudi-Rashidi Wars (1887–1921)

A prolonged conflict between the houses of Saud and Rashidi (Rasheed) over the control of the Arabian Peninsula. The house of Saud first came to prominence in the 18th century when Muhammad ibn Saud, with the help of religious cleric Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab, managed to establish the first Saudi State in Najd (central Arabia) in 1744. By the mid-19th century, the Saudi state had been through many ups and downs, including the Egyptian occupation until 1840. After the Egyptian withdrawal, Najd descended into internecine warfare among the tribes. In early 1843, the Saudi leader Faisal ibn Turki, who was captured by the Egyptians in 1838, returned to Najd, and reclaimed authority with the help of his old friend Abdallah al-Rashidi, the ruler of Jabal Shammar (in north Arabia), who provided the Saudi with troops and money. The relationship between Faisal and Abdallah remained amicable throughout their lives and continued so after the accession of Talal ibn Abdallah in 1847. Faisal died in December 1865 and was succeeded by Abdallah ibn Faisal, who faced a prolonged power struggle against his brother Saud ibn Faisal, who seized Riyadh in 1871. However, Saud's authority proved to be fragile and many tribes ceased to obey him; chief among these were the al Rashidis of Jabal Shammar.

Like the Saudis, the house of al-Rashidi experienced violent succession crises between 1868 and 1872. In March 1868, Talal al-Rashidi committed suicide, his brother and successor Mitab was killed just 10 months later by his nephew Bandar ibn Talal, who in turn was assassinated by his uncle Muhammad ibn Abdallah al-Rashidi in 1872. During the reign of Muhammad al-Rashidi (1872–1897), the Jabal Shammar reached the height of their power, made possible by the continued Saudi strife. Between April 1871 and December 1876, Riyadh saw seven changes of power as the Saudi princes fought for authority and ironically lost most of it in the process. By the mid-1880s, the Saudi authority was largely limited to the town of Riyadh as numerous tribes and oases broke away from and surrendered (voluntarily or forcibly) to the Rashidis, whose prestige and power continued to rise. In 1887, Abdallah ibn Faisal, one of the Saudi pretenders who briefly captured authority in Riyadh, was ousted from the Saudi capital and appealed for help to Muhammad al Rashidi, who eagerly seized this precious opportunity to interfere into Saudi affairs on the pretext of saving the legitimate ruler. Leading a strong detachment, he recaptured Riyadh and appointed his loyal commander Salim al-Subhan as its emir while Abdallah ibn Faisal was kept in virtual captivity in Hail. Salim Al Subhan quickly moved against the remaining Saudi claimants whom he routed in

August 1888. The following year, the once proud Saudi emir Abdallah died an al-Rashidi vassal, his former kingdom largely gone. Although he was succeeded by Abd al-Rahman ibn Faisal, the real authority in Riyadh was in the hands of Salim al-Subhan. In 1890, Abd al-Rahman organized a revolt against the al-Rashidis and repelled their attack on Riyadh. By the end of the year, he had organized a broad coalition of anti-Rashidi tribes and attacked Muhammad al-Rashidi's forces. What ensued was probably one of the largest campaigns fought in Arabia in the 19th century, featuring several thousand men on both sides. The two sides fought a series of battles near Mulaida in the Qasim region throughout December 1890 before Muhammad al-Rashidi routed his opponents in January 1891; Abd al-Rahman fled to Kuwait for safety.

This victory turned Muhammad al-Rashidi into undisputed ruler of central Arabia. His supremacy lasted for six years while he tried to revive the exhausted and devastated country. Yet, his death in 1897 marked the start of a new wave of tribal conflict. The new al Rashidi emir, Abd al-Aziz, faced a series of uprisings, and his callous repression only stoked continued resistance among the tribes. Within a decade he had squandered most of the inheritance bestowed upon him by Muhammad al-Rashidi. Relying increasingly on the Ottoman support, Abd al-Aziz was perceived by many Arabs as an instrument of the Turkish oppression, and the Saudis naturally attracted these discontent tribesmen.

In 1900, the fugitive Saudi emir Abd al-Rahman began preparations to reclaim his authority. Britain supported his actions because it was interested in weakening the firmly pro-Ottoman al-Rashidis. In January 1901, the Saudi-Kuwaiti force invaded Najd, hoping to capture Riyadh, but it was routed by Abd al-Aziz near al-Sarif Oasis in March. At the same time, one detachment of the Kuwaiti-Saudi force, commanded by the young Abd al-Aziz Al Saud, known to Europeans under his kin name Ibn Saud, managed to capture Riyadh but was forced to abandon it after learning about the defeat of the main force. The al-Rashidi forces, supported by the Ottomans, then invaded Kuwait but were unable to capture an important fort at al-Jahra. In the meantime, the British sent a warship to the Kuwaiti aid and exacted pressure on the Ottomans. Abd al-Aziz al Rashidi's withdrawal allowed the Saudis to regroup, and this time Ibn Saud convinced his father to entrust military command to him. In November–December 1901, accompanied by only 40 men, Ibn Saud moved into eastern Arabia and enlisted tribesmen hostile to the al-Rashidis. On January 12–15, 1902, this small group infiltrated Riyadh, where they assassinated the al-Rashidi governor and massacred the entire garrison. Two of Ibn Saud's men were killed and three were wounded. This daring attack captured the imagination of many tribesmen and greatly enhanced the young Saudi's reputation. In May 1902, with his father declining the honor, the ulama and notables of Riyadh declared Ibn Saud as the emir.

While Abd al-Aziz was mobilizing his forced to recapture Riyadh, Ibn Saud mounted attacks throughout Najd, seeking to rally tribesmen dissatisfied with the al-Rashidi rule. The Saudi-Rashidi rivalry, meantime, attracted attention from the Great Powers as well. Germany and the Ottoman Empire threw their support behind al Rashidi, and Britain supported the Saudis. In 1902, Abd al-Aziz set out with his army for Riyadh but was unable to capture the heavily fortified city. Ibn Saud turned to a hit-and-run tactic against a stronger opponent and skirmishes continued from September to November when an epidemic forced Abd al-Aziz to withdraw. Regrouping, the Rashidi leader launched an attack on Kuwait, Ibn Saud's principal ally, in January 1903 but was repelled by joint Saudi-Kuwaiti forces a month later. His renewed attack on Riyadh failed in the spring of 1903 and allowed Ibn Saud to consolidate his power in the emirate of Riyadh, which his ancestors once ruled. In the summer of 1903, the Saudi prevailed in the struggle over the Sudair province, then defeated the al-Rashidi force near Anaiza in March 1904, and captured and captured Buraida in Qasim province in June. His successes, however, alarmed the Porte, which sent 2,000 men and six guns to reinforce Abd al-Aziz. Despite the enemy's superiority in numbers and arms, Ibn Saud engaged it in the open field at al-Bukairiya in mid-July 1904. His men inflicted heavy losses on the Ottoman-al Rashidi force, capturing all cannon and killing the Turkish commander. Abd al-Aziz fled to Shunana, hoping for more Turkish help, but was attacked and routed by Ibn Saud in late September.

Infuriated by such defeats, the Ottoman authorities sent 3,000 more troops to Najd. Ibn Saud refrained from hostilities against the Turks but targeted the Rashidis, whom he defeated again in Qasim on April 13, 1906; Abd al-Aziz died in battle, and his head was briefly displayed before being thrown to the dogs. In the summer of 1906, Ibn Saud reached the Rashidi capital, Hail, but was unable to capture it, although he defeated the new Rashidi emir Mitab ibn Abd al-Aziz. These successes empowered the Saudi leader who successfully pressured the Turks to abandon Arabia. The Turks, whose numbers had declined from about 4,500 to less than 1,000 because of desertions, disease, and skirmishes, left in October–November 1806. The Rashidi emir Mitab was assassinated by his nephews in late December 1906, but the new Rashidi leadership proved to be unpopular and incompetent. The Rashidi emirate steadily declined between 1907 and 1910 and was unable to take advantage of the Saudi preoccupation with rebellious tribes. In late 1907, Ibn Saud routed a joint force of the Rashidis and other tribes near Tarafiya and reasserted his authority in the Qasim region.

By then the rising Saudi emirate prompted concerns among various Arab leaders, including the sheikh of Kuwait, who had long supported Ibn Saud, and Sharif Husain of Mecca who was alarmed by the rise of a new emirate on his eastern borders. Between 1907 and 1915, Ibn Saud was preoccupied with local revolts and

campaigns to various regions, which prevented him from fully concentrating on the Rashidis. During the World War I, the British insisted on Ibn Saud neutralizing the Rashidi's pro-Ottoman group in Arabia. In early 1915, Ibn Saud led some 3,000 men toward Hail but encountered the Rashidi forces near the Jarrab well (north of al-Zilfi), where an inconclusive battle was fought in late January. Unable to confront the Saudis alone, the Rashidis sought alliance with other groups, including the Kuwaitis. The Rashidis also suffered from internal division, and in March 1920, Emir Saud was assassinated by his cousin Abdallah ibn Talal, who was in turn shot dead the same year, relinquishing the title to Abdallah ibn Mitab. A low-intensity conflict between the Rashidis and Saudis continued until late 1920 when a joint Rashidi-Kuwaiti force attempted to invade the Saudi land but was routed near al-Jahra in October 1920. In 1921, Ibn Saud concluded a peace treaty with Kuwait and turned to the isolated Rashidis. In April and May, he defeated the Rashidi forces and besieged Hail, which surrendered after a two-month siege in August. Abdallah ibn Mitab was taken as an honorable prisoner to Riyadh, where he died in 1952. On November 1, 1921, the Rashidi emirate of Jabal Shammar was incorporated into the nascent Saudi state, which controlled the whole of central Arabia.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Ibn Saud; Saudi-Hashemite War (1919–1925); Saudi-Kuwaiti War (1921–1922); Saudi-Ottoman War (1911–1913).

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Saudi-Yemeni War (1934)

A brief conflict between Saudi Arabia and Yemen over disputed boundaries. In 1918, after their defeat in World War I, Ottoman forces left the southern regions of Arabia, where the Mutawakkilite Kingdom of Yemen emerged. Fourteen years later, Ibn Saud proclaimed the merger of the Nejd and Hejaz kingdoms into the Saudi Arabian kingdom, though its southern borders with Yemen remained

undemarcated and disputed. Yemeni king Yahya actively interfered into Saudi Arabian affairs and supported the opponents of Ibn Saud. In February 1934, Saudi-Yemeni negotiations took place in Abna but failed to resolve their differences. Ibn Saud demanded recognition of Saudi rights in Najran, the Yemeni evacuation of the border area mountains, and the expulsion of his opponents who had taken shelter in Yemen. After Yemen refused, the Saudi ruler waited for the end of the pilgrimage in March before issuing an order to attack on March 20. The war proved to be short but sharp. One Saudi army, under Crown Prince Saud, stalled against the Yemeni forces of Crown Prince Ahmad in the highlands. However, Faysal, leading well-trained Saudi troops equipped with modern British weaponry, routed the Yemeni forces in the lowlands, drove them out of Najran, and penetrated far into Yemen's Red Sea coast, capturing the major port town of Hudaydah. Such success, however, aroused concerns in Britain and Italy and threatened to undermine the regional balance of power. Britain, Italy, and France, concerned over their colonial possessions in neighboring Africa, sent warships to Hudaydah. On May 12, after just seven weeks of war, Ibn Saud announced a cease-fire and his willingness to negotiate. The war officially ended on May 20, 1934, with the signing of the Treaty of Taif between Ibn Saud and King Yahya, which defined the Yemeni-Saudi border from the Red Sea to the southern tip of Najran, provided for £100,000 in gold indemnity to be paid to Saudi Arabia, and asserted Saudi sovereignty over the provinces of Asir and Najran. Initially, the provinces were placed under temporary Saudi rule, but in 1994, Saudi Arabia claimed permanent ownership of the territories. In 2000, the two states agreed to demarcate the border, though as of 2010, the process is still under way.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Ibn Saud; Saudi-Hashemite War (1919–1925); Saudi-Kuwaiti War (1921–1922); Saudi-Ottoman War (1911–1923); Saudi-Rashidi War (1887–1921).

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Second Crusade (1147–1149)

During the Second Crusade, which lasted from 1147 to 1149, European political and religious leaders sought to protect the Crusader States, established during the First Crusade in 1096, from the Saljuk Turks. Unable to cooperate with each other

or conquer their enemy, the Crusaders returned to Europe without accomplishing their goal.

Europeans had seized territories in the Levant from Saljuk Turks during the First Crusade, which had sought to protect the European pilgrimage from Jerusalem and defend Christians from the Byzantine Empire against the Turks. After the crusade, the Europeans established four Crusader States: the County of Edessa, the Principality of Antioch, the County of Tripoli, and the Kingdom of Jerusalem. Those kingdoms were defended by elaborate castles but were essentially in hostile territory.

In 1144, the Turkish ruler of Aleppo and Mosul, Zangi, conquered Edessa. Unable to drive Zangi out of Edessa, the Crusader States asked Europe for help. In response to that new threat to European settlement in the Levant, Pope Eugenius III issued a crusade bull in 1145 that encouraged Europeans to live up to the accomplishments of the first Crusaders, promised forgiveness of sins to those who died on the way to fight the crusade, and protected the lands of Crusaders while they were gone. The monk Bernard of Clairvaux preached the crusade throughout Europe. Following the lead of the pope and Bernard, German king Conrad III and King Louis VII of France led large Crusader armies to the Levant.



Events from the Second Crusade showing the Council of Acre (top) and armored and mounted Christian knights riding toward the Muslim-held city of Damascus, 1147–1148. From *Histoire d'Outre Mer* (*Overseas History*) by William of Tyre, 12th century. (Jupiterimages)

Conrad left Germany in May 1147. When he reached the territory of the Byzantine emperor Manuel I Comnenus, Manuel offered him guides, supplies, and advice. The Byzantine emperor had reason to distrust the Crusaders, though, as Europeans had claimed as their own the formerly Byzantine territories that they had seized from the Muslims during the First Crusade. Manuel, however, also feared Zangi's son and successor, Nureddin. Both kings were also anxious about the activities of King Roger II of Sicily, who was attempting to increase his holdings in the region. Nonetheless, Manuel's help could not ensure victory. The Turks demolished Conrad's army near Nicaea on October 25, 1147.

Louis VII, accompanied by his wife, Eleanor of Aquitaine, arrived in Constantinople that same October and reached Nicaea in November. There he joined forces with what remained of Conrad's troops. The French arrived in Antioch in March 1148. Refusing the ruler of Antioch's advice that they attack Aleppo, which was held by Nureddin, they pressed on to Jerusalem.

The Crusaders assembled in Jerusalem decided to attack Damascus even though the ruler of that city had previously enjoyed friendly relations with the Christian Crusader States. Although the Crusaders had an army of approximately 50,000 men, they failed to take Damascus because they suffered from internal strife and a lack of organization. Finding themselves outside the city, which was waiting for Nureddin to arrive and rescue it; they decided to retreat in July 1148, a little over a year after Conrad had left Germany.

The failed Second Crusade considerably weakened the European position in the Levant because it helped the Turks to overcome their differences and consolidate their rule in the region. The last Crusader State fell to the Turks in 1291.

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See also: First Crusade (1096–1099); Zangi.

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Selim I (1470–1520)

An Ottoman sultan for only eight years in the early 16th century, Selim I proved to be an exceptional military commander who enlarged the territory of the Ottoman Empire and paved the way for the reign of his son, Suleiman I. Selim was born in 1470, one of five sons of the sultan Bayezid II. By 1512, two sons had died, leaving Selim, Ahmed, and Korkut as contenders to the throne. Bayezid's position was jeopardized by the rise of Ismail, the leader of Iran who founded the Safavid dynasty, which lasted until 1736. Ismail claimed that he was descended from the fourth caliph, Ali. In 1502, he proclaimed himself shah and proceeded to rejuvenate Iran, but he also infused it with Shiism rather than accept mainstream Islam, whose adherents are called Sunni Muslims.

Ismail sent preachers among the various Turkish tribes in eastern Anatolia to spread the word of the Safavid movement. This soon resulted in border clashes with Ottoman troops. Bayezid was reluctant to attack Ismail, and his inactivity led to his downfall. Selim, whose leadership was accepted by the Janissaries, waited while his two brothers feuded with each other over appointments to administrative posts close to Istanbul. Commanding successful expeditions into Georgia and eastern Anatolia, Selim was successful in promoting a coup by the Janissaries. On April 25, 1512, their commanders forced Bayezid to abdicate in favor of Selim. Bayezid hoped to live in retirement but died mysteriously en route to his birthplace.

On taking the throne, Selim had to fight off a revolt by Ahmed's supporters. By April 1513, Ahmed and Korput were both dead and all opposition to Selim eliminated. To maintain peace in Europe, Selim renewed agreements with Venice and Hungary, allowing both to have better trade concessions within the empire. He also concluded a formal alliance with the Mamluks, who were worried about Ismail's advances.

Assured of no threat to his rear, Selim gathered an army and advanced across Anatolia, slaughtering those who had converted to the Shiite heresy. Ismail's troops withdrew in front of the Ottoman army, hoping to lure Selim into the mountains of northern Iran. They burned everything as they retreated, which led to a supply problem for Selim's army. A major battle took place on August 23, 1514, at

Chaldiran, near Tabriz, the capital of Iran. Selim's better-equipped and organized army won the battle; Tabriz was captured and sacked; and then Selim retreated before the onset of winter. In 1515, Selim occupied and reorganized eastern Anatolia, then defeated an enemy army in Cilicia, which led to its incorporation into the Ottoman Empire.

When Selim assembled his army in 1516, he was prepared to invade Iran once again, but the Mamluk sultan al-Gawri brought his army north into Syria, mistrusting the Ottomans. Selim used the Mamluk advance as an excuse to attack them. The Battle of Marjdabik on August 24 was a complete disaster for the Mamluks. The sultan was killed and his army decimated. Selim quickly occupied Syria and then offered peace terms to the new Mamluk sultan, Tuman Bey, who refused.

Selim's army crossed the Sinai Desert in January 1517 and destroyed a new Mamluk army in a single battle. Tuman Bey escaped but was captured and executed in April. His death spelled the end of the Mamluk dynasty and the beginning of Egypt's incorporation into the Ottoman Empire. While in Cairo, Selim received the sharif of Mecca, who conveyed to the sultan the surrender of Islam's holy cities—Mecca and Medina. Bedouin tribes from Arabia also pledged their allegiance to the Ottomans.

Following the conquest of the Mamluk Empire, Selim returned to Istanbul and busied himself with a number of tasks. He extended the devshirme system of recruiting Christian youths, thereby enlarging the Janissary corps that was the backbone of the Ottoman army. He completed the movement of the Ottoman government from Edirne (Adrianople) to Istanbul. When the Topkapi Palace became too crowded with the new arrivals, Selim ordered the construction of a new palace to house himself and his favorite women of the harem.

Selim also built a new shipyard so that the Ottoman fleet could be enlarged; at the same time, he expanded existing shipyards. He brought to Istanbul the leader of the Mamluk Red Sea fleet, along with his commanders and artisans. By the end of his reign, the Ottoman fleet was perhaps the most powerful navy in the Mediterranean.

The only major military action of Selim's later reign occurred in 1519, when a revolt of Shiite Muslims took place in Anatolia. Led by a man called Celal, who claimed he was the Mahdi (Islamic messiah), the movement attracted those who resented mainstream Islam. Selim sent his Janissaries to attack, and they completely destroyed the rebels. Thereafter, any revolts during the next two centuries in Anatolia were called Celali revolts.

In July 1520, Selim left Istanbul for Edirne, perhaps to plan a campaign against Hungary. He had earlier complained of back pain, and as Selim traveled, his pain worsened. He died on September 22 at Çorlu. Sources are mixed over the cause of death—cancer, the plague, or boils have all been theorized. Following Selim's

death, his son Suleiman took over the empire. Selim's only son, Suleiman, has been rated as one of the greatest sultans in Ottoman history.

Richard Sauers

See also: Chaldiran, Battle of (1514); Mamluk Sultanate; Ottoman-Safavid Wars ; Suleiman the Magnificent.

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Selim III (1761–1808)

Ottoman sultan. The first son of Mustafa III, he was born in Istanbul on December 24, 1761. Thanks to the liberal and companionate approaches of his father and his uncle, Abdulhamid I, he enjoyed unusual freedom and a high-quality education. He was an accomplished composer of classical Ottoman music and a talented poet—writing under the nom de plume İlhami. Despite his classical training he showed great interest and zeal in European-type military reforms and even secretly corresponded with French king Louis XVI to get help and advice.

Selim III ascended the throne during the Ottoman-Habsburg-Russian War of 1787–1791. He was unable to change the course of the war but used its disastrous ending as a pretext to convince even the most traditional and conservative officials of the necessity for military reforms.

Selim officially began his military reforms with the publication of new regulations for the Kapikulu corps (imperial regular army) and Timarli Sipahi (provincial cavalry corps) in 1792. Even though the targets of the reforms of the established army corps seem to have been modest and reasonable, they ended in failure. Selim and his intimate circle of lieutenants launched the radical part of the reforms secretly behind the cover of Kapikulu reform attempts. The main idea was to establish a modern European-style infantry corps and later use this corps as a core around which a totally modern military could be created. Indeed the name of the new infantry corps, the *nizam-i cedid* (literally, new regiment or order), became the name of the entire reform package and era.

Fortunately a quick start was possible because Koca Yusuf Pasha (the commander in chief) had already conducted trials with Russian and German deserters and prisoners during the war. The first regiment was established in Levend in 1795

and the second one in Üsküdar in 1799. With growing confidence, Selim ordered the establishment of additional units, albeit under the control of the ayans (provincial magnates) in Anatolia. At least nine provinces carried out the order and, for the first time, recruitment of villagers began. After this strategic decision the size of the corps rose rapidly from 9,300 in 1801 to 24,000 in 1806.

Surprisingly, the most important and enduring reform of the *nizam* period, the establishment of the first modern military school of the empire, was launched in 1795 without fanfare and was unknown to even some of the reformers. The Mühendishane-i Berri Hümayun (Imperial Military Engineering School) was not only the first modern military school but also the first modern high school of the empire.

Yet, while the government was struggling with domestic opposition a new war forced itself upon the empire. The revolutionary French Republic decided to accomplish its grand design of crippling the British Empire by capturing Ottoman Egypt. A French expeditionary army under the command of Napoleon easily crushed Ottoman provincial troops in two pitched battles and captured Cairo in July 22, 1798. The British Royal Navy sank Napoleon's fleet, isolating the French, and the powerful governor of Syria, Cezzar Ahmed Pasha, stopped the French advance by the successful defense of Akka (Acre) (March 19 to May 21, 1799), mainly by using his own mercenary troops.

The foreign problems did not end with the final peace with France in 1802. The Russian army invaded the principalities of Moldavia and Wallachia in 1806, starting a war that would last more than five years. The Ottoman military once again performed poorly and, in spite of its numerical superiority, lost most of the pitched battles and displayed only limited and ineffective resistance in the defense of its fortresses. A series of rebellions further destabilized the empire.

Selim was equally unsuccessful in uniting different interest groups within the reformist camp. Different factions sabotaged each other's activities and occasionally caused the elimination of important figures like Ebu Ratib Efendi, who was the real dynamo behind most of the military reforms. It is no great wonder that a small disagreement within the guards of the Istanbul straits turned into a full-scale rebellion (known as the Kabakçı Mustafa rebellion) on May 25, 1807. Selim failed to show the determination to face the rebels by using his faithful two *nizam* regiments, which had the capability to suppress the rebellion. Instead, he tried to appease the rebels by accepting their initial demands, which included the execution of reformist officials and some of his intimate friends. This surprisingly soft and timid approach simply encouraged the rebels, and other dissidents joined them. The rebels attacked and massacred the *nizam* soldiers who had been left to their fate by the government. Finally, Selim was forced to abdicate and a new sultan, Mustafa IV, ascended to the throne.

Alemdar Mustafa Pasha, an important nobleman, was persuaded to intervene by political refugees from Istanbul (better known as Rusçuk Yarani), from the

Danubean province of Rusçuk, but his attempt to save Selim was unsuccessful. Selim was killed while his rescuers were forcing their way into the palace on July 28, 1808. Alemdar Mustafa Pasha subsequently dethroned Mustafa IV and gave the throne to a young prince, Mahmud II. The Alemdar incident clearly shows the sorry state of the empire—the provincial forces of a local magnate defeated the rebels that the government of a mighty empire had been unable to deal with.

Mesut Uyar

See also: Ottoman Army (Early 19th Century); Russo-Ottoman Wars.

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Senussi and Sultan of Darfur Rebellions (1914–1916)

The 19th-century French colonial expansion in North Africa was resisted by a number of desert tribes and traditional leaders. Another opponent of French colonialism was a Sufi brotherhood (Ikhwan) called the Senussi (sanusyyia). As with the Wahhabi, the Senussi was an Islamic reform movement seeking to renew Islam. Its members believed they could successfully oppose Western colonialism by returning to what they believed was the original purity of Islam in Muhammad's day.

The Senussi movement was founded in western Algeria in 1837 by Muhammad ben Ali al-Sanusi. Soon afterward, to escape the French, he had moved east into the mountainous interior of Cyrenaica. The center of operations had been established at al-Beida in 1843, then moved to the oasis of Kufra in 1895 and to the central Saharan oasis of Qiru in 1899. By 1900 the movement had spread along the Saharan caravan routes. It had established 143 lodges (zawiyas) in a number of oases and desert towns across thousands of miles of eastern Libya and the Saharan Desert. The Senussi sent out trained brothers who were welcomed in the desert as learned judges who could teach and also arbitrate disputes. Although they were nominally under Ottoman Turkish rule, the Senussi were in practice an independent force in much of the Sahara.

When the Italo-Turkish War began in 1911, the Senussi joined with the Turks and other traditional leaders to fight the Italians. Their early military successes increased their stocks of military supplies. The Ottoman Turks also gave the Senussi modern military training. Nuri Pasha, half brother of Enver Pasha, and Ottoman-

Iraqi general Jafar al-Askar were sent to the area to lead the tribal levies against the Italians.

Italy won the Italo-Turkish War and took Libya from Turkey. At the same time, the French expanded their influence in the Sahara so that by 1914 most of the western Saharan region had been taken by the French and Italians. Nonetheless, the Senussi continued to resist Italian control, and on August 26, 1914, the Italians suffered a major defeat when the Senussi captured one of their supply columns. Most of the Italians were killed, and the Senussi secured thousands of rifles, a few artillery pieces, and some supplies.

In November 1915 the Senussi invaded British-controlled Egypt. The exact reason behind this is obscure, but the move proved a disaster. At Aqqaqir, Egypt, on February 26, 1916, British forces defeated the Senussi, overwhelming them with a combination of armored cars and firepower. At a critical moment in the battle, a charge by the Dorset Yeomanry broke through the Senussi formations. Senussi commander General Ja'far al-'Askar was wounded and captured, and the remaining Senussi were driven into Libya where they continued to harass the Italians and the French to the west.

In 1916, a Senussi ally threatened the British. A thousand miles south of Benghazi, the Sultanate of Darfur covered an area of roughly 150,000 square miles, much of it mountainous. Darfur, which borders present-day Chad, had once been an independent kingdom but by the late 19th century supposedly became a tributary province of Sudan under Anglo-Egyptian rule. In practice its sultan enjoyed substantial autonomy. Sultan Ali Dinar ruled the area and its peoples, some of whom spoke Arabic rather than tribal languages.

Following the defeat of the Mahadi at the Battle of Omdurman in 1898, the new (Anglo-Egyptian) Sudanese government recognized in 1899 Ali Dinar, a grandson of Mahommed-al Fadhi, as sultan of Darfur. In 1914, influenced by the Senussi, Sultan Ali Dinar refused to acknowledge Anglo-Egyptian suzerainty and authority. Instead, he declared himself a subject of the sultan of Constantinople.

In March 1916 the British moved against Ali Dinar. The sultan possessed an army of perhaps 5,000 men, armed mostly with older small arms and a few small artillery pieces. Ali Dinar tried to use his remote location and native desert terrain to his advantage, but to no avail. The chief battle occurred at the village of Beringia on May 22, 1916. This British victory was a testimony to overwhelming British firepower. After a British aircraft dropped bombs on the sultanate's capital of Al Fasher, opposition collapsed. Sultan Ali Dinar was killed on November 6, 1916 after a short gun battle with Anglo-Egyptian troops, and the British secured the entire area.

The Turks had invested very little in the way of manpower and supplies in the fighting in Africa, but with the help of the Senussi and Sultan Ali Dinar, they had tied down for two years tens of thousands of French, Italian, and British troops who

might otherwise have been employed on other fronts. Darfur's relationship with the Sudan remained difficult, and in the late 1990s another rebellion developed there.

Andrew J. Waskey

See also: French Colonial Policy in Africa; West Africa, French Conquest in.

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Serbian-Ottoman War (1876)

During the Serbian-Ottoman War of 1876, Serbia and Montenegro fought the Ottoman Turks in support of an uprising in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The conflict intensified the crisis in the Balkans that culminated in the Russo-Ottoman War of 1877–1878.

In the second half of the 19th century, most of the Balkan states lived under strict Ottoman rule. In 1875, the Ottoman Empire passed a law effecting a rigid collection of taxes in Bosnia, despite a bad agricultural year in 1874. Coupled with that economic burden was a proposed Ottoman constitution intended to appease the Balkan states. The main feature of that constitution was an assembly that would represent all the peoples of the Ottoman Empire.

Despite that offer, Serbians in Herzegovina and other Balkan areas rebelled with limited, but notable, success, and ethnic nationalism among the Balkan states began to grow. The combination of Orthodox Christian beliefs and a Slavic cultural identity produced the idea that a federation of Serbs, Croatians, Slovenes, and Bulgarians was not only preferable to Ottoman rule but was also the Balkan states' right as an ethnic group. Rebellion raged in Bosnia in 1875 and spread to Bulgaria and other regions the following year.

The Ottoman Empire was especially harsh in repressing the Bulgarian revolt. For Russia, a major supporter of the pan-Slavism movement, the Bulgarian Horrors was the last straw. After Serbia declared war on the Ottoman Empire on June 30, 1876, the Ottomans defeated a united Serbian front, but Russia stepped in and gave the Ottoman sultan an ultimatum for peace. In addition to Russia's involvement, Great Britain was threatening to fight the Ottomans in protection of Balkan Christians, though it simultaneously stated its intention to honor earlier alliances with

the Ottomans against the Russians. Those conflicts necessitated a conference, and the Great Powers met in Istanbul to discuss peace between Serbia and the Ottomans. The sultan would not agree to Russian terms, however, and the conference fell apart. The Serbians then signed an independent peace with the Ottoman Empire that preserved the status quo.

Following the peace in late 1876, Russia declared war against the Turks in 1877. The Ottomans, although weakened by their suppression of the recent revolts, put up a strong fight but eventually succumbed. That war culminated in the Congress of Berlin in 1878. Through that settlement, the European powers recognized Serbia, Montenegro, Romania, and part of Bulgaria as independent states. The settlement also gave other areas of the Ottoman Empire to various countries for control and administration. The Ottoman Empire was not dismantled, yet its significant territorial losses left it a shadow of its former self.

Stacy Kowtko

See also: Ottoman-Montenegrin Wars; Russo-Ottoman Wars; Russo-Ottoman War (1877–1878).

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Sétif Uprising (1945)

An anticolonial uprising in Algeria that signaled the start of a liberation movement culminating in Algerian independence in 1962. On May 8, 1945, as much of the world celebrated the end of World War II in Europe, riots broke out among the Berber population of the city of Sétif in the Department of Constantine in Algeria. It began as just another victory parade, which had been approved by the French authorities.

Because May 8 was a market day, it attracted many Berbers from around the city who nursed long-standing grievances with the European settlers over the seizure of their ancestral lands. While marchers did carry posters proclaiming the Allied victory, there were also placards calling on Muslims to unite against the French for the release of nationalist leader Ahmed Messali Hadj and death to Frenchmen and Jews. Early in the parade a French plainclothes policeman pulled a revolver and shot to death a young marcher carrying an Algerian flag. This touched off a bloody rampage, often referred to as the Sétif Massacre.

Muslims attacked Europeans and their property, and violence quickly spread to outlying areas. The French authorities then unleashed a violent crackdown that

included Foreign Legionnaires and Senegalese troops, tanks, air force planes, and even naval gunfire from a cruiser in the Mediterranean Sea. Settler militias and local vigilantes supported the authorities and took a number of prisoners from jails and executed them. Major French military operations lasted two weeks, while smaller actions continued for a month. An estimated 4,500 Algerians were arrested, of whom 99 were sentenced to death and another 64 were given life imprisonment. Casualty figures remain in dispute. At least 100 Europeans died. The official French figure of Muslim dead was 1,165, but this is certainly too low, and figures as high as 10,000 have been cited.

In March 1946 the French government announced a general amnesty and released many of the Sétif detainees, including moderate nationalist leader Ferhat Abbas, although his Friends of the Manifesto and Liberty political party was dissolved. The fierce nature of the French repression of the uprising was based on a perception that any leniency would be interpreted as weakness and only encourage further unrest.

The Sétif Uprising, which was not followed by any meaningful French reform, drove a wedge between the two communities in Algeria. Europeans now distrusted Muslims, and the Muslims never forgave the violence of the repression. French authorities did not understand the implications of this and were thus caught by surprise when a rebellion began in Algeria in November 1954.

Thomas D. Veve and Spencer C. Tucker

See also: Algerian War (1854–1962).

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Seventh Crusade (1248–1254)

The Seventh Crusade (1248–1254) was a personal crusade led by King Louis IX of France. Its goal was to recapture Jerusalem, which in 1244 fell to the Muslims. To

secure Jerusalem, Louis made Egypt the object of conquest of his crusade. Using the logic of the Fifth Crusade, Louis believed that Egypt with its wealth would provide a solid base to attack Jerusalem. Much like the Fifth Crusade, Louis' crusade would end in failure. In addition, the Seventh Crusade witnessed the initial incursions by the Mongols into Asia Minor.

Although the fall of Jerusalem was no longer an event that turned the world upside down, the fall of Jerusalem, coupled with the disastrous defeat of the Crusaders at the Battle of La Forbie in 1244, may have contributed to Louis's decision to take the cross in 1245. Louis, seriously ill when he made his vow, prepared to set off for the Holy Land along with his brothers Robert of Artois and Charles of Anjou.

France was probably the strongest state in Europe at the time. Once Louis had made his decision, he threw himself into preparations, but he had to remain on good terms with both Holy Roman Emperor Frederick II and Pope Innocent IV. The feud between the two threatened to embroil all of Europe in war. That meant that Louis would have to rely on his own resources. For the next three years, Louis collected money and men, and on August 25, 1248, he sailed to Cyprus with an army approximately 20,000 strong.

Louis spent the next several months on Cyprus negotiating with various powers in Asia Minor. The various Crusader States asked for his help, but he was determined not to repeat past mistakes. Ignoring their bickering, Louis was determined to attack Egypt with maximum force. By the end of May 1249, Louis sailed for Egypt. Upon reaching the Damietta, Egyptian opposition was brushed aside, which is evidence of Louis's meticulous preparations. Damietta was established as a base of operations for action against the Muslims in Syria and Egypt.

On November 20, Louis began his march into interior Egypt, which coincided with the death of the sultan and near panic among the Egyptians. By February 1250, his army had reached the main Egyptian defensive works, beginning the Battle of Mansurah. The attack was initially successful when the advance guard under Louis's brother, Robert of Artois, penetrated Mansurah; however, the attack ended poorly. Robert was killed, and Louis could not break the Muslims. Meanwhile, his army was starving and being ravaged by disease. On April 5, Louis began to retreat to Damietta. The army had managed to struggle only partway back to Damietta when Louis was forced to surrender. The most carefully planned and organized crusade of all had been defeated, and Louis was a prisoner.

In May, Louis was released for a ransom that included possession of Damietta. Afterward, most of his fellow Crusaders returned to Europe, but Louis sailed for Acre. He stayed there for nearly four years, becoming the de facto ruler of all the Crusader States. Louis negotiated a treaty with Egypt in 1252, which came to nothing but did allow him to refortify Acre, Caesarea, and Jaffa on a massive scale. Meanwhile, the Mongols showed up in Asia Minor under Khan Mongke, and Louis

The arrival of French king Louis IX at Damietta. Christian forces captured this Egyptian city in June 1249 during the Seventh Crusade. (Photos.com)

attempted to covert them to Christianity and become allies against the Muslims. The khan rejected his overtures and retorted that Louis should submit to him.

Louis ended the Seventh Crusade when he left Asia Minor on April 24, 1254, in part because his mother had died. The disaster of the Seventh Crusade was personally interpreted by Louis as punishment for his sins. Louis is considered a saint in French history because of his devotion, simple dress, dedication to the poor, and attempt to refocus the French monarchy to good kingship after the crusade.

Tim Barnard

See also: Eighth Crusade (1270); Sixth Crusade (1228–1229).

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Sèvres, Treaty of (1920)

An abortive and never ratified peace treaty between the defeated Ottoman Empire and the World War I Allies (without Russia and the United States) was concluded in Sèvres, France, on August 10, 1920. The treaty envisaged the virtual dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire and called for large-scale territorial changes and the redistribution of imperial control in the Near East.

According to the treaty, the Ottoman Empire was to recognize the independence of its former Arabian possessions in Hejaz and to cede Mesopotamia and Palestine as mandates to Britain; Syria and Lebanon as mandates to France; Turkish Armenia to the independent Republic of Armenia; and the Eastern Thrace, including Gallipoli and the Turkish Aegean Islands, to Greece. Smyrna and the adjacent area were to be administered by Greece for five years, after which a plebiscite was to be held. A plebiscite was also planned for Kurdistan.

Additionally, Turkey renounced all its claims to the ethnically non-Turkish territories. The Ottoman government confirmed the Italian possession of the Dodecanese and Rhodes and the British control over Cyprus and Egypt. The Turkish Straits were to be demilitarized and internationalized. The coastal regions around Antalya and Adana (Cilicia) were to be occupied by Italy and France, respectively, as their spheres of influence. Further, the strength of the Turkish army was limited to 50,000 men, and the country was placed under the de facto entente's protectorate.

The harsh conditions of the treaty engendered great resentment in Turkey and in the republican nationalist movement under Kemal Atatürk, which refused to recognize the Treaty of Sèvres. The successes of the nationalists during the Turkish War of Independence (1919–1923) forced the Allies to negotiate a new treaty with Turkey in Lausanne in 1923.

Peter Rainow

See also: Lausanne, Treaty of (1923); World War I.

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Shamil (d. 1871)

Leader of the anti-Russian resistance in Chechnya and Daghestan that delayed Russia's conquest of the North Caucasus for more than two decades. Born in a small

village of Gimry (modern-day Daghestan) around 1797, he was the son of a free landlord and received a good education, which included studies in Arabic, rhetoric, and logic. At the age of 33, he joined a Sufi group, Muridis, and came under influence of Ghazi Muhammad, who launched an armed resistance against the Russian expansion into North Caucasus. In 1832, Ghazi Muhammad died during a battle at Gimry and was replaced by Gamzat Bek as the leader (imam) of the resistance movement. Gamzat Bek, however, was killed just two years later and Shamil was elected as the third imam.

A capable and perceptive man, Shamil played a central role in the North Caucasian resistance to Russia for 25 years. He proclaimed an independent state (imamate) and divided its territory into districts, each under control of a naib who combined military-administrative authority. He established a new recruitment system and reorganized the Chechen and Daghestani forces, introducing military structure and strict discipline; by the 1840s, Shamil had even established his own artillery foundry and gunpowder manufacturing. Shamil conducted wide-ranging raids throughout the eastern portion of North Caucasus, prompting Russian punitive expeditions, which invariably failed to subdue the fiery imam. In 1839, Shamil defended his mountain stronghold of Akhulgo (Ahulgo) for more than two months against a superior Russian army, which prevailed only after incurring heavy losses. Escaping from Akhulgo, Shamil regrouped his forces and launched guerrilla warfare throughout Chechnya and Daghestan.

Shamil's exploits and occasional victories, particularly in the 1840s, spread his fame and reputation throughout the Russian Empire and even Europe. In 1857, Russian authorities organized a large and well-equipped expedition, led by Generals N. I. Evdokimov and A. I. Baryatinsky, to finally subdue Shamil. The Russians began a methodical campaign of reducing villages and depriving Shamil of area of operation. In April 1859, they captured Shamil's stronghold at Vedeno, forcing the imam to seek shelter at Gunib. Surrounded and blockaded, Shamil was forced to surrender to the Russians on September 6, 1859. Russian authorities treated Shamil well, placing him under house arrest in Kaluga and Kiev. In 1869, he was allowed to make a pilgrimage to Mecca and Medina, where he died in March 1871.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Caucasian War (1817–1864).

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Sharia, War and

Sharia, literally "the path leading to the watering place," is an Islamic law as ordained by Allah. Systematized during the 8th–9th centuries, it represents the legal and social modality of a people based on the revelation of the last prophet, Muhammad. Unlike canon law, the sharia does not only represent religious law but also covers a wide range of secular laws and ordinances, including military law. The sharia however was (and still is) subject to various interpretations and, over the centuries, four major schools—Maliki, Shafii, Hanbali, and Hanafi—have emerged within Sunni Islam, while Shia jurisprudence developed its own peculiar variations; this entry will deal with the sharia of the Sunni Islam.

Under sharia, an Islamic state's principal goals were to carry out God's law and seek to establish Islam as the dominant world ideology. To achieve them, Muhammad's successors were willing to embark on prolonged conquests in the name of Islam, justifying such actions with the concept of jihad. Yet, as the Muslim expansion ground to a halt, Muslim authorities had to adjust to the reality of Muslim and non-Muslim realms. As a result, the world was divided into two spheres: the *dar al-Islam* (abode of Islam), the area under Muslim rule and subject to Islamic law where Muslims enjoy full rights of citizenship while non-Muslims were tolerated but granted only partial rights and subject to special rules; and the *dar al-Harb* (abode of war), territory outside the world of Islam whose inhabitants were denoted as unbelievers. Because the sharia called for Islam's worldwide dominion, the two abodes are, in theory, constantly at war with each other. Some Muslim jurists also made subdivisions within this division, adding *dar al-Muwadaah* or *dar al-Sulh* (abodes of Truce), where the non-Muslim rulers have reached a truce with the Muslims, generally in return for the payment of tribute.

An Islamic state was under obligation to enforce the sharia, to recognize no authority but its own and spread Islam. If non-Muslims refuse to accept Islam or pay the poll tax (jizya), they are subject to a jihad (commonly described as holy war), which sought to transform the *dar al-harb* into the *dar al-Islam*. This legal responsibility to wage war was a product of early Arab society and state that came about as a result of rapid expansion. The sharia condemned the pre-Islamic Arab practices (e.g., intertribal raids, vendetta) and prohibited all types of violence (whether directed against Muslims or non-Muslims), leaving a jihad as the sole legal violence, though had to be directed against non-Muslims. Yet, the jihad was not the only legal means of interacting with non-Muslims and the sharia recognized negotiation, arbitration, and treaty making as legitimate alternatives.

Although the sharia prohibited all forms of violence and declared jihad as the sole legal war, Islamic history is full of conflicts between Muslim rulers or factions, who, in theory, violated the doctrine. Muslim jurists often considered these conflicts as *harb* (secular) wars caused by man's sins, recklessness, and pride. The

Koran specifies, "If two parties among the Believers fall into a quarrel, make ye peace between them: but if one of them transgresses beyond bounds against the other, then fight ye (all) against the one that transgresses until it complies with the command of Allah; but if it complies, then make peace between them with justice, and be fair: for Allah loves those who are fair (and just)" (49:9).

Muslim jurists have distinguished four ways in which a believer can stay true to God (Allah): by his or her heart, tongue, or hands and by the sword. The first type refers to the internal struggles all people experience to remain true to the laws of God, and Prophet Muhammad considered it the most important type of jihad, often called the greater jihad. The second and third types refer to a person's daily struggles to be good and honest, support the right, and battle the wrong. However, the fourth type, oftentimes called the lesser jihad, implies the outer, oftentimes violent, struggle in defense of the true religion, Islam. The sharia declares that Islam cannot tolerate *shirk* (associating other gods with Allah) and mandates that all Muslim religious leaders must ensure that no unbeliever denies Allah and his favors (*Nizam*). This concept was initially developed in an effort to combat polytheism and allowed exception for the dhimmis (e.g., Christians, Jews) who agreed to pay the poll tax. Although in theory the jihad implied a state of permanent war between *dar al-Islam* and *dar al-Harb*, in reality Islamic states often made peace with non-Muslims and Muslim jurists had to produce new interpretations of the sharia to justify such suspensions of jihad. Thus, they agreed that when an Islamic state entered a period of decline, the jihad had to be interrupted by a peace during which the jihad duty became dormant.

In its basic form, the lesser jihad can be directed against non-Muslims or against Muslims who have reneged from Islam, espoused dissenting views, or threatened public order. The great Muslim jurist Al-Mawardi, known as Alboacen in the West, distinguished between the "wars against polytheists and apostates" and "wars of public interest." In the first group, the most violent form of jihad is reserved for those who refused to acknowledge Allah. They are denounced as pagans or idolaters and are subject to death: "Fight and slay the Pagans wherever ye find them, and seize them beleaguer them, and lie in wait for them in every stratagem (of war)" (Koran, 9:5) and "So when you meet in battle those who disbelieve, then smite the necks until when you have overcome them" (Koran, 47:4). Muslim jurists argued that the dhimmis (often called "the people of the book" or "Scriptuaries"), who believe in Allah but have distorted their scriptures are subject to the jihad but are only partially liable to punishment. Thus, unlike "pagans," who have a choice of Islam or war, the dhimmis can also chose to pay a poll tax. Among other types of jihad, the al-ridda or the apostasy jihad is directed against those Muslims who have reneged from Islam. Muslim jurists suggested first starting mediation to convince such apostates to return to Islam and, if they refused, to declared jihad, which would be subject to the same rules as the war against *dar al-Harb*. The same

principles applied to *al-baghi*, the type of jihad directed against those Muslims who embrace unorthodox forms of Islam.

"Wars of public interest" included fighting belligerents, highway robbers, and deserters who harassed peaceful population. As the Koran states, "The punishment of those who wage war against Allah and His Messenger, and strive with might and main for mischief through the land is: execution, or crucifixion, or the cutting off of hands and feet from opposite sides, or exile from the land: that is their disgrace in this world, and a heavy punishment is theirs in the Hereafter" (5:33). Another type of war, the *ribat*, is based on the Koranic instruction to protect the frontiers of *dar al-Islam* and refers to military outposts set up along the frontiers of the Islamic realm. As the Koran explains, "Make ready your strength to the utmost of your power, including steeds of war, to strike terror into (the hearts of) the enemies, of Allah and your enemies, and others besides, whom ye may not know, but whom Allah doth know" (8:60). Muslim jurists disagree whether this directive has a defensive character or not; some Hadith specifying that jihad is offensive in character because its goal is to combat the unbelievers whereas the *ribat* is defensive, aiming at protecting the believers. The *ribat* was particularly significant in Spain, where the Muslims endured the centuries-long Reconquista conducted by the Christians; thus, the medieval Muslim scholars, such as Ibn Hudhayl, argued that the *ribat* in Spain was the most indispensable duty of the believers.

The sharia recognizes jihad as a collective responsibility of the Muslim community, not an individual duty (*fard 'ayn*), such as the Five Pillars of Islam. As such, the jihad is considered a state instrument and must be declared and conducted under specific rules outlined by the sharia. It cannot be launched by an individual—although if the *dar al-Islam* is attacked, jihad becomes the duty of every believer—and only an imam (ruler, head of state) had the responsibility of declaring it. Such a call could be made at a public speech, prayer, or special communication issued in the name of *amir al-muminin* (commander of the faithful). Yet, the jihad does not imply immediate start of hostilities as the Koran (17:16) required a request to be made to the adversary to embrace Islam or pay the poll tax. A refusal to accept either offer would then provoke the fighting, although some Muslim jurists argue in favor of renewing an invitation before attacking. Once the invitation was issued, a Muslim leader could wait for a response for several days (usually three), during which he was allowed to negotiate with the enemy. During early Muslim conquests, this grace period oftentimes led to surrender and peaceful settlement in Iraq, Syria, and Egypt. This practice was also quite prevalent during the Crusades.

Once the invitation to embrace Islam was rejected, the sharia allowed the start of actual war, which, however, had to be conducted for the glory of Islam not material aggrandizement or personal glory. Muslim jurists agreed that unnecessary destruction and excessive killing was prohibited but, as expected, disagreed on details. The jihadists, in theory, had the right to kill any *harbi*—resident of *dar al-harb*—who

refused to accept Islam, provided they were not killed perfidiously or with unnecessary cruelty. But the jurists agreed that noncombatants (women, children, monks, the old, or the physically or mentally disabled) could not be maltreated, unless they directly participated in violence by action or advice. The killing of craftspeople, wage earners, and farmers who do not do battle or those who follow the army but do not participate in battle (e.g., merchants) was also prohibited. Jurist Malik ibn Anas prohibited the destruction of flocks and beehives, Muhammad ibn Idris ash-Shafii believed all inanimate objects (including plants) had to be destroyed, and Abu Hanifa an-Numan argued that everything a jihadist could not take had to be destroyed, thus authorizing wholesale destruction of settlements. Muslim armies were not allowed to start a war during the sacred months (*al-ashur al-haram*), although Koranic dictates conflict in this respect: "They ask thee concerning fighting in the Prohibited Month. Say: 'Fighting therein is a grave (offence); but graver it is in the sight of Allah to prevent access to the path of Allah, to deny Him, to prevent access to the Sacred Mosque, and drive out its members' " (Koran 2:217). Some jurists prohibited Muslims from using some weapons, for example, poisoned arrows, though poison or other materials were permitted for despoiling enemy water supplies. If the defenders of a besieged city took Muslims captives, the Muslim army was advised to use limited means of violence, and some jurists even call for complete cessation of assault. Abu Hanifa argued that the Muslims could use siege machines and arrows against besieged towns, even if such weapons could kill the captive Muslims, as long as the intention was to kill the *harbis.* Shafii, however, stated that catapults could be used against military installations but not toward inhabited houses. Abu Hamid al-Ghazali believed the killing of captive Muslims during a siege was justified on the basis of public interest (*istislah*).

During combat, the sharia denied the Muslim combatant the right to kill his foe if the latter withdraws and ceases to fight: "if they withdraw from you but fight you not, and [instead] send you [guarantees of] peace, then Allah Hath opened no way for you to war against them" (Koran 4:90). However, the enemy can be killed by surprise through the use of agents, spread of rumors to undermine morale, or ruses and stratagems. Upon victory, the Koran prohibited collective punishment of the defeated, proclaiming "that no bearer of burdens can bear the burden of another" (53:38). Nevertheless, the Koran also tolerates acts of vengeance and reciprocation of punishment: "as for those who have piled up evil deeds, the recompense of an evil deed is its like" (40:40) and "the recompense of any evil deed is an evil like it" (53:31). Once a siege or battle was finished, the sharia prohibited mutilation of the bodies of dead *harbis* and advised burial of the dead.

War has traditionally produced plenty of spoils and the sharia regulated the process of acquiring, dividing, and maintaining these spoils. The sharia distinguished between *ghanima* (property), *asra* (prisoners of war), and *sabi* (women and children) as types of spoils Muslims could obtain during war. The sharia made

a distinction between property acquired by Muslims by force and property acquired by chance or occupied as a result of peace. Although Islam recognized non-Muslims' right to ownership, taking such property as spoils during the war was considered just punishment because of the victims' refusal to embrace Islam. Nevertheless, taking this property required an imam's permission because otherwise it would be considered objectionable (*makruh*), and potentially a theft. Muslim jurists agreed that only those who participated in a battle could claim spoils, but some recommended that reinforcements that were on the way to the battle or were prevented from participating by some extraordinary event should also receive a share. If a Muslim perished in battle, his share had to be given to his offspring. The division of spoils had to take place after the Muslim victory was complete but could be done on the battlefield or back home; the final decision was in the hands of imam. Hanafi jurists, however, prohibited sharing spoils outside the *dar al-Islam*.

The Koran (8:41) specifies that "out of all the booty that ye may acquire [in war], a fifth share is assigned to Allah, and to the Messenger, and to near relatives, orphans, the needy, and the wayfarer." Thus, one fifth of the spoils had to be given to the state but Islamic law schools were divided over how this share should be managed. Maliki jurists believed the share should distributed evenly among the members of the Muslim community, Hanafi scholars argued that it should be divided into three parts (for the Prophet, and the caliph as his successor; the Prophet's relatives; and the poor, orphans, and wayfarers), and the Hanbali school recommended dividing it into six parts for every group mentioned in the Koranic *ayat*. The remaining four-fifths of the booty were divided among the male participants in the battle; any women and children present received either no shares or smaller shares. Maliki, Shafii, and Hanbali jurists agreed that a cavalryman should receive three parts (two for the horse and one for the rider) and an infantryman one part. Exercising the power of *tanfil* (supererogation), an imam could grant an additional share or shares (*nafal*) to certain participants, but the jurists disagreed on the amount that could be dispersed in such a way. Historically, prisoners of war (*asra*) often constituted a large proportion of the spoils and could be released on ransom payment (*fida*), exchanged for Muslim captives, turned into slaves, or executed. The sharia prohibited killing the *sabi* (women and children) but permitted their enslavement.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: War and Violence in the Koran.

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Sher Khan Suri (1486?–1545)

The ruler of north India between 1539 and 1545 who played an important role in the Islamic conquest of India, systemized the relationship between the Muslim elite and the Hindu populace, and developed an efficient bureaucracy and tax system. Born as Farid Khan, he came from the family of a minor chieftain and began his career in the service of Jamal Khan, the governor of Jaunpur (in northern India), and later for Bahar Khan of Lohani, who conferred upon him the title of Sher Khan for killing a tiger single-handed. By the late 1520s, Sher Khan had joined the services of Babur, who, after his conquest of Delhi, rewarded him with estates *(jagir*) in Bihar (in eastern India). In 1528, he became vice governor of Bihar, gradually becoming its undisputed ruler. His continued expansion, however, alarmed the Mughal emperor Humayun, who attacked invaded Bihar in 1537. Sher Khan defeated the Mughals at Chausa on June 26, 1539, becoming de facto ruler of most of eastern India and assuming the royal title of Farid al-Din Sher Shah. In May 1540, he again defeated Humayun at the battle of Bilgram (Kannauj) and occupied Delhi, expelling Humayun from India. Over the next several years Sher Khan conducted a series of successful campaigns that subjugated most of northern India to his control. He secured control over the Punjab and suppressed the Baluchi tribes on the northwestern frontier. Malwa fell to him in 1542 and Raisin in 1543, followed by Sind, Multan, and Marwar in 1544. Sher Khan died in a gunpowder explosion during the siege of Kalinjar on May 22, 1545, leaving an empire that stretched from the Bay of Bengal to the Indus River.

A talented administrator, Sher Khan introduced many reforms that proved to have long-lasting effects on northern India. He divided his realm into administrative units, established a revenue system based on the survey of lands, reorganized the system of tax collections, and improved trade and commerce. Tolerant of non-Muslims, he promoted Hindu officers and introduced direct recruitment and cash payments in the army. Many of his reforms were later adopted by the Mughals.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Akbar; Babur.

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Sicily, Muslim Conquest of

Muslim raids into Byzantine Sicily began in the mid-seventh century and continued until the island was absorbed into the *dar al-Islam* by the Aghlabids in the ninth century. Byzantine defenses on the island were periodically bolstered in the seventh and eighth centuries, but the Byzantine government there was plagued by political instability. By the early ninth century, the Byzantines had shifted resources to the more dangerous eastern land frontier in Anatolia and away from the central Mediterranean islands.

The Aghlabid dynasty of Tunisia, recently broken away from the Abbasid caliphate, invaded Sicily while intervening in a civil war between rival Byzantine officers there in 827. The conquest occurred in three waves over 80 years, each wave focusing on one of the main valleys of the island. The first wave, from 827 to 840, was in the Val di Mazara, on the western end of the island. Palermo was taken in 831, and became the Aghlabid headquarters and the most thoroughly Islamicized city on the island. In 840, the Aghlabids swept through Platani, Caltebellotta, Corleone, and Marineo.

The invasion of the Val di Noto, in the southeast, also began in 827, but lasted until 878. Mineo was taken in 827, Modica in 845, and Lentini in 847. Sicilian resistance intensified in the 840s, and Aghlabid troops began committing atrocities to weaken the will to resist. Noto and Scicli fell in 864, and Syracuse in 878. Syracuse was the scene of a massacre because of its long resistance: the Aghlabids wanted to make it an example. The Aghlabid invasion of the Val Demone began with incursions into Mt. Etna in 835–836. Messina was captured in 843 and Cefalu in 858. Castrogiovanni, the Byzantine headquarters, was taken in 859, and many of its citizens were enslaved by the Aghlabids. The last Byzantine position in Sicily, Taormina, finally fell in a great bloodbath in 902. Sicily remained in Muslim hands for 234 years, and in time a brilliant and distinctive Islamic civilization emerged. So thoroughly Islamicized was Sicily (Siqilliyah in Arabic) that the Baghdadi geographer Ibn Hawqal (fl. ca. 977) reported that there were 300 mosques there in the 10th century. The bulk of the citizenry, however, remained Christian.

William E. Watson

See also: North Africa, Muslim Conquest of.

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Siege Warfare, Islamic Medieval

Siege technology was an aspect of medieval warfare that ranged in scope from very small-scale operations, as when some Byzantine local forces drove off nomad raiders by erecting a barricade of carts around their church, to massive endeavors involving thousands of troops and huge expenditure. It was a field in which Byzantine and Muslim superiority over Western Europe was initially pronounced. Despite their tendency to rely on established tactics and weaponry, the Byzantines possessed very advanced siege machines. For example the earliest illustrations of a great crossbow mounted on a chassis come from an 11th-century Byzantine source, and the late 13th-century Western scholar Egidio Colonna attributed the biffa (form of trebuchet) with an adjustable counterweight to the Romans, by which he probably meant the Byzantines.

Muslim armies used various siege techniques. Light troops went ahead to impose a blockade, and orchards outside the city were progressively destroyed in an attempt to induce surrender, while the besiegers defended themselves with palisades and entrenchments. A 13th-century military manual by the writer al-Harawī, based upon long established procedures, lists the sequence of events as follows: First the commander ordered his laborers to assemble siege machines. Then bombardment began with the smallest engines, followed by those of greater power to put the enemy under increasing psychological pressure. The besiegers were also to post units of cavalry an arrow-shot from each enemy gate as a precaution against sorties.

Saladin's siege train included a variety of specialist troops such as engineers, fire troops, flamethrower operators, surveyors, and assorted craftsmen. It is also clear that the Muslims did more mining than Crusader or Frankish armies, and they used the originally Chinese tactic of erecting mounds of earth as firing positions for stone-throwing machines throughout the medieval period and well into the early modern era. Such machines gradually demolished the enemy's battlements so that defending archers lacked cover. Assault parties were commanded by the best officers, while the troops themselves carried fire weapons and tools to further demolish the enemy wall. A further variation was to use any numerical advantage to make small attacks against different parts of the wall and thus exhaust the garrison.

In defense, Muslim garrisons resorted to various stratagems, including psychological warfare: for example, they sent men with torches out of a postern gate by

night, who then returned with their torches extinguished and emerged again, making the garrison appear more formidable. Local militias used their knowledge of surrounding orchards and gardens to destroy small groups of invaders, as happened during the Crusader attack on Damascus in 1148. During the siege of Acre in the course of the Third Crusade, the son of a coppersmith surpassed professional fire-troops by designing a more effective way of shooting Greek fire (the petroleum-based incendiary liquid, which is still widely, though perhaps wrongly, regarded as the "secret weapon" that enabled the Byzantine Empire to survive against repeated Arab-Muslim attacks during the early medieval period), thereby destroying the Crusaders' siege engines. During this same siege, the defenders also used a grappling hook to ensnare one of the leading men in the army of Richard the Lion-heart, hauling him up the wall.

The counterweight mangonel, or trebuchet, is generally considered to have been invented in the Middle East during the 12th century, though there is evidence that a primitive counterweight manjanīq had been known in the Muslim area two centuries earlier. This "Persian" weapon was first illustrated and described in a military treatise written by Murda al-arsusī for Saladin. Nevertheless, the counterweight trebuchet did not have a major impact on siege warfare until the start of the 13th century.

Al-arsusī also described well-established forms of manpowered manjaniqs, of which the "Arab" type was considered most reliable. It consisted of a wooden frame with a roof and three walls to protect a team of rope-pullers inside. The "Turkish" type required less timber and was simpler to erect, while the "Frankish" or "Rumī" (i.e., Western or Byzantine) version had a more stable arm and axle. The smallest form (Arab. lu'ab) was mounted on a single pole and had the smallest payload and shortest range, but could shoot in any direction. By the late 13th century, some of the largest counterweight machines were prefabricated and transported to the scene of a siege in pieces. As elsewhere, most mangonels and other siege engines could also be used defensively from the top of fortified towers.

Apart from a "black bull-like" manjaniq that shot large arrows rather than stones, and may therefore not have been a beam-sling weapon at all, there were several bolt-shooting machines. These included the great crossbow, which was sometimes mounted on a frame or pedestal. This weapon had been known for centuries; it was spanned by a windlass or other mechanical means. The *qaws al-ziyar*, known in Europe as the espringal, was another fearsome weapon spanned by a winch or windlass. It had two separate "bow arms" thrust through tightly twisted skeins of animal hair, silk, sinew, or a mixture of these. The monstrous version described by al-Tarsusi had the power of 20 men, but even in 14th-century Morocco, it took 11 mules to carry a dismantled *qaws al-ziyar*. The ordinary *ziyar* appears to have been a development of the single-armed stone-throwing engine known in late Roman times as an onager.



Used throughout antiquity in both Europe and the Near East, a siege tower was a specialized siege engine, typically constructed as a rectangular wooden tower on wheels or rollers and equipped with ladders, stages, and drawbridges at the top. The tower's height was equal to or sometimes higher than the fortification wall to allow troops to stand on top of the tower and fire into the fortification. (Viollet-le-Duc, Eugène Emmanuel, *Dictionnaire raisonné de l'architecture française du XI au XVI siècle,* 10 vol., 1854–69)

Mobile wooden sheds to protect the men working rams were used by Islamic armies, as they were by Crusader and Byzantine forces, but, like the burj (wooden siege tower), were ideal targets for Greek fire and other forms of fire weapon. Perhaps for this reason, they largely fell out of use from the late 13th century. Other more common devices were screens and mantlets to protect sappers and miners, which were commonly used by virtually all medieval armies. One example used during the final siege of Acre by the Mamluks in 1291 consisted of a large sheet of felt on a system of pulleys. It not only hid individual men but also absorbed mangonel stones and crossbow bolts. The zahafah is more obscure, but may have been a fixed immobile wooden tower for archers.

Fire weapons became steadily more effective. In 12th-century Syria, for example, clay and glass grenades were designed for different purposes, some apparently being antipersonnel weapons. Yet the decline of fire weapons from the end of the 14th century may have resulted from their own success in driving wooden and other inflammable targets from the battlefield.

Siege technology in the western Muslim world was virtually identical to that in the Near and Middle East and became particularly sophisticated under the Almohads in the later 12th century. Here a commander sometimes had a marqaba (observation post) erected from which he could direct operations. Another notable feature of sieges in these western regions was the building of towns, complete with their

own stone fortifications, next to the city under attack; the walls and minaret of one such "counter city" still stand at al-Manura outside Tlemcen in North Africa. Otherwise the usual sequence of events was followed. Defenders fought outside their walls until convinced that the attackers could not be driven away. In 14th-century Granada, this stage was followed by walling up all gates except those needed for sorties. Particularly advanced semiexplosive pyrotechnics also appeared in North Africa and al-Andalus in the late 13th century, some of them possibly incorporating primitive gunpowder. Knowledge of saltpeter, essential in the making of gunpowder, already existed in the Middle East, and traces are said to have been found in ceramic grenades found at the sites of 13th- or even 12th-century sieges. It was not, however, until the 14th century that gunpowder was used widely in siege warfare, not only in primitive guns but as rockets and as an incendiary substance.

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See also: Military Equipment, Islamic; Muslim Armies of the Crusades.

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Siffin, Battle of (657)

Central military event in the first Muslim Civil War of 656–661. The battle took place on the plains of Siffin in what is now Syria. The fighting initially favored the forces of Ali ibn Abi Talib, the fourth caliph of Islam, but the Syrian governor Muawiyah successfully maneuvered Ali into putting their dispute up for arbitration. The resulting decision weakened Ali's influence over the caliphate and helped put Muawiyah in position to become caliph and found the Umayyad dynasty. The Battle of Siffin was also a key event in the split between the Shiite and Sunni branches of Islam.

The conflict between Ali and Muawiyah began with the assassination of Uthman ibn Affan, the third caliph of Islam. Ali, as a kinsman of the Prophet Muhammad, was selected to succeed Uthman. Muawiyah, who was related to Uthman, refused to recognize Ali as caliph because he blamed Ali for failing to prevent Uthman's murder or to punish those responsible. Muawiyah gathered an army of those opposed to Ali at his capital in Damascus.

Ali led an army of possibly 90,000 troops into Syria to put down the rebellion. Muawiyah's forces—estimated to be 120,000 but possibly fewer—marched out to meet them on the plains of Siffin near the Euphrates River. Under the leadership of Ali's general Malik al-Ashtar, Ali's forces gained an advantage over Muawiyah's troops. Muawiyah, however, instructed his soldiers to fix on their spears copies of the Koran and to shout its proclamation that Muslims should not shed each other's blood. A substantial part of Ali's army refused to fight at this point, and Ali agreed to put their dispute up for arbitration.

In the resulting negotiation, Ali's representative, Abu Musa, was outmaneuvered by Muawiyah's delegate, Amr ibn al-As, and his authority as caliph was called into question. Although weakened, Ali remained as caliph of the fractured Islamic world until his assassination in 661 by a member of the Kharijite sect, which believed that Ali had betrayed Islam when he put the matter of Siffin up for human—as opposed to divine—arbitration. With Ali out of the way, Muawiyah became caliph. He founded the powerful Umayyad dynasty of caliphs.

The Battle of Siffin increased the division between the groups that would eventually split into the Sunni and Shia branches of Islam. The Sunnis, as represented by Muawiyah, believed that the line of caliphs passed through the descendants of

Muhammad's wife Aisha. The Shia believed that Muhammad had instead proclaimed Ali as his successor. The followers of Shia Islam venerate Ali as second only to Muhammad in holiness.

Ryan Hackney

See also: Ali Ibn Abi Talib; Muawiyah; Muslim Civil War (First); Umayyad Caliphate.

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Sinope, Battle of (1853)

Decisive Russian victory over the Turks during the Crimean War. In late November 1853, Ottoman vice admiral Osman Pasha was en route north along the western Black Sea coast with a force of seven sailing frigates, two corvettes, and several transports to resupply Ottoman land forces. Osman flew his flag in the 60-gun frigate *Avni Illah*. Caught by a storm in the Black Sea, he took his ships into the Ottoman port of Sinope (Sinop). Although Osman's largest guns were only 24-pounders, the anchorage was protected by 84 guns, some of them possibly landed from the ships.

Russian admiral Paul S. Nakhimov soon arrived at Sinope with three ships of the line of 84 guns each: the *Imperatritsa Maria* (flagship), *Chesma*, and *Rostislav*. He also had two frigates. He secured from Sevastopol three additional ships of the line: the 120-gun *Veliky Knyaz Konstantin*, *Tri Sviatitelia*, and *Parizh*. Their main armament consisted of new 68-pounder shell guns.

A thick mist on the morning of November 30 masked the approach of the Russian ships into the harbor. The Ottomans barely had time to clear for action before battle was joined at 10 a.m. Within half an hour, the *Veliky Knyaz Konstantin* had sunk an Ottoman frigate and silenced the Ottoman shore batteries. The battle nevertheless raged until 4 p.m. Only one Ottoman vessel, the paddle steamer *Taif* of 12 guns managed to escape; the remaining ships were all sunk. The Russians admitted to 37 dead, while Ottoman losses were upwards of 3,000 men.

Although the Turks were badly outgunned at Sinope, the inequity of the losses conclusively demonstrated the superiority of shell over shot against wooden ships. The Russian *Imperatritsa Maria* had been struck by 84 cannon balls without major damage, for example, while the Ottoman fleet had been destroyed. The battle heightened world interest in the construction of ironclad warships for protection against shell.

The battle also produced a wellspring of support in Britain and France for the Ottoman Empire. The British press labels this legitimate act of war "a foul outrage" and a "massacre."

Spencer C. Tucker

See also: Crimean War (1853–1856).

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Sipahis

The earliest Ottoman armies were entirely traditional, consisting of Turkoman tribal cavalry, a tiny elite recruited from slaves or prisoners, and a few ill-trained infantry. However, the Ottomans rapidly absorbed several military traditions, that of the Mamluk sultanate being the most important. The conquest of the Byzantine city of Bursa also enabled the Ottoman ruler to establish a regular army, and by the late 14th century, its most important part consisted of freeborne holders of *timar* estates. Of these the majority were cavalry, known as Sipahis, whose *timars* were so similar to previous Byzantine *pronoai* fiefs that some continuity seems inevitable. The fast-expanding Ottoman Empire was soon divided into sanjaq provinces, each of which was supposed to furnish a specified number of Sipahi cavalrymen. Nevertheless, the *timarli* fief holders of these provinces remained under direct government authority, being grouped into alay regiments under alay bey officers led by the sanjaq bey provincial governor. The 14th-century Ottoman army was also characterized by a large number of Christian elite troops, again including Sipahis. Whereas most Byzantine frontier lords who transferred their allegiance to the Turks in Anatolia immediately converted to Islam, a substantial number of those who joined the Ottomans in southeast Europe clung to their original faith. In fact it was Ottoman policy to leave existing military elites in place if they provided troops and taxes. Such Christian Sipahi families usually converted to Islam after the second or third generation to confirm their position within the Ottoman military structure, merging into a new Balkan military aristocracy that differed from that seen in the Asian provinces. During the 16th century, Ottoman tactics reached their classic form. Here the primary role of Sipahis was to guard the flanks of an army in battle. Ahead of the army were akinci light cavalry whose task was to draw an enemy toward the Ottoman infantry and artillery. Once the latter had broken the enemy assault, the Sipahis would attack and, if possible, surround the foe.

Although the highly disciplined Janissaries most impressed the Europeans, their importance was actually less than that of the Sipahis who provided the offensive, battle-winning element within a classic Ottoman army. Virtually all European tactical developments that arose out of war against the Ottomans reflected this Sipahi threat, not that of the Janissaries. Even as late as the 17th century, when European observers believed European infantry were superior to the Janissaries, they still admitted that Ottoman cavalry were superior. Nevertheless, the 16th century had witnessed a decline in Sipahi fortunes. Most fiefs were now held by Kapikulu rather than provincial sipahi cavalrymen, and those Sipahis who still held fiefs often paid others to serve in their place. The traditional Sipahi also found himself unable to cope with increasingly disciplined, musket-armed European infantry, and by the late 18th century the old feudal Sipahi cavalry of the Ottoman Empire had virtually ceased to exist as a military force, having evolved into a sedentary rural aristocracy.

David Nicolle

See also: Devshirme System; Janissaries; Kapikulu Corps.

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Sis, Battle of (1606)

Major Safavid victory over the Ottomans. In 1588, the 17-year-old Abbas ascended the Safavid throne, inheriting a country that was beset by domestic and foreign threats. Almost half of Iran was occupied by the Ottomans and the Shaybanid Uzbeks. The Qizilbash tribal confederation, the regime's foundation, had become fractious and undisciplined. Many provinces were virtually independent. In 1590, to gain a free hand for domestic consolidation, Abbas signed a humiliating peace with the Ottoman Empire, recognizing its occupation of much of northern and western Iran. After 10 years of consolidating his power, Abbas chose an opportune moment to strike at the Ottomans while they were distracted by internal unrest. In 1603, he reconquered Azarbaljan, Nakhchivan, and Erivan, inflicting a crushing defeat on the Ottomans under Chighalezade Pasha near Tabriz. The Ottomans

responded in 1606 when Sultan Ahmed led an army of some 100,000 men to face Shah Abbas, who had about 62,000 troops at hand. The two armies met at Sis, near Lake Urmiya. In the beginning of the battle, the Ottomans mistook the initial Iranian cavalry diversion as the main attack and tried to redeploy their forces to face this foray. Abbas quickly exploited this mistake, charging with the rest of his army. The Turks suffered up to 20,000 losses and fled from the battlefield. The victory allowed Abbas to reclaim parts of Armenia and Azerbaijan and turn his attention to eastern Georgian principalities.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Abbas the Great; Ottoman-Safavid Wars.

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Sixth Crusade (1228–1229)

The Sixth Crusade (1228–1229) changed the crusading movement; although the crusade began with official sanction from the papacy in 1228, it was concluded with the recovery of Jerusalem by an excommunicate whose crusade was no longer officially sanctioned. The Sixth Crusade set a new precedent that witnessed individual kings launching crusades without heavy papal involvement.

The principle participant in the Sixth Crusade was Holy Roman Emperor Frederick II. Originally, Frederick had attempted to join the Fifth Crusade, but tensions between the papacy and the Holy Roman Empire kept him from participating. The Fifth Crusade had already ended in debacle by the time Frederick could have joined it. In 1225, Frederick reaffirmed his crusading vow at San Germano, Italy, agreeing to depart for the east. In the same year, Frederick married Isabella (also known as Yolande) of Jerusalem, the daughter of John of Brienne, and took the title of king of Jerusalem, setting the stage for expanding the struggle between the Holy Roman Empire and the papacy.

The marriage between Frederick and Isabella aimed, in part, to help in conquering Jerusalem without going to Egypt. Frederick assembled many troops in Brindisi, Italy, and as planned, the Crusaders sailed for the east in the late summer of 1227. However, epidemic disease forced Frederick, who had fallen ill, to stop the voyage east. Pope Gregory IX excommunicated Frederick immediately. While Gregory may have done this because he was growing impatient with Frederick, it

is also possible that his decision was influenced by the tension that existed between the Holy Roman Empire and the papacy. Whichever was the case, Frederick resumed his crusade in 1228. As an excommunicate and an unrecognized Crusader, Frederick found that a great number of his own army and nobles still supported him, but many in the Crusader States and military orders did not.

Since Frederick could not guarantee a military victory, he turned to diplomacy. Emissaries between the sultan of Egypt, al-Malik al-Kamil, and Frederick had been exchanged in the past. Originally, al-Kamil wanted to enter into an alliance with him against enemies in Damascus. By 1228, al-Kamil did not recognize how weak Frederick really was and immediately opened negotiations with Frederick to secure Egypt. On February 18, 1229, al-Kamil signed a 10-year truce with Frederick, handing over Nazareth, Bethlehem, several areas already occupied by Crusaders, and Jerusalem with the understanding that the Temple of Jerusalem would remain in Muslim hands. In return, Frederick pledged to protect the sultan's interests against all enemies. This included not helping other crusading states.

Despite condemnation from Pope Gregory IX, Frederick crowned himself king of Jerusalem on March 18, 1229. Jerusalem then remained in Christian hands for 15 years as the personal possession of Frederick.

Tim Barnard

See also: Fifth Crusade (1217–1221); Seventh Crusade (1248–1254).

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Smyrna Crusade (1344)

A joint crusading operation carried out by the Holy League (Lat. Sancta Unio) against the powerful Turkoman ruler of the Aydin emirate, Umur Begh or Umur Pasha (1334–1348), who had his headquarters at Smyrna (mod. İzmir, Turkey), a stronghold on the western Anatolian coast.

The crusade was preached in August–September 1343 by Pope Clement VI and undertaken by a united Western fleet carrying forces of the papacy, the Venetians,

the Hospitallers, the Lusignan kingdom of Cyprus, and some other minor Latin rulers of the Aegean region. The operation's main target was Smyrna itself, held since 1317 by the Aydin Turkomans and used since 1326–1329 as their base for piratical operations in the southeastern Mediterranean. The crusade operations of 1343–1344 came as a sequel to an earlier abortive attempt by the Holy League in 1332–1334 to seize the port (autumn–winter 1334). The participants had included the Byzantine emperor Andronikos III Palaiologos and the French king Charles VI of Valois, but its failure had left Umur Begh's position strengthened until the early 1340s.

The crusade of the Holy League venture met with success on October 28, 1344, when a surprise attack by the titular Latin patriarch of Constantinople, Henri of Asti, occupied the port and the lower citadel of the town. Umur Begh's naval prestige thus received a severe blow, and he was then forced to mount attacks by land aimed at recapturing the harbor of Smyrna and dislodging the crusaders from the lower town. During the period of the emir's counteroffensives, the Christians received assistance from a new crusading fleet headed by Humbert II, the dauphin of Viennois, who was officially appointed leader of the crusade by Clement VI. In an attempt to neutralize Umur Begh's efforts to retake Smyrna, Humbert led repeated



unsuccessful operations in the Aegean between early 1345 and late 1346, using as his base from mid-1346 the island of Chios, recently captured by the Genoese. It was only in late April–early May 1347 that his forces (chiefly the Hospitallers) scored a victory over a united Turkoman fleet from the emirates of Aydin and Sarukhan near the island of Imbros.

Umur Begh was killed in action (April–May 1348, according to the dating of the contemporary Byzantine historian Nikephoros Gregoras) during one of his raids against lower Smyrna, thus meeting with a hero's death according to his biographer Enveri, the 15th-century Ottoman epic historian. Umur's demise occurred just as his former ally, the Byzantine usurper-emperor John VII Kantakouzenos (1347–1354), was on the verge of joining the Holy League, while Clement VI had since 1347 been contemplating a peace treaty with Aydin, having, however, rejected it in February 1348.

Umur's brother and successor, Hizir (Hidir Begh), eventually signed a treaty with the Latins on August 18, 1348. Smyrna remained in Latin hands until its seizure by Timur Lenk (Tamerlane) in the autumn of 1402, following the latter's victory over the Ottomans at the battle of Ankara.

Alexios G. C. Savvides

See also: Nikopolis, Crusade of (1396); Timur.

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Songhai Empire (15th–16th Centuries)

The last and greatest of the three West African empires that existed between 1000 and 1600. Centered on the trading city of Gao, Songhai reached beyond its predecessors' boundaries and established a strong trading relationship with the Arab and European world before its own demise.

Songhai was created out of the previous West African empires of Ghana and Mali, which ruled, respectively, during the years 800 to 1230 and 1230 to 1464. In 1464, Emperor Sunni Ali founded the Songhai Empire by conquering the Malian cities of Timbuktu and Jenne and the area of the Niger River bend. In 1492, Ali died, and rule fell to his son, Sunni Barou. However, Sunni Barou's reign was short-lived. Siding with the non-Muslim population, he quickly alienated the merchants and aristocracy of Songhai. Fourteen months later, a rebellious leader, Muhammad Toure, overthrew Sunni Barou and took over the throne.

Under Muhammad, Songhai expanded rapidly into the Sahara, Mali, and the West African coastal area of Senegambia. To consolidate his new holdings, Muhammad instituted a centralized government, replaced local chiefs with family members, established a taxation system, and required conquered peoples to pay tribute to his court. As a Muslim ruler, Muhammad shrewdly expanded his power and influence into the Arab world. In 1497, Muhammad duplicated the legendary 1332 pilgrimage to Mecca by Malian ruler Mansa Musa and established diplomatic relations with Morocco and Egypt. He also brought in Muslim scholars to improve the university in Timbuktu and remodeled Songhai's laws and customs to adhere to stricter Muslim guidelines. By the end of Muhammad's rule in 1528, Timbuktu had become a center of learning that attracted African, Arab, and European scholars.

The Sankore Mosque and madrassa was at the center of the great Islamic scholarly community at Timbuktu, during the Songhai Empire, 15th century. (iStockPhoto)

After Muhammad, there was a succession of rulers. Askia Musa, Muhammad's son, took over in 1528. However, because of his harsh rule, he was killed in 1531. Three rulers—Bengan Korei, Askia Ismail, and Askia Issihak I—had short reigns before Askia Dawud took over in 1549. Ruling from 1549 to 1582, Dawud enjoyed a relatively peaceful and prosperous reign. After the rule of Dawud, Songhai fell on hard times under the rule of several weak rulers—Askia Muhammad III, Muhammad Bani, and Issihak II. Inevitably, the country fell into civil war and chaos. Songhai's rule also waned because of European traders from Portugal who diverted gold resources from the more traditional trading relationship with the Arab empires.

Viewing Songhai's decline as an advantageous opportunity, Moroccan forces decided to invade the vulnerable empire. In 1591, a Moroccan army with Spanish and Muslim mercenaries invaded Songhai. Armed with Spanish cannons and muskets, the Moroccan forces soundly defeated the Songhai Army and conquered the cities of Timbuktu and Gao. Afterward, Songhai fractured and fell to the Moroccans and the preying forces of the increasing Atlantic slave trade.

Oscar Williams

See also: al-Mansur, Ahmad ibn Muhammad; Sunni Ali; Toure, Askia Muhammad.

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Spain, Arab Conquest of (711–718)

The Arab conquest of Spain began in 711 with an invasion by an Umayyad army composed largely of recently converted Berbers from North Africa and Arabs. Before this, the Umayyads, centered in the caliphate at Damascus, had expanded their domains in North Africa, successfully converting the Berbers to Islam. Moreover, dynastic feuding in the Visigothic kingdom of Spain had made the realm quite unstable and prone to outside intervention.

In 710, a dispute over the election of the Visigoth king Roderick led his enemies to seek assistance in overthrowing him. These local Visigoth factions invited Arab-Berber forces into Spain for this purpose. Under the leadership of Tariq ibn Ziyad, Umayyad forces landed on Gibraltar (named after him as Mountain of Tariq or Jebel al Tariq) and campaigned toward the north into the territory held by the Christian Visigoths. Although Roderick's enemies intended to use Umayyad forces to remove Roderick from power and maintain Visigothic control, Tariq decided to conquer these territories for Islam.

The Battle of Guadalete, occurring in either 711 or 712 near the Guadalete River near Cadiz, was fought between the Christian Visigoths and the Umayyad forces. Under Roderick, the Visigoths fought to repel the invading forces but were ultimately unsuccessful against Tariq's Umayyad forces who annihilated the Visigothic troops and most of the Visigoth elites in battle. Subsequent this victory, Tariq requested further reinforcements to conquer Spain, and those forces entered Spain from North Africa under the leadership of Tariq's superior, Musa. The Umayyads were able to create alliances with Roderick's enemies in Spain and drive the remaining Christian resistance into the Spanish northern mountain regions.

The eight-year campaign brought most of Spain under Umayyad control with the exception of regions in the northwest (Asturias and Galicia) and the Basque regions in the Pyrenees Mountains. By 718, the Umayyads had secured their authority over most of Spain, thus establishing it as part of their greater Muslim Empire, which stretched across North Africa and Mesopotamia. The territory was named al-Andalus (where the name Andalusia comes from) and was an integral part of the Umayyad Empire, particularly when the Umayyad dynasty was overthrown in Damascus in 750 and al-Andalus became the center of the Umayyad state. Moreover, Christians and Jews were tolerated as "peoples of the book." They were subject to higher taxation but otherwise left alone. The Christian kingdoms in northern Spain were able to resist Muslim conquest and eventually became the beacons of the Reconquista in later centuries.

Abraham O. Mendoza

See also: Tariq ibn Ziyad; Reconquista.

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Spanish-Algerian Wars

Spanish expansion into Algeria occurred as an outgrowth of the Reconquista and Spanish ambitions within the Mediterranean. Many Jews and Moors expelled from the Spanish kingdom made their way to Algeria. Even so, Spanish expansion never extended far beyond coastal fortresses into the interior of Algeria. Over the course of the 16th century Spain captured a number of Algerian ports. In 1509 Spain seized Oran from the Zayyanid dynasty and communities and leaders in the region around

Oran pledged their loyalty to Spain in opposition to Tlemcen. In 1510, a Spanish force of 10,000 men under Pedro Navarro accompanied by Cardinal Cisneros went into Algiers to expand Spanish dominions of the Kingdom of Sicily, but the expedition was hindered by logistical problems and ultimately destroyed by the local populace. In 1512, the emir of Tlemcen swore fealty to the Spanish crown. The Spanish began to construct a system of forts that relied on the Muslim tribes surrounding them to maintain the frontier.

Spanish authority in North Africa came under pressure from the expanding Ottoman Empire. In 1529 the Ottoman Empire corsairs under Barbarossa captured Algiers and slaughtered the Spanish garrison at El Peñon in the harbor, which had refused offers of safe passage conditional upon surrender. This movement of the Ottoman Empire into the Maghreb altered older political structures and reduced the power of the older ruling Hafsid sultanate. In 1541, as part of the larger Hapsburg conflict with the Ottoman Empire, the Holy Roman Emperor Charles V launched another expedition against Algiers, which ended in a Spanish defeat in part because of a major storm that hit the expedition and made it impossible to bring artillery against the city. Charles V's defeat then led to the independence of Hasan of the Hafsi sultanate and Mohammed VI of the Zayyanid. In 1552, the Ottoman Empire seized Tlemcen. In 1558, the count of Alcaudete mounted an expedition to North Africa that was defeated by Algiers. In 1570, Algiers mounted an expedition against Tunis that led to that city's capture. Despite the decline of Spanish power in North Africa over the latter half of the 16th century, Spain retained Oran and Bejaia.

The Spanish lost control of Oran in 1708 when the Turks seized it and Mars al-Kabir in sieges while Spain was embroiled in the War of the Spanish Succession. In 1732, Philip V restored Spanish control of Oran, and Spain maintained the city through 1792. In 1774, following the unsuccessful Moroccan siege of Melila, King Charles III ordered a punitive expedition to the North African coastline. In 1775, Alexander O'Reilly, an Irish officer in Spanish military service, led an expedition to Algiers, landing at the Bay of Algiers only to be routed by the Muslim forces under Muhammad ben Abdallah. Barbary raids in the Mediterranean continued to attack Spanish shipping, and as a result, the Spanish navy bombarded Algiers in 1783 and 1784. In 1792, Spain abandoned Oran, selling it to the Ottoman Empire, and it became the site for a new bey in Algiers, though French influence in the region increased over the 19th century. Despite being removed from Algeria in the 19th century, Spain retained a presence in Morocco. Algeria consistently opposed Spanish fortresses and control in nearby Morocco through the 20th century.

Michael K. Beauchamp

See also: Barbary Corsairs; Reconquista.

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Spanish-Moroccan War (1859–1860)

By mid-19th century, Spain possessed several settlements (Ceuta, Melilla, Alhucemas, and El Penon) on the north coast of Africa. The local tribe, the Kabylas of Anghera, made frequent raids into the Spanish territory, leading to clashes with the Spanish garrisons. In 1859, Spain demanded monetary compensation and territorial concession from Sultan Muhammed IV (r. 1859–1873) and when the sultan refused, Spain's prime minister, Leopoldo O'Donnell, declared war on October 22, 1859. O'Donnell personally conducted the war, leading a 40,000-man army into Morocco and blockading Moroccan seaports. Despite poorly conceived operations, the Spaniards exploited their military superiority to prevail in the war. Though Morocco had occasional successes, the Spanish army, led by General Juan Prim y Prats, scored a decisive victory near Tetuán in January 1860. On April 26, 1860, Morocco agreed to a peace treaty, paying a heavy war indemnity of 20 million piastres (borrowed by Morocco from Britain in return for payments from Morocco's customs duties), granting trade privileges to Spanish merchants and ceding territory (the Sierre Bullone heights and coastal territory, the town of Tetuán) to the Spanish crown.

Alexander Mikaberidze

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St. Gotthard Abbey, Battle of (1664)

Major battle during the Austro-Ottoman War of 1663–1664. The new conflict between Austria and the Porte broke out after the 1658 invasion of Poland by Prince György Rákóczi II of Transylvania, an Ottoman vassal acting without the sultan's permission. To rein in his unruly vassal, Grand Vizier Koprulu Mehmed Pasha conducted a successful campaign (1660) in Transylvania that claimed Rákóczi's life and annexed the region to the Porte. Rákóczi's successor, Transylvanian prince János Kemény, fled to Vienna seeking Habsburg support against the Turks. Holy Roman Emperor Leopold I, desiring to bring Transylvania under his influence and

prevent the spread of Ottoman authority, pledged support to Kemény. In 1663, after the Habsburg's rejected Ottoman demands to evacuate Transylvania, the grand vizier's son, Fazil Ahmed led some 100,000 Ottoman troops into Hungary and besieged the strategically important fortress of Nové Zámky (Neuhäusel, in Slovakia). The small Austrian army under Count Raimondo Montecúccoli was too weak to attack the Turks and sought protection on the fortified island of Schutt, which protected the eastern frontier of Austria. The Nové Zámky fortress offered a determined resistance to the Turks, who did not captured it until the end of September. With the winter fast approaching, Koprulu Fazil Ahmed decided to winter in Serbia and resume the offensive in the spring.

The threat of a major Ottoman invasion of Austria—the first since the time of Suleiman the Magnificent—prompted Leopold I to seek a wider alliance with European states. The Imperial Diet voted a levy of money and troops from the Holy Roman Empire, while King Louis XIV of France, traditional enemy of the Habsburgs, chose to set aside his grievances and dispatched 4,000 men under Jean de Coligny to assist the Imperial army under Montecúccoli.

Koprulu Fazil Ahmed resumed the offensive in the spring of 1664 but conducted it very slowly. To avoid devastation of the Habsburg land, the Austrians chose to reach a peaceful settlement with the Porte and negotiations began at Vasvar (Eisenburg) in late July. However, while they were underway, the Imperial and Ottoman armies continued to fight. As the Turks advanced, Montecúccoli chose to wait for the Turks behind the Raab River (in western Hungary) but shadowed their march along the right bank of the river. On August 1, Koprulu Fazil Ahmed found a convenient place near Szentgotthárd (St. Gotthard) Abbey to cross the Raab. But while his army was in the midst of the crossing, it was surprised by Montecúccoli, who exploited the fact that the Turks could only move across river in small detachments that could be defeated piecemeal. Nevertheless, the Turks fought fiercely and broke the Austrian center, which was formed by the troops dispatched by the Imperial Diet. The Austrian right wing held ground, but the impetuous attack of the French on the left wing proved to be decisive. The Turks were driven across the river, abandoning most of their artillery and suffering heavy losses.

The Battle of St. Gotthard was the only major confrontation of the Habsburg and Ottoman armies between the Fifteen Years' War (1591–1606) and the second Siege of Vienna (1683). It revealed a certain decline of the Ottoman military superiority: though the Ottoman troops still demonstrated their fabled gallantry and fighting power, their tactics and weapons, particularly artillery, were increasingly becoming out of date. Nevertheless, the Habsburg army was too weak to exploit the victory at St. Gotthard and Emperor Leopold chose to accept the Treaty of Vasvar.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Austro-Ottoman Wars; Koprulu, Mehmed Pasha; Vasvar, Treaty of (1664).

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St. Petersburg, Treaty of (1723)

Peace treaty signed in the wake of the Persian Campaign of Emperor Peter I of Russia. In 1722, in an attempt to expand Russian influence to the Caspian Sea, Peter I secured an alliance with eastern Georgia and launched a successful campaign along the western shores of the Caspian Sea. By late August he had captured Derbent (southern Daghestan), but stormy weather forced him to return to Russia. The Russian flotilla, however, conducted successful raids and occupied Resht (December 1722) and Baku (July 1723). These successes compelled Iran, which had just suffered a devastating Afghan invasion, to sue for peace. Russia and Iran signed a peace treaty on September 12, 1723. The agreement forced Iran to cede all lands on the western and southern coast, including Derbent, Baku, Shirvan, Gilan, Mazandaran, and Astrabad. Russia pledged to provide military support against the Ottoman Empire. The Iranian government initially refused to ratify the treaty, but the Russian threat of further military action forced it to consent to ceding these provinces. In 1732, Russia agreed (in the Treaty of Resht) to return the aforementioned territories in return for Iranian help against the Porte.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Rasht, Treaty of (1732); Russo-Ottoman Wars.

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Sudanese Civil Wars

A long internal and ideological conflict over control of the Sudanese government, the Sudanese Civil Wars of 1955–1972 and from 1983 to the present have failed to resolve underlying religious tensions in the nation.

Since 1955, Sudan has experienced a series of civil wars between the largely Muslim peoples of the north and the traditional African tribes and Christian elites to the south. During the early phase of the war (1955–1972), the south attempted

to secede from the country. The Sudan People's Liberation Movement (SPLM), however, soon sought a truce giving the south regional autonomy in exchange for a cessation of hostilities. The signing of the Addis Ababa Accords in 1972 brought 10 years of relative peace to the nation.

The discovery of oil by U.S.-based Chevron Corporation in 1976 in Bentiu in southern Sudan fueled lingering discord between the Sudanese government and southern rebel leaders. By the time fighting broke out again in 1983, the SPLM called for the overthrow of all Islamic leaders from national power. Influenced by communist theories of social and economic reform, the movement's leaders emphasized a Sudan based on equality rather than factors of race, ethnicity, religious persuasion, gender, or cultural beliefs. In response, an Islamic fundamentalist movement grew in northern Sudan. Islamic clerics took over control of the government on June 30, 1989, and began to rule the country through the military and the sharia (Islamic law).

Hostilities ebbed considerably in the early 1990s as international leaders and the United Nations attempted to broker a peace settlement. Fighting had severely affected the entire nation and had even led to starvation and bloodshed in neighboring nations, a development that threatened to widen the war beyond Sudan. In 1992 and 1993, a peace agreement was reached through the auspices of the

Soldiers of the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) show off their weapons during an SPLA march through a village in southern Sudan. (AFP/Getty Images)

Intergovernmental Authority on Drought and Desertification. The organization offered a secularization plan to separate religion from the state to reduce the ethnic and religious tensions fueling the conflict.

Although the Islamic government rejected the plan for religious reasons in late 1993, a peace agreement was reached with rebel groups four years later. The government, however, still adamantly refused to remove Islamic values from the functions of the state, which prompted rebel factions to reject the government's call for peace and unity. A cease-fire agreement was never established, and fighting resumed.

On January 19, 2002, a cease-fire agreement was brokered by the United States and Switzerland in hope's of ending the 18-year civil war. The agreement called for a cessation of the fighting in the Nuba Mountain region, a halt to the aerial bombardment of civilians, and the establishment of "tranquility zones" to allow humanitarian aid to resume unhampered. However, the agreement largely failed, and the violence continues unabated to the present day. The Sudanese Civil War has killed more than 2 million people and internally displaced more than 4.5 million others from their homes due to fighting or war-related famine.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Ogaden War (1977–1978).

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Sudanese-Ethiopian War (1885–1889)

The collapse of the Egyptian Empire in the early 1880s led to numerous conflicts in northeast Africa. The failed Urabi Revolution and subsequent British invasion of 1882 reduced both military forces and the revenue needed to maintain the empire. These reductions coincided with a popular uprising against Egyptian rule in the Sudan. Led by Muhammad Ahmed (1844–1885), who was accepted as al-Mahdi, a messianic figure popular with Sudanese Muslims, this uprising created the Mahdiyah, a theocracy that promoted jihad as a duty of devout Muslims.

The failure of Egypt's empire also affected neighboring Christian Ethiopia (Abyssinia), whose emperor, Yohannes IV (1831–1889), had defeated Egyptian invaders at Gundet (1875) and Gura (1876). These victories encouraged Ethiopian desires to dominate modern-day Eritrea and gain access to the Red Sea. Dangling this possibility, Britain convinced Yohannes to accept the Adwa Treaty (1884),

which ended conflict with Egypt, and required Ethiopia to help evacuate the Egyptian garrisons, now cut off from the Nile by Mahdiyah-dominated Khartoum. At the same time, British diplomats helped Italian imperialists occupy Red Sea ports along the Eritrean coast.

Combined with the centuries-old tradition of Ethiopian-Sudanese cross-border raids and significant religious differences between the nations, these events resulted in war, which began when Muhammad Ahmad's successor, Abdullah ibn Muhammad (1846–1898), initiated raids into Ethiopia as retaliation for assisting the retreating Egyptians. The first major battle ended in disaster for the Sudanese when Ras Alula (1847–1897) crushed a column of invaders at Kufit (September 23, 1885).

Yohannes, distracted by Italian efforts to expand their Eritrean holdings, plus internal unrest in Gojjam and Shewa, did not press a counterinvasion. This allowed the Sudanese to regroup, smash an Ethiopian force at Sar Weha (June 1887), and then sack the ancient capital of Gondar. Half a year later, the Mahdists returned, and nearly burned the entire city of Gondar (January 23, 1888).

Such actions were sufficient to goad Yohannes into a maximum effort. He raised more than 100,000 soldiers for a deep incursion into the Mahdiya. His first target was Gallabat, where 60,000 Mahdists were dug in behind a zareba (thorn barricade). Between March 8 and 11, 1889, Ethiopians took down the defenses and were on the verge of a major victory when Yohannes was killed by small-arms fire. The emperor's death caused his army to panic, turning Gallabat (also called Metema) indo a Sudanese victory. Heavy losses on both sides, plus worry over the intentions of British, Italian, and Belgian imperialists, made this the last major battle of the war. No peace treaty was ever signed, as the Mahdiyah was destroyed after the Anglo-Egyptian victory at Omdurman (September 2, 1898).

John P. Dunn

See also: Anglo-Sudan War (1883–1899); Ogaden War (1977–1978).

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Suicide Bombings

Bombing in which an explosive is delivered and detonated or caused by a person or persons who expect to die in the explosion along with the intended target or

targets. In recent years the number of suicide bombings or attacks has risen exponentially, and not just in the Middle East. The United States was struck by aircraft piloted by suicide hijackers on September 11, 2001, resulting in the deaths of almost 3,000 people.

Suicide bombers employ several different techniques. Japanese pilots in World War II were known for crashing their airplanes straight into targets, causing tremendous devastation. These pilots were known as kamikaze ("divine wind"), the name given to a typhoon that destroyed a Mongol invasion fleet off Japan in the 13th century. Kamikazes exacted a heavy toll on Allied warships at the end of World War II, especially off Okinawa. Other attackers use bombs secured in cars or trucks.

Individual suicide bombers strap explosives and shrapnel to their bodies and wear vests or belts specially designed for the purpose. They then drive or walk to their targets. Because military targets are heavily defended, typically the targets are crowded shopping areas, restaurants, or buses, or suicide bombers may approach softer targets directly linked to the military or police, such as a line of recruits in the street as during the Iraq War. Detonating the explosives will kill or injure people in the vicinity as well as destroy property, such as a religious shrine. An explosion in an enclosed area is more destructive than one in the open, and suicide bombers pick their targets accordingly. Forensic investigators at the site of a suicide bombing can usually identify very quickly the bomber and the general type of device he or she used. A suicide vest decapitates the bomber, while a belt cuts the bomber in two.

The explosives themselves are easily constructed. They include gunpowder, a battery, acetone, mercury, cable, a light-switch detonator, and a custom-made belt or vest to hold the explosives. Explosives may also be carried in a briefcase or other bag. The bomber sets them off by flipping a switch or pressing a button. Muslim extremists typically leave a written or video will and pronounce the Fatiha, or opening verse of the Koran, and the words "Allahu akbar," or "Allah is great," as they detonate their bombs.

Suicide bombings have been common in the Middle East since the late 1970s, when they were employed in Syria by the Islamic resistance against the Baathist government. In November 1982 an Islamic resistance suicide bomber destroyed a building in Tyre, Lebanon, and killed 76 Israelis. The Organization of Islamic Jihad and other militant Islamist groups, including Hezbollah, as well as numerous Christians carried out another 50 suicide attacks between 1982 and 1999, when the Israelis withdrew from Lebanon. A massive bombing in October 1983 forced American and French troops from Lebanon. The belief that such attacks bring martyrdom has encouraged suicide bombings all over the world, including Afghanistan, Chechnya, Croatia, Tajikistan, Pakistan, Yemen, Panama, Argentina, and Algeria, but such attacks were also employed prior to this period by the Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka. In 1995 a suicide bomber dressed as a priest attempted to assassinate Pope John Paul II in Manila.

Palestinians began suicide bombings in the early 1990s. The inspiration for the attacks was the so-called War of the Knives, a battle between Palestinians and Jews praying at the Western Wall that took place on October 8, 1990. Eighteen Palestinians were killed in the melee, and the radical Hamas organization called for a jihad, or holy war. Omar abu Sirhan took this call literally. He walked to a neighborhood in Jerusalem and killed three people with a butcher knife. He claimed that he had seen the Prophet Muhammad in a dream and that the Prophet had ordered him to take revenge for the slain Palestinians. Abu Sirhan had fully believed that he would die during his killing spree.

Hamas declared abu Sirhan a hero and quickly transformed his act into the inspiration for a generation of suicide killers. Hamas and Islamic Jihad, another radical Islamic organization, informed their faithful that martyrdom actions or suicide attacks were a righteous act because jihad was individually required of Muslims under the circumstances of Israeli occupation.

The first Palestinian suicide bombing occurred in April 1993 in the West Bank. There were 198 known suicide bombing attacks in Israel and Palestine between 1993 and July 2002. The bombers died in 136 of those attacks. These attacks usually occurred within Israel's pre-1967 borders. Attacks increased after the beginning of the Second (al-Aqsa) Intifada in September 2000. Although suicide bombings made up only a small percentage of actual attacks launched by Palestinians against Israelis, they accounted for perhaps half the Israelis killed between 2000 and 2002.

Although some 70 percent of the suicide attackers in Lebanon in the 1980s were Christians, Palestinian suicide bombers have been Muslims. However, a Greek Orthodox religious figure, Archimandrite Theosios Hanna, supported fedayeen shahids (fighter martyrs) in several speeches. It is obvious from the Tamil, Japanese, or anarchist violence that the motivation is primarily nationalist, and in fact Islam strictly forbids suicide and engaging recklessly in jihad so as to obtain martyrdom. There are set rules regarding who may participate in jihad, and these exclude young people, those with dependents, and also traditionally women. The main religious justification is that jihad is really a defense of Islam and is required of believers under Israeli authority who need not wait for jihad to be formally declared as under normal circumstances. To Muslims, there is a difference between an individual and a collectively incumbent religious duty. Religious authorities who decry the linkage of Islam with suicide and the killing of innocent people try to convince their audiences that the greater jihad, the striving to be a good Muslim in every possible aspect of life, can substitute for jihad as armed struggle, or that if armed struggle is necessary, it should not involve attacks of this type. Not all religious authorities take this position, of course, and unfortunately the televised footage or videos of suicide bombers serve as a recruiting tool for others.

For many young Muslims, the temptation of martyrdom with its promise of rewards in paradise is irresistible. They are taught that martyrdom cleanses them of

sins and that they will have special power to intercede on behalf of their relatives and close friends on the Day of Judgment. The families of suicide bombers are often extremely proud of their loved ones and praise them publicly as heroes. These families acquire higher status in the Muslim communities. Some Palestinians were at one time receiving financial support from Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein, and in this way the bombers were able to provide for their dependents. Successful suicide bombers believe that they will be remembered as popular heroes.

A major motivation of many Muslim suicide bombers is revenge on Israelis, who have killed numerous Palestinians, often including relatives and friends of the bombers. Suicide bombers have left statements explaining their actions in which they list specific victims of Israeli attacks, particularly women, children, and the elderly. Suicide attackers convince themselves that they are not killing innocent victims. They often use the argument that all Israelis serve in the military, at least as reserves, and therefore are combatants and not really civilians. Some Hamas members made such arguments in the past, but the organization itself observed a truce on such attacks from 2004 to 2007.

A large proportion of Palestinians support armed resistance to the Israeli presence, and many support the work of suicide attackers. Numerous other Palestinians do not support this position and consider attacks on civilians reprehensible, but they have not been nearly as prominent as those who praise suicide bombers, in much the same way as the fedayeen were praised in the past.

Cynics point out that using suicide bombers is an inexpensive method for the radical Palestinians to wage war against Israel, an extreme form of asymmetric warfare. The ingredients for the explosives do not cost much, and many bombers even collect and recycle the shrapnel from past explosions so they can kill Israelis with the same shrapnel that killed Palestinians. Palestinians argue that it is impossible to put a price on human capital, so they are not only losing their own youths but are also paying a very high public relations cost if the world believes that Palestinians are only capable of such violence.

The fiqh al-jihad, or rules of jihad, specify that women and parents of dependent children or the children of the elderly should not volunteer for jihad, but in the five-year period when such attacks were most prevalent in Israel, bombers came from both genders, all ages, and all levels of education and income, although the majority are young unmarried men who grew up in refugee camps in an atmosphere of hatred against Israel. Those who were recruited to such actions were chosen for their psychological predispositions, not to suicide but suggestibility, and were prevented, if possible, from contacting those close to them.

Those attackers who authorities said were traceable to Hamas and Islamic Jihad were persons with no major family responsibilities and who were over the age of 18. In some cases recruiters sought individuals who could speak Hebrew well.

Understandably, suicide bombings are enormously upsetting to potential civilian victims. Suicide bombers turn up when they are least expected as their victims go about their daily business, so victims and bystanders are taken completely by surprise. The victims are often civilians, and children often make up a sizable percentage of those killed. Because the bomber has no concern for his or her own life, it is difficult to prevent such attacks. In Israel, many businesses have hired security guards who are specially trained to spot potential bombers. As with all acts of terror, the fact that such bombings spread fear among the Israeli population is as valuable to the radicals' cause as actually killing Israelis.

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See also: Radical Islam in the 20th Century; Sharia, War in; Terrorism; War and Violence in the Koran.

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Suleiman the Magnificent (d. 1566)

Ottoman sultan (1520–1566), the son of Sultan Selim I. Under Suleiman, known to Europeans as "the Magnificent" and in Turkish as Kanuni (the lawgiver), the Ottoman Empire expanded to its effective territorial limits in both east and west, although to the south the Ottomans were unable to contain the Portuguese in the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf. Ottoman law was codified, and the empire came to play a major role in international politics. For later Ottomans, the reign of Suleiman was a golden age.

Much of Suleiman's reign was spent campaigning against Hungary. In 1521 he took Belgrade, and on his second campaign, he routed the Hungarians at Mohács (August 1526) and entered Buda (mod. Budapest). King Louis II was killed in battle, and the Hungarian throne left vacant. At this point Suleiman withdrew, due to a serious revolt in Anatolia. A succession dispute erupted, with the Hungarian

Estates electing John Szapolyai, while the Habsburg archduke Ferdinand of Austria (brother-in-law of Louis) had himself crowned. Suleiman backed Szapolyai, and Ferdinand occupied Buda. In 1529 Suleiman marched on Hungary, retook Buda, and laid siege to Vienna. In 1530 Ferdinand besieged Buda and took western Hungary. In 1533 an agreement was made whereby Hungary was divided between Ferdinand and Szapolyai and their lands remained Ottoman tributaries. After a renewed period of fighting in Hungary, a five-year truce was eventually concluded in 1547.

In the eastern Mediterranean region, Suleiman expelled the Hospitallers from the island of Rhodes (mod. Rodos, Greece), which fell to the Ottomans in 1522. In the west, he faced the Spanish fleet. In 1535 the Spanish king and Holy Roman Emperor Charles V led a successful campaign against Tunis. When war broke out with Venice in 1536, Suleiman entered into an alliance with Charles's enemy, King Francis I of France. There were several further French-Ottoman alliances, the Ottoman fleet even wintering at Toulon in 1543. Venice lost most of her Aegean islands and, as part of the Holy League with Pope Paul III, Charles V, and Ferdinand of Austria, suffered a major defeat at Preveza in 1538. According to the peace concluded in 1540, Venice lost various islands, including Naxos, Santorini, Paros, and Andros, as well as Monemvasia and Nauplion. Further successful Ottoman campaigns in the Mediterranean in the 1550s under Piale Pasha were followed by the siege of Malta (1565) and the capture of Chios from the Genoese (1566).

In the east Suleiman campaigned against the Safavids of Persia. Ottoman forces took Bitlis (1533), Tabriz (1534), and Baghdad (1534), and Iraq became an Ottoman possession. Despite further warfare against the Safavids, no major conquests were made, and what was to become the permanent frontier between the two states was set by the Treaty of Amasya (1555). In 1553 Suleiman executed his son Mustafa for apparently plotting to take the throne. Bayezid, another son of Suleiman, revolted in 1558 but was defeated near Konya (1559) and fled to Persia. After negotiations with the Safavid ruler Shah Tahmasp, Bayezid was killed in 1562. In 1566 Suleiman set off against Hungary for what was to be his last campaign. He died at the siege of Szigetvár.

Kate Fleet

See also: Amasya (Amassia), Treaty of (1555); Austro-Ottoman Wars; Hungarian-Ottoman Wars (1437–1526); Mohács, Battle of (1526); Ottoman-Safavid Wars; Preveza, Battle of (1538); Selim I; Tahmasp; Venetian-Ottoman Wars.

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Sunni Ali (d. 1492)

Founder of what would become the greatest empire in West African history. Using superlative military and administrative skills, he developed the Soninke state of Songhai into the center of a powerful commercial and military empire. In the 14th century, the great West African empire of Mali was in decline. Songhai was a client state of Mali, centered at the port of Gao on the Niger River. Gao was an important trading entrepot linking the trans-Saharan trade of North Africa with the savanna lands to the south of the river. In the 14th century, the king of Songhai had declared his state's independence from Mali.

Little is known of Sunni Ali before he succeeded to the throne of Songhai in 1464. His predecessor, Sunni Sulayman, had set the kingdom on a path to expansion, which Sunni Ali continued. Shortly after taking power, Sunni Ali launched an invasion of the important trading city of Timbuktu, which was controlled by Tuareg raiders. He subdued the Tuareg and brought the city under his rule, thereby funneling the rich trade of the Sahara into his kingdom. This was the first of an unending series of campaigns Sunni Ali fought over the next three decades to expand and consolidate his hold over his empire. From Timbuktu, his armies headed south to conquer the Niger port of Jenne. The city capitulated after a long siege. Then, in 1480, Sunni Ali attacked the Mossi states south of the Niger. Though he did not conquer the Mossi, he was able to end their threat to his expanding empire. Sunni Ali also waged war against the Fulani state of Massina, which he also subdued.

Sunni Ali commanded a large and efficiently organized military. His land forces included both infantry and cavalry. The strength of his military was his navy, however, which drove his rivals out of the Niger ports.

Contemporaries attributed Sunni Ali's success in part to his purported magical talents, which he supposedly used in battle. Though he claimed to be a Muslim, he refused to disassociate himself with the traditional religions that supposedly gave him his supernatural powers. At times, he dealt harshly with Muslim critics. For example, he executed many of the clerics in Timbuktu after conquering that city. He recognized the advantages Islam could bring to him in his dealings with other Muslims, however, and kept up the appearances of being a devout follower of the faith.

Sunni Ali was also a gifted administrator and created a bureaucracy that allowed him to impose his will in the distant provinces of his expansive empire. He appointed

administrators loyal to him to help rule newly conquered provinces. This system made Songhai a more centralized empire than its predecessors of Ghana and Mali.

In 1492, Sunni Ali's armies fought a successful campaign against the Fulani of Gurma. According to some traditions, on the way home, Sunni Ali was drowned crossing the Niger River. Other traditions dispute this story, however, insisting instead that he was killed by a rival claimant to the throne of Songhai. On his death, he was succeeded by one of his sons, Sunni Barou. Like his father, Sunni Barou relied for legitimacy on the traditional religion of the Soninke, which brought him into opposition with the Muslims of Songhai. In 1493, his father's favorite general, Muhammad Toure, a devout Muslim, defeated Sunni Barou in battle and seized the throne.

James Burns

See also: Songhai Empire (15th–16th Centuries; Toure, Askia Muhammad.

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Svishtov, Treaty of (1791)

Peace accord between the Ottoman Empire and Austria that concluded the Ottoman-Habsburg War of 1787–1791. The treaty was signed in the village of Svishtov, on the right bank of the Danube, on August 4, 1791. The Ottoman victories in the concluding stages of the war forced Emperor Leopold II to accept armistice and start peace negotiations. The resulting treaty, concluded with Prussian, English, and Dutch mediation, contained 14 articles (plus seven clauses in a separate pact) and proved to be rather favorable to the Turks. During the war Austria had captured Belgrade and, together with Russia, occupied Wallachia and Moldavia. Under the treaty, the Ottoman Empire agreed to cede the famous Old Orshova gorge that separated Romania and Serbia to Austria but retained all other prewar territories, essentially reverting to the boundary established by the Treaty of Belgrade in 1739. The fortress of Khotin (Hotin) stayed in Austria's possession until the end of the Russo-Ottoman War in 1792.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Austro-Ottoman Wars; Belgrade, Treaty of (1739); Russo-Ottoman Wars.

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Sykes-Picot Agreement (1916)

Agreement reached between the British, French, and Russian governments regarding claims of territory belonging to the Ottoman Empire. In the spring of 1915 British High Commissioner in Egypt Sir Henry McMahon promised Sharif Husayn of Mecca British support for an Arab state under Husayn in return for Arab military support against the Ottoman Empire. Confident in British support, in June 1915 Husayn proclaimed the Arab Revolt. The French government was alarmed over this, and on October 24 McMahon informed Husayn of limitations on a postwar Arab state. Britain was to have direct control of the Baghdad-Basra region so that the area west of Hama, Homa, Aleppo, and Damascus could not be under Arab control. Any Arab state east of the Hama-Damascus area would have to seek British advice. McMahon also warned Husayn that Britain could make no promises that would injure French interests.

Aware of the British agreement with Husayn, Paris pressed London for recognition of its own claims in the Ottoman Empire. Englishman Sir Mark Sykes and Frenchman François Georges Picot were appointed by their respective governments to conduct the negotiations, and, because discussions of the future of Asiatic Turkey necessarily affected the Russians, the two proceeded to Petrograd in the early spring of 1916 and there presented their draft agreement. They secured Russian support in the formal Sazonov-Paléologue Agreement of April 26, 1916, named for Russian foreign minister Sergey D. Sazonov and French ambassador to Russia Georges Maurice Paléologue. It is most often known as the Sykes-Picot Agreement, however. The agreement was officially concluded on May 16, 1916.

The Sykes-Picot Agreement provided extensive territorial concessions to all three powers at the expense of the Ottoman Empire. Russia was to receive the provinces of Erzurum, Trebizond, Van, and Bitlis (known as Turkish Armenia) as well as northern Kurdistan from Mush, Sairt, Ibn Omar, and Amadiya to the border with Persia (Iran). France would secure the coastal strip of Syria, the vilayet of Adana, and territory extending in the south from Aintab and Mardin to the future Russian border to a northern line drawn from Ala Dagh through Kaisariya Ak-Dagh, Jidiz-Dagh, and Zara to Egin-Kharput (the area known as Cilcia). Britain would secure southern Mesopotamia with Baghdad as well as the ports of Haifa and Acre in Palestine. The zone between the British and French territories would be formed into one or more Arab states, but this was to be divided into British and French spheres

of influence. The French sphere would include the Syrian hinterland and the Mosul province of Mesopotamia, while the British would have influence over the territory from Palestine to the Persian border. The agreement also provided that Alexandetta would become a free port while Palestine would be internationalized.

The parties involved agreed to maintain strict secrecy regarding the agreement. Despite this, the Italian government learned of its existence by early 1917 and forced the French and British governments to agree in the Saint-Jean-de-Maurienne Agreement of April 17, 1917, that Italy would receive a large tract of purely Turkish land in southern Anatolia and a sphere of influence north of Smyrna. This was the final agreement among the Allies regarding the future partition of the Ottoman Empire. It was contingent on the approval of the Russian government, which was not forthcoming because of revolutionary upheaval there. Husayn did not learn of the Sykes-Picot Agreement until December 1917 when the information was published by the Bolshevik government of Russia and relayed to Husayn by the Turks, who vainly hoped thereby to reverse his pro-British stance.

The Sykes-Picot Agreement proved a source of bitter conflict between France and England at the 1919 Paris Peace Conference. French premier Georges Clemenceau expected to receive British support for French claims to Lebanon, Cilicia, and Syria. He based this belief on a December 2, 1918, meeting in London with British prime minister David Lloyd George, where, in a verbal understanding without witnesses, Clemenceau agreed to modify the Sykes-Picot Agreement. Recognizing the British role in victory in the Middle East, Clemenceau agreed that the oil-producing area of Mosul, assigned to France in the Sykes-Picot Agreement, would be transferred to the British sphere. Palestine, which had been slated for some form of international status, would also be assigned to the British. In return, Clemenceau believed that Lloyd George had promised British support for French claims to Syria and Cilicia.

At the Paris Peace Conference, however, Lloyd George jettisoned the Sykes-Picot Agreement. Appealing to U.S. president Woodrow Wilson's principles of national self-determination, he argued that the Arab Revolt entitled the peoples of Lebanon and Syria to self-rule. Lloyd George wanted Husayn's son Emir Faisal, who was under British control, to rule Lebanon and Syria. But Lloyd George also insisted that Britain retain control of Iraq and Palestine. Clemenceau protested. The standoff was resolved on April 24, 1920, at the San Remo Conference, whereby the British and French governments reached agreement on mandates in the Middle East. Britain would receive Palestine and Iraq, while France secured Lebanon and Syria. Self-determination was thus rejected.

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See also: Arab Revolt of 1916–1918; World War I.

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Syrian Campaign (1941)

Operation carried out during World War II by the British Commonwealth, along with Free French and Palestinian Jewish units, against the pro-Vichy French colonial administration in Syria and Lebanon in June and July. This campaign grew out of British fears (present since Nazi Germany's victory over France in May and June 1940) that the French in Syria might provide Germany with bases and material support for a move against Britain's interests in the Persian Gulf.

The immediate trigger was the April 1941 revolt in Iraq by Arab nationalist and pro-Axis Iraqi army officers. This uprising, encouraged by the Germans and supported by arms shipments and German aircraft based in Syria, began on April 2. The British rushed reinforcements from Palestine and India to Iraq and the pro-Axis government collapsed when the British retook Baghdad on May 31.

The British knew that the French in Syria were involved in the Iraq revolt and that the French high commissioner for Syria and Lebanon, General Henri Dentz, was a pro-Vichy Anglophobe who had willingly supported the Iraqi rebels. Furthermore, the British feared that the German offensive in the Balkans could be a prelude for an attack through Syria. These considerations convinced the British that the Vichy presence in Syria had to be eliminated. On June 8, 1941, they invaded Syria in an operation codenamed Exporter.

The makeshift British force consisted of Australian and Indian troops plus two battalions of Free French and some Palestinian Jews. They were supported by Royal Air Force units rushed from the western desert theater. They attacked in three columns—the Australians supported by Palestinian Jewish reconnaissance

Free French troops and vehicles are cheered by residents in Damascus, Syria, in June 1941, after Vichy forces evacuated the city. Allied forces had occupied Damascus since June 21. (AP/Wide World Photos)

units from Palestine north into Lebanon toward Beirut and Damascus, British units from Trans-Jordan northeast toward Palmyra, and a British/Indian force from Iraq toward Raqqa and Allepo. All three columns were commanded by General Sir Henry Maitland Wilson.

Initially, the British sought a peaceful takeover by appealing to anti-Vichy and anti-German sympathies among the French forces. Unfortunately, most of the French officers and noncommissioned officers remained loyal to Vichy. Among the 40,000 troops of the French garrison, only 8,000 were metropolitan French (Smith 2009, 192). The rest were colonial regulars who followed their officers.

The result was a bitter campaign. The British encountered stiff French resistance in Lebanon at Damour and Merjeyoun, and in central Syria at Palmyra. In addition, naval and air skirmishes resulted in the damage of several British ships and the sinking of one French destroyer near Beirut. Damascus fell on July 22. After five weeks of fighting and 2,000 total military deaths, Dentz capitulated at the fortress of Acre on July 11.

Britain's position in the Persian Gulf was secure. Ironically, the most immediate reason for the campaign had already ceased to be a factor. With the invasion

of the Soviet Union, Hitler put off any plans for operations in Iraq and withdrew the Luftwaffe units in Syria before Exporter began. Nevertheless, the campaign had political effects on Britain's already bitter relations with the Vichy French and with the Free French under the leadership of Charles DeGaulle. Both factions were intensely suspicious of Britain's designs in Syria. These issues were to remain for the rest of World War II and into the postwar era.

Walter F. Bell

See also: French Mandates; Iran during World War I; Iraq during World War II; North Africa, Role in World War II.

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T

Tafna, Treaty (1837)

Peace agreement between Emir Abd al-Qadir and the French general Thomas-Robert Bugeaud. The treaty was signed in the wake of the French invasion of Algeria. Abd al-Qadir had scored a victory at La Macta in June 1835 but failed to prevent French forces from capturing Mascara in December 1835. In 1836, he was again defeated at Sikkah and chose to compromise with the French. In the treaty, France recognized Abd al-Qadir's territory (Oran, Kolea, Tlemcen, and Algiers) as sovereign while the emir accepted French authority in coastal ports. The French also agreed to privately supply the emir with arms and munitions. The treaty proved to be short-lived and was eventually violated by the French in 1839.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Abd al-Qadir; Algeria, French Conquest of (1830–1857).

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Tahmasp I, Shah (1514–1576)

Safavid ruler of Iran whose reign saw a continued conflict with the Ottoman Empire. Born at Shahabad in March 1514, Tahmasp was the eldest son of Shah Ismail, the founder of the Safavid dynasty, and came to power in 1524 at the tender age of 10. Unable to rule, he was under control of the Qizilbash tribal leaders whose rivalries eventually led to civil strife in 1526. Exploiting Iran's internal weakness, the Uzbeks invaded its northeastern province of Khurasan but were defeated in a battle at Jam in 1528. By 1533, Tahmasp, aged 19, asserted royal authority and began to rule in his own right. Exploiting Ottoman preoccupations in Europe, where Suleiman I the Magnificent was conducting major campaigns in Serbia and Hungary, Tahmasp sought to stir up rebellion in the eastern provinces of the Ottoman

Empire and opened diplomatic negotiations with the Habsburgs on the creation of a Habsburg-Safavid alliance against the Ottomans. In response, the Ottomans, led by the Grand Vizier Ibrahim Pasha, who was later joined by Suleiman himself, invaded Iraq and, over the next eight years, captured Baghdad, Bitlis, and Tabriz. Tahmasp avoided pitched battles and waged a scorched-earth strategy. Tabriz, recaptured by Tahmasp in early 1535, was sacked later that year by Suleiman. Although major military operations ended, minor skirmishes and border fighting persisted for almost a decade. Between 1540 and 1553, Tahmasp also conducted military campaigns in the Southern Caucasus, primarily targeting the eastern Georgian kingdoms of Kartli and Kakheti, where he captured and resettled thousands of Georgians who soon become an important new element in Iranian society. In 1544, Tahmasp also became involved in the Indian political affairs after he sheltered the Mughal emperor Humayn who had been overthrown and forced to flee from India. With Tahmasp's help, Humayn was able to reclaim his authority in 1555.

In 1548, Tahmasp's conquests of Tabriz and Van provoked a second campaign by Suleiman. Yet again, the shah adopted a scorched-earth policy, laying waste to the Armenian highlands; the Ottomans, however, reclaimed Tabriz and Van as well as additional fortresses in Armenia and Georgia. After a three-year hiatus, the war was resumed in earnest. Tahmasp's attack on Erzurum in 1552 led to a counterattack by Suleiman, who reclaimed Erzurum and invaded western Iran in 1553–1554. Unable to defeat the Ottomans, Tahmasp chose to negotiate, signing the Treaty of Amasya in 1555. Under the treaty, the two powers determined their spheres of influence: Iran received Azerbaijan, eastern Armenia, eastern Kurdistan, and eastern Georgian kingdoms and the Ottomans claimed all of western Georgia, Arabia, Iraq, western Armenia, and Kurdistan. Kars was declared neutral, and its fortress was destroyed.

Tahmasp spent the last years of his life in seclusion, particularly after becoming ill in the mid-1570s. A generous patron of the arts, he commissioned various artistic works, including the famous *Shahnama-yi Shah Tahmaspi*, which contained dozens of exquisite miniature paintings. Even before his death, his sons from Georgian, Circassian, and Turkoman wives quarreled over succession, and their quarrels turned into open conflict when he died.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Jam, Battle of (1528); Ottoman-Safavid Wars; Suleiman the Magnificent.

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Tajikistan, Civil War in (1992–1997)

After its declaration of independence, Tajikistan experienced a major domestic conflict that lasted from December 1992 to June 1997. This civil war fluctuated in intensity but at various stages it involved Russia and other Central Asian countries in support of the Tajik government. The origins of the war lay in social discontent among a large number of Tajiks over the direction in which the country was headed. The Tajik bureaucrats, many of whom were ethnic Uzbeks, maintained a tight hold over the country during the Soviet era and remained in power after the country's independence. Thus, the government of the new state remained under the control of pro-Russian former communist officials led by President Rakhman Nabiyev. The newly established opposition parties, representing politically and economically destitute regions challenged Nabiyev's government and condemned it for widespread corruption and repression. The opposition consisted of several political groups, including Rastokhez (a Tajik nationalist party), the Islamic Renaissance Party (a Muslim fundamentalist group), the Gorno-Badakshan separatists (Lali Badakshan), and the liberal Democratic Party of Tajikistan.

In May 1992, after disputed presidential elections, riots broke out in Dushanbe, which quickly developing into an armed confrontation. Opposition forces succeeded in capturing the Tajik capital of Dushanbe, but the government appealed for help to Russia and Uzbekistan and, with their aid, reclaimed the capital. However, as the fighting escalated, Nabiyev's own supporters turned against him, ousting him a coup in September 1992. Imomali Rahmonov, a former communist and Uzbek-supported politician, was installed as interim president and quickly banned all opposition parties. Attacks by opposition militias, aided by Islamic radicals from Afghanistan, continued, claiming lives of hundreds of people and causing major destruction in the countryside.

By the mid-1990s, the opposition regrouped with the aid of the Islamic radical party Jamiat-e Islami that operated in Afghanistan. United into the United Tajik Opposition (UTO), the opposition adopted a nationalist stance against the Uzbek-dominated government, which turned for assistance to Russia and Uzbekistan. Hostilities were now largely conducted by Islamic fighters, and they organized several attacks on Dushanbe, where they combated Russian forces. The conflict produced massive casualties estimated at between 30,000 and 60,000 people, and an estimated 1 million Tajiks were either internally displaced or became refugees in Afghanistan.

In 1994, Rahmonov won a presidential election in which he faced no opposition candidate. Two years later he accepted a United Nations–sponsored "Inter-Tajik Dialogue" with the UTO, headed by Said Abdullo Nuri. Under the agreement, the UTO was to be allowed to operate legally and included in a coalition government. However, the accord also stipulated the exclusion of the former communist

Uzbek functionaries and granted about 30 percent of government positions to northern politicians to temper the dominance of the southern political interests. The Uzbek political elite, particularly from the Leninabad region, led by Abdumalik Abdullajanov, an Uzbek and a former prime minister of Tajikistan who formed the National Revival Movement (NRM) that supported UTO, rejected the 1996 agreement. In 1997, a political unrest, guided by the Uzbek elite, broke out in the southwestern region of the Kurgan-Tyube, and some demonstrators tried to march on Dushanbe but were quickly dispersed by the government forces and fled into Uzbekistan, whom Tajik authorities accused of providing covert support for rebels.

In 1999, peaceful elections were organized and, despite many accusations of voter fraud, produced a victory for Rahmonov, who was reelected president. Russian troops continued to maintain order in southern Tajikistan until the summer of 2005 (when they handed over responsibility to their Tajik colleagues) and kept a strategic military base in Dushanbe and at a former Soviet space-monitoring center at Nurek. To limit the influence of Islamic radicalism, the Tajik parliament passed a law banning religious organizations from associating directly with political parties. The National Reconciliation Commission, established to oversee the implementation of the 1997 peace accord, declared its work complete at its final meeting in March 2000 after the election of a reformed, newly bicameral Supreme Assembly.

Over the next few years Rahmonov and his ruling People's Democratic Party of Tajikistan successfully consolidated power. In a 2003 national referendum, the electorate voted to extend Rahmonov's presidential mandate, allowing him to run for reelection. In 2006, Rahmonov (who changed his surname to Rahmon in 2007) won presidential elections that were boycotted by many opposition parties. In February 2010, Rahmonov's People's Democratic Party won an overwhelming majority in parliamentary elections, which international observers condemned for widespread fraud and abuses. Yet, as of 2011, even though the 1997 peace accord has not been implemented, a fragile peace seems to be holding up in the country, though the potential for escalation of violence remains high. Renegade militias and criminal groups operate throughout the country, and Islamic radicals periodically infiltrate from Afghanistan. Thus, in 2006–2007, the country was periodically rocked by a series of explosions, the most recent taking place in Dushanbe in mid-November 2007 and in Khujand in September 2010.

Alexander Mikaberidze

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Talas, Battle of (751)

Decisive battle between a Chinese Tang army and the Arab forces of Ziyad ibn Salih. The Arab victory ensured hegemony over central Asia. In 750, the petty kingdom of Chach was occupied by Chinese forces commanded by Kao Hsien-chih. Chach's ruler was executed, and his son sought the help of the Abbasid governor of Khurasan. The Muslim force was reinforced by the army of Ziyad ibn Salih, who took overall command and marched toward the Talas River. Accounts of the strength of the combined army vary, but some claim it was more than 200,000 men. According to Chinese records, the Chinese had raised a force of 30,000, though Arab sources suggest that the Tang Army was around 100,000 men. The two sides met close to the present-day city of Dzhambul in present-day Kazakhstan. The initial fighting was inconclusive, but the Muslim cavalry took heavy losses. However, at this stage the Qarluq Turks attacked the Tang forces in the rear. According to Chinese sources this was a flagrant act of betrayal. On the other hand, Arabic records say that the Qarluqs were allied with the Islamic forces and that their attack had been carefully orchestrated by Ziyad ibn Salih. The consequences of this attack are not debated, however: the Chinese forces were crushed. Only around 10,000 troops are believed to have escaped from the debacle. The net result of the battle was that Chinese influence would not extend beyond the Tarim Basin again. The battle proved to be of great importance in the history of Central Asia because it determined which of the two civilizations—Chinese or the Muslim—would predominate in the region. After the Arab victory, the inhabitants of Central Asia became Muslim almost in entirety.

Ralph M. Baker

See also: Abbasids; Central Asia, Russian Conquest of.

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Taliban

Political and religious movement begun in Afghanistan in the 1990s. The word Taliban means "students" and is an Arabic word used in many Muslim countries to signify students from madrassas (Islamic schools). In the mid-1990s, however,

Afghan students from Pakistani madrassas adopted the name for a political-religious movement that eventually established an Islamic theocracy in much of Afghanistan.

When Soviet forces invaded Afghanistan in 1979, many young Afghan boys and other noncombatants fled the country and were lodged in refugee camps in Iran and Pakistan. During the 10-year Soviet occupation, more than 2 million refugees, mainly Pashtuns, found refuge in Pakistan's Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP), especially the tribal areas. The NWFP was also home to hundreds of fundamentalist madrassas run by the Deobandi sect, as well as Wahhabi schools established by wealthy Saudi donors. Tens of thousands of Afghan and Pakistani boys thus received a fundamentalist/Islamist education in these madrassas.

Soviet forces departed Afghanistan in 1989, and Afghan communist forces met defeat in 1992, but civil war between rival mujahideen leaders erupted soon afterward. Much of the fighting pitted Pashtuns against ethnic Tajiks, Uzbeks, and Hazaras of northern and central Afghanistan. Pakistan, which hoped to establish lucrative trade routes with Central Asia, sought a strong Pashtun-dominated government to provide stability.

Members of the Taliban pose with AK-47 assault rifles and rocket-propelled grenades in Zabul province, south of Kabul, Afghanistan, October 2006. (AP/Wide World Photos)

By the mid-1990s, many refugee children were old enough to fight, and their strict, fundamentalist Islamic education made them ideal recruits for the Taliban. The Taliban emerged in 1994 when Mullah Mohammed Omar led a small group of fighters in liberating several villages from local warlords. In late 1994, Pakistan enlisted the Taliban's support. Omar and approximately 200 fighters overran Spin Boldak and Kandahar and in the process captured many weapons, including tanks, artillery, and aircraft. Their success prompted thousands of Afghan and Pakistani students to join them. By early 1995, the Taliban controlled much of the Pashtun regions of the country.

Thereafter, the Taliban confronted better organized non-Pashtun forces in northern Afghanistan. Both sides committed numerous atrocities, mainly against rival ethnic groups. Despite several defeats, the Taliban captured Herat in 1995, Kabul in 1996, Mazar-i Sharif in 1998, and Taloqan in 1999. By 2000, fighting had largely stalemated with the non-Pashtun Northern Alliance bottled up in northeastern Afghanistan and portions of central Afghanistan, although it still controlled Afghanistan's United Nations (UN) seat. Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates were the only countries to recognize the Taliban government. Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and various Arab Gulf states also provided weapons to the Taliban, while India, Iran, Russia, and the Central Asian states supported the Northern Alliance. Ironically, the United States initially leaned toward supporting the Taliban, but that changed after the Taliban offered sanctuary to the terrorist group Al Qaeda.

Widespread human rights violations provoked international condemnation, but the Taliban consistently ignored outside criticism. Their version of an Islamic theocracy was perhaps the harshest ever seen in the Muslim world. Women were virtually imprisoned in their homes, medieval-like Islamic punishment became routine for criminal offenses, and international aid organizations were expelled, with no attempt to provide for millions of destitute Afghans. The Taliban even went so far as to destroy priceless historical and cultural treasures, such as the Buddhas of Bamyan, which they claimed were blasphemous to Islam.

The Taliban's downfall came following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks against the United States, when the Americans and other allies launched major military operations in support of the Northern Alliance in October 2001. The United States sought to topple the Taliban because it had failed to turn over Al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden after the attacks and because it continued to give refuge to terrorists. Disenchanted Pashtuns rose up as well and established a Southern Alliance. Within weeks, most of the Taliban and foreign jihadists had fled to the tribal areas, where they found sanctuary.

This autonomous region historically resisted British and Pakistani control. Fearing the internal consequences, the Pakistani government refused to conduct sustained counterinsurgency operations there after the September 11 attacks. Consequently, the Taliban used the area to rebuild its forces. Although weakened, the Taliban remains a potent threat in the Pashtun regions of Afghanistan, and Pakistan

and coalition forces continue to do battle with its fighters in Afghanistan. Since 2007, the number of Taliban-inspired attacks in Afghanistan has risen steadily, so much so that the United States and other coalition nations have had to expend more troops and resources to counter the Taliban resurgence.

Chuck Fahrer

See also: Afghanistan, Soviet War in (1978–1989); Afghanistan, U.S. War in (2001–); Northern Alliance; Osama bin Laden; Wahhabism.

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Talikota, Battle of (1565)

Decisive battle between a coalition of Muslim states and the Hindu kingdom of Vijayanagara. By the mid-16th century, northern India saw the rise of several Muslim sultanates (Deccan sultanates), chief among them being those of Ahmednagar, Bidar, Bijapur, and Golconda. Southern India remained under control of Vijayanagara. Rama Raya, the ruler of the Hindu state, actively interfered in northern affairs and periodically chose to ally himself with one or another of his neighbors, hoping to extend his authority, but he seems to have overreached himself. In 1563–1564, taking advantage of continued domestic turmoil in southern India, the sultanates created an alliance against the Hindu state and, led by Ali Adil Shah I, invaded the Vijayanagara. The decisive battle took place at Talikota on the banks of the Krishna River on January 23, 1565. The Muslim army had approximately 100,000–110,000 men and a few dozen cannon. The Hundu force, commanded by the octogenarian Rama Raya, was slightly bigger and included about 100 war elephants. The Muslims exploited their superiority in artillery to soften the Hindu defenses and, after the defection of the Muslim allies of the Vijayanagara, made a decisive assault that routed the Vijayanagara host and killed their leader. One of the most important battles in Indian history, it marked the end of the last great Hindu state in south India and ensured that north India remained under Muslim control.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Akbar; Babur; India, Muslim Conquest (to 16th Century).

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Tangiers, Treaty of (1844)

Peace treaty Morocco was forced to sign on September 10, 1844, after a disastrous war with France. This conflict was a product of Morocco's jihadi culture and the 1830 French invasion of neighboring Algeria. The former was a centuries-long tradition that promoted conflict with European states, and the latter created a powerful connection to this tradition in the form of Abd al-Qadir (1808–1883), the Algerian resistance leader. The end product was Moroccan support for Abd al-Qadir, which in turn led to French attacks by sea and land in 1844. Tangiers required Morocco to recognize the French conquest of Algeria, arrest or drive out Abd al-Qadir, and reduce Morocco's military presence on the Algerian frontier.

John P. Dunn

See also: Abd al-Qadir; Morocco, French Conquest of (1907–1934).

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Tanzimat

Turkish for "reorganization," the period of Ottoman reforms from 1839 to 1876 during which Ottoman sultans and government reformers tried to modernize the Ottoman Empire, secure its territorial integrity against growing nationalism and aggressive European powers, encourage the development of Ottomanism, and more thoroughly integrate non-Muslims and non-Turks into Ottoman society by enhancing their civil liberties and granting them equality.

Sultans Mahmud II (r.1808–1839) and Abdülmecid I (r. 1839–1861) and European-educated bureaucrats, such as Ali Pasha, Fuad Pasha, Ahmed Cevdet Pasha, and Midhat Pasha, provided the initial impetus for the Tanzimat reforms. They realized that since the late 1600s the Ottoman Empire had declined politically, militarily, and geographically as the European powers had increased their military

power and annexed Ottoman territory after several wars. The reformers recognized that the old religious and military institutions no longer met the needs of the empire in the modern world and sought to adopt successful European practices.

Mahmud II provided the initial impetus for the reforms, but his successor Abdülmecid I took the first official step by proclaiming the Imperial Rescript of the Rose Chamber on November 3, 1839. The most significant provision of the rescript was the elimination of the millet system, by which each religious group had its own autonomous religious community, and the declaration of legal equality for Muslims and non-Muslims in the empire. In 1856, the Ottoman government provided full legal equality to all Ottoman subjects, regardless of religion. The Nationality Law of 1869 made all inhabitants of the empire Ottoman citizens, regardless of religion or ethnic nationality.

The rescript revised tax system, allowed the recruitment of non-Muslims for the Ottoman army, reorganized the army, established a regular recruitment method, and fixed the length of military service.

The rescript also promised a number of administrative reforms, including guarantees of security for the lives, honor, and property of all Ottoman subjects; the introduction of the first Ottoman paper banknotes (1840); a modern financial system with a central bank, treasury bonds, and a decimal currency; the reorganization of the civil and criminal codes; the establishment of the first modern universities and academies (1848); and the establishment of a prototype parliament (1876). The reforms also created a system of state schools to educate prospective government officials. Finally, the government created defined administrative districts headed by a governor with specified duties and an advisory council to better serve that territory.

The rescript also called for the expansion of roads, canals, and railroads to provide better communication and transportation within the empire. To further modernize the economy, the government replaced guilds with factories and established the first stock exchange in Istanbul in 1866.

The rescript showed a move toward Westernization, mirroring the liberal ideals of the French Revolution that glorified humanity and individual rights. The sultan hoped that by adopting Western standards he could sufficiently appease European governments so they would not interfere in Ottoman internal affairs and he could prevent the empire from falling under European control.

The Tanzimat reforms had mixed results. Many of those educated in the schools established during the Tanzimat period became progressive leaders and thinkers of the Turkish Republic, such as Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, as well as in other former Ottoman states in the Balkans, the Middle East, and North Africa.

Many Christians in the Balkans rejected the reforms because they eliminated the autonomy and special privileges they had had under the millet system. In fact, the reforms spurred some provinces to rebel, and Britain had to strongly advocate

for the maintenance of Ottoman territory to ensure that the reforms would succeed. Groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood appeared that disliked the loss of cultural traditions and religion in Ottoman society.

The Great Powers also contributed to the internal opposition to the reforms. After the Crimean War, the European powers demanded increased sovereignty for the ethnic communities within the empire, undermining the Ottoman government's attempt to provide legal equality for all citizens and promote Ottomanism, that is, a feeling of belonging to a cosmopolitan Ottoman nationality. The Christian middle class increased its economic and political power, while the Muslims received none of these benefits and were ultimately left worse off by the reforms. As a result, the Ottoman Empire saw the radicalization of a portion of the Muslim population with anti-Western sentiment and the rise of such groups as the Young Ottomans.

The reforms peaked in 1876 with the implementation of an Ottoman constitution that provided some limits on the autocratic powers of the sultan. The Ottoman ministers had deposed Abdul Aziz on May 30, 1876, and his nephew Murad succeeded him. He, in turn, was deposed and Abdülhamid II became sultan on August 31, 1876. Although he signed the empire's first written constitution, he quickly turned against it, marking the end of the Tanzimat period.

Robert B. Kane

See also: Mahmud II; Ottoman Army (Early 19th Century).

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Taraori (Tarain), Battles of (1191–1192)

Two battles that contributed to the establishment of Muslim rule in India. Islam had been known in India through Muslim traders soon after the death of Muhammad. The first Muslim military expedition against India occurred in the late seventh century, and in 712, Muhammad ibn Kasim invaded and conquered the impoverished north Indian province of Sind. There was, however, no Arab military move against the interior of the subcontinent.

It would not be the Arabs but the Turkic tribes of the Central Asian steppes who, having conquered Persia and Afghanistan, would carry the Muslim faith into India.

In 1000, Mahmud of Ghazna launched the first of more than a dozen military expeditions into Hindustan, in north India, over a 26-year period. His objectives were monetary and religious. He sought to acquire the wealth of India, but he also wanted to propagate the faith and eradicate what he regarded as the false Indian religions. He became known as the "Idol Breaker" because of his wanton destruction of Indian temples. Mahmud looted but did not build, yet for a time his capital of Ghazna was one of the world's wealthiest cities.

Early in the 12th century, Ghazna came under challenge from the Afghan fortress city of Ghur. The struggle between Ghur and Ghazna was at first inconclusive, but in 1174 the soldiers of Ghur triumphed when Ghiyas-ad-Din captured Ghazna and placed his brother Mu'izz al-Din on its throne. The latter came to be known as Muhammad of Ghur.

Muhammad of Ghur immediately set out to expand his influence into India. In 1182, he conquered Sind, and three years later he secured control of Punjab, in northwestern India, and westernmost Hindustan. Where his predecessors had relied on Hindu levies, Muhammad employed only Ottomans and Afghans, reliable Muslims who would be zealous in carrying out a religious war against the Hindus.

In the winter of 1190–1191, Muhammad invaded south from the Punjab into Rajputana. That state's soldiers were well-disciplined and skilled fighters, loyal to their ruler, King Prithvaraja, who was also a capable general. Muhammad's troops soon captured the border fortress town of Bathinda and garrisoned it with 1,200 cavalry. King Prithvaraja immediately responded; the battle between the two sides occurred near Panipat, some 90 miles north of Delhi. It is known variously as Tarain, Narain, and, most recently, Taraori. No precise date for the battle is available, but it took place in 1191. The size of the armies is also not known, although reputedly the Rajputs were the more numerous.

The battle began with Muhammad of Ghur launching a cavalry attack against the Rajput center, firing arrows. The Rajputs stood firm, mounting flanking attacks that forced a Muslim retreat. To save the situation Muhammad led a charge at the enemy line. Reportedly, he fought personally with King Prithvaraja's brother, Govind Tai, viceroy of Delhi. Govind Tai was mortally wounded but managed to wound Muhammad seriously in the arm. Muhammad escaped and joined his retreating army, which withdrew to Ghur. Rather than pursue, the Rajputs proceeded to Bhatinda, which they recaptured after a 13-month siege.

Muhammad recovered from his wound and mounted a new campaign the next year, with a large force of Afghans, Persians, and Ottomans that may have totaled 120,000 men. The battle occurred on the same battlefield sometime in 1192, although this time Muhammad was careful not to engage with the well-disciplined Rajputs. He formed his army in five divisions and sent four of these to attack the Rajput flanks and rear. If pressed, they were to feign retreat to try to break the Rajput unit cohesion.

The flanking attacks failed in their design, and the fighting continued for most of the day, but when Muhammad ordered his fifth division to pretend to withdraw in panic, the ruse worked and the Rajputs charged, breaking their unit cohesion. Muhammad then threw a fresh cavalry unit of 12,000 men into the battle, and they threw back the Rajput advance. The remaining Muslim forces turned and pursued, sending the Rajputs fleeing in panic.

With the Muslims almost on him, King Prithvanaja abandoned his elephant for a horse in an attempt to escape. He was ridden down and captured some miles from the battlefield, and promptly executed. Most of his subordinate commanders were also killed.

Muhammad annexed Rajputana, but he was not content with this. With the victory at Taraori, there was no armed force in India capable of withstanding him. In 1193, his forces took the Bihar province, the center of Buddhism. Buddhism was virtually eradicated there, forcing its practitioners to flee to Tibet and Nepal and ensuring that this religion would spread in China and not India. Over the next several years Muhammad's armies expanded his control to the east and throughout northern India. In 1202, one of the armies reached Bengal, completing the annexation of Hindustan.

Spencer C. Tucker

See also: India, Muslim Conquest (to 16th Century); Mahmud of Ghazna; Muhammad of Ghur.

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Tariq ibn Ziyad (d. 720)

As a mawla or "client" of Musa ibn Nusayr, governor of the Umayyad caliphate's westernmost province of the Maghrib (North Africa), Tariq ibn Ziyad was authorized to conduct the first raid across the Straits of Gibraltar against the Visigothic kingdom of Hispania. This may actually have been an intervention during a power struggle between the current Visigothic king and the heirs of a previous ruler. Some Moroccan Jewish Berber tribes may also have been raiding the Iberian Peninsula in support of persecuted coreligionists. Indeed, it has been suggested that Tariq ibn Ziyad and Tarif ibn Malluk, the first Berber Muslim commanders to cross the straits, may have been Jewish converts to Islam. According to the later medieval

chronicler Ibn Khaldun, Tariq was from a Berber tribe in what is now Algeria. Tariq ibn Ziyad first appears in the historical record as the Umayyad caliph's governor of Tangier. Tariq's raid against the southernmost tip of Spain followed an armed reconnaissance led by Tarif ibn Malluk. The names of both of these Muslim leaders are still recalled in the Spanish coastal town of Tarifa, named after Tarif, and the rock of Gibraltar whose name comes from the Arabic *Jabal Tariq* (Tariq's mountain). Tariq's small army, supposedly composed of 7,000 Berbers, Syrians, and Yemenis, landed on Gibraltar on April 29, 711. They then won a decisive victory over the Visigothic king Roderick at the Battle of Guadalete, traditionally dated July 19 of that year, where Roderick was killed. The following year Musa ibn Nusayr, Tariq's superior as governor of North Africa, entered the campaign with a larger army. Thereafter, the rest of the Visigothic kingdom was rapidly overrun, including the province of Septimania in southern France. Tariq, like Musa, was summoned back to Damascus a few years later. Though dismissed from his post, he was not imprisoned and, according to some sources, spent the remainder of his life as a religious ascetic.

David Nicolle

See also: Musa ibn Nusayr; Spain, Arab Conquest of (711–718).

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Tarsusi, Ali ibn Murdi al- (12th Century)

Islamic scholar and author of a major military treatise "*Tabsirat . . .*". Written in collaboration with the master armorer of Alexandria for the famous Muslim commander Saladin (Salah al-Din), the treatise had a memorable title of "Information for the Intelligent on how to Escape Injury in Combat; and the Unfurling of the Banners of Instruction on Equipment and Engines which assist in Encounters with Enemies." The book is based on military tactics and traditions of the Fatimid and Abbasid dynasties and provides a unique survey of military reality in the Islamic world in the early Middle Ages. It provides detailed descriptions of weapons that were not in common use by the Muslim armies and shorter accounts of better-known arms. As a result, the treatise provides a thorough survey of a range of weapons, how they were made and used, as well as the disposition of armies and their tactics.

Tarsusi describes several incendiary weapons, some of which the Crusaders called "Greek fire," which featured a mixture of a tar, resin, sandarac, powdered sulfur, dolphin fat, and goat kidney fat poured in a clay vessel and wrapped in wool; placed on a mangonel, this vessel was lit and thrown. The book's section on archery describes a pre-Turkish tradition of infantry archery that was prevalent among the Arabs. The bow varieties included hand bows (*qaws al-yad*) and leg bows (*qaws al-rigl*) that could be loaded by standing on the bow; a larger portable bow known as *'aqqar*, and a husband that contained a tube through which short arrows and breakable capsules could be shot. In addition, there were also mechanical crossbows (*qaws al-ziyar*) mounted on supports and used in sieges. Tarsusi specifies that each *qaws al-ziyar* required "a number of men to pull its string . . . it is placed up against towers and similar obstacles and nobody can withstand it."

The treatise contains a great deal of practical advice. For example, Tarsusi discusses the difficulties of carrying several weapons at once and offers suggestions on how to carry them. For example, if a horse archer has a lance, he should put it under his right thigh, but if he also carries a sword, then the lance should be carried under the left thigh. He also recommends that an archer should carry two bows. He writes, "When shooting at a horseman who is armoured or otherwise untouchable, shoot at the horse to dismount him. When shooting at a horseman who is not moving, aim at the saddle-bow and thus hit the man if [the arrow flies] too high the horse if too low. If his back is turned, aim at the spot between his shoulder. If he charges with a sword shoot at him, but not from too far off for if you miss he might hit you with his sword. Never shoot blindly" (Tarsusi 1968).

In another section, Tarsusi seeks to survey heavy striking weapons that "bring death and destruction." These were made exclusively of iron (*dabbus*) or in combination with wood (*'amud*). A *tabar* was a large ax with a semicircular blade a wooden handle. *Khanjar* was a short dagger used in hand-to-hand combat. Tarsusi notes that a lance used by a mounted warrior combines the force of the horse and its rider. A lance could be thrust with the brute strength of the arm or the warriors could couch it under the arm, using the momentum of his charge.

Tarsusi provides one of the earliest descriptions of a throwing machine that used a counterweight and notes that all the stone projectors were of the beam-sling and man-powered type, except for the arrow-firing *ziyar*, which was torsion powered. He describes three types of man-powered *manjaniqs* (projectile-throwing machines): Arabic, which was the most accurate; Turkish, which required the least labor and material in construction; Frankish, which was in between the Arabic and Turkish in terms of construction. The treatise specifies that a maximum range for the first three types was around 120 meters. The treatise also describes *arradah*, a light man-powered stone-thrower built with one supporting pillar, and a small sized *lu'ab*, which Tarsusi considered so well known that he did not provide details on it. The ammunition of all these siege weapons was specially rounded stones or Greek fire.

Discussing shields, Tarsusi notes that each nation had its own technique of manufacturing them. There were *turs*, round shields made of wood, metal, or hide, and *tariqas*, long kite-shaped shields used by the Franks and the Byzantines to "hide the knight and the foot soldier." A *januwiyya* was similar to a *tariqa* but could be held on the ground and used by foot soldiers to "[form] a fortress which resists archers." A large siege shield, the *karwah*, was made of a wooden frame filled with cotton and covered with hides. Another type of shield, the *shabakah*, consisting of a wooden frame with ropes drawn on it like a net and covered with hides, was used to alleviate the impact of missiles. The Muslims were familiar with the ancient Roman tortoise, and used a smaller version, the *dabbabah*, made of a wooden frame on wheels covered with boards and raw hides; a larger version, the *zahhafah*, had iron sheets and a turret.

Tarsusi devotes a special section to the tactics and dispositions of the Muslim armies, providing detailed descriptions of battle formations and various maneuvers. Thus, he notes that

> amongst the principles are that the army should have a center, a right wing and a left wing . . . the foot soldier is placed in front of the knights to be as it were a fortress for him. A fence or cuirass or parapet should be placed in front of each foot soldier to fend off from him the harm of those who would attack him with sword or lance or piercing arrow. Between every two of these men an archer . . . should be positioned that he may shoot if an opportunity presents itself . . . It is necessary when arranging the battlefield to organize the contingents (ajnad), one by one, and to arrange the cavalry flag by flag, portion (khamis) by portion, since the custom of the enemy is to attack in their entirety. (Hillenbrand 2000, 519)

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Fortifications, Islamic; Military Equipment, Islamic; Muslim Armies of the Crusades.

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Tehran Treaty (1814)

Treaty of alliance between Iran and Britain that remained the basis for relations between these two states until 1856. Signed on November 25, 1814, the treaty

sought to revise the Definitive Treaty of 1812 because, during the Russo-Iranian War of 1804–1813, Britain found itself in the difficult position of having to assist Iran against Russia, with whom Britain was allied against Napoleonic France. The Tehran Treaty repeated most of the provisions of the Definitive Treaty, with the shah promising to resist any encroachment upon his country by European armies hostile to Britain and to use his influence with the rulers of "Karezan, Taturistan, Bokhara, Samarkan or other routes" to stop any invasion aimed at India through these territories. The treaty revised provisions dealing with British support of Iran. The treaty specified that the purpose of the allies was strictly defensive and that British military assistance or an annual war subsidy, along with weapons, would be provided if Iran were attacked by a foreign state. Article six specified that should any European state that is at peace with Britain attack Iran, Britain pledges "to use its best endeavors" to mediate peace between the two side. This provision was a disappointment to Iran, which had just lost a war to Russia (Britain's ally) and was forced to surrender vast territories in the Caucasia. The Treaty of Tehran seriously undermined Anglo-Iranian relations during the Russo-Iranian War of 1826–1828 when Britain failed to support Iran. Eventually, Britain bought its way entirely out of the entangling clauses of the Treaty of Tehran by paying an indemnity to Iran to mollify the terms of the Treaty of Turkmanchai (1828), which ended the Russo-Iranian War.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Anglo-Iranian Agreements; Definitive Treaty (1812); Russo-Iranian Wars; Turkmanchai, Treaty of (1828).

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Terrorism

While there is no settled definition of terrorism, many scholars and government institutions do agree on most components of a definition. Terrorism is essentially an act or threat of violence, directed against noncombatants, to achieve a change in a political status quo by indirect means. It may be employed for a wide variety of ideological, religious, or economic reasons.

Modern terrorism dates to the Russian anarchist organization Narodnaya Volya (People's Will) of the 19th century, which attempted, through assassinations, to overthrow the czarist regime. Their methods were adopted by anarchists

throughout the world, and the decades leading up to World War I were marked by frequent assassinations, including that of U.S. president William McKinley in 1901. The assassinations of the Austrian archduke Franz Ferdinand and his wife Sophie in June 1914 sparked the outbreak of World War I.

The decline of European colonialism after World War II was accompanied by a surge in terrorism that has escalated through the succeeding decades. Triggered by the early Japanese victories against the European powers and the United States in the Pacific theater, it became clear that the colonial powers could be successfully confronted by indigenous peoples, using asymmetric warfare of various means, including terrorism. The two decades after World War II witnessed uprisings and revolts throughout Asia and Africa, which resulted in the independence of most of the colonies, further strengthening the idea that the Western Powers could be attacked via acts of terrorism.

Terrorism by both Arab and Jew against each other and against the British Mandate power occurred in Palestine in the 1930s. Following Israel's creation in 1948, Palestinian groups, some supported by neighboring Arab governments, began to launch terrorist attacks against the Jewish population of the new state. By the mid-1960s, these groups had become institutionalized under the Palestine Liberation Organization, which counted numerous organizations under its umbrella, most notably Yasir Arafat's Fatah and George Habash's Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). Palestinian terrorism continues to present Israel and the West with a daunting security challenges to this very day.

Violent Islamist extremists have called for a revolution to restructure society by establishing an Islamic state governed by sharia law. Most believe that Muslims must reestablish the caliphate first locally in the Middle East before it transforms the rest of the world. Many Muslims believe that killing oneself for Islam is not considered suicide, but rather an act of martyrdom. Indeed, suicide bombers in the past 20 years or so have become the backbone of Islamic-sponsored terrorism, the most damaging of all were the suicide attacks on September 11, 2001, against the United States.

The Iranian Islamic revolution that brought Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini to power in 1979 provided ample evidence that pro-Western governments are vulnerable to violent overthrow. The 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the decade-long insurgency that followed, provided many Islamic radicals with the training, experience, and organization needed to turn radical ideology into practice.

Iran and other radical states in the region routinely trained individuals in intelligence and sabotage operations in special camps. During Operation Desert Storm, Iraqi president Saddam Hussein issued calls over the radio for terrorists to attack targets throughout the region and beyond. None answered his call. In the aftermath of Desert Storm, however, the United States and its allies suffered a number of terrorist attacks. Hezbollah conducted a rocket attack on the U.S. Embassy in

Beirut on October 29, 1991, and bombed several buildings at the American University there. In 1992, Iraq mounted attacks on United Nations personnel working in Iraq in an effort to terrorize them into leaving the country. Iraqi operatives also attempted, on June 26, 1993, to assassinate U.S. president George H. W. Bush with an enormous car bomb during his visit to Kuwait. Saddam reportedly made cash payments, through the Arab Liberation Front, of $25,000 to each family of suicide bombers to encourage more such attacks. It was also common for the families of suicide bombers in Israel to receive cash payments.

After the Persian Gulf War, several terrorist groups vowed to attack U.S. military forces in Saudi Arabia, claiming that it was unconscionable for the Saudi government to allow Christian forces to live and work on Islam's holy ground. On November 13, 1993, the Office of the Program Manager/Saudi Arabian National Guard was badly damaged by a car bomb. Four Saudi nationals confessed and were executed on May 31, 1996. Their confessions foreshadowed a murderous trend: they were veterans of jihads in Afghanistan, Bosnia, and Chechnya; they claimed that the Saudi rulers were apostates; and they were inspired by Islamic law to commit the attacks.

One month later, the Khobar Towers in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia, was destroyed by a truck bomb, killing 19 U.S. servicemen. In 1996 and again in 1998, Al Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden published a fatwa (a religiously based imperative) requiring every Muslim to attack U.S. personnel and interests around the world; drive U.S. forces from Saudi Arabia; remove the Saudi royal family and other apostate Arab regimes from power; and liberate Palestine. Bin Laden would later state that it is also a Muslim's duty to acquire weapons of mass destruction. Soon Bin Laden was operating from Afghanistan with the full knowledge and support of the Islamic Taliban regime there.

The current War on Terror began with Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan, a month after the devastating 9/11 attacks on the United States carried out by Al Qaeda. Objectives included removing the Taliban from power, destroying Al Qaeda's training camps, and killing or capturing its operatives. In 2002, the Taliban was defeated, but a number of Al Qaeda and Taliban members escaped and new recruits soon appeared, drawn from the religiously conservative northwest region of Pakistan. These groups continue to attack North Atlantic Treaty Organization troops, Afghan government officials, and civilians. Even Afghan girls attempting to attend school have been the object of terrorist attacks. Suicide bombings have become a regular occurrence. Taliban and Al Qaeda operatives (including bin Laden) operate with relative freedom in the northwest reaches of Pakistan and can then slip back across the border into Afghanistan. Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) provides money and equipment to the Taliban to attack U.S. and coalition forces in Afghanistan. Iran has also provided financial and material support as well as training to terrorist groups in the Middle East, and it has provided support

and sanctuary to Iraqi Shiite cleric Muqtada al-Sadr and his militia. Hezbollah in Lebanon (also the beneficiary of Iranian support), the IRGC, and Iran's Ministry of Intelligence have supplied equipment to Iraqi militants that has then been used to kill many U.S. and coalition forces in Iraq.

In 2003, Operation Iraqi Freedom spearheaded by the United States removed Saddam and his regime from power and liberated Iraq. However, former regime loyalists, foreign fighters, Islamist extremist groups such as Al Qaeda in Iraq, and Ansar al-Islam have attacked coalition forces and civilians in attempts to destabilize the country so that they might drive the United States and its allies from Iraq and take power. In 2005, the insurgent strength was estimated at 20,000 people.

Between 2003 and 2005, more than 500 suicide car bombings and vest attacks occurred. Targets included refineries, electrical stations, police stations, open-air markets, and even mosques. The insurgents' intent is to undermine the public's confidence that the government will ever be able to provide essential services and security. However, in 2006, Sunni and Shia sheikhs formed alliances to fight against Al Qaeda in Iraq and other violent Islamist groups. Reasons for this development included the success of the coalition troop surge that began in early 2007; a unilateral cease-fire by al-Sadr's Mahdi militia; and local popular support for operations conducted by the more than 100 Iraqi Army battalions.

The Arab-Israeli conflict is an ongoing conflict that began in 1948 and continues be supported by Iran, Syria, Al Qaeda, and various other terrorist groups. Every year, Israel suffers dozens, sometimes hundreds, of attacks, conducted by rejectionist groups such as Hamas, Hezbollah, as well as the PFLP and radical factions of Fatah. They are labeled "rejectionist" because they reject Israel's right to exist and all initiatives to peacefully resolve the Arab-Israeli issue. In 2001, a particularly deadly year, almost 200 Israelis and more than 500 Palestinians were killed in terrorist attacks and the related fighting. Israel has responded with targeted killings of terrorist leaders, has bulldozed the homes of suicide bombers, and began building a security fence in the West Bank.

Iran and Syria claim that all groups fighting Israel are engaged in a war of national liberation and legitimate resistance. They provide Hezbollah and other terrorist groups with financial, operational, and logistics support. In 2002, the Israelis intercepted the Karine-A, a Palestinian Authority (PA)–owned ship carrying nearly 50 tons of Iranian weapons, including Katyusha rockets, bound for Hamas and other groups in Gaza and the West Bank. Iran's motives include seeking to spread its Islamic revolution and to terminate the Middle East Peace process.

In 2006, Hamas won the plurality of seats in the Palestinian Legislative Council and formed a government to run the Palestinian National Authority. Israel stated it would hold Hamas responsible for all acts of terrorism and began arresting Hamas legislators with each such act. However, the PA is responsible for security in Gaza and the West Bank. The Palestinian public does not want the PA to arrest and

prosecute terrorists, for they believe Israel has no right to exist and is an "illegal entity."

During the first six months of 2006, 428 Qassam rockets and 590 mortar rounds were fired from Gaza at Israel. As of 2007, 40 tunnels connecting Gaza and Egypt were destroyed. Since June 2007, 40 tons of explosives, large quantities of ammunition, and more than 150 rocket-propelled grenade launchers were smuggled into Gaza through those tunnels. In December 2008, Israel launched a large-scale military offensive against Hamas-held Gaza in an attempt to reduce or eliminate rocket fire and other terrorist attacks from that area and seriously weaken Hamas itself.

On July 12, 2006, the Second Lebanon War began, triggered by a Hezbollah incursion from Lebanon into Israel, in which it captured two soldiers and killed eight others. Israel retaliated. Over the next month, Hezbollah fired more than 4,000 Katyusha rockets and other missiles into Israel. Israeli artillery and air force planes thus targeted Hezbollah positions throughout southern Lebanon. Hostilities stopped before Hezbollah could be defeated, and Iran and Syria cooperated to resupply Hezbollah's equipment losses. In early 2009, Hezbollah's political power and influence ensured that the Lebanese government authorities would not disarm Hezbollah or expand its authority into areas controlled by Hezbollah, such as the Bekaa Valley, or enter the 12 Palestinian refugee camps in the region.

By no means restricted to the Middle East, terrorism continues to be a serious threat to peace around the world. So long as the Arab-Israeli conflict persists, terrorism will no doubt be an endemic problem in the nations of the region. Also, the ongoing struggle between militant Islam and the industrialized nations of the West will virtually guarantee that acts of terrorism will be a constant threat. Besides the religious and ideological threads to which many terrorists cling, terrorism continues to be driven by economic issues (poor versus rich nations) and perceived geopolitical imperatives.

Donald R. Dunne and Elliot Chodoff

See also: Afghanistan, U.S. War in (2001–); Al Qaeda; Al Qaeda in Iraq; Arab-Israeli War (1967); Arab-Israeli War (1973); Hamas; Hezbollah; Jihad; Khomeini, Ruhollah; Lebanon, Israeli Operations against (2006); Osama bin Laden; Palestine Liberation Organization; Radical Islam in the 20th Century; Taliban; War and Violence in the Koran.

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Third Crusade (1187–1192)

On October 8, 1187, the city of Jerusalem surrendered to the Muslim hero Saladin, instigating the Third Crusade. Jerusalem had been the seat of the Kingdom of Jerusalem, one of the Crusader States established after the end of the First Crusade in 1099. The loss of Jerusalem provoked a violent reaction in Europe—Pope Urban III's heart is said to have stopped at the news. Led by the storied English king Richard the Lion-heart, the Third Crusade did not accomplish its goal of winning back Jerusalem but cemented Richard's reputation in Europe.

The call to crusade was issued by Urban III's successor, Pope Gregory VIII, in 1187. Contained within a papal bull, it provoked a passionate and widespread reaction. A number of Europe's most powerful secular lords and kings took the crusade vow, gathered their armies, and headed to the Holy Land. Among them were Holy Roman emperor Frederick I Barbarossa, who was by then well into old age; Philip II Augustus of France; Duke Leopold of Austria; and England's Richard.

The aim of the crusade was to take the holy city of Jerusalem back from the Muslims. Each of the kings who signed on as leaders vowed to succeed, but several never even saw the city. Frederick died on the way to the Holy Land while trying to swim across a stream, probably from the shock of the ice-cold water. Then Leopold and Philip returned home after the first battle of the crusade at the city of Acre in 1191, leaving Richard in control of the entire Crusader army. Richard executed 2,700 Muslim men, women, and children who were captured during the Siege of Acre when the ransom promised for their release failed to arrive in time.

Richard won several victories on his way to a showdown with Saladin. He took the cities of Jaffa and Daron and soundly defeated Muslim forces at the Battle of Arsuf. Saladin's forces stubbornly kept Richard's forces away from Jerusalem, however. As the fighting went on, Richard began to realize that even if he were able to take the walled city, which was not at all certain; there was little hope of keeping it once the Crusaders returned home. Besides, Richard had other pressing concerns at home and in Cyprus, which he had conquered on the way to the Holy Land. Accordingly, Richard made peace with Saladin in 1192 and headed home.

The stated goal of the crusade was never fulfilled, but the brief war cemented the reputations of its most famous participants, Richard and Saladin. They would live in the memory of Europe as twin exemplars of the code of chivalry.

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See also: Arsuf, Battle of (1191); First Crusade (1096–1099); Hattin, Battle of (1187); Saladin.

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Timur (1336–1405)

Conqueror of much of western and Central Asia, and founder of the Timurid Empire in Central Asia. He was born near Samarqand (in present-day Uzbekistan) in 1336 as a member of the Barlas tribe, a tribe of Mongolian origin but thoroughly Turkic in ethnicity by the 14th century. In his youth, Timur was a minor leader and sometimes bandit amid the disorder that existed in Central Asia as the Mongol Empire dissolved. With the collapse of the Mongol Empire, new opportunities arose, and Timur prospered, serving as the lieutenant of his brother-in-law Emir Husain. Before a falling out between the two in 1370, they gained control of Mawarannahr ("Land across the River," or the Amu Darya), also known as Transoxania. Timur emerged the victor in this fraternal dispute.

Timur spent the next decade consolidating the region under his control and defending it from raids by the remnants of the Chagatai khanate. However, he became embroiled in external events in 1380 when he lent support to Tokhtamysh, a prince of the khanate of the Golden Horde in Russia and Ukraine, who was embroiled in a civil war. Timur viewed this as an opportunity to secure his border and gain

influence with the Golden Horde. Also in the 1380s, Timur decided to expand his state and crossed the Amu Darya into Persia and Afghanistan. By 1394 the regions of Fars, Iraq, Armenia, and Georgia had succumbed, but it is unclear if he wanted to create a stable empire or simply preferred to plunder.

At the same time, Timur's protégé, Tokhtamysh, challenged Timur's authority. As a descendent of Chinggis (Genghis) Khan, Tokhtamysh viewed himself as the rightful leader of the world of the post-Mongol Empire. Tokhtamysh invaded Timur's empire in 1385 and 1388, defeating Timur's generals twice. In retaliation, in 1391 Timur invaded the Golden Horde and defeated Tokhtamysh. Tokhtamysh quickly regained power and invaded Timur's empire again in 1395. This forced Timur to pursue Tokhtamysh, and at the Battle of the Kur River, Timur defeated him. Then, Timur broke the power of the Golden Horde by inciting and supporting various contenders for the throne and destroying the cities of Sarai and New Sarai. He also ensured that none of the contenders could threaten his power. While Timur destroyed the Golden Horde's power, he did not incorporate it into his empire, perhaps realizing that as a non-Chinggisid prince he would never be accepted as the ruler in that region.

Mongol ruler Timur attacks the Knights of St. John while taking Smyrna in 1403, as depicted in a miniature by Bihzad, 1467. Timur, known in the West as "Tamerlane," was a masterful military commander who led highly successful campaigns to conquer central and western Asia. (Jupiterimages)

Timur's next target was in India, and he invaded the sultanate of Delhi in 1398. His armies sacked and burned Delhi in a wanton display of destruction. As always after a campaign, wealth from the plunder poured into his capital at Samarqand. The sultanate never fully recovered. Despite the massive haul of plunder from India, Timur did not remain at his capital. In 1399 he marched west against the Mamluk sultanate in Egypt and Syria and the Ottoman Empire in Anatolia, as both had supported rebellions against him. In 1401 Timur invaded Syria and defeated the Mamluks, sacking Aleppo and Damascus in the process. He then invaded the Ottoman Empire and crushed Sultan Bayezid at Anakara in 1402. Bayezid was taken prisoner and was marched off to Central Asia as Timur again left two more empires in turmoil rather than conquering them.

With his western frontier secure from the threat of attack, Timur returned to Samarqand in 1404. Despite being carried in a litter for most of his later campaigns, Timur did not plan a life of ease yet. Instead, he planned an invasion of China. The invasion ended prematurely, as Timur died on January 19, 1405, in the city of Otrar. Although he had designated a successor, his empire, held together primarily through the force of his will, quickly disintegrated into smaller states ruled by his sons and grandsons, the Timurids.

Timothy May

See also: Ankara, Battle of (1402); Baghdad, Siege of (1401); Bayezid; Mamluk Sultanate.

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Tondibi, Battle of (1591)

Battle that led to the collapse of the Songhai Empire in the late 16th century. At the time, the Songhai were the dominant state in western Africa and were reputed to be fabulously wealthy. Their defeat by a much smaller army with superior weapons and technology was reminiscent of the successes of such Spanish conquistadores as Hernando Cortés. The Moroccans who conquered the Songhai had close connections with the Spanish and may have been inspired by the stories they heard.

The Songhai Empire developed around the city of Gao during the 14th century. Its territory was astride the most important trade routes of the time, especially those on the Niger River. A Muslim people, the Songhai had commercial connections as far away as Mecca. Under King Sonni Ali, they conquered their neighbors along the Niger, especially the well-known commercial cities of Timbuktu and Jenne. Timbuktu was especially important as a center of learning and as the terminus for trade routes leading from Tunis, Tripoli, and Egypt. Later kings organized the empire in a more rational manner and created provinces with their own governor. Commerce was the lifeblood of the empire, and the government took such steps as creating uniform measures and central administrative offices to encourage trade. Although the empire reached its height by 1528, it was still a powerful polity in 1590. By the late 16th century, the reported wealth of the Songhai had traveled down the trade routes and aroused the envy of other rulers.

The most important of those rulers was Ahmed al-Mansur "the Victorious," ruler of Morocco. Mansur had defeated European invaders in his land in 1578 and created one of the most powerful states in North Africa. The source of Mansur's success lay in aid received from Moorish fugitives from Spain and technical advisers from the Ottoman Empire. Emulating his European enemies, Mansur built up an army based primarily on gunpowder weapons. By 1590, the Moroccan army possessed large numbers of cannon, muskets, and arquebuses.

Mansur heard stories of the many gold mines and great wealth of the Songhai, as well as their weakness. None of Mansur's advisers believed that it was possible for an army to travel across the Sahara Desert to Songhai. However, he decided to send an army of 25,000 men. Four thousand men were armed with muskets, and the weapons included 10 cannon. Many of the soldiers were European mercenaries. Over 9,000 transport animals were included. Their commander was Spanish-born Judah Pasha. The army left in 1590. In an incredible six-month march across the desert, a remnant reached Songhai territory.

The Songhai king had learned of the expedition from travelers and prepared to face them. The two sides met at Tondibi, fewer than 50 miles from the Songhai capital of Gao. Only 1,000 Moroccans were reported to have survived the trip, while 30,000 Songhai warriors awaited them. The Moroccans, however, had their gunpowder weapons. In short order, they routed the Songhai. The central authority of the empire collapsed, although fighting with scattered groups continued. The Moroccans established a puppet state in 1618, under the rule of the leaders of Timbuktu. The wealth of the Songhai, however, proved to be a myth, and Mansur never found the riches he hoped.

Tim J. Watts

See also: Al-Mansur, Ahmad ibn Muhammad; Moroccan-Songhai War (1591–1593); Songhai Empire.

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Toure, Askia Muhammad (1442–1538)

Variously known as Askia al-hajj Muhammad b. Abi Bakr and Askia the Great, Askia Muhammad Toure ruled the Songhai Empire from 1493 to 1529 and is considered one of the great West African rulers. Under his rule, the borders of the empire expanded to encompass nearly 500,000 square miles of the West African Sahel (arid strip of land south of the Sahara) and savannah regions, including much of modern-day Mali and Niger, as well as the northern portions of Burkina Faso and Nigeria. After serving as a general to two of his predecessors, Askia Muhammad came to power in a coup, deposing Abu Bakr b. Ali, the son of Sunni Ali Ber (r. 1464–1492), after two decisive military battles. He ruled the empire from the ancient city of Gao along the Niger River, but also had control of Timbuktu, the semiautonomous scholarly center of medieval West Africa. His dynasty lasted for a century, overseeing the golden age of Timbuktu and Songhai.

Askia Muhammad was from the Soninke ethnic group and was a devout adherent to Islam, making a pilgrimage to Mecca in 1497–1498. In Cairo, he received the authority to act as a deputy of the caliph, the overall leader of Muslims, which gave him legitimacy in the eyes of local Islamic scholars who looked upon him as a pious patron. Askia Muhammad's affable relationship with the scholarly elite in both Gao and Timbuktu helped secure his place in the documented history of the region. This was in contrast to his predecessor, Sunni Ali, who was lukewarm to Islamic practices at best and often hostile toward the Islamic scholars.

As a result, the two most important historical chronicles of Timbuktu, Tarikh al-Fattah and Tarikh al-Sudan, portray Sunni Ali as a ruthless tyrant and show nothing but adoration for the enlightened Askia Muhammad. The support of religious leadership further solidified the legitimacy of both his rule and plans for expanding the empire to surrounding non-Muslim regions.

Through a series of wars with Songhai's neighbors, Askia Muhammad was able to conquer territory and create tributary relationships as far away as the Saharan city of Taghaza to the north, Aïr in the east, the edge of Borgu in the south, and the Senegal River in the west. His superior tactics and troop numbers often secured victory, but he was thwarted in Borgu and the Mossi States, and had limited success in Hausaland. As a consequence of the warfare, Songhai captured many prisoners and enslaved them under the auspices of the Songhai state or sold them

to North African traders. Large numbers of slaves were taken during many of the campaigns; some accounts reveal that large parts of cities had to be set aside to house the captives. Only non-Muslims could be enslaved according to religious law; however, Muslim states could be and were forced into a tributary relation with Songhai. Ironically, most of the soldiers of Songhai were themselves more or less servile to the state.

Askia Muhammad inherited a strong central government from Sunni Ali, but Muhammad strengthened it even further, adding new positions and functions to oversee the governance of the enlarged territory. He also consulted with prominent Muslim scholars on how to rule his empire, men such as Egyptian Jalal al-Din al-Suyuti, Muhammad ibn Abd al-Karim al-Maghili of Tlemcen (in modern Algeria), and local scholars from Timbuktu. The advice ranged from the mundane to the permissibility of forcing leaderless local Muslim peoples under his authority and deposing tyrannical Muslim rulers for the greater good of Muslims. Although al-Maghili's advice had contemporaneous impact, his work would also be cited and acted upon more than three centuries later by 19th-century jihadists such as Umar Tal and Sheikh Usuman dan Fodio. The latter's military campaigns, legitimized largely by al-Maghili's rulings, led to enslaved captives on all sides of the conflict being sold into slavery and sent to the Americas.

Askia Muhammad's son Musa deposed him in 1529. He was banished for a period and then returned to live the rest of his life restricted to the royal palace before dying in 1538. The succeeding 50 years would bring internal struggles and revolts as Askia Muhammad's descendents vied for power, all of which allowed for the Moroccan invasion in 1591 and an end to the Songhai Empire, Askia dynasty rule, and the fortunes of Timbuktu as a scholarly center.

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See also: Songhai Empire (15th–16th Centuries; Sunni Ali; Usuman dan Fodio.

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Tours, Battle of (732)

In 729, Umayyad authorities feared that the northern frontier of al-Andalus was imperiled by a local alliance between Munusa, the rebel Berber governor of Cerdagne (region in the eastern Pyrenees) and Duke Eudo of Aquitaine. The Umayyads decided to eliminate Eudo to secure their northern border.

The Umayyad emir of al-Andalus, Abd ar-Rahman ibn Abd Allah al-Ghafiqi, marched his mixed army of cavalry and infantry through the Pyrenees at the Roncevaux Pass in October 732. He took Bordeaux and defeated Eudo's army on the banks of the Dordogne River. Eudo fled to the Merovingian Frankish court and warned the major domus Charles about the invasion. Abd ar-Rahman marched north along the old Roman road to catch Eudo and acquire plunder and glory. After sacking the Church of St. Hilary at Poitiers, the Muslims continued north, intending to sack the wealthy shrine of St. Martin at Tours. Charles led the Frankish heavy infantry south, and positioned it between Poitiers and Tours at a site later called Moussais-la-Bataille, near Niré. After a week of maneuvering, Abd al-Rahman ordered his men to charge the Frankish line on October 25. Formed up into an impenetrable infantry square, the Franks repelled successive waves of Muslim cavalry. Abd al-Rahman died leading one of the assaults. His death as well as squabbles among factions and the Muslim preoccupation with war booty contributed to the Muslim defeat in the battle. The next morning, the Franks found that the Muslims had abandoned their camp and much of their plunder after the battle. Arabic sources later called Abd al-Rahman a martyr for the faith. Charles earned the title of Martellus (Hammer), and the victory so enhanced the status of his family that his son Pepin III managed to topple the Merovingian family from the Frankish throne in 751.

William E. Watson

See also: Spain, Arab Conquest of (711–718); Umayyad Caliphate.

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Tripolitan War

The North African Barbary States (Algeria, Morocco, Tunis, and Tripoli) had sanctioned sea raiders called the Barbary pirates to attack the ships of other nations in the Mediterranean Sea since the 16th century. Since 1786, the United States had

made tribute payments to the Barbary States to protect its shipping from pirate raids, but in 1801, when the pasha of Tripoli demanded a higher payment, U.S. president Thomas Jefferson refused to pay.

The pasha declared war on May 14, 1801, and began seizing American ships, but only minor skirmishes between Tripoli's pirates and U.S. naval forces ensued. When the United States' blockade of Tripoli failed to daunt the pirates, Jefferson pursued diplomatic negotiations, but no agreement with the pasha could be reached. For a short time, the blockade was lifted, and the United States resumed its tribute payments.

In 1803, however, sustained military action between the two countries erupted. The U.S. forces, led by Commodore Edward Preble and Lieutenant Stephen Decatur, dealt deadly blows to the pirates. Preble sent the U.S. frigate *Philadelphia* to resume the blockade, but the ship was captured when a storm drove it aground. Then, on February 16, 1804, Decatur and his crew raided the Tripoli harbor to set fire to and destroy the *Philadelphia*.

The major U.S. victory in the Tripolitan War occurred when William Eaton, the U.S. consul to Tunis, captured the port city of Derna as part of his mission to



Burning of the frigate *Philadelphia* in the harbor of Tripoli, February 16, 1804. (National Archives)

replace the Tripolitan pasha with the rightful ruler. Eaton and his troops, which consisted of U.S. marines and some Arab mercenaries, landed in Egypt and marched to Derna, where U.S. naval vessels aided them in the attack. The conflict at Derna was later memorialized in the U.S. Marine hymn, "From the halls of Montezuma to the shores of Tripoli."

Before Eaton could proceed with his mission to unseat the pasha, a peace agreement was reached in June 1805. It dictated that the United States would no longer pay tribute to Tripoli. The other Barbary states continued to receive some tribute until 1816.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Barbary Corsairs; Barbary Wars (1783–1815).

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Tukulor-French Wars

Colonial conflicts between France and the Tukulor Empire in the late 19th century. The Tukulor (Toucouleur) people had a long history of controlling the Senegal River valley in West Africa. By the late Middle Ages they had converted to Islam and had gradually expanded their territory to the north. Although the Tukulors were conquered by the Mali Empire in the 14th century, they still played an important role in political life of West Africa. In the 19th century, the Tukulors experienced a revival under the leadership of al-Hajj Umar (Omar) Tall (ca.1796–1864) who waged a jihad (holy war) against the neighboring tribes. Starting in 1852, his forces, equipped with European arms, raided and occupied lands of the neighboring Malinké people and advanced into the Kayes region in Mali. However, by the mid-19th century, West Africa also came under influence of colonial France, who demonstrated implacable hostility for the Muslim Tukulors. For Louis Léon César Faidherbe, the French governor of Senegal, the rise of the militant Islamic state among the Tukulors posed a major threat to France's colonial ambitions, so he turned the destruction of their power into a central goal of his policy. Al-Hajj Umar initially sought friendly relations with the French and hoped to conduct trade and commerce with them, but their refusal to sell him weapons and their support of his opponents

compelled him to declare war. In 1856, Umar suppressed the revolt of the Jawara, who were aided by the French, and then attacked the French fort of Médine in April 1857. The Tukulor army of some 15,000 men surrounded the French fort, which was protected by a small garrison armed with cannons. After a two-month siege, the rising river waters allowed the French to receive reinforcements on two gunboats, and the Umars were forced to lift the siege. After a yearlong respite, Faidherbe counterattacked, sacking Gemu, Umar's stronghold in northern Senegal. Realizing that he would be unable to defeat the French, Umar concluded a truce and turned his attention east, sacking the Bambara kingdom of Segu (Segou) and the rival Muslim state of Masina on the Upper Niger in 1860–1862.

The truce between the Tukulors and France endured for almost 30 years. Umar was killed in 1864 and was succeeded by his son Ahmadu Seku, who lacked his reputation and leadership skills prompting internal turmoil. The Tukulors faced a series of rebellions from the people they conquered under Umar and gradually lost many of their provinces. Ahmadu recognized the long-term threat of French colonialism but was unable to check it because the French were the only suppliers of the modern weaponry the Tukulors needed to maintain superiority over their neighbors people. In 1866 and 1874, Ahmadu negotiated treaties of trade and friendship with the French colonial authorities, but neither agreement was ratified by the French government. In 1878, he concluded another treaty that opened the Tukulor lands to French trade and recognized the Niger as being under French protectorate in return for a French pledge to respect the Tukulor Empire's territorial integrity. But this treaty was not ratified either. Ahmadu avoided potential conflicts with the French even when circumstances were favorable to him, such as during the Upper Senegal crisis of 1885–1886 when political struggles in France affected French military operations in Upper Senegal. This allowed French colonial army to lay the groundwork for the eventual conquest of the empire. In February 1889, General Louis Archinard began the final conquest of the Tukulors by storming the fortress of Koundian. The following year he occupied the Tukulor capital of Segu, and in 1891 he completed the empire's destruction by seizing Nioro and Kaarta. Ahmadu Seku fled to Sokoto in present-day Nigeria, marking the end of the Tukulor state.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: West Africa, French Wars of Conquest in.

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Turgut Reis (d. 1565)

Ottoman admiral who commanded the Ottoman navy during the 1565 siege of Malta and died of wounds incurred in that battle. Born near Bodrum, on the Aegean coast of Turkey in 1485, Turgut began his apprenticeship as an artilleryman at age 12. He quickly mastered the skills of seamanship, eventually became the captain of several small armed vessels, and attacked Italian ports and Christian shipping in the eastern Mediterranean. In September 1538, he commanded the center-rear wing of the Ottoman fleet that defeated the Holy League's navy, commanded by Andrea Doria, in the Battle of Preveza. Later that year, Turgut Reis became governor of Djerba.

Captured by Giannettino Doria, the nephew of Andrea Doria, in 1540, Turgut served as a slave in a Christian galley and was a prisoner in Genoa. In 1544, Barbarossa Hayreddin Pasha, the commander of the Ottoman Mediterranean fleet, forced Genoa to release Turgut in exchange for 3,500 gold ducats. He returned to raiding Christian shipping and ports in the Mediterranean, becoming governor of Tripoli after the Ottomans captured the city in 1551. In July 1556, the sultan appointed Turgut commander of the Ottoman Mediterranean fleet after Barbarossa Pasha's death The sultan successively appointed Turgut governor of Algiers, chief regional governor of the Mediterranean Sea, and then pasha of Tripoli.

In May 1565, Turgut, with 1,600 men and 15 ships, joined Piale Pasha in besieging Malta. He advised Lala Mustafa, commander of the Ottoman army attacking Fort St. Elmo, to capture the citadels of Gozo and Medina as soon as possible, but Lala Mustafa ignored that advice. Turgut brought more artillery fire to bear on the recently built Fort St. Elmo, which controlled the entrance to the Grand Harbor, and, in June, ordered a complete siege of Fort St. Elmo to isolate it from Fort St. Angelo.

On June 17, 1565, a cannon shot from Fort St. Angelo across the Grand Harbor struck the ground near Turgut. Mortally wounded by debris from the impact, he died six days later. Before he died, Turgut learned that the Ottomans had captured Fort St. Elmo. He was buried in Tripoli. The Ottomans ultimately failed to take the key forts and withdrew from Malta on September 11, 1565, after suffering about 8,000 casualties. People across Europe celebrated what would turn out to be the last epic battle of the Crusader period.

Robert B. Kane

See also: Barbarossa Hayreddin Pasha; Kemal Reis; Müezzinzade Ali Pasha; Piale (Piyale) Pasha; Preveza, Battle of (1538).

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Turki ibn Abdallah, Campaigns of

The first Saudi state, established by Muhammad ibn Saud in 1744, came to an end in 1818 after the invasion of the Egyptian forces of Mehmed Ali. The Saudis soon regrouped, and Turki ibn Abdallah established a second Saudi state in central Arabia with his capital in Riyadh in 1823–1824. Bolstered by the support of al-Wahhab's descendants, Turki conducted vigorous campaigns to reassert his authority throughout central Arabia, eventually controlling al-Arid, al-Kharj, al-Hawta, Mahmal, Sudair, al-Aflaj, and Washm by 1825. In 1826–1828, he raided various tribes that refused to recognize his authority and forced the sheikhs of the Subai, Suhul, Ajman, Qajtan, and Mutair tribes to pledge their allegiance to him. By the late 1820s, Saudi detachments appeared in Hejaz as well, raiding Medina, Mecca, and al-Taif in late 1827, but were unable to secure control of the region. Turki was more successful in eastern Arabia, where he was concerned about the al-Arayar tribespeople, led by sheikhs Muhammad and Majid, in the al-Hasa region. In 1830, the al-Arayar sheikhs organized an alliance of local Bedouin Arabs and invaded the Saudi lands in Najd. In a decisive battle, Turki defeated Majid (who was killed in action) and drove Muhammad back into al-Hasa, where he sacked Hufuf and captured the fortress of Qut. This victory allowed Turki to place eastern Arabia under his control and spread the Wahhabi teachings. In late 1830, the Saudi leader turned his attention to southeastern Arabia, forcing the rulers of Bahrain to pay heavy tribute to him. In 1832, he raided Oman, whose sultan also agreed to pay tribute to the Saudis. Thus, by 1833, Turki controlled the whole coast of the Persian Gulf and most of central Arabia, although many Bedouin tribes continued to defy his authority. In 1834, Abdullah ibn Ahmad al Khalifa, the ruler of Bahrain, attacked the Saudi coastal towns in al-Hasa. Before Turki was able to mobilize his army to face this threat, he was killed by assassins sent by his rival Mishari ibn Abd al-Rahman on May 9, 1834. Turki's death marked a turning point in the history of the Saudi state and launched almost a decade of internecine wars and unrest in central Arabia.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Ibn Saud; Saudi-Hashemite War (1919–1925); Saudi-Rashidi War (1887–1921).

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Turkish-Armenian War (1920)

Conflict between the Turkish National Movement (successor to the Ottoman Empire) and the Democratic Republic of Armenia (DRA) over the control of eastern Asia Minor (present-day northeastern Turkey). By the end of World War I, the Ottoman and Russian empires had collapsed. In 1918, the Armenian state declared its independence and sought to reclaim Armenian lands that had been under the Ottoman control for the past several centuries. In 1917–1918, the Western Armenian Bureau, an executive body of the umbrella union of Armenian political groups, established a defense council to organize Armenian military units in western Armenia, prompting regular skirmishes between the Armenians and Turks. In March 1918, Bolshevik Russia and the Central Powers negotiated the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk in which it agreed to cede the Russian provinces of Eastern Anatolia to Turkey (article 4) in exchange for peace. In March through April, the Turkish forces successfully entered parts of western Armenia, occupying Erzinjan, Erzerum, Van, Khnus, Alashkert, and Kars. In May, at the conference in Batum, Halil Bey, the Ottoman representative, put forth additional territorial demands, calling for the Ottoman occupation of Batum, Alexandropol, Akhalkalaki, Shirak, and Echmiadzin. However, the Ottoman defeat in World War I put an end to such territorial claims and revived Armenian hopes for recovering some of the land.

The Treaty of Sèvres (August 1920) played into the Armenian hands because it called for transfer of substantial Ottoman territory—the Erzurum, Bitlis, and Van provinces, as well as parts of the Erzurum and Trapesund provinces—to Armenia. Although the Ottoman sultan accepted the treaty, the Ottoman nationalist leaders in Ankara rejected it and prepared to defend the Ottoman territory by force. In early September 1920, skirmishes erupted between the Turkish and Armenian forces in the Oltu district and quickly escalated into a war. Armenia proved to be unprepared for the Turkish attack. Led by General Kazim Karabekir, the Turks defeated the Armenians at Sarikamish on September 28–29 and captured Kaghizman and Merdenik. In October, Karabekir pushed toward Kars, which the Armenians abandoned on October 30, and then toward Alexandropol (Gyumri), which the Turks captured a week later. By mid-November, Karabekir's forces were preparing to attack the Armenian capital of Yerevan. With more than half of its territory occupied by the Turks and unable to secure military aid from the Western powers, the DRA was forced to sue for peace on November 18 and sign the Treaty of Alexandropol

on December 2, 1920. Armenia renounced the provisions of the Treaty of Sèvres, accepted territorial division outlined in the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk, and agreed to tight restrictions on its military forces (e.g., less than 2,000 troops, only eight cannon). Just days after the treaty was signed, a Bolshevik army invaded the rump Armenian state and established a soviet republic. In 1921, Turkey and the Soviet Union signed the treaties of Moscow and Kars that resulted in territorial exchanges that established the present borders between Turkey and Armenia.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Alexandropol, Treaty of (1920); Franco-Turkish War (Cilicia War) (1920); Kars, Treaty of (1921); Lausanne, Treaty of (1923); Sèvres, Treaty of (1920).

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Turkmanchai, Treaty of (1828)

Signed at Turkmanchai on February 22, 1828, the treaty was the definitive acknowledgment of the Persian loss of the Caucasus region to Russia and of the permanent division of Azerbaijan. The treaty required Iran to cede sovereignty over the khanates of Yerevan, Nakhichevan, Talysh, Ordubad, and Mughan in addition to regions that Russia had annexed under the Treaty of Gulistan in 1813. The Aras River was declared the new border between Iran and Russia. Iran agreed to pay vast reparations of 20 million rubles in silver and transferred to Russia the exclusive right to maintain a Caspian Sea fleet. In addition, the capitulatory rights guaranteed Russia preferential treatment for its exports, which generally were not competitive in European markets, and exempted Russian subjects from Iranian jurisdiction. Russian subjects living in Iran received a privilege wherein Iranian officials were prohibited from entering their property without proper authorization from the Russian ambassador. The treaty set the tone for Russo-Iranian relations for the next 90 years.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Gulistan, Treaty of (1813); Russo-Iranian Wars.

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U

Umayyad Caliphate

The Umayyad dynasty was in power from 661 to 750, a relatively short but formative period, as the Umayyads consolidated Islamic control of conquered lands and adapted the classical Roman, Greek, and Persian heritages to Islamic civilization. The Umayyad dynasty chose Damascus as its capital and established its presence there with the construction of the great mosque out of the Christian cathedral, which had previously been a temple to Jupiter. The Umayyads laid the foundations for classical Islamic civilization, yet they, along with the Greek Byzantines and Frankish Carolingians, were also inheritors of the Roman Empire that had preceded them. The Umayyads maintained much of the late antiquity Byzantine administrative system that they had inherited. They transformed the caliphate from an elected leader based on consensus to a hereditary monarch relying on a trained bureaucracy.

The first Umayyad caliph, Muawiyah (r. 661–680) came to power by defeating Ali, the son-in-law of the Prophet Muhammad, in the first Muslim civil war. Muawiyah established his capital in Damascus in Syria, since the earlier capital, Medina, had seemed to contribute to instability, as it was in the midst of the factionalized tribes of the Hijaz while the wealth and power center had shifted to Syria. Muawiyah divided his empire into a few large provinces ruled by his closest associates and family members. For local government, he relied on provincial scribes and elites. Through marriage and cooperation, he managed to keep factions and warring tribes at peace. He designated his son, Yazid (r. 680–683), as his successor.

After Yazid's death, civil war erupted again. Marwan I (r. 684–685) was elected by the leading tribe, the Qudaa, and he succeeded in maintaining the Umayyad power base of Syria and Egypt. Ibn al-Zubair, linked to the family of the Prophet, led the revolt and was recognized as caliph by the rebels. However, the opponents to Umayyad rule, although initially successful, were not united. Ibn al-Zubair was killed in the siege of Mecca by al-Hadjdjadj, who had been sent by Abd al-Malik (r. 685–705), son and successor to Marwan. Abd al-Malik managed to finish the civil war and reconquer Iraq (and to build the Dome of the Rock around 692). He then presided over a period of peace and prosperity. He reformed and formalized the Umayyad administration and taxation, and he also made Arabic the official language of the government. In 744 the caliph al-Walid II was assassinated after being on the throne for only one year. His assassination unleashed a civil war that

was not ended until 750 when the Abbasids came to power and moved the capital to Baghdad. However, Abd al-Rahman ibn Muawiyah, an Umayyad prince, escaped to Spain and set up the Umayyad caliphate of Cordoba, which presided over a great cultural flowering in Islamic Spain. The last Umayyad caliph in Spain ruled until 976.

The territory that the Umayyads were able to conquer was vast. Immediately after the end of the civil war, Muawiyah continued his assault through North Africa. By 711 the Muslims had conquered Spain, and by 751 they had reached central Asia and India. Although these conquering armies were initially the great nomadic warriors of the Arabian Peninsula, by the later Umayyad period the caliphs employed professional armies of mixed ethnicities.

The Umayyads were great patrons of art. Their transformation of the cathedral of Damascus into a mosque (709–715) symbolized their synthesis of the classical pre-Islamic Roman and Byzantine heritage with the new religion of Islam. Like the Dome of the Rock in Jerusalem (692), the construction of the mosque relied on Byzantine artisans and utilized Byzantine mosaics and architectural techniques. Early Umayyad caliphs also built numerous desert retreats near Damascus. Many of these pleasure palaces and complexes were masterpieces of early Islamic art, but by the reign of Yazid III (744) such expenditures had depleted the treasury, and he was forced to reside in Damascus.

Umayyad mosque in Damascus, Syria. (Iconotec/StockphotoPro)

Although the Abbasids maligned the Umayyads as impious, the foundations of Islamic civilization were laid in the Umayyad period, as Islam came into its own as an organized religion. Ulama, Islamic scholars, debated and discussed every aspect of Islamic law and life. The Hadith, sayings of the Prophet, were collected and authenticated. It was also in the later Umayyad period that the major sects of Islam arose, most notably the division between the Shia and the Sunni.

By the end of the Umayyad period, Islamic civilization had developed and advanced far beyond its tribal, militaristic roots. Soldiers, tribesmen, and free people were all subjects of a central government. The Muslims were not an occupying army but were now part of a new culture that had arisen from the collapse and transformation of late antiquity culture.

Benjamin de Lee

See also: Abbasid Revolution (747–751); Abbasids; Abd Allah ibn al-Zubair; Ali ibn Abi Talib; Muawiyah; North Africa, Muslim Conquest of; Spain, Arab Conquest of (711–718).

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Usuman Dan Fodio (1757–1817)

Charismatic Muslim leader among the Fulani people in the area of West Africa that is now northern Nigeria. Inspiring his followers with the idea of Islamic revolution, Usuman rose up against the area's Hausa rulers, eventually establishing his own Sokoto caliphate to replace Hausaland.

Usuman was born in 1757 into the Toronkawa clan of a Fulani community that lived in the Hausaland region of West Africa. He was raised in the state of Gobir, one of several Hausa states located in the northern region of present-day Nigeria. Usuman's father was a Muslim cleric. The Fulani in West Africa had earned a reputation for producing Muslim teachers of great charisma and piety. As a young man, Usuman showed himself to be a devout and brilliant student, and from an early age, he gained a reputation for his religious devotion.

Hausaland consisted of a series of walled city-states ruled by a Hausa elite. The Fulani, who were predominantly pastoralists, had settled in Hausaland centuries

before and often found themselves in conflict with the settled Hausa over water rights and grazing areas for their herds. By the late 18th century, drought in Hausaland had sharpened the latent hostility between the two communities.

In around 1774, Usuman began preaching throughout Gobir. By 1786, he was traveling to such neighboring states as Zamfara to continue his mission. During those years, he attracted a small army of ardent supporters. Usuman owed his success to his tremendous personal charisma and to the fact that he delivered his sermons in both Fulani and Hausa, thus endearing himself to the many African Muslims who were not familiar with Arabic. After five years in Zamfara, he returned to Gobir. He found that in his absence, the Hausa ruler of Gobir had begun to repress Islam. An exception was made for Usuman, however, and the cleric resettled in Gobir and began to attract new students.

Between 1789 and 1804, Usuman had a series of mystical visions that inspired him to lead a jihad, or holy struggle, against Muslims who were lax in their religious practice. That category included many Hausa rulers who considered themselves Muslims but did not observe their religion with the puritanical zeal of Usuman. In 1801, a new ruler named Yunfa assumed power in Gobir. He initially allowed Usuman to continue his preaching. Yet as Usuman's following grew, Yunfa began to see him as a potential rival and in 1804, tried to have him assassinated. Usuman escaped this attack and with his followers fled to neighboring Gudu. The failed assassination attempt added to Usuman's prestige, and new followers flocked to join him. While many of his new recruits were inspired by his religious message, others were motivated by their dislike of the Hausa leadership or the simple desire to plunder the Hausa states.

In 1804, Usuman's followers attacked Gobir and emerged victorious after four years of war. Meanwhile, his example had inspired other Fulani communities throughout Hausaland to declare jihads against their rulers. By 1812, Fulani armies had conquered Hausaland and created a vast confederation in its place.

After the conquest of Hausaland, Usuman faced challenges from within his community of Fulani followers and from the neighboring Muslim state of Bornu. After the stimulating years of leading a jihad, Usuman soon tired of the burden of ruling an empire and retired to a life of quiet contemplation. He was succeeded by his son Muhammad Bello, who proved to be an accomplished general and administrator. Muhammad Bello built the city of Sokoto, which would become the spiritual center of the new Islamic empire. When Usuman died in 1817, Muhammad Bello won a brief and bloodless succession struggle to replace his father.

James Burns

See also: Muhammad Bello; Toure, Askia Muhammad; West Africa, French Wars of Conquest in.

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Uzun Hasan (1425–1478)

Ruler of the Turkoman dynasty of the Ak-Koyunlu who carved out a vast empire in Iraq, Iran, and southern Caucasia. Born Abu al-Nasr Hasan Bahadur in Amida (Diyarbakir) in 1425, he was a member of the ruling dynasty of the Ak-Koyunlu state. After the death of Kara Osman, who founded the Ak-Koyunlu dynasty, in 1435, his descendants turned against each other in their struggle for power, but by late 1450s, Uzun Hasan had emerged victorious. The contemporary geopolitical situation was quite threatening to Uzun Hasan's fledgling state. In the west, the Ottoman Turks had just destroyed the last vestiges of the Byzantine Empire, securing their authority in Anatolia. In the east, a much larger, and hostile, Kara Koyunlu dynasty ruled western Iran and parts of Iraq.

Uzun Hasan quickly demonstrated his political and military acumen. He successfully dealt with internal opposition, and conducted multifaceted diplomacy, establishing a series of alliances to protect his state. He strengthened diplomatic ties with the Empire of Trebizond, Venice, Muscovy, Burgundy, Poland, and Egypt. Uzun Hasan's wide-ranging campaigns earned him a reputation for being fierce. His first campaigns were directed against his rival Kara Koyunlu (1450s) whose army, led by Jahan Shah, was routed on the banks of the Tigris River in May 1457. The following year Uzun Hasan conducted the first of several *ghazi* campaigns against the Christian kingdom of Georgia (1458–1463), where he claimed an immense booty that helped fund his subsequent wars. In addition, he won the accolade as the "sultan of the ghazis," which gained him supporters among the Turkoman tribes. In 1461, he clashed for the first time with the Ottomans, but after several inconclusive skirmishes, Uzun Hasan chose to avoid a prolonged conflict with the Turks and stood by while the Ottomans destroyed his ally the Empire of Trebizond. In 1464–1466, he successfully campaigned in northern Iraq and eastern Anatolia, where he captured the fortress of Harput.

In 1467, his rival Jahan Shah of the Kara Koyunlu invaded the Ak-Koyunlu territory but suffered defeat near Sanjaq (Chapakchur region) on November 10; exploiting poor weather and the enemy's tactical mistake, Uzun Hasan attacked the Kara Koyunlu camp at dawn, killing Jahan Shah and his sons. With Jahan Shah's death, the Kara Koyunlu army was thrown into turmoil, allowing Uzun Hasan to quickly

proceed with his conquest. He took Mosul and besieged Baghdad for 40 days before Jahan Shah's successor, Hasan Ali, counterattacked, supported by the Timurid sultan Abu Said (Timur's great-grandson), who also marched with a separate army from Khurasan in the spring of 1468. Nevertheless, Uzun Hasan managed to incite division among his opponents and then defeated Hasan Ali's weakened army near Marand in August 1468. Uzun Hasan exploited this success to conquer Karabagh, where he faced the approach of Abu Said's army. The Timurid advance proved to be disastrous on account of cold weather and Uzun Hasan's skillful tactics. Wintering on the Mughan steppe, Abu Said surrounded his camp with a ditch and a fortress of wagons chained together. Uzun Hasan avoided attacking the Timurid wagon laager and instead cut off its supplies and isolated the sultan diplomatically. After several weeks, the Timurid troops wavered in their loyalties, and many deserted or went over to the Turkomans. On January 29, Sultan Abu Said tried to escape from his camp but was captured and executed a week later.

The death of Sultan Abu Said opened doors to the Ak-Koyunlu expansion eastward. Uzun Hasan's forces spread throughout Iran, campaigning in Kirman, Fars, Luristan, Khuzistan, and Kurdistan. The surviving Kara Koyunlu forces were destroyed at Hamadan in 1468, while later the same year Uzun Hasan captured Baghdad. Thus, by 1469, Uzun Hasan emerged as the ruler of a vast state that included much of Iraq and Iran and was the only polity in western Asia capable of dealing with the Ottoman Turks. He demolished the Kara Koyunlu and reduced the once-mighty Timurid Empire to a few local kingdoms in Central Asia.

The rise of Uzun Hasan did not go unnoticed in Europe, which was alarmed by the Ottoman destruction of the Byzantine Empire. The Republic of Venice was the first to establish diplomatic contacts with him. Negotiations began as early as 1458 but a formal alliance was concluded in 1464. During the Venetian-Ottoman War of 1463–1479, the Venetians were concerned about the Turkish conquest of Euboea (1469–1470) and urged Uzun Hasan to take action against the Ottomans. In summer of 1472, the Ak-Koyunlu ruler responded by organizing an invasion of Anatolia and Syria. He troops sacked Tokat and invaded Karaman, where they seized several fortresses. In the fall of the same, Uzun Hasan turned to the Mamluk provinces in Syria, penetrating deep into Mamluk territory to the outskirts of Aleppo.

Upset by these attacks, as well as by Uzun Hasan's insolent letters, Sultan Mehmed II counterattacked with an army of some 100,000 men in the spring of 1473, driving the Turkomans out of the Kireli region (west of Konya) and sacking Kemakh. By late July, Uzun Hasan gathered his army (no more than 40,000 men) near Erzindjan, where, on August, he defeated one part of the Ottoman army under Hass Murad Pasha as it was trying to cross the Euphrates River. Just a week later Uzun Hasan encountered the main Ottoman army, under Sultan Mehmed, near the village of Bashkent on the Otlukbeli River, where a decisive battle took place on August 11, 1473. Unlike the traditional, cavalry-dominated army of Uzun Hasan,

Mehmed's troops incorporated firearms and artillery. Deployed behind a barrier of wagons, the Ottomans exploited their superiority in firearms to inflict heavy losses on the Ak-Koyunlu. The battle ended with a complete rout of Uzun Hasan's army and opened eastern Anatolia to the Ottoman expansion, although Uzun Hasan suffered no appreciable territorial losses in the immediate aftermath. Nevertheless, the damage to his reputation and prestige was grave indeed.

Despite this setback, Uzun Hasan rallied his remaining forces and spent five years suppressing rebellions that erupted after the news of his defeat. In 1476–1477, he launched a new ghaza campaign against Georgia, most probably to refurbish his image and gain much-needed plunder. However, the winter campaign in Georgia had a detrimental effect on his health. In Tabriz, He breathed his last on January 5, 1478, at the age of 52, leaving behind a massive Turkoman Empire but making no provision for the succession.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Byzantine-Ottoman Wars; Ghazi; Mamluk Sultanate; Mehmed II; Otlukbeli, Battle of (1473); Venetian-Ottoman Wars.

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V

Varna Crusade (1444)

The last great land-based crusade against the Ottoman Empire, which ended in the defeat of a Balkan Christian coalition by the Turks near the city of Varna (in mod. Bulgaria).

The Varna Crusade came about in response to Ottoman advances in the Balkans, notably the occupation of Serbia (1439) and the siege of Belgrade (1440). In 1443, for the first time after the disastrous Nikopolis Crusade (1396), Hungary initiated an ambitious offensive campaign against the Ottoman Empire, encouraged by Pope Eugenius IV and his legate Cardinal Giuliano Cesarini. A Hungarian army of some 35,000 troops, led by the famous general John Hunyadi (Hung. Hunyadi János), was accompanied by Cesarini, the Serbian despot George Branković, and King Vladislav I (king of Poland as Władysław III), who had been elected as king of Hungary in expectation of significant Polish support against the Turks. The army left Buda on July 22, 1443, crossed the Serbian border by mid-October, and occupied Sofia by December. Having gained some other minor victories, it returned home in January after learning that Sultan Murad II had crossed the Bosporus, and celebrated a spectacular triumphal march in Buda.

Faced with a revolt by the Karamanids in Anatolia in spring 1444, the sultan was unwilling to face war on two fronts, and offered favorable peace conditions to Hungary: peace for 10 years, the surrender of Serbia and Bosnia, the liberation of the sons of Branković, and 100,000 gold florins. The extravagant peace terms confused the political parties in Hungary; before the sultan's offer in April the Hungarian diet had voted for war, and the king had taken a solemn oath to carry it out. The war was also supported by the legate Cesarini, who envisaged the union of the Roman Catholic and Greek Orthodox churches and the relief of Constantinople, and by the Polish court party in Buda, though it was rejected by Poland.

The period between April and September is very controversial, and has been clarified only recently. Despot Branković accepted the sultan's conditions and offered John Hunyadi his own immense possessions in Hungary in exchange for his support of a future peace treaty. Hunyadi seems to have accepted Branković's offer, which meant that Hungary was preparing for war and negotiating peace terms at the same time. A tentative peace treaty was concluded by the Hungarians at Adrianople (mod. Edirne, Turkey) on June 15, and the sultan left Europe on July 12 to

lead his troops against his adversaries in Anatolia. In this precarious situation, the Hungarians tried to win both peace and war. On August 4, at Szeged, King Vladislav declared invalid any former or future treaties made with the infidels, with the approval of Cesarini. Meanwhile the Hungarian-Ottoman peace treaty was ratified on August 15 in Várad (mod. Oradea, Romania) by the king, John Hunyadi, and Branković, only a few miles from the forward outposts of the royal army. A papal-Venetian fleet sailed to blockade the Dardanelles, but the Hungarian-Ottoman diplomatic activity disturbed the European Christian coalition and the efficacy of the blockade, causing delay and depriving the campaign of the necessary surprise effect. The unity of the coalition was now in tatters. Despot Branković was satisfied to have at least regained northern Serbia together with its capital (August 22); he not only failed to join the coming war, but even tried to hinder it.

The Christian coalition army amounted to some 20,000 men, considerably fewer than the previous year. It consisted mostly of Hungarians, along with Polish and Bohemian mercenaries and some 2,000–3,000 Wallachian light cavalry led by Vlad Dracul; the absence of any Serbian and Albanian auxiliary troops should have been a warning signal. The army left Orflova on September 20, intending to strike at the Ottoman capital of Adrianople. The Christians marched along the Danube route via Vidin (September 26) and Nikopolis (October 16), and turned southeast via Novi Pazar and Shumen, capturing and plundering all these cities. Due to bad reconnaissance, they did not know that the sultan had already crossed the Bosporus with an overwhelming (perhaps double) numerical superiority.

The Christians met the sultan at the city of Varna on November 9, on terrain unfavorable for them, between the lake of Devna and the sea coast. Despite John Hunyadi's military talent, the Christians were defeated as a result of poor cooperation among the multinational coalition forces. Hunyadi initially gained the upper hand on both wings by the overwhelming attack of his heavy cavalry. The sultan considered a retreat, but at the next decisive moment King Vladislav attacked the Turkish elite Janissary units with his Polish troops. This ruined the Christian tactics, and resulted in the death of the king and the papal legate. The Christian battle order dissolved, and the cavalry left in panic-stricken flight, including John Hunyadi, who escaped to Wallachia. Both sides suffered heavy losses, above all among the Christian infantry units that attempted to defend their camp behind wagons in a manner similar to that of the Hussite troops of Bohemia.

The Hungarian and papal war parties had been correct in their assessment that 1444 presented the best opportunity in a long time to wear down Ottoman power by force of arms. This crusade, however, proved to be the last spectacular failure of traditional crusading strategy: sweeping the Ottomans out of Europe in a single campaign, in the absence of political unity among the fragmented and partly conquered Balkan states, proved to be impossible, and the Christians were unable to make full use of the favorable peace conditions. Much more could have been achieved by accepting the peace terms than by launching a campaign into an unstable region.

As had been done by King Sigismund after the defeat of the Nikopolis Crusade in 1396, the Hungarian kings again adopted a deliberate defensive strategy (particularly under King Matthias Corvinus, son of John Hunyadi) up to the final collapse of the Hungarian defense system in 1521 and of the medieval kingdom of Hungary itself in 1526.

László Veszprémy

See also: Adrianople, Treaty of (1444); Hungarian-Ottoman Wars (1437–1526); Murad II; Nikopolis, Crusade of (1396).

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Vaslui-Podul, Battle of (1475)

Major battle between the forces of Stephen III of Moldavia and Hadim Suleyman Pasha, the Ottoman *beylerbeyi* of Rumelia, which resulted a decisive Ottoman defeat. In the fall of 1474, in response to Stephen's attempts to assert greater sovereignty, Hadim Suleyman Pasha led an army of about 120,000 men to restore Ottoman authority in the region. Gathering 40,000 men and supported by Hungarians and Poles, Stephen met the enemy at Podul Înalt (the High Bridge), near the town of Vaslui (now part of eastern Romania). Before the battle, the Moldavians continuously harassed the Ottoman forces to wear them down. Taking advantage of marshy terrain and rainy and foggy weather, which deprived the Ottomans of their superior artillery, Stephen provoked the Ottomans into attacking on January 10, 1475. With initial Ottoman attacks repelled, Stephen mounted a coordinated attack with all his forces. Simultaneously, Moldavian buglers concealed behind Ottoman lines sounded their bugles, spreading confusion among Ottoman units. The Ottoman commander lost control of the army and ordered a retreat. Over the next three days hundreds of Ottoman troops, caught in a swampy valley, were surrounded and killed; thousands fled and were pursued. The Moldavian success in this battle, arguably one of the biggest European victories over the Ottomans, proved to be short lived. Stephen, whom Pope Sixtus IV granted the title of "Athleta Christi" (Champion of Christ), failed to secure an alliance with Poland and was defeated by the Ottomans at Războieni (Valea Albă) in July 1476.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Războieni, Battle of (1476).

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Vasvar, Treaty of (1664)

Treaty signed between the Ottoman Empire and the Habsburgs on August 10, 1664, at Vasvar (Eisenburg). Under the leadership of the Grand Vizier Koprulu Fazil Ahmed Pasha (1661–1676), the Ottomans sought to counter the Habsburg interference in Transylvania. In 1663, after the Habsburgs rejected Ottoman demands to evacuate Transylvania, Fazil Ahmet led 100,000 Ottoman troops into Hungary. After capturing the key fortress of Nove Zamky (Neuhausel), the Ottomans returned to Serbia to spend winter there. In the spring of 1664, Fazil Ahmed successfully resumed his campaign and the Austrians chose to reach a peaceful settlement with him. Negotiations began at Vasvar (Eisenburg) in late July. Under the terms agreed, the Austrians were to surrender a number of border fortresses (Neuhausel and Grosswardein), recognize the Ottoman control of Transylvania, and agree to pay the sultan an annual tribute of some 200,000 florins. In return, the Ottomans agreed to make a suitable gift to the emperor, to maintain a 20-year truce with the empire, and to allow the Austrians to build a new fortress on the Waag River. However, while the treaty's text was on its way to Vienna, the Imperial and Ottoman armies clashed on August 1, 1664, at St. Gotthard, where the Ottomans suffered a major defeat. In spite of the victory, Emperor Leopold, who was aware of how weakened the Austrian army was, chose to confirm the terms of the Treaty of Vasvar. The treaty held until 1683, when border skirmishing escalated to full-scale war and culminated with the Ottoman siege of Vienna.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Austro-Ottoman Wars; Koprulu Fazil Ahmed Pasha; St. Gotthard Abbey, Battle of (1664).

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Venetian-Ottoman Wars

A series of military conflicts between the Republic of Venice and the Ottoman Empire over hegemony in the eastern Mediterranean Sea and the Balkan Peninsula. The Ottomans' expansion into the Balkans in the 14th century was initially welcomed by Venice. In fact, Venetians sent two ambassadors to congratulate Murad I (r.1362–1389) for his conquest of Adrianople (Edirne) in 1365. In 1384, the

Ottoman envoys arrived at Venice to discuss an alliance against Genoa. Although an alliance against Genoa never materialized, Venice and the Porte did conclude several agreements in 1403, 1408, and 1411. Yet, the Ottomans' westward expansion continued, and the Venetians' attitudes changed.

First Venetian-Ottoman War (1416)

In June 1416, after Ottoman incursions into the Aegean Sea, the Venetian fleet under Pietro Loredan attacked and destroyed the Ottoman navy in a battle off Gallipoli. Building on this success, the Venetians secured control of the Dalmatian coastline and established outposts in southern Greece.

Second Venetian-Ottoman War (1425–1430)

The second Venetian-Ottoman War was fought between 1425 and 1430 when Sultan Murad II (1403–1451) targeted Venetian settlements along the Albanian coast and at Epirus in western Greece. The two powers fought for control of Salonika, which the Venetians bought from the Byzantines in 1423 and where they held a large garrison. In 1430, the Turks besieged and captured the city, forcing Venice to sue for peace. In 1443, Venice gave help to the Crusader army that marched against the Ottoman Empire but was routed at Varna in 1444.

Third Venetian-Ottoman War (1453)

During the third Venetian-Ottoman War, Venetians contributed warships to the defense of Constantinople against the Ottoman Turks. Their efforts, however, proved futile as the Byzantine capital fell to the Turks in May 1453.

Fourth Venetian-Ottoman War (1463–1479)

During the fourth Venetian-Ottoman War, Sultan Mehmed II "the Conqueror" (1429–1481) raided Venetian settlements along the Dalmatian coast, capturing the Venetian fortresses of Lepanto (Nafpaktos) in 1462 and Argos in 1463. Venice officially declared war in July 1463 and concluded an alliance with Hungary, the Papal States, and Burgundy, promising to divide the Balkans among the allies in case of victory over the Turks. In 1463–1466, the Venetian army under Alvise Loredan landed in the Morea while the Hungarian forces under King Matthias Corvinus campaigned in Bosnia. Both the Venetians and the Hungarians achieved considerable success and captured a number of Ottoman cities and locations. To confront this threat, Sultan Mehmed II ordered the establishment of a new shipyard in Constantinople that would produce warships to neutralize the Venetian fleet. He

then dispatched Grand Vizier Mahmud Pasha Angelovic against the Venetian land forces, which were defeated and driven into the Morea. Sultan Mehmed II led another army into Bosnia, where he became embroiled in a prolonged conflict with Corvinus. In 1464, Venice sent one of its ablest commanders, Sigismondo Malatesta, to take command of its forces in the Morea, but Malatesta failed to produce any decisive result. The Venetian fleet, under Orsato Giustinian, tried to capture Mytilene, the capital city of Lesbos, but was driven back by the Ottoman navy led by Mahmud Pasha. Simultaneously, the Venetians became embroiled in a new conflict with the Knights Hospitaller of Rhodes, which diverted their manpower and resources. In 1466–1467, the new Venetian naval commander, Vettore Cappello, reinvigorated Venetian naval operations in the Aegean Sea, where he captured several Ottoman-held islands but was defeated in his attempt to capture Athens. At the same time, Mehmed II conducted operations in Albania, where he faced ongoing Albanian resistance under the leadership of Skanderbeg. In 1470, the Ottomans captured Negroponte (Chalcis), the Venetian port on Euboea. Venice responded by negotiating an alliance with the Ak-Koyunlu Turkoman and supporting Sultan Uzun Hasan's invasion of the Ottoman realm; yet, in the battles of Erzinjan (Erzincan) on the upper Euphrates and Otlukbeli in August 1473, Mehmed decisively defeated Uzun Hasan, depriving Venice of a powerful ally. In the next six years, the Ottomans overran much of central Greece and Albania, threatening the outskirts of Venice. By the Treaty of Constantinople in 1479, the Venetians recognized the loss of their territorial possession in the Aegean, paid a 100,000-ducat indemnity, and agreed to pay annual tributes to the Ottomans in return for trading rights. The two states also agreed on the creation of common borders, which they marked by heaps of stones or other devices in Albania and Morea (Peloponnese).

Fifth Venetian-Ottoman War (1499–1503)

In 1499, a new Venetian-Ottoman war began over continued territorial claims between the two states. Venice received help France, Aragon, and Portugal but the tide of war soon turned against it. In August 1499, Kemal Reis, leading a massive Ottoman fleet, inflicted a devastating defeat on the Venetian fleet under the command of Antonio Grimani at the Battle of Zonchio (also known as the Battle of Sapienza or the First Battle of Lepanto). This was the first naval battle that featured warships with cannons. After repelling Venetian attack on Lepanto in December 1499, Kemal Reis bombarded the Venetian ports on the island of Corfu, and in August 1500, he routed the Venetian fleet at the Battle of Modon (also known as the Second Battle of Lepanto). Later that year the Ottoman fleet raided Modon, Coron, Sapientza (Sapienza), Voiussa, and the island of Lefkada before returning to Istanbul in November. The Venetians fared better on land as their army, commanded by Gonzalo de Córdoba and supported by the Spanish, captured Kefalonia. However,

the Ottoman raids continued and, in 1501–1502, reached as far as Vicenza, forcing Venice to sue for peace in 1503. Under the terms of the peace treaty, the Ottomans took control of parts of Morea (Peloponnesus) and islands in the Aegean and Adriatic seas but lost Cephalonia, the largest of the Ionian islands.

Sixth Venetian-Ottoman War (1537–1540)

After 1503, Venice was sidelined in the continued struggle for the Mediterranean as France, Spain, and the Ottoman Empire clashed over regional hegemony. More than three decades passed before the sixth Venetian-Ottoman war broke out. In the meantime, the Ottoman offensives into Austrian territory brought them to the gates of Vienna, which was besieged in 1529. Seven years later Suleiman I "the Magnificent" concluded an alliance with France against the Habsburgs and extended commercial privileges, known as capitulations, to the French merchants. He then sent an envoy to Venice proposing that it enter the Ottoman-French alliance. However, his offer was rejected as the Habsburgs were a more immediate threat to Venice than the Ottomans. So the Republic signed an alliance with Emperor Charles V of the Holy Roman Empire. The war began in 1537 with Suleiman marching his army to Vlore on the Adriatic coast. He intended to launch a two-pronged offensive on Italy but first had to besiege the Venetian island of Corfu. The siege had to be abandoned after the arrival of a strong Imperial Venetian fleet commanded by Andrea Doria. Meanwhile, the Ottoman fleet under Khair ed-Din Barbarossa, laid waste to the Aegean and Adriatic coastlines. The two fleets finally met at Preveza, an Ioanian coastal town south of Corfu, on September 27, 1538, and Barbarossa gained a decisive victory over Doria. By 1540, Venice had ceded to the Ottomans virtually all of its Aegean islands and outposts in Morea (Peloponnesus), including Nauplia and Monemvasia.

Seventh Venetian-Ottoman War (1570–1573)

The next three decades produced a relative lull in Venetian-Ottoman hostilities, and despite some frictions in 1564–1565 when the Ottomans attacked Malta, the peace treaty was renewed in 1567. By then, Venice retained only two major colonies in the eastern Mediterranean, the islands of Cyprus and Crete, which allowed it to control the profitable Levantine trade. Nevertheless, the Republic of Venice had to pay an annual tribute to the Egyptian Mamluks until 1517, and then to the Ottomans. However, the location of Cyprus—near the Ottoman heartland and on the trade routes to and from Levant—turned it into a target for Ottoman expansion. The Venetians' refusal to cede Cyprus to Sultan Selim II led to the seventh Venetian-Ottoman War. Selim II organized a major expeditionary force to seize the island, with Lala Mustafa Pasha commanding the land forces and Müezzinzade Ali Pasha

leading the navy. In the summer of 1570, about 5,000 Venetian soldiers at Nicosia fought off a besieging 60,000-man Ottoman army but finally succumbed on September 9. The entire Venetian garrison and much of the population was put to the sword. The Ottomans then blockaded Venetian-held Famagusta but it held out for almost a year before surrendering in mid-May 1571.

In the meantime, Venice sought allies to face the Ottoman onslaught. Unable to recruit the Holy Roman Empire and France, it turned to Spain, whose status in the Mediterranean was threatened by the Ottomans. On May 15, 1571, Venice, Spain, Naples, the Papal States, and Italian states established the Holy League to fight the Porte. The Holy League's fleet of some 200 galleys, commanded by Don Juan of Austria, assembled at Messina in August 1571. In a battle off Lepanto on October 7, 1571, the Holy League's fleet inflicted a decisive defeat on the Ottoman navy of Müezzinzade Ali Pasha. Although the battle ended Ottoman naval dominance in the eastern Mediterranean, Venice was unable to recover Cyprus and suffered territorial losses in Dalmatia. The Ottomans soon replenished their naval forces, which were now led by Kilic Ali Pasha, and resumed naval operations. In 1573, Venice left the Holy League and signed a peace treaty (March 7, 1573) ceding Cyprus and its possessions in Albania and Epirus and paying a large indemnity to the Ottomans. Cyprus remained under Ottoman rule until 1878.

Eighth Venetian-Ottoman War (1645–1669)

The peace established in 1573 proved to be lasting, and it was only broken in 1645 when Venice and the Ottoman Empire clashed (for the eighth time) over the island of Crete. Known as the Cretan or Candian War, this conflict began when the Knights of Malta attacked an Ottoman convoy and landed with their loot at Candia (Crete) in 1644. In response, Sultan Ibrahim I accused the Venetians of collusion with the Knights of Malta and sent Yussuf Pasha with some 50,000 troops to capture the Venetian colony in 1645; Silahdar Yusuf Pasha, the sultan's son-in-law, commanded the navy. Although the Turks conquered most of the island in the first three years of the war, the fortress of Candia (modern Heraklion) withstood one of the longest sieges in history, lasting from 1648 to 1669. After 1659, Venice received active support from France, whose expeditionary force fought the Turks until 1669. The French withdrawal proved to be a turning point in the Candia defense, and the Venetian captain general Francesco Morosini accepted the terms of surrender from Grand Vizier Ahmed Koprulu on September 27, 1669. The subsequent peace treaty left Crete in Ottoman hands, ending a 400-year Venetian presence there; Crete would remain under Ottoman control until 1913.

The Cretan War was not, however, limited to the Siege of Candia alone. Although the Venetian navy could not directly take on the Ottoman fleet at Crete, it focused its efforts on providing supplies to the besieged garrison and blockading

the Dardanelles. Ottoman attempts to break through the blockade were largely unsuccessful. In May 1649, the Venetians, under Giacomo da Riva, scored a major victory over the Turkish fleet led by Voinok Ahmed, and two years later, Alvise Mocenigo defeated another Ottoman fleet of Hosambegzade Ali Pasha south of Naxos on July 8–10, 1651. The Ottomans responded by increasing production of warships and concentrating their naval forces in the eastern Mediterranean. Starting in May 1654, the Ottoman and Venetian navies fought a series of naval battles in the mouth of the Dardanelles Straits. Although the Ottomans initially scored a victory, the Venetians under Lazaro Mocenigo inflicted a series of defeats on them between 1655 and 1668 but were unable to turn the tide of the war.

The third theater of war was in Dalmatia, which saw plenty of action in early stages of the war. The Ottomans initially made significant gains capturing the islands of Veglia, Pag, and Cres, and the fortress of Novigrad, in 1646. Supported by the local population, the Venetians turned the tide the following year as their counterattack drove the Ottomans back and reclaimed their territories. By 1669, Venice almost tripled its territorial holdings in Dalmatia and ensured its control of the Adriatic. Still, the war had a profound effect on Venice as its treasury was exhausted, its most prosperous colony lost, and its trading position in the Mediterranean diminished.

Ninth Venetian-Ottoman War (1684–1699)

The ninth Venetian-Ottoman war began in 1684 as part of the wider conflict known as the "Great Turkish War" waged between the Ottomans and an alliance of Holy Roman Empire, Hungary, Russia, Spain, and Poland-Lithuania. Although the war saw military operations conducted in Austria, Hungary, Serbia, and Ukraine, the Venetian efforts were directed toward the conquest of the Morea (Peloponnese) peninsula in southern Greece. In 1684, the Venetians secured the Ionian Islands while Francesco Morosini seized parts of Dalmatia and Morea (Peloponnesus) between 1685 and 1687. In September 1687, they captured Athens (damaging the famed Parthenon in the process) but were later forced to abandon the city. In 1688–1689, the Turks successfully repelled Venetian attacks on Negroponte and Monemvasia, which marked the end of the Venetian ascendancy. In 1689, the Ottomans raided Messolonghi and swept through central Greece and Peloponnese. The Venetian capture of Chios in 1694 led to a major naval battle near the Oinousses Islands in February 1695, which resulted in a decisive victory of the Ottoman fleet led by Mezzo Morto Hüseyin Pasha. The Turks reclaimed Chios and held it until the First Balkan War in 1912. The war ended with the conclusion of the Treaty of Karlowitz (January 1699), which confirmed the Venetian possession of the island of Kephalonia, the Morea and most of Dalmatia.

Mid-17th-century naval engagement in the Dardanelles between the Ottoman and Venetian fleets, from a contemporary Turkish manuscript. (The Art Archive/Museo Correr Venice/Gianni Dagli Orti)

Tenth Venetian-Ottoman War (1714–1718)

The tenth, and last, Venetian-Ottoman War started in 1714. In response to Venetian incitement of an uprising in Montenegro in 1714, the Porte declared war on Venice and sent land and sea forces to capture Venetian islands and fortresses in the Aegean area. The campaign unfolded rather swiftly as the Ottoman army under Grand Vizier Silahdar Damat Ali Pasha swept through the entire Morea while the navy under Canum Koca drove the Venetians from the Aegean islands. In 1716, an Ottoman assault on Corfu was repulsed by the Venetians with help from Spain, Portugal, and several Italian states. Nevertheless, Venice was exhausted by the war and saved from further defeats by the intervention of Austria in 1716. Austrian success eventually led to the Treaty of Passarowitz (July 1718). Venice gave up the Peloponnesus but acquired a few Albanian and Dalmatian outposts.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Constantinople, Treaty of (1479); Karlowitz, Treaty of (1699); Kemal Reis; Mehmed II; Murad II; Otlukbeli, Battle of (1473); Passarowitz, Treaty of (1718); Suleiman the Magnificent; Uzun Hasan; Varna Crusade (1444); Zonchio (Sapienza), Battle of (1499).

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Vienna, Siege of (1529)

Having taken Buda in early September, Ottoman Sultan Suleiman I (Süleyman the Magnificent) swept aside Habsburg Archduke Ferdinand's advance posts and moved along the Danube River to the chief prize of Vienna. As soon as Ferdinand learned of Suleiman's force, he had called on his brother monarchs for assistance, but few responded in positive fashion with troops. Meanwhile, authorities in Vienna prepared as best they could to resist a Turkish assault. They gathered in food, ammunition, and other stores; removed many of the women and children from the city to ease the strain on supplies; positioned the 72 pieces of artillery available to them; cleared fields of fire; and effected such interim repairs as were possible in the circumstances to the relatively low 250-year-old city walls.

Ferdinand departed, leaving Philip, count palatine of Austria, in charge of the city's defense. He was ably assisted by Count Nicholas zu Salm-Reifferscheidt and Field Marshal Wilhelm von Roggendorff. Defending troops numbered only some 22,000 infantry and 2,000 cavalry. Suleiman commanded a vast force. Counting Ottoman garrisons gathered up en route, Hungarian levies under King Zapolya, and camp followers, the Turkish host may have numbered as many as 350,000 people. Although the actual Turkish fighting force could not have been more than 90,000 men, this was still a fourfold advantage over the defenders. The first Turkish skirmishers arrived at Vienna on September 23, 1529, although the main army did not

come up and surround the city until four days later, when the siege officially began. Some 400 Ottoman ships controlled the Danube.

The weather turned out to be a key factor, aiding the defenders. It was a very rainy fall, and cold weather set in early. This bad weather delayed the Turkish supply trains and prevented Suleiman from bringing up his heavy artillery. Although he had some 300 guns available, they were too small to be able to make serious breaches in the city's walls.

Suleiman sent emissaries to demand that the defenders surrender. If they failed to do so, he promised he would destroy the city so completely that nothing of it would remain. Few doubted his word. Receiving no reply, Suleiman ordered daily artillery fire against Vienna and the commencement of mining operations to try to blow holes in the walls to utilize his superior numbers of infantry. Made aware of Suleiman's plans by a deserter, the defenders commenced countermining, with a number of underground battles occurring. The defenders also mounted several sorties from the city to disrupt Turkish siege operations, but with little effect.

On October 12, the Turks managed to breach the wall with a mine but the gap was not sufficiently large, and defending pikemen were able to hold the Janissaries at bay, killing some 1,200 of the attackers. That same night Suleiman met with his principal lieutenants and surveyed the situation. Supplies were insufficient to sustain his vast force, and Suleiman's army was basically a summer force with winter fast approaching. Suleiman decided on one last attempt. On October 14, the Turks again exploded a mine under the city walls, but the section of wall fell outward, creating problems for the attackers. Despite hard fighting, the defenders again held.

On October 15, the people of Vienna awoke to find the sea of tents pitched before the city had disappeared. The Turks had struck camp. They massacred their prisoners, except those of both sexes young enough to qualify for the slave market, and departed. The harsh winter took a heavy toll on the army as it withdrew slowly southward to Istanbul, harassed by Christian cavalry.

Had Suleiman taken Vienna in 1529, he could have spent the winter there and then resumed campaigning in the spring in an invasion of Germany. It was by no means clear what France might have done in those circumstances. Although Suleiman returned to Austria three years later, he was rebuffed at Guns (Koszeg).

Spencer C. Tucker

See also: Austro-Ottoman Wars; Janissaries; Suleiman the Magnificent; Vienna, Siege of (1683).

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Vienna, Siege of (1683)

The failed Ottoman siege of the Austrian capital of Vienna was fought between July 13 and September 12, 1683, and was conducted by Kara Mustafa (ca. 1620–1683), the grand vizier of Mehmed IV (1642–1692), the Ottoman sultan.

On August 6, 1682, Sultan Mehmed IV, meeting with his top advisers in Topkapi Palace, decided to conquer the Habsburg Holy Roman Empire. In April 1683, the Ottoman army left its winter camp at Adrianople for Vienna, which it began besieging July 13. Ottoman siege operations focused on mining under the defensive walls of Vienna and then blowing up sections to allow the Ottoman troops to pour into the city. Vienna, however, was protected by a series of defensive lines. The siege continued with growing success until September 11, when a relief army composed of Saxons, Bavarians, Austrians, and Poles moved into position to attack the Ottoman camp. The Battle of Kahlenberg was fought on September 12 on the Danube plain outside Vienna. The relief army led by Charles Sixte, Duke of Lorraine, drove the Ottomans out of Austria and defeated their army on October 9 at Párkány (Slovakia). The defeat began the Ottoman Empire's slow decline. Kara Mustafa was executed (strangled) by the sultan on December 25.

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See also: Austro-Ottoman Wars; Vienna, Siege of (1529).

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W

Wahhabism

A Muslim religious reform movement that appeared in central Arabia in the 1740s. The term "Wahhabi" was coined by foes of the reform movement in reference to the movement's founder, Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab (1702–1792). Wahhabism derives its influence from its association with the Saudi dynasty. The unique feature of Wahhabism as a religious doctrine is its view of other Muslims as unbelievers, which makes them legitimate targets of Muslim holy war, or jihad. This view provided justification for the Saudi dynasty's military expansion in much of Arabia. In the modern kingdom of Saudi Arabia, Wahhabism is the official religious doctrine propagated in mosques and schools. When it comes to Saudi policy on the Arab-Israeli conflict, however, Wahhabism is subordinate to government calculations of the national interest.

Muhammad ibn Abd al-Wahhab was a religious scholar from a small town near the present-day Saudi capital of Riyadh. In 1740 he composed a theological essay condemning common Muslim religious practices. For example, many Muslims went to holy men to seek their blessings. Other Muslims visited the tombs of holy men to ask that they intercede with God on their behalf. Sheikh Muhammad considered such actions to be idolatry because they violated Islam's central belief in worshiping God alone without any intermediaries. Because Muhammad branded other Muslims as unbelievers, he became a controversial figure. He was expelled from two Arabian towns before he formed an alliance with Muhammad ibn Saud in 1744. Sheikh Muhammad gave religious legitimacy to Saudi military expeditions in the guise of Muslim holy war against unbelievers in return for Saudi political support.

By 1800, Saudi-Wahhabi forces had conquered much of Arabia. The major Muslim power of the time, the Ottoman Empire, responded to the Saudi conquest of the holy city of Mecca with a military campaign to crush the first Saudi state. That war lasted from 1811 to 1818 and ended in an Ottoman victory. However, the Saudis staged a comeback in the early 1820s to rule over a smaller Arabian realm. The second Saudi state refrained from aggression against Ottoman territories. Because the Saudis would not wage holy war, Wahhabi leaders urged followers to avoid all contact with outsiders, such as Egyptian or Iraqi Muslims, on the grounds that strangers were unbelievers whose company would threaten the purity of true Muslims' belief. The second Saudi state fell to a rival Arabian power in 1891.

The present Kingdom of Saudi Arabia began to emerge when Saudi prince Abd al-Aziz ibn Saud, also known as Ibn Saud, seized Riyadh in 1902. Over the next 30 years, he conquered the territories that presently make up the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. A major element in those conquests was a new branch of the Wahhabi movement called Ikhwan (Brethren). The Brethren were tribesmen who gave up their nomadic way of life to settle in agricultural communities, where they learned Wahhabi doctrine. The Brethren became fierce warriors for Wahhabism and gained a fearsome reputation for their savage treatment of defeated enemies. They provided the shock troops for Ibn Saud's military campaigns, but in the mid-1920s he had to restrain them from pursuing holy war against tribes in Iraq and Transjordan. At the time, those two countries were governed by British-appointed monarchs. Consequently, Brethren raids threatened to embroil Ibn Saud in a confrontation with Great Britain. When he ordered the Brethren to cease their raids they rose up in rebellion, but he was able to crush them by 1930.

Three years later, Ibn Saud granted American oil companies the right to explore for petroleum. Wahhabi clerics were unhappy to see Americans permitted into the kingdom, but Ibn Saud and the oil companies minimized contact between Saudis and foreign workers by creating special residential compounds for non-Saudis. The first test of U.S.-Saudi relations came in 1947, when the United States supported the United Nations (UN) resolution for the partition of Palestine into Jewish and Arab states. Ibn Saud made clear his opposition to the creation of Israel but was careful not to jeopardize his ties with American oil companies. The only time that Saudi opposition to U.S. support for Israel disrupted relations came during the October 1973 Yom Kippur War. Saudi Arabia's King Faisal responded to the U.S. emergency airlift of military supplies to Israel by imposing an embargo on oil sales and joining with other major oil producers to dramatically raise the price of oil.

Throughout the Cold War, Saudi Arabia joined forces with the United States to combat the spread of communism in the Muslim world. Saudi efforts included support for exporting Wahhabi doctrine, which is firmly anticommunist. It is also firmly anti-Jewish because of its attachment to historical religious texts emphasizing early clashes between the Prophet Muhammad and Jewish clans in Arabia. When it comes to setting foreign policy, however, Saudi rulers take a practical approach and only consult Wahhabi leaders when seeking their approval for sensitive initiatives.

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See also: Ibn Saud; Jihad; Ikhwan; Kharijites.

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War and Violence in the Koran

The Koran (Quran) contains verses that specifically address the concepts of war, fighting, and violence (and their opposite corollaries, peace and eschewal of violence). A distinctive Koranic view, therefore, exists regarding what constitutes legitimate and illegitimate wars, the conditions for launching a legitimate war, and the limits of war. The different legal and ethical articulations of war and peace that have emerged in Islamic thought testify to the different—and conflicting—ways of reading and interpreting some of the key Koranic verses dealing with this topic. Some of these variant ways of understanding the text are discussed here.

The specific Koranic terms that have a bearing on this topic are *jihad*, *qital*, and *harb*. Jihad is the broadest term among these three and its basic Koranic signification is "struggle," "striving," and "exertion." The full Arabic locution *al-jihad fi sabil Allah* consequently means "struggling/striving for the sake of God," and the Koran often refers broadly to those who "strive with their wealth and their selves" (*jahadu bi-amwalihim wa-anfusihim*; e.g., 8.72). *Qital* is the term that specifically refers to "fighting" or "armed combat" and is a component of jihad in specific situations. *Harb* is the Arabic word for war in general. The Koran uses this last term to refer to illegitimate wars fought by those who wish to spread corruption on earth (5:64); to the thick of battle between believers and nonbelievers (8:57; 47:4); and, in one instance, to the possibility of war waged by God and his prophet against those who would continue to practice usury (2.279). This term is never conjoined to the phrase "in the path of God."

Many of the Koranic strictures pertaining to nonviolent and armed struggle against wrongdoing cannot be properly understood without relating them to specific events in the life of the Prophet Muhammad. A significant number of Koranic verses are traditionally understood to have been revealed in connection with certain episodes in the Prophet's life. Knowledge of the "occasions of revelation" (*asbab al-nuzul*) as obtained from the biography of the Prophet and the exegetical literature, is indispensable for contextualizing key verses that may at first sight appear to be at odds with one another. A specific chronology of events needs to be mapped out so that the progression in the Koranic ethics of warfare and peacemaking may be understood against its historical backdrop, which is discussed next.

The Meccan Period

From the onset of the revelations to Muhammad circa 610 until his emigration to Medina from Mecca in 622 during the period known as the Meccan period, Muslims were not given permission by the Koran to physically retaliate against their persecutors, the pagan Meccans. Rather, verses revealed in this period counsel Muslims to steadfastly endure the hostility of the Meccans and say that to forgive those who cause them harm is the superior course of action. Three significant verses (42:40–43) reveal a highly important dimension of jihad in this early phase of Muhammad's prophetic career:

> The requital of evil is an evil similar to it: hence, whoever pardons and makes peace, his reward rests with God—for indeed, He does not love evil-doers. Yet surely, as for those who defend themselves after having been wronged no blame whatever attaches to them: blame attaches but to those who oppress people and behave outrageously on earth, offending against all right; for them is grievous suffering in store! But if one is patient in adversity and forgives, this is indeed the best resolution of affairs. Further, Pardon and forgive them until God gives His command. (2:109; cf. 29:59; 16:42)

Sabr ("patience"; "forbearance") is thus an important component of jihad as well. The verses quoted previously underscore the nonviolent dimension of jihad during the Meccan period, which lasted 13 years compared to the Medinan period of 10 years. For the most part, this meant resisting the Meccan establishment by first secret and then active, public propagation of the faith, through manumission of slaves who had converted to Islam, and, for some, by emigration to Abyssinia/Ethiopia whose Christian king was sympathetic to the early Muslims, and later to Medina.

Both Muslim and non-Muslim scholars, medieval and modern, however, have tended to downplay the critical Mecccan phase in the development of the Koranic doctrine of jihad. It is, however, practically impossible to contextualize the Koranic discourse on the various meanings of jihad without taking the Meccan phase into consideration. The introduction of the military aspect of jihad in the Medinan period can then properly be understood as a response to the persecution suffered by Muslims at the hands of the pagan Meccans for peacefully proclaiming their faith during the 13-year Meccan period.

The Medinan Period

In 622, which corresponds to the first year of the Islamic calendar, the Prophet received divine permission to emigrate to Medina, along with his loyal followers. Within a year of the emigration to Medina, the Prophet received a revelation

allowing him and his followers to physically retaliate against their Meccan persecutors. The following verses are widely acknowledged to be the first to grant Muslims permission to bear arms:

> Permission [to fight] is given to those against whom war is being wrongfully waged, and indeed, God has the power to help them: those who have been driven from their homes against all right for no other reason than their saying, "Our Provider is God!"
>
> For, if God had not enabled people to defend themselves against one another, monasteries, churches, synagogues, and mosques—in all of which God's name is abundantly glorified—would surely have been destroyed. (22:39–40)

In these verses, the Koran asserts, if people were not allowed to defend themselves against aggressive wrongdoers, all the houses of worship—it is worthy of note here that Islam is not the only religion indicated here—would be destroyed and thus the word of God extinguished.

Another verse states:

> They ask you concerning fighting in the prohibited months. Answer them: "To fight therein is a serious offence. But to restrain men from following the cause of God, to deny God, to violate the sanctity of the sacred mosque, to expel its people from its environs is in the sight of God a greater wrong than fighting in the forbidden month. [For] discord and strife (fitna) are worse than killing." (2:217)

Wrongful expulsion of believers—Muslims and other monotheists—from their homes for no other reason than their avowal of belief in one God is one of the reasons—*jus ad bellum*—that justify recourse to fighting, according to these verses. Earlier revelations (Koran 42.40–43) had allowed only nonviolent self-defense against the wrongful conduct of the enemy. In another verse (2.191), the Koran acknowledges the enormity of fighting, and thus the potential taking of human life, but at the same time asserts the higher moral imperative of maintaining order and challenging wrongdoing. Therefore, when both just cause and righteous intention exist, war in self-defense becomes obligatory.

> Fighting is prescribed for you, while you dislike it. But it is possible that you dislike a thing which is good for you, and that you love a thing which is bad for you. But God knows and you know not. (2.216)

The Koran further asserts that it is the duty of Muslims to defend those who are oppressed and cry out to them for help (4.75), except against a people with whom the Muslims have concluded a treaty (8.72).

With regard to initiation of hostilities, the Koran has specific injunctions. Koran 2.190 reads, "Fight in the cause of God those who fight you, but do not commit aggression, for God loves not aggressors," which forbids Muslims from initiating hostilities. Recourse to armed combat must be in response to a prior act of aggression committed by the opposite side.

In the month of Ramadan in the third year of the Islamic calendar (624), full-fledged hostilities broke out between the Muslims and the pagan Meccans in what became known as the Battle of Badr. In this battle, the small army of Muslims decisively trounced a much larger, and more experienced, Meccan army. Two years later, the Battle of Uhud was fought in which the Muslims suffered severe reverses, followed by the Battle of Khandaq in 627. Apart from these three major battles, a number of other minor campaigns were fought until the Prophet's death in 632 . Some of the most trenchant verses exhorting the Muslims to fight were revealed on the occasions of these military campaigns. One such verse is 9.5, which is one of what have been termed the "sword verses" (*ayat al-sayf*), states:

> And when the sacred months are over, slay the polytheists wherever you find them, and take them captive, and besiege them, and lie in wait for them at every conceivable place.

Another verse that is often conjoined to the previous verse runs:

> Fight against those who—despite having been given revelation before—do not believe in God nor in the Last Day, and do not consider forbidden that which God and His messenger have forbidden, and do not follow the religion of the truth, until they pay the jizya with willing hand, having been subdued. (9.29)

The first of the sword verses (9.5), with its internal reference to the polytheists who may be fought after the end of the sacred months, would circumscribe its applicability to only the pagan Arabs of Muhammad's time; this is how in fact many medieval jurists, such as al-Shafii (d. 820), understood the verse. The second of the sword verses is seemingly directed at the People of the Book, that is, Jews and Christians, but again, a careful reading of the verse clearly indicates that it does not intend all the People of the Book but only those from among them who do not, in contravention of their own laws, believe in God and the Last Day and, in a hostile manner, impede the propagation of Islam.

The Koran, in another verse (2.193), makes clear, however, that should hostile behavior on the part of the foes of Islam cease, then the reason for engaging them in battle also lapses. This verse states: "And fight them on until there is no chaos (fitna) and religion is only for God, but if they cease, let there be no hostility except to those who practice oppression."

The harshness of the two sword verses is thus considerably mitigated and their general applicability significantly restricted by juxtaposing conciliatory verses to

them, such as the one cited in the previous paragraph, and other such verses. Among other such verses are the ones that have been characterized as the "peace verses":

> If they incline toward peace, incline you toward it, and trust in God. Indeed, He alone is all-hearing, all-knowing (8.61).

And

> Slay them wherever you catch them, and turn them out from where they have turned you out; for persecution is worse than slaughter. But if they cease, God is Oft-forgiving, Most Merciful. (2.191–92)

And

> God does not forbid you from being kind and equitable to those who have neither made war on you on account of your religion nor driven you from your homes. God loves those who are equitable. (60.8)

These verses make warring against those who oppose the propagation of the message of Islam and consequently resort to persecution of Muslims contingent upon their continuing hostility. Should they desist from such hostile persecution and sue for peace instead, the Muslims are commanded to accede to their request. Koran 60.8 further makes clear that non-Muslims of goodwill and peaceableness cannot be the targets of war simply on account of their different religious background.

This point is further driven home elsewhere in the Koran. "There is no compulsion in religion; the truth stands out clearly from error," affirms the Koran (2.256). Another verse (10.99) states, "If your Lord had so willed, all those who are on earth would have believed; will you then compel mankind to believe against their will?" In accordance with these Koranic injunctions, a most medieval jurists agreed that the purpose of jihad in the sense of armed combat was not to compel non-Muslims to convert to Islam. However, the political and historical circumstances in which the Muslims found themselves in from roughly 661 on, that is from after the era of the four "rightly guided" caliphs (632–661), led the jurists in particular to fashion a code of religiously mandated war that was partly based on a particularistic reading of specific Koranic verses and partly based on Realpolitik. In a process that may be described as *hineinterprieren* (back interpretation), medieval legal scholars attempted to read back into certain Koranic verses justification for offensive military action against non-Muslims, as undertaken by the Umayyad and Abbasid rulers. The polyvalence of the term jihad in Koranic usage was progressively sacrificed by these jurists and in the context of international and inter-state relations, jihad for a number of these scholars came to mean exclusively "armed combat," both in a defensive and offensive sense.

Asma Afsaruddin

See also: Sharia, War and; Radical Islam in the 20th Century.

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Wars of the Mad Mullah (1901–1920)

Sayid Muhammad Abdille Hassan (1856–1920) was the most successful Somali military leader since Ahmad ibn Ibrahim (1507–1543). A devout Muslim influenced by fundamentalist Salafi doctrines, the Sayid was greatly disturbed by the expansion of British, Italian, and Ethiopian power into Somali lands. During the late 1890s, he began to gather followers by preaching resistance to these Christian invaders. His forces skirmished with rival Somalis, Ethiopian, and British troops in 1899–1900. This led the imperialists to mount five major campaigns against Muhammad, sometimes conducted jointly, but always under British command.

Dubbed the "Mad Mullah," by his British enemies, Muhammad was a charismatic nationalist who also excelled in the highly respected Somali art of poetry. He raised considerable armies, once having more than 10,000 regulars supported by even larger numbers of clan militia. The Sayid proved adroit at ambush, as witnessed by the defeat of the Somali Camel Constabulary at Dul Madoba (August 9, 1913). Muhammad commemorated this event with one of his better known poems, "The Death of Richard Cornfield," which reminded his men they had killed the British commander.

During this period, Muhammad moved his forces south and away from the coast. He established forts to protect camel herds—the main form of Somali wealth at that time—and his headquarters, Taleh (Taleex). Although this proved fruitful as British resources were drawn into World War I, on its conclusion, these large bases became a handicap.

The final British campaign against Muhammad started in 1919, and included Force Z—an air unit of 12 de Haviland DH9 bombers. Between January 21 and 28, 1920, these planes performed ground-attack missions with great success. The Sayid's forces suffered heavy losses and were terrified by their introduction to

airpower. Although Muhammad escaped, his base was drastically reduced, while rival Somali leaders were encouraged to attack by gifts of British gold and weapons. Despite an all out manhunt, Muhammad was never captured, instead becoming one of the millions to die during the Influenza Pandemic of 1919–1920.

Although defeated by the three imperial invaders, Sayid Muhammad Abdille Hassan remains a powerful figure to modern Somalis. His 20-year struggle against foreign powers made him a national hero commemorated on postage stamps or by equestrian statues, even though such artistic efforts would not have found favor with his fundamentalist Islamic views. Twenty-first century Somali jihadi forces, like al-Shabab, look to the Sayid as their spiritual forefather.

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See also: Anglo-Sudan War.

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West Africa, French Wars of Conquest in

In 1854, French possessions in western Africa, like those of other European powers, were miniscule coastal and riverine trading enclaves, more or less under African control. In that year, however, taking advantage of their exclusive possession of the navigable lower and middle Senegal River, the French military began to intervene forcibly among the Senegalese states to impose favorable terms of trade for French merchants. The French conquest of western Africa had begun.

These first French actions against their Woloff, Mauritanian, and Tukulor (Toucouleur) neighbors drew inspiration from the French conquest of Algeria that, having begun in 1830, offered a model of apparently successful military colonialism. Ambitious infantry and artillery officers adopted this model, including the willful manipulation of military reports and multiplication of campaigns, to earn rapid promotions by extending French domination. In addition, these officers exploited the bogey of militant Islamic opposition to French rule to justify actions to eliminate Muslim rulers. After 1871, French officers and civilian administrators would additionally become imbued with Jacobin-influenced republican ideals that would move them to reject most power sharing with west African traditional rulers, Muslim or non-Muslim, except as temporary expedients. Eventually most African rulers and their states were eliminated.

Two periods (1854–1861 and 1861–1863) during which General Louis Faidherbe, an engineer officer with Algerian experience, governed Senegal served as a prelude to post-1878 French conquests. Adapting orders from Paris to local realities, Faidherbe led a series of limited river- and land-based operations against the Mauritanian, Woloff, Tukulor, and Sarakhollé states of the Senegal River valley, resulting in French military control of the banks of the navigable western portion of this river. Faidherbe's forces undertook similar actions along the Atlantic coast south of Saint-Louis and inside the navigable reaches of the Saloum and Casamance rivers. Faidherbe's campaigns also forced the Tukulor state builder, El Hadj Omar, to move his center of operations to Ségou on the middle Niger River.

In 1857, Faidherbe created the first companies of Senegalese Riflemen, a model of native African military recruitment that French commanders would replicate as they moved inland. Native levies and the warriors of African allies would provide the bulk of French military manpower in western Africa.

The fabled (but mythical) wealth of Timbuktu, to which was added the assumed strategic value of Lake Chad, constituted the magnets that attracted French expansion inland from the upper Senegal as well as from Algeria and the coastal points that would become Guinea, Côte d'Ivoire, Dahomey (Benin), and Gabon. The decision taken in 1880 to open a series of fortified posts and to build a railway linking Kayes, at the head of navigation on the Senegal River, to Bamako, on the middle Niger River (occupied in 1883), led to armed conflict with the Tukulor Empire, ruled since 1864 by El Hadj Omar's eldest son, Ahmadou, and with the empire of the Dioula state builder, Samori Touré.

To successive French commanders of the Upper River/western Sudan, particularly Gustave Borgnis-Desbordes (1880–1883), Joseph Simon Galliéni (1886–1888), and Louis Archinard (1888–1891 and 1892–1893), the Tukulor Empire, because it blocked the way to Timbuktu, had to be destroyed. This task, completed in 1893, was accompanied by lesser campaigns against former Bambara, Tukulor, Sénoufo, and other African allies who were no longer needed.

As the French communication lines linking the upper Senegal and the upper and middle Niger regions grazed the northern rim of the area where Samori Touré was building his empire, a clash occurred at Keniéra, south of the Niger River, in February 1882. Later, periods of hostilities alternated with periods of uneasy peace, as Samori, attempting to avoid the French, shifted his area of state building from upper Guinea to northern Côte d'Ivoire. In September 1898 Captain Henri-Joseph Gouraud, commanding a small detachment of mostly African troops, captured Samori inside Liberian territory.

While the French were combating these African adversaries, they were also contending with instances of dissidence among presumed allies and suppressing numerous rebellions. The establishment of the Upper River/western Sudan region as an autonomous military command in 1880 was a stimulus to independent actions

One of the most important figures in France's colonial history, Louis Faidherbe was an architect of the French Empire in Africa. (Library of Congress)

on the part of its commanders. The French occupation of Timbuktu in 1894 was one such action.

The eastward-moving struggle against Samori offered the French an impetus to link the French enclaves farther down the west African coast to the interior. This process sped up and expanded after the 1885 Berlin West Africa Conference established rules for the effective European occupation of African territory.

In 1899 French columns from Algeria, the western Sudan, and the French Congo converged near the southern shore of Lake Chad, at Kousséri. Here the combined forces defeated the Sudanic state builder Rabah Zoubeir. Although this battle is often viewed as marking the close of the era of the French conquest of western Africa, French forces, for many more years, would fight smaller campaigns in outlying areas, such as the region of southern Côte d'Ivoire. As a kind of afterthought, France began the pacification of Mauritania in 1905, a task that would drag on until 1938.

Leland Conley Barrows

See also: Algeria, French Conquest of (1830–1857); French Colonial Policy in Africa.

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Western Sahara War (1976–1991)

Conflict between Morocco and the Algerian-backed the Polisario (Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el-Hamra and Río de Oro) independence movement over control of Western Sahara, a former Spanish colony in northwest Africa; the conflict also involved Mauritania, which initially seized control of parts of Western Sahara but was eventually forced to disengage and remain neutral. The war was prompted by Spain's withdrawal and the International Court of Justice's ruling on the uncertain legal status of the Western Saharan territory. In late 1975, Morocco's king Hassan II organized the "Green march" of thousands of Moroccans demanding Western Sahara's union with Morocco. In November 1975, as part of the Madrid Accords, Spain agreed to transfer control of the territory to Morocco and Mauritania, which it formally did in February 1976. Morocco occupied two thirds of the territory, while Mauritania seized the southern portion. However, the partition of Western Sahara was challenged by the local Polisario independence movement, which received backing from Algeria. Unable to combat superior Moroccan army, the Polisario turned to Mauritania, participating in a coup that ousted its President Moktar Ould Daddah in July 1978 and convincing the Mauritanian military junta to retreat from southern region of Western Sahara in 1979.

Over the next few years the conflict rapidly escalated as Moroccan troops clashed with the better-trained and better-armed Polisario troops. In response to the rebels' war of attrition, Morocco deployed about 150,000 troops in the region and began constructing a network of defensive sand walls (berms) with fortified observation points and early-warning equipment. Between 1980 and 1987, Morocco built 2,000 miles of such sand walls, which isolated the Polisario from much of the land and limited its operations to sporadic raids. With generous military and civilian aid from France, the United States, and Saudi Arabia, Morocco invested billions into rehabilitating the region, building schools, hospitals, and other infrastructure.

Unable to defeat Morocco militarily, the Polisario turned to the diplomatic front, gaining recognition from more than 80 countries for its Saharan Arab Democratic Republic (SADR) and even obtaining full membership in the Organization of African Unity (OAU) in 1984; Morocco withdrew from the OAU in protest. As of 2011, 22 states have withdrawn their former recognition, and 12 have suspended

their diplomatic relations with SADR pending the outcome of the United Nations (UN) mediation. However, as Algeria reduced its support, SADR remains increasing depended on international assistance, especially from the UN. In April 1991, the UN Security Council authorized the establishment of a combined military and civilian force, the United Nations Mission for the Referendum in the Western Sahara (MINURSO), to organize and implement a referendum process by 1992. Both sides accepted a cease fire on September 6, 1991, but the deployment of MINURSO and implementation of the referendum have been repeatedly delayed because of bitter disagreement over voter eligibility. Several attempts at restarting the process, notably the 2003 Baker plan, have largely failed.

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See also: Sand War (Moroccan-Algerian War) (1963).

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Western Sudan, Jihads in

The first half of the 19th century witnessed the outbreak of three religious wars, also known as jihads, in the western Sudan. The most famous and influential began in Hausaland in 1804 under the leadership of Usman dan Fodio. It was followed by jihads in Massine under Seku Ahmadu (Ahmad Lobbo) in 1818 and in the Futa Jallon area under al-Hajj Umar Tall in 1851. Caused by a combination of religious zeal and economic and political grievances, these movements had a lasting impact on the region.

Despite the spread of Islam in the region, in the 18th century whole areas still remained non-Muslim. Even in professed Muslim states, Islam was largely a religion of the towns, the ruling elite, and merchants. Although most of the ruling dynasties, especially in Hausaland, were Muslim, these dynasties were not strictly observant, and many unorthodox practices contrary to Islam, such as illegal taxation, enslavement of Muslims, and unlawful seizure of property, were common. Islamic and non-Islamic religious customs and practices existed side by side or were even blended. Revival of Islamic brotherhoods such as Qadiriyya (which emphasized that salvation came through study and intellectual activity) in the second half of

the 18th century also strengthened the belief in the coming of a Mahdi (savior) and aroused great expectations.

Nonreligious factors also contributed to the outbreak of the jihads. Politically, by the beginning of the 19th century no single large centralized state had emerged in the region. Many of the rulers of the western Sudanese states, especially the Hausa and Bambara kings, were petty tyrants widely despised for their favoritism and self-indulgence. Town-dwelling Fulani, many of whom were devout Muslims, despised their rulers for the luxury and sinfulness of court life as well as for their mistreatment of commoners. Merchants, peasants, and herders all complained over what they perceived as exorbitant taxation. One Fulani group in particular, the Torodbe or Toronkawa clan, was especially outspoken in its criticism of political and religious conditions in the region. Devout Muslims with a long tradition of religious scholarship but little access to political power, members of the clan resented their subordinate position and the fact that they took orders from their lukewarm Muslims and illiterate rulers. By the beginning of the 19th century, communities led by the Torodbe clan and individual scholars and preachers were found throughout the western Sudan preaching reform.

The most famous wandering scholar was a Fulani from Gobir, Usman dan Fodio, who was born in December 1754 into an old scholarly family of the Torodbe. After years of study, Usman began to teach and preach in the Hausa states of Kebbi, Zamfara, and Gobir. He attacked non-Islamic religious practices, condemned corrupt and unjust governments and illegal taxes, advocated education for women, and insisted on complete acceptance of the spiritual and moral values of Islam. He soon attracted student-disciples, many of whom returned to their homes to teach and preach in Hausaland and beyond.

In the late 1780s, Usman appears to have won the support of Sultan Bawa of Gobir, with whom he signed an agreement that granted Muslims freedom of religion and guaranteed respect for Islam. Taxation was decreased, and Muslims imprisoned for religious reasons were released. The agreement also allowed Muslim men to wear turbans and women to wear veils, both of which became hallmarks of Usman's followers. Still dissatisfied, Usman in the mid-1790s began to raise the possibility of jihad, or holy war. In response, Bawa's successor, Nafata, withdrew the privileges and outlawed new conversions to Islam. Nafata's successor, Yunfa, also determined to check the growing power of Usman, captured and imprisoned some of his followers in December 1803. When Usman liberated the captives at Degel and repeatedly refused to hand them over, Yunfa threatened to attack Degel itself. This led to the *hijra* (flight) of Usman and his followers from Degel to Gudu on February 21, 1804. At Gudu, he raised the standard of revolt by attacking the nearby town of Gobir and then, having been proclaimed commander of the Believers, proclaimed a jihad against the rulers of the Hausa states. Various Fulani rose up in rebellion in the other states, and many Tuareg and Hausa

peasants also joined the cause. Within a decade, all the principal Hausa states had been conquered. In the next two decades Nupe, parts of the Oyo Empire (Ilorin), and Borno (Katagum and Gombe) were added to the Fulani Empire, with its new capital of Sokoto.

Usman's success resulted in part from the weaknesses of the Hausa states, which had been divided by internecine wars for much of the 18th century. Oppressive rule, economic hardships, and social ills rallied Fulani and non-Fulani behind Usman. The zeal and determination with which he was able to infuse his followers by his preaching, coupled with the military ability of Abdullahi and Bello, his brother and son, respectively, were also important factors.

Other important jihads followed. Between 1818 and 1844, Seku Ahmadu (b. 1775), Usman's disciple, unified a number of smaller Bambara, Arma, and Songhai kingdoms and principalities to establish the highly centralized Fulani theocratic state of Masina. In 1852 under al-Hajj Umar (1794–1863), a Tukulor, another jihad was directed not only against western Sudanese rulers but also against the French, who had begun their imperialist drive in the region of the Senegambia. Although he died in 1863 before he created an effective administrative machinery, Umar created a Tukulor state that lasted until its overthrow by the French in 1893.

These jihads had far-reaching political, economic, and social consequences. They brought about fundamental political changes in which larger kingdoms replaced petty states. Usman's jihad led to the establishment of a single Fulani state in place of the many competing states in Hausaland. The state, known as the Sokoto caliphate, was the largest political unit in 19th-century West Africa. Political centralization decreased the number of wars in the region, which in turn stimulated agricultural and handicraft industries, particularly in Hausaland. Trade increased, with Kano becoming the hub of commercial growth in Hausaland. All three jihads led to the Islamization of the region and in consequence a revival of Islamic scholarship and education.

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See also: Jihad; Songhai Empire (15th–16th Centuries; Tukulor-French Wars; Usman dan Fodio.

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World War I. *See* Arab Revolt of 1916–1919; Damascus, Fall of (1918); Enver Pasha; Husayn ibn Ali; Ibn Saud; Jerusalem, Fall of (1917); Kemal Atatürk, Mustafa; Lausanne, Treaty of (1923); Lawrence, Thomas Edward (Lawrence of Arabia); Ottoman Army (World War I); Ottoman Empire, Entry into World War I; Sakarya, Battle of (1921); Sèvres, Treaty of; World War I (Caucasian Front); World War I (Iranian Front); World War I (Mesopotamian Theater); World War I (Palestine and Syria).

World War I (Caucasian Front)

Military front involving Russia and the Ottoman Empire. The 300-mile-wide area of mountain ranges and high plateaus constituting the Turko-Russian frontier in Caucasia had, in spite of its forbidding nature, long been the primary battlefield of those two powers. Yet in 1914, Russian leaders did not regard this as a major theater of war. They rightly expected the war to be decided by the clash of mass armies on the battlefields of Europe. Ottoman leaders, especially Minister of War Enver Pasha, nourished fantastic Pan-Turanic schemes and devoted a major military effort to offensives in the Caucasus region, forcing Russia to follow suit. A four-year struggle ensued in which Turkey suffered some bitter defeats but also scored its most spectacular success of the entire war.

Both opposing armies entered the war on the Caucasian Front insufficiently prepared for major operations. Russia normally maintained three corps in the area in peacetime, but with the war starting and Turkey still neutral, two had redeployed to the Eastern European Front. The I Caucasian Corps that remained had been reinforced only by the II Turkistan Corps and some Cossack divisions. Split in five separate groups, this Russian army of about 100,000 infantry, 15,000 cavalry, and 256 guns, commanded for all practical purposes by its chief of staff, the capable Major General Nikolay Yudenich, guarded the major communications across the frontier and maintained a general reserve around Tiflis. Turkey's Third Army opposed the Russians. Commanded by Hasan Izzet Pasha, it contained three corps: IX, X, and XI. These were understrength and desperately short of munitions.

Even before the Russian declaration of war on November 2, 1914, weak Russian forces advanced across the frontier to secure better defensive positions. Within a week, Izzet Pasha had concentrated four divisions of the IX and XI Corps against the main Russian body on the Kars-Erzurum Road. He checked the Russians with heavy losses in fighting around Köprüköy, pushing the attackers back toward the frontier where the latter consolidated their position after being reinforced. The Russians were more successful on their left flank, where they encountered only weak Turkish forces. On the other hand, Russian defenses on their right flank, around the Black Sea port of Batum, collapsed under the pressure of Turkish irregulars.

This was the situation that encouraged Enver Pasha to order the Third Army to undertake a major offensive, in spite of approaching winter that would cover the area with 10 to 12 feet of snow and drop temperatures to –50°F. The Third Army was reinforced to 120,000 men, outnumbering the Russians, who had about 80,000 men, by 50 percent. Enver's plan was a single encirclement with IX and X Corps moving through the Oltu River valley to place them in the right rear of the Russian salient, while XI Corps pinned the Russians in front. But the grandiose operation that began on December 22, 1914, resulted in disaster. Although the flanking force advanced rapidly, taking Oltu within two days and the key city of Sarikamiş within four days, XI Corps failed to pin the Russian army. With the aid of fresh reinforcements, Yudenich trapped the Turkish left wing in the Turnagel Woods north of Sarikamiş. On January 4, 1915, the Ottoman IX Corps surrendered wholesale. Having suffered 50,000 casualties to Yudenich's 28,000, the remnants of the Third Army withdrew in confusion.

Fortunately for the Turks, the Russians were too exhausted to follow up their victory with a rapid advance on Erzurum. During the spring, the battered Third Army, having been additionally reduced by a typhus epidemic to about 20,000 men, was slowly rebuilt to combat strength. By June 1915, it numbered more than 50,000 effectives, not counting the Erzurum fortress garrison, while Yudenich, now formally commander of the Russian Caucasus Army, had about 80,000 men.

Assuming that the Third Army was still weakest on its right, as it had been in 1914, Yudenich resumed the offensive in June 1915 by pushing his new IV Caucasian Corps down the northwestern shore of Lake Van for a drive on the key city of Muş. The Turks, however, succeeded in concentrating in the area a total of 70,000 effectives, formed around the rebuilt IX corps as a new wing under Abdulkarim Pasha, a fact that the Russians failed to detect. Caught in the restricted terrain by superior Ottoman forces, the Russian advance ground to a halt. The ensuing battle focused on the city of Malazgirt, which the Turks captured on July 26. Intoxicated by this success, Abdulkarim pressed on into the Elişkirt Valley, but, repeating the Sarikamiş pattern, was then checked by a Russian counteroffensive that recaptured Malazgirt on August 15. This indecisive military operation cost the Turks more than 80,000 casualties, with the unlucky IX Corps again almost being wiped out.

Both armies used the remainder of 1915 to rebuild their strength. Then, taking the Turks by surprise, Yudenich struck on January 10, 1916, with I Caucasian and II Turkistan Corps down the Kars-Erzurum road, actually where the Turkish lines were strongest. (Following the fight for Malazgirt, both armies had stripped the Muş sector of all but the bare minimum of troops.) Still, the attackers vastly outnumbered the defenders, who had tasked three understrength corps (the IX, X, and XI) with each holding 20 miles of front line. Within a week, the Russians had carried the fortified lines of Köprüköy. Badly mauled and reduced to some 50,000 effectives, the Turkish Third Army retreated to the Erzurum fortress area.

As the second-largest Turkish fortress (after Adrianople), Erzurum was regarded as an almost impregnable stronghold by the Ottoman General Staff. That belief may have been one reason it failed to send much-needed reinforcements quickly to the Third Army. On February 11, 1916, the Russians attacked the Turkish lines around Erzurum. Yudenich concentrated more than 250 guns on a small sector of the line. Losses were heavy, but the Russians' three-to-one numerical superiority told. On February 16, the Third Army withdrew from Erzurum just in time to escape total envelopment. Along with the fortress, the Turks sustained 25,000 casualties and lost 327 guns, their hospitals, and substantial stocks of supplies. Additionally, on April 16, 1916, the only large Black Sea port in the area, Trabzon, fell to the Russians, a logistical disaster for the Turks in this mountainous area not serviced by railroads. Reinforced by the veteran V Corps from Gallipoli, the shaken Third Army was barely able to avoid annihilation.

During the spring, the Ottoman General Staff devised a new grand design. On the right flank of the Third Army, a new Second Army under Ahmed Izzet Pasha appeared, formed of crack divisions no longer needed for the defense of the Gallipoli Peninsula. While the Third Army remained seriously understrength and could not effectively oppose a renewed Russian offensive in July 1916, which cost the Turks the cities of Bayburt on July 17 and Erzincan on July 25, the Second Army was slowly brought up to a strength of 10 infantry divisions with ample cavalry and heavy artillery, for a total of 100,000 effectives.

On August 2, Izzet Pasha launched his offensive against the Russian left flank. A month earlier, such an attack might have saved the Third Army from disaster, but now Yudenich could devote his full attention to this new threat to his flank. Izzet Pasha's offensive was poorly planned and was carried out by three widely separated columns against a Russian army that enjoyed interior lines and superior communications. Still, the Second Army's crack troops were initially successful, until they were checked by Russian counterattacks in late August. By September 26, Izzet Pasha's offensive was over. For little ground gained he had sacrificed 30,000 irreplaceable well-trained infantry.

This proved to be Turkey's penultimate major offensive. Soldiers on both sides on the Caucasian Front spent the remainder of 1916 and most of 1917 in the trenches with almost no action on either side. The Turkish Second and Third armies had exhausted their offensive potential. In the second half of 1917, the Russian forces, plagued by revolutionary discontent, began to disintegrate. Caucasia became for all practical purposes a political and military vacuum.

On the Turkish side, the Second Army was dissolved and the entire front again put under the authority of the Third Army. With its former corps and divisions consolidated into new ones, but still far under authorized strength, the army was hardly capable of offensive operations. However, the disappearance of any organized opposition in its front, save the National Army of the newly independent

Armenia, seemed to warrant another offensive, the last by the Ottoman Empire. It commenced on February 12, 1918, and was a great, if short-lived, success. Erzincan fell immediately and Trabzon within a fortnight. On March 12 Vehip Pasha was in Erzurum, and on the 25th he crossed the prewar frontier. On April 3 the Turks were in Sarikamiş, on April 6 in Van, and on April 14 in Batum, having reconquered within two months all the ground lost since 1914. On April 25 the 10,000-strong Armenian garrison surrendered the fortress city of Kars, which had been Turkish territory until 1878, along with more than 200 guns and substantial quantities of supplies. Finally assuming a grand scale, the Turkish offensive then fanned out into northern Persia and Azerbaijan. Amidst chaotic peace talks with Russian, British, German, Armenian, and Georgian envoys, the Turks took the major Caspian Sea port of Baku on September 15, 1918. Finally, on November 8 their 15th Infantry Division captured Petrovsk, 180 miles north of Baku. By that time, however, the Armistice of Mudros on October 30 and Turkey's departure from the war had already rendered the vast territorial gains of its last offensive entirely meaningless.

Dierk Walter

See also: World War I.

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World War I (Iranian Front)

A secondary fighting front during World War I but nonetheless one of great strategic importance. A vast empire bordering most of the focal points of Great Power rivalry in Central and South Asia yet stricken with an utterly weak central government and persistent feudal and tribal structures, Persia represented a power vacuum that almost by default became a battleground for the Great Powers in the war. Persia was extremely important to both sides because of its strategic location and because of recently developed British-controlled oil fields. Vulnerable to foreign intervention, Persia was ruled by the weak and vacillating 17-year-old Ahmad Shah. His miniscule military consisted largely of an 8,000-man Cossack Brigade commanded by Russian officers and a Swedish gendarmerie of 7,000 men led by Swedish officers who favored the German side.

Supposedly, foreign troops entered Persia during the war to uphold the shah's authority. In reality, British troops entered south Persia to protect the Anglo-Persian oil installations around Abadan and keep open the sea route through the Persian Gulf. Western Persia became a convenient extension of the Anglo-Turkish Front in Mesopotamia and the Russo-Turkish Front in the Caucasus. In central Persia, British, Russian, Ottoman, and German forces and missions battled for dominant influence over what little central power the monarchy possessed, and in eastern Persia, Britain tried to shield its Indian Empire from German, and later Russian, interference. In 1918 northern Persia became the springboard for British intervention in the Russian Civil War.

Turkey was the only power that hoped to take Persian territory. Minister of War Enver Pasha was pursuing his fantastic Pan-Turanic schemes when he ordered the Van Jandarma (paramilitary police) Division into Persia in December 1914, simultaneously with the Caucasian offensive of the Third Army. In spite of some success in bringing local tribes on their side, the Ottoman invaders were unable to secure a permanent foothold in Persia. In the spring of 1915 Russian forces drove them back.

Late in 1915, Russia reinforced its forces, commanded by General Nikolai N. Baratoff. That December they advanced on Hamadan, Tehran, and Qum, driving the Ottomans back farther and bringing most of northwestern Persia under Russian control. Seesaw action continued through the winter of 1915–1916 with inconclusive engagements between Turkish, Russian, and Persian tribal forces, but little ground actually changed hands. On February 25, 1916, Baratoff took Kermanshah.

In the spring of 1916, to support the Russian defense in the Caucasus, Baratoff received orders to move on Khaniqin. His advance, however, collided with a renewed Turkish effort in Persia. Ali Insan Pasha's Ottoman XIII Corps of three crack infantry divisions totaling 25,000 men hit the scattered Russians and drove them back. On June 26 the Turks were in Karind and on July 2 in Kermanshah. Operating at the extreme end of a fragile supply line through hostile country, Baratoff had no real hope of stopping the Ottoman thrust. The Allies considered a diversionary attack on the Turkish flank by the British Expeditionary Force in Iraq, but this did not materialize. On August 9 Ali Insan took Hamadan. Realizing that he had little chance of permanently holding vast stretches of territory deep in Persia with his small force, he advanced no farther. The Russians remained firmly entrenched on the mountain passes just beyond Hamadan.

A lull occurred in Persia during the winter of 1916–1917. In the spring the Ottoman XIII Corps was withdrawn from Persia to help fend off the British advance in Mesopotamia. Baratoff followed, and on March 31, 1917, he retook Qasr-e Shirin. The Ottoman invasion of Persia was over.

In central and southern Persia, the first two years of the war saw German influence in the ascendant. German diplomatic personnel succeeded in winning over local tribes to oppose the British and Russians, and the Germans even managed to incite revolts in south Persia. The Germans also sent a military mission to Tehran to train Persian troops under German leadership, and German expeditions traversed the country toward Afghanistan, hoping to win Emir Habib Allah of Afghanistan to their side and thus exert pressure on British India. If the British overstated the case in their claim that Persia was virtually a German colony in 1915–1916, it was nevertheless obvious that upholding British influence there would require additional resources.

The British response was multifaceted. Britain asked its Russian allies to bring pressure to bear on the central government by advancing on Tehran. The British also reinforced with units of the Indian army their position in the Persian Gulf and in southern Persia, and in Fars and Kerman the British raised an indigenous force under their control. Known as the South Persian Rifles, the force later expanded to two brigades of more than 6,000 men. Finally, in the vast expanses of eastern Persia, the British established a military cordon to prevent German incursions into Afghanistan. In the southeast, the British maintained throughout the war the so-called Seistan Force, later styled the East Persian Cordon Field Force. It consisted of several Indian squadrons and companies and some 100 indigenous troops. British forces in southern and eastern Persia spent the rest of the war upholding British influence and quelling tribal unrest in continuous small wars.

In the northeast the Russians controlled vast expanses of Persia bordering their central Asian provinces. In 1916 after the Russian advance in northwestern Persia, the Germans found themselves cut off from their lines of communications.

The Russian revolutions of March and November 1917 dramatically changed the military situation in Persia. Internal unrest sapped Baratoff's force and loosened the Russian hold on northwestern Persia. Simultaneously, the Ottomans again pushed into the Caucasus region with the aim of finally securing a Pan-Turanic empire. Meanwhile, German progress in southern Russia posed a threat not only to the British position in Persia but also to its influence in Afghanistan. To remedy this situation, the British dispatched to northern Persia forces under Major-General L. C. Dunsterville. A confusing strategic situation developed when the Turkish Ninth Army advanced southeast into Persia and took Tabriz, while Dunsterville moved his troops, known as "Dunsterforce," north to secure a road to the vital oil-producing region around Baku. The British forces were finally drawn into the Russian Civil War, at times fighting alongside the counterrevolutionary White forces against the Bolsheviks in northern Persia, Caucasia, and Turkistan.

The Turks, meanwhile, tried to hold on to Azerbaijan even after the Armistice of Mudros (October 30, 1918). Only on November 7, 1918, did British forces

finally enter Baku. The British intervention in Transcaspia (Turkistan) continued into March 1919, when Russian White forces took over from them.

Dierk Walter

See also: World War I.

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World War I (Mesopotamian Theater)

The October 29, 1914, entry of the Ottoman Empire into World War I on the side of the Central Powers threatened British interests in the Near East, especially the Suez Canal and the newly discovered oil fields in the area around Basra in Mesopotamia. At the end of September the British had discussed sending reinforcements to the area, and they now did so, seeking to protect these important assets and to encourage the Arabs to revolt against Ottoman rule. On November 7 a brigade of the Indian army and 600 British troops landed at Fao at the head of the Persian Gulf. The initial British goal was to capture Basra.

The campaign began well. British and Indian forces captured Basra on November 22 and Qurna, at the confluence of the Tigris and Euphrates, on December 9. On April 12, 1915, the Turkish army attacked both Basra and Qurna in an effort to dislodge the British and Indians. At Shaiba, southwest of Basra, 6,000 British and Indian defenders routed 10,000 Turks. The British sustained some 1,357 casualties, the Turks 2,435. The British were unable to follow up the victory, however, as they had no transport. The ease of the victory gave the British forces a false sense of Turkish military inferiority.

Through 1915 Whitehall left much of the decision making for Mesopotamia to the government in India, which did not necessarily have the same interests as those in London. On April 9 General Sir John Nixon, commander of the Indian Northern Army, assumed command in Mesopotamia. Nixon's orders were to secure Basra and Lower Mesopotamia; protect the oil fields, the refinery at Abadan, and the pipeline; and prepare for an offensive against Baghdad.

To carry out these missions and expand the British defensive perimeter, Nixon called for drives up the Tigris and Euphrates rivers. In May 1915 Major General

Charles Townshend's 6th Indian Division proceeded up the Tigris, routing the Turkish defenders and pursuing them in a series of quick, successful amphibious operations. The conclusion of the pursuit came at Amara where an amphibious reconnaissance force of about 100 soldiers and sailors captured the town, its stores, and its garrison. The Turkish troops there surrendered on the assumption that the main Anglo-Indian force was close on the heels of the reconnaissance force, when in reality it was nearly 100 miles away. Subsequently, Major-General George Gorringe led the 12th Indian Division up the Euphrates and captured Nasiriyah, in another amphibious operation, on July 25. The Basra region and Lower Mesopotamia were now secure, and the oil fields were held safe from Turkish attack.

These easy campaigns on the Tigris bred a sense of overconfidence among the British and convinced Nixon that he could capture Baghdad and bring a speedy close to the campaign. Despite Townshend's objections that his men were not prepared for such an effort in the heat of the summer and that he lacked sufficient logistical support, Nixon ordered the 6th Division to continue its advance up the Tigris. River towns fell in quick succession to Townshend's force as it drew closer to Baghdad. On September 28, 1915, following two days of fighting, the British occupied Kut-al-Amara, 90 miles from Baghdad. British supply lines now stretched 380 miles from Kut to the sea, and their transportation capacity was far from adequate.

Despite mixed opinion on the advisability of an advance on Baghdad, Townshend continued his push upriver on November 11. Eleven days later he was within 25 miles of Baghdad. At Ctesiphon during November 22–26, 1915, Townshend attacked an entrenched Turkish force of 18,000 men and 52 guns commanded by German General Colmar von der Goltz. The British lost 4,600 men, almost one-third of the force of three infantry brigades, without displacing the Turks. The Turks at Ctesiphon suffered 9,500 casualties, twice as many as Townshend's force, but rather than breaking, they counterattacked.

Lacking sufficient reserves and supplies, Townshend had little option but to retreat to Kut, sending his sick and wounded on a torturous 400-mile trek (13 days by boat) to the Persian Gulf. Townshend's exhausted troops needed a rest, and he halted at Kut to wait for reinforcements. From December 7 the Turks placed Kut under siege. Townshend had 10,000 effectives; there were also 2,000 casualties and 3,500 Indian noncombatants.

In January 1916 Lieutenant-General Sir Fenton Aylmer led a British effort to raise the siege. The main constraint in Aylmer's attempt, as in all such British efforts in the campaign, was the supply situation. In January 1916 the rivers were the only viable means of transport open to the British. Although materials to build a narrow-gauge railway from Basra to the front lines at Ali Gharbi were available in India, no thought had been given to sending these to Mesopotamia, and by the time the Turks surrounded Townshend in Kut it was too late. The British forces in

Mesopotamia also faced a chronic shortage of boats for river transit. Aylmer faced the task of lifting a siege in an area that was a three-week round-trip boat journey from Basra. That port also left much to be desired. Its port facilities were so inadequate that it could take up to six weeks for oceangoing transports to unload their cargoes. Aylmer's relief force was therefore sent forward as troops arrived, and the maximum size of his force was set by the army's supply limitations, rather than the number of troops estimated to be necessary to lift the siege.

On January 3, 1916, Aylmer's force of 19,000 soldiers and 46 guns advanced up both banks of the Tigris toward Kut. On January 7 and 8 they fought and failed to dislodge a Turkish force at Sheikh Sa'ad about 19 miles from Kut. The Turks, who had their own supply problems, soon withdrew, however. On January 9 Aylmer's force occupied Sheikh Sa'ad, but the fighting had claimed 4,000 of his men. Responding to pressure from Nixon, Aylmer continued to press the attack. On January 13 he engaged the Turks in the Battle of the Wadi, 12.5 miles from Kut, suffering another 1,600 casualties in the process.

Under pressure from Nixon and spurred on by reports from Townshend of dwindling supplies within Kut, Aylmer ordered his remaining forces to take the Hanna Defile in preparation for a final assault on Kut. Aylmer now had about 12,000 men, while the Turks had about 30,000 men between Aylmer and Kut. The attack on the Hanna Defile began with a British artillery barrage at midday on January 20 that continued until the next morning. It did little more than warn Turkish commander Khalil Pasha where the attack was coming.

On January 21, 4,000 British soldiers set out across 600 yards of flooded terrain separating the two forces, only to be cut down by Turkish machine-gun fire. Having sustained 2,700 casualties, Aylmer believed his force was now inadequate to lift the siege. Nevertheless, Nixon ordered him to continue. With additional British reinforcements, Aylmer tried again, and on March 8 he reached the Dujaila Redoubt, 2 miles from Kut. The Turkish Sixth Army, reinforced by 36,000 men transferred from Gallipoli after the British evacuation there at the end of December, repulsed the British, leading Nixon to replace Aylmer with General Gorringe.

Gorringe made one last attempt to relieve Kut. His command was bolstered to 30,000 men by the arrival of Major-General Sir Stanley Maude's 13th Division. Von der Goltz drew on Turkish reserves in Baghdad to match that number. Maude's division attacked the Hanna Defile at dawn on April 5 only to find the Turkish frontline trenches unoccupied. Maude regrouped, attacked, and captured Fallahiyeh while a diversionary attack on the other bank of the Tigris enjoyed similar success. Although these successes had cost 2,000 British casualties, Gorringe prepared to attack Sannaiyat the following day. The Turks fought off attacks on Sannaiyat on April 6, 7, and 9, inflicting further casualties on the British. On April 17, Gorringe switched targets to the other side of the river and took Bait Asia with light casualties. Turkish counterattacks failed to dislodge the British and cost the Turks about

4,000 casualties. The loss of 1,600 men of the British-Indian force, however, made it impossible for Gorringe to continue in that sector on the bank of the river. On April 22, Gorringe chose to resume his attack on Sannaiyat and failed, at a cost of 1,300 more casualties. This was the last effort to relieve Kut. In all, the British had suffered 23,000 casualties trying to rescue the 10,000 survivors at Kut.

Townshend surrendered unconditionally to Khalil Pasha on April 29, 1916. Goltz, who had masterminded the Turkish siege, did not live to see the British surrender. He died of typhus on April 19, although rumors persisted that the Turks had poisoned him. The Turkish victors forced some 8,000 British and Indian prisoners to march to camps in Anatolia without sufficient water or provisions. Through mistreatment and neglect, nearly 5,000 died before the end of the war.

In August 1916, General Sir Stanley Maude replaced Nixon as commander of British forces in Mesopotamia, having replaced Gorringe as commander of British forces on the Tigris the previous month. Maude reorganized the forces at his disposal, revamped the system of medical care, and improved the supply train. He then resumed the offensive up the Tigris on December 13 with a force of 59,000 British and 107,000 Indian soldiers. The force recaptured Kut on February 25, 1917.

After a brief rest and consolidation, Maude resumed his march on Baghdad on March 5. Khalil did not take effective advantage of the pause. He abandoned construction of defenses around Ctesiphon, giving up on the idea of a forward defense, and ordered his 33,000 soldiers to dig in on both sides of the Tigris and along the Diyala River about 20 miles south of Baghdad. By March 10 Maude had forced a crossing of the Diyala. Khalil, ignoring German arguments for a counterattack, withdrew to the northwest to protect the Berlin to Baghdad railroad and then decided to evacuate Baghdad entirely. On March 11 Maude's forces entered Baghdad without a fight. This was a major propaganda coup at a time when the Allies needed any victory, although the capture of the city carried little strategic significance.

To consolidate his newly won position, Maude dispatched columns up the Tigris, Euphrates, and Diyala rivers in an effort to destroy the Turkish army in the field. This renewed effort, which sought ultimately to capture the terminus of the Baghdad-Samarrah railway, began just two days after Maude's forces took Baghdad, pitting 45,000 British troops against 25,000 Turks. Although the Turks carried out a skillful fighting withdrawal, notable British successes, including capture of the flood control works at Falluja on March 19, prevented the Turks from flooding the plains between the Tigris and Euphrates. The British then took Samarrah on April 23. In the campaign, Maude's forces had sustained 58,000 casualties (40,000 from disease), and this forced a cessation of offensive action until the autumn.

On September 28, 1917, the British offensive resumed. Its most notable success was the capture of Tikrit on November 6. Maude died of cholera on November 18. His replacement, Lieutenant-General Sir William Marshall, followed Maude's policy of advancing up the rivers to keep the pressure on the Turks. Maude's death, however,

gave General Sir William Robertson, chief of the Imperial General Staff, the opportunity to limit the resources earmarked for the Mesopotamian theater.

British efforts resumed in the spring of 1918 against dwindling Turkish resistance. The capture of 5,000 Turks at Khan Baghdad on the Euphrates on March 26, 1918 showed that the Turkish army had lost its will to fight. In October a British force drove up the Tigris and captured the oil fields around Mosul shortly before the leaders of the Ottoman Empire asked for an armistice. The last battle in the Mesopotamian theater took place near the ancient Assyrian capital at Asshur. The Turks signed an armistice at Mudros on October 30, 1918. It went into effect the next day, ending Turkish participation in the war.

Following the war, Mesopotamia received its modern name of Iraq and became a British Mandate. Fighting there during the war had cost the British and Indians 92,000 casualties, including 27,000 dead (13,000 of disease). In the same period the Ottoman army had sustained an estimated 325,000 casualties in what historian Michael Lyons has called "perhaps the most unnecessary campaign of the entire war."

John Lavalle

See also: World War I.

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World War I (Palestine and Syria)

British land campaign aimed at liberating Jerusalem and forcing the Ottoman Empire to surrender. The British cabinet discussed an initial plan for the Palestine campaign in January 1915. It proposed an attack on Syria, combined with an advance north from Basra to Baghdad. This plan was shelved, however, in favor of the campaign at Gallipoli.

In February 1915 the Turkish military, urged on by its German ally, attacked the Suez Canal. The British repulsed this effort led by Turkish minister of marine general Ahmed Djemal Pasha and assisted by German chief of staff lieutenant general Friedrich Kress von Kressenstein. Because of the great manpower demands of the Western Front, troops in the Egyptian Expeditionary Force (EEF) mostly remained on the defensive until 1917. The Turkish attack of 1915 did, however, force the

British to build up fortifications on the eastern side of the Suez Canal. Nuisance raids on the area continued, but the Turks launched no other major offensives there. During 1916 the EEF, led by Lieutenant General Archibald Murray, began construction of a road, a railroad, and a water line across Sinai. Such supply lines and access to water would be crucial in any campaign in Palestine and Syria.

Newly elected British prime minister David Lloyd George wanted military victories and believed they could be achieved most easily in the Middle East. He urged Murray to take Gaza and then move up the coast to Jerusalem. The British Palestine offensive began in December 1916 with the capture of El Arish, 25 miles south of the Palestinian border. However, southern Palestine between Gaza and Beersheba was heavily fortified. The Turkish defenders there were led by the German generals Kress von Kressenstein and Erich von Falkenhayn.

Murray mounted the first attack on Gaza on March 26, 1917. Lieutenant General Sir Charles Dobell led a cavalry attack from the east in combination with an infantry attack from the south. Just as the battle turned to British advantage, Dobell, who was hampered by poor communications, ordered his troops to withdraw. This failure produced more than 3,000 British casualties. A second attempt to take Gaza, beginning on April 17, also failed, this time with more than 5,000 casualties. In response, Murray was replaced with Major General Sir Edmund Allenby, a cavalryman and veteran of fighting in South Africa and on the Western Front.

Allenby arrived in Egypt at the end of June 1917. After taking stock of the situation, he requested reinforcements and supplies to extend the railroad and water lines. He then reorganized his forces into three corps: XX Corps under Lieutenant General Philip Chetwode, XXI Corps under Lieutenant General Edward S. Bulfin, and the Desert Mounted Corps under Lieutenant General Henry Chauvel. He also moved his headquarters from Cairo to the front. Lloyd George saw to it that the requests were met, and Allenby received two infantry divisions from Europe, one infantry division from Salonika, and artillery and Royal Flying Corps support.

Allenby decided to strike at Beersheba, but with a deception to convince the Turks that he was massing troops to attack at Gaza. For the attack he would have four infantry divisions and three cavalry divisions (80,000 men and 218 guns, supported by 5 tanks). The Turks defended the 30-mile line between Gaza and Beersheba with five infantry divisions and one cavalry division (35,000 men and 200 guns).

Allenby prepared meticulously for the attack. He ordered the construction of new roads, commissioned updated maps, and studied campaigns in the area, including both the Crusades and Napoleon Bonparate's invasion. He also organized 30,000 camels to supply water. Colonel Richard Meinertzhagen, Allenby's chief of intelligence, played an important role. He established a wireless receiving station and used it to intercept Turkish radio transmissions. Meinertzhagen also brought about the death of one of the principal Arab spies by sending him a letter thanking

him for service to the British with payment for said services. He then arranged for the letter to be intercepted by the Turks, and the spy was executed. Meinertzhagen also arranged a deception, making it widely known that Allenby would be in Cairo during 29 October–4 November. Lastly, he devised a plan whereby a staff officer would arrange to be pursued by Turkish forces and drop a haversack filled with papers that described an impending attack on Gaza rather than at Beersheba. The first two attempts at the latter failed, until Meinertzhagen took on the task himself and succeeded.

On 31 October the offensive opened with a massive artillery attack against Turkish positions at Gaza, which was well fortified by barbed wire and a formidable trench system. But the artillery attack was a feint. A full-scale attack was then launched against Beersheba. The Desert Mounted Corps (4th Brigade Australian Light Horse) executed a dangerous long ride across the Judean Desert, then charged the Turkish left flank and seized control of the water wells before they could be destroyed.

After the capture of Beersheba, Allenby turned his attention to Gaza, which he secured in four days. The XX Corps (10th, 60th, and 74th Divisions) steadily pushed back the Turks. Allenby sent XXI Corps up the coast into Palestine, the Turks retreating to the Judean Hills 20 miles south of Jerusalem.

Allenby did not want to allow the Turks time to establish a defensive line south of Jerusalem and so refused to let his men and their animals rest. Although his supply and communication lines were stretched, Allenby pushed his forces toward Jerusalem. On November 16, 1917, his forces took Jaffa, on the coast.

Allenby wanted to minimize fighting within the historic city of Jerusalem, and he devised a plan of encirclement. The British brought 18,000 infantry, 8,000 cavalry, and 172 guns to this battle; the Turks had 15,000 infantry, 800 cavalry, and 120 guns. Following fierce fighting on the city's outskirts, on December 8 XXI Corps, supported by artillery fire, broke through from the west. Turkish forces then evacuated Jerusalem, which surrendered on December 9, 1917, ending 401 years of Ottoman control. In anticipation of advancing across the Jordan River, Allenby set a defensive line from the Mediterranean shore east to the Jordan River valley, approximately 10 miles north of Jerusalem.

Allenby wanted to push northward quickly to Damascus, but with the start of the Ludendorff offensive on the Western Front, two of his divisions were recalled and sent there. Allenby then received reinforcements from Mesopotamia. He was also able to take advantage of internal Arab unrest within the Ottoman Empire. The Turks had been weakened by the Arab Revolt led by Husayn ibn Alī, beginning in June 1916. As grand sharif of Mecca, Husayn's family controlled the Hejaz, which contained the holy cities of Mecca and Medina. Husayn's third son, Faisal, became an important Arab military leader and, along with Captain T. E. Lawrence, scored important victories against Turkish forces in 1916 and 1917, including the seizures

of Aqaba and Wejh. Allenby integrated Faisal's actions with his own plans and sent the Arabs additional supplies to support their raids on Turkish outposts and railroad lines. Faisal's forces became known as the Arab Army of the North.

On the other side of the battle lines, dramatic changes in personnel occurred. General Otto Liman von Sanders replaced Falkenhayn in March 1918; Liman von Sanders in turn replaced almost all the German staff officers with Turks. Within the Ottoman Empire, the death of Sultan Mehmed V resulted in the ascension of his brother, Mehmed VI, to the throne. Mehmed VI appointed General Mustafa Kemal as commander of the Seventh Army in Syria.

By summer 1918 three Turkish armies were positioned across the Jaffa-Jerusalem line. The Seventh and Eighth Armies were between the coast and the Jordan River; the Third Army lay east of the river. The Turks, however, had been fighting for six months without relief and lacked reserves. Turkish forces consisted of 26,000 infantry, 3,000 cavalry, and 370 guns. An additional 6,000 troops guarded the Hejaz railroad to the east. On this front Allenby enjoyed a two-to-one advantage in manpower as well as a tremendous edge in cavalry and air power. The British had 57,000 infantry, 12,000 cavalry, and 540 guns.

Allenby's goal was to capture Damascus, but first he needed to gain control over the Jordan Plain. After two failed attempts to take Amman, Allenby regrouped and devised a plan to advance northward by which he would outflank Turkish forces to the east while depending on Arab forces to cut the railroad line between Déraa (50 miles south of Damascus) and Haifa.

Early on the morning of September 19, 1918, in the Battle of Megiddo, British forces struck the Turkish right flank. A simultaneous Royal Air Force bombing raid on Nazareth destroyed that Turkish communications center, hampering Turkish redeployment. In a few hours the defensive line had been pierced, and soon the 9,000-man 4th Cavalry Division advanced 10 miles north and then 30 miles east to Jenin and Megiddo. By nightfall the British had taken 2,500 prisoners and almost captured General Liman von Sanders. Déraa fell on September 27.

To the north and east the offensive continued. On September 23 the 23rd Cavalry Regiment captured Haifa, Acre, and Es Salt. On September 25 it took Amman, which gave the British control over the Hejaz railroad. On September 30, British troops entered Damascus with little opposition. On October 2 the city formally surrendered, and 75,000 Turks became prisoners of war. British forces sustained only 5,600 casualties in the capture of Damascus. In the entire campaign, Allenby's forces suffered some 50,000 casualties, the majority of them from disease. The other wing of the British forces took Beirut on October 8.

In the meantime, Kemal, whose Seventh Army remained intact, was ordered to retreat toward Damascus. When he arrived there in late September, the city was in disarray. Kemal was ordered to hand over his troops to commander of the Fourth Army general Djemal Pasha and proceed to Rayak to gather scattered units. Upon

arrival at Rayak, Kemal realized that there were insufficient troops to halt the British offensive. Kemal then took matters into his own hands and ordered all his troops to reassemble north at Aleppo, 200 miles north of Damascus, in the extreme northwest corner of Syria. When the British called on Kemal to surrender and then attacked on October 25, he withdrew to the northwest outskirts of the city in defense of the southern border of Turkey rather than Aleppo. Kemal's forces attacked repeatedly, forcing the British, outnumbered six to one, to call for reinforcements from Damascus. On October 26, with reinforcements, the British took Aleppo. The Ottoman Empire surrendered on October 30, 1918, and Liman von Sanders officially handed over his command to Mustafa Kemal.

Laura J. Hilton

See also: Arab Revolt of 1916–1918; Damascus, Fall of (1918); Husayn ibn Ali; Jerusalem, Fall of (1917); Lawrence, Thomas Edward (Lawrence of Arabia); World War I.

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Y

Yahya Khan, Agha Mohammad (1917–1980)

Indian and Pakistani military leader and president of Pakistan (1969–1971). Born on February 4, 1917, in Peshawar, India (now Pakistan), Agha Mohammad Yahya Khan graduated from Punjab University and the Indian Military Academy at Dehra Dun. Commissioned in the Indian Army in 1938, he served with the British Army in North Africa, Iraq, and Italy during World War II.

Upon the creation of Pakistan in 1947, Yahya Khan cofounded the Pakistan Staff College at Quetta. He also helped to bring Muhammad Ayub Khan to power. During the Second Pakistan-India War in 1965, Yahya Khan commanded an infantry division. The following year he was appointed commander in chief of the Pakistani Army.

On March 25, 1969, civil unrest prompted Muhammad Ayub Khan, the president of Pakistan, to declare martial law. He promptly resigned after naming Yahya Khan chief martial law administrator and president. Yahya Khan moved swiftly to abolish the 1962 constitution and dissolve the National Assembly. He served as president for the next two years.

On March 29, 1970, Yahya Khan promulgated the Legal Framework Order of 1970, which functioned as an interim constitution and under which an election could be held. Then, in December 1970, Yahya Khan oversaw the first free elections in Pakistani history. The Awami League, led by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, captured 160 out of 165 seats in East Pakistan but no seats in West Pakistan. Instead of brokering a compromise between Rahman and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, majority leader of the West Pakistani Assembly, Yahya Khan used military force to repress the opposition in East Pakistan, and a civil war ensued. The Third Pakistan-India War (December 3–17, 1971) began when India interceded. West Pakistan was defeated, and East Pakistan seceded to become Bangladesh in 1971.

Yahya Khan resigned the presidency on December 20, 1971, and was replaced by the Pakistani foreign minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. In 1972, Bhutto placed Yahya Khan under house arrest. Yahya Khan died on August 10, 1980 in Rawalpindi, Pakistan, after suffering a stroke.

Andrew J. Waskey

See also: India-Pakistan War (1947); India-Pakistan War (1965); India-Pakistan War (1971).

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Yarmouk (Yarmuk), Battle of (636)

Decisive Arab victory over the Byzantine Empire. By the time of the Muslim invasion of Syria, the Byzantine emperor Heraclius was a sick man. His greatest triumph had been to regain Romano-Byzantine provinces lost to the Sassanian Empire under previous rulers. His tragedy was to then lose an even greater territory to the rising power of Islam. Heraclius was also the first emperor in generations to lead his armies in person, though his field commander at Yarmouk was an Armenian. Although the Battle of Yarmouk is often portrayed as a clash between Islamic and Christian forces, not all of those fighting would have been wholeheartedly committed to either faith, the Byzantines relying heavily on non-Christian Arab auxiliary troops. The two sides had already clashed several times, and in 634, Damascus fell to the Muslims. A Byzantine counteroffensive retook the city but then faced the main Muslim army close to the river Yarmouk.

According to available accounts the Byzantines greatly outnumbered the Muslims and were able to establish a front about 8 miles (13 kilometers) long. The Muslim commanders adopted a defensive position from which they could dominate the Dera'a Gap between the Yarmouk gorges and the Hawran lava plain. After a prolonged standoff the Byzantines moved forward on August 16, driving back the Muslim flanks but unable to take the enemy's main encampments. Two days later the Muslims counterattacked, their relatively small cavalry forces making a successful advance around the Byzantines' northern flank. The Byzantines fell back and were trapped between the steep gorges. On August 20, Byzantine resistance finally collapsed, their losses being so great that the army defending Syria virtually ceased to exist. Reportedly Heraclius left the area with the words, "Peace be with you Syria, what a beautiful land you will be for your enemy."

David Nicolle

See also: Byzantine-Muslim Wars (to 1035).

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Yemen, Civil War in (1962–1970)

Civil conflict in North Yemen (Yemen Arab Republic) lasting from 1962 until 1970 that pitted royalist forces of the Mutawakkilite Kingdom of Yemen against those seeking to establish the republic. In addition to the ongoing civil divisions in North Yemen (the south was controlled by Great Britain until 1967), the immediate catalyst of the civil war was the death of Ahmad bin Yahya in September 1962. Ahmad was the ruling imam in the region and represented the hereditary monarchy, which had controlled northern Yemen for many years. Ahmad's repressive reign, which had begun in 1948, had gained few new adherents over its 24-year history. Ahmad harbored visions of uniting all of Yemen but was unable to garner sufficient support to end British rule in the south. In 1955, Ahmad had to fend off a serious coup attempt instigated by two of his brothers and some disgruntled army officers.

To bolster his position, Ahmad entered into a formal military pact with Egypt in 1956 that placed Yemeni military forces under a unified command structure. That same year, Ahmad also named his son, Seif al-Islam Mohammed al-Badr, crown prince and heir apparent. He also established formal ties with the Soviet Union. In 1960, Ahmad left North Yemen to seek medical treatment. In his absence Crown Prince al-Badr began to implement several reform measures that his father had promised to implement but had as yet gone unfulfilled. Outraged that his son made such moves without his knowledge or assent, Ahmad promptly reversed the measures when he returned home. This did not, of course, endear him to his subjects, and several weeks of civil unrest ensued, which the government quashed with a heavy hand. The 1955 coup attempt and growing resentment toward Ahmad rendered him both paranoid and reactionary in the last years of his rule.

Ahmad died on September 19, 1962, and al-Badr now became imam. One of his first official acts was to grant a blanket amnesty to all political prisoners who had been imprisoned during his father's reign. He did so in hopes of maintaining power and keeping the kingdom's detractors at bay. But al-Badr's tactics did not stave off discord. Indeed, just a week later on September 27, Abdullah al-Sallal, commander of the royal guard who had just been appointed to that post by al-Badr, launched a coup in the capital city of Sana'a (Sanaa or Sana'a).

The rebels, supported by a half dozen tanks and several artillery pieces, proclaimed the establishment of the "Free Yemen Republic." They seized key locations in Sana'a, including the radio station and armory. They also moved against Al-Bashaer Palace. The Imamate Guard there rejected demands that they surrender, and fighting began, with the defenders surrendering the next day. This coup,

however, brought on a full-blown civil war. Meanwhile, an insurgency continued against the British in South Yemen.

Despite a radio announcement by the new government that he had been killed, al-Badr escaped to the northern reaches of Yemen, where he received the support of royalist tribes. Al-Badr also was supported by the conservative Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which bordered Yemen on the north. At the same time, al-Sallal received military assistance from Egypt. Indeed, Egyptian General Ali Abdul Hameed arrived in Sana'a on September 29 to assess the needs of the new revolutionary government, and as early as October 5 an Egyptian battalion had arrived there to act as a personal guard for Colonel al-Sallal. Apparently, Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser, reeling from the breakup of the United Arab Republic (UAR) with Syria, hoped that Egyptian support for a republican victory in Yemen would recoup his prestige in the Arab world as well as deliver a rebuff to Egypt's rival Saudi Arabia.

Nasser soon discovered that many more troops would be required than initially thought. The numbers of Egyptian forces in Yemen steadily increased, to a maximum of some 55,000 men in late 1965. In so doing, Cairo ignored repeated warnings by Ahmed Abu-Zeid, Egyptian ambassador to royalist Yemen during 1957–1961, that the Yemenis lacked a sense of nationhood, that no Egyptian combat troops should be sent there, and that any aid should be limited to equipment and

Yemeni government forces man a recoilless rifle on the crest of Algenat Alout in 1964 during the civil war. (Hulton Archive/Getty Images)

financial support. As well as underestimating the situation on the ground, Nasser failed to understand the depth of sentiment in Saudi Arabia regarding Egyptian intervention, which the Saudi royal family saw as a direct threat to its domination of Yemen and the other Gulf states.

By the mid-1960s, the royalists had also secured the help of Iraq, Jordan, Pakistan, Iran, and Britain, as well as covert assistance from Israel, while the Soviet Union and several other communist bloc nations supported the Republican side. The conflict also became politicized along Cold War lines, with the United States, Great Britain, and other many other Western powers siding with the royalists. On several occasions, the United Nations attempted to mediate an end to the bloodshed, but the regional and international dynamics of the struggle made this an almost impossible task.

Egyptian forces initially performed poorly in Yemen. The paucity of maps, an unfamiliarity with the terrain, and a lack of knowledge of local conditions all impeded their effectiveness. The Saudis did not have this problem, as they and the northern Yemeni tribes were closely related. In January 1964, royalist forces even laid siege to Sana'a.

Egyptian air strikes on Najran and Jizan within Saudi Arabia, staging areas for the Yemeni royalist forces, threatened a direct shooting war between Egypt and Saudi Arabia. U.S. president John F. Kennedy responded to appeals by supplying air defense systems to the Saudis. He also dispatched U.S. aircraft to Dhahran Airbase in the kingdom, demonstrating an American commitment to defend Saudi Arabia against Egyptian attack.

Although Egyptian tactics gradually improved, to include the extensive use of air power in a ground support role, the war settled in to a protracted stalemate and a huge drain on the Egyptian treasury and military. Indeed, the presence in Yemen of so many well-trained troops and much equipment was greatly felt in the June 1967 Six-Day War with Israel. Nasser desperately wanted a mutual withdrawal of Egyptian and Saudi forces, and his excuse came with Egypt's ignominious defeat in the Six-Day War.

A weakened and chastened Nasser was now compelled to begin troop withdrawals from Yemen. That same year, the British withdrew from South Yemen. By 1969, both sides in the struggle had agreed that the first step to ending the war was the withdrawal of all foreign troops. This formed the basis for a subsequent agreement on April 14, 1970, whereby Saudi Arabia recognized the republican government of Yemen in return for the inclusion of royalists in several key government posts. There was no role for Imam al-Badr, however, and part of the compromise stipulated that he and his family leave the country. Al-Badr lived in exile in Britain until his death in 1996.

The Yemen Civil War left deep scars on that country's society and politics that were a long time in healing. It is estimated that the eight years of war claimed the lives of 100,000–150,000 people. Border clashes continued between the two

Yemen states, however. Finally, on May 22, 1990, following protracted and difficult negotiations, the two Yemen states united as the Republic of Yemen.

Paul G. Pierpaoli and Spencer C. Tucker

See also: Yemen, Civil War in (1994); Yemenite War (1979).

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Yemen, Civil War in (1994)

After the long 1962–1970 civil war and the 1979 conflict, the leaders of North and South Yemen agreed to the union of their states. In January 1990, the two countries opened their borders, and their union became official in May when Ali Abdullah Saleh was chosen as the leader of the new Republic of Yemen. However, the country's first free elections, held in April 1993, proved to be highly contentious, and although Saleh's General People's Congress (GPC), representing conservative northern interests, secured most of the seats, its political authority was challenged by the Yemen Socialist Party (YSP), led by Ali Saleh al-Beidh, which claimed support in former South Yemen. As political tensions escalated, civil strife erupted in April 1994, and in May al-Baidh announced South Yemen's secession from the union.

The conflict lasted nine weeks. By mid-July, the southern forces were decisively defeated and their capital Aden surrendered. Still, the conflict jeopardized regional stability and caused a stern response from Saudi Arabia, which denounced the north's actions. After the war, in October 1994, Saleh was reelected president, keeping the Republic of Yemen intact though dominated by the north. Although peace and stability were largely restored in the country, Yemen still suffers occasional flare-ups of violence. The clashes in the Saada region (North Yemen), where the Shia Houthis tribespeople complain of economic and religious discrimination, has seen increasing levels of fighting since 2004. In 2009, the fighting between the rebels and the government became so intense that neighboring Saudi Arabia got involved in the conflict as well. As of 2010, the Saada region continues to witness skirmishes; clashes in July 2010 claimed more than 34 lives.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Yemen, Civil Wars in (1962–1970); Yemenite War (1979).

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Yemenite War (1979)

A brief conflict between the pro-Western Yemen Arab Republic (North Yemen) and the Soviet-backed People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (South Yemen). The two states had been involved in a prolonged conflict between 1962 and 1970 that left deep scars on society and politics. North Yemen experienced turbulent political life over the next seven years as its pro-Saudi ruler, Colonel Ibrahim al-Hamadi, was assassinated three years after seizing power in 1974. His successor as a president, Colonel Ahmed ibn Hussein al-Ghashmi, survived for only four years before being killed when a bomb exploded in a suitcase carried by a South Yemeni envoy on June 24, 1978. In the aftermath of Ghashmi's death, South Yemen president Rubayi Ali was deposed and executed. As accusations flew between the two states, tensions led to open hostilities on February 24, 1979, when troops on both sides of the border fired on each other. North Yemenite forces attacked across the border and raided several villages in South Yemen, and South Yemen responded, with Soviet, Cuban, and East German support, by attacking North Yemenite territory. Concerned about escalating violence, Saudi Arabia called an emergency meeting of the League of Arab States (LAS), while the United States began providing arms to North Yemen and dispatched a naval task force to the Arabian Sea. The LAS negotiated several armistices but these were routinely violated until a truce was finally accepted by both sides on March 19, 1979. North and South Yemenite armies returned to the prewar status quo, and LAS forces were deployed on the border to maintain peace.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Yemen, Civil Wars in (1962–1970); Yemen, Civil War in (1994).

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Young Turks

A coalition of groups that brought about the fall of Ottoman sultan Abdulhamid II in 1909. Initially welcomed for their democratic aspirations and modernizing goals

for the Ottoman Empire, the Young Turks did not fare well in the destructive geopolitics of World War I and presided over the disintegration of the Ottoman state and rise of Turkish nationalism.

In the 19th century, the Ottoman Empire was disintegrating because of the failure of the ruling sultans to stem the tide of decay and the rise of ethnic nationalism inside their nation, to which the stronger Western powers responded by creating new states and annexing Ottoman territory into their own empires. In response, the Tanzimat reforms were instituted by the Ottoman sultans in the mid-19th century, which resulted in the modernization of many parts of the government of the Ottoman Empire. Hundreds of government officials were trained in Western methods and concepts, but some became dissatisfied with the pace of reform. They believed the Tanzimat reformers were not interested in real change, but in accumulating power in their own hands. Some of those men organized the Young Ottoman organization. The Young Ottomans promoted constitutionalism and parliamentary government. Many worked in such agencies as the Bureau of Translation and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, where they had constant contact with Western institutions and publications.

When Abdulhamid II became ruler in 1876, he first approved and then suspended a new constitution. In response to the authoritarian rule of Abdulhamid II after 1876, the Young Ottomans involved themselves in plots to reform the government. Many of the principal civilian leaders were exiled to Paris once their plans were uncovered by government agents. Those young men formed the Committee of Union and Progress (CUP) in 1889 and the League of Private Initiative and Decentralization around 1902. (The CUP was the first to adopt the name Young Turks, after the name of a journal produced by one of its members. Later, the name became loosely identified with other factions advocating the overthrow of Abdulhamid II.) Both the CUP and the league called for the military and moral strengthening of the Ottoman Empire, equal rights for all ethnic and religious groups, and the restoration of the Constitution of 1876 that Abdulhamid had set aside. The CUP favored a strong central government, however, while the league preferred a more decentralized government and European assistance.

Spurred on by the revolutionary publications of the exiles, the CUP steadily gained members in Turkey. It included not only teachers and students but also bureaucrats, army officers, and members of the Muslim clergy. Chapters were formed in the major cities of Romania, Bulgaria, and Albania. An attempt to overthrow the Turkish government in 1895 failed, and Abdulhamid dispersed the revolutionaries to such remote parts of the empire as Macedonia, believing that the revolutionary spirit would fade. However, Abdulhamid's move only increased their revolutionary fervor. Next, Abdulhamid offered amnesty and high positions to exiles to get them to return and work with the government.

Still, the CUP continued to add followers. The new secular schools instituted under the Tanzimat reforms produced thousands of educated bureaucrats, officers,

and intellectuals who came from the lower classes and resented restrictions placed on them. Many were strong patriots who believed that if the sultan's corrupt regime were swept away, they could build a stronger country. The growing strength of reformers and the increasing attacks of nationalistic minorities caused the government to become more and more repressive. By the beginning of the 20th century, followers of the CUP were increasingly convinced that only radical change would save Turkey.

The initiative for the Young Turk revolution came from military officers within the Ottoman Empire, especially those of the Third Army Corps in Macedonia. Led by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, they formed the Ottoman Liberty Society in 1906. In 1907, the group agreed to merge with the CUP, a key development that brought the League of Private Initiative and Decentralization and the CUP together to work toward mutual goals. Events in 1908 spurred them to action. Bosnia and Herzegovina was annexed by the Austro-Hungarian Empire, while Bulgaria and Crete declared their independence from Ottoman rule. On July 3, the Third Corps launched a revolt that quickly spread to other military units throughout the empire. Unable to rely on his troops, Abdulhamid restored the Constitution of 1876 and reconvened the parliament, hoping to undercut the rebellion, but his rule lasted only another year.

The Young Turks took charge of the government and began to introduce numerous and diverse reform programs, though by 1911, the CUP's political agenda was contested by liberal, conservative, and nationalistic forces internally. In 1913, the CUP gained effective control, thanks in part to rigged elections and in part to the chaos of the Balkan Wars. By the time it consolidated its power, not only had it lost the Balkans (and therefore most of the empire's Christians), but its ideals of a multinational Ottomanism had faded somewhat to be replaced by a preference for congressional representatives who were ethnic Turks and members of the CUP.

The new CUP leadership included Enver Pasha as war minister, Jemal Pasha as naval minister, and Talat Pasha as interior minister. Those men carried out many reforms of the provincial administrations, which led to greater centralization. They also secularized the legal system and provided a better system of elementary school education, especially for girls. The Young Turks are hailed for those modernizing programs. The CUP government also made Turkish the language of administration and instruction, however, which alienated the large number of Arabs in the empire.

With the onslaught of World War I, the Young Turks chose to ally with Germany, though in their admiration for the German military, they overestimated its effectiveness. They also wished to reconquer Egypt from the British and the Caucasus Mountains from Russia, which made alliance with Germany logical. The Young Turks began to fear that the Armenians (Christians living in eastern Anatolia) would support the Russians, though they had shown no sign of disloyalty to the Ottoman government since the overthrow of Abdulhamid II. Acting with German

assistance, the Young Turks ordered the deportation of the Armenians from the Ottoman state. When the Armenians resisted, the Ottoman Army unleashed local Turkish and Kurdish brigands who killed an estimated 1 million during the Armenian Genocide and scattered the rest.

Their genocidal persecution of the Armenians did not endear the Young Turks to the Arabs. Though theoretically united by Islam, many Arabs were suspicious of the way the Young Turks combined religion with nationalism. More damage was done, however, by the former naval minister, Jemal, as he and his troops rested in Syria during 1915 to reorganize an attack on the British and the Suez Canal. Jemal's treatment of the Syrians was so cruel and arbitrary that he inspired them to join in the British-sponsored Arab Uprising, led by the Hussein clan from Mecca. That revolt forced Jemal to withdraw from Syria, ceding control of the entire region south of Anatolia to the French and the British.

By late 1918, military defeat appeared imminent, and the CUP leaders resigned from government in October, just a month before the Armistice of Moudros ended the war. In spite of their misfortunes and their mistakes, however, the Young Turks are regarded by Turkish people as having led an important phase in the regeneration of the nation. Their transformation from Ottoman to Turkish nationalism and their ideas about Islam allowed for subsequent rulers to progress more rapidly. Arguing that religion should be a matter of conscience and that the legal aspects of Islam should be surrendered to secular legislation, they called for a split between Islam and the state. That idea became the foundation for the policy of secularization later adopted by the Turkish republic under Atatürk.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Armenian Massacres; Balkan Wars (1912–1913); Moudros, Armistice of (1918); Kemal Atatürk, Mustafa; Ottoman Army (World War I). Tanzimat; World War I.

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Z

Zab, Battle of the (750)

Decisive battle between the Umayyad army and the forces of the rising Abbasid faction. In 747, the Abbasids, descendants of Prophet Muhammad's uncle Abbas, exploited the rising public discontent at the Umayyad government to launch their revolt in Khurasan (northern Iran). After capturing the town of Merv in February 748, the Abbasid forces advanced west, taking control of central Iran by the end of the year. In 749, they captured most of Iraq and the head of the movement Abu al-Abbas was declared caliph at Kufa. To face the rebels, the Umayyad caliph Marwan led a largely Syrian army, and the two sides met on the banks of the Zab River, a tributary of the Tigris River, in early 750. Marwan made the mistake of building a bridge and crossing the river, which placed his army at a disadvantage. Estimates of the size of the Abbasid forces, led by Abdallah ibn Ali, vary between 10,000 and 30,000 men, and the Umayyad army is said to have had 120,000 men, which is certainly an exaggeration.

The close-run battle was fought on February 26, 750. The Abbasid commanders chose a defensive tactic, deploying their troops in closed formations with their spears pointed forward to protect them against the veteran Syrian cavalry. The Syrian cavalry charges failed to break through the enemy formation, which resulted in heavy losses and shattered morale. Marwan, seemingly losing his nerve, ordered retreat and destroyed the bridge, stranding many of his men on the other side. The battle ended in a decisive victory for the Abbasids. Marwan fled to the Levant, pursued by the Abbasid forces who rapidly took over Syria as well. Unable to find shelter in Syria and Palestine, the caliph fled to Egypt, where he was killed in a skirmish near the village of Busir in early August 750. The victory on the Zab River signaled the end of the Umayyad Caliphate and the rise of the Abbasid dynasty, which would remain in power until the 13th century.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Abbasid Revolution; Abbasids; Abu Muslim Khorasani; Umayyad Caliphate.

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Zangi (d. 1146)

Imad al-Din Zangi was governor of Mosul and Aleppo, famous for his capture of the city of Edessa (mod. Şanliurfa, Turkey) from the Franks in 1144. Zangi was born around 1084, the son of Aq-Sunqur alajib, a Turkish emir in the service of the Great Saljuk sultan Malik-Shah I. Aq-Sunqur was appointed governor of Aleppo in 1087, but after Malik-Shah's death in 1092, Aq-Sunqur was slain by the sultan's brother Tutush I, whom he had opposed in favor of Malik-Shah's son Barkyaruq. Zangi was brought up by Karbugha, the governor of Mosul, became an emir, and distinguished himself over the years in the service of the various rulers of the city. In 1123, his efforts were rewarded when he was awarded two governorships in Iraq.

In 1126, Zangi was appointed governor of Baghdad and Iraq. A year later, responding to requests made by envoys from Mosul, Mahmud, the Saljuk sultan of Persia and Iraq, appointed Zangi to the governorship of the city. Zangi made his formal entry into Mosul in the autumn of 1127 and soon after also took control of other territories in Iraq and Upper Mesopotamia, including Nisibis (mod. Nusaybin, Turkey) and Harran. He then turned his attention to the city of Aleppo, which was in an uproar. The city's governor had made himself unpopular with its people, and they had besieged him in the citadel. Zangi sent representatives to the city, then made a formal entry in June 1128. He brought with him the remains of his father, whose memory was very dear to the populace. To further establish his legitimacy Zangi linked himself to his predecessors by marrying the daughter of Riwan, one of the earlier Saljuk rulers of Aleppo.

In early 1130, Zangi captured Baha' al-Din Sawinj, the ruler of Hama (mod. amah, Syria), and a son of Taj al-Muluk Buri, the ruler of Damascus. He thus gained possession of Hama. Zangi also attempted to take Homs (mod. im, Syria) but met resistance from its inhabitants. In the same year he raided the Frankish fortress of Atharib. Zangi then conducted a campaign against the Artuqids of Mardin and Hisn Kayfa, before spending two years preoccupied by conflict in Iraq. Then, in the spring of 1134, he attacked the Artuqid ruler of Hisn Kayfa, defeating his forces near Amida (mod. Diyarbak1r, Turkey) but failing to take the city. Meanwhile, Zangi had been invited to intervene in Damascus by Shams al-Muluk Ismail, the son of Buri, but when he arrived with his army in February 1135, he found that Isma'il had been murdered and replaced by his brother Shihab al-Din Mahmud. After a number of inconclusive skirmishes with Damascene troops, a message arrived from the Abbasid caliph in Baghdad ordering Zangi to return to Mosul.

He was thus able to retreat honorably. He then conducted a campaign against the Franks, taking Atharib, Zerdana, Tell A‘di, and Ma‘arrat al-Nu‘man and repelling an attack by Bertrand, count of Tripoli. He also besieged Homs but was forced to withdraw upon hearing of fresh instability in Iraq. This instability would occupy his attention until 1137.

In December 1135, fearing a renewed assault from Zangi, the ruler of Homs handed the city over to the rulers of Damascus. In May 1137, Zangi took troops from Mosul and Aleppo and besieged Homs but was resisted. In July, hearing that the Franks had moved on Hama, he was forced to make peace. The Franks entrenched themselves at Montferrand (mod. Barin, Syria), a stronghold to the west of Hama and Homs. Zangi besieged Montferrand, while his troops took Kafartab and Ma‘arrat al-Nu‘man from the Franks. Hearing that reinforcements were approaching from Jerusalem and Tripoli, Zangi accepted the capitulation of Montferrand, which he had previously rejected, in August 1137.

Another factor affecting Zangi’s decision to accept Montferrand’s capitulation was the arrival at Antioch of the Byzantine emperor John II Komnenos. John’s initial intentions had been to try and bring Antioch under his control, and indeed, contact between the emperor and Zangi was initially peaceful, but in 1138, John made an alliance with Prince Raymond of Antioch. In April 1138, the Byzantine emperor took Buza‘ah and then, reinforced by troops from Tripoli, besieged Aleppo for three days. In the face of resistance, the emperor decided to isolate the city. Frankish troops reoccupied Atharib, Ma‘arrat al-Nu‘man, and Kafartab, while the emperor besieged Shaizar (mod. Shayzar, Syria). Harassed by Zangi’s troops and beset by disagreements with the Franks, the emperor allowed himself to be bought off by the inhabitants of Shaizar, and he withdrew from the area in May. By the end of October, Kafartab, Buza‘ah, and Atharib had been retaken, removing the threat to Aleppo. Meanwhile, in August 1138, Zangi finally took possession of Homs when he married Buri’s widow, Safwat al-Mulk, who brought him the city as her dowry.

In June 1139, Shihab al-Din Mahmud of Damascus was assassinated and replaced by his brother Jamal al-Din Muhammad. At the time Zangi was engaged in a campaign against the Artuqid Timurtash, but Safwat al-Mulk incited him to take vengeance for her son’s assassination, and Zangi decided to attack Damascus. Before doing so, however, he attacked Baalbek. The city was taken on October 10, but the citadel continued to hold out until the October 21, when a capitulation agreement was made. But when the troops of the citadel came out, Zangi reneged on the agreement and had many of them killed, something that only increased hostility toward him elsewhere. Zangi then advanced on Damascus, eventually besieging it in October and November 1139. Jamal al-Din died in March 1140 and was succeeded by his son Mujir al-Din, who was a minor. Acting on his behalf was Muin al-Din Unur, an old opponent of Zangi. Unur sought the aid of the Franks, offering

to give them the border town of Banyas (mod. Baniyas, Syria), along with hostages and payment for their expedition. Hearing of this, Zangi withdrew, then reinforced the defenses of Baalbek, which he left in the hands of Najm al-Din Ayyub, the father of Saladin. In June 1140, he returned to Damascus but was forced to retreat in the face of a sortie by city's forces. Damascus agreed to recognize the sovereignty of Zangi, who, having won a moral victory, returned to Mosul.

Zangi spent the next three years subduing rebellions and rivals to the north and east. His efforts caused friction with the Saljuk sultan Masud (1143–1144), but he was able to avoid serious conflict by paying an indemnity. Then, in late spring of 1144, following the instructions of the sultan and the interests of Mosul, he set out toward Edessa, taking several towns en route. He was engaged in operations against the Artuqids in the Diyar Bakr region when he heard that Count Joscelin II of Edessa, responding to a request for help from the Artuqid Qara Arslan, had left Edessa with a strong force of troops. Seizing the opportunity, Zangi besieged Edessa, taking it by storm on December 24, 1144. Thus, the first of the capitals of the Frankish states of Outremer returned to Muslim hands. Building on his success, Zangi took Saruj (mod. Suruç, Turkey) in January 1145. In March he besieged Bira (mod. Birecik, Turkey) but was forced to abandon the siege in May, when he heard that his deputy in Mosul had been assassinated.

After dealing with plots against his life in Mosul and Edessa, Zangi set out on his last campaign in the spring of 1146. He subdued Timurtash, then attacked Qalaat Jabar on the Euphrates. During this siege, in September 1146, Zangi was assassinated by a Frankish slave while he lay in a drunken stupor. He was succeeded at Mosul by his eldest son, Sayf al-Din Ghazi, and at Aleppo by his second son, Nur al-Din Mahmud.

Niall Christie

See also: First Crusade (1096–1099); Malik Shah; Nur al-Din; Second Crusade (1147–1149); Third Crusade (1187–1192).

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Zanj Slave Revolts

A series of uprisings of slaves of African descent in the Islamic world, including the vast revolt of 869–883 that was one of the longest and most destructive slave revolts in history. By the seventh century, western Asia had a history of commercial ties, which included slave trade, with the East African littoral. The rise of Islam further strengthened these ties because although Islam prohibited the enslavement of Muslims it allowed slavery in general. Thus, sub-Saharan Africa became into a major source of slaves for the Islamic world. These slaves were distinguished by their origin: the Bantu-speaking peoples of East Africa were called the Zanj and blacks from south of the Sahara were called al-Aswad. The African slaves were employed in various capacities but most of the Zanj slaves were committed to hard-labor projects in lower Mesopotamia, where they dried marshes and worked in the fields.

Subject to inhumane treatment and conditions, the Zanj slaves rebelled in 689 but were quickly subdued. In 694, a slave named Riyah organized a more successful revolt that quickly grew in size, defeating local government forces and devastating the Euphrates region before the main Abbasid army suppressed it. More than 200 years later, the Abbasids faced several Zanj revolts throughout Mesopotamia but managed to suppress them all. The most serious was the revolt initiated by Ali ibn Muhammad in 869. An Arab who preached social and political egalitarianism, Ali incited several slave work crews to revolt by pointing out the injustice of their social position and promising them equality and freedom. The slaves were supported by the lowly classed Muslims of the Basrah area, who embraced Ali's sociopolitical ideas. The rebels, whose numbers grew rapidly in size and power, defeated Abbasid forces and established their capital, al-Mukhtarah (the Chosen) in an inaccessible region in the salt flats of southern Mesopotamia. They sacked the prosperous port towns of al-Ubullah and Abbadan. The caliphal army, led by al-Muwaffaq, the brother of Caliph al-Mutamid (r. 870–892) could not cope with the rebels, who captured Basra in September 871 and routed the caliphal army in April 872. Exploiting the Abbasid preoccupation with a revolt in Iran, the Zanj conquered Wasit (877), Nummaniya (878), and Djardjaraya (just 70 miles south of Baghdad), in effect creating a vast Zanj state. In 879, Caliph al-Mutamid organized a new offensive against the black slaves, who were gradually driven into lower Mesopotamia. In 880, the Abbasids reclaimed Khuzistan, and in 881, they laid siege to al-Mukhtarah, which was captured after two-year siege in 883.

The consequences of the revolt were profound. The importation of Zanj slaves was restricted, and Muslims became more averse to Africans in general, which led to a widespread diffusion of negative and unfavorable images of blacks in the Islamic

world. The revolt also distracted the Abbasid caliphate from other regions, for example, allowing Ahmad ibn Tulun to establish the Tulunid dynasty in Egypt.

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See also: Abbasids.

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Zenta, Battle of (1697)

Decisive battle during the Austro-Ottoman War of 1683–1699. The Treaty of Vasvar, ending the previous Austro-Ottoman War in 1664, held for 20 years before it was broken by another conflict, called Great Turkish War. This conflict, however, was not limited to the Austrians and Ottomans but rather involved other European states that united into anti-Ottoman coalition. Austrian positions in royal Hungary remained tenuous and faced resistance from the Kuruc movement led by Imre Thököly. In 1682, Thököly recognized Ottoman sovereignty, and Austrian attempts to subdue him prompted a response from the Ottomans. The Ottoman invasion of Austria in 1683 almost succeeded in capturing Vienna before the Austrian-Polish forces under King John III Sobieski of Poland scored a major victory at Vienna (September 1683) and drove them out of northwestern Hungary. Pope Innocent XI helped create the Holy League, which consisted of the Holy Roman Empire, Venice, Poland, and Russia, all of whom coordinated their attacks on the Porte. The fate of the war was decided on the fields of Hungary, where the Ottomans suffered defeats at Gran (Esztergom) and Neuhäusel (1685), Buda (1686), and Mount Harsan (near Mohacs, 1687). By the end of 1687, southern Hungary and much of Transylvania came under Hapsburg (Austrian) control, and Austrian operations extended into Serbia, where Habsburg forces celebrated victories at Belgrade (1688), and Nis (1689). Sultan Suleiman II's counterattack into Transylvania and Serbia was at first successful and led to the conquest of Belgrade in 1690. Yet, the Ottomans then suffered defeats at Slankamen (1691) and Grosswardein (Oradea, 1692). Austria then became distracted by the War of the Grand Alliance against France and turned away from the Ottoman front for almost five years. The resilience of the Ottoman army was demonstrated in the Habsburg failure in a second siege of Belgrade (1694) and Ottoman victories at Lugos (1695) and Bega (1696).

An illustration commemorating the victory of the Austrian and Imperial forces, led by Prince Eugene of Savoy, over the Turks at the Battle of Zenta, September 11, 1697. This victory forced the Treaty of Karlowitz upon the Ottoman Empire and significantly reduced the Turkish military presence in Europe. (Rischgitz/Getty Images)

In 1697, Sultan Mustafa II took personal command of a major invasion of Hungary, leading with 100,000 men from Belgrade. He intended to besiege Szegedin but on September 11, while crossing the Tisza River near Zenta, his army was surprised by the Habsburg army under Eugene of Savoy. Waiting until the main body of the Ottoman army was engaged in the crossing, Eugene attacked and broke through the Ottoman defensive lines guarding the bridgehead. Thrown into disorder, the Ottoman army collapsed, and the grand vizier and 30,000 troops were killed in the confusion.

This crushing defeat compelled the sultan to accept peace negotiations, which resulted in Treaty of Karlowitz on January 26, 1699. The Ottoman Empire, although retaining Serbia, accepted vast territorial concessions, recognizing Austria's control of all of Hungary (except the Banat of Temesvar), Transylvania, Croatia, and Slavonia; Venice's influence in Morea and Dalmatia; and Poland's presence in Podolia.

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See also: Austro-Ottoman Wars; Karlowitz, Treaty of (1699).

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Zonchio (Sapienza), Battle of (1499)

Major battle between the Venetian and Ottoman fleets for control of eastern Mediterranean; the battle is noteworthy for being one of the earliest uses of naval artillery. In 1499, a new Venetian-Ottoman War began over continued territorial claims between two states in Greece and the eastern Mediterranean. Venice received help from France, Aragon, and Portugal but the tide of war quickly turned against it. In the summer of 1499, Kemal Reis and Dawud Pasha, leading a massive Ottoman fleet of 67 galleys, 20 galliots, and about 200 smaller vessels, sailed into the Ionian Sea to support the Ottoman army's campaign in southern Greece. The Turks occupied the island of Sapienza and its harbor of Porto Longo, where they waited for the Venetian fleet (47 galleys, 17 galliots, and about 100 other vessels) of Antonio Grimani, who maneuvered on open seas hoping to bring the Turks to battle. Despite its numerical superiority, the Ottoman fleet avoided a decisive battle because it first had to deliver heavy guns that were needed to capture the fortress of Lepanto, which the Turks were besieging. Had Grimani pursued more aggressive tactics, Venice could have won a victory by denying the Ottomans passage to the Gulf of Corinth where Lepanto was besieged.

After weeks of maneuvering against each other, Grimani saw an opportune moment for attack on August 12, but the Turks sought protection in the Bay of Zonchio, where the Turks were able to sink several Venetian ships. The battle revealed low morale and poor planning among the Venetians, who acted in confusion. Only two Venetian ships carried through with attack to engage the Ottoman flagship. But in the ensuing combat, the Turks used incendiaries to destroy all three vessels. The rest of the Venetian fleet took virtually no part in the battle.

Although the Venetians were soon joined by a French flotilla, Grimani did not drive home a decisive attack. After further inconclusive engagements south of Zante (August 20 and 22) and off Cape Papas (August 25), Kemal Reis managed to sail into the Gulf of Corinth and deliver cannon. Just days later Lepanto surrendered. The Ottomans established major shore batteries on both sides of the gulf, which now became an Ottoman naval base from which the Turks could operate in the Ionian Sea. Grimani was recalled to Venice in disgrace and dismissed from his position.

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See also: Kemal Reis; Venetian-Ottoman Wars.

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Zsitvatorok, Peace of (1606)

Peace treaty that ended the Thirteen Years' War (1593–1606) between the Ottoman Empire and the Habsburg monarchy. Signed on November 11, 1606, the treaty marked the first major check of the Ottoman advance into the Habsburg territory and stabilized the Habsburg-Ottoman frontier for half a century. During the Thirteen Years' War, the Ottomans had failed to break the resistance of the Habsburgs while the Imperial troops behaved with such callousness toward the Protestants in Transylvania and Hungary that István Bocskay, a Transylvanian lord and a Habsburg supporter, rebelled and drove the Habsburgs out of Transylvania. In June 1606, Bocskay signed the Peace of Vienna with the Habsburgs, who recognized him as ruler of an enlarged Transylvania and guaranteed the rights of the Protestants in Royal Hungary. Bocskay then mediated the Peace of Zsitvatorok (November 1606) between the Habsburg emperor Rudolf II and Sultan Ahmed I.

The treaty is noteworthy for the sultan's acknowledgment of the emperor as an equal. Since the time of Suleiman the Magnificent, the Habsburgs had been compelled to yield tribute to the sultans, who considered the emperors as their vassals. The Peace of Zsitvatorok, however, specified that the sultan would accord to the emperor his full rank and titles, therefore, accepting him as an equal. The annual tribute that the Habsburgs had hitherto paid to the sultans was ceased in exchange for a single lump payment of 200,000 gulden and a triennial exchange of voluntary gifts through ambassadors. Each side retained the territories then under its control, and the Ottomans gained only the fortresses of Erlau and Kanizsa. Both sides agreed to maintain the treaty for 20 years, although in reality it lasted for half a century.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Austro-Ottoman Wars.

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Zuhab (Zohab), Treaty of (Treaty of Qasr-e Shirin) (1639)

Peace treaty signed between Safavid Persia and the Ottoman Empire, also known as the Treaty of Qasr-e Shirin. The treaty, concluded on May 17, 1639, between the Ottoman sultan Murad IV and Shah Safi of the Safavid Iran, ended the 15-year conflict between the two states. During the last conflict, which began in 1623, the Safavids under Shah Abbas gained substantial success and occupied Iraq for 15 years before the Ottoman counterattack recaptured it in 1638. The Peace of Zuhab was signed the following year, establishing a boundary between the two empires that remained virtually unchanged into modern times. The treaty, referred to as a *sulh* (truce) and not a *silm* (peace), recognized Iraq (including Baghdad and the Shatt al-Arab), western Caucasia, and Kurdish territories as part of the Ottoman Empire but granted southwestern Caucasia to Iran. The Ottoman sovereignty in Iraq, however, continued to be disturbed by Arab and Kurdish tribal unrest.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Safavid-Ottoman Wars.

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Zuravno, Treaty of (1676)

Peace treaty between Poland and the Ottoman Empire concluded on October 16, 1676, at Zuravno (Zorawno), Ukraine. The treaty ended the ongoing conflict between the two states and revised the previous treaty of Buczacz (1672), which the Poles had found unfavorable for them. The Porte recognized Polish control over the western Ukraine and agreed to relinquish its claim to an annual tribute to be paid to the Ottoman sultan. The Ottomans retained control over southern Ukraine.

Alexander Mikaberidze

See also: Polish-Ottoman Wars.

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Glossary

Note: Ar.—Arabic; Ott.—Ottoman; Turk—Turkic; Lit.—literally

Aawan (Ar.) "Assistants," members of a ruler's entourage.

Abd (Ar.) "Servant," often used with one of the names of God, such as Abd Allah "Servant of God." Abd also means "slave," comparable to *ghulam* (Per.) or *mamluk* (Ar.).

Abna Soldiers of Khurasani (northeastern Iran) origin who settled in Baghdad in the Abbasid era.

Acemi oğlan Training units of the Janissary Corps; a conscript trained for entry to the Janissary Corps.

Adarga A heart-shaped hard leather shield used by the Moors of North Africa; subsequently adopted by Spanish conquistadores.

Adat Customs; in the Ottoman army, the term also implied customary payments.

Ağa (agha) Title used for ranking members of the palace and ottoman military, but also as a honorific title for provincial notables.

Ağribar In the Ottoman navy an oared vessel, smaller than a *fusta*.

Ahdaths (Ar.) Urban/city militia.

Ahl al-'ahd In Islamic categorization of groups, "people who have an agreement" with Muslims. This general category included *dhimmis (ahl al-dhimma)*, *ahl al-hudna*, and *ahl al-aman*.

Ahl al-aman "People who received guarantee of safety," meaning people who are permitted to stay in the Muslim territory temporarily. They could not settle in the Muslim controlled land and were not required to pay jizya. This category usually included merchants, visitors, envoys, etc.

Ahl al-bayt Lit. "the people of the house," meaning the Prophet Muhammad and members of his household; in Shiite tradition, the term refers especially to his

cousin and son–in–law ‘Ali ibn Abi Talib, his daughter Fatima, his grandsons al-Hasan and al-Husayn, and their progeny. In some countries, i.e., Egypt, a special register of the Prophet’s descendants is maintained.

Ahl al-harb (harbis) Inhabitants of areas under infidel rule.

Ahl al-hudna “People of the armistice,” that is people living outside the Muslim territory who agree to refrain from waging war against the Muslims.

Ahl al-kitab Lit. “People of the Book,” refers to religious communities who possessed a written scripture (the book); the Koran specifically refers to Jews, Christians, and Sabians. Later Muslim rulers extended the interpretation of *ahl al-kitab* to include Zoroastrians and Parsis, among others. Unlike pagans, the *ahl al-kitab* could not be forcibly converted and were entitled to protection within the Islamic state.

Ajarida/Ajarrida A branch of the Kharijites (Kharijiyya) founded by Ibn Ajarrad in the eighth century, whose adherents lived mainly in eastern Iran.

Ajnad Military district, military unit; sing. *jund*.

Akçe A silver coin, chief monetary unit of the Ottoman Empire. Three akçes were equal to one para, and 120 akçes were equal to one kuruş.

Akinci In the Ottoman army, Turkoman nomad volunteers who offered their services to the state in exchange for the lion’s share of the disposable war booty. These were usually light cavalrymen, famous for their raiding; also see yürük.

’Alam World.

Alam-i sheriff The Prophet’s standard.

Alamut Fortress of the Nizari Ismailis, known as the Assassins in the West, in northern Iran, which fell to the Mongols in 1256.

Al-ashur al-haram (Ar.) The sacred months when the conduct of war is prohibited.

Alaybeyi Officer of provincial Ottoman cavalry responsible for mustering troops for campaign.

Alef (Ott.) Fodder.

Alginci In Mongol army, advance guard or nomadic garrison force whose purpose was providing warning in the event of a major attack.

‘Alids Descendants of ‘Ali ibn Abi Talib.

Al-Khamis Unit in the Muslim armies after the reorganization of Caliph Marwan II (744–750).

Al-Khulafa al-Rashidun “The rightly guided caliphs,” in Sunni tradition, the term refers to the first four caliphs who led the Muslim community: Abu Bakr, Umar, Uthman, and Ali.

Al-mamalik al-sulaniyya (Ar.) The Royal Mamluks, that is Mamluks who had been bought and raised by the ruling sultan.

Al-muharibun War against secession.

Alqa In the Mamluk sultanate, non-Mamluk horsemen Kurds, Turkomans, or military refugees (known as *wafidiyya* or *musta'minun*) from across the frontier with the Mongols who served in the Mamluk army.

al-Rum Arabic term for the Byzantine Empire.

Alti bölük Six standing cavalry regiments who served as household troops of the Ottoman sultan.

Aman Safe-conduct pass; a person who receives it becomes a *mustamin* (pl. mustaminun). The duration of the *aman* was usually set at less than a year, but the Hanbali school allowed for much longer *aman* (up to 10 years).

Amir Prince; also military commander and a title used by many independent rulers.

Amir al-bahr Admiral of the fleet.

Amir al-juyush "Commander of the armies," an honorific title borne by several Fatimid viziers.

Amir al-muminin "Commander of the Faithful." A title used for 'Ali ibn Abi Talib and adopted more widely by Sunni caliphs.

Amir al-muslimin "Prince of the Submitted," a title used by the Almoravids and princes in the Maghrib.

Amir al-Umara "Prince of Princes," a title used by the Buyids.

Amir-hajib Military chamberlain.

Amir-i dad Military justiciar.

Amir-i sada Commander of a 100-men unit.

Amsar An Arab military colony and administrative center. During the early stages of Islamic expansion, Arab warriors oftentimes established military camps that served as the centers of military and political power in occupied territories; each amsar consisted of a military cantonment in which the Arab fighters settled in their tribal formations. Some amsars (Kufa and Basra in Iraq, Qomm in Iran, Fustat in Egypt, Qayrawan in Tunisia) later developed into important cities that contributed to eventual Arabization of the provinces.

Amud (Ar.) Mace, club

Anbar-i miri In the Ottoman empire, state granaries were often used to supply the army with essentials.

Ansar "The helpers," refers to the people of Medina who aided Muhammad after the *hijra* (emigration) from Mecca to Medina.

Aqid (Ar.) Military leader in Bedouin and settled Arab tribes.

Arabaci (Ott.) Wagoner, a driver of wagons for mounted cannons.

Arrada (Ar.) A type of mangonel used for throwing stones.

Asabiyyah Tribal or group solidarity in the face of external forces.

Asir (Ar.) Prisoner of war; pl. *asra*; in the Ottoman Empire the term was *esir* (pl. *üsera*)

Asker (Ott.) Soldier; pl. asakir

Askeri The servitor military class of the Ottoman Empire, exempt from taxation. The class consisted of *kuls* (administrators, military commanders, Janissaries, Sipahis) and *ilmiyye* (e.g., judges, religious scholars etc.); opposite to *reaya* (merchants, artisans, peasants).

At gemisi In the Ottoman navy, ships transporting horses; see also *örtülü*, *taş gemisi*, and *top gemisi*.

Atabeg The title of an officeholder who acted as regent or guardian to a prince in the Saljuk, Zangid, Ayyubid, and Mamluk dynasties. It is derived from the Turkish words *ata* (father) and *beg/bek* (prince). It was first introduced by the Saljuks of Persia and Syria in the second half of the 11th century. The Saljuks who ruled Syria between 1070 and 1154 depended on atabegs in their rule, and the institution was subsequently taken up and developed by other ruling dynasties of Turkish or Kurdish origin.

Avariz In the Ottoman Empire, extraordinary levies or services introduced in emergency situations, usually to support the navy.

Avariz-i divaniyye Irregular wartime taxes in the Ottoman Empire. The tax could be in cash, in kind, or in service, and its goal was to support the Ottoman military on campaign, pay the empire's garrison troops, and finance state-related institutions and services.

Awlad al-nas (Ar.) Lit. "sons of the people [who matter]," these were the sons of Mamluks who could not be enrolled as Mamluks and served in inferior units.

Ayatollah An honorific title for high-ranking Shiite religious authorities.

Ayn (Ar.) Spy.

'Ayyar Lit. "rascal, tramp, vagabond." A term used for the members of an organization grouped under the concept of *futuwwa* (chivalry), especially the highway warriors active in Iraq and Iran from the 9th to the 12th centuries.

Azap Infantry archers, mostly volunteer Turkic or Kurdish tribesmen from Anatolia, in auxiliary service to the Ottomans.

Azeb 1. An auxiliary soldier recruited into the Ottoman imperial army, whose expenses were met by the local people under the avariz system; 2. A fighting man in the Ottoman navy.

Babiali The Ottoman grand vizier's offices, which were moved out of the palace in 1654. Also referred to as *Paşa Kapisi*, it was known as the Sublime Porte to the Europeans.

Bacaluşka From "basilisk," an Ottoman term for a large gun, often used in sieges; see *balyemez*, *kanon*, and *şayka*.

Badu Arab nomad, Bedouin.

Baghi, al- War against dissension.

Bahaduran Russian deserter units in the service of the Qajar Iran.

Bahriyya (Ar.) Navy

Bahşiş Awards and cash bonuses given to the Ottoman troops for services performed.

Balyemez In the Ottoman army, heavy cannon, similar to *şayka*, used as siege or fortress guns.

Baqt A special treaty concluded between the Muslim Arabs and Nubia in the mid-seventh century. The treaty proclaimed peace between Muslims and the Nubians and required the latter to send gifts of slaves, while the former responded with gifts of food.

Barca Large ships equipped with guns.

Baruthane (Ott.) Gunpowder works in the Ottoman Empire.

Baruthane nazin (Ott.) Supervisor of the gunpowder magazine.

Bashi-bozuk/başıbozuk Irregular soldiers of the Ottoman army, known for their lack of discipline, ferocity, and merciless treatment of civilians.

Basqaq Turkish term used in place of *daruqaci*.

Bast In Iran, a sanctuary, usually sought in a mosque, a shrine that had symbolic importance, or s foreign embassy. For example, facing a civil unrest in 1909, Muhammad Ali Shah sought a *bast* in the Russian legation. In the early 20th century *bast* was a popular movement strategy in Iran.

Baştarda In the Ottoman navy, a war galley. There were three types of *baştarda* with respect to their function and magnitude a medium (common) *baştarda, paşa baştarda* (admiral's galley), and *sultan baştarda* (sultan's galley).

Baya An oath of allegiance pledged to the caliph.

Bayt al-mal The Ottoman public treasury.

Bedel-i nüzul An exceptional surtax used to provide grain to the army, increasingly relied on by the Ottoman sultans starting in the 17th century.

Bedouin Nomadic tribes originally of the Arabian desert, but after the expansion of Islam they were found across North Africa and into southern Iraq.

Beldar Ottoman military laborers.

Berbers The original and indigenous people of the Mahgreb (North Africa) region.

Bey A Turkic title for a chief, a ruler in the Central Asia states and in the early Ottoman Empire. In later periods, the title also referred to a commander and the governor-commander of a *sanjak* or a *ziamet.*

Beylerbey/beglerbegi "Bey of beys," Ottoman and Iranian titles for the highest-ranking provincial governor.

Beylerbeyilik/beglerbegilik Ottoman province, the largest administrative unit (consisting of several sancaks) under a *beylerbey.*

Beylik An Ottoman province under the jurisdiction of a *bey.*

Beyt ül-mal/Bayt al-mal In the Ottoman empire, originally the term referred to a treasury, but later it also implied various casual revenues falling to the public treasury.

Bich'hwa Lit. "scorpion," derived from the shape of an animal horn, the *bich'hwa* was a small dagger with a recurved blade widespread in India.

Bostancilar (Ott.) Lit. "gardeners," the elite guard of the Ottoman sultans.

Bunichah A system of conscription that was developed by Prince Abbas Mirza in early 19th century and survived until the 1920s. Under this system, each province was called upon to provide recruits, the number calculated on the basis of the amount of land under cultivation, supplemented by voluntary enlistment and the incorporation of small tribal contingents.

Burj (Ar.) Siege tower.

Caliph "Successor of the Prophet of God," a title used by Muslim rulers to indicate their connection to Muhammad's leadership over the Muslim community.

Caliphate The jurisdiction of a caliph.

Çam A small oared ship used by the Ottomans in the Black Sea region.

Çavuş Ranking officer of the Ottoman palace establishment.

Cebeci (Ott.) Armorer, member of a specialized unit of support (*cebeci başi*) within the Janissary corps responsible for making and repairing armor and weapons.

Cebehane (Ott.) Armory, also military equipment and supplies.

Cebeli (Ott.) A fully armed retainer provided by the holder of a *timar,* or *ziamet* to fulfill his obligation to the state.

Celali *Sekban* and *saruca* mercenary bands, which often engaged in banditry, especially in the late 16th and early 17th centuries.

Celepkeşan Wealthy persons charged with supplying sheep to the Ottoman army.

Cemaat-i topçiyan-i ahengeran/ topçiyan-i haddadin In the Ottoman Empire, a special group of blacksmiths tasked with forging wrought-iron cannons. They were usually employed at the Istanbul Imperial Foundry and, in the 15th to 16th centuries, produced some of the largest cannons in the world.

Cercle Administrative division established by the French colonial system in Western Africa.

Cerik Mongol term applied to the military forces assigned to the khan (*qan*). In some cases, the term also referred to the local armies Mongols raised from the occupied territories.

Chavush Sultan's messengers who reported directly to him on the progress of battle.

Cit palankasi Simple reed-palisade forts constructed by the Ottomans in areas where stone forts (*kale*) were not needed or were too expensive to build.

Companions In Sunni tradition, persons who converted to Islam during Muhammad's lifetime and who had personal contact with him; they are considered the primary transmitters of Hadith. Shia scholars are more selective in defining whom they consider a companion.

Çorbaci/çorbasi Lit. "soup maker," an officer in the Janissary Corps in command of an *orta* of 100 men

Dabbaba (Ar.) Wooden tower used in siege warfare.

Dakhala (Ar.) Asylum.

Dar al-'ahd (Ar.) Territory in treaty relations with a Muslim state.

Dar al-Funun (Ar.) An elite military and technical college established by Mirza Taqi Khan Amir Kabir in Iran in 1851.

Dar al-harb (Ar.) Lit. "the realm of war," territory not subject to Islamic law.

Dar al-Islam (Ar.) The "realm of Islam," a term used in classical Islamic jurisprudence to denote regions or countries subject to Islamic law. Often contrasted with the *dar al–harb*.

Dar al-sina'a (Ar.) Arsenal

Dar al-sulh (Ar.) Territory at peace with Muslim state(s).

Daraqa (Ar.) Wooden shield, covered with leather.

Darbzen In the Ottoman army and navy, probably the most popular and widely used types of cannon. These ordnance came as large (*büzürg*, firing ~2.5-kilogram projectiles), medium (*miyane* or *vasat*, firing 1.23-kilogram projectiles), and light

(*kücük,* firing a 920-kilogram projectile) guns. These cannon were also used in the navy where *ağribarsm da kalyatas* used them as shipboard ordnance. Ottoman sources sometimes use this term to describe larger-caliber siege guns (*darbzen-i şahî*). See also *kanon* and *şahî.*

Daruqaci/daruqa Mongol official in charge of conquered areas and peoples. Two varieties existed: *yeke daruqaci* were sent by the great khan and represented the central authority, and *daruqaci* were those appointed by princes and regional rulers to represent their authority.

Defterdar Chief financial official in the Ottoman Empire.

Dehqan Eastern Iranian prince or noble.

Derbençi Lit. "Pass guards," Ottoman auxiliaries specializing in mountain warfare.

Dergah-i ali (Ott.) The Ottoman sultan's court.

Derya beys Naval commanders in the Ottoman fleet.

Devshirme/devşirme (Ott.) Levy of non-Muslim boys destined for military and administrative service.

Dey Junior officer rank in the Ottoman Army; also, the title of Ottoman military commanders in Algiers and Tunis.

Dhimmi Protected groups of non-Muslims living under Muslim rule. The status stems from the concept of "the People of the Book (*ahl al-kitab*). *Dhimmi*s were required to pay a special tax (*jiziya*) and were not allowed to serve in the army. Still, many rose to prominence as scholars, government advisers and officers, and physicians.

Dhu l-Fiqar/zulfiqar The sword of Caliph Ali, presented to him by Prophet Muhammad. It remains an important symbol for the Shiites.

Din-ü-devlet The idea of the Ottoman state, incorporating concepts of religion (*din*) and state (*devlet*).

Dir' (Ar.) Coat of mail.

Dirlik (Ott.) A benefice in return for military services; *eli emrlü* were those awaiting confirmation of appointment to a *dirlik*.

Divan-i humayun Ottoman imperial council presided over by a sultan or grand vizier; the chief interpreter of the divan was usually selected from the Greek Phanariot community of Istanbul.

Diwan/divan A government council, registry.

Dizdars Fort commandants in the Ottoman Empire.

Dolma duvari Ottoman term for wooden-framed walls stuffed with earth.

Eflaks In the 15th through 16th centuries, the Vlach nomads who were organized for military and other services under the Ottomans.

Ehl-i kalem In Ottoman classification, "men of the pen," or government bureaucrats.

Ehl-i seyf In Ottoman classification, "men of the sword," or people eligible for military duty.

Elci An envoy sent by Mongol rulers to other nations or an imperial delegate sent to a local area to see to the fulfillment of central authority.

Emin (Ott.) Commissioner, intendant; *emin-i peksimad* was in charge of procuring bread for the army; *emin-i koyun* supplied mutton to the army; *emin-i nüzül* procured grain.

Emir Ruler; in Arabia, the title was applied to the governor of a province, later to a member of the ruling house of Al Saud. See also Amir.

Esame çalik yeniçeri ve sipahileri In the Ottoman Empire, former troops who sought restoration to the permanent pay roll and reinstatement to a permanent standing regiment.

Eşkünci *Timar* holders assigned to take part in military expeditions (*eşkun*).

Eyalet (Ott.) A province, synonymous with *vilayet*.

Eyalet Askerleri The provincial forces of the Ottoman Empire

Eyalet-i Budin The most strategically situated of the four provinces that made up Ottoman Hungary. It included parts of present-day Hungary, Serbia, Croatia, and Slovakia. The capital of the Budin Province was Budin (Buda).

Eynek Ottoman term for small cast-iron artillery pieces that used projectiles weighing between 400 g and 1 kilogram. These cannon were usually used aboard river flotillas.

Fallaqa Lit. "bandits," the term refers to the militant nationalists who launched an armed resistance against the French in 1954.

Falya Ottoman term for the touchhole of a cannon.

Farasu'n-nawba "Sentry Horse," a practice of keeping a saddled, bridled, and equipped horse in constant readiness at the caliph's palace to permit the caliph a quick escape in case of danger.

Faris (Ar.) Horseman, cavalryman.

Farisan A class of irregular Ottoman cavalrymen.

Farman In Iran, a shah's edict, decree. Thus, at the start of a war the shah would assemble his forces by issuing a *farman* calling on the tribal khans and provincial governors to gather recruits.

Farr (Ar.) To withdraw, retreat.

Fatehnama A victory dispatch.

Fatwa "Legal opinion." Issued by a mufti or some other recognized and qualified scholar, a *fatwa* is a legal or advisory opinion in answer to a specific question or a broader issue facing the community.

Fay (Ar.) Booty.

fida'i (fidawi) Young devotee who volunteers to sacrifice his life for a cause. The term is often used especially for members of the Nizari Ismailis group who were sent on assassination missions.

Firangi An Indian straight-blade sword that used blades manufactured in Western Europe and imported into India or made locally in imitation of European blades.

Firkate (Ott.) A frigate.

Fitna Violent factional dissension or a conflict between Muslims.

Furusiya Courage, daring; the term also refers to Mamluk textbooks on horsemanship and military art.

Fusta A small oared warship, particularly used in the Eastern Mediterranean and Danube basin.

Fustat Old Cairo, the first Muslim city in Egypt, founded by 'Amr ibn al-'As (d. 663).

Futuhat The conquest of territory by Muslim armies.

Ganimet In the Ottoman system of incentives, pay system for irregulars and auxiliaries that offered a share in the spoils of the campaign.

Garip yiğitler Volunteers, not necessarily for military service, in the Ottoman military.

Ghanima (Ar.) Spoils of war.

Ghayr-wajhis In the Delhi sultanate, troops received pay in cash or in drafts on provincial revenue.

Ghaza Fighting for the cause of Islam.

Ghazi Muslim warriors who fought to uphold and expand the Islamic faith in the medieval Arabic and Turkish periods

Ghazu (Ar.) Raid, hostilities among Arab tribes.

Ghulams "Slaves" (of the shah). In Iran, professional soldiers drawn from communities of former Christian (e.g., Georgian, Armenian) slaves or prisoners or their descendants. Similar to the Janissaries of the Ottoman Empire, ghulams were particularly useful to the shah because they lacked a connection to Iran's tribes or any social standing.

Gönüllü (Ott.) Military volunteers in the Ottoman army.

Guruş Ottoman silver coin.

Hadith The words, opinions, or rulings of the Prophet Muhammad. The Hadith, along with the Sunna and the Koran are the main sources for Islamic law.

Hakam (Ar.) Arbitrator.

Hakim (Ar.) Governor.

Haramizade (Ott.) Bandit, brigand.

Harb (Ar.) War.

Harbi A foreigner, a person who belongs to the *dar al-harb*, regardless of his country of origin. Because *dar al-harb* is legally at war with *dar al-Islam*, a *harbi* was automatically regarded as an enemy. If the harbi was a polytheist, he was liable to be killed by a Muslim under Koranic injunction. If a harbi belonged to *ahl al-kitab*, then he could be spared and taken as a prisoner and enslaved. Harbis could also receive *aman* to enter and reside in the *dar al-Islam*.

Harclik (Ott.) Provisional advance made to troops of border garrisons as well as supplemental funds provided to various troops to cover the expenses of campaigning.

Harraqa (Ar.) A fire-ship.

Hashemite (Banu Hashim) The Meccan clan to which Prophet Muhammad belonged. The term is also used to describe the descendants of Muhammad.

Hashimiyya A Shia group that emerged in the eighth century; also used generally to designate the Abbasids and others who claimed descent from Hashim, the ancestor of the Prophet Muhammad.

Hayduk Originally a Hungarian irregular foot soldier, later a brigand.

Hazine (Ott.) Treasury; *hazine-yi amire* is an imperial treasury; *hazine-yi birun*, the outer treasury; *hazine-yi enderun*, the inner treasury; *hazine-yi amire-yi sefer-i humayn*, the campaign treasury.

Hijra/hijrah "Emigration." This term refers to the journey of Muhammad and his companions from Mecca to Medina at the end of September 622. It marks the beginning of the Muslim (lunar) calendar, known by the same name, abbreviated AH (Arabic *Hijra* or *Hegira*).

Hisar (Ar.) Siege.

Hisar erleri In the Ottoman Empire, garrisoned troops, usually irregulars.

Hisn (Ar.) Fortress.

Hiyad (Ar.) Neutrality.

Hizb A political party or movement, that is, Hezbollah (Hizb Allah, Party of God) in Lebanon.

Horde In the Western historiography, the term refers to any major grouping of Mongols, the most famous being the Golden Horde (q.v.). The term derives from Middle Mongolian *hordo*/*ordo*, or "palace tent."

Humbaracilik Ottoman practice of making and using bombshells.

Humbaracis In the Ottoman army, bombardiers who manned mortars (*havan-i humbara*) and fired shells made of iron and containing explosive materials.

Ibadiyya/Ibadis/Ibadites The only surviving branch of the Kharijis, named after their leader ʻAbd Allah ibn Ibad in the seventh century.

Ifriqiya Mediaeval Muslim name for parts of northeastern Africa.

Ilkhans The Mongol rulers of Iran.

Imam In Sunni tradition, a legal scholar or the prayer leader in a mosque; in certain cases, the head of a Muslim state. Among Shia communities, an imam is an infallible guide to the community, descended from the family of the Prophet. The Twelver Shiites believe there were only 12 imams, the last one of which went into occultation (hiding) and will return one day as the Mahdi.

Iman "Faith."

Intifada (Ar. "shaking off") The Palestinian Arab uprisings against the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and Gaza.

Iqaʻ (pl. iqaʻat) In the Mamluk sultanate, an allocation of agricultural land on which a Mamluk officer (*muqaʻ*) had a right to collect the taxes to purchase new Mamluks and to use for military training and maintenance of his unit.

Iqta A hereditary fief granted to a person in exchange for military service in Iran and other parts of the Islamic world; holder of an *iqta* was a *muqta*.

Irtidad An act of apostasy.

Ishan Cash bonuses given to Janissaries and other Ottoman troops by the sultan or his *serdar.*

Ismaili (Seveners) Shiites who disagreed with the main body of Shia over the identity of the seventh Imam. The Ismailis followed Jafar al-Sadiq's eldest son Ismail, but the majority (called the Imamis or Twelvers) followed his younger son Musa al-Kazim.

Işkampoye Small oar-driven Ottoman ships that probably used no more than 13 oar-benches and small-caliber guns and were mainly used on rivers and in the Black Sea.

Iştira (Ott.) Purchase of provisions for the army.

Jahiliyya "Time of Ignorance," pre-Islamic history in the Arabian peninsula.

Jalayrids A Muslim dynasty that ruled Iraq, Kurdistan, and Azerbaijan (1336–1432) and was succeeded by the Kara Koyunlu.

Jasus (Ar.) Spy.

Jawshan (Ar.) Type of armor, usually mail-and-plate armor with rectangular plates.

Jihad Inner struggle for purification, as well as holy war.

Jizya A traditional poll tax levied on all non-Muslims (dhimmı) in Muslim states.

Jund (Ar., pl. ajwad) Army, regiment.

Kadirga In the 17th century, the most popular type of Ottoman war galleys, using about 25 oar-benches and three cannon.

Kafir (Ar., from *kufr* or unbelief) Infidel, he who denies Allah or commits a great sin.

Kaim mekam In the Ottoman Empire, deputy grand vizier.

Kale Ottoman moated and stone-walled fortress.

Kale kob Heavy battering guns used in the Ottoman army.

Kalyatas (Ott.) A galliot.

Kanon From "cannon," an Ottoman term for an artillery piece. Although *kanon* is often synonymous with *bacaluşka* (large siege guns), these cannon tended to be smaller in size.

Kantar An Ottoman measurement of weight, often used in military. One kantar = 44 okka = 54 kilogram (until the end of the 17th century) and 56.4 kilogram in later eras.

Kapucu (Ott.) "Gate keeper," a ranking official in the sultan's palace.

Kapucu başi Head of the corps of *kapucus.*

Kapudan pasha/paşa Grand admiral of the Ottoman fleet.

Kapukulu (kapikulu) Originally the term implied servants of the palace, but later the term *kapukulu ocaklari* (generally shortened to *kapukulu*/*kapikulu*) referred to standing, salaried armed forces.

Kard A straight-bladed, single-edged dagger in use across much of the Islamic world; see *katar* and *bich'hwa*.

Karr-wa-farr A tactic used in the Islamic world, which consisted of a feigned retreat from the enemy to draw overeager pursuers out of position into an ambush. The Mongols were particularly adept in this tactic.

Katar A special dagger with crossgrips and an H-shaped hilt that was in use in India; see also *bich'hwa*.

Kaymakam (Ott.) An official who performed the function of the main official in his absence.

Kazan A large copper cauldron that served as a symbol and the most treasured possession of a Janissary unit. It was used to prepare meals, and the Janissary ortas carried it in military parades and protected it in battle. It carried a great symbolical importance in battle. It served as a rallying point and its loss carried a heavy disgrace for the entire unit. To take refuge next to the *kazan* was to claim sanctuary and to tip it over was to begin a mutiny.

Kazasker (Ott.) A military judge.

Kesikten/kesig Lit. "those with favor," a general term for members of the Mongol imperial bodyguard, which also included the *kebete'ul* (night guards), the *qorci* (quiver bearers), and the *turqa'ut* (day guards). Although their primary function was to protect the khan (*qan*), the *kesikten* also performed government functions, that is, as imperial representatives in conquered domains.

Kethuda/Kethüda Originally the term referred to a majordomo of the palace, but later it designated the second most important office in the Ottoman Empire (after the grand vizier).

Khanda A traditional double-edged, straight-bladed, blunt-tipped sword in India; see *talwar.*

Khanjar (Ar.) Dagger, short sword.

Kharaj Land tax established by Caliph Umar II to be paid by the dhimmis on the earliest conquered lands by the Muslims. The *kharaj* situation varied from region to region and from time to time.

Khassakiyya (Ar.) Personal military escort of a sultan.

Khayl (Ar.) Cavalry.

Khedive Of Iranian origin, this title translates as "master" or "lord" and is associated with the rulers of 19th-century Egypt. In 1867, the Ottoman sultan Abdülaziz agreed to recognize Ismail, ruler of Egypt, as a khedive in exchange for a significant increase in Egypt's annual tribute.

Khums (Ar.) One-fifth of the spoils of war awarded to the chieftain or ruler.

Khushdashiyya (Ar.) A group of Mamluks belonging to the same patron.

Khuwa (Ar.) Tribute or payment for protection.

Khwarezm-shah Title of the rulers of the Khwarezmian Empire.

Kılıç A long sword with a gentle curved blade widespread in the Ottoman Empire and Iran; also see *shamshir* and *yatagan*.

Kolunburna In the Ottoman army, a light field cannon (from a "culverin"); see *darbzen*.

Köprücu Ottoman military engineers who specialized in bridge and road repair.

Kul (Ott.) A term usually applied to the members of the sultan's household, that is, *kapukulu*.

Kulah A conical-shaped, spiked helmet popular in Iran and India.

Kumanya Common provisions fund maintained by the individual Janissary companies. Each Jannisary contributed two gold pieces to this reserve fund for the communal mess during campaign.

Lağimci In the Ottoman military, a specially trained corps of army engineers (miners and sappers).

Lashkar-e-Taiba Called the "Army of the Pure," a "mujahid" or paramilitary organization in Pakistan that professes an ultraorthodox version of Sunni Islam and has been involved in terrorist activities.

Levend (pl. levendat) In the Ottoman empire, temporary military recruits, who disbanded at the conclusion of a single season's campaigning.

Liwa In early Islam, a banner of military command; also see *raya*.

Madu/maru An Indian parrying and thrusting weapon consisting of shield with a pair of black horns fastened together with their points in opposite directions.

Maghrib/Maghreb Lit. "the place of sunset." In mediaeval Muslim geography it referred to the western part of North Africa (present-day Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia).

Mahdi Lit., the "rightly guided one," in Muslim eschatology, a prophesied redeemer of Islam who will foreshadow the coming of *Yaum al-Qiyamah* (literally "Day of the Resurrection" or "Day of the Standing").

Mameluk sword A cross-hilted, curved sword used by Mamluks in the Ottoman Egypt. Derived from *shamshir*, this sword was adopted for ceremonial purposes by several Western militaries, including the United States Marine Corps, in the 19th century.

Manjaniq (Ar.) Mangonel.

Marsun (Ar.) Royal decree.

Maryol taifesi Emergency troops forcibly recruited from the Ottoman peasantry.

Mavna In the Ottoman Navy, a galleass.

Mawali "Clients," a term used for non-Arab Muslims in the early centuries of Islam.

Mawlay A title used in Morocco for sharifs, descendants of the Prophet. It is often given in its French form, *Moulay.*

Maymana (Ar.) The right flank of the army.

Maysara (Ar.) The left flank of the army.

Menzil-hane In the Ottoman Empire, internal network of imperial supply stations.

Merham beha Injury money that Ottoman sultans granted to the wounded troops.

Mighfar (Ar.) A helmet covering the head and the face, except the eyes.

Mingan Mongol tribal units that comprised a *tumen.*

Miri Ottoman term for belonging to the ruler or to the state.

Morisco Muslims in Spain and Portugal who converted to Catholicism during the Reconquista; see *mudéjar.*

Mudéjar Muslims who remained in Spain and Portugal after the Reconquista; see *morisco.*

Muhadana A truce.

Muhajirun The Muslims who immigrated with Muhammad from Mecca to Medina in 622. See *ansar.*

Mujahid/Mujahadeen One who participates in jihad, a warrior for the faith.

Mulk Authority, sovereignty.

Mulkgiri Periodic military campaigns or raids in India, usually conducted between October (after the monsoon passed and the fall harvest was collected) and April (before the onset of the heat).

mullah; mulla Denoting a Muslim religious cleric.

Muqaddama (Ar.) Army vanguard.

Muqatila (Ar.) Fighters.

Murtadd (Ar.) "Apostate," a Muslim who reverts to polytheism or adopts another religion.

Murtat Serbian infantry archers of mixed Christian-Muslim stock in the Ottoman army.

Murtaziqa (Ar.) In medieval Muslim armies, freely enlisted regular soldiers, receiving regular pay; see *mutatawwia.*

Müsellems Following Orhan's reform of the Ottoman army, cavalrymen serving in return for regular salaries rather than for booty or in fulfillment of religious objectives.

Mushrikun (Ar.) Polytheists.

Mustamin A person who received *aman* (a pledge of security).

Mutasarrif In the Ottoman Empire, head of a *sanjak*

Mutatawwia In medieval Muslim armies, volunteers who were recruited for temporary service and received grants while on duty.

Naft (Ar.) a type of bitumen used in the Middle East. Mixed with other ingredients, it formed the essential ingredient of the famous "Greek fire." As a weapon it was used in a large syringe with a copper tube (*naffata*, *zarraka*) to discharge the naft in the form of a jet. Early Muslim armies included a specialist corps of *naffatin* armed with Greek-fire weapons.

Naib Deputy of an official, regent. In the Delhi sultanate, a viceroy.

Naqb (Ar.) Mine.

Noyan/noyon "Lord," a Mongol title of authority, it was applied to commanders and persons receiving territories for administration.

Ocak The unit of households in military organizations (i.e., *yaya*); also a Janissary unit consisting of 195 companies (*orta*).

Ocaklik Ottoman system of "service villages" that were tasked with auxiliary military service (e.g., managing gunpowder mills, saltpeter fields, burning charcoal, maintaining bridges and mountain passes,) in return for exemption from payment of irregular wartime taxes (*avariz-i divaniyye*).

Okka An Ottoman measurement of weight that was prevalent in military usage (e.g., cannon caliber). Until the end of the 17th century, one *okka* equaled 1.2288 kilogram; in later periods it was equal to 1.2828 kilogram; also see *kantar.*

"Old Man of the Mountains" A name Western sources used to apply to the head of the Niziiris (Assassins) sect.

Ordu bazaar The Ottoman army's mobile commissariat. The ordu bazaar consisted of several dozen tents housing essential crafts. In the 18th century, the most represented craftsmen were the bootmakers (*hiffafan*) and the grocers (*bakkalan*).

Orta A unit, headed by *çorbaci*, within the Janissary corps.

Örtülü In the Ottoman navy, special covered vessels transporting gunpowder, see *at gemisi*, *top gemisi*, and *taş gemisi*.

Pan-Arabism A philosophical and political movement based on Arab nationalism that calls for the solidarity of Arab peoples and, sometimes more specifically, a union of Arab nations in the Middle East.

Pan-Islamism A movement and a policy that emerged in the Muslim world during the second half of the 19th century. Pan-Islamism advocated religious unity and

political solidarity for all Muslims inside and outside the Ottoman Empire, under the leadership of the Ottoman caliphate, against the imperialism and colonialism of the European Great Powers.

Pan-Turanianism Pan-Turkish nationalist movement that emerged in the Ottoman Empire in the 19th century and sought (unsuccessfully) to unite the peoples of Turkic origin in the Middle East, Russia, Iran, and Central Asia.

Paşa baştardasi In the Ottoman Navy, the admiral's galley.

Pasha/paşa Title of a high-ranking military and civil official in the Ottoman Empire.

Pashalik/paşalik An administrative district of the Ottoman Empire governed by a pasha.

Pençik In the Ottoman empire, the ruler's claim to a one-fifth share of the booty captured from the enemy.

Pilkhana In the Delphi sultanate, an elephant stable.

Porte/Sublime Porte Western European diplomatic term used to describe the Ottoman government. The term originated from the high gate (*porte* in French) of the court of the Grand Vizier in Topkapı Palace in Istanbul, where royal decrees were announced and foreign dignitaries and ambassadors usually assembled for reception. The term High Porte referred to the private court of the sultan.

Prangis Ottoman term for the smallest-caliber (~150–350 gram projectiles) guns used in the Ottoman army.

Prester John Legendary Christian king of the east who was to come and defeat the Muslims and restore the Holy Land to Christian control.

Pulwar A single-handed curved sword used in Afghanistan, Pakistan, and North India.

Qadi (Ar.) A Muslim judge (pl. *qudat*).

Qaid (Ar.) A ship captain.

Qalansuwa A high, pointed, conical cap worn by noble families of the Sassanid Empire that was then adopted by the Ummayad and the Abbasid caliphs.

Qalb (Ar.) Center of the army.

Qara'ul Lit. "those sent out to look," in the Mongol army, a patrol or reconnaissance force, but also troops on guard duty.

Qari In Mongol Empire, the term referred to provinces or subordinate territories.

Qasr (Ar.) Castle, fort.

Qaws (Ar.) Bow.

Qaza In the Ottoman Empire, an administrative unit, part of a *sanjak*.

Qizilbash (Turk.) Lit. "Redheads," name of Turkic nomad tribes (most notably Shamlu, Rumlu, Ustajlu, Tekel, Afshar, Qajar, and Zulqadar) and followers of the Safaviyya Sufi order who founded the Safavid dynasty in Persia in the 16th century. Qizilbash wore red caps with 12 black tassels standing for the 12 Shiite imams and shaved their beards but let their mustachios grow long.

Qorci Lit. "quiver bearer," a title held by members of the Mongol imperial bodyguard. See *kesikten*.

Qoyitul Lit. "those in the rear, those following up," a rear guard of the Mongol army.

Quriltai Mongol assembly of princes and generals.

Rais (Ar.) Ruler of an oasis, governor of a region.

Rakab Assembly of the high-ranking officials in the Ottoman Empire.

Rasul (Ar.) Emissary.

Raya A flag, banner indicating tribal or other units; see also *liwa*.

Razzia A military raid.

Reaya In the broad sense, tax-paying populace of the Ottoman Empire, distinct from the *askeri*, in a narrower sense, the peasantry.

Ribat Safeguarding of the frontiers of the *dar al-Islam* by deploying forces in frontier towns (*thughur*) and settlements for defense purposes. During the early Muslim conquests of North Africa, *ribats* also housed military volunteers, called the *murabitun*. These fortifications later served to protect commercial routes and served as centers for Muslim communities.

Ridda Session, apostasy.

Rumeli In general, European territories of the Ottoman state.

Rumh Lance.

Sabi (Ar.) Women and children taken as spoils of war.

Sabigha (Ar.) A long-sleeved coat of mail.

Saçma An Ottoman term for some of the smallest Ottoman ordnance pieces, which usually fired grapeshot and were popular in the Ottoman navy.

Sadrazam Grand vizier.

Safir (Ar.) Ambassador.

Sağ kol A military road from Rumelia to the Crimea.

Sahaba Companions of Prophet Muhammad, who took part in the creation of the Muslim state during the Prophet's lifetime.

Şahi/shahi Ottoman term for very light and small guns, most of which used projectiles weighing less than 2 kilogram. Also see *saçma*, *eynek*, *prangis*, and *şakaloz*.

Saif/sayf A curved Arabian sword. It holds a particular place in the Arabic culture.

Şakaloz An Ottoman term for a large-caliber hand-held firearm with a hook used to fix the weapon to the rampart or other place to reduce its recoil. They fired small-caliber (30–50 gram) balls and were widely present in Ottoman fortresses.

Sakayan In the Ottoman Empire, a corps of water carriers.

Salafiyyah A philosophical and political movement that began in Egypt in 19th century and sought to accommodate Islam to the ideas of secular materialism and modernization.

Sancak An administrative-territorial unit, part of a province in the Ottoman Empire, ruled by a sancak-begi (*beyi*). A beglerbegilik was divided into several sancaks.

Sancak begi. In the Ottoman Empire, commander of forces at the county level.

Sandals In the Ottoman navy, small rowboats (7 to 12 pairs of oars) carried by ships.

Saqa Army rear guard.

Saqaliba (Ar.) In medieval Islamic world, slaves, including military slaves, and mercenaries of European origin.

Saracens Lat. *Sarraceni*, Fr. *Sarrasins*, in the Crusade era, an indiscriminate term for Muslims.

Sarbaz In Qajar Iran, these were troops produced as a result of reforms of Abbas Mirza. They were armed with muskets made in Tabriz on the French model, and clothed in uniforms on the French model but with a typical Persian black sheep-skin hat.

Sar-i jandar In the Delhi sultanate, a commander of the sultan's guards.

Sardar In Iran, an army commander.

Saruca In the Ottoman Empire, a group of irregular soldiers similar to sekban.

Şayka 1. in the Ottoman navy, oared ships used in river flotillas; 2. In the Ottoman army, heavy guns firing stone balls.

Sefer (Ott.) Military campaign.

Sefer harci In the Ottoman Empire, supplementary taxes for campaign provisions.

Sekban Literally "a keeper of hounds." The term initially referred to the persons in charge of a sultan's hounds, who were incorporated into the Janissary Corps

under Mehmed II. The term, however, was also used to describe irregular soldiers, oftentimes landless peasants, who acted as mercenaries. Organized as companies of 50 to 100 people under a Janissary officer, sekban were paid during wartime, and these mercenaries often turned into brigands during peace or supported rebellious provincial governors.

Serdar/serasker In the Ottoman Empire, an army commander.

Serden-geçtiler Regular soldiers in good standing who volunteered for especially dangerous assignments, attracted by the promise of exceptional and/or long-term rewards after their safe return.

Serpme In the Ottoman army, an explosive bombshell.

Shah Title of the kings of Iran. When compounded as *shahanshah*, it denotes "king of kings." The title has been also used in central and southern Asia, most notably in Afghanistan until the overturn of the monarchy in 1973.

Shahanshah Lit. "king of kings," one of the royal titles in Iran and Mughal India.

Shahid A martyr in the name of Islam.

Shamshir This deeply curved, single-edged, tapering blade sword was introduced to India in the 16th century from Persia.

Sharif Arabic title restricted to members of the Hashemite clan, in particular, to descendants of Prophet Muhammad's uncles al-'Abbas and Abu Talib and of the latter's son Ali by Muhammad's daughter Fatimah. Sharifs were local rulers of Mecca and Medina under the suzerainty of Baghdad (later Cairo). After the establishment of Ottoman rule in Arabia, the Ottomans recognized the senior representative of the sharifs as prince of Mecca.

Shaykh/sheikh Arabic term for old man, tribal elder, or tribal chief; ruler of a small principality; also used as an honorific title for any religious dignitary.

Shaykh al-Islam Lit. "The Elder of Islam," a title introduced in the Abbasid caliphate at the time of the Buyids and applied as an honorific to religious leaders of high standing. Eventually, it became to denote the office of the mufti of Istanbul but was abolished in 1924.

Shirk Polytheism; *mushrik* (pl. *mushrikun*) polytheist.

Silahdar In the Ottoman Empire, a cavalry regiment of the Palace Guards that was responsible for preparing and clearing routes for the army's passage while on campaign.

Silahşoe (Ott.) A member of the palace guard.

Sipahi Ottoman cavalry; there were two types of sipahi units 1. palace and salaried, one of the *alti bölük* units; 2. provincial cavalryman supported by a *timar.* Retired sipahis (*mütekaid sipahi*) and the sipahis' children (*sipahi-zade*) constituted distinct groups that were often used as auxiliary military corps.

Şişe-i humbara-i deste In the Ottoman army, hand grenades made of glass, as opposed to regular iron hand grenades or *tane-i humbara-i deste*.

Subashi Ottoman provincial prefect.

Sulh (Ar.) Peace.

Sultan according to the Koran, the term denotes moral or spiritual authority, but it was later used to describe political or governmental power. Mahmud of Ghazna (998–1030) was the first Muslim ruler to be called sultan by his contemporaries, and under the Saljuks of Anatolia and Iran it became a regular title.

Süratçi Western-style artillerymen trained during the reign of Mustafa III.

Sürgün In the Ottoman Empire, a policy of mass resettlement of craftsmen, merchants, and artisans to promote Ottoman trade and industry.

Tabar (Ar.) Axe.

Tabur cengi Lit. "the camp battle," a tactic of defensive arrangements of "war wagons" chained together and manned by crossbowmen, hand-gunners, and/or light artillery. First used by the Hussites in Bohemia in the mid-15th century, the Ottomans borrowed this tactic via the Hungarians and later introduced it to the Safavids and the Mughals.

Tahkim (Ar.) Arbitration.

Talimhane A shooting-gallery for training the Ottoman Janissaries and gunners. It was built in Istanbul in 1572.

Talwar Of Persian origin, a quintessential sword (with curved blade) of Mughal India; see also *shamshir.*

Tane-i humbara-i deste In the Ottoman army, regular iron hand grenades, as opposed to *şişe-i humbara-i deste* or hand grenades made of glass.

Tariqa (Ar.) Cuirass.

Taş gemisi In the Ottoman navy, ships transporting heavy stone cannonballs; see *at gemisi*, *örtülü*, and *top gemisi*.

Telhis (Ott.) Report, memorandum from the grand vizier to the sultan.

Terakki In the Ottoman system of incentives, salary promotions.

Tersane Emini/tersane-yi amire emini (Ott.) Head of the Imperial Shipyard.

Tersane-i Amire Istanbul Naval Arsenal, the principal center of the Ottoman shipbuilding.

Thughur Small garrison-posts that were maintained on the frontier between the *dar al-islam* and the *dar al-harb.* The *thughur* consisted of two defensive lines: the outer line was for primary defense and included base camps for attacks; and the inner line, called *awasim*, protected settlements.

Timar In the Ottoman Empire, the land revenue assignment that was granted in exchange for military service.

Top arabacilari (Ott.) In the Ottoman army, a unit of the gun-carriage drivers.

Top gemisi In the Ottoman navy, ships transporting cannons; also see *at gemisi*, *örtülü*, and *taş gemisi*.

Topçu (Ott.) Cannoneer, artilleryman.

Topçu ocağı (Ott.) Artillery corps.

Tophane (Ott.) Imperial Arsenal, governed by a *tophane nazin*.

Tophane-i Amire The Ottoman Imperial Arsenal in Istanbul.

Tüfenk Ottoman term for a hand gun, musket. This hand gun fired 12 to 15 gram bullets (*tüfenk findiği*) and were manufactured in state-operated workshops (*miri tüfenk karhaneleri*) or by private gun makers; *futilli tüfenk* is a matchlock musket; *çakmakli tüfenk*, a flintlock musket; *metris tüfengi*, a long-barrel (up to 160 centimeter) trench gun.

Tüfenkendaz (Ott.) A musketeer.

Tuğ Horse-tail banner in the Ottoman army; as a rule two *tuğs* symbolized the sultan's presence, and one indicated a grand vizier.

Tumen/Tümen In the Mongol army, a military unit of 10,000 but also a military-administrative unit comprising several tribal units or *mingan*.

Turcopoles/Turcoples Christianized mercenaries of Turkish origin in the service of Byzantine and Frankish armies in the Balkans and the Near and Middle East in the period of the Crusades, especially from the late 11th century onward.

Türedi asker In the Ottoman Empire, irregular troops enlisted for temporary military service on a contract basis.

Turs (Ar.) Shield.

Tutsak Ottoman prisoners captured by the non-Muslim side.

Umma/ummah (Ar.) A Muslim community.

Ustadh (Ar.) In the Mamluk sultanate, a patron Mamluk to whom other Mamluks pledged loyalty.

Uyun (Ar.) "Eyes," scouts sent to reconnoiter and spot the enemy during a *ghazu*.

Vakf-i nukud In the Ottoman Empire, a special cash fund to subsidize the Janissary companies' purchases of staple commodities.

Vali/Vaali (from wali) Ottoman governor of a province. In the Safavid Empire, a special title, considered higher ranked than "khaan" (khan), given only to the Georgian rulers.

Vali'ahd In Iran, a crown prince.

Vilayet An administrative division of the Ottoman Empire, usually translated as "province" or "governorate."

Wajhdars In the Delhi sultanate, regular troops paid in assignments of land.

Wali "A friend of God." In Arabia, the term referred to a ruler of an oasis. The Shiites often use it to describe Imam Ali. Sunnis also use the term when talking about Muslim holy men and women who they believe have intercessional powers with God, a popular practice though condemned by the orthodoxy. Also see *vali*.

Wazir/vizir/vizier The adviser to a ruler, usually a person with great power.

Yatagan/yatağan An Ottoman sword with a forward curved blade.

Yaya (Ott.) Irregular infantrymen; see also *müsellems*.

Yeniçeri Ağasi (Ott.) Commander of the Janissaries.

Yerliyya Locally recruited Janissaries, stationed in various urban centers and fully integrated into their surroundings.

Yevmiye (Ott.) Daily pay for Janissary and irregular troops.

Yoldashlik In the Ottoman army, commendable acts of gallantry and comradely behavior that were recommended to the sultan's attention for reward or promotion.

Yürük In the Ottoman army, Turkoman nomads who formed a tribal contingent.

Zahire (Ott.) Provisions, supplies; *zahireci* is a state supplier.

Zamburaks In Iran, small cannons mounted on a swivel on the pack-saddle of a camel.

Zanj (Ar.) The name given by the Arabs to the black tribes of the coastal regions of East Africa, which served as a source of slaves. The term is often used to describe African slaves who carried out a series of revolts against the Abbasids in Iraq in the second half of the ninth century.

Zarbzen (Ott.) An Ottoman field cannon.

Ziamet/Zeamet (Ott.) A grand fief usually given for military service. It yielded agricultural revenue that was greater than that of a *timar.*

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